The Architecture of Imperialism
MILITARY BASES AND THE EVOLUTION OF FOREIGN POLICY IN EGYPT'S NEW KINGDOM

by

ELLEN FOWLES MORRIS

BRILL PROBLEMES DER ÄGYPTOLOGIE
The Architecture of Imperialism
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Military Bases and the Evolution of Foreign Policy in Egypt’s New Kingdom

by

Ellen Fowles Morris
To Davis Greene Kirby
whose curiosity and indomitable spirit
inspire his loved ones to trespass and savor the view
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ABBREVIATIONS

AASOR  Annual of the American Schools of Oriental Research
ADAJ  Annual of the Department of Antiquities of Jordan
AJA  American Journal of Archaeology
AJSL  American Journal of Semitic Languages and Literatures
AOAT  Alter Orient und Altes Testament
AR  Ancient Records of Egypt II–IV
ASAE  Annales du Service des Antiquités de L’Égypte
BA  Biblical Archaeologist
BAR  Biblical Archaeology Review
BASOR  Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research
BES  Bulletin of the Egyptological Seminar
BIE  Bulletin de l’Institut d’Égyptologie
BIFAO  Bulletin de l’Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale
BiOr  Bibliotheca Orientalis
CdE  Chronique d’Égypte
CRAIBL  Comptes Rendus à l’Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres
CRIPEL  Cahiers de recherches de l’institut de Papyrologie et d’Égyptologie de Lille
DE  Discussions in Egyptology
EES  Egypt Exploration Society
EI  Eretz-Israel
GM  Göttinger Miszellen
IEJ  Israel Exploration Journal
JAOS  Journal of the American Oriental Society
JARCE  Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt
JCS  Journal of Cuneiform Studies
JEA  Journal of Egyptian Archaeology
JEOL  Jaarbericht van het Vooraziatisch-Egyptische Genootschap Ex Oriente Lux
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<tr>
<td>JESHO</td>
<td>Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient</td>
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<tr>
<td>JNES</td>
<td>Journal of Near Eastern Studies</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSSEA</td>
<td>Journal of the Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities</td>
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<tr>
<td>KBO</td>
<td>Keilschrifttexte aus Boghazköi. Berlin, 1916–1921</td>
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<td>KUB</td>
<td>Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköi. Berlin. 1921–1944</td>
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<td>l.p.h.</td>
<td>Life, prosperity, and health</td>
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<td>MDAIK</td>
<td>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts</td>
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<td>MDOG</td>
<td>Mitteilungen der Deutschen Orientgesellschaft</td>
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<tr>
<td>MIFAO</td>
<td>Mémoires publiés par les Membres de l'Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale du Caire. Cairo</td>
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<td>MMA</td>
<td>Metropolitan Museum of Art</td>
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<td>MVAG</td>
<td>Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatisch-Ägyptischen Gesellschaft</td>
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<td>NARCE</td>
<td>Newsletter of the American Research Center in Egypt</td>
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<td>OA</td>
<td>Oriens Antiquus</td>
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<td>OBO</td>
<td>Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis</td>
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<td>OLZ</td>
<td>Orientalistische Literaturzeitung</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEFQst</td>
<td>Palestine Exploration Fund Quarterly Statement</td>
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<td>PEQ</td>
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<td>RB</td>
<td>Revue Biblique</td>
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<tr>
<td>RdE</td>
<td>Revue d’Égyptologie</td>
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<td>RHA</td>
<td>Revue hittite et asiatique</td>
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<td>SAK</td>
<td>Studien zur Altägyptischen Kultur</td>
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<td>SAOC</td>
<td>Studies in Ancient Oriental Civilization</td>
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<td>SASAE</td>
<td>Supplément aux Annales du Service des Antiquités de L’Égypte</td>
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<td>UF</td>
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<td>Urk.</td>
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<td>VT</td>
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<tr>
<td>WZKM</td>
<td><em>Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes</em></td>
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<td>ZAS</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache und Altertumskunde</em></td>
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<td>ZAW</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift für die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft</em></td>
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<td>ZDPV</td>
<td><em>Zeitschrift des Deutschen Palästina-Vereins</em></td>
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CHAPTER ONE

AN INTRODUCTION

THE CENTRAL PROBLEM

Given the ever-expanding corpus of work focusing on Egypt's imperial interests during the New Kingdom (c. 1550 to 1069 B.C.), it is only with the best of excuses that one may venture in good faith to add to it. General books and articles exist, as do works focusing on the empire in Syria-Palestine, Libya, or Nubia. Within these broad categories, scholars have studied military, economic, and administrative topics as well as specific time periods, certain archaeological sites, and aspects of imperial terminology. While such works have added immeasurably to our understanding of Egyptian imperialism in the New Kingdom, their very proliferation highlights the complexity of the topic as well as the contentious dialogue it often provokes.

My own excuse for introducing this work into the mix is that despite such prodigious scholarship in the field of New Kingdom foreign relations, no one has yet attempted a cross-frontier investigation of the military bases that housed imperial functionaries and troops. During the New Kingdom, the pharaonic administration erected

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1 Kemp 1978; Frandsen 1979; Leclant 1980.
5 Faulkner 1953; Christophe 1957; Schulman 1964a; Yoyote and Lopez 1969; Spalinger 1982; Kadry 1982; Chevereau 1994.
6 Ahituv 1978; Na'aman 1981; Bleiberg 1983b.
military bases in Syria-Palestine, Nubia, Libya, and at key points along the borders of the Nile Valley itself. As I hope to demonstrate in the chapters that follow, our understanding of military strategy can be significantly enhanced through an analysis of how these bases evolved over time and on different frontiers. Such an approach to the study of Egypt’s empire—and indeed to imperialism in general—is particularly valuable for four overarching reasons.

1. As opposed to a study focused upon military campaigns, the recorded versions of which tend to amplify the personal valor of the king at the expense of logistical details, a study of fortified bases (“fortresses”) and unfortified bases (“administrative headquarters”) illuminates some of the more constant and practical concerns of imperial management. While well-publicized armed expeditions took place only sporadically, Egyptian bases were staffed year round; thus the mundane details of the administration and management of these compounds are particularly informative.

2. The geographic distribution of military bases throws into relief the areas of their empire that the Egyptians felt possessed a particular strategic or economic importance. The positioning of a fortress or administrative headquarters near a river ford, by a gold mine, along a major trade route, or in a particularly volatile border area, for example, often betrays imperial stratagems left unarticulated in royal texts.

3. The timing of the installation of a new base or the abandonment of an older one is a sensitive barometer of shifting imperial priorities. The erection of new bases may reflect increased insecurity, a new emphasis on territorial control, or a rethinking of imperial infrastructure. Similarly, the abandonment of a base or a series of bases might be due either to military setbacks or, conversely, to the successful pacification of a region.

4. Military bases almost invariably served as nodes of communication between imperial representatives and local populations. While state propaganda often obscures our understanding of relations between these two groups, the study of military bases can provide a much fuller picture. Egyptian outposts, after all, are the concrete materialization of the interplay between imperial ambitions and indigenous
(re)actions. As such, these compounds have the potential to reveal traces of collaboration, of resistance, and of economic symbiosis, among other complexities.

In order to fully explore Egypt’s New Kingdom military bases and the broader issues surrounding them, it is vital that both textual and archaeological evidence be considered. These two data sets complement one another, and indeed without both sources of information our understanding would be much reduced. In many cases, bases known from texts have yet to be located by archaeologists—and the converse is also true. Yet even in less extreme instances, the information that the two corpora provide is fundamentally different and in many instances mutually exclusive. As it is the core project of this book to analyze the textual and archaeological data relevant to Egyptian military bases, I will take the opportunity within this introduction to focus upon the nature of my sources, as well as some specific issues relevant to their interpretation. In addition, I will highlight a few of the most important arguments and conclusions of this study.

The textual record

Textual references to military bases appear throughout the New Kingdom in a number of different genres, the two most prevalent being royal and private inscriptions. Often these compounds are mentioned in reports of royal campaigns, in enumerations of an individual’s titles, or amidst the biographical information that is often included in steles and on tomb walls. There are other quite fruitful sources as well. The Amarna archive, a corpus of some 350 letters exchanged between late Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs and Near Eastern rulers of territories both large and small, sheds a tremendous amount of light on Egyptian bases in Syria-Palestine. Indeed, the archive is particularly precious given the paucity of contemporaneous excavated installations.

Fortresses and administrative headquarters also make appearances in letters sent between Egyptians, such as the Twentieth Dynasty correspondence between Djutmose—a necropolis scribe who was serving on a military expedition in Nubia—and his associates in Thebes. So-called model letters likewise constitute an extremely rich source of information. Known examples of these documents are restricted
largely to the Nineteenth Dynasty and appear to have been selected or composed in order to instruct future scribes how to draft a proper “business letter.” While it is unknown whether the letters, which often indirectly concern the administration of fortresses, are genuine (i.e., copies of missives that were at some point actually sent between two officials), there is no reason to believe them to be in any way atypical of administrative letters.11 Jar inscriptions and a few other miscellanea round out the types of texts that bear reference to military bases.

Often highly specific in nature, textual evidence can include the names of the buildings themselves, many of which reference the supposed function of the base (such as “Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemeh” [KRI V, 14: 13]). Texts also often provide descriptions of the resident personnel (criminals with amputated noses, in the case of Tjaru [Urk. IV, 2144: 15–17]) and hints as to the activities that took place within the base (such as the stockpiling of foodstuffs [EA 294: 18–24] and the repair of chariots [P. Anastasi I, 26: 3–9], both at Jaffa). In each chronologically based chapter of this book, the textual sections aim to flesh out our knowledge of the names and locations of these compounds; of the personages—royal, official, martial, and civil—associated with them; of the functions the personnel performed; and of the role these structures played in Egypt’s overall military strategy. This information, combined with that garnered from the contemporary archaeological remains, provides a fuller understanding of the methods by which the Egyptians protected and administrated their empire at each particular period.

A second, and equally important, goal of the textual study has been to sharpen the quite vague definitions of several Egyptian terms that are of paramount importance for understanding the nuances of Egypt’s imperial strategy. Over the years, Egyptologists have translated the words ḫtm, mnw, mkdr, nḥtw, bḥn, and sgr variously as “fort,” “fortress,” “castle,” “keep,” and “stronghold.” Yet there has been little attempt to isolate the structural and/or functional distinctions among them. By examining the specific occurrences and general pat-

11 The exception to this rule is P. Anastasi I, which appears to have constituted an elaborate lesson in rhetoric, mathematics, foreign vocabulary, and Syro-Palestinian geography. The verbose and satiric style of the document leaves no doubt that it was composed solely for pedagogic purposes (see the discussion of this text in chapter five).
terning of these words, however, it is indeed possible to arrive at definitions for some terms and to identify important patterning in others. The results of this endeavor are discussed comprehensively in the concluding chapter of this work and are summarized below.

Briefly, this study suggests that htm-fortresses were defined primarily by virtue of their function. Most often placed at vulnerable points of entry into the Nile Valley, htm-fortresses monitored movement and prevented unauthorized passage between one specific restricted area and another. In this manner the fortress itself served as a geographic “seal” or “lock,” a htm in Egyptian terminology.12 Architecturally, however, htm-fortresses ranged in size from relatively modest forts (such as the roughly 1,600 m² installation at Kom el-Quzoum) to enormous fortress-towns (like Tjaru [Tell Heboua I], which extended over 120,000 m²). The size of any given htm, then, seems to have been determined by the particular political and environmental circumstances of its emplacement.

If a broad similarity in scale and structure was neither inherent nor even important within the lexical category of the htm-fortress, architectural coherence seems to have been vital to the identity of mnnw-fortresses as a group. The massive enclosure walls of excavated New Kingdom mnnw define an area that ranges in size from 10,000 m² (Aksha) to only 54,000 m² (Sesebi). Uniformly temple-centered, mnnw are composed of well-defined cultic, administrative, and domestic sectors. A preoccupation with defense is far more evident in the architecture of the Libyan mnnw than in their Nubian counterparts. On both frontiers, however, the Egyptians erected these fortress-towns to protect areas threatened by hostile incursions and to lay claim physically and economically to a territory over which they professed political control.

Htm and mnnw are the only two terms for “fortress” that are discovered in Eighteenth Dynasty inscriptions. It is notable, however, that the word dmi, meaning “town” or “settlement,” is also employed upon occasion, both as a synonym for “fortress-town” (mnnw) and as a designation of individual administrative headquarters in Syria-Palestine. Dmiw are also depicted along the Ways of Horus in Seti I’s Karnak relief. In this context they are distinguished from the other forts by their elaborate structure and by their location in the

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most fertile pockets of the northern Sinai. It is apparent, then, that while the term *DMI* is certainly not to be translated as “fort” or “fortress,” the Egyptians themselves utilized this word without compunction to refer to those of their bases at which a significant population resided.

The remaining terms of interest in this study, *MKDR, NHTW, BHN*, and *SGR*, did not come into use as designations for Egyptian military bases until the Nineteenth Dynasty. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to discern precise meanings or definitive archaeological correlates for any of them. Indeed, although architectural, pictorial, and textual evidence all suggests that the compact, non-*DMI* forts erected along the Ways of Horus were virtually identical to one another in form and function, the labels pertaining to the compounds utilize three out of four of these latter terms (*MKDR, NHTW, and BHN*).

It is argued in this work that unlike the Eighteenth Dynasty vocabulary (*HTM* and *MNNW*), the new and often imported terms in the Nineteenth Dynasty could be employed rather loosely as synonyms for one another and for the concept of “fortified structure” or “military base.” As is explored in greater depth in chapter seven, distinct patterns of usage among these terms are indeed discernable. A comprehensive review of textual material suggests, for example, that *NHTW* often housed prisoners of war, that *BHN* may well have been connected at least on occasion with agricultural estates, and that *MKDR* were limited primarily to the route across the northern Sinai. Still, however, the relative paucity of attestations for these later terms and the lack of secure architectural correlates for any of them significantly hamper efforts to develop concise, finely honed definitions.

**The archaeological record**

An investigation into the archaeology of military bases is the logical counterpart to an examination of the texts concerning them. Following the textual studies within each chapter, then, are analyses of the excavated structures identified by others or myself as fortresses or administrative headquarters. These identifications are made on the

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13 See chapter five.
14 For the Semitic derivations of *MKDR, BHN*, and *SGR*, see the in-depth discussions of these terms in chapter seven.
basis of the architecture of the compounds and their associated artifacts. Each structure is then studied in the context of its immediate environment for the total assemblage of evidence it provides as to the ways in which the base functioned during its life span and the nature of the population that inhabited it.

The purpose of the archaeological investigation is to understand each military base within its own geopolitical landscape. The nature of the artifacts found within a structure is vitally important to determining how it functioned and who resided within. Also stressed, however, is the wider context of the compound, such as the settlement in which it was embedded and the relations of the base to other Egyptian emplacements and to local indigenous communities. Subtle and often elusive issues, such as the social and economic relationships forged between Egyptian and local populations, are often revealed via a study of military bases. Likewise, the architecture of the building itself reveals a great deal when factors such as the presence or absence of fortifications, storage facilities, or strictly administrative areas are taken into account. Finally, the built structures associated with a fortress or administrative headquarters (i.e., wells, industrial areas, granaries, cultic buildings, cemeteries, and so forth) often help to determine the purpose of the Egyptian base and the nature of its community.

An archaeological investigation of an Egyptian military base answers important questions about the establishment, life history, and end of such a complex. Among the most important aspects of this study, however, is the examination of (1) the overall patterning of Egyptian fortresses and administrative headquarters within each period and (2) the evolution of these patterns over time. Such a broad-based investigation into the spatial and temporal contexts of Egyptian emplacements serves to significantly complement and contextualize both the existing isolated site reports and the trends observed in the study of the textual material. Perhaps the most valuable contribution

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15 Two recent dissertations, one by Higginbotham (1994, published in 2000 as a book) and another by Mumford (1998), have dealt extensively with the range of Egyptian and Egyptian-style artifacts found in Syria-Palestine and have produced object catalogues for most of the northern sites discussed in this work. The methodology and the conclusions of these dissertations differ significantly from that presented here, resulting in little redundancy. Bearing these studies in mind, however, this work addresses the artifacts discovered in and around military bases, but it does not make them a primary focus.
of the archaeological investigation, however, is its focus upon the variability in form and function of imperial architecture. The existence of this diversity suggests that the Egyptian government possessed an in-depth understanding of the geopolitical realities of each subject territory and, further, endeavored to tailor and continually adjust its imperial blueprint in order to maintain optimal efficiency and efficacy in its administration.

**EGYPTIAN-STYLE MATERIAL CULTURE AND VARIANT THEORETICAL APPROACHES**

By way of concluding this introductory chapter, I would like to touch briefly upon two theories previously proposed to explain a dramatic escalation in Egyptian-style material culture between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties in Syria-Palestine. These theories, put forth by James Weinstein and Carolyn Higginbotham, will be discussed in greater detail in chapters four and five. Given that some of the issues—especially those raised by Higginbotham—have direct bearing on all of the chapters in this book, however, it is important to address them at the outset. Further, taking the opportunity to do so allows me to elaborate upon certain significant theoretical and methodological approaches that inform this work.

Without going into undue detail, the situation that begs explanation is why the number and variety of Egyptian-style artifacts and architectural remains excavated in Canaan should skyrocket with the advent of the Nineteenth Dynasty. Prior to this period, Egyptian-style architecture is unattested north of the Gaza Strip, and Egyptian-style artifacts are by and large restricted to portable or prestige goods. In the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, enclaves of Egyptian-style architecture and material culture suddenly proliferate in the wadi systems of the Negev, at the major coastal harbors, and along the two most important north-south transit routes in Canaan: the Via Maris and the Jordan Valley.

In a seminal article on the evolution of Egypt’s foreign relations during the New Kingdom, Weinstein suggested that this increased archaeological visibility reflected a shift in imperial policy to a much more intensified military occupation. He writes, “Whereas in prior centuries Asiatic revolts had been suppressed by Egyptian troops, who then either returned home or went back to one of a handful
of garrisons situated at certain strategic points in the region, in the 13th and 12th centuries B.C.E. the Egyptians stayed in Canaan in much larger numbers than before.” Weinstein’s explanation, then, is satisfying in its simplicity—more pots reflect the presence of more people. As will be discussed below, however, a study that includes textual as well as archaeological evidence for Egyptian enclaves abroad does much to problematize this notion.

For her part, Higginbotham examined the same problem and came up with an entirely different explanatory hypothesis. She suggested that the vast majority of Egyptian or Egyptian-style material culture in Ramesside Canaan—including almost all of the buildings that are here identified as administrative headquarters—constituted the product of elite emulation. According to her theoretical framework, which I will hereafter refer to as the elite emulation model, “peripheries of prestigious cultures sometimes derive a legitimating function from the core cultures. Features of the “great civilization” are adopted and adapted by local elites and their communities to provide an iconography of power which transfers some of the prestige of the distant center to local rulers.” As viewed from the vantage point of this model, then, most of these “administrative headquarters” (also sometimes termed “governor’s residencies”) can be interpreted as the villas of elite Canaanites, men who flaunted their worldliness and access to power by occupying Egyptian-style dwellings and utilizing Egyptian-style artifacts.

The elite emulation model has been proposed as a preferable alternative to the so-called direct rule model, implicitly espoused by scholars like Weinstein. Proponents of this more traditional view posit “an Egyptian military and administrative presence in Palestine consisting of garrison-hosts and bureaucrats posted in imperial centers throughout the region.” Although the elite emulation model is central to the most recent synthetic analysis of Egyptian-style architecture in Canaan, it is not followed in this work. By way of explanation, then, I will briefly state three facets of the elite emulation model that are, in my view, problematic.

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19 Higginbotham 2000: 12.
20 Higginbotham 2000.
1. According to the expectations set up to test the elite emulation model in Canaan, direct rule and elite emulation must necessarily be two mutually exclusive phenomena.

The notion that it is appropriate to contrast the elite emulation model with the direct rule model in order to proclaim one or the other more fitting to the situation in Ramesside Canaan requires that these two models be defined by a series of diametrically opposed expectations. Yet in this process, an unrealistic dichotomy between the two models leaves the complex nature of imperial peripheries unrecognized. It is vital to this theoretical framework that direct rule and elite emulation cannot coexist. As political anthropologists have often demonstrated, however, an empire erected without the aid of indigenous collaborators is virtually unimaginable.

Savvy imperial governments, both ancient and modern, have recognized that the co-option of local elites is vital to stability in a region. As elites inevitably form the nexus of an extremely wide array of social networks, their acceptance of and cooperation with a foreign power often communicate to their countrymen that imperial rule is in fact palatable. Likewise, given their familiarity with administering their own country, local elites possess a cultural knowledge that is invaluable to a foreign power desirous of erecting an effective government.

For their own part, ambitious elites often consciously co-opt imperial styles as potent symbols by which they intend to convey meaning to two separate audiences. To the imperial power, the acculturated elite announces his affinity with the ideology and goals of the ruling government and thus his own ripeness for promotion within the system. Likewise, to his countrymen, the elite expresses his political alliance with the ruling power of the day. Such an affiliation broadens the clout of the elite with those that now govern, and in many cases it also proclaims his access to a whole new vocabulary of cultural sophistication.

Thus, when it comes to imperial territories, the top-down phenomenon of direct rule cannot and should not be neatly divorced from the largely bottom-up phenomenon of elite emulation. Such a crisp division, however, is inherent to the elite emulation model, which is largely defined by its opposition to the direct rule model. Yet even proponents of the former must admit that the Egyptians utilized native Canaanites both as vassals and as Egyptian functionaries, yet always in conjunction with a military presence in the form
of “imperial centers, staffed by small numbers of soldiers and administrators.”\textsuperscript{21} With such a situation clearly spelled out in the texts—and, I argue, also in the archaeology—it is little wonder that “both the textual and the archaeological evidence fail to provide a perfect correlation with the expectations for either the Direct Rule or the Elite Emulation model.”\textsuperscript{22}

2. According to the elite emulation model, if Canaan had been directly ruled by the Egyptians, then former imperial enclaves in Canaan, like those in Nubia, should exhibit purely Egyptian-style archaeological remains.

It has already been stated that a major difficulty in applying the elite emulation model to Ramesside Canaan is that the mutually exclusive distinctions between elite emulation and direct rule create a specious set of opposed archaeological expectations. Yet even if one puts such concerns aside, one of the fundamental expectations set out for the direct rule model remains difficult to defend. The closest parallel for direct rule in Ramesside Canaan is stated to have been the New Kingdom experience in Nubia.\textsuperscript{23} It is therefore posited that a situation of direct rule in Canaan should manifest itself in a series of imperial enclaves within which the material culture would be entirely Egyptian in style.

In order to address the numerous reasons why this represents a highly problematic conclusion, it is useful to briefly review the geopolitical history of the two frontiers under consideration: Nubia and Syria-Palestine. This exercise will help elucidate the danger of imposing identical theoretical models upon two such dissimilar frontier zones. Concomitantly, it will also serve as a useful preface to our investigation of New Kingdom imperialism, especially for readers who are not already familiar with the history of Egypt and its dominated peripheries.

The topographical, cultural, and historical backdrops for the imposition of Egyptian rule on Nubia and Syria-Palestine are startlingly dissimilar from one another. At the beginning of the New Kingdom in Lower Nubia, the Egyptians encountered a loosely organized, middle-range society, which had endured sporadic Egyptian domination for

\textsuperscript{21} Higginbotham 1996: 162.
\textsuperscript{22} Higginbotham 2000: 129.
\textsuperscript{23} Higginbotham 2000: 12.
over a thousand years. Ironically, however, cultural barriers between Egyptians and Nubians had only begun to break down in the Second Intermediate Period, when the Nubians were in fact free from direct pharaonic control. In the Second Intermediate Period, Lower Nubia came under the suzerainty of the kingdom of Kush, an Upper Nubian power with significant cultural ties to Egypt. The selective adoption of Egyptian material culture that began under Kerman rule rapidly accelerated until by the middle of the Eighteenth Dynasty the artifact assemblages of Nubians became virtually indistinguishable from those of Egyptians. The seeming ease with which the Nubians adopted Egyptian material culture, however, is not entirely difficult to understand given that both populations lived a life largely dictated by the cycle of the Nile’s annual flood, and both similarly practiced a mixed economy of agriculture and cattle herding.

The situation that the Egyptians faced at the beginning of the New Kingdom on their northern frontier was very different from their experience in the south. Egypt had never before extended its empire significantly into Syria-Palestine, although sporadic military campaigns into the region are evidenced from the First Dynasty onward. In the Middle Bronze Age, moreover, Canaan had witnessed a fluorescence of urban life, and a network of elaborately fortified city-states newly ornamented the Syro-Palestinian landscape. Most impressively, members of this culture had succeeded in wresting control of the eastern Delta from the Egyptians in the Second Inter-

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24 Throughout the Egyptian occupation of Nubia in the Middle Kingdom, the indigenous population appears to have maintained its cultural boundaries intact; at least the archaeological record shows very little mixing of C-group and Egyptian assemblages. Some scholars (Junker 1925: 11; Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 41) have suggested that this separatism on the part of the Nubians may be read as a conscious form of resistance to Egyptian authority. Alternatively, it may have been that the Egyptians practiced a deliberate policy of apartheid, viewing the Nubians as “not people to be respected. They are wretches!” (Parkinson 1991: 45; Boundary stele of Senwosret III at Semna and Uronarti).

25 Egypt and Kerma had been trading partners since the Middle Kingdom (Bourriau 1991: 130). Egyptian architectural and artistic models were adopted selectively by the rulers of Kush, and indeed the virtually identical technology employed suggests that Egyptian architects and craftsmen may well have been resident at Kerma itself (O’Connor 1978: 57). Certainly, after the Kushite takeover of Lower Nubia, the new rulers hired limited numbers of Egyptian expatriates to man the formerly Egyptian-controlled fortresses in Lower Nubia and to refurbish their temples (Säve-Söderbergh 1949; S. T. Smith 1995; 2003).
mediate Period and had dominated this area for at least a century.  

Even after the first pharaohs of the Eighteenth Dynasty managed via repeated military incursions to gain a foothold in Syria-Palestine, they soon discovered an intrinsic difficulty in controlling it. The topography varies wildly in Syria-Palestine, often within extremely short distances, and, as if in sympathy, the internal politics of the region tend toward schism and factionalization. Frequent destruction levels at many tells and information from contemporary documents—such as the Amarna letters—offer eloquent testimony to the uneasy relations and ever-shifting alliances among city-states, rural villages, nomadic populations, and outside powers. Egyptian culture and administration could be relatively easily transposed onto the loosely integrated, Nilotic culture of Nubia. To introduce almost anything fundamentally Egyptian into the varied topography of Canaan, with its myriad autonomous polities and ethnically diverse population, however, proved more difficult. For this reason, despite the appearance of New Kingdom Egyptian enclaves and the adoption of occasional Egyptian-style artifacts, the people of Syria-Palestine remained largely true to their traditional culture throughout the period of Egyptian rule.

Despite the fundamental and quite blatant differences between the two frontiers, however, it is remarkable that in Egyptian art, rhetoric, and official ceremonies, Nubians and Syro-Palestinians grovel before the pharaoh in identical poses of submission. The appointment of indigenous rulers (wāw) and the education of their heirs in Egypt demonstrate that the Egyptians did in fact attempt to extend such symmetry to their imperial efforts on the two frontiers. The pharaonic government, however, was also intensely practical. In the administration of its empire, Egypt’s primary goals were to maintain power and to enrich the crown.

In the north, the most expedient way to extract resources was to utilize the system already in place, i.e., the local governments. The relatively egalitarian society of Lower Nubia, however, had no such ready-made system in place. Further, rulers of the early Eighteenth Dynasty had already eradicated the powerful kingdom of Kush in

26 For discussion and bibliography pertaining to the Hyksos period in Egypt and Canaan, see Van Seters 1966; Dever 1985; Bietak 1991a; 1996; Oren 1997; Ryholt 1997.
Upper Nubia, the only political entity whose infrastructure could perhaps have been co-opted. Therefore, with no surviving complex local hierarchy intact, the long-term goals of the imperial government were best served by investing in a complete reorganization of the Nubian economy and governmental structure along Egyptian lines.

Although the Egyptians largely realized their goal of attaining effective political and economic control on both frontiers, the archaeological remains of Egyptian bases in the north and in the south are essentially dissimilar. With regard to Canaan, it is misleading to assume—along with Higginbotham’s elite emulation model—that an authentic Egyptian military base should possess a thoroughly Egyptian-style material culture. Instead, it is important to recognize that indigenous material culture always existed side by side with Egyptian-style artifacts, even in the areas of the northern empire that the Egyptians occupied continuously throughout the New Kingdom.

Indeed, in all sites east of the Sinai, local Canaanite goods overwhelmingly predominated and might well be expected to have done so. Given prohibitive transport costs, the Egyptian administration almost certainly obtained from local populations the majority of the items with which military bases were furnished and supplied. Such local procurement of resources undoubtedly occurred with regard to Nubian fortresses as well. New Kingdom Nubia’s pervasive Egyptian-style material culture, however, effectively masks many of the obvious distinctions between local and imported goods or, indeed, between the detritus of indigenes and that of imperialists. Therefore, the expectation that Canaanite bases, like those of Nubia, should exhibit purely Egyptian material culture neglects to take into account that by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian-style assemblages were in fact the norm in Nubia, and military bases constituted no exception to this rule.

3. The methodology set up to test the elite emulation model privileges the study of individual categories of artifact over the study of artifact assemblages.

My third and last major hesitation with the methodology, and hence the conclusions, of the elite emulation model is that the means used for testing it is based on a study of discrete artifact categories. Such an emphasis leads to a focus upon the distribution of entities like faience vessels or scarabs rather than the distribution of sites at which numerous disparate categories of Egyptian or Egyptian-style artifacts
converge. I will here elaborate upon this point, as it represents an important divergence in methodology between my own study and that undertaken by Higginbotham, and also because it allows me to clarify with respect to this book important matters of terminology and theoretical outlook.

Anyone investigating archaeological evidence for Egyptian presence abroad has to contend with the rather irksome fact that the difference between an Egyptian artifact and one that only looks Egyptian is often all but impossible to discern with the naked eye. Archaeologists working at New Kingdom Canaanite sites frequently excavate artifacts that appear to be of Egyptian origin but that when tested in a laboratory prove to have been of local manufacture. In Nubia, meanwhile, the main challenge is finding something that isn’t Egyptian in appearance.

For purposes of clarity, then, this study recognizes three major categories of seemingly Egyptian objects:

1) A true “Egyptian” object, i.e., an import from Egypt itself
2) An “Egyptian-style” object, i.e., an almost perfect imitation of an “Egyptian” object that is fabricated out of local materials
3) An “Egyptianizing” object, i.e., an adaptation or a reworking of Egyptian motifs or styles in a manner alien to Egypt’s artistic tradition

Although Egyptianizing objects will occasionally be discussed in this work, the main focus is upon Egyptian and Egyptian-style objects. Without chemical testing of an artifact, or in many cases even proper publication of a site, distinguishing between the two categories is difficult.27 One of the very few site reports to include trace analysis of many of its objects is the recent republication of the Beth Shan materials by James and McGovern. At Beth Shan, it was determined that the Egyptian-style pottery, small faience objects (such as pendants and jewelry), and the vast majority of the “special” ceramic items (such as the ubiquitous clay cobra figurines and duck heads) had been fashioned locally, although according to typically Egyptian

27 There are several fortuitous exceptions. Alabaster vessels, for example, may be fashioned out of calcite from Egypt or gypsum from Israel. While these materials are relatively easy to distinguish at a glance, even this situation gets complicated if the objects are not photographed well or if the material is identified simply as “alabaster” in the text.
manufacturing techniques. The similarity of these artifacts in both technology and style to Egyptian models implies that, although the materials were local, the artisans themselves may not have been.

The production of Egyptian-style items abroad may well have been a cost-efficient method of providing soldiers and administrative personnel stationed in foreign lands with at least some of the comforts of home. Additionally, at least in terms of ceramic production, it may have suited the Egyptian government to produce standardized forms that could be utilized for rationing or ritual. To complicate matters, however, it is probable that some of the Egyptian-style objects in Canaan were manufactured by Egyptians or by Canaanites for a Canaanite market. D. Ben-Tor, for example, argues that a high percentage of the Middle Bronze IIA–IIB scarabs found in Canaan were, in fact, produced and utilized by the resident Canaanite population. I. Ben-Dor, meanwhile, suggests that a particular style of calcite “Egyptian” vessel, found much more often in Canaan than in Egypt, had been manufactured by Egyptians primarily to satisfy a Canaanite market. Clearly, then, the examination of one object, whether Egyptian or only Egyptian in style, is able to reveal very little in isolation. An investigation into the greater contexts of architectural and artifact assemblages, however, allows patterns to be recognized and reasonable hypotheses to be formulated.

While elite emulation may indeed account for the occasional appearance of Egyptian or Egyptian-style prestige objects on Canaanite soil, it is seldom the only explanation for their presence. In Late Bronze Age tombs, for example, it is not uncommon to find an Egyptian or Egyptian-style prestige good deposited in the same context as Mycenaean tableware, Mitanni-style cylinder seals, and high-quality local ceramics. Such eclecticism more likely reveals a cosmopolitan taste for luxury goods than it does the desire by the deceased or his family to emulate aspects of each specific culture. Similarly, certain Egyptian prestige goods may originally have come to Syria-Palestine as gifts bestowed upon loyal foreign dignitaries by the Egyptian government. This practice is well documented in New Kingdom texts.

Most importantly for this work, it is difficult to use the elite emu-

30 I. Ben-Dor 1944: 101.
lation model to explain the high percentage and impressive variety of utilitarian or otherwise humble Egyptian-style artifacts discovered within strategically situated Egyptian-style compounds.

As has already been stated, the elite emulation model is not followed in this work, but—as an alternative explanatory framework—it serves as a valuable reminder to caution. The present study abides by the rule that the wider the range of Egyptian or Egyptian-style artifacts discovered at a Syro-Palestinian site, the greater the probability that Egyptians themselves had at one time been resident. Five broad categories of Egyptian or Egyptian-style material culture are recognized within this study: architecture, statuary or hieroglyphic inscriptions, pottery, nonprestige goods, and prestige goods. While exceptions are made for insufficiently published sites, each compound that is designated within this work as an Egyptian military base will have possessed in its immediate environs objects in at least four of these categories. The greater the variation in the types of “Egyptian” and “Egyptian-style” artifacts at a site, after all, the less likely it is that these artifacts can be explained away by elite emulation, trade, official gifts, or the like.

**So, what does the methodology employed by this study contribute?**

As a partial answer to this question, let us return to the problem stated above, namely that it is necessary to explain why archaeological evidence for imperial activity in Egypt dramatically increases from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Dynasty. The elite emulation model simply ignores this question, leaving the reader to conclude that emulation must have become fashionable, all of a sudden, a full two and a half centuries after the establishment of the empire. While theoretically possible, this hardly seems plausible—especially considering

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32 These include figurines, ceramic objects, small frit or faience amulets, scarabs bearing hieroglyphs or amuletic designs, and generally any Egyptian-style artifact fashioned out of common materials.

33 Objects are considered prestige goods on the basis of the quality of their workmanship and the costliness of their materials. Items fashioned of ivory, calcite, gold, silver, or semiprecious stones are always deemed prestige goods. Faience vessels and core-formed glass vessels also fall into this category due to the technical expertise demanded in their manufacture (James and McGovern 1993: 162–163).
that the active co-option of elites is often especially characteristic of early stages of imperial development.\textsuperscript{34}

Far better suited to explain the suddenness of this change is James Weinstein’s theory, namely that the material trappings of Egypt’s empire only become visible after the introduction of a policy shift on the part of the Nineteenth Dynasty rulers. These later pharaohs, he argues, committed more troops and administrators to Canaan than ever before and stationed these personnel in the region permanently. This argument would indeed appear to fit the archaeological evidence admirably. When one conducts an intensive study of the textual as well as the archaeological evidence for Egyptian bases in Canaan, however, the situation becomes less clear. There is in fact no evidence for any substantive change from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Dynasty in the number or nature of the imperial officials and/or troops stationed in the region.

In order to present my own view on the subject, obtained as the result of this in-depth analysis of both archaeological and textual bodies of evidence, let me anticipate arguments more fully presented in chapter four’s overview of late Eighteenth Dynasty involvement in Syria-Palestine. There and elsewhere in the course of this book, it will hopefully be demonstrated that a policy change did indeed mark the transition between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties on the northern frontier. This change of policy, however, did not in fact influence the sheer density of Egyptian bases situated throughout Canaan, nor necessarily the numbers of individuals stationed permanently in the region.

In chapter four, textual evidence is put forth to demonstrate that the archaeological invisibility of the Eighteenth Dynasty imperial personnel stationed north of the Gaza Strip stemmed from two specific policies. First, the Amarna letters inform us that it was evidently common practice for Egyptian troops to be billeted locally in compounds that had been commandeered from Canaanites. Second, as Thutmose III relates in his annals, the troops were supplied in all their needs by taxes and obligations levied on local populations. Thus, considering that the occupying forces lived in Canaanite buildings and were supplied with Canaanite food in Canaanite pots, it is little surprise that evidence for Egyptian personnel stationed in the

\textsuperscript{34} Bartel 1985: 15; Sinopoli 1994: 164.
This still leaves open the question, however, of what accounts for the sudden and dramatic visibility of these bases at the turn to the Nineteenth Dynasty. The answer that I propose, which is elaborated in chapter four, is that this situation represents the material correlate to an edict issued by Horemheb, the last king of the Eighteenth Dynasty. As part of his efforts to legitimize his rule and to remove any lingering tarnish of his association with the Amarna Period pharaohs, Horemheb enacted a series of policy reforms designed to combat formerly routine abuses of governmental authority. One such abuse, allegedly introduced by Thutmose III, was the practice of displacing the costs of imperial processions onto the shoulders of the nomarchs whose territories the king and his court passed through. Such a “craven” practice, Horemheb argued, imposed undue hardship on local officials and must in the future be discontinued.

Within this work, I argue that just as Thutmose III had displaced the costs of royal ventures within Egypt onto the shoulders of local officials, he similarly defrayed the expense of imperial travel by assigning to his northern vassals the responsibility for housing and provisioning imperial functionaries. Substantiation for this claim can be found within Thutmose III’s own inscriptions and also in the strident complaints expressed by late Eighteenth Dynasty vassals. It follows logically, then, that Horemheb’s reform of this practice would similarly have been extended north of Egypt’s borders in order to appease the long-standing resentment among his vassals at having their resources and facilities co-opted according to imperial whim. As a corrective to this abuse, then, Horemheb implicitly assumes responsibility for creating a permanent, self-sufficient infrastructure to support the needs of royal functionaries. As a result of Horemheb’s reform in Canaan, I argue, one finds Egyptian-style buildings newly constructed in Canaan, Egyptian craftsmen newly imported, and the material trappings of empire for the first time archaeologically evident.

I offer the outline of this particular thesis not in an attempt to foreground a central focus of this work but rather to serve as a concrete illustration of the utility of employing multiple lines of evidence to address problems of New Kingdom imperialism. As I hope will be amply demonstrated, the textual and archaeological evidence gathered and synthesized within this study allows for an enhanced appreciation of the variability and flexibility of frontier strategy as it evolved.
over time and across borders. Further, it is hoped that the results will provide new insight into the practicalities of imperial occupation and also into the highly contextual reactions of indigenes to the imposition of foreign governance.

THE ORGANIZATION OF THIS BOOK

In order to highlight the ever-evolving and fundamentally political nature of Egyptian foreign policy in the New Kingdom, the chapters of this work are ordered on a chronological basis. The early, middle, and late Eighteenth Dynasty, the Nineteenth Dynasty, and the Twentieth Dynasty each receive a separate chapter, and such a division of time is attractive for two reasons. First, the pharaohs of each temporal grouping, by and large, faced similar threats abroad and, in consequence, developed a relatively consistent foreign policy. Treating these reigns together allows for a greater understanding of the context of international relations under any given king. Second, each of these periods is at least potentially recognizable in the archaeological record due to the appearance or disappearance of various types of signature ceramic types. In Syro-Palestinian archaeology, the same divisions of time bear the names Late Bronze IA, IB, IIA, IIB, and Iron Age IA.

Chapter two focuses upon the early Eighteenth Dynasty, or the LB IA period, from the reign of Ahmose to the end of Hatshepsut’s tenure as pharaoh (c. 1550–1458). In both Syria-Palestine and Nubia, the rulers of this era established the empire by means of a series of far-flung military expeditions. The stretch of time lasting from Thutmose III’s assumption of sole kingship until the death of Pharaohs who pursued foreign policies that differed from the rest of their cohort—such as Hatshepsut, Horemheb and Ramesses III—usually reigned either at the beginning or the end of each period.

See the discussions and charts in Weinstein 1981; Leonard 1989: 6–7; Mumford 1998: 12–13. The tripartite division of the Eighteenth Dynasty is also valid in terms of Egyptian ceramic chronology. It is, however, extremely difficult to differentiate between Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty ceramic forms (Bourriau 1981: 72–73; Hope 1987: 97).

While the equation between specific groupings of pharaohs and the various Syro-Palestinian archaeological periods is generally agreed upon, the exact chronology is not. The absolute dates provided in this work follow those adhered to in the most recent synthesis of Egyptian history (Shaw 2000: 481). Margins of error and preferences for different chronological schema have resulted in the wide array of dates that have been preferred by individual scholars, but most of these dates differ from one another by a few decades at most.
his grandson, Thutmose IV (c. 1458–1390), or the LB IB period, is the subject of chapter three. During this time, Egyptian kings subdued the Syro-Palestinian and Nubian frontiers via continued military strikes and the development of a sophisticated imperial infrastructure. Chapter four takes as its subject the greater Amarna Age, or the LB IIA period, which comprised the reigns of Amenhotep III through Horemheb (c. 1390–1295). In both frontiers, a drastic drop off in campaigns is witnessed, and the infrastructure set in place by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs was largely relied upon to maintain Egyptian rule in these subject territories.

The Nineteenth Dynasty (c. 1295–1186), coeval with the LB IIB period, is addressed in chapter five. These pharaohs reinitiated intensive campaigning, especially in the north, and constructed fortresses for the first time along the Libyan frontier. The final historically based chapter, chapter six, spans the Egyptian Twentieth Dynasty (c. 1186–1069), or the IA IA period. This era witnessed a brief resurgence of Egyptian power in the reign of Ramesses III and soon thereafter the almost complete withdrawal of Egypt back into its traditional boundaries. Given the distinct character of each of these five periods, it is not surprising that the nature of the archaeological and textual evidence for military bases likewise varies quite substantially among them.

The chapters themselves are subdivided into two or three sections, thereby focusing in sequence upon the fortresses and administrative headquarters of Syria-Palestine, Nubia, and—in the case of chapters five and six—also Libya. Likewise, the discussion of each frontier includes three components: an overview of the evolution of imperial events and strategy, a presentation and analysis of textual sources, and a site-by-site review of archaeological evidence. Because it is important that this work, despite its formidable bulk, be as user friendly as possible, the main conclusions that can be drawn from the studies of the texts and material culture are presented in summary form within each initial overview. Thus, the nonspecialist may elect to confine his or her reading within any given chapter to the frontier overviews as well as to the discussion of contemporary cross-frontier policy that serves as each chapter’s conclusion. For the more particularly interested reader, however, the in-depth treatment of individual texts and archaeological sites will be indispensable. Within these sections, the reader will find the specifics to justify the broader conclusions presented in the overview, in this introduction, and in the book’s final chapter.
Figure 1. Principal regions of the eastern Delta and the northern Sinai
Figure 2. Principle regions of Canaan
Figure 3. Principal regions of northern Syria-Palestine
Figure 4. Principal regions of the western Delta and the coastal road to Libya
Figure 5. Principal regions of Nubia
CHAPTER TWO
FRONTIER POLICY IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH DYNASTY

OVERVIEW OF EGYPTIAN INTERACTIONS WITH SYRIA-PALESTINE

Historical summary

Before the Egyptians could even consider erecting an empire in Syria-Palestine, they first had to rid the northern portion of their own country of the Hyksos, who had ruled it for a little over a century. Although the Theban dynasty under the successive reigns of Seqenenre-Tao II and Kamose had already initiated the reconquest, it was not until the reign of Ahmose that the foreigners were definitively defeated. The autobiographical text of a soldier named Ahmose son of Iba is the primary source of information concerning this war (Urk. IV, 1: 16–4: 13).

Ahmose son of Iba took part in the siege of the Hyksos capital at Avaris (modern Tell el-Dab’a) and fought in at least three other battles against Hyksos supporters during the course of the siege. The first clash took place at a local canal, the second in the immediate environs of the capital, and the third in a town south of Avaris.1 Recently discovered relief fragments from Ahmose’s mortuary temple at Abydos depict horses, archers, and other warlike subjects, almost certainly indicating that scenes of Ahmose’s battles against the Hyksos had once adorned the temple walls.2

1 Breasted (AR II: 6) believed the quote, “Then one fought in (the) Egypt, south of this town (dmi)” (Urk. IV, 4: 3), to refer to a rebellion that took place in Upper Egypt, south of the soldier’s native town of Elkab. As Avaris is referred to in the narration of the preceding battles as a “town” (dmi—Urk. IV, 3: 7) and also as “this place” (Urk. IV, 3: 16), however, there is no reason to assume that an Upper Egyptian locality is meant. On the contrary, it makes much more sense to posit a battle against a Lower Egyptian polity loyal to the Hyksos cause (see also Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 142). A campaign against a Hyksos ally was undertaken by Kamose (Smith and Smith 1976: 60) and is implied in the Rhind Mathematical Papyrus colophon (discussed below—Helck 1975a: 78). Tell Farasha, a town less than 20 km south of Tell el-Dab’a, which possessed both Hyksos burials and ceramic (Yacoub 1983: 175–176), would have been a prime candidate for such a campaign.

In addition to the autobiography of Ahmose son of Ibana, an intriguing colophon inscribed upon the Rhind Mathematical Papyrus sheds light on what must have been the last few months of Hyksos control in Lower Egypt. On the reverse of the papyrus, well over a decade after the composition of the main body of the text, pivotal events in Egypt’s civil war had been jotted down. The text reads, “Regnal year 11, second month of Shomu—Heliopolis was entered. First month of Akhet, day 23—this southern ruler advanced to Tjaru. Day 2[5]—it was heard, ‘Tjaru has been entered.’” As both the colophon and the border-fortress of Tjaru (modern Tell Heboua I) are discussed extensively below, it will suffice here to note that control of this strategic point would have allowed Ahmose to block an important route through which the Hyksos rulers in southern Canaan could have sent reinforcements to their counterparts at Avaris.

By isolating his foe from outside help, and by means of a protracted siege (Urk. IV, 3: 7), Ahmose was able to reunite Egypt and thereby to found the Eighteenth Dynasty. The Hyksos ruler at Avaris may have surrendered in the end—for there appears to be no concrete evidence of a destruction level at the site. According to the archaeological record, in fact, the city seems simply to have been abandoned. Thus, it is not an unlikely scenario that the inhabitants of Avaris and allied towns were forced into exile following their surrender. Further, such a mass exodus may have survived in cultural memory at least as late as Josephus, who records that the Hyksos were allowed to depart for Canaan as a condition of their surrender.

At some point subsequent to the Theban victory, perhaps even directly upon its heels, the Egyptians felt it wise to eliminate the threat of a renewed Hyksos attack by besieging Sharuhen (Urk. IV, 4: 14–17), modern Tell el-Ajjul. This powerful Hyksos center lay

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3 See Helck 1975a: 78.
4 The regnal year is almost certainly that of the last Hyksos ruler Aqenenre Apophis II given that the obverse of the papyrus is dated to the 33rd year of Apophis. The reference to Ahmose as “this southern ruler” further suggests that a northern Hyksos sympathizer had written the document (Helck 1976: 33–34; Redford 1992: 128–129).
7 The rationale for following Stewart (1974: 61) and Kempinski’s (1974) identification of Tell el-Ajjul as Sharuhen is discussed in detail below. One important factor in this conclusion, however, was the impressive nature of the Hyksos remains at the site. Petrie (1932: 1) estimated that over 1,000 tons of stone had been excavated.
just across the Sinai from Egypt at the eastern end of the Ways of Horus—a military and trade route that began at the fortress of Tjaru in the eastern Delta, traversed the northern Sinai, and ended in the vicinity of Tell el-Aluj and Gaza some 220 km farther. As the most expedient land route between Egypt and Canaan, the Ways of Horus was of immense strategic importance. Tell el-Aluj was also located at the head of the Via Maris, the foremost Canaanite highway in the Late Bronze Age. By virtue of the settlement’s position, then, the inhabitants of Tell el-Aluj had the potential to interfere with almost all land traffic exchanged between Egypt and Canaan.

The soldier Ahmose son of Ibana records taking part in the siege of Sharuhen. Although this is the only recorded military activity in southern Canaan during the reign of Ahmose, it is quite possible that the Egyptians in fact fought several battles in nearby locations during the three years that this siege took place. Certainly, the Egyptians had not hesitated to conduct subsidiary campaigns while they besieged Avaris. Such a scenario is relevant with regard to the widespread destruction levels witnessed in southern Canaan at the beginning of the LB IA. The possible role of early Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian armies in the termination of the region’s Middle Bronze Age is discussed below.

Ahmose pa-Nekhbit, another soldier from Elkab, records having fought with Ahmose in Djahy (Urk. IV, 35: 16–17)—a rather vague toponym that encompassed both Canaan and Lebanon. Due to the fact that Ahmose pa-Nekhbit survived until the reign of Hatshepsut, the great-granddaughter of the pharaoh Ahmose, this battle must have occurred late in Ahmose’s reign. The necessity of such a delayed date suggests that Ahmose pa-Nekhbit’s Djahy campaign in all likelihood is not to be identified with the siege of Sharuhen.

A further indication of battle in the reign of Ahmose is found on a stele that dates to his 22nd year. In its text, there is mention of

from the fosse to build the city and its fortifications. The enclosed area of the town, protected by a 6 m deep fosse, 3 m high ramparts, and a thick enclosure wall, was twice as large as Megiddo (Tufnell 1993: 50).

8 See below; Gardiner 1920; Oren 1987; 1993a; 1999.
9 Dorsey 1991: 57. The so-called King’s Highway that ran along the highlands did not become particularly important until the Iron Age, when settlement in the hill country intensified.
oxen, “which his majesty captured [in his] victories [among] the Fenkhu” (Urk. IV, 25: 12), dragging quarried stone. The term Fenkhu, in its most common usage, designated the Lebanese coast, and so it is tempting to associate the presumed Fenkhu expedition with a jar fragment that mentions a hunting or pleasure outing in Kedem. This locality is known from the story of Sinuhe to have been located somewhere in the general vicinity of Byblos. The jar fragment, found in a tomb that originally belonged to Ahmose’s wife or his son, bears traces of what might be Ahmose’s name.

No Syro-Palestinian campaigns can be assigned without a doubt to the reign of Amenhotep I. The discovery of several blocks of a dismantled temple doorjamb at Karnak, however, may indicate that Amenhotep I had, in fact, been quite active in the north. The blocks depict offering bearers from Tunip, Kedem, and a locality called dšiwny—and Kedem is again mentioned on the jamb in a context that may pertain to military ventures. Although dšiwny is otherwise unknown, Kedem and Tunip were located in modern Lebanon and the Orontes River valley respectively.

Now, the jar fragment mentioning recreation taken in Kedem—discussed above in connection with the campaigns of Ahmose—may in fact date to the reign of Amenhotep I, in which case two commemorations of this king’s visit to Kedem may have survived. Admittedly, Bradbury believes that both the Karnak blocks and the

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12 Giveon 1982a: 1039. Vandersleyen (1971: 89–127; followed by Shea 1979: 3) suggests that in the earliest part of the Eighteenth Dynasty “Fenkhu” may have been a generic word for Canaan. There is no proof that this is necessarily so, however, despite Vandersleyen’s evident desire to connect the Fenkhu campaign to the siege of Sharuhen. Fenkhu-land is also mentioned in a rhetorical inscription (Urk. IV, 18: 6) in conjunction with Khenthennefer, a Nubian locality in which Ahmose son of Ibana fought under Ahmose (Urk. IV, 5: 5—for discussions of Khenthennefer, see Goedicke 1965; O’Connor 1987: 115, and n. 75). Given that the toponyms appear to have been juxtaposed to emphasize the vast extent of Ahmose’s empire, it makes sense that the term Fenkhu should have referred to the farthest reaches of Egypt’s control in the north, i.e., the Phoenician coast.

13 Gardiner 1916b: 133, B 29; Redford 1979a: 271.


15 Redford 1979a.

16 Gilula (1985: 49) has suggested that dšiwny be equated with biblical Zion in the neighborhood of Jerusalem. Such a locality, however, would have necessitated a substantial detour for a northern campaign.

17 See Redford 1979a: 271 for a discussion and extensive references.

jar fragment date to Thutmose I; however, her arguments have not gone unchallenged. For his part, Weinstein agrees with Redford that the blocks date in all probability to the reign of Amenhotep I, although he notes that dating the blocks with reference to their supposed context is somewhat problematic.

The preparative work likely undertaken along the Phoenician coast and in the Orontes valley by the first two rulers of the Eighteenth Dynasty appears to have paid off in the reign of the third. Thutmose I’s campaign against the Mitanni peoples of the land of Naharin—located east of the Euphrates in northern Syria—is celebrated in numerous monuments, both royal and private. Many other inscriptions, although they do not specifically mention Thutmose I’s

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20 Redford’s (1979a: 273) argument that the blocks originally belonged to a temple of Amenhotep I stems primarily from their context among other monuments of Amenhotep I in the third pylon at Karnak. Weinstein (1991: 110) points out that although such an assignment is probably correct, there is no definitive proof that the blocks came from the third pylon. Further, he notes that the third pylon contained dismantled monuments of a number of early Eighteenth Dynasty rulers.
21 Naville 1898: pl. 80 and Urk. IV, 697: 5. The only reference to the Mitanni campaign on a royal monument of Thutmose I—“his northern (frontier) is on that inverted stream which flows downstream in a southerly direction” (Urk. IV, 85: 14)—is fraught with debate. Although this description would appear to fit the Euphrates River, which ran from north to south in contrast to the Nile, the Euphrates campaign should not have occurred as early as regnal year 2, when the Tombos inscription was completed. Some scholars thus argue that the Tombos inscription must have been antedated (Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 147–149; Redford 1979–1980: 68–69), while others believe the description might refer to a Nubian, Egyptian, or Red Sea location (for extensive references, see Bradbury 1984–1985: 5–7 and Bryan 2000: 243, n. 2). It is also possible, however, that although Thutmose I had not yet reached the Euphrates, he knew of the river and claimed it as a border in anticipation of just such a future campaign.
22 The biographies of Ahmose son of Ibana (Urk. IV, 9: 8–10: 3) and Ahmose pa-Nekhbit (Urk. IV, 36: 9–11) directly concern Thutmose I’s invasion of Mitanni. It is now believed that descendants of the two men inscribed the texts upon the respective funerary monuments during the reign of Thutmose III (Bryan 2000: 71). The great wealth of personal and historical detail contained within each text, however, suggests that they were originally composed during the lifetimes of the two veterans. The other private tomb containing information possibly pertinent to Thutmose I’s Mitanni campaign belonged to a soldier named Amenemhet (Borchardt 1920: pl. 18). It is not entirely clear, however, whether the sovereign referred to in connection with the Mitanni expedition is indeed Thutmose I or whether it is Amenhotep I. In view of the fame of Thutmose I’s campaign to Mitanni, and the absence of a known campaign to the same region during the reign of his predecessor, Thutmose I appears the more likely candidate.
campaign, may bear evidence relating indirectly to it.\(^{23}\) The most complete narration of the battle comes again from the autobiography of Ahmose son of Ibane, who writes of an “expedition to Retenu to slake his (= Thutmose I’s) desire throughout the foreign lands. His majesty arrived at Naharin. His majesty, l.p.h., found that fallen one while he was marshaling (his) troops. Then, his majesty made a great slaughter among them. Without number were the living captives which his majesty brought off in victory” (Urk. IV, 9: 8–14).\(^{24}\) Both Ahmose son of Ibane (Urk. IV, 9: 17) and Ahmose pa-Nekhbit (Urk. IV, 36: 11–12) report capturing chariots in the course of the battle. On his return home, after having erected a stele on the eastern bank of the Euphrates (Urk. IV, 697: 5), Thutmose I indulged in an elephant hunt in the north Syrian land of Niy.\(^{25}\)

Significantly, although a great many references to Thutmose I’s northern campaigns are extant, none refers to Canaan, the heartland of the Egyptian empire. We know only that Thutmose in all probability appointed an overseer of the storehouse at the Ways of Horus (Urk. IV, 547: 4), which is a subject discussed at length below. Thutmose I’s foreign policy, instead, seems to have been directed northward, primarily focusing upon the kingdom of Mitanni. Mitanni emerged at the beginning of the sixteenth century as the major political power in northern Syria and held its preeminent position until the late fourteenth century, when a dynastic feud led to the usurpation of much of its territory by Assyria and Hatti. During the reigns of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 649: 9) and Amenhotep II (Urk. IV,

\(^{23}\) For example, Berlin 14994, Ägyptische Inschriften aus den Staatlichen Museen zu Berlin II 1924: 115; Naville 1908: 165–166; Urk. IV, 1069: 3–13. Items such as the faience bowl found at Alalakh in Level V (Woolley 1953: pl. 8a) and the ring from Hamath (Porter and Moss VII: 392) are intriguing, yet they cannot be employed as evidence for military campaigns in these regions.

\(^{24}\) According to Redford (1979a: 276), such prisoners may have included the palace guard Senimose (Urk. IV, 1069: 9) and the overseer of works Benya (Porter and Moss I: 410; Säve-Söderbergh 1960b).

\(^{25}\) Naville 1898: pl. 80. Most scholars view Thutmose I’s excursion into Mitanni territory as a successful razzia, intended by the king to be a show of force rather than an attempt at serious conquest. Bryan (2000: 73), however, suggests that Thutmose I’s own relative silence concerning his Mitanni campaign may indicate that the king met with a stronger resistance from his Syrian foe than he had originally anticipated. The fact that Thutmose III desired to emulate his grandfather’s accomplishment, however, would suggest that the venture did not end in humiliation. Likewise, given the relative dearth of inscriptions dating from Thutmose I’s reign in general, it is untenable to employ an argument of silence in the historical reconstruction of this reign.
1314: 1–6), the king of Mitanni directly interfered in Canaanite affairs, and Thutmose I’s thrust northward may have been designed to combat just such political meddling.

A single northern expedition is known for Thutmose I’s son, Thutmose II, and this campaign appears to have been of a very different sort than those undertaken by his father. Ahmose pa-Nekhbit, the seasoned veteran from Elkab, records fighting and taking prisoners among the Shasu (Urk IV, 36: 12–14), a predominantly seminomadic people encountered in areas ranging from the Sinai to the Transjordan, to the central hill country (KRI I, 9: 3–5) and Syria (KRI II, 103: 12–108: 10). Throughout the New Kingdom, the Shasu were mainly attacked in order to eradicate the threat that these groups posed to the safety of caravans and travelers or to settled populations in general. Like many pastoral peoples, the Shasu offered a victorious army little in the way of booty. Their potential to wreak havoc upon an imperial infrastructure, however, was substantial.

Thutmose II boasted that during his reign messengers traveled unmolested in the land of the Fenkhu (Urk. IV, 138: 10), and this happy situation may have been the result of his campaign against the Shasu or of a similar military effort to secure safe passage for his messengers. After all, envoys utilized these trade routes to bring Thutmose II precious and exotic diplomatic gifts, such as live elephants.

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26 Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 6. Although the text of Seti’s battle relief at Karnak indicates that his Shasu foes were located in the hills of Kharu, the battle scene makes it quite clear that Shasu also frequented the northern Sinai and the environs of Gaza.
27 Giveon 1971: 235–236. Given the association of the toponym $\text{t}\text{s}$ $\text{s}\text{m}w$, “[Land of] the Shasu,” with the Transjordan in New Kingdom lists, and the mention of Shasu from Edom in P. Anastasi VI, 54–55, the geographical “homeland” or base of the Shasu could well have been in this area (Giveon 1971: 235; Ward 1972: 50–56). See Astour (1979), however, who argues that the majority of the toponyms are in fact to be situated in the Biqa’ Valley and in central Syria.
29 The Karnak reliefs of Seti I depict the king offering booty to the god Amun prior to his first northern campaign, which included a battle against the Shasu (Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 2). The plunder consists of elaborately carved vases and pots with motifs including Bes lids, running cows, ibex heads, and marsh plants. The objects depicted resemble some of the finest alabasters from Tutankhamun’s tomb and must be credited to the rulers of Retenu as the accompanying inscription implies.
30 A like claim was put forth by Hatshepsut, who boasted, “roads that were blocked up are being trod” (Urk. IV, 385: 17).
from Niy in Syria. While these gifts in no way indicate an exertion of political control over the donor countries, they do demonstrate the recognition of Egypt as a force with which to be reckoned. Similarly, the gifts suggest that the wide web of royal trade networks, evidenced so vividly in the Amarna letters, was already well established in the early Eighteenth Dynasty.

After Thutmose II’s death, his wife Hatshepsut acted as a ward for Thutmose III and eventually elevated herself to the status of coregent. In her tenure as pharaoh, Hatshepsut sponsored mining activities in the Sinai (Urk. IV, 373: 1–2) and commissioned trading ventures to Lebanon (Urk. IV, 373: 3–5; 534: 11–535: 16), Punt (Urk. IV, 372: 14–17), and Tjehenu-Libya (Urk. IV, 373: 6–11). While it is likely that she was indeed deeply involved in trading and mining ventures, others of her claims are definitely overblown. For instance, Hatshepsut neither drove the Hyksos from Egypt nor donated millions of prisoners of war to Egyptian temples (Urk. IV, 248: 8).

Evidence for Syro-Palestinian campaigns during Hatshepsut’s reign is slight at best. Such a deemphasis on martial activity is unusual, but it is possible that Hatshepsut purposefully downplayed achievements in this sphere since they would have reflected more highly on her coregent than on herself. Scattered hints, however, such as the overseer of the royal armory’s statement that he followed his lord “in the southern and northern foreign countries” or the retrospective references to Gaza and Sharuhen in Thutmose III’s annals, discussed below, suggest that the Egyptian armed forces under Hatshepsut did indeed see action in Syria-Palestine.

The annals of Thutmose III further illuminate the situation in the north during the coregency of this pharaoh and his aunt. In the annals it is written: “Now for a [long] period of years Ret[enu had fallen into] anarchy, every man [showing hostility] towards his neighbor [. . .].” Heated debate has centered upon the degree of blame

31 Naville 1898: pl. 80.
32 Gardiner 1946: pl. 6.
33 Taking a different point of view, Redford (1967: 58) suggests that more information concerning Hatshepsut’s military successes might have survived if Thutmose III had not “destroyed it so as not to invite comparison with his own military successes.”
35 This translation follows Redford’s (1979b: 338–342) reassessment of the Karnak inscription.
that should placed upon internecine warfare versus the early Eighteenth Dynasty armies for causing the widespread destruction levels witnessed at many of the Middle Bronze Age IIC sites in Canaan. The extent of this damage is impressive. Well over twenty sites appear to have been violently destroyed, while many others suffered abandonment. The blow to Canaan was severe enough, in fact, that less than half of the towns that flourished in the Middle Bronze Age were rebuilt in the succeeding period. Indeed, even those towns that eventually did see new construction often had lain vacant for numerous decades. This great spate of destructions, which vividly marks the transition between the Middle and Late Bronze Ages in Syria-Palestine, is generally agreed to have occurred over roughly a century, i.e., the span of time between Ahmose’s accession and Thutmose III’s battle at Megiddo.

While many scholars believe that the Egyptians decimated numerous towns in their desire to rid Canaan of any potential Hyksos strongholds, others are less convinced of Egyptian involvement. The latter prefer to see the destructions as a product of internal strife—perhaps aggravated by the influx of Hyksos refugees from Egypt. Likewise, the damage is often attributed to disruptive migrations, to attacks by northern populations, to natural disasters or other ecological downturns, or to a general systems collapse caused by a variety of factors.

39 See for example, G. E. Wright 1961: 91; Hoffmeier 1989: 181; Dever 1990: 76. Kenyon (1979: 180) condensed the time period into only twenty years or so, but most scholars now prefer to view the transition as a much more gradual process.
41 Dever (1990: 78) points out that such stress is not evident in the Canaanite city-state system prior to this time. The famously elaborate Hyksos fortification techniques may well indicate, however, that the threat of warfare was a very real concern in Middle Bronze Age Palestine.
42 Bienkowski 1986: 128; Bunimovitz 1990: 444; Hoffmeier 1991: 122. See Weinstein (1997: 95), however, who argues that Egyptian influence on Canaanite material culture actually declines from MB IIC to LB IA. This is not what one would expect were the territory to have experienced a massive influx of Egyptianized Hyksos.
Those who seek to shift the emphasis away from the Egyptians generally cite the scarcity of known early Eighteenth Dynasty military campaigns into Canaan, the lack of patterning in the distribution of destroyed sites (along strategic routes or in specific trouble spots, for example), a lack of faith in Egypt’s techniques for siege warfare, and a concern that the Egyptians were not in the habit of destroying conquered towns. The foremost of these qualms is perhaps the least serious criticism for two reasons. First, comparatively few monuments of early Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs have survived. Buildings such as temples, on which royal victories were generally broadcast, tended to suffer dismantlement or vigorous refurbishing at the hands of later rulers. Evidence for the campaigns of the early Eighteenth Dynasty, then, have most frequently survived in biographical statements of individuals—of which there are also comparatively few that date to the early Eighteenth Dynasty.

The second reason why the dearth of recorded military campaigns into Canaan is not particularly surprising is that pharaohs rarely commemorated battles in which they themselves did not take center stage. It is quite likely that early Eighteenth Dynasty rulers generally commanded the more glamorous forays into Lebanon and Syria and left mundane “mopping up” expeditions in the south to able generals. Indeed, exceptional finds such as the Amenemhet II daybook or the Amarna letters allow an insight into the almost routine nature of military activity in reigns that otherwise have traditionally been viewed as predominantly pacificist.

The large-scale destruction of Middle Bronze Age Canaan—eloquently attested in the archaeological record, yet completely absent from textual evidence—may well have been caused by a continual and determined effort on the part of Egyptian armies to subdue the

49 Shea 1979: 2–3.
50 In *Urkunden der 18.Dynastie*, the inscriptions dating from the reigns of Ahmose to Hatshepsut in total occupy about a third as much space as that allotted solely to the inscriptions of Thutmose III.
51 The combined number of Theban tombs contemporary with the early Eighteenth Dynasty rulers from Ahmose to Hatshepsut does not equal the number of tombs dating to the reign of Thutmose III alone (Porter and Moss 1951: 476).
52 Altenmüller and Moussa 1991.
countryside. In addition, it is more than likely that the anarchic conditions described by Thutmose III at the beginning of his annals led to a significant number of destroyed communities. Nomadization, a situation in which people living in agriculturally based communities flee their homes in times of political instability, is a recognized phenomenon and surely took place as raids by Egyptians, nomadic groups, and neighboring communities made settled life less and less safe. In a war-torn feedback loop, chaos begets chaos, and it is likely that Canaan was an extremely unsettled environment for much of the early Eighteenth Dynasty. The Egyptians, it appears, were able to set up bases in the southernmost area of the country and may have had a garrison farther north, a possibility discussed below. It has been aptly noted, however, that the impressive military ventures of Thutmose I and Thutmose III might not have been accomplished quite so easily if Syria-Palestine had not been at that point “a weakened, partly desolated and ruined country.”

Finally, it is perhaps possible that the virtual absence of Canaan from early Eighteenth Dynasty records is due to the fact that pharaohs on their northern campaigns generally avoided the region. Progress through an unsafe and conflict-ridden environment would certainly have been slow, and indeed others could well have plundered from local communities the foodstuffs upon which an Egyptian army would depend for sustenance. The sea route, however, was familiar to the Egyptians from well over a thousand years of procuring Lebanese timber, and employment of maritime transport would have allowed the Egyptians to bypass the south altogether. While the pharaohs secured access to cedar forests, fought daring battles against Mitanni,

54 For discussions of the process of nomadization both in general and with respect to Late Bronze Age Canaan, see Finkelstein and Perlovitsky 1990; Hopkins 1993: 209–210. Gonen (1981: 80) notes that although the number and size of Canaanite polities plummeted dramatically in the Late Bronze Age, the number and size of cemeteries remained virtually unchanged from the Middle Bronze Age. To explain this situation, she suggests a subsistence switch by a significant percentage of the population to a pastoral or at least a non agrarian-based economy. It is surely not insignificant that the first secure mention of the Shasu-bedouin dates to the early Eighteenth Dynasty. Ward (1972: 53) describes this population as “a group of freebooters . . . who were encountered predominantly in their dual role of mercenaries or robber-bands serving or preying on the towns and caravan-routes of Canaan . . . a social class, not an ethnic group.” The emphasis placed by Thutmose II (Urk. IV, 138: 10) and Hatshepsut (Ur. IV, 385: 17) on securing formerly dangerous roads also makes sense in this context.

and took their recreation in Kedem and Niy, then, the frustrating and inglorious task of combating disorder in Canaan in all probability was left primarily to seasoned military men.

*Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for early Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters*

In the early Eighteenth Dynasty, Egypt’s pharaohs appear to have pursued two main goals with respect to their northern frontier. First and foremost, they needed to rid Egypt and southernmost Canaan of the Hyksos and their sympathizers. Post-conquest military policy, therefore, seems to have been aimed at securing Egypt’s victories by erecting fortresses or garrison outposts in now depopulated former Hyksos strongholds. Whether these new bases were replenished with a robust Egyptian population or rather supplied only with a modest cadre of soldiers depended on whether the bases were located inside the Nile Valley or to the northeast of it.

In Egypt, Ahmose and his successors built—among other installations—a “palatial fortress” at Tell el-Dab’a, the site of the former Hyksos capital.\(^56\) Likewise, the Egyptians reoccupied the Hyksos stronghold at Tell Heboua I (Tjaru), which guarded one of the major entry points from the Sinai into the eastern Delta. Conquered by Ahmose even before Avaris itself, this site was emptied of its former inhabitants, repopulated with Egyptians, and fortified on such a grand scale that it can only be considered a fortress-town (see figure 9). By concentrating a substantial population base at such a vulnerable point of entry, the early Eighteenth Dynasty rulers undoubtedly intended the sheer bulk of the town to intimidate would-be invaders.

Taken in conjunction with the numerous granaries and storage facilities excavated at Tell Heboua I, the appointment of a resident overseer of the storehouse may suggest that the settlement also early on served as a staging post for regular campaigns northward into Canaan. Considering that virtually no such expeditions are specifically mentioned in early Eighteenth Dynasty texts, the tremendous quantities of grain stored at this point of access to the military highway across the Sinai is extremely important. The existence of such an

\(^{56}\) Bietak 1996: 71. Considering its location firmly within Egypt proper and the fact that only the foundations remain, this installation is not here subject to detailed discussion.
infrastructure provides a strong argument that the Ways of Horus was already well traveled at the outset of the New Kingdom and that, consequently, many MB IIC/LB IA Canaanite destruction levels may indeed be aptly laid at the feet of Egyptian soldiers.57

By the opening of Thutmose III’s sole reign, this king was able to lead his army across the Sinai in ten days. The accomplishment of such a feat, which would have been the envy of later Assyrian and Persian generals, suggests both that the Egyptian troops were well provisioned with food and that the local wells were efficiently maintained and guarded from brigands. The emplacement of an efficient policing system in the north Sinai must have been a necessary first step toward the development of the chain of fortified way stations that punctuated this route in the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties.

Just across the Ways of Horus, an early Eighteenth Dynasty garrison likely occupied Gaza. Certainly, the site’s inhabitants presented no obstacle to the progress of Thutmose III’s troops on his first campaign of victory and, indeed, seem instead to have feted the army in celebratory style. Further, the settlement, locally known as gdl (Gaza), apparently already bore the formal Egyptian name of “The-ruler-seized-(it).” Such bombastic monikers are as characteristic of Egyptian emplacements in Canaan as they had been in the Middle Kingdom of Nubian fortress-towns. Given ancient Gaza’s location under the modern city, however, questions concerning its role both in the Hyksos period and in the early Eighteenth Dynasty remain largely unanswered.

Thutmose III’s annals also imply that prior to his assumption of sole rule, troops had been quartered north of Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajjul). Conditions of unrest, however, had caused the garrison to retrench at Sharuhen and await pharaonic intervention. Although the former location of this garrison is not known, Gezer and Lachish are two intriguing candidates. As particularly important Hyksos power bases, either of these towns may have fallen victim to the same Egyptian strategy of eradication and reoccupation as had been enacted at Tell el-Dab’a, Tell Heboua I, and Tell el-Ajjul. Likewise, due to their strategic importance as links between the hill country and the

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57 For the possibility that Tell el-Borg, a similarly strategic site only 6 km from Tjaru, was fortified at this time, see the discussion in chapter three.
coastal route, both Gezer and Lachish received a substantial amount of Egyptian attention throughout the New Kingdom—suggesting that their importance may well have been recognized early on.

While the garrisoning of Gezer and/or Lachish is pure speculation, the Egyptian occupation of Tell el-Ajjul (Sharuhen) has been demonstrated by means of excavation. This southerly Canaanite town, which had withstood a three-year-long Egyptian siege, would have served as an excellent launching point for Hyksos troops intent on retaking the Delta, and Ahmose undoubtedly wished to avoid such renewed conflict. Once the Egyptians gained their hard-won entrance into Sharuhen, a peaceful surrender for the Hyksos inhabitants does not seem to have been an option. Indeed, a thick and vitreous destruction layer suggests that the Egyptians entirely eradicated the Hyksos town, a move that represented a logical decision in terms of border security.

Likely because Tell el-Ajjul was a Hyksos center located outside of Egypt, however, the authorities did not attempt to repopulate it with Egyptian citizens as they had Tell el-Dab’a and Tell Heboua I. Instead, archaeological evidence suggests that the government simply installed a small garrison at the site to maintain order and to keep watch over the remnants of the local Canaanite population (see figure 10). Judging from the remains, the base itself seems to have consisted primarily of an administrative headquarters and its outbuildings. The plan of this main building is somewhat ambiguous due to later damage, but it can be convincingly reconstructed as a center-hall house. Such buildings were not only popular among wealthy Egyptian officials, but many were also employed as administrative buildings in Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty Canaan.

Judging from the artifacts discovered at Tell el-Ajjul, there is little question that the inhabitants of the garrison were either Egyptian or strongly influenced by Egyptian culture. Likewise, the discovery of a storage jar stamped with the twin cartouches of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III suggests that the garrison received at least some level of direct Egyptian provisioning in the early Eighteenth Dynasty. The inhabitants of the base may also have supported themselves through the ownership of cattle and the extraction of taxes from local farmers.\textsuperscript{58} It is interesting, however, that there is no evidence for an

\textsuperscript{58} As I will argue in chapter four, the relative self-sufficiency of this and other bases located just adjacent to the eastern edge of the Ways of Horus was unchar-
adversarial relationship between the soldiers and the indigenous population. The lack of defensive architecture, the high percentage of local cooking pots discovered in and around the headquarters, and the large number of burials in the town cemetery, in fact, suggest that the Egyptian garrison interacted with the locals frequently.\(^{59}\) Whether the Canaanites acted as auxiliary troops, service personnel, or even marriage partners, however, is unknown.

While the first goal of early Eighteenth Dynasty foreign policy, then, was to eradicate nearby trouble spots and to fortify the areas surrounding Egypt’s border, the second goal was broader in scope. Although textual evidence and widespread destruction layers indicate that the Egyptians were active in Canaan, the more highly touted royal campaigns in the early Eighteenth Dynasty struck far to the north in Syria and Lebanon. The dual aim of these campaigns seems to have been to re-open lucrative trade routes and to eliminate interference from Mitanni—the other Near Eastern superpower of the day. While the early Eighteenth Dynasty rulers do not appear to have erected or occupied any permanent bases in the north, this task would be assiduously attended to when Thutmose III ascended to sole rule.

*Textual references to early Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters*

**Regnum of Ahmose**

1. \(\text{rmp-tsp} \; 11 \; \text{bd} \; 2 \; \text{á} \; \text{tw} \; \text{tw}\; \text{á} \; \text{bd} \; 1 \; \text{á} \; \text{tw} \; \text{á} \; \text{tw} \; 23 \; \text{twn} \; \text{wr} \; \text{pn} \; \text{rsy} \; \text{r} \; \text{tárw} \; \text{sw} \; 2[5] \; \text{á} \; \text{tw} \; \text{r-dl} \; \text{bw} \; \text{tárw} \) (Rhind Mathematical Papyrus, colophon; Helel 1975a: 78)

Regnal year 11, second month of Shomu: Heliopolis was entered. First month of Akhet, day 23: this southern ruler advanced to Tjaru. Day 2[5]: it was heard, “Tjaru has been entered.”

\(^{59}\) This high percentage of local cooking pots found in association with an Egyptian base could be compared with the case at New Kingdom Askut in Nubia (see S. T. Smith 2003: 113–124).
Figure 6. Early Eighteenth Dynasty northern Sinai
Figure 7. Early Eighteenth Dynasty Canaan
Figure 8. Early Eighteenth Dynasty northern Syria-Palestine
The province of Tjaru is only once referred to by name before the advent of the New Kingdom. In the Middle Kingdom text “The Teaching of Dua-khety,” the prologue states that Dua-khety, a man from Tjaru, composed it while journeying south to enroll his son in a scribal school at the capital.60 In this text, as well as in the Rhind Mathematical Papyrus and in most other New Kingdom sources, the writing of Tjaru is determined by a town-sign.61 This spelling suggests that Tjaru had served as a population center or “town” since the Middle Kingdom. Although Tjaru is known from numerous New Kingdom texts62 to have been the location of the htm-fortress that safeguarded and regulated the border between the eastern Delta and the overland route to Canaan, its exact location has only recently been satisfactorily determined.

Many different archaeological sites have been proposed as the ruins of Tjaru,63 but before the mid-1980s general consensus held that the fortress was located at Tell Abu Sefeh.64 This town, strategically located on a narrow isthmus between Lake Menzalah and Lake Ballah, possessed an imposing Roman fortress and fragments of monuments bearing the names of three Nineteenth Dynasty rulers: Ramesses I, Seti I, and Ramesses II.65 A survey and soundings undertaken at the site by the Ben Gurion University expedition and excavations initiated by the North Sinai Salvage Campaign, however, have recovered no sherds or in situ archaeological remains that date prior to the Saite Period.66 While Tell Abu Sefeh, then, was assuredly

61 Gardiner sign O 49. Posener (1969: 5) reads frt rather than frw. If his reading were in fact correct, then the P. Rhind inscription would mark the first attested occurrence of the toponym frw.
62 Examples are gathered and analyzed in subsequent chapters.
63 Suggestions for Tjaru’s location have included Tanis (Brugsch 1974: 992–997), Ismailiya (Erman 1906: 73), an area southwest of Bubastis (Nibbi 1989: fig. 1), a location somewhere between Pi Ramesses and Heliopolis on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile (Vandersleyen 1993: 85), and Qantara or its immediate vicinity (Bietak 1975: 131, 133; Cavilleri 1998: 17).
66 For the work of the Ben Gurion team, see Oren 1987: 113, n. 3. For a summary of the results of the northern Sinai salvage work, see Hoffmeier 1997: 183, 195, n. 76. The obelisk and stone base found at Tell Abu Sefeh by Griffith in 1886
not the site of the New Kingdom town of Tjaru, the large Roman fortress that covers the majority of the site may perhaps be identified with classical Sile.\textsuperscript{67}

Excavations at Tell Heboua I, initiated by Abd el-Maksoud in 1986 as part of the North Sinai Salvage Campaign, have convinced most scholars that this was the site of Tjaru during the pharaonic period.\textsuperscript{68} Like Tell Abu Sefeh, Tell Heboua I was located on a narrow, elevated spit of land that projected between two bodies of water (in this case paleolagoons that had been indirectly watered in antiquity by the Pelusiac branch of the Nile).\textsuperscript{69} Before excavation had even begun, it was apparent that Tell Heboua I possessed a plethora of New Kingdom sherd and other artifacts, a door-jamb with cartouches of Seti I, and a massive enclosure wall. Archaeological work at the site has since revealed a number of carved stone blocks that bear the toponym “Tjaru,”\textsuperscript{70} and an associated survey of Tell Heboua I’s environs identified several discrete areas devoted to New Kingdom cemeteries, habitations, and administrative buildings.\textsuperscript{71}

Of most direct relevance to the Rhind Mathematical Papyrus colophon under discussion, however, are the numerous Hyksos-period artifacts that have been discovered at Tell Heboua I. These include contemporaneous ceramic, a horse burial, and a pair of steles inscribed

\textsuperscript{67} Oren 1984b: 34, 35; Hoffmeier 1997: 196, n. 112. The equation between ancient Egyptian Tjaru and classical Sile is made on philological grounds (see Gardiner 1918: 243). Given that Abu Sefeh was located barely 10 km from Tell Heboua I/Tjaru, it is quite likely that the Greco-Roman fortress-town had been founded as a replacement for Tell Heboua I, once the older town had become physically and environmentally degraded. An analogy may be seen in the transfer of the toponym Tjeku from Tell er-Retabah to nearby Maskhuta in Saite times (Redford 1982b: 1055).

\textsuperscript{68} Valbelle and Maksoud 1996: 60–65; Hoffmeier 1997: 185–186; Redford 1998: 45, n. 4. Griffith (Griffith and Petrie 1888: 101) described Tell Heboua I in the late nineteenth century as “[a] small heap of red bricks on the sand, 20 yards square and very unimportant in itself.” He believed it to be a Turkish guard-post. Gardiner (1920: 107), meanwhile, identified Tell Heboua as the fort labeled “Dwelling-of-the-Lion” found on Seti I’s depiction of the Ways of Horus at Karnak (KRI I, 10: 1).


\textsuperscript{71} See Valbelle et al. 1992.
with the name of the Fourteenth Dynasty king Nehesy. It seems, then, that Tjaru may well have served as a conduit between the Hyksos capital at Tell el-Dab’a and other Hyksos-dominated city-states in southern Canaan. Given the strong Hyksos presence at the site, it is logical that Ahmose would have attempted to capture Tjaru in order to prevent the allies of his enemies from funneling manpower and supplies through this strategic gateway.

The Rhind Mathematical Papyrus provides the information that both Heliopolis and Tjaru had been captured prior to the fall of Tell el-Dab’a, which lay between the two towns on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. If the Hyksos were still in full control of their capital, it is perhaps likely that Ahmose was forced to take a circuitous route through the Wadi Tumilat and north via the Bitter Lakes in order to reach Tjaru. Conversely, if the Egyptians had already effectively bottled up the Hyksos at Tell el-Dab’a, Ahmose could have surged northward with impunity. Given the significant time lapse between his capture of Heliopolis and his arrival at Tjaru, however, Ahmose and his soldiers may either have faced resistance in the course of their journey or have found themselves temporarily preoccupied with the activities that followed a successful conquest.

Ahmose’s capture of Tjaru, a move that allowed him effectively to isolate his opponents, would indeed have been one of the major turning points of the war against the Hyksos. As will be discussed below, however, no evidence has yet been unearthed at Tell Heboua I to indicate that the conquest of Tjaru was a particularly violent affair. Indeed, as at Tell el-Dab’a, the archaeological remains are more consistent with abandonment than with fierce fighting. Given this intriguing and rather unexpected fact, it is tempting to speculate that a peace settlement, perhaps involving a large-scale banishment of the town’s Hyksos inhabitants, may have been negotiated. It is important to note, however, that at both Tjaru and Tell el-Dab’a the Egyptians lost no time in reclaiming their territory by transforming these towns, architecturally at least, into thoroughly Egyptian centers.

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72 Maksoud 1983: 3–5; 1998: 37–39; Hoffmeier 1997: 185. Although it is not clear that Nehesy should be considered a Hyksos ruler, the distribution of artifacts bearing his name suggests that his realm, like that of the Hyksos, was centered upon the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Indeed, Bietak (1984: 62) suggests Avaris as Nehesy’s capital on the basis of both artifacts and texts.
Chapter Two

Text from the reign of Thutmose III, with relevance perhaps to the reign of Thutmose I

1. wḥm nsw ɪm-y r sdḥw kn sn-nfr ɪm3'-ḥrw ir(t) n ɪm-y r st m ḫwty-h3y-tp ɪm3'-ḥrw (Statue of Sennefer; Urk. IV, 547: 3–4)

The king’s herald, overseer of the treasury, the valiant one, Sennefer, justified; engendered by the overseer of the storehouse in the Way of Horus, Dʒḥuyt-hay-tp, justified.

Although a “Way of Horus” is referred to in the mythic topography of at least two religious writings (Pyramid Text 363; Urk. IV, 237: 9), it first appears as a distinct terrestrial landmark in the Instructions to King Merikare. In this text a Tenth Dynasty king boasts to his son that he had filled the eastern district from Hebenu to Way of Horus with towns to repel Syro-Palestinian incursions. The Way of Horus appears again in the Story of Sinuhe as the fortress at which Sinuhe must stop and declare his business to the commander (ḥ3y) in charge of the frontier patrol (ḥ3ry). Given the fact that officials from the royal court arrived in boats to fetch Sinuhe for his journey to the palace, the Way of Horus must have been accessible from Egypt by water.

The association of the Way of Horus with an eastern Delta border-fortress that was accessible by water has led many scholars to assume a shared identity between it and the fortress of Tjaru, discussed above. According to this assumption, the preeminent border-fortress

73 “Wḥt ḫr” is an alternate writing for the more common w3wt ḫr (Wb. I, 248; Faulkner 1986: 52; Valbelle 1994: 381). The former toponym is found in the Theban tombs of Sennefer and Puyenre. One further example may appear in a list of fishing grounds dating to the late Eighteenth Dynasty (Caminos 1956: 19–20). Whereas Erman argued that because wḥt-ḥr and ḫ3y-ḥr were written slightly differently they signified two distinct places, the similarity in context between the sites designated one way or the other strongly suggests that the two versions should be equated (Davies 1922: 81–82, n. 1).

74 Line 88. Publications of this text include, most recently, Helck 1977a and Quack 1992. An overseer of the Way of Horus (ɪm-y r pr ḫ3y-ḥr) is attested also on a Fifth Dynasty funerary inscription at Giza (Hassan 1953: figs. 40, 42, 52).

75 The identification of Hebenu is much debated, although an eastern Delta location would appear proper given the context. The various arguments for its whereabouts are summarized in Ward 1971: 28–29, n. 113 and Hoffmeier 1997: 70, n. 22.

76 Gardiner 1916b: 147, l. 242.

77 Erman 1906: 72–73; Gardiner 1920: 113; Bietak 1980: 63; Wente 1990: 110, n. 15. It is significant that the fortress designated as Way(ṣ) of Horus and the fortress of Tjaru never appear in the same text, even in such sources as the Karnak relief.
of the New Kingdom could be identified either by the town in the vicinity of which it lay (Tjaru) or by the name of the overall district (Way of Horus). So far, pre-Hyksos architecture has yet to be found at Tell Heboua I or in its environs, but Middle Kingdom levels have been reached at Tjaru only in a small number of sondages. Throughout the New Kingdom, however, it appears almost certain that when the name “Way(s) of Horus” was used to signify a particular fortress, rather than a larger district, it designated Tjaru.

The fact that Sennefer’s father, presumably a contemporary of Thutmose I, was appointed as an overseer of the storehouse in the Way of Horus (i.e., Tjaru) suggests that Egypt had already reinvested in its border defenses and stocked them with supplies shortly following the defeat of the Hyksos. Indeed, as will be discussed below, evidence from recent excavations at Tell Heboua I demonstrates that not only was the border-fortress largely complete at or before the reign of Thutmose III, but also that a substantial area had indeed been given over to storage. Perhaps significantly, the most impressive storage area so far discovered—Zone B—was provided with a sizable house, seemingly perfect for the abode of an “overseer of the storehouse of the Ways of Horus.”

of Seti I, P. Anastasi I, or the Late Egyptian Miscellanies (see chapter five), all of which focus upon the eastern Delta border zone. Although Valbelle (1994: 384) warns against an “équivalence rigoureuse” between the two toponyms, she does note their mutual exclusivity, positing that during the course of the New Kingdom a fortress in the Way of Horus district may have gradually come to be known as Tjaru rather than Way(s) of Horus.

The toponym Way(s) of Horus appears to have designated a particularly marshy and fertile area of the northeastern Delta. Since Gardiner’s (1920) study of the Karnak reliefs, it has also been viewed by many as the name of a fortified highway running along the northern Sinai between Tjaru and Gaza. Two major theories exist as to why this route through the Sinai would have been dubbed the Way(s) of Horus. According to one theory, it gained its name because it was the road that the king, as the living Horus, would take on his campaigns to Syria-Palestine. Alternatively, it may have been that the god Horus lent his name to the route by virtue of his position as the patron deity of the easternmost Delta (Bietak 1980: 62).

Maksoud 1998: 39. Due to extensive building in the Hyksos period and in the New Kingdom, it is also likely that much of the Middle Kingdom architecture may have been destroyed or at least deeply buried as the centuries passed.

An overseer of the storehouse is also known from a Middle Kingdom seal impression found at the fortress of Uronarti (Martin 1971: 222).

For this house, BAT I, see the section on the archaeology of Tell Heboua I below.
At least two other overseers of the storehouse at Tjaru seem to have been involved with facilitating shipments of wine in the Nineteenth Dynasty (KRI II, 688: 9–15). Storage space at the fortress, however, could also be utilized for less innocuous purposes. Weapons to equip soldiers while on campaign, for example, were stored at Tjaru in the Twentieth Dynasty (P. Lansing 9, 10). Further, one might surmise that the border-fortress also served as a depot for the food supplies required by armies on the long journey across the Sinai. Certainly, the large number of granaries at Tjaru suggests that some were in fact put to this use. Considering that historical texts are silent regarding the employment of the overland route to Canaan in the reign of Thutmose I, such varied textual and archaeological evidence attesting to an interest in Tjaru at this period is particularly valuable.

Text from the reign of Thutmose III, with relevance to the reign of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III

1. ist ‘h’ nw [§3] m rnpwt iw rt[nw w3 r] h‘d3 s nb hr [rwd] r sn-nw.f [. . .] hpr.n is m h3[w kyw iw]‘yt ntt im m dmi n šhrn št §3 ‘m yrđ nfrtyt-r phw t3 w3(w) r bš3 hr lm.f (Annals of Thutmose III; Redford 1979; Murnane 1989)\(^{83}\)

Now for a [long] period of years Ret[enu had fallen into] anarchy, every man [showing hostility] towards his neighbor [. . .]. It was in the tim[es of others] that it happened that the [garr]ison which had been there (was) in the town of Sharuhen, and (the region) from Yurza as far as the marshes of the earth had fall(en) to rebelling against his majesty.

This historical retrospective, which prefaces the narration of Thutmose III’s first official campaign into Syria-Palestine, introduces three important pieces of information. First, it indicates that “for a long period of years” Retenu, a toponym designating Syria-Palestine generally,\(^{84}\) had been plunged into chaotic circumstances. This passage has been

\(^{82}\) In the Twentieth Dynasty there is yet another text (P. Harris I, 78: 9–10) that refers to weapons having been stored centrally, perhaps also in arsenals as at Tjaru.

\(^{83}\) Sethe transcribed this text in Urk. IV, 648: 2–7; however, his restorations have not been followed by other scholars (Redford 1979b: 338). Murnane (1989: 186) generally subscribes to Redford’s transcription but prefers “Now for a long period of years con[ten]ti[ousness was in (or throughout?) Asia (or this land)”—‘w r[k] t m (or hḥ) stt (or ts pm).

\(^{84}\) Gardiner 1947a: 144*; Drower 1980: 425.
discussed above with respect to the tumultuous transition between the Middle and Late Bronze Ages in Canaan.

Second, the text states that prior to Thutmose III’s assumption of sole rule, an Egyptian garrison had been present in Retenu, presumably in the dual role of conqueror and peacekeeper. Although the time period at which this occurred is not stated, and Thutmose III could conceivably be referencing events from generations back, it makes sense to assume that the garrison had only recently been expelled from its base. Indeed, the crisis that had precipitated this event, the rebellion radiating from Yurza (modern Tell Jemmeh) to the far reaches of Syria, appears to have been the *a priori* cause of Thutmose III’s first campaign. While it is not stated, then, that the garrison occupied a specific military installation in Retenu during the reign of Hatshepsut, it appears probable that Egyptian forces were in fact present in the region at that time.

The third fact to be gleaned from this inscription is that the retreating Egyptian garrison fell back to Sharuhen, presumably one of the few remaining polities under Egypt’s direct control. The location of Sharuhen has been debated vigorously, but most scholars agree that the town should be identified with one of two former Hyksos strongholds in the Wadi Ghazzeh, either Tell el-Far‘ah South or Tell el-Ajjul. Albright first suggested the site of Tell el-Far‘ah as a candidate, remarking, “it is exceedingly strong and the topographic location is admirably adapted for Sharuhen.” Many scholars have since followed this identification, citing the city’s former glory as a Hyksos

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85 Both O’Connor and Redford (personal communications) regard the notion that the Egyptians had been “pushed back” to Sharuhen with wariness. Such an interpretation, however, is not only consistent with the text itself but adds to the impression that Egypt’s nascent empire was in a period of crisis prior to the campaign of Thutmose III.
86 B. Mazar 1951; Amiran and Van Beek 1975: 545; Dorsey 1991: 68.
87 The site of Tell el-Far‘ah South will henceforth be designated simply as Tell el-Far‘ah, as Tell el-Far‘ah North bears little import for the understanding of New Kingdom foreign policy.
88 Goedicke (1980: 210–211) has suggested that Sharuhen should be taken as a broad term that denoted an area of southeastern Canaan corresponding approximately to later Philistia. He believes that the three years given by Ahmose son of Ibana is far too long for the siege of a single city. Instead he would amend the text to refer to the “towns” of Sharuhen. His theory is not, however, generally followed. Other alternative suggestions for the site of Sharuhen include Anaharath (Aharoni 1960: 179; Wells 1995: 151), Tel Sera’ (a popular suggestion in the nineteenth century—see Rainey 1993: 183*) and Tell Haror (Rainey 1988; 1993).
89 Albright 1929: 7.
center—as evidenced by archaeological remains—and its close fit with post-New Kingdom Egyptian and Biblical references.  

In 1957, a reanalysis of the Middle Bronze Age levels at Tell el-Ajjul prompted Stewart to suggest that this site provided a closer fit with textual evidence pertaining to Sharuhen. This hypothesis remained unpublished until 1974, the same year as Kempinski published an article that reached the same conclusion. Tell el-Ajjul was not only far larger than Tell el-Far’ah in the Middle Bronze Age (roughly 28 acres as opposed to 7.5 acres), but it was also located strategically on the main north-south highway in southern Canaan, where a topographical list of Amenhotep III at Soleb, later copied by Ramesses II at Amara West, suggests that Sharuhen should be located. In contrast, Tell el-Far’ah lay over 20 km to the southwest in a relatively isolated stretch of the Wadi Ghazzeh.  

In addition, Tell el-Ajjul yielded evidence for both a flourishing late Hyksos occupation and a destruction layer dating to the LB I period, as might be expected if the site were indeed seized by Ahmose. Neither feature was found at Tell el-Far’ah. Finally, there is sub-

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91 Stewart 1974: 3; Kempinski 1974. Tell el-Ajjul has also been suggested as the site of ancient Gaza (Petrie 1931) or Beth ‘Eglayim (Tufnell 1975: 52; Aharoni 1982: 94; T. Dothan 1982c: 35).  
92 Fairman 1940: 165. In these lists Sharuhen is grouped with towns such as Gaza, Raphia, and Jaffa—all three of which are located on the eastern stretch of the Ways of Horus highway and the southern end of the Via Maris.  
93 Hoffmeier (1991: 120) cites Thutmose III’s claim that the rebellion stretched from Yurza (Tell Jemmeh) to the marshes of the earth to argue that Tell el-Far’ah, which is south of Tell Jemmeh, is a more suitable site for Sharuhen than Tell el-Ajjul, which is north of it. According to the inscription, he argues, Tell el-Ajjul would have lain in enemy territory, and it would thus have been an unsuitable place for an Egyptian army to retreat. While Tell el-Far’ah indeed lies south of Tell el-Ajjul, it is accessed via the Wadi Ghazzeh, which places it in essence 20 km farther from Egypt than Tell el-Ajjul. A rebellion extending from Yurza outward, therefore, would presumably indicate that all territories to the north and east had rebelled, leaving only isolated Egyptian enclaves at the sites of Tell el-Ajjul and Gaza.  
94 Besides settlement, burial, and ceramic evidence, Weinstein (1981: 8) notes that Tell el-Ajjul had the greatest number and the widest variety of Hyksos royal name scarabs in Canaan. He firmly believes that it was this city’s position as a powerful Hyksos center that earned it the wrath of Ahmose.  
95 Kempinski (1974: 150) cites the lack of bichrome ware and Hyksos scarabs bearing the names of Apophis and Khayan as evidence that the late Hyksos occupation of Tell el-Far’ah was not substantial. Regarding the lack of a destruction level at Tell el-Far’ah, which he believes to be Sharuhen, Hoffmeier (1989: 183)
stantial evidence that the Egyptians occupied Tell el-Ajjul in the early Eighteenth Dynasty—precisely the period in which the texts suggest that a garrison was indeed present at the site. At Tell el-Far’ah, the LB IA period is all but unattested, and there is no evidence for an Egyptian occupation.96 Stewart and Kempinski’s arguments have been widely accepted and in some cases elaborated upon.97 The identification of Tell el-Ajjul as Sharuhen is followed in this work.

If Egyptian bases existed at both Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) and Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajjul) in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, it is possible to see a pattern whereby Egyptian forces erected military bases upon the sites of newly conquered Hyksos strongholds. In doing so, the Egyptians effectively rid the area of potentially hostile Hyksos elements. Moreover, as both towns were located in areas of primary strategic importance (Tjaru at the gateway from the northern Sinai into Egypt and Tell el-Ajjul at the link between the Ways of Horus and the Via Maris), the Egyptians were able in this manner also to secure their borders against future land attacks.

Just where the Egyptians stationed their garrison in Retenu prior to its retrenchment at Sharuhen is unfortunately not known. Based upon an apparent military predilection for the reoccupation of Hyksos strongholds, however, it is tempting to suggest either Gezer or Lachish. Both of these sites yielded a comparatively large number of Hyksos royal name scarabs (three for Lachish and four for Gezer)98 and appear to have been either occupied by or in intensive contact with

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96 There is neither settlement nor cemetery material at Tell el-Far’ah from this period, and Weinstein (1991: 111, n. 6) maintains that LB I pottery has been found in negligible quantities on the tell.

97 Redford 1979a: 286, n. 146; Tufnell 1984; Gonen 1992a: 211; Dessel 1997: 38. Weinstein (1981: 8; 1991: 106) has pointed out that Tell el-Ajjul yielded 18 Hyksos royal name scarabs, 43% of the total known from Canaan. Significantly, more Hyksos royal name scarabs have been found at Tell el-Ajjul than are known from Egypt proper! Tell el-Far’ah, on the other hand, has revealed only two such scarabs.

98 Only Jericho, which yielded three Hyksos royal name scarabs, approached the totals of Gezer and Lachish (Weinstein 1981: 240). Jericho appears, however, to have lain abandoned during the LB IA period (Kenyon 1976: 563).
Egypt later in the Eighteenth Dynasty. Further, the position of both Gezer and Lachish as conduits between the Via Maris and the troublesome Hill Country may have made them particularly attractive to the Egyptians, who presumably wished to keep an eye on the highlanders as well as to guard the lowland transit route.

Text from the reign of Thutmose III, with possible relevance to the reign of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III

1. rnp-t f tpy šmĂw sw 4 sw n ḫb-nsw nṯ ḫ3 r dmš n ḫnḫ n p3 ḫk3 gdl [rn.f n ḫmrw] (Annals of Thutmose III; Urk. IV, 648: 9–11)

Year 23, first month of Shomu, day 4, day of the king’s festival of appearance. (Arrival) to the town of The-ruler-seized-(it), Gaza being [its Syrian name].

The Egyptian army’s first stop upon leaving Egypt and traversing the Ways of Horus road across the northern Sinai was the town of Gaza, where the soldiers rested for a night before resuming their march northward. In this text Gaza is provided with two names, one Egyptian, “The-ruler-seized-(it),” and one Syrian, “Gaza.” The Egyptian custom of renaming conquered towns, especially those that were subsequently placed under direct rule, is well known. The same types of formal or royally inspired names were also applied to Egyptian fortresses newly constructed in foreign territory.

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99 See chapter four, particularly. Redford (1979b: 341, n. 15) tentatively suggests Byblos for the location of the northern garrison. While the site certainly would have been the focus of much northern activity in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, one would expect a garrison retreating from Byblos to have left for Egypt by boat rather than to have made the long landward journey toward Tell el-Ajjul.

100 Thutmose III’s army covered the 220 km of the Ways of Horus, from Tjaru to Gaza, in a period of 10 days. This meant that the army likely traveled some 22 km a day on average, a particularly good pace for troops on the move (Kitchen 1977: 218; Astour 1981: 14; Dorsey 1991: 13). The speed with which Thutmose III and his army traversed this distance has led Oren (1987: 70) to suggest that the chain of wells across the northern Sinai must have been effectively policed in his reign. As yet, however, no early Eighteenth Dynasty archaeological evidence suggests the presence of way stations across the northern Sinai.

101 Gaza is generally thought to be located at Tell Harube (T. Dothan 1982: 35c; T. Dothan and M. Dothan 1992: 48; Ovadiah 1992: 464), a site briefly examined by Pythian-Adams but never subjected to modern or thorough excavation.

102 See, for example, “Sumur of Sese” (P. Anastasi I, 18: 8–19: 1), “Ramesses-Meryamun, the town which is in the Valley of the Cedars” (KRI II, 14: 6–10), or “this town, Ramesses-is-strong” (P. Anastasi III, 5: 3), all discussed in chapter five.

103 Examples from Thutmose III’s sole reign include “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-subdues-the-wanderers” (Urk. IV, 740: 1) and “Slaying-the-foreigners” (Urk. IV, 1228: 12), both of which are discussed in chapter three.
It seems apparent, then, that by the time the annals were written, Gaza had already lost its autonomy. From the reign of Thutmose III until the end of the New Kingdom, Gaza served as a headquarters for the Egyptian administration in Canaan and apparently lacked a local dynasty of its own. It is unknown, however, whether Gaza was first seized during this particular campaign or at some point prior to it. Some scholars suggest that Thutmose III both captured and renamed Gaza at the time of his first campaign, and this is certainly possible. As Gaza was located north of Yurza (Tell Jemmeh), it may have been situated within the sphere of general rebellion. Although the town of Gaza must, according to the chronology of the campaign, have been conquered in the space of a day (presumably at the tail end of one long march and prior to the beginning of another), one could easily imagine that its inhabitants surrendered without struggle upon sighting the approach of Thutmose III’s vast army.

Several facts, however, appear to suggest otherwise. To begin with, one might expect that the capture of Gaza would have received more fanfare in the narrative of the annals if it in fact represented the first victory of the first campaign. Secondly, Gaza does not appear in Thutmose III’s exhaustive lists of conquered Canaanite towns, although the nearby hostile polities of Yurza (Urk. IV, 783: no. 60) and Jaffa (Urk. IV, 783: no. 62) do. Third, it would appear poor planning for Thutmose III to have directed his army, presumably hungry and tired after their tenth straight day marching, to storm an enemy town. A sounder strategy, it seems, would have been to halt the army on friendly ground in order to fortify them with food, drink, and a good night’s sleep before they resumed their march northward to Megiddo. Fourth, Gaza was located barely 6 km, less than an hour’s walk, from the Egyptian base at Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajjul)—a base garrisoned already in the joint reign of Hatshepsut.

104 Spalinger 1982: 135; Rainey 1993: 179*. Katzenstein (1982: 112) suggests that Gaza had been conquered by earlier Eighteenth Dynasty kings but was renamed in honor of the anniversary of Thutmose III’s coronation. Redford (personal communication) believes similarly that the name had been given to Gaza to indicate the new legal status of the town as property of the Egyptian government, but that the timing of the campaign is too condensed for Gaza to have been captured on this campaign.

105 Although, if one takes the position that Gaza was in fact closer to Egypt than Tell Jemmeh (due to the necessity of reaching the latter through a detour via the Wadi Ghazzeh), it is not necessary to view Gaza as located in enemy territory.

and Thutmose III. Presumably if Gaza and Sharuhen were not allied, it would have been difficult for them to coexist in such close proximity.

The final clue suggesting that Gaza had in fact been captured prior to Thutmose III’s first official campaign is the character of the town’s Egyptian name. When Egyptian rulers captured or built in foreign territories, they were seldom shy about (re)naming the towns and/or fortresses after themselves. To have the pharaoh who seized Gaza identified solely as “the ruler” is strange. It is tempting, then, to speculate that the elliptical structure of Gaza’s designation in this particular inscription could be explained if the town had originally been named for Hatshepsut. Regardless, however, of whether Gaza was conquered in the reign of Hatshepsut, the reign of one of her predecessors, or the first year of Thutmose III’s sole reign, it is clear that the site was one of the oldest and most secure of the Egyptian bases in Canaan. It is deeply disappointing, then, that the early Eighteenth Dynasty town has never been excavated.

Archaeological evidence for early Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

Tell Heboua I, Tjaru (see figure 9)

It is no coincidence that Tjaru, which had once been one of the most important Hyksos bases, was transformed following its defeat into New Kingdom Egypt’s most famed fortress. Any power attempting to control the eastern Delta would immediately realize the strategic value of the site. Due to an extensive series of paleolagoons, indirectly irrigated by the Pelusiac branch of the Nile, Egypt was afforded natural protection on its easternmost flank. There were, however, two primary weak points through which uninvited foreigners could make their way to Egypt. To the south, the well-watered Wadi Tumilat provided a straight, if narrow, chute into the

107 Consult the section below regarding early Eighteenth Dynasty archaeological evidence at Tell el-Ajjul.
108 Indeed, pharaohs of the Nineteenth Dynasty appear to have routinely renamed installations built by other pharaohs after themselves (see, for example, the wholesale renaming of the forts along the Ways of Horus in the reign of Ramesses II, discussed in chapter five).
109 Müller 1893: 159; Alt 145: 10; Murnane 1989: 188, n. 33.
southern Delta area. Far more accessible to a visitor from Syria-Palestine, however, was the naturally raised land bridge that spanned the lagoons at Tell Heboua I. It was upon this modest isthmus that Tjaru had been settled in the Middle Kingdom, perhaps as a component in the “walls of the ruler” system of border control.111

The discovery of two steles bearing the name of the king ‘Aa-seh-re Nehesy112 suggests that under the Hyksos, Tjaru may have enjoyed royal patronage. Recently excavated architecture from the Second Intermediate Period has revealed a burgeoning settlement, which included numerous habitations, tombs, and an unusually large number of granaries.113 Although it is not specifically attributed to the Hyksos in the excavation report, a glacis to the east of the site bore strong similarities to the “type de massif a été recnue dans le Delta à Tell el-Yahoudiyeh et dans différents sites de Palestine.”114 Indeed, given the probable employment of Tjaru as a conduit between the Hyksos in Egypt and their counterparts in Canaan, and given the Hyksos propensity to fortify their settlements with glacis, the example at Tell Heboua I should provisionally be assigned to the Hyksos occupation.

As discussed above, Ahmose’s conquest of the Hyksos base at Tjaru has left no observable trace in the archaeological record. Whether the site had been abruptly abandoned or whether the inhabitants surrendered is not known. The Egyptians, however, appear to have found much to co-opt in the Hyksos installations, as several Hyksos-period houses were expanded and reused in the early New Kingdom.115

The most dramatic Egyptian imprint on the town of Tjaru was the construction of a massive mud-brick enclosure wall. It is not clear under which pharaoh the project was initiated, but work seems

111 The earliest levels of the site have been reached only in sondages (Maksoud 1998: 39), so it remains unclear whether Tjaru was fortified at this time. Bietak (1984: 61), however, suspects so. For a review of the earliest attestations of Tjaru and the possible involvement of this border town in the “walls of the ruler,” see above as well as Hoffmeier 1997: 167–168.

112 Maksoud 1983.

113 Levels Va–IVa date to the Hyksos occupation (Maksoud 1998: 37–38). The impressive number of Second Intermediate Period grain storage installations has led Maksoud (1998: 115) to speculate that the site may have served as a sort of fortified granary at this time.


to have been concluded at or before the reign of Thutmose III.\textsuperscript{116} Although the entire circuit of the rectangular enclosure wall is not delineated, enough has been excavated to indicate that the New Kingdom pharaohs had designed Tjaru on an unprecedented scale for a fortress-town. The settlement wall enclosed an area of at least 120,000 m\textsuperscript{2}, and indeed possibly twice that amount.\textsuperscript{117} For comparison’s sake, the powerful Hyksos town of Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajjul)—one of the larger Canaanite polities of the day—occupied only 116,875 m\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{118}

Aside from its great extent, the enclosure wall at Tjaru was also unusual in that it possessed a skirting wall.\textsuperscript{119} This second, outer wall was bastioned in a similar fashion to the inner wall but was far less substantial in nature. While the inner wall extended 4–7 m in width, the outer wall measured only 1.2 m. Undoubtedly built to frustrate those who intended to sap or scale the main wall, the double wall may also have served to shield the inner wall from sandstorm-related damage.\textsuperscript{120} In good Egyptian fashion, neither wall employed stone foundations, although in certain areas preexisting Hyksos architecture had been shaved down and employed as a platform.\textsuperscript{121}

Disregarding for the moment the unprecedented size of the emplacement at Tell Heboua I and its unusual double wall, the early Eighteenth Dynasty town of Tjaru is not significantly different from other contemporaneous large-scale Egyptian constructions. Tjaru’s rectangular plan, its bastioned walls, and even the “state-size” brick employed in its construction\textsuperscript{122} are reminiscent of the early Eighteenth Dynasty fortified town at Sai. Indeed, such walled fortress-towns were to be constructed in Nubia throughout the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties.

Due to the poor preservation of the main outer wall, only one gate has been uncovered at Tjaru. This monumental entranceway, reinforced by two bastions, granted entrance to the fortress from the

\textsuperscript{116} Maksoud 1998: 36.
\textsuperscript{117} Maksoud 1998: 111.
\textsuperscript{118} Albright 1938: 337.
\textsuperscript{119} The Middle Kingdom fortress of Buhen (see below) and the Twentieth Dynasty fortress at Tell er-Retabah (see chapter six) also possessed double walls. Otherwise, however, this feature is quite rare.
\textsuperscript{120} Maksoud 1998: 112–113.
\textsuperscript{121} Maksoud 1998: 36–37.
\textsuperscript{122} Most of the bricks utilized at Tjaru had dimensions of 40 × 20 cm (Maksoud 1998: 45), while those employed at Sai measured 41 × 19.5 cm (Azim 1975: 109).
west, the side from which one would approach Tjaru if traveling from the Nile Valley. Its eastern counterpart, the gate presumably providing access to the Ways of Horus highway, has yet to be discovered.

Against the town’s northern wall, the Egyptian authorities installed a series of granaries and at least two unusually well-built, modestly sized buildings—BAT. I and BAT. IV. The smaller but better preserved of the two structures, BAT. I, at roughly 64 m² in area, can easily be classified as a “center-hall” house. As is typical of a center-hall house, BAT. I had a roughly square plan and a series of chambers organized around one central room. Significantly, BAT. I could be accessed via the street or from the grain storage area, and so it appears likely that the building’s owner, perhaps an overseer of the storehouses like Sennefer’s father, enjoyed authority over Tjaru’s storage facilities. As will be discussed extensively in chapters five and six, imperial architects employed the plan of the center-hall house as a model for administrative buildings in Canaan during the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. Whether BAT I served as a house or an administrative building in this case, however, is not entirely clear.

The plan of BAT. IV, the other possible administrative building, is unfortunately rather difficult to make out due to later damage. Judging from the preserved portions of the building, however, it is likely that BAT. IV also adhered to a center-hall plan, although, at 196 m² in area, this building was substantially larger than the nearby BAT. I. While no artifacts have been recorded to illuminate its function, BAT. IV’s location in the granary complex suggests that it also served an administrative function. Certainly, keeping track of the foodstuffs and other items stored at Tjaru would have been a daunting task in itself. Maksoud estimates that the border-fortress’ granary could have stored some 178.35 metric tons of grain, an amount not inconsistent with what would be expected of a storehouse that provisioned armies for their treks across the Sinai. Whether the grain

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123 Maksoud 1998: 36, 119–120.
125 Other domestic buildings, including some built in the Second Intermediate Period that had been reused or expanded, were found throughout the excavated areas (Maksoud 1998: 36, 115–116).
stored at the fortress was locally grown or requisitioned by the state from a number of sources, however, is unknown.\textsuperscript{127}

The great quantity of bread molds discovered in public places at Tell Heboua I indicates that at least some level of industrial food production took place at the site. It is unfortunately unclear, however, with which institutions the molds should be associated. Excavations also uncovered evidence for extensive bronze production. According to the associated detritus, the primary articles manufactured in this process were weights, hooks, and—not surprisingly—arrowheads. Evidence for weaving, on the other hand, came primarily from domestic dwellings.\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{Tell el-Ajjul} (see figure 10)

Petrie and his associates excavated Tell el-Ajjul in five seasons, from 1930 to 1934 and again in 1938; they published the site in a series of volumes entitled \textit{Ancient Gaza}. Although the excavators produced prompt reports, their methodology, conventions of notation, and their ideas concerning chronology shift from volume to volume, resulting in data that are often difficult to interpret.\textsuperscript{129} In addition, they did not collate their architectural plans,\textsuperscript{130} and they present artifacts in isolation from their context, noting only general provenience and occasionally absolute level. Such a system renders the stratigraphic levels difficult to discern. For these reasons, it is particularly unfortunate no one has attempted a comprehensive synthesis and reevaluation of the Late Bronze Age material, such as was undertaken by Stewart with regard to the Middle Bronze Age levels.\textsuperscript{131}

\textsuperscript{127} Maksoud (1998: 121) suggests that a good portion of the grain was indeed local, given the fertility of the eastern Delta and the number of bones of domestics found scattered around the site.

\textsuperscript{128} Maksoud 1998: 122.

\textsuperscript{129} See Albright 1938a for a penetrating critique of Petrie’s excavations.

\textsuperscript{130} Yassine (1974) attempted to devise a coherent city plan from the scattered plans given in \textit{Ancient Gaza} I–V, yet the result, as he admits, is largely hypotheti-

\textsuperscript{cal and includes only Middle Bronze Age architecture.

\textsuperscript{131} See Stewart 1974. Gonen (1992b: 70–82) restudied the Late Bronze Age cemetery material, and her analysis is particularly interesting. It is to be regretted, however, that she rarely includes specifics. Thus, while she might state that six burials in the Eastern Cemetery should be dated to the Late Bronze Age I, she neglects to list which six burials these were. Stewart (1974: 7) was apparently in the process of extending his examination to the Late Bronze Age levels at Tell el-Ajjul when he died.
Figure 9. Border-fortress at Tell Heboua I (Tjaru) (after Maksoud 1998: 128, fig. 1)
In conjunction with these procedural concerns, the stratigraphy of the site itself was not without its own inherent difficulties. According to Petrie:

Mixture was caused by erosion, but a more serious mixture was caused by the innumerable grain pits sunk by the Arabs, and afterwards filled up as rubbish holes. The digging of these had thrown up earlier material and so brought objects upward, while it let late things fall down below. Hence in judging of the range of any kind of pottery or other objects, it is only a continuity of occurrence which is decisive, while single examples at very different levels may be regarded as sporadic.\footnote{Petrie 1932: 5.}

Considering this potent mixture of ambiguous stratigraphy and confusing publication, it is not surprising that there has been a fair amount of disagreement as to the chronology of the site.

Petrie’s belief that Palace V constituted the first Eighteenth Dynasty building at the site was successfully challenged by Albright.\footnote{Petrie 1932: 1, 14; Albright 1938a: 342.} Based on his own analysis of the ceramic material, Albright believed that Ahmose’s attack on the town resulted in the destruction level that separated Palace I (and contemporaneous City III) from Palace II (and contemporaneous City II). The amount of bichrome ware in Palace II and City II convinced him that this stratum was in fact coeval with Megiddo level IX—the city that Thutmose III attacked in his first campaign. Because of this supposed correlation, Albright argued that the destruction between City and Palace II and Palace III (= City I) resulted from the campaigns of Thutmose III.\footnote{It should be noted that Sharuhen is not listed among the Canaanite towns conquered by Thutmose III, suggesting that it, like Gaza, was loyal to the Egyptian government and would not have provoked a military campaign. Even if the town were hostile, however, the timing of Thutmose III’s campaign to Megiddo makes it extremely unlikely that the army would have had time to conquer Sharuhen on its route northward.} This view has been followed by numerous scholars\footnote{Yassine 1974: 131; Weinstein 1981: 4; Oren 1992: 110, 116.} and was originally subscribed to by Stewart and Dever.\footnote{Stewart 1974: 58; Dever 1976. Stewart had worked with Petrie in the fourth season of excavation at Tell el-Ajjul. A notebook he compiled for classroom use was edited and published posthumously in 1974. Within the bulk of the text, Stewart subscribed closely to Albright’s chronology. In a postscript that he wrote in 1957, however, he revised his ideas substantially based upon contemporary studies of Cypriot ceramic.}
In 1957 Stewart formulated a revised chronology, which was published formally in 1974. In the same year, Kempinski produced an article arriving at a similar conclusion. Both scholars suggested that the destruction level separating Palace II (= City II) and Palace III (= City I) should be associated with Ahmose’s siege rather than an undocumented attack by Thutmose III nearly a century later. This reevaluation of the stratigraphy is based largely on a reassessment of the chronological range of bichrome ware, which is now known to have begun in MB IIC. Hyksos royal name scarabs, discovered in association with the building deposits and the destruction layer of City II, were also taken into account. According to this reassessment, then, the first Eighteenth Dynasty building on the site would in fact have been Palace III. This conclusion has been accepted by numerous scholars and is followed in this work.

Palace III, henceforth termed Building III, replaced two successive Hyksos-period structures that had also been situated on the acropolis of the tell. In keeping with the general state of the excavations, Petrie was able to map only a small portion of Building III, and he published this without a scale, a north arrow, or adequate written explanation. Although the reconstruction of Building III must remain tentative, it is tempting to see in it the outline of a center-hall residence. According to this reconstruction, Building III would have been more or less square, at roughly 27 m to a side, and have been accessed via a porch at the corner. Such side entrances are in fact typical of center-hall houses in Egypt.

Most scholars who have written on Tell el-Ajjul since Petrie’s day describe Building III as an Egyptian fortress, despite the fact that

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139 Kempinski 1993a: 53.
140 Kempinski 1993a: 53.
141 Tufnell 1975: 60; Redford 1979a: 286, n. 146; Dever 1985: 70.
142 If this reconstruction were correct, Building III would be equivalent in scale to the center-hall residence of Nakht (Badawy 1968: 101) or to Ramesses III’s temple palace at Medinet Habu (Badawy 1968: 41). The architecture of Building III has also been compared to a mortuary temple at Tell ed-Dab’a (Bietak 1979: 252) and to the fortified structure in level VII at Beth Shan (Albright 1938a: 353–354, but see James and McGovern 1993: 58, who disagree). Indeed, given the incomplete preservation of Building III, numerous comparisons are possible.
the structure lacks obvious signs of fortification and although evidence for specifically Egyptian-style masonry techniques is weak.\textsuperscript{145} While the outer walls of the building were in some cases up to 2.6 m thick, the presence of a drain in the southwestern corner and the relatively thin internal walls suggest that the structure may have served a primarily residential or administrative purpose. It is notable, however, that Petrie’s team discovered 14 arrowheads scattered in the direct vicinity of the building and one inside it. Although this is admittedly slim evidence, these weapons may provide a hint that the building did in fact serve as the headquarters of a garrison, perhaps even that mentioned in the annals of Thutmose III.\textsuperscript{146}

Remains of thin-walled structures, conceivably barracks, houses or workshops, were uncovered just to the south of Building III, and a long block of nine small rooms lay to its west. Judging from the orientation and the thickness of the outer walls, this western annex almost certainly had been constructed as a unit with Building III. The small size of the rooms and the apparent lack of connecting doorways could suggest a storage-related function for the structure.

A study of the material culture associated with Building III bears out the theory that its inhabitants were either Egyptian or individuals who routinely interacted with Egyptians. Four scarabs, a plaquette, and one scarab impression were found in the appropriate levels\textsuperscript{147} of Building III and its immediate vicinity. The scarab impression bore the cartouche of Thutmose III and may perhaps provide evidence for an Egyptian administrator stationed at the site. Another scarab and the plaquette had been inscribed with the name of the god Amun, and the remaining two scarabs bore amuletic hieroglyphs.\textsuperscript{148}

Because scarabs were easily portable and were popular in Canaan and Egypt alike, Egyptian-style ceramic is perhaps a better indicator of an Egyptian cultural affiliation. Unlike Mycenaean or Cypriot ceramics, New Kingdom Egyptian wares were in general neither

\textsuperscript{145} Albright (1938a: 353) mentions that Building III had been built “in Egyptian fashion,” presumably indicating a lack of stone foundations. Otherwise there is little reported about the construction methods employed by the masons.

\textsuperscript{146} While there is always the possibility that the projectiles were remnants of the battle for control of the tell, they appear to have been mixed in with material contemporaneous to Building III. If they were specifically associated with a destruction layer, Petrie does not mention it.

\textsuperscript{147} Based upon the plan of Building III and its environs (Petrie 1932: pl. 48), the range of absolute levels for contemporaneous objects is roughly between 1094 and 976.

\textsuperscript{148} Petrie 1932: pl. 8.
known for their intrinsic beauty nor utilized as containers for highly valued trade goods. The presence abroad of relatively humble Egyptian-style utility wares—typically fashioned from local clays and discovered in combination with other forms of Egyptian-style material culture—is thus often understood as betraying the on-site presence of a potter who had catered to Egyptian tastes.

At Tell el-Ajjul, 13 of the 21 reconstructable vessels found in association with Building III have close Egyptian parallels. Of the remaining eight forms, one was a Cypriot import, one a Canaanite storage jar, and the rest were deep carinated bowls of the type often used for cooking. Such a pattern could suggest, perhaps, that Canaanite servants or even wives cooked for the inhabitants of Building III. By contrast, however, an Egyptian spinning bowl that came from a contemporary context a little farther afield might possibly imply that at least one Egyptian woman was resident at the site. This conclusion is admittedly highly speculative, given the fact that Egyptian men employed in workshops also wove and, indeed, that the bowl may not have been utilized by an Egyptian at all.

Undoubtedly the most illuminating sherd with respect to relations between the Egyptian government and the inhabitants of Tell el-Ajjul, however, is a storage jar fragment. This otherwise unremarkable artifact had been impressed before firing with the paired cartouches of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III, dating it to the time at which the annals indicate that an Egyptian garrison retreated to Sharuhen. The presence of the sherd suggests that the resident troops were at least occasionally directly provided with supplies by the imperial government.

Further evidence concerning the economic life of the garrison, however, suggests a greater degree of self-sufficiency. A goose-shaped branding iron discovered just outside Building III hints that the garrison may have possessed a herd of cattle, thereby meeting some of its needs locally. The ownership of such a herd, in combination

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149 Of the following forms, the first combination is Petrie’s corpus number, while the second is its parallel in Holthoer’s (1977) classification of New Kingdom pottery: 3C: PL 4; 12G7: PL 8; 15H1: CU 1; 23K17, 19; CC 3; 31K6: WD 1; 32A9 (× 3); CV 1; 32A10–11: CV 1; 34Z10–11: JU 1; 55W9: AO 1; 69D: XO 6.
150 Petrie 1932: pl. 27: 15W3.
151 Petrie (1932: 1) originally associated this sherd with Building V. A subsequent examination, however, has shown that the sherd should in fact be correlated with Building III (Kempinski 1974: 148 and n. 18).
perhaps with rights to a portion of the local agricultural surplus, would have rendered the garrison able to support itself without relying upon Egyptian imports.

The thriving Middle Bronze Age town that Ahmose besieged at the opening of the Eighteenth Dynasty shrank by 60 to 90 percent in the course of the Late Bronze Age.\textsuperscript{153} With the exception of the area immediately surrounding the Egyptian administrative headquarters, the contemporary town is barely represented in the archaeological record, and Petrie’s reports mention it only in passing.\textsuperscript{154} The local cemeteries contemporary with Building III flourished, however. In her reexamination of the Late Bronze Age mortuary remains, Gonen identified some 133 individual pit burials that could be dated to this time period.\textsuperscript{155}

Gonen reconciles the discrepancy between the sparsely occupied tell and the large number of burials by suggesting that the descendants of the former Middle Bronze Age inhabitants continued to utilize the cemeteries at Tell el-Ajjul.\textsuperscript{156} Although Gonen’s hypothesis may be correct, one would not need to postulate many more than ten deaths per year in a permanent garrison to arrive at the same count.\textsuperscript{157} The relatively high incidence of Egyptian ceramics, scarabs,\textsuperscript{158} and Egyptian-style material culture (such as amulets or alabaster vessels) certainly suggests that the population buried at Tell el-Ajjul, if not ethnically Egyptian, was at least profoundly influenced by Egyptian culture.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{153} Gonen 1984: 64.
\textsuperscript{155} Gonen 1992b: 70. Gonen (1992b: 77) dates LB I from Ahmose to Thutmose III and begins LB II with the reign of Amenhotep II.
\textsuperscript{156} Gonen 1981: 80.
\textsuperscript{157} As Petrie and his team found out in their first season of work, the area around Tell el-Ajjul can be extremely malarial (Petrie 1931: 1). Disease and casualties at war could well have accounted for such a death rate. Malaria was apparently known in Egyptian texts as \textit{tw gu}, or the “evil wind” (Westendorf 1980: 1167), and it has historically plagued the southern coastal region of Canaan (Amiran 1953: 198, 202).
\textsuperscript{158} Only one scarab, that of Amenhotep I, demonstrably predates Thutmose III (Petrie 1931: pl. 14: 129). Providing the scarab wasn’t an heirloom, however, it may offer evidence for Egyptian interest in the site in the reign of Ahmose’s son.
\textsuperscript{159} A complete reexamination of the Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age cemetery material at Tell el-Ajjul, undertaken with an eye toward discerning ethnicity and gender in the burials, would significantly further our understanding of the demographics of the town’s population at this time period.
Figure 10. Administrative headquarters at Tell el-Ajjul
(after Petrie 1932: pl. 48)
Overview of Egyptian interactions with Nubia

Historical summary

Egypt’s reconquest of Nubia began in the reign of Kamose, who is generally assumed to have been the older brother of Ahmose, first king of the Eighteenth Dynasty. Kamose’s southern campaigns are mentioned in the text of a confiscated letter, purportedly sent from the Hyksos ruler Apophis to the newly enthroned Kushite king, resident at Kerma. In his message, which was intercepted along the oases route, Apophis invited the Nubian leader to invade Upper Egypt while the bulk of Kamose’s forces were fighting in the north. Such a move, Apophis argued, would be a fitting retaliation for the strikes Kamose had made against both of their territories. 160

Two contemporary steles present further evidence for the historicity of Kamose’s campaigns in Nubia, undertaken presumably to eliminate the very real threat of an attack on his southern border. The first stele, recovered from the Nubian fortress of Buhen, belonged to a soldier named Ahmose, who claimed to have captured 46 people while following the ruler—an impressive accomplishment. 161 Although battle in Nubia is not expressly referred to in the second stele, the steward Emhab reports having reached both Avaris and Miu by year three of an unspecified Second Intermediate Period ruler, most probably Kamose. 162 If Miu is, in fact, to be located in the region of the fourth cataract, there is a strong possibility that Kamose may have reached Kerma in his push southward. If so, the destruction layer at the site, which Bonnet has dated to the end of the Hyksos period, may perhaps have been due to one of Kamose’s southern razzias.

161 MacIver and Woolley 1911a: 90–91. The element ms is all that remains of the king’s name. Based on the space remaining within the cartouche and the epithet “mighty ruler” (ḥk3 ṣḥḥ), however, Vandersleyen (1971: 62–64) has mounted a strong case that Kamose’s name should be restored.
163 Zibelius-Chen 1972: 120; 1988: 192. In an early article, O’Connor (1982: 930) suggested that Miu was situated between the second and third cataracts, although he now agrees with Kemp (1978: 29, n. 68) that a location in the Shendi Reach is more probable (O’Connor 1987b: 123–124, 126). Störk (1977: 279–280), meanwhile, has situated Miu between the fourth and fifth cataracts. Clearly, there is little agreement as to the location of this toponym.
164 Bonnet 1979: 8. The date of the destruction of Kerma is not certain. In recent
Of the Middle Kingdom fortress-towns in Lower Nubia, only Faras and Buhen yielded evidence pertinent to the reign of Kamose. At Faras, archaeologists discovered scarabs bearing this pharaoh’s cartouche.\textsuperscript{165} The text of yet another stele discovered at Buhen, however, is far more informative. In this monument, a great officer of the city ($\textit{\text{	extsuperscript{n}t\textit{\textsuperscript{w} n niwt}}}$)\textsuperscript{166} explicitly refers to a project to rebuild the walls of Buhen in the third year of Kamose.\textsuperscript{167}

While the Egyptians of the Fourth Dynasty had been drawn to Buhen primarily to take advantage of nearby copper sources, it was surely the site’s strategic location just downstream of the second cataract that prompted Senwosret I to construct an elaborate fortress there. Similarly, it would almost certainly have been these very same strategic concerns that spurred Kamose’s decision to refurbish Buhen’s fortifications. The second cataract and the formidable Batn el-Hajar, just south of it, could only be navigated during the flood season, and even then extreme care had to be employed. Buhen’s riverside position just north of the cataract, then, was an ideal locale from which to monitor or intercept riverine traffic—for boats would be highly vulnerable as they negotiated the dangerous granite outcrops of the cataract. The network of hills located in close proximity to the fortress-town similarly allowed the Egyptians to keep close surveillance over the land routes that bypassed the cataract region.\textsuperscript{168} If Buhen indeed marked Egypt’s official southern frontier at the end of Kamose’s reign,\textsuperscript{169} maintenance of tight security would have been of primary importance.

After Kamose’s death, his brother Ahmose continued efforts to stamp out Hyksos and Kerman threats. At Buhen the new pharaoh completed the refurbishment of the crumbling Middle Kingdom works Bonnet has dated it to the “early Eighteenth Dynasty” (Bonnet 1999: 405) and very tentatively to the reign of Thutmose II (Bonnet 2001: 228). As will be discussed below, however, it would appear extremely unlikely that the Egyptians had not launched a successful attack on Kerma by this late date.

\textsuperscript{165} Griffith 1921: 86 and pl. 18.

\textsuperscript{166} This title is known from Middle Kingdom sources, including a seal impression from the fortress of Semna (Leprohon 1993: 431, n. 141).

\textsuperscript{167} H. S. Smith 1976: pl. 2, fig. 1.

\textsuperscript{168} H. S. Smith 1972: 55–57.

\textsuperscript{169} No inscriptions or buildings that can be unambiguously ascribed to Kamose are found farther south than Buhen. Further, the attention and expense required to refurbish the site’s fortifications suggest that this emplacement represented Egypt’s first line of defense. Kamose does not appear to have undertaken work on any other Nubian fortress-town in his reign.
fortifications and installed a šaw, or military commander, named Tur. With Buhen thus secure, Ahmose launched possibly as many as three campaigns to the south. These expeditions are narrated in the inscriptions of the soldier Ahmose son of Ibana.

In the first campaign (Urk. IV, 5: 4–14), Ahmose fought in Khenthennefer (ḥnt-hn-nfr), an imprecise toponym that Goedicke has suggested refers to the area beyond the last Egyptian fortification. As the Middle Kingdom fortresses did not extend past Semna and Semna South in the second cataract, it is likely that the battle in Khenthennefer occurred farther upstream. One possible locale for this conflict may, in fact, be the vicinity of Sai. Certainly, this island represents the largest center of Kerman culture north of Kerma itself. Further, as will be discussed below, the wholesale conversion of Sai into an Egyptian fortress-town in the reign of Ahmose suggests definitive early Eighteenth Dynasty victories in this area.

The location of Ahmose’s second recorded battle (Urk. IV, 5: 16–6: 9) is even less precisely known than that of his first. According to the description, the battle was engaged on the river and resulted in the capture of an individual referred to only as the “southern enemy,” perhaps a designation of the previously vanquished

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170 Randall-MacIver and Woolley 1911b: pl. 35. This individual will be discussed at length below.
171 From the narration of the text, it is unfortunately ambiguous whether the three battles took place in one extremely busy southern campaign or whether two or three separate campaigns should be envisioned. For the purposes of this discussion, however, the issue is not critical. A campaign to Nubia may also be alluded to on an inscribed block found at Karnak that describes an expedition bound south of Thebes (Abdul-Khader Mohammed 1966: pl. 5; Redford 1970: 23, n. 2).
172 Goedicke 1965: 111.
173 Judging from its relatively small size, Semna South might be more aptly described as a fortified outpost, a dependency of the much larger fortress of Semna, located 1 km farther north (Kemp 1991: 175–176).
175 A sandstone statue of Ahmose and a decorated sandstone block depicting the king offering to a deity have been found at Sai and likely attest to Ahmose’s sponsorship of the fortress-town (Vercoutter 1973: 24–25; Arkell 1966: 82; Berg 1987: 5; Morkot 1987: 31). The form of Ahmose’s name on the monuments is relatively late, and it has been argued on these grounds that Amenhotep I founded the Egyptian town but was moved by filial piety to celebrate his father on temple relief and by erecting a statue in his honor (Vandersleyen 1971: 71, 177, 202, 213). Säve-Söderbergh (1941: 145) suggests that the statue may have been brought to the fortress-town at a later date. The possibility that Ahmose himself founded Sai late in his reign, however, appears most succinctly to fit the archaeological and textual evidence and is adopted here.
leader of Sai or Kerma. Finally, a third struggle (Urk. IV, 6: 11–15) eradicated a “fallen one” named Teti-‘n, who had “gathered to himself rebels.” Whereas prisoners had been taken in the first two battles, the troublemakers in the third were uniformly executed, presumably as a stern warning to those who might dare propose further rebellions.

Unfortunately, the information provided by Ahmose son of Ibana’s narrative is not sufficient to determine whether Ahmose, in extending his power southward, succeeded in controlling Kerma directly. Bonnet reports a rebuilding of the city’s fortifications shortly after their destruction at the end of the Second Intermediate Period. If the Egyptians frowned upon vassals refurbishing their fortifications, as appears to have been the case in Syria-Palestine, the repairs to the defensive system at Kerma may indicate that the site had fallen back into Kushite hands in Ahmose’s reign or shortly thereafter.

The campaigns of Amenhotep I to Nubia are likewise known solely from the inscriptions of Ahmose son of Ibana (Urk. IV, 6: 15–8: 2) and his fellow soldier from Elkab, Ahmose Pa-Nekhbit (Urk. IV, 36: 1–4). The latter individual records two campaigns in which he followed the ruler. The first took place in Kush and yielded the soldier one prisoner, while the second battle occurred at the otherwise unknown toponym \( y^\prime m^m^{w-khk3} \).

Ahmose son of Ibana describes only one conflict but provides more detail than his comrade-in-arms. He states that an expedition had been formed “to extend the borders of Egypt” (Urk. IV, 7: 2). Presumably this would have meant that the campaign took place south of Sai, where Amenhotep I was in the process of continuing work on his father’s fortress-town. Following the Egyptian victory, the text states that the Nubian leader’s people \( (r\dot{m}l) \) and cattle had to be “sought” \( (h\dot{h}y) \), indicating that the enemy may well have been seminomadic. The pursuit of the missing people and animals apparently ended near the “Upper Well” from whence Ahmose son of Ibana led Amenhotep I back to Egypt in the space of two days’ time (Urk. IV, 7: 15). This Upper Well has been plausibly identified as Selima Oasis—a verdant area that was accessible from Sai, capable

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176 Bonnet 1979: 8.
of supporting both people and cattle, and located on a well-known caravan track to Egypt.\textsuperscript{179}

In addition to his work at Sai, Amenhotep I sponsored a temple at the second cataract fortress of Uronarti (Urk. IV, 78: 8–12).\textsuperscript{180} Turi, the former \textsuperscript{\textit{\textit{fsw}}\textsuperscript{\textit{\textit{fsw}}}} of Buhen who had been subsequently promoted to the position of viceroy of Kush, directed this project and also carved inscriptions near the second cataract fortress of Semna.\textsuperscript{181} Amenhotep I set up royal steles in or near the Lower Nubian fortresses of Faras\textsuperscript{182} and Aniba,\textsuperscript{183} and blocks bearing his name have been found at Elephantine.\textsuperscript{184} Significantly, however, Amenhotep I’s work at these Middle Kingdom fortress-towns appears to have focused upon the refurbishment of temples rather than fortifications. In this respect, then, it is potentially important that the military title \textsuperscript{\textit{\textit{fsw}}} was replaced at Buhen with the civil title \textsuperscript{\textit{\textit{h3ty}-\textit{\textit{h3ty}}}}, or mayor, a further testament to the very early demilitarization of Lower Nubia in the New Kingdom.

It may have been Amenhotep I’s successor, Thutmose I, who finally defeated the last Kushite king. An inscription at Sehel lauds the pharaoh for overthrowing wretched Kush (Urk. IV, 89: 5–7), and Thutmose I boasts in his inscription at Tombos of overthrowing the Nubian ruler and leaving none to take his place (Urk. IV, 83: 17–84: 5). Although Ahmose Pa-Nekhbit is, as usual, frustratingly laconic in his report of the conflict (Urk. IV, 36: 5–8), Ahmose son of Ibana states that Thutmose I had journeyed to Khenthennefer in order to cast out violence and suppress raiding (Urk. IV, 8: 4–6).

\textsuperscript{179} Berg 1987: 7. Although Selima would, in fact, have been a “Lower Well” with respect to Sai, the name might have been a traditional one, utilizing Aswan as a reference point, as the trail that led north from Selima ended at Aswan. It appears logistically incredible, however, that Ahmose could have led his sovereign from Selima to Egypt in two days’ time. It is possible, then, that while the pursuit may have ended at the Selima Oasis, the Upper Well could have referred to the Dunqul Oasis farther north along the same trail. In this case a two-day trip to Egypt would have been physically feasible, if still an extraordinary feat. While it is also possible that the defeated people and their cattle fled to one of the many wells located in the desert west of Kerma and Kawa (see Kitchen 1977: fig 1), these water sources would have been situated even farther from Egypt than Selima Oasis.

\textsuperscript{180} Reisner 1955: 26.

\textsuperscript{181} Breasted 1908: 45; Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 145–146.

\textsuperscript{182} Porter and Moss (VII: 126) mention fragments of a stele from the rock temple of Hathor of Ibshek, which they tentatively ascribe to Amenhotep I.

\textsuperscript{183} Although the stele was found at Kasr Ibrahim, it may well have originally stood in the main temple at Aniba (Plumley 1964: 4, pl. I, 3).

\textsuperscript{184} Habachi 1975b: 1221.
On his return trip, the pharaoh hung “the fallen one...that wretched Nubian Bowman” head downward off the prow of his ship (Urk. IV, 8: 13–9: 5). According to the courtier Ineni, some of the more fortunate prisoners of war, captured “after the overthrow of vile Kush,” were subsequently donated to the temple of Amun at Karnak (Urk. IV, 70: 1–4).

It was in or closely following the reign of Thutmose I, as well, that the capital of Kush at Kerma was abandoned—perhaps as the result of an imperial dictate—for a less elaborate settlement located closer to the river. Evidence that Thutmose I succeeded in penetrating Upper Nubia far upstream of Kerma is in fact demonstrated by the presence of his inscription on Hagar el-Merwa, an imposing rock-face located midway between the fourth and fifth cataracts. The inscription served to inform Nubians of the penalty for transgressing the stele, baldly stating that any violator’s “[head (?)] shall be cut off...and he shall have no heirs.” Not far from Hagar el-Merwa, at the site of Kurgus, the ruins of a fortress that Arkell believed to be of early Eighteenth Dynasty date still stand. As yet poorly understood, this structure will be the subject of more detailed discussion below.

A royal inscription from the reign of Thutmose II mentions mnnw fortress-towns that had been constructed during the reign of his father, Thutmose I, “in order to repress the rebellious lands of the bowmen of Khenthennefer” (Urk. IV, 139: 1). The proximity of the ruins at Kurgus to the inscription at Hagar el-Merwa, and of the intriguing archaeological remains at Tombos to the Tombos inscription, has led various scholars to propose that Thutmose I had, in fact, constructed Egyptian bases at these sites. While the lack of excavation at both Tombos and Kurgus has thus far prevented the testing of this theory, both remain plausible candidates for the mnnw-fortresses in Thutmose II’s inscription.

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185 Bonnet 1979: 8; 1991: 114.
186 Arkell 1950: 38 and fig. 4. The repetition of a similar threat in Amarna letter EA 162 suggests that such punishment may have been meted out to rebels as part of a cross-frontier policy. In a letter written to a particularly troublesome vassal, Akhenaten threatens, “If for any reason you prefer to do evil, and if you plot evil, treacherous things, then you, together with your entire family, shall die by the axe of the king” (EA 162: 35–38; Moran 1992: 249).
188 For references, see the sections devoted to these fortresses below.
The only other fortresses in or around which Thutmose I (or his viceroy) left inscriptions had been built by pharaohs in the Middle Kingdom and the early Eighteenth Dynasty. These include Elephantine,189 Kubban,190 Serra East,191 Semna,192 and Sai.193 Trenches found below the temple-based settlements of Sedeinga and Sesebi have led to speculation that these sites may well have experienced aborted beginnings in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, but there is no evidence that architecture had been erected at either site at this period.194 The fortresses of Gebel Sahaba,195 Dabenarti,196 Mayanarti,197 and Dorginarti198 are all likewise excluded from consideration, as they are now believed to postdate the New Kingdom.

Thutmose II’s Aswan inscription details the events of this pharaoh’s only known Nubian campaign (Urk. IV, 138: 11–141: 7). This expe-

189 Habachi 1975b: 1221.
190 Porter and Moss VII: 84. As this fortress guarded the rich Wadi Allaqi gold mines, it is perhaps not a coincidence that the first substantive evidence for the resumption of gold mining in Nubia is in the reign of Thutmose I (Manley 1996: 63).
191 Hughes 1963: 129. The architecture, ceramic, and burial evidence points to a reoccupation of Serra in the New Kingdom, although the later Christian settlement has largely obscured this level. Thutmose I is represented by a seal impression on an amphora, which may indicate royal interest in the site.
192 Porter and Moss VII: 145.
194 For Sedeinga, see Adams 1984a: 227. For Sesebi, see Fairman 1938: 153; Kemp 1978: 22. At the site of Soleb, Giorgini (1959: 169) found a gate, a quay, and a pond that predated the main temple-town of Amenhotep III.
195 Based upon its dissimilarity to Middle Kingdom fortress-towns, Kemp (1978: 22) tentatively assigned the complex to the New Kingdom. Säve-Söderbergh (1967–1968: 233) briefly explored Gebel Sahaba, but when this scholar and his team revisited the site in conjunction with the Scandinavian Joint Expedition to Sudanese Nubia, they found it more typical of the Twenty-fifth Dynasty in terms of both its construction and its material culture (Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 322–323).
196 Ruby (1964: 54, 56) suggested that Dabenarti fortress, located directly opposite Mirgissa, had been built in the New Kingdom. The fortress appears never to have been occupied, and Ruby argued that if it had been built in the Middle Kingdom, it would have been reoccupied in the New Kingdom. Despite Ruby’s objections, one might suggest that Dabenarti had been originally constructed in the Middle Kingdom as a pair or gateway with Mirgissa. Similar pairs of fortresses include Semna and Kumma, Ikkur and Kubban, and Faras and Serra.
197 The second cataract fort of Mayanarti has also been dated to the New Kingdom on the basis of its architecture (Dunham 1967: 177–178). The pottery, however, is almost exclusively of much later date (Dunham 1967: 178).
198 Despite the presence of architectural elements and various small finds from the Ramesside period, which at first led scholars to assume a New Kingdom date for the fortress (Knudstad 1966: 182–183, 186), Heidorn (1991: 205) has recently demonstrated that an assignment to the Third Intermediate Period is more probable.
dition was mounted in response to a rebellion that may well have been prompted by news of Thutmose I’s death. Upon receiving the intelligence that a leader in the north of Kush—perhaps the exiled ruler of Sai—and two of the sons of the slain ruler of Kush were plotting “to rob the people of Egypt in order to steal the cattle from behind these mn(n)w-fortresses, which your father... built” (Urk. IV, 138: 15–17), Thutmose II dispatched his army to quell the rebellion. Perhaps significantly, Bonnet interprets the restoration of Kerma’s main temple around 1500 B.C. as archaeological evidence for just such an organized rebellion at this time.

The response to this uprising was unusually harsh, perhaps signaling a growing pharaonic impatience with resistance. Following the Egyptian victory, the Nubian males were uniformly slaughtered with the exception of “one among those children of the ruler of wretched Kush, who was brought alive as a living prisoner together with his (lit. their) underlings (brw)” (Urk. IV, 140: 10–11). On analogy to later policy, the Kushite prince may well have been held in an Egyptian stronghold (nhtw—Urk. IV, 690: 2–3; P. Harris I, 76: 7–9; 77: 3–6; KRI V, 24: 1–3), taught Egyptian (KRI V, 91: 5–7), educated at court, and perhaps given an official position in service of the king—until the day came when he would be returned to his homeland to rule as a loyal vassal of Egypt (Urk. IV, 690: 4–5).

Revolts during the first year of a new pharaoh’s reign, such as that narrated above, are common throughout Egyptian history. In Syria-Palestine as well as Nubia, local leaders frequently took advantage of the temporary disruption in routine to test a new pharaoh’s ability to enforce his demands of tribute and taxes. Such revolts may also have been integrally connected to the oaths administered to foreign rulers in the king’s name, for it is almost certain that these bonds were held as valid not for perpetuity but only for the lifetime of the treaty partners. Aside from this one retaliatory campaign,

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199 The same inscription that records the rebellion also announces Thutmose II’s coronation (Morkot 1987: 32).
201 Feucht 1985: 43.
203 Redford 1984: 25. It is interesting to note in this regard that the application of this oath to vassals is first noted in the reign of Thutmose II’s father. Upon his coronation, Thutmose I sent a letter to his viceroy giving his full titulary and commanding: “Now you shall cause that the oath be established in the name of my majesty” (Urk. IV, 80: 17). In addition, it is stated in the Tombos stele that “the
however, no other military ventures to Nubia are recorded for Thutmose II’s reign.

This king did, however, sponsor a good deal of cultic construction, including work on the southern temple at Buhen, and on temples at the second cataract forts of Semna and Kumma. Although it was only the temples at these sites that received new embellishments rather than the fortifications themselves, a military presence may still have been maintained. On the doorjamb of the temple at Kumma, for instance, the viceroy Seni left an inscription after “he had inspected the Medjay in its entirety” (Urk. IV, 142: 5).

An isolated cartouche of Thutmose II at Napata (Gebel Barkal) is of particular interest, for it suggests that a fortress, or at least a temple, may have been established at the site in the early Eighteenth Dynasty. Not only is Napata important in being, with the possible exception of Kurgus, the farthest-flung Egyptian base in Upper Nubia, but the town was also located at the head of the primary trade route that connected Upper Nubia to the Butana region. Indeed, the vast majority of the exotic southern African goods that reached Egypt would originally have been transported along this route.

Hatshepsut, the last pharaoh of the early Eighteenth Dynasty, appears like her predecessors to have campaigned in Nubia. One contemporary claims to have been in the royal entourage “when he overthrew the Nubian bowmen, and when their leaders were brought

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204 Porter and Moss VII: 135. It should be noted, however, that “the inscriptions in which they (= the names of Thutmose I and II) occur are by no means explicit, and one is left to guess just what part, if any, these two played in bringing the monument to existence” (Caminos 1974: 11). The temple is generally ascribed to Thutmose II’s wife Hatshepsut.

205 For Semna, see Porter and Moss VII: 149. For Kumma, see Porter and Moss VII: 152.

206 Unfortunately, it is not entirely clear whether the term “Medjay” should be interpreted as designating the land of the Medjay (as the determinative might suggest) or the Medjay people. If the latter were indeed correct, it is still not clear whether the Medjay inspected by the viceroy were in fact Medjay tribesmen or whether they were instead police employed by the Egyptians. Given that both groups may have served the same purpose with regard to the fortress, however, the point is to some extent immaterial.

207 Wilkinson 1835: 472.

to him as living captives. I saw when he razed Nubia, being in his majesty’s following. The structure of this inscription is peculiar, for just prior to the narration of the battle, Hatshepsut is designated with the feminine pronoun. While it is possible that the author felt it appropriate to switch from feminine to masculine in the context of military ventures, it is also conceivable that the pronoun “he” referred to Hatshepsut’s stepson and co-regent, Thutmose III. Certainly, the Armant stele (Urk. IV, 1246: 3–5) indicates that Thutmose III campaigned to the south while sharing power with Hatshepsut. In the process, he evidently captured a rhinoceros and quelled a rebellion in Miu—a territory that may have been located in the vicinity of the fourth cataract. Finally, to celebrate his far-flung victory the king erected a boundary stele, just as he would later do at the edge of the Euphrates in Syria.

Fragmentary references to a Nubian battle in the reign of Hatshepsut have also been found at Deir el-Bahri, and an official named Djehuty claims to have witnessed his king plunder vile Kush (Urk. IV, 438: 10). An additional reference to the defeat of vile Kush is found on a double-dated year 12 graffito near the rapids at Tangur, and the courtier Senenmut may possibly have included a reference to this battle in his tomb (Urk. IV, 399: 5). On a more peaceful note, Hatshepsut built or added to the temples at Elephantine, Faras, Buhen, and Kumma.

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210 Zibelius-Chen 1972: 120; 1988: 192. The Armant stele does not present a coherent chronological structure within which to situate the campaign to Miu. A description of the campaign is sandwiched between a reference to the eighth campaign, during which Thutmose III had also set up a stele (Urk. IV, 1245: 18–1246: 2), and a more detailed discussion of the first campaign (Urk. IV, 1246: 14–1247: 11). Störk (1977: 241; followed by O’Connor 1982: 904–905 and Zibelius-Chen 1988: 195) dates the Miu campaign to year 35, as a boundary stele of Thutmose III was apparently carved at Kurgus in this year and placed near Thutmose I’s stele (Arkell 1950: 38; Vercoutter 1956: 68–69). Although this would appear a good argument for dating the campaign later, reference to a “first victorious [expedition]” placed (quite literally) beneath the nose of the accompanying depiction of a rhinoceros could indicate that the battle in Miu took place just prior to the first campaign (Drower 1940: 159–160; Redford 1967: 61–62; Reineke 1977: 372).
Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for early Eighteenth Dynasty southern fortress-towns

To summarize with broad brushstrokes, then, the early Eighteenth Dynasty experience in Nubia, it is readily apparent that a great deal of military effort was required to vanquish the Kushite kingdom based at Kerma, as well as other independent or allied leaders of polities stretching from Sai to Miu. In addition to the numerous campaigns that are known from this era, accidents of preservation have no doubt obscured others, and any that resulted in Egyptian losses were likely never recorded. The difficulty in subduing Upper Nubia should be contrasted with the Egyptian experience in Lower Nubia, an area that appears to have been largely pacified by the reign of Kamose!

The variant political situation in Upper and Lower Nubia is reflected in the archaeological evidence for Egyptian construction programs. None of the Middle Kingdom fortresses north of the second cataract, with the exception of Buhen, were refortified. While many were reinhabited and provided with temples, the older fortress-towns served as nuclei for primarily civilian settlements. Most of the Lower Nubian fortresses upstream of the second cataract had in fact been situated in broad pockets of fertile land, so it is likely that the settlements were largely self-sufficient and perhaps even produced an agricultural surplus. The imperial government may have intended, then, for these reestablished communities to underwrite some of the costs of imperial ventures, such as gold mining or quarrying.

The early Eighteenth Dynasty government seems in its resuscitations of the Middle Kingdom fortress-towns to have adopted the Thirteenth, rather than the Twelfth, Dynasty model of occupation. That is to say, instead of employing a rotating garrison that manned a fortress until it was relieved by new troops, the Egyptians regarded the fortress-town essentially as a civil settlement. The population of such an establishment would not only farm their own land, thereby necessitating less state support, but they would also rise to arms to defend themselves if danger arose. The Egyptians had employed such strategies to populate and defend their border areas for well over a

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214 The campaigns of the first two kings of the Eighteenth Dynasty, for instance, are known solely from the biographies of two soldiers at Elkab.
thousand years. As a Herakleopolitan king had articulated it in the First Intermediate Period, “The Asiatic is a crocodile on its shore, it snatches from a lonely road; it cannot seize from a populous town.”

The transformation of the older Nubian fortresses from primarily martial to fundamentally civil settlements is also betrayed in the writing of the word ḫmnw, or fortress-town. In an inscription at Deir el-Bahri, the word is determined with a “town-sign” rather than an “enclosure-sign” as was traditional. Although this new writing did not supersede the earlier, it is a telling reflection of how the definition of what constituted a ḫmnw-fortress evolved with the reoccupation of Nubia in the early Eighteenth Dynasty.

With regard to the demilitarization of the fortress-towns, the exception that proves the rule is Buhen (see figure 12). This Middle Kingdom installation, which together with associated hilltop watchposts closely guarded the northern end of the second cataract, likely served as Egypt’s southernmost border-fortress under Kamose and in the early part of Ahmose’s reign as well. Certainly, we find a “great officer of the city” overseeing the refurbishment of the town’s fortifications already in Kamose’s third year. Likewise, upon Ahmose’s accession, this king appointed an individual named Turi to serve as ḫsw, or military commander of Buhen. This title had been borne by the highest-ranking officer at the fortress since the Middle Kingdom. With the appointment of this commander and the refurbishment of Buhen’s fortifications, then, it is clear that both Kamose and Ahmose felt it vital to maintain tight military security at the cataract’s end.

Yet, even in the reigns of these two kings, certain factors serve to temper this picture. For one, although archaeological work has confirmed that repairs were indeed undertaken to Buhen’s fortifications at this period, these refurbishments seem often to have been effected for cosmetic reasons. Likewise, excavators deemed the masonry on a number of the more practical repairs downright slipshod. Certainly, the refortification did very little to restore the fortress to the marvel of military engineering that it once had been. The vast majority of the elaborate defenses that characterized the early building were either not renewed or, indeed, were consciously paved over.

Likewise, it is of some interest that the ḫsw-commander appears to have been stationed at the fortress in the company of his wife,

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216 Lichtheim 1975: 105.
as she is depicted by his side on a votive stele erected at the local temple. Further, the nearly even ratio of men to women in New Kingdom interments at the site suggests that the commandant would not have been the only man whose family resided with him at the fortress. Considering this, then, it should be of little surprise that the title “ḥsw of Buhen” seems to have been permanently retired once Amenhotep I promoted Turi to the position of viceroy of Kush. From that time forth, the leadership position at the fortress-town would be fulfilled by a ḫty-, or mayor. Clearly then, when an expected threat from the south failed to materialize, the early Eighteenth Dynasty administration felt free to relax its vigilance at Buhen just as it had already done with regard to the other fortress-towns in Lower Nubia.

In the midst of the second cataract itself, a number of Middle Kingdom fortresses were likewise reoccupied, such as Uronarti, Semna, Shelfak, Kumma, and Mirgissa. At these already ancient forts, attention seems likewise to have focused primarily upon refurbishing non-military installations such as temples. Indeed, the benefits bestowed by a young Thutmose III on the cults located at Semna, Uronarti, and Shelfak attest to a desire on the part of the Egyptian government to bolster the religious and community life of individuals stationed in the desolate second cataract region.

Now, precisely because conditions were so inimical in the Batn el-Hajar, it is clear that the renewed inhabitants of the Middle Kingdom fortresses were not simply there to settle the land and to maintain an imperial presence, as was the case in the north—the region was both too arid and the river too dangerous for this. Thus most scholars believe that at least some of the inhabitants stationed in the second cataract fortresses were employed in order to help facilitate shipping ventures. Moreover, an inscription of a viceroy of Kush at Kumma may also suggest that the authorities retained the services of desert scouts, a security precaution first instituted in the Middle Kingdom. Such men—trained in the art of tracking enemies, fugitives, smugglers, and the like—are discovered operating out of military bases on all three frontiers during the New Kingdom. Considering the manifest value of their services, this is hardly surprising.

Whoever the inhabitants of the second cataract forts were, however, the state does not appear to have been overly concerned with their physical safety. Of all these citadels, only Mirgissa appears to have been refortified, and this may perhaps have been related to
the traditional function of this site as a trading entrepôt.\textsuperscript{217} Evidence tying specific Eighteenth Dynasty rulers and/or a flourishing contemporary population to the site, however, is admittedly slim. Indeed, Egypt’s expansion to the south must quickly have rendered obsolete Mirgissa’s former status as the single sanctioned point of Egypto-Nubian trade.

This expansion into Upper Nubia would, moreover, have negated the second cataract forts’ function as the first line of defense for Lower Nubia. Judging from archaeological remains, the most immediate threat to Egyptian holdings at the dawn of the New Kingdom would have been posed by the Nubians who inhabited the island of Sai. This settlement represented the largest community of Kerman Nubians north of Kerma itself, and judging from their frequent appearance in the Middle Kingdom execration texts, trouble from this region was nothing new. Ahmose’s strikes southward seem to have been directed, at least in part, toward eradicating this threat, and to this end his ventures were remarkably successful. Eventually, the resident population seems to have been either slaughtered or banished from the island. Then, over the ruins of the Kerman settlement, the Egyptians erected Sai—the first of a new breed of Upper Nubian fortress-towns (see figure 13).

The architects of the fortress of Sai appear to have taken an amended version of Buhen as their model—in effect expanding Buhen’s inner citadel to the area encompassed by its outer enclosure wall. As at Buhen itself, the Egyptian authorities constructed monumental administrative buildings, a temple, storage facilities, and domestic areas. What is interesting, however, is that even though Sai represented the southernmost Egyptian settlement in Nubia at the time of its construction, there appears to have been little emulation of the elaborate defenses of the Middle Kingdom fortresses. The wall at Sai, although substantial at 5 m thick, did not possess parapets, a glacis, or the outer skirting wall of older models. Similarly,

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\footnotesize
\textsuperscript{217} Vercoutter et al. 1970: 20–23, 181–184; S. T. Smith 1995: 139. Ceramic evidence and a gold mounted scarab of Thutmose I found at Askut may possibly indicate early Eighteenth Dynasty activity at this second cataract fortress as well (Badawy 1964: 51). S. T. Smith (1995; 2003) has studied Badawy’s excavations at Askut and has written a great deal about the importance of the Egyptian expatriate community on the island and its relations with local Nubians (particularly Nubian women) in easing the transition from Kushite rule in the Second Intermediate Period to Egyptian rule in the New Kingdom.
\end{flushright}
the cemeteries were located outside of the town walls, something not
risked by the Middle Kingdom inhabitants of Buhen. These features
suggest, then, that either the relations between the Egyptians and
the indigenous population were relatively peaceable or, perhaps, that
Nubian populations had been displaced from the region.

While Sai was founded by Ahmose, or at the very latest by
Amenhotep I, inscriptions of Hatshepsut and her husband Thutmose
II imply that their father, Thutmose I, had in his lifetime newly
established a whole series of *mnnw*-fortresses. While it is impossible
at present to identify the sites upon which these fortresses were
founded, Tombos, Kurgus, and perhaps even Napata are three intrigu-
ing possibilities. According to military logic and the presence of asso-
ciated inscriptions, all three make for very attractive candidates. It
is thus unfortunate that compelling archaeological evidence for the
presence of these *mnnw*-fortresses has been harder to come by.

The presence of a victory stele carved at the behest of Thutmose
I on a rock face at Tombos first led Breasted to suggest that a nearby
crumbling stronghold represented the remains of this king’s fortress.
While this identification has not been borne out by recent archaeo-
logical work, there is plenty of evidence for Eighteenth Dynasty set-
tlement in the region. Likewise, the presence of a modern Nubian
village undoubtedly obscures much of the earlier remains. If an early
Eighteenth Dynasty fortress were indeed situated at Tombos, this
installation would have shared two important features in common
with Sai. First, its position less than a day’s walk north of Kerma
would have been dictated by the Kerman capital itself, just as the
presence of a Kerman population at Sai undoubtedly dictated the
placement of that fortress. Secondly, like Sai, the fortress would have
been built on an island, the optimum in defensive locations. Excavations
at Tombos, currently undertaken under the direction of S. T. Smith,
should in the future clarify matters substantially.

As at Tombos, the association of a heavily weathered military
edifice with a monumental inscription of Thutmose I led to the sug-
gestion that this compound too should be enumerated among
Thutmose’s *mnnw*—a hypothesis that a team under the direction of
W. V. Davies is currently testing. Such an early Eighteenth Dynasty
fortress at Kurgus would have been located at the farthest extent of
Egypt’s penetration into the Sudan. Because of its extremely periph-
eral location, the fortress could not have been founded before the
reign of Thutmose I.
Unlike Sai and Tombos, it is doubtful that a base at Kurgus would have been situated primarily with reference to a powerful local polity. Instead, the governing factors might more likely have been trade, security, and the presence of a nearby gold mine. Indeed, the same extremely arid environs of Kurgus, which undoubtedly discouraged indigenous settlement, also may have made it difficult for a garrison based at the site to support itself with crops grown locally. Because of the possible need to provision a population at Kurgus, then, it is not unlikely that a further early Eighteenth Dynasty fortress should be sought somewhere in the great expanse between Tombos and Kurgus. As will be discussed below, the strategic location and the importance of Napata in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty make this site, also, an intriguing candidate for further exploration.

At present it is impossible to determine whether Tombos, Kurgus, or Napata should be included among the plurality of $mnw$ established by Thutmose I. If so, judging from the Aswan-Philae text of Thutmose II, one might expect Tombos and Napata, at least, to have been staffed by Egyptians who owned herds of cattle as well as land. These fortresses, however, would also have been located significantly farther upstream than previous bases and in areas that suffered repeated rebellions. Considering their frontier status, then, it is also possible that establishing a resident civilian settlement at these bases so early in the Eighteenth Dynasty might have been deemed unwise.

The stated purpose of the $mnw$-fortresses built by Thutmose I was “to repress the rebellious lands of the bowmen of Khenthennefer” and to transform them into serfs ($ndt$) whose labor benefited the Egyptian government and/or its chosen representatives. Whether or not the term $ndt$ should be interpreted in its strict juridical sense, the archaeological record indicates that graves in traditionally Nubian cemeteries experienced a precipitous impoverishment following the assertion of Egyptian control. Further, the information that the $ndt$ had formulated a plan to steal cattle from the fortresses may well suggest that the Nubians regarded the cattle as their own rightful property. It would not be far-fetched, in fact, to postulate that the inhabitants of the fortress-towns had acquired much of their chattel by force or levy from the recently subjugated local population. The erection of fortress-towns, fully stocked with Egyptians and their cattle, then, must have been intended to clearly and incontrovertibly establish Egyptian dominance over the land and its peoples.
Figure 11. Early Eighteenth Dynasty Nubia
Figure 12. Fortress-town at Buhen
(after Clarke 1916: pl. 26 and Emery et al. 1979: pl. 84)
Figure 13. Fortress-town at Sai
(after Azim 1975: 94, 98)


**Textual references to early Eighteenth Dynasty southern fortress-towns**

**Reign of Ahmose**

1. nsw-bity nb-phty-r r3 r’ iḥ-ms mry hr nb bhn di(w) ‘nḥ ḏd ws mi ṛ’ ḏt in tṣw n bhn ṭwri [ḥtp ḏt] nsw ḥr nb bhn di.f šsw(?) kaw ṣḥdw n k3 [n] tṣw n bhn ṭwri ḡhm ṅḥ (Northern Temple of Buhen; Randall-MacIver and Woolley 1911: 88, pl. 35)

The king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Nebpehtyre, son of Re, Ahmose, beloved of Horus, lord of Buhen—may he be given life, stability, and dominion like Re, eternally—by the commandant of Buhen, Turi. [An offering that] the king [gives] (to) Horus, lord of Buhen, that he may grant alabaster(?), cattle, and fowl for the ka [of] the commandant of Buhen, Turi, repeating life.

Although the refurbishment of Buhen’s fortifications may not yet have been fully accomplished, Ahmose installed a man named Turi to act as ḥṣw, or commandant, of the fortress. A ḥṣw is associated with Buhen as early as the reign of Senwosret I and two men who served at the fortress under the ruler of Kush in the late Second Intermediate Period also held this title. Although Ahmose adhered to a long-standing tradition, then, in appointing a ḥṣw at Buhen, it is notable that following his reign the title is never again applied to a fortress official.

Turi’s promotion directly from ḥṣw of Buhen to viceroy of Kush is undoubtedly a testament to the paramount importance of this fortress in Ahmose’s military strategy. An official named Kamose,

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218 Although it is difficult to discern in the photograph of the stele on plate 35, the sign resembles the jar-stand of the phoneme “g” but without the central triangle. It does, however, also resemble the silhouette of the “baggy shaped” alabaster vessel manufactured in Egypt during the Second Intermediate Period (see Ben-Dor 1944: 101–102; Randall-MacIver and Woolley 1911b: pl. 90, no. 10862). As alabaster is frequently paired with cattle and fowl in the ḥtp ḏt nsw formula, it seems likely to have been intended here.


221 As discussed in chapter three, the tax list and the copy of the Duties of the Vizier presented in Rekhmire’s tomb are drawn from originals that do not postdate the reign of Ahmose and may in fact date significantly earlier. The attestation within these sources of ḥṣw of Elephantine and Bigh, then, cannot be used to argue for the survival of this title into the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.

222 Turi seems to have been preceded as viceroy of Kush by at least two other individuals (H. S. Smith 1976: 206), although this is debated (Simpson 1963: 32ff.; Habachi 1972: 52). It appears unlikely, however, that Turi’s father also served as king’s son of Kush, despite the awarding of this title to him in a stele dedicated by a descendant (H. S. Smith 1976: 208). Regardless of whether the office of the
whose stele dates stylistically to the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty, apparently succeeded Turi as the highest official at Buhen, but this man assumed the title of $h3by$-3, or mayor, rather than commander.223 Mayors are also attested at the New Kingdom fortress-towns of Sai, Soleb, Faras, and Aniba.224 In all probability, the pronounced preference for this latter title should be understood as an indication of the fundamentally civil nature of these settlements following the initial reconquest of Nubia.

This particular sandstone stele, described by the excavators as having been found “in the thickness of the left jamb” of the temple doorway,225 depicts the commandant of Buhen in the company of a woman who must certainly be identified as his wife.226 The appearance of the couple, standing side by side on a stele dedicated at the local temple, may suggest that Turi’s wife resided with him at the fortress. Certainly, the 1:1 ratio of male to female burials in the New Kingdom cemetery at Buhen demonstrates that the on-site presence of Turi’s wife would have been in no way remarkable.227

Evidence for such an even split between the sexes is, moreover, invaluable for determining the nature of Buhen’s reoccupation at the outset of the New Kingdom. Based upon archaeological evidence, scholars believe that early in the Middle Kingdom a revolving gar-

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223 H. S. Smith 1976: 207.
224 Posener 1958: 58.
226 Randall-MacIver and Woolley (1911a: 88) identify her as “a female figure, probably Isis.” Given the figure’s extremely short stature with respect to Turi and her lack of any divine paraphernalia, however, it seems more probable that she was in fact his wife.
227 Randall-MacIver and Woolley excavated approximately 637 bodies in the New Kingdom cemeteries H and J. Of this total, 47 were sexed as male and 42 as female. When calculated the ratio is 1:1.119. Children accounted for 33 burials total or .06%. Such a low number suggests that infants and children may have been generally buried in areas other than the main town cemeteries. Unfortunately, the excavators found it extremely difficult to date individual interments. Multiple burials in chamber tombs had in almost all cases been plundered, and very seldom could datable pottery be associated with a particular individual. In pit tombs, on the other hand, where interments were usually single, the grave goods often amounted solely to a string of beads or a scarab. The 1:1 ratio, therefore, includes burials of the entire New Kingdom.
rison of men staffed the fortress. As the Twelfth Dynasty wore on, however, the Egyptian government’s fiscal and political influence in Nubia gradually waned, and the garrison troops apparently became much more invested in the fortress-town, perhaps even marrying locally and forming kinship ties with the surrounding community. Finally, in the Thirteenth Dynasty, the vast majority of Buhem’s soldiers were likely born, raised, and buried at the site. 228 Judging from the even balance of men and women resident at Buhem in the New Kingdom, then, it would seem that Egypt’s government had decided to model its reoccupation upon the citizen-garrisons of the Thirteenth Dynasty rather than upon the system as it had originally been designed.

Reign of Thutmose II, with relevance to the reign of Thutmose I

1. wnw m nd(w)t nt nb t3wy ḫmṯ n k3t sbrero ḫwṯf rmt kmt r ḫwp mmnmt ḫr-s3 nn n mnw ḫl.n it.k m ḫtw.f nsw-bity ³s-hpr-k3-r’ ³nh(w) dtr r ḫṣf ḫswwt ḫwty iwntwy nw ḫnty-hn-nfr (Aswan-Philae rock inscription; Urk. IV, 138: 14–139: 1)

The ones who were as serf(s) of the lord of the two lands are thinking of plotting. The rebels will rob the people of Egypt in order to steal the cattle from behind these mn(w)-fortresses, which your father, the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Aakheperkare, may he live eternally, built in his victory in order to repress the rebellious lands of the bowmen of Khenthennefer.

Although substantive references to early Eighteenth Dynasty Nubian fortresses are rare, Thutmose II’s Aswan-Philae rock inscription, fortunately, provides a wealth of information on its own. From this text several facts of importance can be gleaned. First, it is apparent that Thutmose I is credited with building a plurality of fortresses that were intended to repress229 the rebellious Nubians of Khenthennefer. This locality, which Goedicke believes to have referred to the area

228 Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 98.
229 The word ḫṣf may also be translated as “to drive away,” “to ward off,” or “to oppose” (Wb. III, 335–336; Lesko 1984: 194; Faulkner 1986: 197). While all are viable translations, I have favored “to repress” because it seems that the aim of early Eighteenth Dynasty policy in Nubia was to pacify and co-opt the indigenous population, not to eradicate it. An argument for a translation of “to ward off” or “to repel,” however, could be mounted considering the similarity in Thutmose II’s phraseology to the Egyptian name for the Middle Kingdom second cataract fort of Uronarti, ḫṣf ḫwntiw (see Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 81). The purpose of this barren fort was surely to repel, rather than to repress, northward-faring Nubians.
beyond the southernmost Egyptian fortification,\textsuperscript{230} was the object of campaigns by Thutmose I (Urk. IV, 8: 5) and also by Ahmose (Urk. IV, 5: 5) at the very beginning of the dynasty. Presuming that Thutmose II did not credit his father with building fortresses that in reality he only refurbished or added to,\textsuperscript{231} one would expect these new installations to have been located south of the early Eighteenth Dynasty fortress of Sai.

Appropriately dated Upper Nubian fortresses-towns, however, are distressingly elusive in the archaeological record. Thus, the search for Thutmose I’s \textit{mnnw}-fortresses has so far yielded only Tombos and Kurgus, sites with intriguing archaeological remains, monumental inscriptions of Thutmose I, and strategic advantages that would have been of interest to a power bent on the pacification of Upper Nubia. Because early Eighteenth Dynasty occupation has yet to be confirmed at either site, however, both remain at present only best guesses.

As will be discussed in more depth below, a fortress situated on the island of Tombos would have been ideally placed both to keep an eye on the recently conquered capital of Kush and to isolate it from northern Kerman population centers. A fortress erected at Kurgus, on the other hand, could have easily monitored and safeguarded the desert road that led between Korosko in Lower Nubia and Kurgus in Upper Nubia. Thus, any potentially seditious communication between Kerma and Nubians to the north may have been effectively stymied through the occupation of both Tombos and Kurgus. Given that the early Eighteenth Dynasty marks the only time that maintaining a close oversight over Kerma would have been of pressing concern to the Egyptian government, it is perhaps not surprising that these \textit{mnnw}, if erected by Thutmose I, fell into obsolescence relatively quickly.

It is highly tempting to speculate that Thutmose I may also have erected an as yet undiscovered fortress at Napata, as a cartouche of his son, Thutmose II, was discovered there.\textsuperscript{232} Located in a fertile stretch of the Dongola Reach, Napata controlled the major trade route to the Butana region. A fortress placed at Napata would not

\textsuperscript{230} Goedicke 1965: 111.

\textsuperscript{231} Emery (1965: 181), for instance, believes the fortress in question might be Buhen as it “alone among the strongholds in that area was big enough to accommodate large numbers of people and their cattle.”

\textsuperscript{232} Wilkinson 1835: 472.
only have alleviated the isolation otherwise experienced by Kurgus, but in combination with this fortress, it would also have given the Egyptians control of both the land and riverine trade routes from Nubia to the southern savannah regions. Such an argument, based largely upon common sense and the simultaneous occupation of Kurgus, however, must unfortunately remain hypothetical.

The placement of Thutmose I’s fortresses is also potentially important with respect to a second issue. The Aswan-Philae inscription of Thutmose II refers to the flight of the ruler of Kush in the reign of Thutmose I “on the day of the good god’s slaughtering, this land being divided into five districts (\(\text{\textit{ww}}\)), each man being a possessor of his portion . . .” (Urk. IV, 139: 5–7). It is unfortunately ambiguous, however, whether “this land” referred to all of Nubia or only to Upper Nubia, where the battle had taken place. Likewise, it is unclear whether the men assigned portions of Nubia to rule were themselves Nubian elites or whether they were drawn from the ranks of Egypt’s administrators.

Two scenarios suggest themselves, depending upon whether one imagines that Thutmose I awarded slices of the old Kushite kingdom to Egyptian administrators or to indigenous rulers. If the former, one might expect the Lower Egyptian districts to have centered upon Kubban (Egyptian \(\text{\textit{bški}}\)), Aniba (Egyptian \(\text{\textit{mi}m}\)), and Buhen (Egyptian \(\text{\textit{bwhn}}\)), the three major cult centers of the Egyptian-imposed Horus god of Nubia. Each of these centers, moreover, appears to have been located in a relatively fertile eco-zone and to have supported a substantial population during the Eighteenth Dynasty.

If Thutmose II’s inscription referred to the division of Lower Nubia among indigenous rulers, however, a different arrangement might be expected. For instance, if the fiefdoms followed regional C-group

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233 As will be discussed in chapter three, however, it is interesting to note that the \(\text{\textit{mnnw}}\)-fortress at Napata—in which Thutmose III constructed a sanctuary—is named simply “Slaying-the-foreigners,” and that Thutmose III makes no claim to have built anything more than the sanctuary itself. As demonstrated in numerous Syro-Palestinian examples, Thutmose III commonly compounded his own name with the name of his constructions (Urk. IV, 661: 4–6; 739: 15–740: 1). Thus, one might have expected this king to have referred to the fortress at Napata as “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-slays-the-foreigners,” if he had in fact founded it.


235 For the importance of these three centers and geographic zones, see Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 200–205; Christophe 1951; Trigger 1965: 110; Emery 1965: 175–176.
population centers, a division between the three territories of Dakka (opposite the fortress of Kubban), Aniba, and Faras would make eminent sense. 236 On the other hand, it is also quite possible that Lower Nubia could have been divided between the two indigenous principalities that are known from New Kingdom sources: those of Tekhet, a polity centering on the vicinity of the Middle Kingdom fortress at Serra, and Mi’am (at Aniba). 237 The principality of Tekhet will be discussed in more detail below.

Whatever the administrative division in Lower Nubia, that of Upper Nubia is unlikely to have differed substantially whether the men in charge were Egyptians or Nubians. In both cases, the divisions almost certainly would have centered upon the former indigenous population centers of Sai and Kerma. 238 There is a further possibility that all five administrative districts were located in Upper Nubia. In modern times, for example, five distinct tribes dominated the area from the second to the fourth cataracts alone, whereas two were located in the relatively barren Abu Hamed reach. 239 If it was in fact Kush that had been split into five divisions, then, in addition to Sai and Kerma/Tombos, further districts may have been located in the vicinity of Napata, Kurgus, and perhaps also Bugdumbush, as O’Connor suggests. 240

As to whether the men who each shared a portion of Nubia were Egyptian administrators or indigenous leaders, the latter may perhaps be a more likely hypothesis. It would have been politically astute on the part of the Egyptians to subdivide the former empire of Kush, which included Lower as well as Upper Nubia, among a

236 O’Connor 1993: 156. Conveniently enough, these centers would also have been in close proximity to New Kingdom Egyptian towns, each a civil reoccupation of a Middle Kingdom fortress-town. In the late Eighteenth Dynasty tomb of Huy, three Lower Nubian rulers present their children, a bride, and gold to the pharaoh, while three Upper Nubian rulers present exotic gifts and gold.

237 For the principedom at Serra, see Säve-Söderbergh 1960a; 1963. For the principedom at Mi’am, see Simpson 1963. Morkot (1991: 299) suggests a third Lower Nubian principedom may have been situated at Kubban, although his argument is based upon the agricultural productivity of the area rather than material or textual evidence.

238 Although the older town of Kerma was abandoned around the time of Thutmose I (Bonnet 1979: 8), the population moved nearby to a settlement closer to the riverbank. An Egyptian administrator may well have been headquartered 10 km to the north at Tombos.

239 Adams 1984a: 59, fig. 9.

240 O’Connor 1993: 61.
number of much smaller, loyalist chiefdoms. Moreover, both Thutmose I’s Tombos stele (Urk. IV, 86: 1) and his coronation inscription (Urk. IV, 80: 17) indicate that oaths of fealty had been administered to a number of Nubian rulers in his reign. In the act of officially recognizing the leaders to whom he applied this oath, Thutmose I in fact both legitimized and regulated their authority.

For the early Eighteenth Dynasty, a great deal of information exists concerning the Lower Nubian rulers of Tekhet. These individuals, together with their families, appear to have been intimately associated with the pharaonic administration, possessing titles like “vigilant agent of the lady of the two lands,” “scribe,” and “royal acquaintance.” In Upper Nubia, however, the leaders of Kush may have enjoyed a greater degree of autonomy. As Morkot has pointed out, the right to offer the king inwa thereby asserting an independent, reciprocal relationship with the crown, appears in Nubia to have been restricted to the rulers of Kush. Likewise, archaeological and textual evidence both suggest that the Egyptian presence in Upper Nubia was far less intensive than in Lower Nubia.

To return again, more directly, to the subject of Thutmose II’s Aswan-Philae inscription, the narrative also provides important information about the population of the Egyptian fortress-towns with respect to the surrounding countryside. According to the text, rmΔkmt (“people of Egypt”) and their cattle inhabited the fortresses themselves. In contrast, the rebellious Nubians are termed n≈t, a word that designates individuals who were forcibly tied to the land upon which they worked.

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242 Bleiberg (1996: 114) defines inwa as an official gift from a ruler or an individual to the pharaoh that, while not necessarily implying equality, indicates an exchange relationship.
243 Morkot 1991. In order to stress the difference in status between the princes of Wawat and Kush, Morkot could also have pointed to the tribute scene in the late Eighteenth Dynasty tomb of Huy. In this painting, three rulers of Wawat present their own children to the pharaoh along with an offering of gold. The three rulers of Kush pictured in the register below, however, give only gold and exotic gifts. Presumably, the covenant worked out between the rulers of Kush and the pharaoh did not include the mandatory surrender of heirs apparent to the Egyptian court.
244 Faulkner 1986: 143; Lesko 1984: 42; see also Wb. II, 377. Ndt is a contraction of ny dt, meaning a person who is “of the estate” (Lorton 1974: 115; contra Bakir 1952: 40). Its New Kingdom application to foreigners is uniformly vague; the common formula states simply that the inhabitants of certain places were “as ndt of his majesty (m ndt n hm.f),” Lorton (1974: 115) suggests that the word developed
If the conquered Nubians were indeed legally and socially regarded as *ndt*, this would have been a concrete manifestation of Thutmose III’s boast: “Indeed, all foreign lands are as serfs (*ndt*) of his majesty” (Urk. IV, 795: 13–14). The transformation of the Nubian people into a subject workforce appears to have been a direct result of the foreign policy of Thutmose I. In his stele at Tombos, the king explained that his campaigns had been intended “to extend the boundaries of Egypt and the territory of Khaftet-hir-nebes, so that the sand-dwellers and the foreigners shall labor for her” (Urk. IV, 83: 3–6). From these statements it is clear that the early Eighteenth Dynasty campaigns into Nubia were not solely aimed at eradicating the Kushite threat to the south and regaining unfettered access to trade routes and gold mines. In addition, it appears to have been part of pharaonic policy to co-opt Nubian resources (human, animal, and agricultural) for the benefit of the Egyptian state. In the early Eighteenth Dynasty, moreover, the immediate representatives of the state would have been the small colonial enclaves centered within the fortress-towns.

That the quality of life for the population of Egyptian-dominated Nubia plunged precipitously in the course of the early Eighteenth Dynasty is clear. A startling example of this phenomenon is witnessed at the cemetery of Fadrus 185, an Eighteenth Dynasty Nubian cemetery located within the principedom of Tekhet and between the fortresses of Serra and Buhen. Whereas graves classified as lower class had accounted for 35.2% of the cemetery in the earliest the more general meaning of “subjects” with reference to foreigners in the New Kingdom. While this may be true, the choice of words is surely not incidental. It is likely that a people whose sovereignty had been taken away were indeed thought of as crown property. Such individuals could be removed to Egypt to work as slave labor or they could be assigned to Egyptian estates in their homeland. As *ndt*, it is clear that they were no longer free to decide their own destiny. *Mrt* is another category of unfree laborers to whom the inhabitants of foreign lands were compared (see Urk. IV, 102: 14–15; for a discussion of this term, see especially Bakir 1952: 22–25).

Likewise, Thutmose III claims in his Gebel Barkal stele, “My majesty subdued all foreign lands, Retenu being under the sandals of my majesty, the people of Nubia being as *ndt* of my majesty” (Urk. IV, 1236: 13–15). See also the Mahatta rock stele, in which Amun states to Amenhotep III, “I give you the southerners as *ndt* of your majesty” (Urk. IV, 1664: 6).

The equation of the Syro-Palestinian population with *ndt* (Urk. IV, 138: 9) in the reign of Thutmose II may indicate that similar practices were the norm in the core of the northern empire as well.

Graves that possessed fewer than four pots and only small, non-prestige goods were classified as lower class (Troy 1991: 224, 250).
It is at first confusing to find such a situation occurring in the heartland of the princedom of Tekhet, a dynasty of indigenous rulers whose names and titles are known from their tombs and scattered inscriptions. A look at the nearby sepulcher of the prince Djehutyhotep (whose Nubian name was Pa-Itsy), however, clarifies matters. In this pyramid-capped monument, which appears to have been typically Egyptian in almost all of its salient details, the prince is shown inspecting the grounds of a large country estate in the exact manner of an Egyptian elite. It appears, then, that by the reign of Hatshepsut the relationship between a Nubian ruler and his larger community may have shifted to resemble more closely that of an Egyptian noble to the commoners who worked upon his estate.

The co-option of Nubian rulers by the Egyptian government is observable within the cemetery of Fadrus itself, which shows a succession of elite tombs moving in three stages from typical C-group tumuli, to an Egyptian-style tomb with a mortuary temple, to pyramid-topped Egyptian-style funerary monuments. The first departure from traditional C-group architecture appears to have taken place in the reign of Ahmose or Amenhotep I. At this time the prince of Tekhet was Djehutyhotep’s grandfather, dsi-w£2, who already possessed the Egyptian name of Teti in addition to his own. Significantly, it may have been in the reign of his son nw£w, prince of Tekhet under Thutmose I and II, that the heirs to Lower Nubian...

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248 Troy 1991: 249–251. Fadrus is one of the only New Kingdom Nubian cemeteries to have been subjected to intensive analysis by its excavators. While one should bear in mind that Fadrus is only a single cemetery, and not necessarily a typical one, the progressive impoverishment of Nubian burials throughout the New Kingdom is a recognized phenomenon. See Emery (1965: 179), Säve-Söderbergh (1967–1968: 232, 237), and Sinclair and Troy (1991: 183–184). For an alternate opinion, however, see Adams (1984a: 238) and O’Connor (1993: 62), who argue that the assimilated Nubians enjoyed a standard of living comparable to or higher than that of peasants in Egypt.

249 Säve-Söderbergh 1960a.


251 Williams 1991: 74.
chiefdoms were first delivered to the Egyptian court to be raised.\textsuperscript{252} Although there is no hard and fast proof that Djehuty-hotep and his brother Amenemhet had been brought up at court, such a hypothesis would explain the titles of “scribe” and “true royal acquaintance” that Amenemhet held prior to his assumption of princedom.\textsuperscript{253}

Säve-Söderbergh has suggested that the relatively rapid disappearance of C-group material culture in the course of the early Eighteenth Dynasty may indicate that the move toward Egyptianization was not entirely organic.\textsuperscript{254} According to his view, the process may have been analogous to the spread of Christianity, whereby the conversion of an entire nation often followed shortly on the heels of the acceptance of Christianity by its leader. Certainly, if the treatment of foreign prisoners of war within Egypt itself is any indication, one can assume that the Egyptian administration strongly encouraged assimilation. Upon entrance to the Nile Valley, foreign captives were given Egyptian names,\textsuperscript{255} dressed in Egyptian clothes, and encouraged to learn the Egyptian language, so that “they might go upon the road, which (they) had not descended (before).”\textsuperscript{256} Indeed, it is even possible that Nubians who refused to abandon their traditional way of life were made to feel increasingly unwelcome in Egyptian-governed territory as the Eighteenth Dynasty wore on.\textsuperscript{257}

It is, of course, this mass assimilation, and perhaps also the exodus of more traditionally oriented Nubians from areas of Egyptian control, that renders the indigenous Nubian and the Egyptian expatriate extremely difficult to differentiate in the New Kingdom. The increasing impoverishment of traditionally indigenous cemeteries like

\textsuperscript{252} This policy, well known from Egyptian records, is most succinctly explained by Thutmose III himself: “Now the children of the rulers and their brothers were brought to be in strongholds (nḫtw) in Egypt. Now, whoever died among these rulers, his majesty will cause his son to stand upon his place” (Urk. IV, 690: 2–5—see chapter three). The twentieth-century colonial practice of educating Algerian elite in Paris or Indian elite at English universities served much the same purpose of indoctrinating the native upper classes with the ideology of the colonial power.


\textsuperscript{254} Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 189.

\textsuperscript{255} Indeed, these adopted names often incorporated the name of the pharaoh under whom the individual had been captured (Sauneron and Yoyotte 1950: 68).

\textsuperscript{256} Bruyere 1930: 35–36, II. 2–6.

\textsuperscript{257} Such communities of Nubian traditionalists are exceptional in the archaeological record after the early Eighteenth Dynasty (Säve-Söderbergh 1962: 96; Adams 1984a: 236–237; Kemp 1978: 43).
Fadrus, however, lends archaeological substantiation to the notion, derived from textual evidence, that much of the Nubian population were regarded as *ndt*, or chattel belonging to the state. Indeed, the statement in Thutmose II’s inscription that *ndt* were planning to steal cattle away from the Egyptian fortresses causes one to wonder if the Egyptians had appropriated Nubian cattle as a means of both pacifying and rendering dependent the local population. From the myriad representations of cattle in C-group art and the frequent association of bucrania with mortuary structures, it can be inferred that cattle had traditionally occupied a place of crucial symbolic and economic importance in Nubian society.

Reign of Hatshepsut, with relevance to the reign of Thutmose I

1. ‘*a-hpr-k3-r’ m sp.f tpy nh-tw.f iw [...] hr.i iw.i r rd[t] ḫnt(y) [...] imy 3t.f [mk(?)] ḫm n ḫhm [...] nb nnw nw ḫm [...] (Fragments from Deir el-Bahri; Naville 1908: pl. 165)

...Aakheperkare in his first occasion (of) his victory [...] before me. I will cause that [...] sail southward [...] which is in his moment. Behold (?), assuredly [...] did not save [...] every [...] (of) the royal *nnw*-fortresses of (his) majesty.

The above portion of a monumental inscription was recovered from Hatshepsut’s Deir el-Bahri mortuary temple and published by Naville among a collection of similar fragments. These isolated pieces of text are extremely difficult to make sense of, but taken together they seem to refer to two campaigns, one undertaken by Hatshepsut’s father, Thutmose I, and another authorized by the queen. The latter conflict appears to have involved plotting on the part of the Nubians and action taken by a royal garrison.²⁵⁸

What is of paramount importance for this discussion, however, is the writing of the word *nnw*, or fortress-town, which is here determined with the *niwt*-town hieroglyph, instead of the more usual *pr*-house determinative. This rare variation of the word appears to acknowledge within the writing system of the Egyptian language the fundamental change in the form and function of Nubian fortresses.

²⁵⁸ Naville 1908: pl. 165; Redford 1967: 58–59. The garrison is termed *iw’t nt ity(t)* (Naville 1908: pl. 165). Although where this royal garrison was stationed is a particularly interesting and relevant question, no evidence is forthcoming. Hatshepsut is attested in temple contexts at Faras, Kumma, and Buhen, but military officials or personnel from her reign in Nubia are as yet unknown.
between the Middle and New Kingdoms. Whereas the former were
designed with almost hypertrophic attention to defense, the New
Kingdom fortifications are relatively simple in design and not
particularly formidable in nature. At Buhen, although the walls were
rebuilt, the drawbridge, ditch, ramparts, and parapets were aban-
don ed.\footnote{Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 13, 16.} At Sai the forti-
fications are scarcely more substantial than the enclosure walls of Theban temples, and at the majority of rein-
habited Middle Kingdom fortresses no repairs at all were adminis-
tered to the outer walls.

New Kingdom fortresses, as discussed above, appear in most cases
to have functioned primarily as colonial settlements. The civilian
character of the majority of the fortresses is attested in the textual
record by the profusion of associated administrative and religious
titles and by the relative dearth of military titles. Archaeologically,
their civil nature is evidenced not only by the overflow of domestic,
religious, and administrative buildings outside the often-dilapidated
fortress walls but also by the intensive royal sponsorship of temple
construction. As the temple appears to have been the economic and
social center of most New Kingdom towns, early Eighteenth Dynasty
rulers must have realized that if their imperial efforts were to suc-
cceed, the Egyptian population living in Nubia needed strong com-
munity centers far more than well-designed ramparts, bastions, or
parapets.

\textit{Reign of Thutmose III, while still a ward of Hatshepsut}
eign countries [...] Cause that one inscribe the god’s offerings, which the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, the lord of the two lands, the lord of performing rituals, Khakaure, made [...] for [all] the gods of Nubia in the temple of (his) father Dedwen, foremost in Nubia [...] Offerings for the New Year’s festivals: Upper Egyptian grain, 50 hekat-measures; Upper Egyptian grain, 204; emmer, 20; to the yearly allowance of (his) father Khnum, opposer of bows. A bull of the herd for the [...] of (his) father Dedwen, a [bull of the herd] [...] A bull of the herd for the festival of Repelling-the-bowmen which will happen in the fourth month of Peret, day 21. Offerings for the New Year’s festival: Upper Egyptian grain, 50 hekat-measures; Upper Egyptian grain, 204 hekat measures; emmer, 15 to the annual allowance at Repelling-the-bowmen [...] Upper Egyptian grain, 26 hekat-measures to the annual allowance of the great king’s wife Mereseger at Subduing-the-foreign-countries [...] His majesty decreed it for the mayors (and) the district governors of the Head of the South (beginning with) Elephantine, as their taxes of every year.

Given that in his second regnal year the dictates of Thutmose III would in reality have been crafted by his regent, this inscription must be viewed as part and parcel of early Eighteenth Dynasty foreign policy. The inscription occurs on the wall of a recently restored Middle Kingdom temple at Semna dedicated to Khnum and Dedwen. As part of the renewal, Senwosret III was installed among the deities worshiped at the temple, and orders were given to the viceroy that all original festival offerings should be reinstated. The funds to cover these expenses were to be extracted from mayors and estate managers in the Head of the South and Elephantine. 260 Indeed, Semna’s rocky and desolate environs almost certainly could not have yielded food for its own garrison, much less have produced a surplus with which to honor the gods.

Interestingly, the names of two other second cataract fortresses are witnessed in this text. The Middle Kingdom name for the fortress at Uronarti, Repelling-the-bowmen, appears twice. In the first instance, a bull of the herd was to be donated to the festival of Repelling-the-bowmen, which occurred on the 21st day of the 4th month of Peret. In addition, the king assigned some 254 hekat-measures of

260 In the tomb of Rekhmire, the mayors and district governors of the Head of the South, beginning with Elephantine and the fortress of Bigeh, are among the officials charged with making payments to the vizier’s office (Urk. IV, 1119: 16–1120: 5). Clearly, these officials must have been among the most important and the wealthiest in Nubia.
Upper Egyptian grain to Repelling-the-bowmen as the annual allowance to support the festal offerings on the New Year. The Middle Kingdom fortress of Shelfak, or Subduing-the-foreign-countries, is likewise mentioned in the endowment. Through the renewed offerings, the cult of a great king’s wife, based at Shelfak, would receive 26 hekat-measures of Upper Egyptian grain annually.

Given the fact that Semna, Uronarti, and Shelfak were all located in reasonably close proximity to one another, it makes sense that their cultic festivals should have been to some extent interrelated. Just as the Theban temples jointly shared certain religious festivals via the medium of cultic visits and processions, one can imagine that the cults of Dedwen and Senwosret III, present at both Semna and Uronarti, would have occasionally combined ceremonies for special days of worship. Such an intertwining of religious rites would have served to provide the isolated communities located in the second cataract region with a larger social network. Certainly, as will be seen in chapter three, the bolstering of temples and temple communities in Nubian fortresses would become one of Thutmose III’s major priorities during his sole reign.

2. \text{nfr n\textbf{r} nb t\textbf{w}y nsw-b\textbf{t}y mn-\textbf{lpr}-\textbf{r}’ ir.n.f m mnw.f n \textit{it(f)} \textbf{hkwnw lw wsrw rtw nfr m mnr inr f n sn’t} (Dedication inscription within the temple of Kumma; Urk. IV, 211: 16–212: 1)

The good god, lord of the two lands, king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Menkheperre. He made (it) as his monument for (his) father Khnum, smiter of desert antelope, making for him a temple consisting of beautiful white stone from Sha’at.

As early as the reign of Senwosret I, Egypt related with hostility to the Nubians who inhabited the island of Sai. Under its ancient name, Shaat, the settlement is enumerated in the execration lists along with others of Egypt’s most hated and feared southern foes.

\begin{itemize}
\item[261] The New Kingdom temple at Shelfak has not been located, but New Kingdom attestations of activity at the site include inscriptions from the time of Thutmose I and Thutmose III, an inscription of a mayor (\textit{hr\textbf{y} stw}), a commander of police or desert scouts (\textit{hr\textbf{y} m\textbf{g}\textbf{z}w}), six scribes (\textit{s\textbf{s}}, and six scribes of the army (\textit{s\textbf{s} m\textbf{s}}) (Hintze 1965). In general, however, excavation at the site suggests that it was not intensively occupied in the New Kingdom (Trigger 1965: 109; 1976: 123; Arkell 1966: 102).
\item[263] Vercoutter 1956: 73.
\item[264] Posener 1940: 49, 55; O’Connor 1991: 147.
\end{itemize}
Indeed, given this evident enmity on the part of the Egyptians, it is not surprising that archaeological evidence reveals Sai to have been the major Kushite population center north of Kerma.\textsuperscript{265} In the reign of Ahmose or his son Amenhotep I, however, the Egyptians not only conquered Sai, but they also began the process of converting it into a fortress-town.

The early Eighteenth Dynasty fortress built at Sai was valuable to the Egyptians for a variety of reasons. First, it secured the island from the resurgence of a hostile local power. It also allowed the approach to the second cataract to be easily monitored. Likewise, a well-traveled overland caravan route that ran parallel to the Nile Valley could be accessed with relative ease from Sai, as it ran closest to the river at this point. Finally, according to this inscription, Sai had another attraction as well. Limestone was not as plentiful in the sandstone- and granite-rich Nubian river valley as it was in Egypt proper. The quarry located at Sai, then, must have attracted the interest of the Egyptian government, which desired to employ this beautiful white stone in royal building projects. Certainly, Hatshepsut and Thutmose III found Sai a convenient base from which to harvest stone for the temple to Khnum that they erected in the second cataract fortress of Kumma.

\textit{Archaeological Evidence for Early Eighteenth Dynasty Southern Fortress-Towns}

\textit{Buhen} (see figure 12)

It is a testament to the relative ease with which Lower Nubia was pacified that the first Middle Kingdom fortress to undergo extensive renovation in the early New Kingdom was Buhen. Egyptians had occupied the site as early as the Old Kingdom due to the presence of nearby copper ore.\textsuperscript{266} With its location at the northern end of the second cataract, surrounded by hills that offered excellent positions from which to monitor desert trails around the cataract, the site was a strategist’s dream.\textsuperscript{267}

\textsuperscript{265} Gratien 1986.

\textsuperscript{266} Emery 1963.

\textsuperscript{267} The fortress was also associated with a road, which could be traced for 6 km and is thought to have led to a copper mining area (Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 4).
In the Middle Kingdom, Senwosret I sponsored the construction at Buhen of an elaborate fortress, the defenses of which consisted of an inner citadel, approximately 150 × 138 m in area, and a 5 m thick buttressed enclosure wall. The citadel itself was protected by round bastions, brick-paved ramparts, parapets, a substantial ditch that could at times be flooded with water, and a glacis. Outside the main fort, the Egyptians erected yet another wall, which extended roughly 712 m in perimeter on the three inland sides of the fortress. This outer wall was roughly 5 m thick and likewise protected with towers, a ditch 3 m deep and 6 m wide, a second brick wall on the counterscarp, and a glacis. At some point midway thorough the Second Intermediate Period, however, these formidable defenses were penetrated, and Kushite personnel occupied the fortress along with the remnants of the Egyptian forces that had declared their loyalty to the ruler (hk3) of Kush. As S. T. Smith has argued, the continued presence of Egyptian expatriates in Nubian fortresses such as Buhen and Askut may well have eased the transition from Egyptian control to Kushite control and back again at the beginning of the New Kingdom.

By Kamose’s third year, Buhen seems to have been firmly back in Egyptian hands and to have become the focus of a renewal project. While the impressive outer fortifications were not altered, the inner citadel received new skin walls of 1.2 m in thickness on its northern, western, and southern sides. The new fortifications strengthened the fortress, yet many of the specifically defensive features of the Middle Kingdom complex were not reduplicated. For example, the western gateway of the outer wall was shortened and simplified, while the inner citadel’s defensive ditch, ramparts, bastions, and drawbridge were paved over to the north and west to form a sunken brick road. Indeed, even in the areas that the Egyptians refortified, the work was often shoddy, and new towers were almost always constructed directly atop rubble from the old.

The administrative heart of the inner citadel at Buhen, and the likely residence of Turi during his tenure as ḫsw, was Block A, a

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268 Most of the information here summarized concerning Buhen has come from the Emery, Smith, and Millard (1979) excavation report.

269 Scholars differ as to whether the Kushite takeover was accomplished peacefully (S. T. Smith 1995: 110–126; 2003: 80–81) or by force (Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 3, 92).

43 × 25 m, two-story building altered little from its Middle Kingdom plan. Directly inside its corner entrance, a staircase led to the ramps and battlements—the only such staircase preserved in the fortress. Meanwhile, a shorter staircase gave access to the second story of the building itself, which may have contained a residential suite. Certainly, there was no room for domestic space on the first floor, as this level consisted solely of four columned halls and four long, narrow rooms. Undoubtedly, the two easternmost of these rooms served as a larder, given that wine jars bearing the name of Hatshepsut were found here along with the detritus of many other food and drink containers.271

The northernmost pair of rooms, accessed though a central 15-pillared hall, may well have served as an audience chamber for the ġsw and later the ḫty-ṛ of Buhen, judging from the layout of the rooms and the monumentality of the architecture. Although Block A had been constructed in the Middle Kingdom and remained little altered in the New Kingdom, it shares a few features in common with the administrative headquarters identified in LB IIB and IA IA Canaan and thereby also with the center-hall houses of Amarna. These salient features include its corner entrance, the relatively thick walls and second story, and the internal arrangement of a central hall surrounded on four sides with rooms and corridors.

The entire northeastern third of the inner citadel of Buhen, in which Block A was located, appears to have been devoted to religious and administrative buildings. Block D, just east of Block A, may have served as a storage area, although the floors had been whitewashed with gypsum plaster—perhaps suggesting that the building had other, loftier functions.272 The discovery of a furnace for copper smelting makes it clear that industrial pursuits occurred in the building as well, although it is doubtful that the furnace had been present already at the beginning of the New Kingdom. The

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271 Due to the extremely denuded state of the fortress and the disruption of the original deposits in ancient and modern times, the contexts of very few of the archaeological deposits can be considered secure (Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 93–94). The great conglomeration of jars and sealings found in the eastern halls of Block A, however, allow for reasonable assurance that this area had indeed been utilized for storage.

272 Emery (1961: 85 and Emery, Smith, and Mallard 1979: 10) suggests on the basis of its plan that the area served as a barracks in the Middle Kingdom. Large-scale barracks, however, have yet to be discovered at other New Kingdom fortress-towns.
functions of blocks G and H are also uncertain, although both complexes are closely associated with the temple built by Hatshepsut and may have served, respectively, as workshop and storage areas. As a testament to the importance of this stone temple, dedicated to the worship of Horus of Buhen, Hatshepsut made sure to provide it with its own separate gateway and quay.

To the southwest of the commandant’s quarters lay blocks B and C, which appear from their architecture to have served as domestic, workshop, and storage areas. Immediately to the southeast, however, roughly 8,100 m² of the inner citadel could not be accurately planned due to severe denudation. The few walls that remained were built mostly atop the grid-like Middle Kingdom walls. While the earlier architecture suggests storage compartments or foundations for houses or workshops, the New Kingdom walls displayed a more open configuration—leaving the function of this area somewhat obscure.

Outside of the citadel walls, but inside the area protected by the enclosure wall, Ahmose had reconstructed a Middle Kingdom temple, apparently also dedicated to the god Horus of Buhen. The intermediate zone in which it was located, although unfortunately much denuded, contained traces of serpentine walls and mud-brick buildings. On analogy with the fortresses of Mirgissa and Kor, at which troops appear to have been housed outside the citadel yet inside the area protected by the outer fortification, it has been suggested that troops were quartered in this zone at Buhen as well. After the first few reigns of the Eighteenth Dynasty, however, when the settlement at Buhen became predominantly civilian in nature, the outer walled area may well have been given over to houses, workshops, and livestock.

273 Reliefs also honored Satis, Amun-re, Montu, Isis, and Anubis.
277 The reasons why Hatshepsut felt it necessary to construct an additional temple to Horus of Buhen inside the fortress are obscure. Perhaps Ahmose’s mud-brick temple was deemed too humble or dilapidated to serve such an important base; it is true that the artistic workmanship of the earlier temple is decidedly homespun. Alternatively, maybe the two temples served different populations—a split perhaps between the elites and administrators housed within the fortress and the humbler townsfolk and soldiers quartered outside.
279 Perhaps such an area would have protected the fortress' cattle in times of
The excavators of Buhen located two New Kingdom cemeteries (H and J) in the desert northwest of the outer fortification. Due to the practice of multiple burials and the plundered and weather-beaten state of the cemetery itself, chronological differentiation among and even within graves is unfortunately difficult to achieve. Moreover, the distinction in burials between Egyptians and assimilated Nubians is also extremely nebulous due to the general homogeneity of the material culture.²⁸⁰

Definite distinctions can be drawn, on the other hand, between the haves and the have-nots: i.e., those tombs that possessed a high ratio of goods to bodies and the tombs in which individuals were buried with little or no grave goods. Unfortunately, however, it is the very absence of material culture that makes the interpretation of the latter category difficult. While these graves could be evidence for an underclass of Nubian ndt, or serfs, the difference might also be related to the chronological depth of the cemetery. Throughout both Nubia and Egypt, Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty burials are in general characterized by a marked decrease in grave goods, and thus many of the seemingly impoverished burials at Buhen could in fact date to this period of time.²⁸¹

The early New Kingdom fortress-town of Buhen as a whole, then, seems to have been occupied by a religious and administrative hierarchy, as well as a general civilian population. Although Kamose and Ahmose had devoted imperial resources to refurbishing Buhen’s fortifications, most of the truly defensive features had in fact been paved over. Indeed, the restoration seems more cosmetic than practical. After the reign of Ahmose, however, military security admittedly

²⁸⁰ The only Nubian ceramic found in the graves was Kerma ware, which—according to Williams (1992: 4–5)—“was exported to Egypt and commonly used by Egyptians in Nubia.” Given the presence of Kerma ware in similar contexts at Tombos, however, its presence might perhaps be evidence for the incorporation of Upper Nubians, perhaps female marriage partners, into the settlement (personal communication, S. T. Smith 2003).

²⁸¹ As will be discussed in chapters five and six, there is a startling lack of evidence for a resident population, Egyptian or Nubian, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, although public works and even warfare are known to have taken place at this period. It has been suggested that the reason so few late New Kingdom graves have been found in Nubia is that—as in Egypt—this period was characterized not only by multiple burials in family tombs (many of which were later badly looted) but also by a radically restricted assemblage of grave goods (Kemp 1978: 40).
does not seem to have been of paramount importance to either the Egyptian government or the inhabitants of the fortress-town. While in the Middle Kingdom the population of Buhen buried their dead within the enclosure walls, the New Kingdom cemeteries were located well outside the fortress town—perhaps indicating that the indigenous population was deemed less of a threat. Likewise, after the tenure of Turi as Δsw of Buhen, military titles disappear. Throughout the New Kingdom female interments exist in a 1:1 ratio with their male counterparts at Buhen, and weapons are scarcely evidenced. Judging from archaeological and textual evidence, then, it appears likely that inside a generation or so the original New Kingdom garrison may have been replaced by a body of “citizen soldiers.”

Sai (see figure 13)
Like many of the New Kingdom installations in Nubia, Sai was less a fortress-town than it was a fortified town. Although its enclosure wall was 5 m thick and bastioned, Sai’s defenses were decidedly simple in comparison to the fortresses of the Middle Kingdom. In lieu of combining an elaborately defended outer wall and an inner citadel, the entire town of Sai fit within the boundaries of one 238 × 140 m enclosure wall.282 Unfortunately, the construction of an Ottoman fortress directly atop the Egyptian town has done much damage to the site. As the excavators themselves confessed, very few artifacts were found in situ, and the ceramic record was only interesting statistically, for no wares could be confidently associated with their original contexts.283 Bearing this in mind, then, it is quite lucky that the two-fifths of the site that could be excavated yielded definable architecture.

Temple A, one of the earliest buildings at Sai, appears to have been sponsored by Ahmose or his son and to have been dedicated to Amun. The temple is dwarfed, however, in comparison to two palatial-sized buildings (perhaps 66 × 27 m each), which occupied the easternmost excavated area of the town. Of the two, the eastern structure was unfortunately too damaged for its plan to be divined, but its western counterpart possessed a large, six-columned hall as well as numerous grand chambers. The great size of these buildings

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282 Azim 1975: 120.
283 Azim 1975: 96.
is contrasted with the narrow residential zone squeezed into the space west of the buildings and east of the granary. These houses, built with significantly smaller bricks than those used for the palaces or the granary, included three four-room houses of identical plan and two larger residential complexes, perhaps meant for elite officials or extended families. Finally, in the southwestern corner of the fortress-town, next to the gate, a large granary contained at least twelve circular silos. The original number of silos, however, was likely much higher.

Judging from textual sources, the town of Sai appears to have been governed in the New Kingdom by a $h3by$ rather than a fortress commander. It is thus likely that the two palatial buildings had been intended to serve as headquarters for this official and as lodgings for the pharaoh or a viceroy during the course of official visits. While the fortress-town at Sai does not appear to have supported a purely military population, the presence of a strong Egyptian community on the island assured the Egyptian government that the formerly troublesome Kushite polity of Shaat would not be resurrected. In addition to literally obliterating a former threat to Egyptian power, Sai’s location provided easy access to the desert caravan

284 Azim 1975: 120.
285 Four additional silos can be distinguished on the plan, although, as these underlie other silos, all could not have functioned simultaneously. Utilizing Kemp’s (1991: 309) estimation that a round silo of 2.5 m—not filled entirely to capacity—would have held 125 khar-measures of grain, or 9,500 cubic liters, the granary at Sai would likely have contained 3,750 khar-measures of grain or 283,000 cubic liters. Such an amount could have supported 156 workers over the period of a year (Eyre 1987: 202). Although it is possible, given the ratio of state buildings to habitations in the excavated portion of the site, that the actual population of Sai was not especially large, it seems probable that the 12 silos alone could not have supported both the administrative elite and the rank-and-file settlers at the site. Unfortunately, later Meroitic building has obscured the early layout of this part of the fortress. In year 20 of Thutmose III, the viceroy Nehi would refurbish the granary and replace the silos with at least 17 rectangular magazines, each measuring 13 m $\times$ 3.75 m on average (Vercoutter 1958: 155; Azim 1975: 116).
286 Posener 1958: 58.
287 For the scattered information pertinent to the New Kingdom cemeteries at Sai, see Minault and Thill 1974; Vercoutter 1974: 21; Geus 1976: 63–69; Gout-Minault 1976. The material culture associated with the graves was typical of the New Kingdom repertoire anywhere in Egypt or Nubia.
288 The Kerman cemeteries at Sai were discontinued at the end of the Seventeenth Dynasty, and in their place at least two pharaonic cemeteries were established. The abrupt transition suggests either that all of the Kermans were forced to evacuate the island or that any Kermans who remained were forced to assimilate to Egyptian culture.
route that led to the Selima Oasis, northward through a chain of wells, and finally to Upper Egypt. Indeed, with all of its strategic advantages, Sai might best be envisioned as a “new town” of the type employed from ancient times onward to bring order and stability to regions plagued by invasions and banditry.

Possible early Eighteenth Dynasty Base: Tombos (no plan available)
In 1908 Breasted visited the island of Tombos and remarked upon the remains of “a Nubian stronghold of sun-dried brick, which may contain the nucleus of Thutmose I’s fortress.” Breasted and others have been tempted to assign the ruins to Thutmose I because they believe the compound to be mentioned in a victory stele of this king that had been carved onto a nearby rock-face. According to their interpretation of the text, Thutmose I had built a fortress for his army at Tombos and named it “None-faces-him-among-the-entire-nine-bows.” Even scholars who don’t subscribe to this reading, however, are often tempted to view Thutmose I as the founder of the ruined fortress that Breasted described.

The fortress’ proximity to Thutmose I’s Tombos stele and its location barely 10 km north of the Kushite capital at Kerma are both features that would make a date in the reign of Thutmose I quite

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290 See, for example, the Instructions of Merikare, “For the mooring-post is staked in the district I made in the east from Hebenu to Horusway; it is settled with people, of the best in the whole land, to repel attacks against them” (Lichtheim 1975: 103).
291 Breasted 1908: 45.
292 The controversy has centered upon the lines: $km\times n\ nbw\ hwt^{-2}\ st\ mw\ n\ mst\ f\ tm\ hsi\ sw\ mn\ pd\-ps\ dt\ dm\ (wt)$ (Urk. IV, 85: 2–4). Breasted (1988a: 30) and the scholars who follow him (Leclant 1978: 68; Bradbury 1984–1985: 4; Zebelius-Chen 1988: 193; Shinnie 1996: 81) tend to translate the text roughly as follows, “The lords of the palace created a fortress ($mn[nw]$) for his army, (called) There-is-none-facing-him-among-the-united-nine-bows.” It is my opinion, along with scholars such as Sethe (1914: 43–44), Save-Soderbergh (1941: 150; 1991: 3), Goedicke (1974b: 14), Redford (1979a: 274), Berg (1987: 2), and S. T. Smith (personal communication), however, that it is the king himself who is metaphorically the “fortress.” According to this reading, the lines should be translated to the effect of “(Thutmose I is the one) who the lords of the temple created, a fortress for all of his army, he who faces aggressively the entire nine-bows like a young panther.” Such a reading fits the grammar and the general laudatory context of the inscription far better than the former suggestion.
reasonable. Early Eighteenth Dynasty forces based at Tombos would have been situated in a perfect position both to launch attacks on Kerma and later to keep an eye on the newly (re)conquered polity. Two other strategic considerations would have rendered Tombos an attractive locale for the establishment of a military base. First, like Sai, Tombos was an island, and an island base in the third cataract may have been particularly attractive to the imperial government. Certainly, the longevity of Egypt’s fortresses in the second cataract demonstrate that such installations were not only defensively unparalleled, but they were also logistically useful in monitoring and assisting riverine traffic. Second, archaeological evidence suggests that a settlement located at Hannek—just across the river from Tombos—had been a Kerman center of some prominence. Establishing a base at Tombos, then, may have been one of the only ways for the early Eighteenth Dynasty rulers to prevent this strategic location from falling back into Kerman hands.

It is highly unfortunate, then, that archaeological recognizance to date has not confirmed the presence of a New Kingdom fortress at Tombos. The fact that a sizable New Kingdom cemetery is located on the mainland just east of the island, however, is of great interest. So far as can be determined, burials date back at least to the reign of Amenhotep II and possibly to the time of Hatshepsut. While the town site associated with the cemetery has yet to be definitively identified, a concentration of New Kingdom sherds near the southern end of the village of Tombos suggests that a town or possibly a fortress-town may have been situated in this area. Such a location would have allowed the inhabitants to maintain a close watch on southern river traffic and may thus have been particularly desirable.

Possible early Eighteenth Dynasty Base: Kurgus (no plan available)
As was the case at Tombos, the assignation of the otherwise undated crumbling mud-brick fortress at Kurgus to Thutmose I is based

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295 Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 3. S. T. Smith believes that the fortress that Breasted described is probably Christian. Near the southern end of the modern village of Tombos, Smith observed walls that could possibly belong to a fortress. This area will be investigated further in future seasons (S. T. Smith, personal communication).
primarily upon a nearby monumental inscription. Thutmose I’s text warned Nubians against transgressing the stele that had been given to him by Amun, threatening any Nubian who did so with the loss of cattle and heirs. As Zibelius-Chen points out, however, the inscription offers little to intimidate the illiterate, and the text would presumably have required military accompaniment to render it effective.

The fortress of Kurgus is located beyond the fourth cataract, at the farthest point upstream on the Nile that exhibits *in situ* evidence for an Egyptian presence. The Abu Hamed reach is among the most desolate areas of the Nubian Nile Valley, and it is unlikely that a substantial agricultural population could have existed in the near vicinity. Without fertile fields, then, a fortress located at Kurgus would by necessity have imported all of its foodstuffs, presumably from the nearest Egyptian center at Tombos or perhaps even Napata—a substantial stretch of Nile in either case. The positioning of the fortress appears even less practical when one realizes that an army invading Upper Nubia from the south would far more likely utilize the desert trail connecting the West Butana to Napata than it would the slow and tortuous route northward on the Nile.

There are a number of reasons, however, why New Kingdom strategists might have deemed the control of Kurgus important.

1. Kurgus is located in close proximity to a gold mine, although it is unknown to what extent this mine was utilized during the New Kingdom.
2. Kurgus is positioned at the southern head of a well-worn trail leading northward to Korosko in Lower Nubia. The great length

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297 See Arkell 1966: 82 or Bradbury 1984–1985: 3–4 for the text. Scholars who believe the fortress to date to Thutmose I include Morkot 1987: 31; Shinnie 1996: 81. W. V. Davies and his team from the British Museum conducted a test excavation at the fortress in November 2000. While they found no evidence for the compound being a pharaonic construction, its dating remained unclear (personal communication).

298 Zibelius-Chen 1988: 165.

299 Although there is no proof, it is tempting to equate Kurgus with Karoy, the traditional claimed boundary for Egyptian influence in Nubia. See, however, Störk (1977: 260), who believes the fortress was located in Miu and therefore served as an outpost or trading station.

300 Vercoutter 1959: 135; O’Connor 1982: 903; Morkot 1987: 31. It is, perhaps, important to note that gold-bearing ores are not found between the general regions of Tombos and Kurgus (O’Connor 1982: 903).
and aridity of the trail made traversing it extremely difficult before the arrival of the camel, and it has only been relatively recently that New Kingdom inscriptions were discovered at some of the wells.\footnote{Macadam 1955: 8; Damiano-Appia 1992; Morkot 1995: 180. For the arduous nature of the trail, even traversed in modern day on donkey back, see Werner 1987: 120–132.} Given the presence of the inscriptions, however, it is likely that the trail was indeed utilized as a transit route in the New Kingdom and that the Egyptian government attempted to monitor it by employing the services of local Medjay or other desert peoples.

3. A military base at Kurgus, if erected in conjunction with a base at Napata, would have ensured that the Egyptians held a monopoly on all trade routes—via land and water—that led from Upper Nubia to Lower Nubia or to the southern lands.

4. Kurgus is located on a rocky stretch of water that would potentially pose peril to passing ships. Such positioning, then, is reminiscent of the Middle Kingdom second cataract fortresses, which seem to have been utilized both to monitor and to aid riverine traffic.

Although it remains unknown whether Thutmose I in fact sponsored the construction of the fortress at Kurgus, the twenty or more New Kingdom inscriptions found at the nearby rock face of Hagar el-Merwa attest to considerable New Kingdom interest in the site.

Unfortunately, our ability to determine the date of the fortress at Kurgus is considerably hampered by the lack of an accurate plan. At present all we have to work from is Arkell’s summary description. According to his report, the fortress walls formed an imperfect rectangle, with the eastern and western walls measuring 77.7 m, the northern wall 68.6 m, and the southern wall only 64 m. Such measurements yield the fortress an area only slightly smaller than that of the Middle Kingdom fortresses of Shelfak and Uronarti. A large entrance was present at the eastern or desert side of Kurgus, and a small entrance opened to the north. The northern wall appears to have been protected by a curtain wall and a glacis, both admittedly unusual in New Kingdom military architecture,\footnote{This feature is only paralleled by the Libyan fortress constructed by Ramesses II at Zawiya Umm el-Rakham (see chapter five).} while the western
wall possessed a stone facing to help shield it from high floods. Myriad mud-bricks, measuring on average $38 \times 20.5 \times 9.6$ cm, formed the 5.5 m thick outer walls. Assuredly, the joint Sudan Archaeological Research Society and British Museum expedition currently investigating Kurgus will further our understanding of the nature of early Eighteenth Dynasty activity at the site.

NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN FORTIFICATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE HEADQUARTERS IN THE EARLY EIGHTEENTH DYNASTY: A CROSS-FRONTIER PERSPECTIVE

Although an architectural comparison between Tell el-Ajjul and Nubian fortress-towns such as Buhen or Sai yields far more differences than shared features, one important similarity in Egyptian policy on the two frontiers may nonetheless be discerned. Namely, it appears to have been an institutional practice on the part of the Egyptians to banish a particularly troublesome conquered population and to erect a military base in its place. Tell el-Dab’a (Avaris), Tell Heboua I (Tjaru), and Tell el-Ajjul (Sharuhen) had all been important Hyksos centers before their subsequent reoccupation by early Eighteenth Dynasty settlers.

With regard to the Nubian frontier, the flourishing Kerman population of the island of Sai disappears in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, only to be replaced by an Egyptian fortress-town. Likewise, while the Egyptians may have been originally content to keep an eye on Kerma from a nearby base at Tombos, it is notable that following its conquest the old town was abandoned and replaced by a new settlement built closer to the river. Significantly, this replacement town exhibited a mixed Kerman and Egyptian-style cultural assemblage.

Our understanding of early Eighteenth Dynasty installations on both frontiers is hampered by a scarcity of textual information and modern archaeological investigations. The Egyptian-style brand found

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303 Arkell 1950: 38–39. Such measurements are roughly consistent with those discovered at other Eighteenth Dynasty constructions, such as Malkata and Tjaru (Hayes 1951: 164; Maksoud 1987: 15).

304 There is, of course, the possibility that the Egyptians did not occupy Kerma directly because of a treaty relationship worked out between the Egyptian government and the remnants of the Kerman kingdom.
at Tell el-Ajjul and Thutmose II’s reference to the cattle that belonged to the Nubian fortresses suggests that Egyptian bases may well have possessed resident herds. Otherwise, the provision of staple goods probably differed in the north and in the south. Given the large civilian population that would have been present at fortress-towns like Buhen and Sai, it is probable that the inhabitants of these bases cultivated their own cereals. Tell Heboua I may well have been similarly self-sufficient, given its great size and fertile environs. At Tell el-Ajjul and at other relatively modest northern garrison posts, however, sustenance for the troops would likely have been extracted as taxes from nearby polities. Certainly this practice is known to have occurred as early as the sole reign of Thutmose III (see chapter three). The storage jar found at Tell el-Ajjul, which had been impressed with the dual cartouches of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III, however, may also suggest that local provisions were supplemented on occasion with deliveries from Egypt.

It is interesting that the practice of erecting fortress-towns on foreign soil during the early Eighteenth Dynasty appears to have been limited to the southern frontier. While Upper Nubia and Syria-Palestine represented equally virgin territory, Egypt’s long occupation of Lower Nubia and the comforting presence of the Nile almost certainly rendered the southern land less alien to potential settlers. If so, it may have been significantly easier to recruit Egyptians to inhabit a Nile Valley town than one in Syria-Palestine, where agricultural and cultural practices were far more foreign to the Egyptian tradition. Alternatively, it may have been that the pharaonic government had no intention of settling the Levant. Indeed, garrisons may well have been placed in southern Canaan predominantly as peacekeeping forces and as added protection for the Egyptian border but not as proto-settlements for an expanding Egyptian state. With regard to Syria-Palestine, archaeological and textual evidence suggests that Egypt may have preferred the role of absentee landlord to that of homeowner.
CHAPTER THREE
FRONTIER POLICY IN THE MID-EIGHTEENTH DYNASTY

Overview of Egyptian interactions with Syria-Palestine

Historical summary

With the death of Hatshepsut, Egypt's Syro-Palestinian vassals and her northern enemies seized the opportunity to rid themselves of Egyptian interference in their lands. A coalition that included hundreds of towns “from Yurza until the ends of the earth” (Urk. IV, 648: 4) met Thutmose III’s army at the town of Megiddo. Due to a bold move on the part of the pharaoh, the rebels were roundly defeated and forced to seek safety within the town itself. After a seven-month siege the enemy surrendered, took oaths of loyalty, and departed for their homes as chastened Egyptian vassals. Although Thutmose III would campaign annually for the better part of the next twenty years, this battle appears to have held special importance for him.¹

For modern scholars as well, the battle of Megiddo is viewed as a critical turning point in Egypt’s foreign policy with regard to its northern empire.² While recorded campaigns occurred sporadically in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, for two decades after Thutmose III’s battle at Megiddo expeditions northward took place almost annually. In some years the army would wage battles against new or rebel territories, and in others the Egyptians simply flexed their martial muscles and collected tribute. Similarly, it is only after the battle of Megiddo that references to Egyptian installations on foreign soil become almost commonplace in the textual record. Whatever the inhibiting factors may have been during his coregency with

¹ The battle of Megiddo is allotted a disproportionate amount of space in the annals (Urk. IV, 647: 5–667: 15) and is also referenced in numerous other monuments (cf. Urk. IV, 184: 4–186: 7; 757: 14–760: 16; 766: 17–767: 12; 808: 8–809: 7; 1234: 6–1236: 15).
Hatshepsut, upon her death Thutmose III actively set about the task of formalizing his empire.

Thutmose III’s military campaigns are well known from both royal and private texts. Foremost among the officially commissioned sources are his annals, which he had carved upon the temple walls at Karnak, “causing that (each) campaign be recorded by name, together with the plunder which [his majesty brought away from it]” (Urk. IV, 647: 7–8). That the annals were compiled in part from daybook entries is known not only from contemporary accounts (Urk. IV, 661: 14–662: 6; 1004: 9–10) but also from modern grammatical analyses. On the strength of this documentary core, scholars accept the annals as a relatively trustworthy, if inevitably biased, record of Thutmose III’s campaigns.

The famed battle of Megiddo, undertaken both to quell an empire-wide rebellion and “to extend the boundaries of Egypt” (Urk. IV, 648: 15), has been frequently discussed from a tactician’s point of view. It is also interesting, however, with respect to the information it offers on Egyptian fortresses and administrative installations. The narrative of Thutmose III’s campaign begins with a departure from Tjaru (Urk. IV, 647: 12), the Egyptian border-fortress that had been seized by Ahmose, reequipped by Thutmose I (see chapter two), and provided with fortifications no later than the reign of Thutmose III. After a remarkably quick crossing of the Ways of Horus, perhaps suggesting that the fresh-water wells along the Sinai littoral were at least protected and maintained if not actually fortified, Thutmose and his army reached Gaza (Urk. IV, 648: 9–11). At this town, christened in Egyptian “The-ruler-seized-(it),” the Egyptian army celebrated the anniversary of their pharaoh’s coronation. It may also have been at this point that the army reconnoitered with a garrison that had earlier retreated to nearby Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajjul) due to the revolt (Urk. IV, 648: 5).

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5 Maksoud 1998: 36.
6 Oren 1979: 186. Seal impressions bearing the cartouche of Thutmose III occur in Eighteenth Dynasty levels at Haruba site A-289 (phase IV–Oren 1993a: 1390). While such impressions are often found in later reigns, there is at least a possibility that this site had been established in the northern Sinai as early as the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. See also the discussion of the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty fosse at Tell el-Borg below.
7 See the discussion concerning this garrison and its whereabouts in chapter two.
Between Gaza and Megiddo, Thutmose III camped with his army (Urk. IV, 652: 13; 655: 15), and just prior to the battle he positioned garrisons (\textit{\textit{iw}\textit{yt}})\textsuperscript{8} in the north and south (Urk. IV, 656: 16), although it is not entirely clear whether these garrisons also camped or whether they had been billeted in nearby towns. It was only when the need for a prolonged siege became apparent, however, that the Egyptians truly settled in for the long haul. The army, perhaps with the help of prisoners of war (Urk. IV, 184: 15–16),\textsuperscript{9} surrounded Megiddo with a stockade to aid in the process of monitoring entrance or exit to the city. This stockade, constructed with fruit trees (or perhaps “pleasant” trees)\textsuperscript{10} and surrounded by a ditch, was given the formal name, “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-encircles-the-Syro-Palestinians (\textit{styw})” (Urk. IV, 661: 6). During the work, Thutmose III himself is said to have occupied an eastern \textit{\textit{htm}} (Urk. IV, 661: 1) located in close proximity to the besieged city. The nature of this structure will be discussed below.

The hundreds of place names given in the topographical lists that pertain to Thutmose III’s first campaign (Urk. IV, 781: 6–806: 6) and their often precise geographic clustering have led scholars to suggest that Thutmose III and his army conducted numerous raids on surrounding areas while the siege was in progress.\textsuperscript{11} Indeed, archaeologists have assigned many a destruction layer to these presumed

\textsuperscript{8} The interpretation of \textit{iw}\textit{yt} as “garrison troops” follows Schulman 1964a: 17–18. Others prefer the more neutral translation “combat-ready troops” or the like (Redford, personal communication). See Faulkner (1953: 44) for a noncommital discussion.

\textsuperscript{9} In a retrospective of his first campaign, Thutmose III records that he placed the enemy “in a prison (\textit{\textit{hnrt}}) that they themselves had built, the enclosure (\textit{\textit{nsnw}}) around it as a stable rampart (\textit{\textit{sbty mnlt}})” (Urk. IV, 184: 15–16). While this statement may have referred to a separate holding area for prisoners of war, it could also have been a metaphorical designation for the Egyptian-built wall, which in enclosing the city effectively imprisoned the enemy army. Alternatively, it may have referred to the city of Megiddo itself, which had become a prison to those entrapped within.

\textsuperscript{10} Literally, “all their sweet (or pleasant) trees” (\textit{ht.sn nb bnr}—Urk. IV, 660: 16). Breasted (AR II: 185, n. h) suggests the interpretation “fruit trees.” Presumably the Egyptians may have chosen fruit trees as a building material not only for their inherent qualities but also for the havoc the loss of such an important source of income would wreak on the local economy. Nelson (1913: 60–61) has gathered a number of comparative examples of armies constructing stockades around besieged cities. In one case the wall had likewise been fashioned from fruit trees.

\textsuperscript{11} Noth 1938: 26–65; Edel 1953a: 97; Helck 1971: 133. Alternative views on the lists are that they served primarily as compilations of well-known itineraries (Redford 1982a: 59–60; 1986a: 125–126; followed by Hoffmeier 1989: 187–188). Likewise,
subsidiary battles.\footnote{12} Given the gradual nature of the MB IIC/LB I transition and the general chaos that accompanied it (see chapter two), however, such definitive attributions must be approached with caution.

During the seven-month siege of Megiddo, the army appears to have supported itself by harvesting the city’s fields (Urk. IV, 667: 10–15), commandeering its cattle (Urk. IV, 664: 9–14), and accepting “clean grain, wine, large cattle, and small cattle for the army of his majesty” (Urk. IV, 662: 16) from delegates of polities who deemed it prudent to ally themselves with the Egyptians. In the end, however, the long siege paid off. Not only did each city that took part in the conspiracy depart Megiddo as an Egyptian vassal (Urk. IV, 1235: 16–1236: 5),\footnote{13} but the Egyptians returned home with more than 2,000 Canaanite slaves (Urk. IV, 665: 5–12), numerous luxury goods (Urk. IV, 665: 13–667: 8), and the exclusive rights to the products and produce of three Syro-Palestinian towns (Urk. IV, 664: 17–665: 3), which were later dedicated to Amun (Urk. IV, 744: 3–8). Much debate has centered upon the location of these three towns, Yenoam (\textit{y-nw-}\textit{3-m}), Nuges (\textit{i-n-i-w-g-s} \\textit{m}), and Herenkeru (\textit{hw-r-n-k3-rw}), which before their donation to Amun had contained estates belonging to the king of Kadesh.\footnote{14} While Herenkeru is otherwise it has been suggested by Yeivin (1950: 51–62; followed by Aharoni 1968: 146, 152), albeit perhaps less persuasively, that the organization of Thutmose III’s topographical lists reflects the administrative organization of Canaan in the Hyksos Period or the early Eighteenth Dynasty.


\footnote{13} The annals also state that following the battle enemy leaders were appointed \textit{anew} (Urk. IV, 663: 2). Presumably this statement indicates that these individuals were (re)established in their offices specifically as officially sanctioned Egyptian vassals. Such an event is remembered by Addu-nirari in Amarna letter 51: “[\textit{No}][e] (that) when Manakhpiya, the king of Egypt, your ancestor, made [\textit{T}][a[ku], my ancestor, a king in Nukhasse, he put oil on his head and [s]poke as follows: ‘Whom the king of Egypt has made a king, [and on whose head] he has put [oil], [no] one [shall . . .]’” (EA 51: 4–9; Moran 1992: 122). Bryan (1991: 340–341) believes the reference may have been to Thutmose IV, as he was literally “the father of your father,” but it appears more likely that the phrase was meant less literally, as “ancestor” (see Campbell 1964: 68–69 as well as the discussion and references found in Moran 1992: 122, n. 1).

\footnote{14} Urk. IV, 664: 17–665: 2 reads: “A list of what was carried off afterward by the king from the household goods of that fallen one, which were in Yenoam, in Nuges, and in Herenkeru.” Although theoretically “that fallen one” could designate either the king of Megiddo or the king of Kadesh—as these two men were the major ringleaders of the rebellion—this term in the annals is reserved solely for the king of Kadesh (Urk. IV, 663: 12–664: 7).
unknown, Yenoam is most often associated in textual sources with sites situated in the northern Transjordan.

The location of the town of Nuges, however, has garnered by far the most controversy, for many have equated it with Nukhasse—a northern Syrian territory (and town) in the vicinity of Qatna. This has frustrated a number of other scholars who wish to locate all three toponyms together in a restricted area. If one presumes, however, that the king of Kadesh used each of these cities as a military and political base (much as the late Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptians utilized Gaza, Sumur, and Kumidi), one would expect to find these headquarter-cities spread throughout the land. Indeed, their assignment to Amun rather than to a local vassal ruler may imply that ownership of the polities had simply been transferred directly from the ruler of Kadesh to the king of Egypt.

Thutmose III’s donation of these three towns to Amun for the purpose of providing annual revenue need not necessarily have entailed

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15 Redford (1982a: 63–64, 72 and 74; followed by Spalinger 1983: 99) associates *h-n-k-rw* with *h-r-k-r*, no. 101 on Thutmose III’s Karnak list of toponyms. This town, which has been identified as modern Kerek, would provide a Transjordanian location for the site. Given the divergent spellings and the fact that neither Yenoam nor Nuges appears on the Karnak list, however, this identification is far from certain.

16 According to the Beth Shan stele of Seti I (KRI I, 11: 8–12: 14), Yenoam was involved in an insurrection affecting Beth Shan, Rehob, Pella, and Hamath, which was quelled in a single day’s time. Yenoam also appears among Transjordanian toponyms in lists of Seti I and Ramesses II (Edel 1966; Simons 1937: XIII–XVI, XXIV), and perhaps also in P. Anastasi I (see Hasel 1998: 147, n. 25 for a discussion of the pros and cons of interpreting *y*n... as a miswriting for *y*n*m*). Amenhotep III’s mortuary temple toponym list (Edel 1966: 11–13), however, situates Yenoam in a north Syrian context—adjacent to Takhasy and Damascus, which has prompted scholars such as Na’aman (1977: 168–177) to suggest alternate locations. For a comprehensive history of the debates surrounding the identity of Yenoam, see Na’aman (1977: 168), Giveon (1980: 245), and Hasel (1998: 147–148). Proposed locations have included Tell el-Abeidiyeh, Tell en-Na’ameh, Tell Yin’am, and Tell esh-Shihab.


19 Ahituv 1978: 94. Even if these cities were not used as bases per se, Na’aman (1977: 172) points out that during the period of Mitanni rule in Syria, it was common for nobles to own estates in far-flung territories. The parallels he provides demonstrate that it would not have been odd for the king of Kadesh to own property in both Syrian and Transjordanian towns as part of his personal holdings.
any Egyptian construction within them. The crops could simply have been sown, harvested, and transported to the Theban temple by locals on behalf of the Egyptians. An inscription on a statue of the overseer of works under Thutmose III, however, might point to a different scenario. On the back of his statue, Minmose listed from south to north temples that had been constructed under his watch. Second to last on his list is a temple to Hathor, lady of Byblos, and last is a temple to Amun—the vicinity of which was unfortunately too badly damaged to discern (Urk. IV, 1443: 19–20). It is not impossible, then, that the Egyptians had constructed a temple to Amun (or, alternatively, had refurbished the local temple of a male deity identified by the Egyptians with Amun) in one or all of these towns. The bꜣk-revenue produced by the polities, then, may well have been destined for a local temple of Amun.

Monumental stone blocks discovered at Byblos bore the cartouche of Thutmose III and thus suggest that Egyptian funds indeed helped adorn or augment the temple precinct of the famed lady of Byblos. That such “Egyptian” temples on foreign soil played an extremely important economic role with respect to the local and imperial economies is indicated by a biographical inscription of Thutmose III’s treasurer, Sennefer. This official records having presented offerings of millions of things to the goddess of Byblos in exchange for timber

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20 Helck (1971: 444) suggested that the temple to Amun was located at Gaza, as a temple to Aman existed at the site in the Twentieth Dynasty (P. Harris I, 9: 1–3). One would expect a more northerly location for the temple, however, judging from the south-to-north ordering of the list. It may be of some significance, then, that an Amarna letter from the citizens of Tunip refers to their loyalty since the time of Thutmose III and to the fact that the gods of the king of Egypt “dwelled” in Tunip (EA 51: 6–10; Moran 1992: 130).

21 An official named Amenhotep, who served in the reign of Thutmose III’s son, Amenhotep II, bore the title “overseer of the foreign lands of Amun” (Der Manuelian 1987: 140). While it is unclear exactly what such a title meant, it is at least a possibility that it designated responsibility for the oversight of lands belonging to Amun temples outside Egypt proper.

22 Bleiberg (1981: 110) notes that these three towns and the rulers of Lebanon who were charged with provisioning the harbors are the only northern entities specified as providing bꜣk. Given the connection in Egypt between bꜣk-payments and temple economy (Bleiberg 1988), these areas may in fact have submitted their bꜣk to a local Egyptian-oriented temple or to an institution that in turn redistributed the goods as rations to those employed in imperial interests. The fact that the bꜣk-payments provided by the Lebanese rulers to the harbors were specifically designated for the use of the Egyptian army on campaign is important in this regard.

23 Woolley 1921: 200; Dunand 1939: pl. 27, nos. 1317 and 1318; Montet 1998: 14, 249, no. 947; pl. 152.
“on behalf of—l.p.h.—your majesty (i.e., Thutmose III)” (ḥr-ytp [nh ṣwd3 snb ḫm.k]—Urk. IV, 535: 4). A similar incidence of a commercial transaction being carried on under the guise of the presentation of gifts to an “Egyptian” deity occurs in Hatshepsut’s Punt relief at Deir el-Bahri. In this case, the myriad wonders brought back from Punt were reciprocated by offerings given to Hathor, lady of Punt, “on behalf of—l.p.h.—her majesty” (ḥr-ytp ṣnh ṣwd3 snb ḫmt.s—Urk. IV, 323: 5).24 Given the role that temples played in the national and international economy, it is perhaps fitting that Minmose not only constructed at least two temples on foreign soil but that he also assessed taxes for both Syro-Palestinians and Nubians (Urk. IV, 1442: 4–11).25

The last event of Thutmose III’s first campaign that bears special import for this study is the construction of a mnw-fortress in Lebanon dubbed “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-subdues-the-wanderers” (Urk. IV, 739: 12–740: 1). As this fortress will be discussed at length below, it will suffice to note that Lebanon was an area of prime interest for the Egyptians, not only with regard to the timber that could be obtained there but also because of its excellent harbors and strategically situated mountain passes. Although the exact whereabouts of Thutmose III’s Lebanese mnw remains unknown, the Egyptians quite likely founded it adjacent to a harbor, a cedar forest, and a major mountain pass. Further, given the amount of trouble that Thutmose III faced in subduing the northern coast of Lebanon on his subsequent campaigns, it is also probable that the fortress had been erected in the south—perhaps in the vicinity of Byblos.

Little is known about the next three campaigns of Thutmose III and virtually nothing at all of a military nature.26 The king appears to have focused upon solidifying his power in other ways. For example,

24 It is perhaps not coincidental that both Byblos and Punt are referred to as “God’s Land” in Egyptian inscriptions.
26 A block found in the Cairo Museum and assumed to come from the second (Sethe 1984: 676) or third (Drower 1980: 453) campaign of Thutmose III mentions offerings given to Amun-Re and Re-Horakhty, a recreation taken by the king, the torching of foreign towns, and the plundering of villages (Urk. IV, 676: 6–16). The context of the block, however, is highly insecure, and Redford (1992: 159, n. 144) suggests that it may have belonged, in fact, to the narration of the eighth campaign. Given the reference to Amun-Re and Re-Horakhty, however, the fifth campaign might be an equally viable candidate.
by accepting a diplomatic envoy from Assur (Urk. IV, 668: 6–15), and presumably reciprocating in kind, the Egyptians and the Assyrians almost certainly entered into a mutually advantageous alliance against Mitanni. Likewise, Thutmose III cemented a relationship with a presumably powerful ruler of Retenu by entering into a diplomatic marriage (Urk. IV, 668: 17–670: 14).

By year 29, however, Thutmose III was back on the warpath, “destroying the countries that rebelled against him” (Urk. IV, 685: 5). In this campaign, as his predecessors had done commonly in the past (see chapter two), Thutmose III entirely bypassed Canaan and arrived on the shores of Lebanon by boat. The two towns conquered in this campaign, Ullaza and Ardata, were both located at the very northern edge of what at that time could have been considered Egyptian territory. Further, the fact that Ullaza was garrisoned with troops from Tunip (Urk. IV, 686: 3) suggests that it was at the urging of Tunip that the two coastal towns had renounced their Egyptian vassalage.

Despite its location at the farthest fringe of Egypt’s empire, northern Lebanon possessed at least one Egyptian installation, namely a storehouse of offerings (sn n wdmw) at which the army sacrificed to Amun and Re-Horakhty following a successful battle (Urk. IV, 685: 2).

27 Countries such as Cyprus, Babylon, and Hatti—themselves no friends of Mitanni—sent similar envoys later on in Thutmose III’s reign. Indeed, during one of these diplomatic détentes, Egypt and Hatti may well have entered into a formal treaty agreement (Gurney 1980: 671).

28 Although a marriage is not explicitly stated, the annals record the arrival of a princess together with her slaves, dishes, personal ornaments, a gold horn, and sundry gifts reminiscent of the trousseaus known from the Amarna letters (EA 13: 22; 25). That Thutmose III married at least two other northern princesses is evident from the grave of the three “Asiatic princesses” found at Thebes (Winlock 1948).

29 The sudden appearance of Thutmose III on the shores of Lebanon and his departure from the area by boat (Urk. IV, 687: 1) allow for such a supposition to be made (Säve-Söderbergh 1946: 34–35).

30 Sethe restored the broken toponym as wr[t] after Young; however, this reading is not followed by Breasted (AR II: 195). Numerous authors (see Helck 1971: 137; Drower 1980: 454; Redford 1992: 158) have restored the name of this city as Ullaza. Although the site of Ullaza has not been definitively identified, evidence from the Amarna letters confirms its placement on the coast north of Arvad (EA 104; 109; 140). Given its vassalage to Tunip, the town must have been easily accessible via a mountain pass from the Orontes Valley.

31 Indeed, given that Ullaza served as an Egyptian base in the late Eighteenth Dynasty (EA 104; 105; 109; 117; 140—see chapter four), it is perhaps possible that the fortress built by Thutmose III in Lebanon was located at Ullaza and that the transference of its loyalty to Tunip constituted its “rebellion” against Egypt.
It is unclear whether this building should be regarded as more akin to the Amun temple(s) on Syro-Palestinian soil, discussed above, or to the system of harbor provisioning developed by Thutmose III and addressed below. In Egypt a šnḥ generally served not only as a storage facility but also as a workshop in which raw materials were transformed into finished goods or foodstuffs. Incidentally, from the time of Thutmose III onward, kings routinely boasted of filling temple šnḥw with prisoners of war.33

The following year, the Egyptians again sailed northward, this time presumably utilizing the harbors they had just secured to penetrate the Lebanese mountains and to reach the Orontes Valley. In order to check the rebellion that had evidently spread southward from Tunip, Thutmose III attacked Kadesh and succeeded at the very least in destroying its crops.35 The Egyptians stormed the apparently unrepentant Ardata as well, although the annals are ambiguous as to whether Sumur and an otherwise unknown town suffered the same fate (Urk. IV, 689: 7–15).

The number and frequency of these post-Megiddo northern rebellions emphasize just how easily the oaths elicited after conquest could be broken. Perhaps it is not a coincidence, then, that Thutmose III in the course of this campaign also introduced a policy designed to ensure good behavior on the part of his vassals. From this time forth, the Egyptians exacted from their vassals a son or a brother to be held at the Egyptian court until the death of the vassal (Urk. IV, 690: 2–5). This policy was meant ostensibly to ensure that the vassal’s

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32 Although it is unclear, the annals seem to indicate that the storehouse of offerings was located somewhere south of Ullaza and north of Ardata. It is tempting, then, to suggest that it was located at Sumur, one of the best-known Egyptian garrison towns in the Amarna Period. As this harbor settlement was the site of future conflicts later in Thutmose’s reign, however, it seems not to have been under firm Egyptian control in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.


34 The word for expedition is determined by a boat (Urk. IV, 689: 5), and no Canaanite sites are mentioned. The Egyptian reliance on the navy is also illuminated by a papyrus of the royal dockyard at P eru-nefer dated to year 30 (Glanville 1931 and 1932; although see Redford 1965: 110). According to this document, no less a personage than the crown prince Amenhotep oversaw the work of the shipwrights.

35 This battle may have been referred to in the autobiography of the soldier Amenemheb, who recorded two campaigns against Kadesh. During the first of these armed contests, Amenemheb reports capturing two maryanni-warriors (Urk. IV, 892: 8–10).
intended heir would indeed inherit his post, as Egypt pledged to protect and install these heirs apparent. Concomitantly, however, it served both to indoctrinate future rulers with Egyptian culture and to provide Egypt with extremely valuable hostages.

During the course of Thutmose III’s seventh campaign, the Egyptians continued their previous activities: quelling rebellions on the coast of Lebanon and creating new imperial policies. Regarding the former, the town of Ullaza and its resident garrison from Tunip were once more defeated in battle (Urk. IV, 690: 15–691: 8). This time, however, Thutmose III installed one of his own garrisons (Urk. IV, 1237: 9–15) in order to discourage further rebellions. This had the effect of not only preventing the important harbor town from switching loyalties yet again but also of providing the Egyptians with an alternative to Byblos for the procurement of timber (Urk. IV, 1237: 9–18).

In terms of policy formation, Thutmose III also made at least two adjustments to his imperial infrastructure. First, he designated a fixed portion of the Syro-Palestinian harvest to be delivered annually—as b3k—to the Egyptians (Urk. IV, 694: 3–8). Second, he commanded that the rulers of Lebanon—as part of their b3k—equip their harbors “with loaves, with oil, incense, wine, and honey,” thereby assuring the Egyptians of plentiful supplies wherever they chose to land (Urk. IV, 692: 15–693:14). Presumably, based upon the inclusion of grain in later repetitions of this list (Urk. IV, 713: 7; 723: 8; 727: 11), the requisitioned Syro-Palestinian harvests would have been stored at the harbors as well. The only item on the harbor lists that does not

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36 On the basis of Taanach letters 2 and 5, as well as Amarna letter EA 365, Na’aman (1981b: 141–143) has argued that in the reign of Thutmose III the entire southern Jezreel Valley became crown property and was thenceforth serviced by corvée labor. While the evidence does not seem to support such a vast area as being entirely Egyptian-owned, it does appear that certain land was in fact worked on behalf of the Egyptian government at this time. Much of the b3k-revenue, however, may also have come from private fields.

37 As ship’s captains during the Late Bronze Age routinely hugged the shore, docking their ships at the first sign of a storm or at nightfall, these harbors would have been well utilized (see Drower 1980: 507).

38 References to the equipping of the harbors according to an annual contract (nt*) with goods requisitioned from annual taxes (ḥtr and b3kw) also occur in the eighth (Urk. IV, 700: 6–9), ninth (Urk IV, 707: 10–14), thirteenth (Urk. IV, 719: 7–11), fourteenth (Urk. IV, 723: 4–9), and seventeenth (Urk. IV, 732: 6–8) campaigns. The goods with which the harbors were stocked resemble closely those requested
appear to have been intended as sustenance, in fact, is incense. It is highly probable, however, that incense would have been utilized in the cultic rituals that also took place at these installations, if Thutmose III’s offerings to Amun and Re-Horakhty at a štr’ in the fifth campaign (Urk. IV, 685: 13–16) are at all representative.

If Thutmose III’s victory against the confederacy at Megiddo loomed large in his personal history, the battle against Mitanni forces in his eighth campaign was perhaps his crowning glory. The annals provide the information that he reached the Euphrates, set up his stele beside that of his grandfather, traveled southward to Niy, and received embassies from the Babylonians and the Hittites—both sworn enemies of Mitanni (Urk. IV, 697: 3–16; 698: 15–699: 1; 700: 16–701: 9). Outside sources, however, do much to flesh out the picture. From these we learn that Thutmose III embarked on his journey from the coast near Byblos (Urk. IV, 1232: 2–4) and that his army fought in the vicinity of Aleppo (Urk. IV, 891: 2–3), Carchemish (Urk. IV, 891: 8–9), and Qatna (Urk. IV, 188: 15–16). Battles in Sindjar (Urk. IV, 891: 16–892: 5) and Takhasy (Urk. IV, 893: 5–13; of vassals in advance of the Egyptian troops in the Amarna letters (Na’aman 1981a: 181). As Alt (1959: 110) has suggested, it is also quite probable that the harbors served as depots where inland vassals, who were not concerned per se with equipping the harbors, could deliver their taxes for pickup by the Egyptians. Such a system would be equivalent to that in Egypt of farmers bringing their tax to mooring places along the Nile. For discussions of the term nten, see Redford 1970: 43, n. 1; Lorton 1974: 178; Murnane 1990: 73–74.

39 The Kurustama treaty, concluded between Egypt and Hatti to provide for the resettlement of northern Anatolian Kaskan peoples into Egyptian sovereign territory, appears to have been drafted at some point between the reigns of Thutmose III and Thutmose IV (Schulman 1977–1978: 112–113; 1988: 58). As this embassy marks the first appearance of Hittite diplomats in Egyptian records, it is not impossible that at this meeting negotiations took place and treaties or formal agreements were drawn up between the two powers. A very fragmentary copy of this text is extant, and later references to it are found in the Deeds of Suppiluliuma and the Plague Prayers of Mursili II (for translations of these documents, see Schulman 1988: 66–67; Murnane 1990: 31–32).

40 Sources of relevance to the eighth campaign not mentioned above include: the Constantinople obelisk (Urk. IV, 587: 1–3, 13–15), the Armant stele (Urk. IV, 1245: 18–1246: 2), the “poetical” stele (Urk. IV, 613: 9–12), the University of Pennsylvania stele (Spalinger 1978: 35–41), the inscription of Minmose (Urk. IV, 1448: 13), the statue of Yamu-Nedjeh (Urk. IV, 1370: 8–11), the tomb of Menkhheperresonb (Urk. IV, 931: 1–3), the tomb of Montu-iwy (Urk. IV, 1467: 9–15), and perhaps the royal stele found at Khirbet el’Oreimeh (Albright and Rowe 1928: 281–287). The mention of a campaign to Djahy in the tomb of Tjannii (Urk. IV, 1004: 2–9) is not directly assignable to any particular battle.
1442: 16–20; Davies 1922: 33, pl. 29) may also have taken place on this campaign.41

Despite the successes of the eighth campaign, throughout the remainder of his reign Thutmose III faced continual challenges in maintaining his northern border. In the ninth campaign he captured three towns, one of which was located in the vicinity of Nukhasse (Urk. IV, 704: 5–7)—an area supposed to have been ceded to the god Amun! The next year he fought against a Mitanni force in the city of Araina (Urk. IV, 710: 3–711: 2), and three years later he was back to quell a revolt in Nukhasse (Urk. IV, 716: 14–15). His fourteenth campaign, waged against the Shasu (Urk. IV, 721: 10–13), may well have taken place in the Negev, where Thutmose III is known to have fought at some point during his career (Urk. IV, 890: 14–15). As is apparent from later texts, however, Shasu warriors could be encountered even in the northernmost reaches of the Egyptian empire.42

In a final bit of irony, Thutmose III’s last campaign engaged the same enemy he had fought nearly twenty years previously—the king of Kadesh. The Egyptian monarch embarked at the coastal city of Irqata and overthrew it, traveled through the mountains to fight at Tunip,43 headed southward along the Orontes, and captured towns in the vicinity of Kadesh (Urk. IV, 729: 7–730: 10; 894: 5–895: 8). Not surprisingly, among the auxiliaries gathered at Kadesh were Mitanni troops. Indeed, given the fact that all the known rulers of LB I Kadesh bear Mitanni names, it is likely that the two thrones were related by blood as well as contract.44

Although Thutmose III’s son and heir Amenhotep II did not campaign annually, records from his third, seventh, and ninth years indicate that he was indeed active in Syria-Palestine during the first half

41 Faulkner 1946: 40–41. The principles by which the autobiography of Amenemheb was organized are rather unclear, which interferes with the certain assignment of his narratives to particular campaigns.


43 That Tunip had at least for a time in the reign of Thutmose III been under Egyptian sovereignty is suggested by the depiction in the tomb of Menkheperresonb of a prince of Tunip bringing his child to the Egyptian court (Urk. IV, 930: 2–3) and by the protestation in EA 59: 5–12 (Moran 1992: 130) that Tunip had been ruled by Egypt in the time of Thutmose III. Indeed, the letter states that Egyptian gods dwelled in Tunip, which may be a reference to an Egyptian sanctuary or at least the incorporation of Egyptian deities into a Tunipian temple.

44 Redford 1992: 140.
of his reign. Amenhotep II recorded his initial campaign on two steles, erected respectively at Amada and Elephantine. Although the bulk of the inscriptions focused upon works Amenhotep II had performed for the gods, space at the end was reserved for a summary of a campaign that had been undertaken “in order to broaden the boundaries of Egypt” (Urk. IV, 1296: 15).

According to the inscriptions, since Thutmose III had last campaigned in Takhasy—an area located in the Biqa Valley south of Kadesh—seven of the local leaders had rebelled against Egyptian authority. To remedy the situation, Amenhotep quickly journeyed to Takhasy and dispatched the offenders with his mace, although whether he did so literally or metaphorically is another question. Presumably in order to discourage future rebellions at home and abroad, the corpses of his victims were treated brutally and widely displayed. Hung downward off the prow of the royal bark during Amenhotep’s return trip, the bodies of the seven rulers later ornamented the walls at Thebes and Napata (Urk. IV, 1296: 13–1298: 8).

45 One source perhaps relevant for understanding Amenhotep II’s foreign policy is the famous letter he composed to the viceroy of Kush, Usersatet, in which he refers to the viceroy’s participation in military campaigns and refers to him as the “[possessor of a] woman from Babylon, a maidservant from Byblos, a young maiden from Alalakh, and an old woman from Arapkha” (Urk. IV, 1344: 4–7).

46 Given the fact that both Amenhotep II’s third and his seventh campaigns were designated as his “first,” there is much speculation that Amenhotep was still a coregent of Thutmose III in his third year (see the discussion in Helck 1971: 156, n. 106; Der Manuelian 1987: 32–39, 57–58). After the death of his father, then, Amenhotep may have renumbered his campaigns to reflect his activity as sole pharaoh (Alt 1954: 40; Redford 1965: 119–122; Yeivin 1967: 120), although this is much debated (Murnane 1977: 44–47; Wilson 1969: 245, n. 1; Krauss 1978: 174–175). If Amenhotep authored the diplomatic letters found at Taanach while prince, as some believe, these documents would provide further evidence of his active role in Syria-Palestine before his assumption of sole power (see Rainey 1973a: 73).


48 Some have viewed this statement as referring to the materialization of the smiting scene, wherein the pharaoh would ceremonially execute his prisoners in the presence of the god. Ritner (1995: 171, n. 171) interprets the grammar of the passage as indicating that the seven rulers were sacrificed in Egypt before Amun. Such had been the interpretation of Breasted (AR II: 313), although Yoyotte (1980–1981: 37, n. 29) expressed doubts regarding it. If the cult centers to Amun were indeed constructed in Syria-Palestine during the reign of Thutmose III, however, it may be possible to reconcile a sacrifice before the god with a Levantine setting. The exposures of the corpses at Thebes and Napata may also be relevant, as both settlements were also centers of worship for Amun.

49 References to Takhasy are found in two private inscriptions relevant to the reign of Amenhotep II. A certain Amenerhatef served as standard bearer in a regiment called “Crushing Takhasy” (Der Manuelian 1987: 54–55), and Takhasy is
Amenhotep’s year seven campaign was also undertaken ostensibly to widen Egypt’s boundaries “and to give things to those who were loyal”\(^{50}\) (Urk. IV, 1301: 16). Recorded on the Memphis (Urk. IV, 1301: 15–1305: 11) and Karnak (Urk. IV, 1310: 10–1314: 12) steles,\(^{51}\) the campaign appears a blur of battles fought, prisoners taken, and peace offers accepted. Minor skirmishes occurred at Shamash-Edom,\(^{52}\) at a ford of the Orontes River, and in the Biqa Valley villages of Mendjat and Khashabu. The local populations offered no resistance, however, in the marshy territory of Niy and at the towns of Hetjara, Inka, and Kadesh. The Egyptians, further, quelled an uprising in \(i-k\dot{\text{A}}\dot{\text{A}}\), a city that some have identified as Ugarit,\(^{53}\) when rebels threatened to expel both the loyalist ruler and the Egyptian troops stationed in the city to protect him. Comparable sedition may subsequently have been avoided by the capture of a Mitanni messenger in the Sharon Plain. A testament to the success of his campaign, Amenhotep II left Canaan with an additional 2,214 people swelling his ranks. These included not only those that he and his army had captured in battle but also several hundreds of the children and wives of Syro-Palestinian rulers.

The Memphis (Urk. IV, 1305: 13–1306: 10; 1307: 4–1309: 10) and Karnak (Urk. IV, 1314: 14–1315: 8) steles relate the events of year nine as well, when Amenhotep II returned northward for a
period of roughly four months. This time, however, the insurrections appear to have been localized closer to home: along the *Via Maris*, in the vicinity of the Jezreel Valley, and in the region of Galilee. The narrative of the campaign opens in the town of Aphek, located in the Sharon plain, which the Egyptians may well have reached following an uneventful land march or, alternatively, after having disembarked from their ships at Jaffa. After the peaceful surrender of the town, the Egyptians pressed on to Yehem, the site just south of Megiddo at which Thutmose III and his councilors had debated plans of attack years before (Urk. IV, 649: 3–4).

Amenhotep II then plundered the villages of Mepesen and Khettjen, two small settlements west of Sucho,54 and the larger towns of Iteren and Migdol-yenet. The inhabitants of these polities were rounded up and detained within a wall of fire,55 while the bulk of the army had apparently to be occupied elsewhere. Later in the campaign, the town of Anaharath—south of the Sea of Galilee56—was plundered and the Egyptians replaced a presumably rebellious ruler in Geba-Shemen57 with a loyalist successor. Following this event the king and his army journeyed home. Given the relatively restricted area covered by Amenhotep II and the seemingly insignificant nature of his conquests, many scholars have assumed that judicious editing on

54 Sucho has been identified with modern Ras es-Suweke (Helck 1971: 161).
55 The statement in Urk. IV, 1307: 12–16 reads: “...they were made into living prisoners. Two ditches were made around all of them, and it was filled with flame. His majesty watched over them alone until daybreak, his battle-axe in his right hand, there being no one with him. Lo, the army was far from him, except for the servants of pharaoh.” Yeivin (1967: 127), following Vikentiev (1949), believes that the text refers to a “fiery holocaust” of the prisoners themselves, perhaps as a sacrifice to Amun. Der Manuelian (1987: 72–73) slightly amends this view, seeing the burning event not as a sacrifice to Amun, but rather as a terror tactic. Although Amenhotep II does not appear to have shied from employing brutal methods to achieve intimidation, as evidenced by his treatment of the rulers of Takhasy (Urk. IV, 1296: 13–1298: 8), an alternative explanation might be that the wall of flame was in fact employed as a holding device during a night when the Egyptian army was not at its full strength. As future slaves, prisoners of war were a valuable commodity (Bakir 1952: 100–101; Hayes 1980: 376), and comparable holocausts of human victims are unattested. Likewise, should such a sacrifice have occurred, given its potential value as a terror tactic, it would likely have entailed a good deal more pageantry and have garnered a larger audience.
56 Anaharath is thought to have been located at Tell el-Mukharkhash (Aharoni 1967: 149, 155).
57 This town is most commonly identified with Tell el-Amer, 18 miles northwest of Megiddo near the entrance to the Plain of Acre (Yeivin 1950: 57; Rainey 1973a: 74–75; Der Manuelian 1987: 74–75).
the part of the Egyptians has obscured other important—and perhaps not entirely successful—events in the campaign.58

Three rosters of the booty from the year nine campaign survive: one within the text of the Karnak stele (Urk. IV, 1315: 5–17),59 the second within the text of the Memphite stele (Urk. IV, 1306: 6–10; 1307: 7–1308: 13), and the last in a summation at the end of the Memphite stele (Urk. IV, 1308: 18–1309: 8). Interestingly, the content of each of these lists differs significantly from the others. For example, the Karnak text records 550 maryannu-warriors taken as prisoner, the Memphis text gives 74, while the Memphis summation ignores this category altogether. The Memphis text, on the other hand, is the only one that mentions the number of the enemy dead (495) and provides a cattle count.

Most dramatically, the Memphis summation provides head counts that differ from the other booty lists not only in being more detailed (including Apiru, Shasu-bedouin, Khorians, and Nukhassians),60 but also in listing far higher numbers. Indeed, the professed total of captured individuals from this source is 89,600 people, while the numbers given in actuality add up to a total of 101,128 prisoners! In contrast, the Karnak text listed a total of more than 792 prisoners, and the Memphite text proper listed over 415. Even allowing for the ambiguous totals of categories such as “womenfolk” and “children”—categories not even listed in the Memphite summation—the totals in both the Memphis and Karnak texts are much, much, smaller. They are also, however, far more in keeping with the numbers of captives attested from other New Kingdom campaigns.

59 The summary at the end of the Karnak stele appears to concern only one campaign, and as it directly follows the description of the year nine expedition, one would assume that the booty stemmed from this venture. Curiously enough, however, the number of captured maryannu-warriors and their wives appears to be exactly the same as that given for the year seven campaign (Urk. IV, 1314: 10 and 1315: 14; Edel 1953: 167–170).
60 Spalinger (1983: 99) does not equate ngs with Nukhass in either the annals or the Memphis stele, preferring to see it as an otherwise unknown Transjordanian town in close proximity to Yenoam. Any town that could yield 15,070 prisoners, however, would surely have been one of the major political players of the day, and it is unlikely that it would go otherwise unnoticed in Egyptian inscriptions. In addition, the other names on the Memphis list (Apiru, Shasu, and Khorites) refer to broad occupational, ethnic, or territorial groups. The population of a single town, then, would be out of place in the list. Interestingly, Spalinger (1983: 99) does acknowledge that ngs should be equated with Nukhass in the contexts of the mortuary temple of Amenhotep III and in the Kadesh inscriptions of Ramesses II.
There are many debates regarding the validity of the Memphis summation totals. Some scholars have defended them, employing analogies to other Near Eastern powers—most notably the Assyrians and Hittites—who practiced mass deportation. Likewise, Redford has argued that the nature of the archaeological evidence is consistent with such a policy. Considering, however, that after two decades of near constant campaigning Thutmose III managed to return to Egypt with well under 10,000 people, it appears highly unlikely that Amenhotep II—even in three campaigns—could explode the number tenfold. A study by Janssen, moreover, has argued that Egypt’s agrarian society could not have supported such an enormous influx of foreign slaves.

The tendency of most scholars, therefore, has been to seek some other way to explain the extremely high numbers. According to some, Amenhotep II simply exaggerated the totals, either in innocent confusion or for propagandistic purposes. Others have suggested that the numbers also include prisoners captured in Amenhotep II’s other campaigns or even in those of his father as well. One particularly interesting theory proposes that the high totals represented a type of early census, listing according to best estimation the population of different categories of individuals living in Syria-Palestine. Such subject people could be counted, at least metaphorically, as “human chattel” of his majesty. Even Aharoni, who didn’t view the list as a census, accepted its value for broadly determining the ethnic breakdown in the Levant during the mid-second millennium.

 Regardless of whether Amenhotep II indeed deported as many Syro-Palestinians as he claimed, his prowess evidently earned the respect of not only the kings of Babylon and Hatti, who perhaps

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64 Spalinger 1983: 100.
67 Helck 1971: 344.
68 Janssen 1963: 147. There is, as Spalinger (1983: 93) points out, a difficulty in accepting this theory wholeheartedly, as the list on the Memphis stele does not seem sufficient to account for all the populations present in Syria-Palestine at this time. One would have to assume that the “Nukhassians” stood for all the residents of Syria. Even so, this would put the Syrians on roughly equal footing with the Shasu-bedouin, which seems wrong.
69 Aharoni 1968: 156.
were simply reaffirming bonds already forged with Thutmose III, but also of Mitanni—Egypt’s major rival in southern Syria. These three major powers sent embassies to the court of Amenhotep II following his year nine campaign (Urk. IV, 1309: 13–20; 1326: 1–13). It has been suggested by some that the “Kurustama treaty,” which negotiated the settling of Anatolians in the Egyptian territory of Amki (and presumably simultaneously solidified peaceable relations between Egypt and Hatti), was drawn up at this time. Others think that a similar agreement with Mitanni accounted for the evidently peaceful conditions prevailing in the latter half of Amenhotep II’s reign.

The peace between Egypt and Mitanni apparently still held early in the reign of Thutmose IV, as is evidenced by a diplomatic marriage between this pharaoh and the daughter of Artatama I of Mitanni (EA 29: 16–18). Several short inscriptions also highlight the presence of Mitanni envoys at the Egyptian court (Urk. IV, 1597: 14–1598: 2; 1620: 9). Interestingly, Merrilles has noted that a marked influx of Cypriot imports to Egypt occurs in the reign of Thutmose IV—this after a virtual hiatus of such imports during the reigns of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II. Given this situation, it is not unlikely that an Egypto-Mitanni treaty had the effect of ending a trade embargo formerly imposed in areas of Mitanni hegemony.

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70 Spalinger (1983: 94) believes that the embassies probably contacted Amenhotep II after his far-flung year seven campaign but that mention of them was placed after the year nine campaign in order to bolster an otherwise unimpressive venture. Indeed, to his mind the localized nature of the year nine campaign would have been due, in part, to the northern peace agreement. This is, however, strictly theoretical, and if Amenhotep II had indeed demonstrated his power in the region by deported large numbers of people, such a move could conceivably have impressed the other major powers of the day.

71 Drower 1980: 462–463; Murnane 1990: 33; Bryan 1991: 337, n. 32. Although it is not impossible that Amenhotep II forged treaties with Hatti and Mitanni simultaneously, it would seem more likely that the “Kurustama treaty” had been completed prior to any agreement with Mitanni. The nations of Hatti and Mitanni each laid claim to several contested areas in northern Syria, and one would assume that Egypt’s establishment of common borders with Hatti would have been significantly complicated if diplomats from Mitanni had been involved. A date for this treaty late in the reign of Thutmose III might seem preferable (Gurney 1980: 671). For more on the Kurustama treaty, see the extensive references cited in Spalinger 1981: 358, n. 93.


74 Shorter 1931: 23, fig. 1.

Amicable relations appear to have endured throughout the reign of Thutmose IV. Bland references to Naharin in lists of foreign foes (Urk. IV, 1560: 15) or as the outer limit of the Egyptian empire (Urk. IV, 1617: 16–20; 1628: 14) should not be taken seriously in assessing relations between the two countries at this time. The only document, in fact, which has been used to suggest that trouble brewed between Egypt and Mitanni is a Karnak offering list that refers to unknown items as originating “from among the booty of his majesty in wretched...n3 on his first campaign of victory” (Urk. IV, 1554: 17–18). While the incomplete toponym has traditionally been restored as [Naharih]na, i.e., Mitanni, this reading has recently been questioned by Bryan, who argues that there are no examples of Naharin ending in -n3 from the reign of Thutmose IV. Further, the epithet ḫs, meaning wretched or defeated, is unprecedented in association with Mitanni. Instead, Bryan prefers to view the missing toponym as perhaps referring to Sidon, which Thutmose IV is known to have visited (EA 85: 70–71), or to Qatna.

Interactions between Egypt and other major northern powers seem also to have been friendly during the reign of Thutmose IV. Egypt and Babylon corresponded (EA 1: 62–63) and may have sealed their friendship with a dynastic marriage (EA 11: 5–8). Hatti and Egypt also almost certainly abided by a treaty in the reign of Thutmose IV, although the provisions of the agreement are not known in detail. A Thutmosid alabaster vessel found at Assur and thought perhaps to date to the reign of Thutmose IV could indicate that Egypt and Assyria were in diplomatic contact as well, just as they had been in the reign of Thutmose IV’s grandfather (Urk. IV, 671: 8–9). Finally, if the references in the Amarna letters to the “father of your father,” Ma-na-akh-pi-ir-ya, indeed designated Akhenaten’s true grandfather—rather than Thutmose III—the Amarna archive would provide evidence that Thutmose IV himself had invested a

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76 See Cumming 1982: 256.
77 Bryan 1991: 187; 337–339. In support of her contention that the toponym ending in n3 did not designate Naharin, Bryan points to a damaged inscription on a Luxor statue, which lists “nhryn, [īf]šy, [///]/, [///]/n3.”
78 This treaty, again, is the previously discussed Kurustama treaty. Schulman (1977–1978: 112, following Drower) dates the treaty to the reign of Thutmose IV, but the majority of scholars assign it to his father or grandfather’s reign.
local ruler in Nukhasse (EA 51: 4–9) and that the powerful city of Tunip was a loyal vassal during his reign (EA 59: 6–12). Given the form of the name, the often imprecise nature of Egyptian familial designations, and the more aggressive foreign policy practiced by this earlier king, however, the traditional assumption that the references are to Thutmose III appears more likely.

As no records survive of Thutmose IV’s campaigns, his activity in the Levant can only be understood by assembling bits and pieces of information. Perhaps the most famous scrap is the inscription found on a small stele from the king’s mortuary temple in Thebes, which reads, “settlement of Menkheperure with the Syro-Palestinians (ḥbrw) that his majesty captured in the town of Gezer” (Urk. IV, 1556: 10–11).81 As Thutmose IV’s name is encircled not with a cartouche, but rather with the buttressed, rectangular sign for a fortified enclosure, the settlement (grg[t]) may well have been something akin to a fortification or a prison. From the time of Thutmose III on, pharaohs settled some foreigners in nhṭw, or strongholds (Urk. IV, 690: 2–5), and one wonders whether such an installation is indicated here.82 The same stele records a “settlement of wretched Kush that his majesty brought from his booty” (Urk. IV, 1556: 15), which was likewise established in the vicinity of the mortuary temple.

More information on the conflict with Gezer may perhaps be obtained if Malamat is correct in his assignment of a cuneiform tablet excavated at Gezer to the time of Thutmose IV.83 An Egyptian had sent a missive to the ruler of Gezer demanding to know why the recipient had not appeared before him nor welcomed the Egyptian official assigned to watch over him into the town. The letter also commanded that the ruler of Gezer send his brother and another

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81 Petrie 1897: 20–21, pl. 1.
82 Thutmose III states that the sons and brothers of Syro-Palestinian vassals were brought to be m nhṭw in Egypt. The translation “in strongholds,” followed by Säve-Söderbergh (1941: 185) and Feuchtinger (1990 n. 86) among others, is based upon later parallels for the same usage (KRI II, 206: 14–16; P. Harris I, 76: 6–10; 77: 3–6; KRI V, 117: 13–14; Bruyere 1929–1930: 35–36, II. 2–6). Some scholars, however, have chosen to translate the phrase as “as hostages” (Wb. II 317, 14; Faulkner 1986: 139), although this use is otherwise unattested. The “town” of swhn m ipt, mentioned in the introduction to one of the topographical lists (Urk. IV, 480: 4), also housed the families of Canaanite rulers. If it was not the proper name of the nhṭw itself, the settlement of swhn m ipt must have served the exact same purpose (Breasted AR II: 170, no. 402).
individual together with seven oxen to the Egyptians who would soon arrive at the town of Kiddimu. According to Malamat, such evident recalcitrance on the part of the ruler of Gezer, if repeated, could have provoked Thutmose IV’s wrath. As the letter is only loosely dated to the fifteenth century B.C., however, its connection with the Gezer campaign of Thutmose IV must remain speculative. A corresponding destruction level at Gezer has yet to be found, despite much searching. Thus, it must be assumed either that the town did not suffer much damage during the battle or that the citizens of Gezer who lived near Thutmose IV’s mortuary temple had actually been captured by one of his predecessors.

Other references to Egyptian activity in Syria-Palestine are scattered and somewhat vague. A sandstone block, which appears stylistically similar to blocks commissioned by Thutmose IV and discovered in Karnak’s third pylon, is inscribed with the words “you have hacked up the walls of Asia.” Likewise, one of the divisions in Thutmose IV’s army was known as “Menkheperure-defeats-the-Kharu.”

Most of the references, however, are of a more peaceful nature. On his Lateran obelisk (Urk. IV, 1552: 5–6), the king mentions cedar that he cut down in Lebanon, and a first prophet of Amun lists long-horned cattle of Retenu among the properties held by the temple (Urk. IV, 1570: 7). Lastly, an endowment of fields in Djahy for the sphinx temple is listed on the great sphinx stele, a monument attributed to Thutmose IV but perhaps carved at a later date. If the dedication of fields really was contemporary with the reign of Thutmose IV, however, the temple’s fields may provide a parallel to the Canaanite harvests reaped by the order of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 694: 3–8; 713: 7) and to those worked under the corvée system in the reign of Amenhotep III (EA 365).

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85 The destruction of Gezer’s MB IIC city has been variously assigned as early as the first pharaohs of the Eighteenth Dynasty to as late as the reign of Thutmose IV (see Hasel 1998: 185 for a succinct summary). Placing the Middle to Late Bronze Age transition at Gezer as late as Thutmose IV, however, is extremely problematic, and even the theory’s proponents have since abandoned this position (compare Gezer I: 4, 53–55 as opposed to Gezer II: 36).
87 Giveon 1969b: 57.
In summary, the foreign policy of the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty appears to have been dictated largely by Egypt’s relations with Mitanni. After having routed a Canaanite rebellion, which may have been sponsored in part by Mitanni, Thutmose III campaigned almost annually in order to eradicate Mitanni influence in southern Syria. As part of his program to bring the Levant firmly under Egyptian control, Thutmose III erected storage depots, fortresses, "h-palaces, and perhaps also cult centers on Syro-Palestinian soil. Portions of the annual harvests were ceded to Egypt as b3k-taxes, and the produce of three entire towns was dedicated to Amun.

Amenhotep II continued his father’s mission, campaigning at least three times in nine years, i.e., once in northern Canaan (where he intercepted a Mitanni messenger) and twice in southern Syria. Although the internal political situation in northern Syria may have had as much to do with the rapprochement as did Amenhotep II’s own campaigns, Mitanni and Egypt finally entered into a treaty agreement sometime after the campaign of year nine. The peace between the two countries profoundly affected Egypt’s foreign policy over the course of the next century, depriving its rulers of all but local conflicts to quell.

Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for mid-Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

In the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, those who would reach Egypt by boat passed through a checkpoint at the htm-fortress of the sea, most probably situated on the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Both of the narrow entrances through which the Nile Delta was accessible from the east also were secured with htm-fortresses, located at Tjaru (Tell Heboua I), Tjeku (Tell er-Retabah), and possibly Tell el-Borg. The border-fortress of Tjaru, which Ahmose had reclaimed from the Hyksos and which had been refortified in or before the reign of Thutmose III, remained of paramount importance. Indeed, Thutmose III launched his first campaign from Tjaru, and references to this fortress are found in inscriptions dating to both his successors.

Among the most illuminating of the epigraphic material relevant to Tjaru are the many titles of Neby, a man who served as overseer of the htm-fortress, troop commander, overseer of desert scouts, overseer of the adjacent hm-water, mayor of the town, and royal messenger. Two of Neby’s spheres of authority—over troops and over
Medjay desert scouts—aptly demonstrate that Tjaru retained its importance as a strategic checkpoint and as a military stronghold throughout the entirety of the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Yet the fact that Neby also served as mayor of Tjaru is indicative of the on-site presence at the border-fortress of a robust civilian population. Given this, it is interesting that archaeological and survey data both indicate that the size and population of Tjaru expanded substantially during the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Although much of Tjaru’s growth may have been related to the maintenance and staffing of an extremely important htm-fortress, the tombs of Puyemre and Sennefer testify to the agricultural productivity of the surrounding land.

At the htm-fortress of Tjeku, a troop commander likewise presided. Although it does not appear that this man served as mayor as well, he did double as a royal messenger and also accompanied his sovereign on a mission to the Sinai. Tjeku’s position midway along the Wadi Tumilat, which offered passage from the Delta to the Sinai and beyond, no doubt accounted for the bestowal upon him of these additional duties and honors.

In Canaan proper, the annals as well as Taanach letter 6 suggest that the town of Gaza, or The-ruler-seized-(it), served as an Egyptian military base. Likewise, archaeological evidence indicates that the garrison that had occupied the nearby town of Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajju) prior to the first campaign continued to operate in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. The fate of the htm-fortress, or perhaps the htm-gate, that Thutmose III established in the vicinity of Megiddo during the siege of that city, however, is unclear. Egyptian policy, as gleaned from early Eighteenth Dynasty patterns, may suggest that the formerly rebellious polity would have been graced by a continued Egyptian presence. The textual evidence is equivocal, however, and the material record would not suggest such a conclusion. Certainly, if the htm were indeed part of the stockade itself, one might assume that it would have been dismantled shortly following the restoration of peace.

North of Canaan proper, only the coast appears to have been fortified by the Egyptians. Thutmose III constructed at least one mnnw-fortress in Lebanon, “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-subdues-the-wanderers,” which is known from two separate inscriptions. While the location of this installation is nowhere stated, the coastal towns of Byblos and Ullaza are good candidates. The Egyptians launched campaigns from Byblos, constructed ships there, and built at the
local temple. Ullaza, meanwhile, had been the object of repeated campaigns, and a garrison is in fact recorded at the site late in the reign of Thutmose III. The safety of both towns in the Amarna Period was continually placed in peril by the activity of the semi-nomadic Apiru, and it was perhaps this population that is here broadly described as wanderers (šmāw).

Wherever in Lebanon the fortress was located, its major tasks appear to have been threefold: to maintain an Egyptian presence at a suitable harbor, to secure access to a mountain pass inland, and to provide the Egyptian state with plentiful timber from the surrounding cedar-wood forests. A garrison was also apparently stationed at i-kás-ty, which should perhaps be equated with Ugarit. If this identification is correct, the Egyptian presence must almost certainly have been contingent upon the consent of the local ruler.

In general, references to iwšt, or garrisons, in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty are fairly frequent. Garrisons are referred to in Thutmose III’s annals in connection with the battle of Megiddo as having been placed both north and south of the city. In Lebanon, garrisons were stationed at Ullaza, Byblos, and possibly Tunip, while farther south it is likely that Egyptian troops operated out of both Gaza and Jaffa. Certainly, a general and “overseer of the region of the northern foreign lands” (imy-r n h³swt mḥtt) named Djehuty is commonly believed to have been the Egyptian general memorialized in the famous Ramesside tale narrating the capture of this important harbor town.89

Port towns were indeed of prime importance for Thutmose III, who established a series of htm-bases at each of the major harbors in Canaan and perhaps farther north in Lebanon as well.90 These

89 Goedicke 1968; Simpson 1973: 81–84; Drower 1980: 447; Murnane 1997: 253. For a similar retelling of this campaign, see Botti 1955. Evidence of a contemporaneous destruction at Jaffa has been identified in modern excavations (Kaplan 1972: 78). Given issues of timing, the Egyptian attack on the harbor town most likely took place during the extended siege of Megiddo. A battle on the march from Gaza to Megiddo would have been pressed for time and should have been mentioned in the annals, while subsequent to the first campaign, the southern coast of Canaan was firmly in the hands of the Egyptians. Whenever its capture took place, the city of Jaffa appears never to have regained its independence. Its role as a granary (see chapter four) and a pharaonic depot (see chapter five), then, may well have begun already in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty following this campaign. Given the fact that Jaffa possessed the best harbor in southern Canaan (Rogerson 1991: 81), it would be surprising indeed if Thutmose III did not incorporate the town into his system of outfitted harbors.

90 Although these harbor bases are never enumerated by name, based on infor-
installations, which apparently fell under the general oversight and jurisdiction of the overseer of the great $\text{htm}$-fortress of the sea, served a number of varied and vital purposes. First, the fact that these installations are referred to as $\text{htm}_w$ suggests that individuals stationed here closely monitored the passage of people and goods in or out of these harbors. Thus, the Egyptian state could easily impose maritime tariffs. Likewise, intrastate communications between independent Levantine polities could be monitored, fugitives sought for, and a pro-Egyptian navy maintained. In this respect, these $\text{htm}_w$, which sealed off unauthorized access to Canaan by ship, served much the same purpose abroad as did the $\text{htm}$-fortresses erected on the borders of the Nile Valley.

The harbor bases fulfilled one other crucial role in the infrastructure that Thutmose III designed for his northern empire. Namely, they served as storage depots, which were easily accessible to Egyptian armies or functionaries, whether they sailed up the coast or instead traveled northward along the Via Maris. Here in these quayside storehouses were gathered taxes imposed on Canaanite vassals that consisted of staple goods (such as wine, grain, oil, etc.) to fortify the body. In addition, the vassals supplied incense, presumably so as to allow rituals to gods such as Amun and Re-Horakhty to be carried out properly. The spiritual (and perhaps also economic) needs of resident and traveling Egyptians may also partially have been met by a temple to Hathor (in reality the entirely indigenous lady of Byblos) at Byblos and a temple to Amun somewhere to the north. There is additionally a very slight possibility that temples dedicated by the Egyptians to Amun or to local gods identified with him should be sought in the towns ceded to this god after the battle of Megiddo, namely Yenoam, Nuges, and Herenkeru. Likewise, it is perhaps significant that citizens of Tunip claimed in the Amarna Period that Egyptian gods had resided in the temple of their town since the time of Thutmose III.

One last attested type of mid-Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian imperial installation is the campaign palace. During the reign of Thutmose III, the preparation of campaign palaces for the king was the responsibility of a first herald ($\text{whm}_w\text{ tpy}$) named Intef. Intef records that it

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mation concerning harbor depots contained in the Amarna archive (see chapter four), it is likely that they consisted of Gaza, Jaffa, perhaps Akko, Yarimuta, Byblos, and Ullaza—at minimum.
was his practice to arrive at an 'ḫ-palace\(^{91}\) ahead of Thutmose III and his army in order to ready it for their arrival. This involved cleansing and purifying the rooms, consecrating each for its proper purpose, and equipping the palace with every good thing that is desired in a foreign country (Urk. IV, 975: 2–11).

In contrast to the situation for the early Eighteenth Dynasty, then, there is in fact abundant evidence in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty for Egyptian emplacements on Canaanite soil. These included not only forts and garrison headquarters but also harbor depots, campaign palaces, a storehouse of offerings, and at least two temples belonging to—or identified with—Egyptian gods. Such military and nonmilitary installations appear to have been an innovation of Thutmose III, part and parcel of his efforts to erect a stable infrastructure for his Syro-Palestinian empire. What is puzzling, however, is that virtually all of Egypt’s activities north of Tell el-Ajul and south of Byblos remain archaeologically invisible.

Part of this problem may certainly be due to our own poor understanding of the LB IB period, to which the reigns of Thutmose III through Thutmose IV belong. Although lasting for approximately 75 years, the period is fraught with identity problems, and many scholars doubt its existence as a distinct archaeological phase.\(^{92}\) The problem stems from the fact that LB IB is primarily defined by the ceramic forms that it lacks (bichrome, chocolate-on-white, stirrup jars, etc.) and by the sites that weren’t inhabited during it (such as Tell Beit Mirsim and Tell el-Far’ah South, among others).

Compounding the inherent difficulty in identifying LB IB strata, the apparent lack of Egyptian buildings in Syria-Palestine may be due in part to a paucity of excavation in certain key areas. Gaza, for instance, which could well have been the center of Egyptian administration in Canaan, lies buried underneath the present-day metropolitan center. Similar problems arise with regard to coastal Lebanon. Generally, sites adjacent to good natural harbors—i.e., the very sites that the Egyptians would have concentrated their efforts

\(^{91}\) The word 'ḫ is generally translated as “palace” (Wb I, 214; Lesko 1982: 84; Faulkner 1986: 46). It is perhaps interesting, however, that the word may have derived originally from a term for a fortified enclosure (Stadelmann 2001: 13).

\(^{92}\) See Weinstein (1981: 12) for a discussion of the difficulties in defining this period archaeologically and the efforts on the parts of some Syro-Palestinian scholars to merge the LB IB period broadly into a single “LB I” period or an “LB II” phase. While the problems inherent in defining this period archaeologically are widely recognized, scholars such as Weinstein (1981: 12–15) and Leonard (1989: 12–16) have retained “LB IB” as a useful designation in their overviews of the Late Bronze Age.
mid-eighteenth dynasty

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upon—have been more or less continuously occupied up until modern times. Egyptian bases located just outside Canaanite towns, on the other hand, may well have escaped notice due to the fact that archaeologists until relatively recently have focused their excavations primarily upon ancient tells.

Even given these considerations, however, the contrast between the dearth of architectural remains in Syria-Palestine from the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty and the relative abundance of such evidence in the Nineteenth Dynasty (or even to a lesser extent in the late Eighteenth Dynasty) is surely significant. Assuming that the textual references to forts and other buildings on foreign soil have a basis in fact, some explanation for their invisibility in the archaeological record must be discovered. One possibility, formulated on analogy with practices attested from the Amarna Period, is that Egyptians in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty were in the habit of co-opting standing local architecture to serve their purposes. Alternatively, or additionally, vassals may have been commissioned to construct buildings for Egyptian authorities.

If the Egyptians did occupy Canaanite-built compounds and if vassal taxation provided their food and supplies—as the reforms of Thutmose III appear to have intended—it is easy to see how Egyptian garrison posts could remain essentially invisible. Undoubtedly complicating efforts to identify Egyptian bases further must be the well-attested fact that mid-Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs made liberal use of local militia in the maintenance of their imperial forces. In letters number 5 and 6 found at Taanach, for example, an Egyptian officer severely upbraids a local ruler for not providing men to fill his garrison, commanding him to send troops posthaste to Gaza (in letter 5) and to Megiddo (in letter 6).

Another document, also potentially relevant in this regard, is P. Hermitage 1116A. On the verso of this papyrus, an Egyptian scribe compiled a list of quantities of beer and grain provided as rations to maryannu-warriors from twelve Syro-Palestinian cities, including

93 Golénischeff 1913; Epstein 1963; Aharoni 1968: 153. Although originally thought to date to the time of Thutmose III, the papyrus is now assigned to the reign of Amenhotep II; see Weinstein 1981: 13; Leonard 1989: 13.

94 The envoys are specified as maryannu only on the first of the two city lists. Maryannu-warriors debut in Egyptian sources during the reign of Thutmose III. Originally specifying a military elite of Indo-Aryan ethnicity, the term maryannu in second millennium Syria-Palestine seems to have designated any chariot warrior of noble rank (Helck 1980b: 1190–1191).
Ashkelon, Megiddo, Taanach, and Hazor. Significantly, all towns on the list that can be identified with known archaeological correlates lie along the route to Syria.\textsuperscript{95} Although these maryannu-warriors may well have been acting as envoys, perhaps accompanying a caravan of tribute, their services (and those of their colleagues back home) may for all practical purposes have been at the disposal of the pharaoh.

The question of whether Egyptians in the Eighteenth Dynasty built or requisitioned the structures that they inhabited will be revisited in greater depth in chapter four. The ramifications of such a choice, however, are important. A policy of co-opting local buildings would serve an administration’s immediate needs. It would be particularly cost efficient, and it might effectively deprive the former power in the region of its own strongholds. At the same time, however, such a practice would not convey as intense an ideological impact as would the erection of a series of new and impressive Egyptian-style military bases.

\textit{Textual references to mid-Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters}

\textit{Reign of Thutmose III}\textsuperscript{96}

1. irp n kəm n wətt hṛ . . . šsp [inw n rt]nw [hmn in]w n wətt-hr hm n
inw n wh3 rṣty mḥḥ hṛp.n nb r ḫwt-nṯr im[n] . . . ḫs b inw n wətt-hr
(Tomb of Puyemre; Davies 1922: pl. 12, 30.4, and 31)\textsuperscript{97}

Wine of the vineyard of the Way of Horus . . . Receiving [the \textit{inw} of Rete]nu [together with the \textit{inw} of the Way of Horus, together with the \textit{inw} of the southern and northern oases, which the sovereign directed to the temple (of) Am[un] . . . Counting the \textit{inw} of the Way of Horus.

\textsuperscript{95} Aharoni 1968: 153. There is no reason to assume along with Weinstein (1981: 13) that the towns mentioned in this list must of necessity have been occupied by Egyptians at this time.

\textsuperscript{96} Although the tomb of Puyemre dates also to the joint reign of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III, it is placed within the section covering Thutmose III’s sole reign due to the adjacent scene of the “straining of wine by the Apiru” (Davies 1922: 65, pl. 12). The Apiru were rabble-rousing freebooters who often fought as mercenaries in second millennium Syria-Palestine (for the Apiru generally, see Bottero 1954; Na’aman 1986). Given the extent of their range and the nature of their activities, Apiru soldiers would almost certainly have been encountered by Thutmose III’s armies. Indeed, only a generation later, Amenhotep II claimed to have captured 3,600 Apiru in a single campaign (Urk. IV, 1309: 1).

\textsuperscript{97} This text is also published as Urk. IV, 523: 5–7, 15; however, that version is at variance on several points with the inscription as it is copied in Davies’ (1922) report. Due to Davies’ careful study of the tomb, his version is here given precedence.
Figure 14. Mid-Eighteenth Dynasty northern Sinai
Figure 15. Mid-Eighteenth Dynasty Canaan
Figure 16. Mid-Eighteenth Dynasty northern Syria-Palestine
In his capacity as second priest of Amun, Puyemre personally received the *inw*, or diplomatic gifts,\(^{98}\) that the king designated for the temple of Amun. This aspect of his work is commemorated in the three registers of his tomb decoration that depict embassies arriving to the temple to deposit their goods (see figure 17). Topmost, the ambassadors from Retenu bow slightly in acknowledgment of Puyemre, while in the bottom row two “great ones of the southern and northern oases” prostrate themselves before him. Sandwiched between these representatives of the northeastern and southwestern extensions of the empire is a prostrated man “who has authority over the vineyard of the god’s-offerings of Amun” and who represents the northeastern border district of the Way(s) of Horus. Offering bearers associated with this man bring what look to be jars of wine, pomegranates, grapes, turquoise, and carnelian\(^{99}\) to a scribe. The caption to the scene reads, “counting the *inw* of the Way(s) of Horus.”\(^{100}\)

The inclusion of the Way(s) of Horus among such company betrays its continued status as a quasi-foreign territory, despite nearly a century of pacification.\(^{101}\) Valbelle has argued that the toponym Way(s) of Horus, especially in its earlier attestations, should often be viewed as designating a district in the northeastern Delta—rather than a specific fortress or series of fortresses.\(^{102}\) Her thesis would appear viable in this case, as one would otherwise expect an *imy-r htm* (a *htm*-fortress commander) to have acted as the representative of the Way(s) of Horus.

As discussed in chapter two, however, in the New Kingdom the toponym Way(s) of Horus and the name of the border-fortress at


\(^{99}\) As turquoise and carnelian are both obtainable in the Eastern Desert and the Sinai (Lucas and Harris 1989: 391–392, 401–405), it is not surprising to find them amongst the *inw* of this border territory.

\(^{100}\) Davies 1922: 83. On analogy with the tomb of Puyemre, Davies (1973: 42) also restores “the Ways of Horus” as the origins of some Delta goods in the tomb of Rekhmire. Given that the toponym is nowhere surviving in Rekhmire’s tomb, however, the attribution of the goods must remain hypothetical.

\(^{101}\) It should be noted, however, that the status of the representative of the Ways of Horus is closer to that of the governors of the oases than to the rulers of Retenu—if the prostrate rather than slightly bowed greeting position translates to a political statement. While the Ways of Horus was indeed recognized as separate from Egypt’s heartland, the prostrate greeting suggests that the area remained under the secure political control of the pharaonic government.

\(^{102}\) Valbelle 1994.
Tjaru could be employed interchangeably. It is perhaps significant, then, that a vineyard associated with the *ḥmt* at Tjaru is known to have produced bountiful quantities of wine in the New Kingdom (see chapters four and five). Although the manufacture of wine is not generally associated with military installations, the administrative headquarters at both Aphek and Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh appear to have been intimately involved in this very process (see chapters five and six).

One wonders, then, whether winemaking at the Way(s) of Horus was not in fact an adjunct industry, which utilized foreign prisoners of war for manpower. The tomb of Puyemre showcases a scene of winemaking that is captioned: “the straining of wine by the Apiru.”¹⁰³ Given that this motley group often hired themselves out to serve as mercenaries, Thutmose III would assuredly have encountered Apiru in the course of his many campaigns. One would expect these people, therefore, to have been represented among the prisoner of war population under Thutmose III—as they were to be by the thousands in the reign of his son (Urk. IV, 1309: 1). Such an employment of foreign prisoners would clearly echo Kamose’s taunt to his Hyksos rival: “I am drinking the wine of your vineyards which the Asiatics I have captured press for me.”¹⁰⁴

Just as Thutmose III donated the outlying properties belonging to the king of Kadesh in Yenoam, Herenkeru, and Nukhasse to the god Amun after his first campaign, the personal vineyards of King Apophis may have been likewise presented to the god following Egypt’s victory over the Hyksos. While the vineyard was placed under the oversight of an individual bearing the title “he-who-has-authority-over the vineyard of the god’s-offerings of Amun,” then, it is likely that for all practical purposes the vineyards of the Way(s) of Horus remained under the general supervision of authorities at the

¹⁰³ Davies 1922: 65, pl. 12.
¹⁰⁴ Smith and Smith 1976: 60. Syro-Palestinians seem to have been prized as excellent vintners, and the Apiru perhaps especially so (Säve-Söderbergh 1952: 5–14). Levantine wine appears frequently in lists of tribute (cf. Urk. IV, 670: 8; 694: 5; 707: 5; Gardiner 1947: 180–187⁴), and jars of foreign wine are often found on archaeological sites in Egypt (cf. Hayes 1951: 101–102). Likewise, vintners often hold Syro-Palestinian personal names (see Gunn 1923: 167 and the numerous references cited in Hayes 1951: 101–102, no. 232 and Redford 1992: 223, n. 34), and northerners are frequently associated with wine production in tomb scenes (Davies 1922: 65, pl. 12; Säve-Söderbergh 1952: 5–14). Given this strong connection between Syro-Palestinians and the process of winemaking, it is perhaps no coincidence that Shezmu, the god of the winepress, was of Asiatic origin (Redford 1979a: 281, n. 12).
fortress of Tjaru. Certainly numerous wine labels from the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties attest to the fact that the wine cultivated at Tjaru, often under the direct auspices of the overseer of the ḫtm-fortress, graced many a state supper for centuries to come (see chapters four and five).

2. ḳmṯ-spt 22 ḥḥḏ 4 ṣw ṣmḥ ḫtm ḫn tʾrwr ṣm ṣḥyṯ ṣrt ṣn ḫḥt [r ḫ ṣkhw] tʾs ḫmr ṣm ḫn[t ṣm ḫḥt ṣm ṣwr ṣm ṣm³] (Annals of Thutmose III; Urk. IV, 647: 12–648: 1)

Regnal year 22, fourth month of Peret, day 25: [His Majesty passed the ḫtm-fortress of] Tjaru on the first campaign of victory [in order to expel those who violated] the borders of Egypt in valor, in might, in strength, and in truth.

The narrative section of Thutmose III’s annals begins with the army’s departure from the familiar world of Egypt, an event that took place precisely at the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru. Although Egypt viewed Canaan and parts of Syria as sovereign territory, it is clear that the fortress of Tjaru definitively marked the practical border of the country. As discussed in chapter two, Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) was situated on a narrow isthmus that divided two lagoons. This small spit of land thus bridged a passage that quite literally linked the fertile Nile Valley to the arid route across the northern Sinai.

Upon reaching the border-fortress, and before embarking on their long journey, Thutmose III’s troops may have been equipped with food and weapons from the st, or storehouse, which is known to have been in existence as early as the reign of Thutmose I (Urk. IV, 547: 4). From Tjaru the army then set out across the Sinai littoral on a ten-day trek to reach the Egyptian-held town of Gaza. As noted previously, the speed with which the army traversed the 220 km from Tjaru to Gaza suggests that the Ways of Horus military route was already well maintained in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.
Figure 17. A vintner from the Ways of Horus brings wine to Puyemre (after Davies 1922: pl. 12)
Sethe’s restoration of the word *htm* in this text undoubtedly stems from the fact that in New Kingdom inscriptions the fortress at Tjaru is invariably designated as a *htm*-fortress. Obviously derived from the verb *htm*, “to seal” or “to lock,” this type of installation may well have had a primarily defensive function at the beginning of the New Kingdom—i.e., one of locking or sealing off the Egyptian border from outside penetration. Physically, the town of Tjaru itself literally blocked the main land-passage connecting the Nile Valley to the Sinai beyond. Likewise, the town’s thick enclosure wall and massive size indicate a substantial governmental investment in the security of Egypt’s eastern flank. Such defensive measures would certainly have been wise following the Hyksos expulsion. Indeed, judging from the rebellion of even southernmost Canaan in the reign of Thutmose III, Tjaru’s mandate to defend Egypt’s border must still have been current in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.

After Thutmose III’s first victory, and throughout the remainder of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties, however, the danger of an enemy invasion from the east was drastically reduced. Textual evidence strongly suggests that much of Tjaru’s importance for the remainder of the New Kingdom was as a checkpoint at which goods and people traveling across the border could be both registered and regulated. While it is perhaps doubtful that the term *htm* in fact had been applied to Tjaru due to the large staff of administrative officials (or “seal bearers”) found within, there is certainly no doubt that subsequent to this first campaign of Thutmose III’s, Tjaru’s primary importance was more administrative than military.


They surveyed [this] cit[y], encircling (it) with a ditch (and) surrounding (it) with fresh timbers of all their pleasant (*alt.* fruit) trees, while his majesty himself was upon the eastern *htm* of th[is] city, [being

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108 See chapters four and five.

watchful. [...] enclosed [...] with a thick-walled fortification [...] with its thick wall. Its name was made as “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-encircles-the-Syro-Palestinians.” People were appointed in order to watch over the camp of his majesty, being told, “Be steadfast, be steadfast! Be vigilant, be vigilant! [...] his majesty [...] [It was not allowed that (even) one of them] go outside beyond this fortification, except going to knock on the door of their htm.

Due to some ill-timed plundering on the part of the soldiers, the battle of Megiddo ended with the Egyptian army in control of the battlefield but excluded from the city proper (Urk. IV, 660: 4–8). In order to render his victory complete, and to eradicate definitively any remnants of the rebellion, then, Thutmose III and his army settled in for a long siege. The Egyptians harvested the city’s grain and surrounded Megiddo with a wall, which in all probability had been fashioned from the very fruit trees that helped sustain Megiddo’s economy. The Egyptians personified this enclosure wall as the king himself and thus named it “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-encircles-the-Syro-Palestinians.”

The passage excerpted above mentions the word htm twice. In the first instance, the king is described as standing atop the eastern htm of the city and watching his troops construct the stockade. How exactly this passage should be interpreted is unclear, but there are a number of different possibilities. According to one, the Egyptians would have commandeered an existing fort, perhaps a watchtower, which was located east of Megiddo.110 Indeed, the specification that this was the “eastern” htm could even imply that the city possessed several such buildings.

Alternatively, rather than accommodate their pharaoh in a tent for several months, the Egyptians could have constructed a fortress

110 Cf. Nelson (1913: 61), who interpreted the htm as referring to a tower on the east side of the city. B. Halpern has suggested to Redford (personal communication) that a low knoll to the northeast of Megiddo would have been an ideal locale for such a watchtower, whether it had been constructed originally by the inhabitants of Megiddo or newly by the Egyptians during the siege. It is of interest to note that A. Koh believes that he has discovered a htm located just outside the town of Deir el-Medina. This structure, formerly known solely from inscriptive evidence, had been placed so as to be able to simultaneously monitor the traffic coming to or from the town of Deir el-Medina and the Ramesseum (Koh 2001: 48). If Koh is correct, Deir el-Medina’s htm-fort—located just outside of the town it monitored—would provide an interesting parallel to that perhaps constructed at Megiddo.
of their own to the east of the city. Such a fort, in addition to housing the king in a style approximating what he was accustomed to, may have been intended to serve an important defensive function if the battle were to be reengaged. The fact that the armed camp apparently coexisted with the $htm$, however, indicates that the $htm$ either supplemented or housed the camp, but it did not replace it.

Lastly, the word $htm$ could refer to a fortified gate within the wall itself, as it appears to do in the second example. The difficulty with this scenario is that the text clearly states that Thutmose III stood upon the $htm$ while he watched his army survey and build the enclosure wall. As no remnants of a fortress have come to light within eyeshot of Megiddo, however, this latter suggestion bears some merit. Indeed, the word $htm$ is known from a few texts to refer specifically to the gates of a town’s enclosure wall, which were either closed by a threatened city or opened by a surrendering one.\textsuperscript{111}

The word $htm$, as it is employed for the second time in the above passage, is spelled quite differently from its predecessor. Whereas the $htm$ that the Egyptian king stood upon was spelled phonetically, with an enclosure sign for a determinative,\textsuperscript{112} the second $htm$ employs only the $htm$-seal\textsuperscript{113} and the enclosure sign. It is lucky, however, that the intended meaning of the second $htm$ is far clearer than the first. In this latter case it is quite obvious that the word should refer to the $htm$-gate of the Egyptian-built barricade, upon which the Canaanites would have to knock if they wished to leave their town.\textsuperscript{114} In this instance, the use of the word $htm$ for “gate” is particularly appropriate, as it would have been the gate itself that metaphorically “sealed in” the rebellious Canaanites.

In the end, the ambiguities of this passage are frustrating. It would be useful to know whether the variant spellings of the word $htm$ implied two separate structures. If the first $htm$ was indeed a fort, it remains unclear whether it was a fort that the Egyptians constructed for themselves or whether it was an existing fort that the Egyptians commandeered. Indeed, the notable lack of archaeological evidence for Egyptian buildings on Canaanite soil strongly suggests that the

\textsuperscript{111} sv. “$htm$” in Wb. III: 352, no. 6; Baer Files v. II; Lesko 1984b: 198.
\textsuperscript{112} Gardiner 1988: sign O1.
\textsuperscript{113} Gardiner 1988: sign S20.
\textsuperscript{114} Interestingly, there is no evidence that Megiddo possessed a city wall of its own at this period (Gonen 1987: 98).
usurpation of Canaanite structures may have been a normative practice in the Eighteenth Dynasty. This issue will be revisited further below. Finally, if the two $h\text{tmw}$ simply referred to the same gateway in the Egyptian barricade-wall, or to a preexisting fort that had been incorporated into the Egyptian enclosure, this too would be important information. It is clear, however, that the purpose of the $h\text{tmw}$ at Megiddo, as at Tjaru, was to restrict and monitor traffic into—and especially out of—a high security zone.

4. $\text{hr} \text{h\text{st} rt\text{nw} m mnnw k\text{d.n hm.i m nh\text{tw.f hry-ib n wrw n rmnn nty rr f r mn-hpr-r} wfw sm\text{nw} \text{Annals of Thutmose III; Urk. IV, 739: 15–740: 1}}$

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\ldots \text{upon the foreign land of Retenu in a mnnw-fortress, which my majesty built by means of his victory in the midst of the rulers of Lebanon, the name of which is "Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-subdues-the-wanderers."}
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This fragment of text, found in a section of the annals detailing the revenues of the first campaign, provides further information as to Thutmose III’s activities during the siege of Megiddo. It seems that at some point during the seven months of the siege, presumably after the completion of the enclosure wall made the presence of the entire army unnecessary, the king and some of his troops built a mnnw-fortress in Lebanon. The name of the fortress was, again, functionally specific, its manifest purpose being to subdue transient populations.

As the word “wanderers” ($\text{sm\text{nw}}$) is determined by a man who carries his belongings in a small bag tied to a stick,\(^{115}\) it is possible that the purpose of the fortress was to secure an area plagued by migrant ruffians, such as the Apiru. Indeed, the Amarna letters penned by Rib-Hadda make it clear that the Apiru severely threatened and ultimately conquered numerous coastal Lebanese towns in the late Eighteenth Dynasty.\(^{116}\) A fortress constructed by the Egyptians in Lebanon, then, could have performed the dual purpose of safeguarding loyal vassals from threatening neighbors and providing the Egyptians with a northern coastal base. Such a base would have guaranteed a secure harbor for the Egyptians, assured them of access to a mountain pass inland, and provided them with direct access to

\(^{115}\) Gardiner 1988: sign A33.

\(^{116}\) See the extensive discussion of Byblos and the Apiru in the historical section of chapter four.
Lebanese cedar forests. These latter goals, however, were assuredly far too practical to be memorialized within a fortress name.

From the narrative of the first campaign itself there is no hint that the Egyptian army traveled north of Megiddo. Only the topographical lists copied on the walls of Karnak have been used to argue for such a possibility.\textsuperscript{117} While Thutmose III’s northern activity may have been downplayed in order to highlight the victory against the allied force at Megiddo, the statement quoted above clearly indicates that Thutmose III not only ventured northward but also began the process of consolidating this portion of his empire.

The exact location of this fortress, built as it was in the midst of the rulers of Lebanon, has never been determined. It may well, however, have been situated somewhere in the vicinity of Byblos. The ties between Byblos and Egypt had been strong since at least the Early Dynastic Period, if not before,\textsuperscript{118} and a friendly city might well have welcomed Egyptian protection from rival kingdoms and aggressive Apiru. Further, Thutmose III launched his famed eighth campaign into Mitanni territory “in the neighborhood of the lady of Byblos” (Urk. IV, 1232: 3), which may imply that the area had already been specially outfitted for such a purpose. Likewise, diplomatic letters provide information that sometime prior to the reign of Amenhotep III, an Egyptian garrison had been permanently stationed in the city (EA 117, 121, 122, and 130).

It is particularly interesting to speculate as to whether Thutmose III may have in effect paid for the privilege of building such a fortress on the land of the local ruler by providing offerings and sponsoring new construction on the temple of the lady of Byblos. As discussed above, Egyptian temples were in general utilized as largely economic institutions, and—as the lady of Byblos was already firmly identified with the goddess Hathor\textsuperscript{119}—such a transaction would have been consistent with a pharaonic worldview. According to such a view, the king was not “paying” mortals for his goods; rather he was simply demonstrating his appreciation to the gods. Indeed, the Egyptian custom of paying for their timber by providing offerings to the temple of Hathor of Byblos is evident from the tomb inscriptions of

\textsuperscript{117} Noth 1938: 26–65; Drower 1980: 452; Weinstein 1981: 11.
\textsuperscript{118} Wilkinson 1999: 160–162.
Thutmose III’s chief treasurer Sennefer (Urk. IV, 535: 2–16) and from the records kept by the ruler of Byblos in the tale of Wenamun. In addition, both textual (Urk. IV, 1443: 19) and archaeological evidence suggests that Thutmose III did in fact sponsor work upon the temple of the lady of Byblos.

The Lebanese harbor town of Ullaza is yet another candidate for the location of Thutmose III’s fortress. In his Gebel Barkal inscription of year 47, Thutmose mentions a garrison of his stationed in Ullaza and involved in the process of obtaining wood for the Egyptian government (Urk. IV, 1237: 15–17). This harbor town was the object of campaigns as early as Thutmose III’s year 29 (Urk. IV, 685: 8) and again two years later (Urk. IV, 690: 17–691: 1). On both occasions it had been defended in part by a garrison from Tunip (Urk. IV, 686: 1–2; 691: 2–3).

It is unclear, then, whether Thutmose III replaced Tunip’s garrison with his own in order to assure himself of Ullaza’s future loyalty or whether his campaigns themselves had been motivated by Tunip’s seizure of one of his fortresses. The fact that Ullaza is described as being in rebellion on the occasion of the first battle (Urk. IV, 685: 5) is not conclusive to either view. It should be noted, however, that shortly after the battle, Thutmose III and his army proceeded to a storehouse of offerings to give thanks to Amun and Re-Horakhty (Urk. IV, 685: 13–14). As has been observed with regard to the early Eighteenth Dynasty fortresses in Nubia, both storehouses and cultic institutions were vital components of these mnwnw-fortresses.

Other suggestions as to the location of this military base include “inland at the southern end of Lebanon,” put forth by Säve-Söderbergh on the basis that Thutmose III did not concentrate upon the coast of Lebanon until his 5th campaign. Alt likewise opted for a southern coastal location, tentatively placing the fortress in the area of Sidon or the ladder of Tyre. Noth preferred to locate Thutmose

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121 Woolley 1921: 200; Dunand 1939: 27, nos. 1317, 1318, 1320.
122 Although the site of the ancient port of Ullaza has not been definitively identified, textual references indicate that it would have been located in the vicinity of modern Tripolis and the Nahr el-Barid (Alt 1959a: 125, n. 2; Helck 1971: 315; Kuhrt 1995: 193, 323).
123 Säve-Söderbergh 1946: 36.
III’s installation in the coastal town of Sumur, because of its importance as a base in the late Eighteenth Dynasty.125 Finally, Yeivin located the fortress in the Galilee, along with the three towns donated to Amun.126

5. in mšt.i sw3 snwt m ḫtyw n ʿš [hr ḫw]w [nw t3–nṯr] [ . . . ] r mnnw itw.i nṯrw nḥw nw ʾsmōw mḥw iw mḥāb n ḫm.i nšmt nt ḫwnt nt ʿš [ . . . ] ḫr mryt [nt] rmnn m mnn[w] [ . . . ] ḫrw nbw ḫmnn ḫw nsw r šḥnti ʾm.sn r int bḥšt nbt [nt ḫ]nt-š r ṣtp-s3 ʾnḥ ṻḏ snb . . . (Gebel Barkal stele of Thutmose III; Urk. IV, 1241: 13–1242: 4)

It was my army that felled the flagpoles on the terraces of cedar, [upon the mountain]’s [of god’s land] [ . . . ] for the monuments of my fathers, all the gods of Upper and Lower Egypt. Oared barques of cedar are built for my majesty . . . the coast [of] Lebanon in the mnn[w]-fortress. [ . . . ] all the rulers of Lebanon [ . . . ] royal ships in order to sail south in them in order to bring all the marvels of [of Phoenicia] to the palace, l.p.h.

It appears highly probable that the mnnw-fortress mentioned in Thutmose III’s Gebel Barkal stele should be equated with the mnnw-fortress “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-subdues-the-wanderers,” which was built by the same king in Lebanon. In the Gebel Barkal inscription, however, the fortress’ connection to the Lebanese timber industry is made explicit. Although the inscription is slightly damaged in places, it seems clear that a primary duty of the garrison stationed at the fortress was to fell cedar trees for shipment to Egypt and for transformation into divine barques at the fortress proper.127 The Gebel Barkal stele also provides the information that the army was charged with the same lumberjack duties on Egypt’s southernmost frontier in Kush (Urk. IV, 1237: 7).

Both the coastal towns of Byblos and Ullaza are mentioned in the text of the Gebel Barkal stele inscription. The former, or rather the neighborhood of the former, is remembered as the place of embarkation for the victorious eighth campaign. Interestingly, it is specifically stated that Thutmose III “had many vessels of cedar wood built on

125 Noth 1943: 168.
126 Yeivin 1934: 213. Yeivin suggests that the term “Lebanon” (rmnn) extended as far as the mountain range in the southern Galilee.
127 Amenhotep III would later boast that he ordered Lebanese rulers to fell cedar in Retenu for the construction of a sacred barque for Amun (Urk. IV, 1652: 14–16). For an artistic parallel to this exact situation in the reign of Seti I, see Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 9.
the mountains of God’s Land in the neighborhood of the lady of Byblos” (Urk. IV, 1232: 2–3). Could the Lebanese fortress of Thutmose III, at which divine barks were fashioned, have been located outside of Byblos and also have served as a shipbuilding center for amphibious assaults? This is a distinct possibility.

Ullaza, however, is also mentioned in the Gebel Barkal stele, which complicates matters. According to the text, an Egyptian garrison stationed at Ullaza was involved in procuring wood to be sent to the Amun temple in Egypt128 (Urk. IV, 1237: 15–1238: 1). As the wood hewn at Thutmose III’s Lebanese fortress was also destined to be transformed into cultic objects, flagstaffs, and divine barques, the employment of the men stationed at this mnnw and the duties of the garrison posted at Ullaza appear suspiciously similar.

6. smi.tw n.f ḫrt mnnw rṣy mḥt[y] (Tomb of Rekhmire; Davies 1973: pl. 26; Urk. IV, 1105: 4)

One shall report to him the affairs of the southern and northe[rn] mnnw–fortresses.

Thutmose III’s vizier, Rekhmire, had a text inscribed upon his tomb walls that in modern times has been dubbed the “Duties of the Vizier.” Known from three other much more damaged copies on the tomb walls of other New Kingdom viziers (TT. 29, 106, and 131), this text has long been presumed to have been composed in the Thirteenth Dynasty.129 A recent study, however, has argued that the majority of the text was in fact written in the very early Eighteenth Dynasty, although undoubtedly employing older models.130 Aptly christened, the text is largely a summary of the areas of Egypt’s administration that fell directly under the purview of the southern vizier. This text will receive more discussion later in this chapter, as it provides a great deal of information about the administration of the southern frontier in or before the time of Thutmose III.

In his study of this text, van den Boorn has suggested that the northern and southern mnnw–fortresses should be interpreted as guardposts, which monitored the northern and southern entrances to the

128 The destination of the wood is not specifically stated; however, the repeated referencing of Amun in this context suggests an Egyptian locale.
129 See Gardiner (1947: 47), Helck (1958: 2 n. 1; 214), and the extensive references cited in van den Boorn 1982: 369.
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palace confines. His argument centers upon the fact that the immediate context of the passage appears to concern the royal palace rather than the functioning of the country as a whole. While his thesis may be correct, the association of mnnw-fortresses with the precinct of the royal palace is unprecedented. References to southern and northern mnnw fortress-towns, however, are not.

As one of the most powerful officials in the land, it is quite feasible that the southern vizier would have had symbolic authority over the northern mnnw-fortresses and quite real authority over those on the southern frontier. If Rekhmire’s text is to be believed, or if it was not drafted prior to the reintroduction of a split viziership between Upper and Lower Egypt and simply copied without revision, the southern vizier regularly heard reports on the affairs of at least one northern mnnw-fortress. Taking the Middle Kingdom Semna dispatches and the Nineteenth Dynasty Miscellanies as probable examples of fortress dispatches, the vizier was likely informed of all who entered or exited the fortress in either direction, as well as the passage of migrants or fugitives in the near vicinity.

Northern Egyptian bases that may have sent reports to the vizier include the Lebanese mnnw-fortress “Menkheperre-subdues-the-wanderers,” Tjaru, Gaza, Sharuhen, Jaffa, and Beth Shan (see below). In addition, although there is virtually no archaeological evidence to substantiate such a conclusion, several scholars have posited that Thutmose III garrisoned Megiddo following his first campaign of victory. The sources from which this argument is drawn are fourfold.

First, Taanach letter 5 contains an order from the Egyptian functionary Amenhotep to the ruler of Taanach to send men, chariots, and horses to Megiddo the next day. However, as Amenhotep does

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131 Van den Boorn 1988: 46–48; 67, fig. 5.
133 Van den Boorn (1988: 256) himself states that “although the text pertains only to the southern vizier, it implies through its terminology that it covers the fields of operation of both viziers.”
134 Although first encountered as early as the Fifth Dynasty (Strudwick 1985: 334), a dual viziership seems to have been reintroduced in the time of Thutmose III (Hayes 1959: 116; Der Manuelian 1987: 167).
not appear from his other letters to have been based at Megiddo—and indeed had to specify to his vassal that he should direct his men and arms to that city in particular—it appears likely that Amenhotep was simply planning on passing through the city. A second argument mustered in support of the idea that Egyptian forces occupied Megiddo cites the presence of a messenger from Megiddo in Thebes during the reign of Amenhotep II. The messenger from Megiddo, however, was only one of many foreign envoys present at court at the time. Thus, his visit indicates little more than the unsurprising fact that the ruler of Megiddo was in diplomatic contact with the Egyptian court.

It has also been suggested that Amenhotep II brought the ruler of Geba-Shemen back to “the vicinity (hw) of Megiddo (mkt)” rather than to “hw'kt,” as the toponym is literally written. Even if the emendation of the toponym were indeed warranted, this passage is still no proof that the Egyptians occupied Megiddo in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Lastly, a plea from the ruler of Megiddo to restore the archers who had previously been stationed in his town (EA 244: 10) has been taken as evidence for an earlier garrison. As this letter dates to the last decade of Amenhotep III’s reign, however, it is quite possible that the ruler of Megiddo was referring to events in the more recent past.

Although the circumstantial evidence presented above is not sufficient to prove that an Egyptian garrison was stationed at Megiddo following its surrender, the nature of early Eighteenth Dynasty policy decisions renders this at least a possibility. As seen in chapter two—judging from the cases of Tjaru (Tell Heboua I), Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajjul), Avaris (Tell ed-Dab‘a), and Shaat (Sa‘)—it appears to have been Egyptian practice to occupy previously rebellious areas as a precautionary measure against further sedition. In each of the polities mentioned above, however, the majority of the previously rebellious population appears to have been slaughtered, deported, or driven out wholesale and replaced by Egyptians. As this practice

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139 In Taanach letter no. 6, the ruler of Taanach was reprimanded for not having sent men to Gaza (Glock 1983: 61–62), so presumably it was not at all self-evident at any given time where troops should be sent.
140 Epstein 1963: 49–51.
certainly did not take place at Megiddo, an Egyptian occupation of the site at this time must remain an uncertainty.\footnote{Certainly there is no archaeological evidence for such an occupation (Gonen 1987: 97).}

Of all the bases listed above that might have sent reports to the vizier, it is remarkable that the installation located in Lebanon is the only one specifically termed a \textit{mn\textsc{nw}}, and this base would undoubtedly have been located too far north to have reported to the southern vizier daily. It is a distinct possibility, then, that the northern \textit{mn\textsc{nw}} fortresses referred in fact to northern \textit{Nubian mn\textsc{nw}-fortresses}, perhaps thereby indicating that the vizier received reports from fortresses in both Lower and Upper Nubia. Alternatively, it is also not unlikely that the reference to the northern \textit{mn\textsc{nw}-fortresses} in fact was anachronistic, reflecting late Middle Kingdom or Second Intermediate Period institutions—possibly even those erected against the Hyksos. Indeed, following the reign of Thutmose III, the only northern \textit{mn\textsc{nw}-fortresses} attested in Egyptian inscriptions would be the Nineteenth Dynasty installations that guarded the coastal road to Libya (see chapter five).

\footnotesize{7. \textit{imy-r ḫtm wr n wəd-wr ṣət-imn m3'-ḥrw \[. . \] n k3 n mḥ-ib n nsw r r-\textsuperscript{2} sšt ṣḥ(w) sšm ṭsw fnḥw sšp inw nbdw-kd įy n b3w ḥm.f ‘nḥ ṣḏ snb \textit{imy-r ḫtmw ḫstwt mḥtt sš sət-imn ms n nbt-pr ṣy (Statue, Brussels E 4295; Capart 1900: 105–106)}

\textit{(On the figure of Sat-Amun himself)} Overseer of the great \textit{ḥtm}-fortress of the sea, Sat-Amun, justified. \[. . \] \textit{(following traditional funerary wishes:)} For the ka of the confidant of the king in the vicinity of Syria-Palestine, one who knows the state of affairs of the lands of the Fenkuhu-people, one who receives the \textit{inw} of those of bad character who come to the power of his majesty, l.p.h. The overseer of the \textit{ḥtm}-fortresses of all the northern foreign lands, the scribe Sat-Amun, born of the mistress of the house, Ay.

In this group statue, Sat-Amun is seated at center dressed in a festival robe. His daughter, the mistress of the house Baket (\textit{bkt}), sits to his left, while a scribe named Ast (\textit{st}) occupies the honored right-hand position. This man, who must be viewed as either a relative or a particularly close personal secretary of Sat-Amun, is in turn flanked by a very small representation of a woman who is designated “his wife, mistress of the house, Karyfý” (\textit{k3r\textit{yfý}}). Although
Capart believed this woman to be the wife of Sat-Amun, her proximity to Ast and her inferior status, as signaled by size, may indicate that she was in fact wedded to the latter.

Although this statue is not inscribed with a regnal year or specific reference to a reigning king, it is fairly easy to date on an art historical basis. Close parallels suggest that the group statue belongs to a school of art practiced during the reigns of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III, when statues tended to hearken back to Middle Kingdom prototypes. This is in accordance with Capart’s own opinion that the piece dated to the first years of the Eighteenth Dynasty. Although the statue may well have been executed during the coregency, the dearth of evidence for northern fortresses prior to Thutmose III’s assumption of sole power has led us to prefer to postpone its discussion until this point.

Brussels E 4295 is the only known memorial to Sat-Amun, and it is unfortunately unprovenienced. Judging from the titles he bore (“overseer of the great hụm-fortress of the sea” and “overseer of the hụm-fortress of all the northern lands”), however, Sat-Amun and his family must have been based in the very northern Delta, adjacent to one of the Nile mouths. Further, given that Sat-Amun served as “confidant of the king in the vicinity of Syria-Palestine” and claimed to know “the state of affairs of the lands of the Fenkhu-people,” it would be surprising if his own branch of the Nile were not the Pelusiac, which lay farthest to the east.

Overseers of the hụm-fortress of the sea are known from inscriptions of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. Unfortunately, the whereabouts of such a building, or buildings, cannot be divined from these sources. One might conjecture that the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty fortress of the sea that Sat-Amun commanded was situated

144 Capart 1900: 106. Interestingly, the names of both individuals appear to be of Semitic origin.
145 See, for example, the statue of Ahmose Ruru (Fazzini 1975: 71, no. 49) or of Karem and Abykhy (Vassilika 1995: 48, no. 20). The Middle Kingdom prototype is well represented by the group statue of Pepi and his family (Silverman 1997: 128–129, no. 35).
146 Capart 1900: 105.
147 Fenkhu-land is generally equated with the Phoenician coast, although it appears occasionally also to have referred to inland areas of Syria-Palestine (Redford 1979a: 274–275; Drower 1980: 425).
148 Cf. the Bilgai stele (Davies 1997: 339) and P. Hood, 1 (Schulman 1964a: 123, no. 237). See chapters five and six.
at Tell el-Dab’a, the newly refurbished Hyksos capital, as this town boasted a large fortress built in the early Eighteenth Dynasty on the bank of the Pelusiac. This fortress at Tell el-Dab’a continued to function into the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, after which time it was abandoned. In the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties the fortress of the sea would most likely have moved north of the new national capital at Pi-Ramesses (see chapter five).

Just as Tjaru served as the official checkpoint for travelers and tribute-bearers entering Egypt from the overland route across the Sinai, the htm-fortress of the sea may have served such a purpose for those who fared to Egypt by ship. Certainly Sat-Amun’s involvement with the inae-shipments brought by “those of bad character” would suggest such a situation. Further, his claim to have been cognizant of the affairs of the Fenkhu-people, in particular, implies that he came into contact most often with the coastal dwellers of Syria-Palestine, i.e., those most likely to have utilized boats in their communications with Egypt.

Finally, it seems a strong possibility that the northern htm-fortresses over which Sat-Amun had jurisdiction were those institutions that Thutmose III had established along the coast—unusually described as htnw due to their manifest function of monitoring the formidable traffic that bustled through Canaan’s most important harbors. As the overseer of the great htm-fortress of the sea in Egypt, Sat-Amun could keep tabs on the affairs of each of these individual bases via the ships that no doubt regularly plied the waters between the Levantine coast and Egypt. Indeed, the htm-fortress of the sea’s function as the node of central command for the numerous outlying coastal bases is perhaps comparable to the position of the htm-fortress of Tjaru vis-à-vis the string of fortified way-stations arrayed along the Ways of Horus. For example, in the Nineteenth Dynasty, it appears that the central authorities at Tjaru were directly responsible for investigating allegations of impropriety or corruption levied against any one of these forts. Undoubtedly, then, both the htm-fortress of the sea and the htm-fortress at Tjaru served in part to coordinate communication between the pharaonic government and the numerous bases erected to facilitate travel by land or by sea.

150 See the discussion of the so-called border journal in P. Anastasi III.
What is given as favors from the king for the one who is praised, the confidant of the lord of the two lands, child of the nursery, troop commander of Tjaru, (and) overseer of horses, Menna.

The shabti of Menna, an individual who is otherwise unattested, is assigned to the reign of Thutmose III by Petrie. Menna held the rank of troop commander of Tjaru and overseer of horses—titles shared by the general Paramesses (Urk. IV, 2175: 8; 2176: 13; KRI II, 288: 9), his son Seti (KRI II, 288: 8), and the future viceroy under Ramesses II, Huy (KRI III, 79: 16). Similarly, the association of the titles “troop commander of Tjaru” and “child of the nursery” is duplicated in the resume of Neby, who served in the reign of Thutmose IV (see below).

The title ḥry pdt literally translates as “he who is in charge of the archers,” and, indeed, the Amarna letters are rife with pleas by vassals for a detachment of archers (pitati). In the Eighteenth Dynasty, however, it seems that the word pdt could also be interpreted more loosely as “troops.” Based on known examples, this unit of soldiers is stated by Schulman to number between 250 and 5,000 men, although there are indications that the numbers could well be smaller. In his study Military Rank, Title, and Organization in the Egyptian New Kingdom, Schulman also concluded that a ḥry pdt ranked second only to a general (imy-r mšš [wrt]) in the national army. Indeed, it seems an Egyptian general would have had immediately under his command an assemblage of troop commanders that varied according to the size of his army.

In addition to their duties as field officers, troop commanders could and frequently did serve in a number of other capacities, such as

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151 Petrie 1935: 3. Petrie gives no explanation of his reasoning; however, the archaic form of the shabti, which exhibits no sign of tools or hands, and the non-standard inscription would tend to support a date that fell relatively early in the New Kingdom.
152 The titles of ḥry pdt and imy-r ssmt were also borne by the occupant of Theban Tomb 91, which dates to the reigns of Thutmose IV and Amenhotep III (Porter and Moss I: 185).
153 The officials Amenemheb and Paser, who served in the reigns of Thutmose III and Amenhotep II, were also children of the nursery who grew up to hold posts as troop commanders (Der Manuelian 1987: 120–122).
155 Schulman 1964a: 3.
as royal envoy (\textit{wpwty nsw}) and garrison commander (\textit{imy-r iw\textquotesingle yt}).\textsuperscript{156} Of most importance with regard to this study, however, is the fact that the position of overseer of a \textit{htm}-fortress (\textit{imy-r htm}) was almost invariably filled by a troop commander and that troop commanders appear also to have supervised non-\textit{htm}-fortresses in the north.\textsuperscript{157} A fortress' garrison, then, would likely have consisted of a single \textit{pdl} of soldiers serving under their troop commander. Depending on the size of the fortress, it is reasonable to assume that a resident garrison could have consisted of as many as 250 soldiers.

Given that both Paramesses and his son Seti served as troop commanders of Tjaru prior to their ascension to kingship at the start of the Nineteenth Dynasty, the position must have been of extremely high status. It is tempting to surmise from Menna’s title “child of the nursery” (\textit{ḥrd n kṣp}), then, that he gained his post at least in part due to his intimacy with the king as a youth.\textsuperscript{158} To preempt charges of nepotism, however, it should be stated that Menna’s other title, overseer of horses, attests to his high rank in the chariotry, the most respected and selective of the military orders.\textsuperscript{159} While his royal connections no doubt helped Menna rise in this order, by the time he assumed directorship of the \textit{htm}-fortress at Tjaru, he would have possessed strong credentials for the job on his own merit.

\textit{Reign of Amenhotep II}

1. m3(3) šbwt ḫns phww \textit{ir(t)} mḥrw m ṭtt-ḥṣr in ḥṣty-2 n niwt rṣy sn-nfr m3'-ḥrw (Tomb of Sennefer, TT 96; Urk. IV, 1421: 9–11)

Beholding the fields, traversing the marshlands, (and) making arrangements (alt. doing business) in the Way of Horus by the mayor of the southern city, Sennefer, justified.

In his tomb, the Theban mayor under Amenhotep II describes himself undertaking a tour of inspection in the northern province of the Way(s) of Horus. The phrase \textit{ir(t)} \textit{mḥrw} can be interpreted as “mak-

\textsuperscript{156} Cf. KRI III, 115: 10; 262: 6–8; Schulman 1964a: 85; Valloggia 1976: 112–113; Doc. 54; 120; Doc 64 [Sinai]; 128, Doc. 74.

\textsuperscript{157} For a summary of this evidence, see chapter seven. See also the remarks in Schulman 1964a: 53–56; Ward 1966: 175. There is no evidence for Faulkner’s (1953: 46) assertion that the \textit{imy-r htm} ranked above the \textit{ḥṣy pdl} and that the latter actually served under the former.

\textsuperscript{158} For the title \textit{ḥrd n kṣp}, see Feucht 1985.

\textsuperscript{159} Schulman 1964a: 46–47.
ing arrangements” or “doing business.”\textsuperscript{160} Regardless, the accompanying vignette of Sennefer viewing produce may imply that his trip had little, if anything, to do with the eponymous Ways of Horus fortress. This official may simply have owned an estate in the northeastern Delta. Likewise, he could have been acting on behalf of the temple of Amun, as the orchards and gardens of this god were under his care (Urk. IV, 1417: 13; 1418: 1). As discussed above, the temple of Amun almost certainly owned vineyards at the Way(s) of Horus.\textsuperscript{161} Additionally or alternatively, however, it is feasible that Sennefer arrived at the fortress of Tjaru on official business undertaken as a delegate for his brother, the vizier.

2. ink ḫmnw ʾḥ rty\textsuperscript{162} n ḫmw nḥ ḫw knt ʾwy.i plḥ n ḫbw ḫḥṭ m ḫrw (Statue of Hatre, Louvre E. 25550; de Cenival 1965: 17, fig. 3)

I am one who is a competent craftsman for Upper and Lower Egypt, the work of my hands having reached to Elephantine (and) north to Tjaru.

In this craftsman’s boast, the border-fortresses of the south and north are juxtaposed in order to highlight the claim that the products of Hatre’s workshop were known throughout Egypt. Although the quote bears no additional information about the functioning of the fortress at Tjaru, it does provide a more modest equivalent to the extravagant borders of Egypt claimed by mid-Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs. While Egypt had the ability to “show the flag” in Naharin and Karoy, it is clear that at the extremity of these far-flung borders an Egyptian stele was the equivalent of the American flag on the moon—more a symbol of power than a true evidence of political control. To the much-more-practical average Egyptian, home territory ended north of Tjaru and south of Elephantine. Thus, while the actual borders of effective control for New Kingdom Egypt appear to have been in a constant state of flux, the borders of the true Egyptian homeland were never in doubt.

3. iryt m ḫwšt nṯ ḫr-nsw n ḫy-r ḫwšt nḥt ḫḥṭ ḫy-r ḫḥm ḫn-imn (Shabtī; Wild 1957: 223)

What is done as favors from the king for the overseer of all northern foreign countries, the overseer of the ḫḥm-fortress, Kenamun.

\textsuperscript{160} Lesko 1982: 238; Faulkner 1986: 116; see also Wb. II, 135.
\textsuperscript{161} Davies 1992: pl. 12.
\textsuperscript{162} For a discussion of this expression, see de Cenival (1965: 19).
Judging from the sheer size and the remarkable beauty of Theban Tomb 93, there is no doubt of Kenamun’s inclusion among the most favored nobles of Amenhotep II’s court. Indeed, this individual in all likelihood had enjoyed a privileged relationship with Amenhotep since childhood, for Kenamun’s mother had suckled the king as a babe. Certainly, the fact that Kenamun highlighted his mother’s intimate bond to the king both in his own inscriptions and in the decorative program of his tomb suggests that he viewed his position as “milk brother” to the king as a key facet of his identity. Such closeness to the good god evidently served him well; Kenamun rose high in the administration, and at the pinnacle of his career he held the offices of “great steward of the king” and “overseer of the cattle of Amun.” These two titles appear repeatedly in Kenamun’s tomb, far overshadowing other titles that are of more obvious interest to our study, namely “fanbearer on the king’s right” (tyw ḫwḥr ʿwnmy [n] nsw), “royal scribe” (ṣš nsw), and “troop commander” (ḥḥy ḫḏf).164

The title of troop commander is the single demonstrably martial title discovered in Kenamun’s funerary monument, and it is attested only once—on the ceiling of a passageway, where it was hardly showcased. Thus, with the exception of an arguably suspicious quantity of Syro-Palestinian goods and weapons offered to the king as New Year’s gifts, there is little in the tomb to suggest that Kenamun’s resume included a substantial military component. A funerary stele, however, does much to flesh out the picture, and from this record we learn that Kenamun had accompanied Amenhotep II “on water and land to every foreign country” (Urk. IV, 1406: 2) and that while in Retenu he was “not absent from the lord of the two lands on the battlefield in the hour of repelling multitudes” (Urk. IV, 1405: 11).

To find Kenamun serving as troop commander for his sovereign might ordinarily be passed over with little remark, due to the fact that pharaohs frequently called upon their grandees to serve as companions-in-arms. What makes Kenamun of interest to our study, however, is the fact that a single, solitary shabti provides evidence that this man had at some point in his career served as “overseer of the htm-fortress” (ḥḥy-ḥrtm) and “overseer of all northern foreign countries” (ḥḥy-ḥḥṣwt nḥt ḥḥṭḥ). These two titles, along with others

163 Davies 1930: pl. 9. See also Urk. IV, 1403: 18.
164 For compilations of Kenamun’s titles, see Davies 1930: 10–16 and Wild 1957: 233–237.
attested in Kenamun’s resume—troop commander, royal scribe, and
fanbearer on the king’s right—were later to be held by Paramesses
and Seti. This father and son served sequentially as overseer of the
hmft-fortress of Tjaru in the reign of Horemheb, before each in turn
ascended to the throne in the opening years of the Nineteenth
Dynasty. Given the similarity of the titles held by Kenamun to those
of Paramesses and Seti, it is not unlikely that Kenamun preceded
these men as commander at Tjaru. Later in Kenamun’s career, how-
ever, the prestige of this post must have been so eclipsed by subse-
quent promotions and honors that the Theban noble deemed it
hardly worth mentioning.

Although the distribution of individual garrison troops, as opposed
to military fortresses and headquarters of a more or less permanent
status, is of secondary importance in this study, enough controversy
swirls around the identification of the toponym i-k3–ty to merit an
in-depth discussion. The toponym itself is otherwise unknown. There
is a strong camp of scholars, however, that argues in favor of its
being a variant for the name of the city of Ugarit, usually tran-
scribed as i-k3–nt-ti.

Those who argue for the equation of i-k3–ty and Ugarit cite the
fact that the latter city is known to have entered into a vassal relation-
ship with Egypt that predated the reign of Amenhotep III.

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165 See chapter five. Only Seti served as fanbearer on the king’s right. The other
titles were shared by both men.

166 Simons 1937: 132, no. 5: 199.

167 The vassal relationship is presumed by the obsequiousness of the introduction
“[I fall at] your [feet] seven times [and seven times]” (EA 45: 3–4, trans. Moran
1992: 117) and the deferential tone of the letter itself, “Indee[d, I am a servant] to
According to such an agreement, the Egyptians may have been allowed to quarter troops in the city. Likewise, proponents of the idea that Amenhotep II subdued Ugarit on his year seven campaign point out that the Egyptian army had already reached the territory of Niy on the Upper Orontes. From Niy, they argue, a ten-day trip due west to Ugarit would be feasible—especially if the toponym $t3-r-h$ is identified with Zalkhi, a district close to Ugarit, rather than with a locality on the route to Kadesh.  

Scholars who do not accept the correlation between $i-k3-ty$ and $i-k3-ri-ti$ cite the variant spelling of the toponyms, the lack of evidence that Egypt ever possessed the power to interfere directly with Ugarit’s politics, and the fact that the town does not appear on Eighteenth Dynasty topographic lists. Many of these scholars also subscribe to the theory that due to swampy terrain, a round trip from Niy to Ugarit and back would necessitate an exhausting journey of some 260 km. It is argued that this journey would have been far too ambitious a detour for Amenhotep and his army to venture while on campaign.  

Regarding the first of these criticisms, the variant spelling does not appear to be an insurmountable problem. Egyptian scribes were understandably creative when spelling unfamiliar foreign toponyms. Likewise, the detour that supposedly would require the 260 km round trip, rather than the 80–150 km estimated by Edel and Redford, is based upon modern conditions—which need not be relevant to
ancient times—as well as the assumption that Amenhotep II was traveling via Kadesh.

Further, with regard to the Egyptian garrison said to be in residence at the city, one could posit a relationship similar to the one that likely existed between Byblos and Egypt in the reign of Thutmose III. In such a case, a ruler friendly to Egypt would allow the Egyptians a nearby base of operations in return for protection and perhaps a favorable trading status. If part of the garrison’s duty was to make sure a friendly administration stayed in power at Ugarit, a city constantly threatened by both Hittite and Mitanni forces, it would have been a matter of national interest for the Egyptians to come to the aid of Ugarit—both to safeguard their own military base and to ensure that anti-Egyptian factions did not come into power. Likewise, if Egypt and Ugarit had at any time signed a peace treaty, or even entered into an unofficial version of such an association, a stipulation of “mutual aid” may well have been an important component of their relationship.

If it were the case that the Egyptian troops had been invited into Ugarit by that city’s ruler, and indeed had fought on his behalf, it would not then be surprising that Ugarit does not appear upon the toponym lists. In such a scenario, Egypt would not actually have conquered Ugarit for itself, but rather it would have provided auxiliary troops to an ally in an effort to save its own military base and to ensure itself an amicable government in this most important of Syrian ports. Indeed, given that Ugarit was situated on the westernmost fringe of Mitanni’s empire and that this land-locked power must have desired access to the port, it is not improbable that the presence of an Egyptian base at Ugarit encouraged Mitanni to negotiate peace with Egypt in the reign of Amenhotep II.

Reign of Thutmose IV

1a. di(t) i3w sn t3 n wnmfr in wr n md3yw ḫry pḏt n ṭ3rw nby [...] n k3 n iry-p3’t ḫ3ty-2 wr m 3t.f 3 m pr-nsw wr n md3yw ʿmy-r ḫtm172 n ṭ3 n w3s173 ḫry pḏt n ṭ3rw ʿmy-r ḫtm ʿmy-r ḫn ḫ3ty-2 n ṭ3rw nby

172 The issue of the proper translation of this word will be taken up in the section of this chapter pertaining to textual evidence for Nubian fortresses in the reign of Thutmose III.
173 This is a strange spelling for ḫ3wšt in which “p sn” substitutes for the repetition of the second symbol.
Giving praise (to Osiris) and kissing the ground before Wennefer, by the great one of the Medjay and the troop commander of Tjaru, Neby [Offering formula omitted] . . . for the ka of the hereditary noble and count, the great one in his office, grandee in the palace, great one of the Medjay, overseer of the sealed chamber(?) of the land of Wawat, troop commander of Tjaru, overseer of the $htm$-fortress, overseer of the canal/lake, mayor of Tjaru, Neby . . . [Caption to a figure of Neby, himself]: Troop commander and mayor of Tjaru, Neby.

Of the artifacts that Neby is known to have commissioned, Leiden stele V 43 provides the longest list of his offices. Two of these titles, without a doubt, pertain to the fortress of Tjaru. Neby is stated to have been both its troop commander ($hry\; pdt\; h_{3}t_{y}$) and its mayor ($h_{3}t_{y}$). Neby likewise almost certainly obtained the titles “great one of the Medjay ($wr\; n\; m_{d}\; h_{3}t_{y}$), “overseer of the $htm$-fortress” ($imy-r\; h_{3}tm$), and “overseer of the canal/lake” ($imy-r\; h_{n}$)\(^{174}\) by virtue of his position at Tjaru.

The juxtaposition of the titles “troop commander” and “mayor” of Tjaru is particularly interesting, for it suggests that the fortress housed a substantial civilian population in addition to its resident military personnel. Such a combination of martial and civilian inhabitants is reminiscent of that which existed within the Lower Nubian fortress-towns, such as Buhen, discussed in chapter two. These massive constructions had been founded in the Twelfth Dynasty as purely military installations but began in the Thirteenth Dynasty to accrue a permanent population. After the first reigns of the Eighteenth Dynasty, when the process of reconquest was largely over and fear of the southern threat had subsided, the martial title of commander

\(^{174}\) For the controversy over whether $h_{n}$ should be taken to mean “canal” or “lake,” see the detailed discussion in Björkman (1974: 50–51). In either case, however, such a title would have been applicable to an individual holding authority over the $htm$-fortress of Tjaru. As is well known from the Karnak relief of Seti I, Tjaru was situated adjacent to a canal ($ts\; dh_{n}l$—for differing interpretations of the relation between the canal depicted in Seti’s relief and that discovered by the Geological Survey of Israel in the early 1970s, see Sneh and Weissbrod 1973: 59–61; Oren 1984b: 8–9; Hoffmeier 1997: 165–166; Redford 1998: 48–49, n. 19). Recent geological studies (Marcolongo 1992; Valbelle 1992) have likewise demonstrated that Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) was situated in between two extensive paleolagoons. Indeed, the fortress’ position as a viable crossing-point between these lagoons bestowed upon the town its immense strategic importance.
in these fortresses was replaced by that of mayor (ḫ3ty-?). By the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, most Lower Nubian fortresses served simply as the nuclei of substantial townships.

At Tjaru, on the border between Egypt’s heartland and its Syro-Palestinian territories, the combination in one official of both military and administrative titles hints at a similar developmental process. That Tjaru was indeed home to a large civilian population in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty is suggested not only by the agricultural and viticultural industries associated with it but also by the cemeteries nearby—at which graves from this time period were predominant. Indeed, a survey of Tjaru’s environs led by Valbelle has indicated that settlements and cemeteries peppered the area around the fortress of Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) for a radius of several miles. Likewise, excavations within the town proper show that it grew significantly in the century or so following its conquest.

Such a significant augmentation of population in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty may indicate either natural or state-aided growth. Certainly, as the Egyptian front moved farther and farther north, the area surrounding Tjaru would have become safe enough for civilians to inhabit. The population could well have expanded naturally, then, as service personnel and families of military men stationed at Tjaru settled down. On the other hand, the Egyptian government may have actively promoted and sponsored the civilian settlement of Tjaru, believing—as kings had in the First Intermediate Period—that the best protection against invasion is a settled frontier. Whatever the scenario, it is clear that by the reign of Thutmose IV, Tjaru had become not simply a border-fortress but also a burgeoning fortress-town.

Two of Neby’s titles, “troop commander” and “overseer of the htm-fortress,” indicate that despite its largely civilian population and its recession from the front lines of battle, the fortress at Tjaru still actively served as a military base in the reign of Thutmose IV. While Menna had also served as “ḫry pdt of Tjaru,” Neby is the first official

178 It should be noted, however, that there is little evidence within the fortress of Tjaru for extensive state planning of the sort witnessed in the Middle Kingdom Nubian fortresses or the New Kingdom workers’ villages at Amarna or Deir el-Medina.
definitely known to have combined this title with that of _imy-r htm_. Likewise, although Sethe restored “[htm n] t3rw” in the opening line of the text detailing Thutmose III’s first campaign northward (Urk. IV, 647: 12—see above), Neby’s inscription is the first solid evidence that Tjaru was specifically designated as a _htm_-fortress. Like the _htm_-fortress of the sea, discussed earlier, Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) was located at a point in Egypt’s geography at which the Nile Valley was particularly vulnerable to outside penetration. Thus, the border-fortress not only “sealed off” unauthorized entrance to Egypt, but its presence also allowed transborder traffic to be closely monitored and recorded.

The last of Neby’s titles that is of particular importance in relation to the governorship of Tjaru is that of “great one of the Medjay” (wr n mdjyw). Since the waning days of the Old Kingdom, Egypt had employed Nubian Medjay tribesmen in its armies. These mercenaries, who fought most conspicuously during the conflicts in the Second Intermediate Period, are commonly identified in the archaeological record as members of the “Pan-Grave” culture. By the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, however, archaeological evidence for the Pan-Grave people had long ceased; their descendants presumably either assimilated to Egyptian culture or returned to Nubia. The Medjay did leave their legacy in Egypt in at least one facet of the culture, however. From the Eighteenth Dynasty onward, members of the police force were termed Medjay, whether they had any Nubian blood in them or not.

Although Neby’s mother may have been of Nubian origin, his title “great one of the Medjay” doubtless stemmed from his control over the desert scouts associated with the border-fortress at Tjaru. As the Semna Dispatches and Papyrus Anastasi V, 19: 2–20: 6 aptly demonstrate, desert-scouts routinely scoured the land surrounding a fortress in order to keep track of the movements of unauthorized passersby. That this force was apparently separate from the military is an interesting point. It suggests that security was enough of an

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179 If it could be proven that Kenamun served specifically in the _htm_ at Tjaru, then he would have preceded Neby in the combination of these two titles.


181 Björkman 1974: 45.

182 Smither 1942.
issue at Tjaru that the authorities preferred to rely upon seasoned scouts who had an intimate knowledge of the terrain rather than upon soldiers who simply served at the border-fortress as part of their tour of duty.

A last point of interest in Neby’s stele with regard to Tjaru involves the names of his children. Both his son, Horemheb, and his daughter, Meret-Hor, have theophoric names based upon the god Horus. As indicated by the toponym Ways of Horus, this god appears to have been particularly important in the easternmost Delta. Tjaru itself possessed a temple to Horus in the late Eighteenth Dynasty, and it is thus reasonable to suspect that this temple may have been founded at or before the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.

Although the importance of Horus in this area may well have been due to mythic topography, which placed important events of this god’s youth in the eastern Delta, there is another possible explanation. In Nubia, the Egyptians appear to have incorporated local deities into their pantheon to whom they gave the name “Horus of [insert toponym].” It is certainly worth suggesting, then, that the Egyptians may possibly have replaced a Semitic deity that had been worshipped at Tjaru in Hyksos times with Horus—a suitably bland, yet patriotic, Egyptian god.

In summary, then, it is possible to conclude from an analysis of Neby’s stele that Tjaru in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty possessed a substantial civilian and military population. Further, governorship over both of these groups was held by a single man, who also oversaw a contingent of desert scouts. Whereas in wartime Neby may have commanded his troops in battle, in peacetime his combat unit was stationed at Tjaru’s ẖtm-fortress, at which he served as overseer and mayor. Lastly, it is of tangential interest to note that Neby’s obvious reverence for the god Horus may perhaps indicate that the Horus temple known from a late Eighteenth Dynasty inscription existed already in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.

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183 For other associations of Horus with the eastern Delta, see Daressy 1914: 36; Gardiner 1947b: 204.
185 Alternatively, the Egyptians may have invented Horus deities that were sacred to certain locales in order to bolster the morale of their troops. Kemp (1978: 38) discusses this possibility, noting that the majority of the Horus deities in New Kingdom Nubia were located in Lower Nubia and so, perhaps, were holdovers from a Middle Kingdom policy.
chapter three

1b. ḏḏ mḏw ʔst ʾnk ‘wy. t ḥr nty im. t stp ʒt ḥr ‘imṣt y nty im. t ḥȝty - 2 n ʒr  nb y m3 - ḥrw (Alabaster canopic jar in Ronneby College, Sweden; Björkman 1974: 43)

Words spoken: Isis, put your arms around the one who is inside you; protect Imsety who is inside you, (by) the mayor of Tjaru, Neby, justified.

Neby is also known from a canopic jar, which designates him simply as mayor of Tjaru. Given that his funerary equipment was quite possibly fashioned toward the end of his life, or indeed subsequent to his death, it is likely that Neby viewed this title as one of the most important in his repertoire. Another canopic jar identifying him simply as “mayor” is currently housed in the Museum at Sens in France.¹⁸⁶

Unfortunately, Neby’s burial place has not been securely located, although it has been suggested that he may have been interred in Theban Tomb 91. This sepulcher belonged to a “troop commander” and “great one of the Medjay” who lived in the reign of Thutmose IV (Urk. IV, 1598: 9). However, as the unknown inhabitant of Tomb 91 also served as “overseer of the horse” (imy - r ssmt – Urk. IV, 1599: 4), a title not otherwise attested for Neby, such an identification is far from certain.¹⁸⁷ Indeed, considering the trajectory of his career, it would not be surprising if Neby’s tomb were in fact located in the vicinity of Tjaru itself.

1c. wpwjy - nsw ḥr ḥȝswt nb t imy - r pr n ʾpt ḥmt nsw ḥȝty - 2 n ʒr  ḥrd n ḫ  nb y ṭmt - sp ḥ ḫ ḥmn n nswt - bty mn - ḥprw - r² di ʾnb (Rock stele from Sinai; Urk. IV, 1634: 6 – 9)¹⁸⁸

Royal messenger to all foreign lands, steward of the queen’s private quarters, mayor of Tjaru, child of the nursery, Neby. Regnal year 4 before the majesty of the king of Upper and Lower Egypt, Menkheperure, given life.

The rock stele that Neby commissioned in the fourth year of Thutmose IV’s reign depicts this official standing behind the pharaoh as the latter offered milk to the goddess Hathor. Although Neby is here designated as the mayor of Tjaru, he is also given the title “royal messenger to all foreign lands.” This type of official acted as an

¹⁸⁶ Björkman 1974: 43.
¹⁸⁸ See also Gardiner, Peet, Cerny 1955: 81, no. 58, pl. 20 and Porter and Moss VII: 345.
ambassador to foreign courts, relaying messages from the Egyptian king and negotiating on his behalf. The high status that troop commanders enjoyed and their familiarity with foreign topography made them ideal candidates to serve in this capacity. Given that Neby appears to have accompanied Thutmose IV on the trip to the Sinai, however, his services as a messenger would have been gratuitous. More likely, it was primarily due to Neby’s position as a chief dignitary of the border zone between Egypt and the Sinai that he was allowed the honor of escorting his pharaoh on this eastern foray.

The remainder of Neby’s titles, as Björkman has pointed out, emphasize his close connections with the royal court. Neby identifies himself as both a child of the royal nursery (ḥrdw n kȝp) and as the steward of the queen’s private quarters (ṁy-r pr n ipt ḫmt nsw). Although both titles identify Neby as an intimate of the king’s circle, the further suppositions that Björkman makes—namely that Neby’s mother was foreign and that there may have been a harem located at Tjaru—are less than certain. Other Eighteenth Dynasty examples of ḥrdw n kȝp who also served as ḥryw pḏt include Menna (discussed above); Amenemheb, who fought in the wars of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 905: 1–2); and Paser, who served under Amenhotep II (Urk. IV, 1457: 11).

The royal messenger... and troop commander of Tjeku, Amenemhet. Three years after Neby commissioned his Sinai inscription, another royal messenger and troop commander accompanied Thutmose IV to Serabit el-Khadim. This man, Amenemhet, occupied the post

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189 Munn-Runkin 1956; Valloggia 1976.
190 Björkman 1974: 50.
192 The ḥry pḏt Kenamun, although not a ḥrdw n kȝp, was a milk brother of the king—a title that betrays a similarly longstanding and close relationship with the pharaoh.
193 One quite damaged sign separates ṃwty nsw and ḥry pḏt. Giveon (1969a: 172) restored it as st, signifying that Amenemhet had been a messenger of the queen’s daughter. Considering the damaged state of the inscription, however, and the lack of parallels for such a title, this reconstruction must remain tentative at best (Giveon 1969a: 173).
194 It should be noted that Goedicke (1987b: 94, n. 56) believes that Amenemhet lived during the reign of Ramesses II, citing as evidence Sinai inscriptions carved
of troop commander (ḫry ḫḏt) of Tjeku—an office that still existed in the Nineteenth Dynasty.\(^{195}\) Although Tjeku was technically situated within the eighth nome of Egypt, its location deep in the interior of the Wadi Tumilat—and the fact that its name was regularly spelled with the foreign throwstick determinative—make it clear that Tjeku, like Tjaru, was a border area regarded with some suspicion as not being entirely Egyptian. As is reminiscent of the situation at Tjaru as well, surveys reveal intensive Hyksos settlement in Tjeku’s environs during the Second Intermediate Period.\(^{196}\)

Significantly, the eastern Delta was vulnerable to penetration from the east in two main areas.\(^{197}\) The northernmost passageway, guarded by the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru (Tell Heboua I), led through the narrow isthmus that separated the formidable northern and southern lagoons. Farther south, on the other hand, populations arriving from Arabia, the Jordan Valley, and southern Sinai could enter the Delta via the fertile ribbon of the Wadi Tumilat. Here, however, Egyptians stationed at the ḫtm-fortress of Tjeku could intercept their progress.\(^{198}\) The border-fortress at Tjeku, which guarded the middle region of the Wadi Tumilat, is attested with relative frequency in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties (see chapters five and six), but it is otherwise unrecognized in Eighteenth Dynasty sources.

Based on archaeological and textual evidence, scholars have identified New Kingdom Tjeku with the remains found at Tell er-Retabah (see chapter five). Tjeku has also been equated with biblical Succoth, a settlement purportedly encountered by the Israelites on their flight out of Egypt.\(^{199}\) Interestingly, however, despite intensive surveys along the Wadi Tumilat, virtually no Eighteenth Dynasty material culture has been recovered.\(^{200}\) While the Eighteenth Dynasty fortress, which one suspects existed given the on-site residence of a ḫry ḫḏt, may have been obliterated by the sprawling Twentieth Dynasty com-

\(^{196}\) Redmount 1986.
\(^{197}\) Holladay 1982: 1–2; Redford 1997: 65, n. 29.
\(^{198}\) Tjeku is specifically referred to as a ḫtm-fortress in P. Anastasi VI, 53–61.
\(^{200}\) Holladay 1982: 6; Redmount 1986: 19.
pound, the lack of any substantial Eighteenth Dynasty remains in the wadi as a whole is peculiar. A similar dearth of accompanying cultural material is noted, however, with regard both to the First Intermediate Period fortified zone—which scholars posit to have been situated along the Wadi Tumilat\footnote{This zone is mentioned in the Instructions for Merikare. See Sneh et al. 1975: 542–548; Redford 1992: 80, n. 50; Hoffmeier 1997: 66.} and the frontier canal that Necho supposedly constructed in order to connect the Nile with the Red Sea.\footnote{Holladay 1982: 2–3.}

Archaeological evidence for mid-Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

**Tell Heboua I, Tjaru** (see figure 9)
The htm-fortress of Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) continued to flourish and grow in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Its fortifications, discussed in depth in chapter two, had been completed in or before the reign of Thutmose III. As mortuary evidence demonstrates, however, the population continued to grow even after this fortification was complete. Although the dates of Heboua II–IV are not well defined, the cemetery at Heboua IV appears to date to the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, and especially to the reigns of Amenhotep II and Thutmose IV.\footnote{Dorner 1994: 167–168; Aston 1994: 178–180.} The next period of intensive building at the site, however, does not occur until the reign of Seti I in the Nineteenth Dynasty (see chapter five).

**Tell el-Borg (no plan available)**
The site of Tell el-Borg lay barely 6 km from Tell Heboua I (Tjaru) and was similarly situated upon a potentially vulnerable strip of land that ran between the lagoons and a defunct branch of the Nile (perhaps the Pelusiac itself). Although the water in its environs had long since evaporated, the strategic value of the site was still recognized in the 1960s and 1970s A.D. by the Egyptian government during its wars with Israel. At this time, much of the site suffered intense damage as the army created for itself viable trenches, bunkers, and other fortifications. As a result of this activity and of later pillaging by locals, the proper interpretation of the archaeological sequence...
at Tell el-Borg posed a considerable challenge for Hoffmeier and his Eastern Frontier Archaeological Project.\footnote{The data for this summary has been obtained from the text of Hoffmeier’s preliminary report to be published in \textit{JEA} 89 (2003).}

In their work at the site between 1999 and 2001, Hoffmeier and his team undertook both survey and excavation, discovering in the process a fair amount of early to mid-Eighteenth Dynasty pottery (including a sherd stamped with the prenomen of Amenhotep II). In addition, a surface survey revealed a limestone block that bore the top of a cartouche in which the ibis ($\approx\dot{\text{wty}}$) sign was clearly visible. Obviously, this would suggest that either Thutmose I or one of his early to mid Eighteenth Dynasty namesakes undertook work at Tell el-Borg, perhaps on a temple or another state building. Presumably because of Thutmose III’s intensive investment in his eastern campaigns, Hoffmeier has hazarded a guess that the Thutmose in question was Thutmose III.

Of foremost importance for our purposes, however, is a 5.5 m wide fosse (Fosse D) that had been constructed presumably in conjunction with a rather impressive contemporary fortification. While constituting a conventional defense with respect to the Nubian fortress-towns of the Middle Kingdom, fosses are otherwise unknown in the repertoire of New Kingdom defensive architecture. Similarly unique is the extensive use of fired mud-brick that went into the construction of the fosse. Following the excavation of the original trench, the builders of the fortress had laid down two parallel walls of fired brick, presumably to shore up the slope of the sides and to protect against groundwater. On top of the fired brick, the Egyptians laid an outer shell of mud-bricks and then a smooth coat of mud-plaster. Interestingly, however, the bottom of the fosse was not treated in any particular manner whatsoever.

Fosse D at Tell el-Borg had been purposefully filled in with debris sometime at or following the reign of Smenkhkare, and no further material of use in dating was discovered. Citing the presence elsewhere at the site of the Thutmosid block and the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty pottery, Hoffmeier and his team have tentatively dated the original construction of the fort to the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. On the other hand, however, an argument can be made—considering the elaborate defenses of which the fosse was surely a part—for a
date in the early Eighteenth Dynasty. By the first year of Thutmose III’s sole reign, the zone of frontier contestation would have been pushed back firmly into southern Syria and, thus, elaborate border defenses would no longer have served any immediate purpose. If Tell el-Borg had instead received attention in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, however, when the Hyksos still constituted a threat, the presence of the otherwise rather archaic and anomalous fosse could easily be explained. Certainly it is highly likely that the fortification of this site occurred at roughly the same period as Tell Heboua I received its walls.

Tell el-Ajjul (see figure 10)
Despite a widespread distribution in Syria-Palestine of scarabs and other small items bearing the cartouches of mid-Eighteenth Dynasty rulers and despite the dramatically increased textual evidence for Egyptian installations on foreign soil, it is remarkable that the archaeological evidence for these northern structures remains almost exactly the same as it had in the early Eighteenth Dynasty. The single archaeologically attested Egyptian military or administrative installation east of the Sinai is at Tell el-Ajjul. Even more distressing is the fact that due to confusing stratigraphy and premodern excavation techniques, it is impossible to distinguish between early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasty levels at the site. The custom of multiple burials, together with their generally disturbed and poorly preserved state, likewise obscures the cemetery evidence. For this reason, then, the discussion of Tell el-Ajjul in chapter two still holds for the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. The only additional evidence pertinent to Egyptian activity at the site during the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty comes from scattered pottery forms, scarabs, and a clay bulla impressed with a stamp bearing Thutmose III’s cartouche.

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205 It should be noted, however, that scarabs bearing the cartouche of Thutmose III are extremely suspect in terms of dating. Due to his posthumous fame, scarabs bearing the cartouche of this king were produced for the remainder of the New Kingdom (Giveon 1978b: 102).

206 In the most thorough analysis of Tell el-Ajjul’s cemetery material undertaken to date, Gonen (1992b) declines to distinguish between LB IA and LB IB funerary assemblages.

Sites with Egyptian-style pottery

In view of the shortage of northern Egyptian installations to discuss in this chapter, it is appropriate as an addendum to recognize the two sites at which Egyptian-style material varied from the standard LB IB repertoire of scarabs, small objects, and alabaster vessels. Egyptian pottery has so far been discovered at Tell el-Hesi and Beth Shan. The former site yielded a jar handle stamped with Amenhotep II’s cartouche, while a small quantity of Egyptian ceramic has been found in recent excavations of a cultic precinct at Beth Shan.

Although the context of the ceramic was in neither case indicative of a strong Egyptian presence at the site, the appearance of utilitarian Egyptian-style pottery is nonetheless interesting, given that it might possibly imply some degree of imperial provisioning. Indeed the bowls and beer bottles discovered at Beth Shan could have been connected with a system of standardized rationing—each soldier perhaps receiving a bowl of food and a jar of beer. Considering the relatively limited numbers of these bowls and bottles at Beth Shan and their cultic context, however, it is perhaps more likely that the vessels had been employed originally in an Egyptian-style offering ritual.

Overview of Egyptian interactions with Nubia

Historical summary

Thutmose III’s Nubian campaigns are poorly understood, especially in contrast to his exceedingly well-documented activities in the north. A stele from Armant mentions a campaign directed against rebels in the land of Miu, at which time the king also hunted a rhi-

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209 A. Mazar 1993b: 616 mentions “a few Egyptian forms,” while A. Mazar 1997a: 68 notes “several typically Egyptian-style vessels.” Due to the fact that Egyptian ceramic, especially when fashioned out of local clays, is notoriously difficult to identify (Weinstein 1981: 22), there may well have been more Egyptian-style pottery manufactured in Canaan in the Eighteenth Dynasty than is presently recognized.
211 Although Miu may have been located in the region of the fourth cataract (Zibelius-Chen 1972: 120; 1988: 192), this toponym has also been situated between the second and third cataracts (O’Connor 1982: 930), between the fourth and fifth cataracts (Störk 1977: 279–280), and in the Shendi Reach (Kemp 1978: 29, n. 68; O’Connor 1987b: 123–124, 126).
noceros and erected a southern boundary stele, “like that which he made at the ends [of Asia]” (Urk. IV, 1246: 3–5). Although this campaign is generally assigned to the coregency of Thutmose III and Hatshepsut, scholars who have suggested that the campaign took place during Thutmose III’s 35th year have done so based upon a dated inscription carved at Kurgus, which they identify with Thutmose III’s southern stele.212 The Kurgus inscription, largely a verbatim transcription of Thutmose I’s Kurgus stele, warned Nubians against transgressing Egypt’s borders.

It is tempting to view the paired steles of Thutmose I and Thutmose III at Kurgus as appropriate counterparts to the paired steles of these kings erected on the western bank of the Euphrates (Urk. IV, 1232: 12; 1246: 2; 1448: 13). Likewise, the phrasing of the Armant inscription would seem to indicate that Thutmose III had erected his Nubian stele following his eighth campaign, a situation that would fit a year 35 date for the Miu campaign but not a date during the coregency.213 Nonetheless, given the persuasive evidence associating the battle against Miu with Thutmose III’s first campaign, discussed in chapter two, and the Kurgus stele’s silence regarding any military activity in the area, the campaign against Miu cannot be confidently assigned to Thutmose III’s 35th year.

An analogous situation occurs with respect to a year 50 text carved at Sehel in the first cataract. Although the inscription clearly states that Thutmose III cleaned and sailed through a canal after “he had slain his enemies” (Urk. IV, 814: 16), the substance of the text is virtually identical to a nearby inscription of Thutmose I (Urk. IV, 89: 5–7). In fact, the original contributions of the former stele are limited to a renaming of the canal after Thutmose III himself and to a stipulation that the fishermen of Elephantine were henceforth responsible for keeping the channel free of stones (Urk. IV, 814: 17–815: 2). It is impossible to tell, then, whether Thutmose III had indeed slain enemies in his fiftieth year or whether this claim was

212 Arkell 1950: 38; Vercouetter 1956: 68–69. Säve-Söderbergh (1946: 6, n. 1) suggested that the campaign took place in Thutmose III’s 47th year, as he assumed that the southern stele was that erected at Gebel Barkal. Following the discovery of the stele at Kurgus, however, this view fell out of favor. For further references pertaining to this debate, see the discussion in chapter two.

213 Murnane (1990: 91) believes Thutmose III’s “first campaign” to Nubia took place between his regnal years 25 and 31, based upon the appearance of Nubian tribute and the hostage of the son of the ruler of Irem prior to year 35.
copied without regard to its immediate veracity from the inscriptions of his grandfather.  

More illuminating, perhaps, are the lists of Nubian toponyms that Thutmose III inscribed upon the pylons of his temple at Karnak. The fullest heading, surmounting nearly identical lists on the sixth and seventh pylons, reads: “Summary [of] these southern lands of the bowmen of Khenthennefer who his majesty slaughtered; (he is the one) who made a massacre among them, the number (of dead) not having been known, all their inhabitants having been brought as living prisoners in order to fill the workshop (šn) of his father Amun-Re” (Urk. IV, 795: 7–12; similar to 795: 15–796: 3; 796: 5–8). It is perhaps not a coincidence, then, that one of Thutmose III’s most battle-hardened veterans claims to have followed his sovereign to Khenthennefer (Urk. IV, 902: 6–7). Another heading to a Nubian toponym list at Karnak similarly states that prisoners and their herds had been brought to the temple workshop.

The nobles Ineni (Urk. IV, 70: 1–4), Puyemre, and Rekhmire (Urk. IV, 1102: 11–17) all refer explicitly in their tombs to the arrival of southern prisoners of war—although only in the tomb of Rekhmire is it relatively certain that Thutmose III’s sole reign is meant. According to Rekhmire’s inscription, the bulk of these prisoners were destined for service in the temple workshops or as laborers on temple land (Urk. IV, 1102: 15). His tomb records the delivery to Thebes, however, not only of prisoners of war but also of the children of Nubian leaders (Urk. IV, 1102: 11). Likewise, it is notable that a son of the ruler of Irem was sent to Egypt along with the ßk-taxes of Kush at the time of the ninth campaign (Urk. IV, 708: 12).

The requisitioning of Nubian heirs as well as Syro-Palestinian heirs (Urk. IV, 690: 2–5) indicates two important facts. First, it is evidence for Thutmose III’s deliberate enactment of a cross-frontier

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214 For a discussion of Thutmose III’s propensity to plagiarize monuments of Thutmose I, see Redford 1970: 41.
215 See Breasted AR II: 258.
216 Davies 1922: 79–80, pl. 30.
217 Damage to the totals following the “male and female Nubian slaves” and the “son of the ruler of Irem” means that only 61 of the 64 individuals given in the overall total are accounted for. While O’Connor (1982: 904–905) and others would like to see the ruler of Irem providing the court with four of his sons, the lack of plural marks following the sign for “son” makes it perhaps more likely that the missing three individuals were slaves.
policy that standardized the treatment of his foreign vassals, regardless of the very different societal organizations present on each frontier. Second, it provides further substantiation that the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian government did in fact allow the indigenous political system in Nubia to persist—albeit in tandem with a burgeoning Egyptian bureaucracy.

While not enough is known about the 400 or so toponyms preserved on the Karnak lists to subject them to the same scrutiny afforded their Syro-Palestinian counterparts, O’Connor has suggested that the lists do, indeed, display an internal coherence. He argues that it is possible to identify clusters of toponyms relevant to the larger areas of Kush, Miu, Irem, Wawat, Punt, Medja, Setju, and Tjehenu—among others. Within the clusters themselves, although not within the list as a whole, a north to south ordering seems to have been the rule.

The vast numbers of toponyms registered on the Karnak lists suggest that by Thutmose III’s sole reign much of Nubia had been penetrated, explored, registered, and perhaps even conquered. As was the case with Thutmose III’s northern Syrian lists, however, it is to be understood that the places named in the lists need not actually have been physically or even politically dominated by the Egyptians. Despite this caveat, however, it is undoubtedly significant that Thutmose III’s reign appears to have witnessed the last gasps of indigenous culture in Lower and parts of Upper Nubia.

Egyptian interest in the Nubian provinces of Wawat and Kush had a strong economic base, as is evident from an examination of the annals for the campaigns in years seven through seventeen. For the majority of these years, deliveries of $\textit{b3k}$-taxes in gold, slaves,

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218 O’Connor 1982: 930–931.

219 Adams 1984a: 235; Bietak 1987: 122. Säve-Söderbergh (1991: 13) reported a minority of sites in the SJE concession that dated provisionally to the time of Hatshepsut and Thutmose III and “seem to represent a conservative Nubian backlash against the general Egyptianization of Lower Nubia, if, that is, they do not represent a new ethnic element which settled in the valley and were influenced by the culture of the local population” (Säve-Söderbergh 1991: 8). The culture of this group resembled most closely that of the Pan-Grave peoples. Much less is known about Upper Nubia during the New Kingdom. The unassimilated indigenous population is difficult to identify in the archaeological record, although Grzymski’s newly discovered Letti Basin culture and a number of other surveys in the Dongola Reach may soon significantly inform our understanding of the nature of Upper Nubian society (for references to recent work in this regard see S. T. Smith 2003: 89–94.
cattle, ebony, ivory, and grain are recorded. Economically, the province of Wawat would appear to have been of primary importance to the Egyptian government, given that its revenues in gold were almost sixteen times what was produced in Kush. The vast influx of Nubian gold, mined predominantly from Wawat, amounted to an average of some 260 kg annually, and such totals undoubtedly contributed to the eventual devaluation of this metal. Whereas in the Eighteenth Dynasty a deben of gold was worth roughly fifty times a deben of copper, by the Ramesside period gold was only thirty times as valued.

Perhaps in an effort to compensate for its comparatively low gold production, Kush was taxed almost four times as heavily in slaves and cattle as Wawat. It also outdid Wawat in supplying the royal court with ebony, ivory and panther skins, all items appropriate to its more southerly locale. Although the damaged state of many of the b3k-lists in the annals prohibits a trustworthy account of the revenue brought into Egypt annually, Smith estimates that the b3k-taxes from Wawat and Kush—if converted into rations of wheat—could have supported some 9,045 to 17,491 individuals for an entire year.

B3k-taxes were not the only revenue that Nubia provided. The annals do not record income from Nubian inw-gifts, so it is difficult to estimate their importance to the Egyptian economy. From outside sources, however, it is evident that Nubia (Urk. IV, 983: 16–984: 6)—and especially the provinces of Miu (Urk. IV, 949: 16–17) and the rather nebulous Khenthennefer (Urk. IV, 1100: 1)—did indeed offer inw to Thutmose III.

220 As the list of commodities is almost invariably presented in this order, it is to be wondered whether the scribe had ranked them according to the prestige value of each category. 221 Morkot 2001: 242. 222 Trigger 1976: 113. 223 S. T. Smith 1995: 215. 224 S. T. Smith 1995: 170. Outside the annals, the fullest treatment of the revenue that Egypt received from Nubia comes from the Gebel Barkal stele. On this monument Thutmose III claims: “(The foreign lands) work for me like one, paying b3k-taxes a million-fold, consisting of the numerous commodities of the Horns of the Earth and much gold of Wawat, the quantity of which is limitless. One constructs there for the palace, l.p.h., each year more ła₆₉ᵤ₅₉₂-boats and ʜ₆ₑ₆ₛ ships than (there are) crews of sailors, in addition to the b₃₉₆ that the Nubians bring in the way of ivory and ebony” (Urk. IV, 1236: 17–1237: 3). 225 See N. M. Davies 1942: 52, pl. 5.
Although it is difficult to gauge the effect that Egyptian occupation and taxation had upon the indigenous local population, two main points may be highlighted. First, by the end of the reign of Thutmose III, pockets of traditional Nubian culture, evidenced by C-group cemeteries, were the exception rather than the rule. The vast majority of Lower Nubia’s population apparently had either migrated out of the area or had adopted Egyptian culture ways. Secondly, by the end of Thutmose III’s rule, the standard of living for Lower Nubians, at least, had dropped precipitously. At Fadrus, for example, 70.6% of Nubian burials from the time of Thutmose III were classified as “poor,” as opposed to only 35.2% at the end of the Second Intermediate Period. Whether indigenous Nubians were actively oppressed is impossible to ascertain, but it appears that this population posed little threat to Egyptian interests—at least in northern Nubia. The Lower Nubian fortress-towns, first reoccupied in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, continued to flourish. Evidence from the tomb of Rekhmire, discussed below, suggests that fortress commanders were resident at the border-fortresses at both Elephantine and Bigeh (Urk. IV, 1119: 16–1120: 5), and scattered blocks from a temple built by Thutmose III have been found reused in a Ptolemaic pylon at Elephantine. There is no evidence, however, that this pharaoh repaired or built anew any defensive features in the Lower Nubian fortress-towns. Indeed, the vast majority of Thutmose III’s efforts were instead directed toward the construction of storerooms and cult temples. At the fortress-town of Aniba, Thutmose III added to the temple of Horus of Miam, a building originally founded by his grandfather. He also constructed a storehouse some 300 m north of the fortress walls. The erection of a storehouse in an unprotected area is surely a testament to the pacification of Lower Nubia at this time. At Faras, meanwhile, scattered blocks have suggested to some scholars that Thutmose III constructed a temple to Horus of Buhen at the site. This theory is difficult to substantiate, however, as the

228 Habachi 1975b: 1218.
231 Griffith 1921; Michaelowski 1962; Karkowski 1981: 30–63.
nucleus of the Eighteenth Dynasty fortress-town lies underneath a later citadel. The hundreds of Thutmosid stone blocks dedicated to Horus of Buhen, in fact, may more likely have been scavenged from Buhen itself—only 30 km to the south—and brought to Faras in Christian times.\(^{233}\)

The temple to Horus of Buhen at Buhen itself was indeed actively renovated by Thutmose III. Sometime after the death of his coregent, Thutmose hacked out Hatshepsut’s name, altered the original symmetry of the building, and added a plethora of dedicatory inscriptions (e.g., Urk. IV, 806: 9–810: 10; 818: 17–821: 14).\(^{234}\) Unlike the situation in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, however, there is no evidence that Buhen possessed a fortress commander (\(\Delta \text{sw}\)). Only the title of \(h\text{3y}-\), or mayor, is attested from his reign.\(^{235}\)

The remaining evidence for Thutmose III’s activity in Lower Nubia comes from stamped cartouches found on Egyptian pottery at Serra East. According to its excavator, this pottery was found together with traditional Nubian ceramic, possibly indicating a cohabitation of Egyptians and non-Egyptianized Nubians at the site.\(^{236}\) Perhaps, then, Egyptian settlers at Serra were selecting brides from among neighboring Nubian populations, as appears to have been the case at contemporary Tombos and perhaps also at Askut.\(^{237}\) Marriage between expatriates and indigenous women is not an infrequent occurrence in frontier zones cross-culturally, and indeed it seems that where attested this practice nearly always leads to the formation of important alliances and the blurring of ethnic identities. While this is a fascinating issue, such exogamy is unfortunately impossible to confirm with regard to Serra. There, Nubian-style Second Intermediate Period sherds and Egyptian-style Eighteenth Dynasty sherds may simply have become inextricably mixed due to later occupation and intensive building activity at the site.

In the second cataract zone, Thutmose III was also quite busy. During his sole reign and perhaps extending into his coregency with


\(^{234}\) Arkell 1966: 87; Habachi 1975a: 882. See also the statue base of Nehi in which it is said that Thutmose III commanded that Buhen (\(\text{lit.} \)Southern Elephantine) be rebuilt in stone (Karkowski 1981: 273; see Karkowski 1981: 27 for the equation of Southern Elephantine—\(\text{abw-\text{rsyt}}\)—with Buhen).

\(^{235}\) Porter and Moss VII: 141.

\(^{236}\) Hughes 1963: 129.

Amenhotep II, Thutmose rebuilt the early Eighteenth Dynasty brick temple at Uronarti in stone and dedicated it to Montu, Senwosret III (the original founder of the second cataract forts), and the Nubian god Dedwen. Likewise a great palatial structure at the southern end of the island may also have been constructed in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Given the size of this building, it would undoubtedly have been sumptuously furnished, and its location far from the walled confines of the fortress could well be another testament to the largely pacified state of Nubia at this time.

Thutmose III similarly continued the work that he had begun with Hatshepsut converting the mud-brick temples at the fortresses of Semna and Kumma to stone. The newly rebuilt temples were dedicated to Khnum (the god of the cataract region), Senwosret III, and Dedwen (Urk. IV, 816: 13–818: 17). Thutmose III’s program of building storehouses and converting brick temples into stone temples continued just south of the second cataract at Sai, where he did both as early as his 25th year. Although admittedly of lesser importance, it is worth mentioning that sealings bearing Thutmose III’s cartouche have been found at Mirgissa and in association with a local chapel at Askut.

South of Sai, however, evidence for Egyptian construction or occupation is limited. Inscribed artifacts indicate that the cemeteries at Sesebi and Soleb may have been in use during Thutmose III’s reign, and, indeed, it is conceivable that limited trenching could already have begun on the foundations for a temple at Soleb. At Tombos and Kurgus, areas of strategic importance to Thutmose I, inscriptions were thought until recently to be the only manifestations of a contemporary presence. Textual evidence, however, can be quite

244 For Sesebi, see Porter and Moss VII: 174. For Soleb, see Giorgini 1961: 197; Derchain 1973: 37.
245 For Kurgus, see Arkell 1950: 38–39; there is still virtually no trace of a mid-Eighteenth Dynasty occupation. For mid-Eighteenth Dynasty inscriptions at Tombos, see the summary in Porter and Moss VII: 175. S. T. Smith’s (2003: 136–166) recent work in the greater environs of Tombos, however, is beginning to uncover both
informative. The sole record of Thutmose III’s activity at Napata (Gebel Barkal) is a stele from his 47th year, but the text of this monument mentions the existence at the site of an otherwise unknown mnnw-fortress. This installation, named “Slaying-the-foreigners,” apparently housed within it a temple to Amun (Urk. IV, 1228: 12–13). It will be discussed in greater detail below.

It can be seen, then, that Thutmose III’s main contribution to the already-standing Middle Kingdom and early New Kingdom fortresses was to refurbish their cultic and storage facilities, not their defensive architecture. This pharaoh did not limit his cultic constructions, however, solely to the environs of fortress-towns, for he also sponsored the erection of a good number of temples and chapels that were not themselves associated with a fortress or even a walled settlement. These isolated religious buildings include temples at Amada, Dakka, and Qurta, as well as rock chapels at Ellesiya, Gebel Dosha, and Qasr Ibrahim.246

Thutmose III’s emphasis on constructing temples rather than fortified enclaves may be looked upon as a continuation of the early Eighteenth Dynasty move from fortresses to fortress-towns. Temples and private chapels were essential to the fabric of an Egyptian settlement, and virtually every community known from text or archaeological investigation possessed at least one nearby cultic building.247 Egyptian temples, after all, offered a direct connection to the divine and to the protective aspects of divine patronage. The rituals performed therein were thought to ensure fertility and to prevent calamity, and indeed one suspects that in a frontier zone such as Nubia, protection against potential human and ecological threats was felt to be extremely important.248 Moreover, expatriates forging a life for them-
selves in a new land may also have found reassurance and comfort in the orthodox “Egyptianness” of temple ritual.

Egyptian temples also served an important social purpose as the anchor of a community. Although there is disagreement as to the degree of public participation in temple ritual, a certain number of individuals would have served periodically as priests, and the entire community undoubtedly mobilized around temple festivities. In addition, if Nubian temples indeed functioned in a similar manner to their Egyptian counterparts, these institutions would have employed a good percentage of the population on at least a part-time basis. As a case in point, temples generally owned a significant amount of land and livestock, the proper maintenance of which required the labor of numerous individuals. Further, it follows that, as a result of their ownership of resources and their employment of multitudes, temples constituted one of the most important linchpins in Egypt’s redistributive economy. Many of the goods a temple received as income from directly owned resources and the levying of taxes were subsequently distributed in the form of rations to a large number of craft specialists and workers. As Smith has emphasized, such rations may also have underwritten the costs of imperial undertakings in Nubia, such as gold-mining and stone quarrying. Similarly, Bleiberg argues that the temple-based b3k-taxes paid by foreigners often served to finance military ventures in their own territories.

One final vital function of New Kingdom temples in Nubia may have been to formally integrate both Nubia and Nubians into the Egyptian empire. The largely separate material assemblages of Egyptian and Nubian cultures in the Middle Kingdom suggest a bare minimum of contact between the two populations at that time.

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250 For the importance of temples in Egypt’s economy, see most recently Katary 1989; O’Connor 1995; Haring 1997; Gasse 2001; as well as Janssen 1979.
253 As Trigger (1976: 118) phrases it, “By making an Egyptian cult the core of each of their settlements the Egyptians saw themselves incorporating Nubia spiritually as well as culturally within the Egyptian realm.”
The virtually universal adoption of Egyptian material culture in Nubia by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, however, almost certainly indicates vastly increased contact and integration in the New Kingdom. While there is admittedly little definitive evidence that temples built in Nubia incorporated the indigenous population into their community, Kemp has noted the presence of significant quantities of Nubian ceramic at certain small rock temples erected in relatively out of the way places. He suggests that the ceramic originally had been associated with indigenous shrines. The replacement of these shrines by Egyptian rock temples, then, would indicate an imperial policy of appropriating traditional Nubian cultic sites in order to accelerate religious and cultural assimilation.

The eventual outcome of Egypt’s encouragement of assimilation may be noted in the Egyptianization of Nubian burial practice. The fact that Nubian and Egyptian graves are largely indistinguishable after the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty suggests that much of the native population had in fact internalized Egyptian funerary beliefs. By the reign of Thutmose III, objects such as shabtis and heart amulets had become commonplace even in burials at traditionally Nubian cemeteries. This religious paraphernalia, generally fashioned from clay or faience, possessed little intrinsic worth and, indeed, would have held very little meaning to someone uninitiated into Egyptian funerary beliefs.

As a testament to the success of Thutmose III’s efforts to pacify Nubia through military and ideological means, his son appears not

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254 Exceptions to this statement include the burials and monuments of the princes of Tekhet and Miam, which clearly demonstrate the allegiance of these rulers to Egyptian gods—including Amun, Hathor, and Anubis (Säve-Söderbergh 1960: 27; 1963a: 169–170; Simpson 1963: 5, 9). See also the limited Nubian material found in association with the small Egyptian-style chapel at Askut (S. T. Smith 2003: 124–126).

255 Kemp 1978: 38–39; see Adams 1984a: 226 as well. Although first established in the Middle Kingdom, the renewed cults to Dedwen in fortress-towns may have been especially attractive to Nubians. By forcing a Nubian god into the rigid structure of Egyptian religious practice and even iconography, however, the government would have played a role in co-opting, reshaping, and Egyptianizing indigenous religion.

256 Taking a rather dark view, which may be warranted given the number of textual references to Nubians as *ndjet* (serfs) or *hme* (servants) of Egypt’s rulers, Adams (1984b: 60) writes that “When the ideological indoctrination of the temple cults was substituted for the physical repression represented by the fortresses... Nubians were thereby transformed from Neolithic barbarians into the external proletariat of Egypt.”
to have campaigned in the south at all.\textsuperscript{257} Amenhotep II did, however, follow his father’s example in constructing and adding to numerous Nubian temples. Scattered blocks from Elephantine suggest that he constructed a gateway and a pillared hall in the temple of the first cataract gods.\textsuperscript{258} At Aniba he built in the temple of Horus of Mi’am, and blocks from the Horus temple discovered at Faras also bear his inscriptions.\textsuperscript{259} A temple to Isis was erected in his reign at Buhen, and he continued his father’s work at the second cataract fortresses of Uronarti, Semna, and Kumma.\textsuperscript{260}

Indeed, it was at Semna that the viceroy of Kush, Usersatet, erected a stele inscribed with a letter from his pharaoh. On it Amenhotep II warns, “Do not be lenient with the Nubians! Indeed, stand guard against their people and their magicians… Do not listen to their words. Do not search out their messengers” (Urk. IV, 1344: 11–12, 19–20). Significantly, however, the reference to messengers (\textit{wpwtynw}) in this text seems to imply that Amenhotep II’s warning pertained to those Nubians who lived outside the zones of immediate Egyptian control rather than to the Egyptianized Nubians who inhabited the occupied Nile Valley.

Although archaeological evidence for Nubians who still held true to their traditional customs is sparse in Upper Nubia, this area has been exposed to very few modern archaeological surveys. Grzymski has recently initiated a survey project in the Letti Basin, however, and has identified a “Letti Basin culture” that did in fact retain its traditional lifestyle in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, and others have come to similar conclusions.\textsuperscript{261} Likewise, Morkot argues from

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\textsuperscript{257} Der Manuelian (1987: 92–93) believes that a reference to an expedition in the context of a scene depicting the king receiving \textit{inw} (Urk. IV, 1345: 9–1346: 14) indicates that Amenhotep II had indeed campaigned successfully in Nubia. Given the fact that the offering bearers bring \textit{inw} rather than \textit{hk3} (plunder) and that the goods include almost exclusively traditional products of southern trade (i.e., gold, ivory, ebony, incense, panthers, and cattle), this interpretation is tenuous. It should be noted that the appearance of chariots amongst the \textit{inw} is unusual. Without evidence for chariot warriors in Nubia, however, it is safest to view these chariots as luxury items fashioned with costly woods and gold by southern craftsmen rather than as part of the spoils of battle.

\textsuperscript{258} Urk. IV, 1356: 1–9 and 1360: 7–17; Habachi 1975b: 1221.

\textsuperscript{259} For Aniba, see Säve-Söderbergh 1975: 274. For Faras, see Porter and Moss VII: 126.

\textsuperscript{260} For Buhen, see Badawy 1968: 276. For Uronarti, see Reisner 1955: 26. For Semna, see Dunham 1967: 5. For Kumma, see Dunham 1960: 115–116.

\textsuperscript{261} Grzymski 1997. Surveys led by Jacques Reinhold (1993), Derek Welsby (1996), and Stuart Tyson Smith (2003) have likewise identified traditionally Nubian sites in Upper Nubia during the New Kingdom.
inscriptional evidence for the existence of largely independent Upper Nubian polities. He reasons that *inw* from Kush would have been donated by independent rulers, just as the donors of *inw* in Syria-Palestine also hailed from independent principalities.\(^{262}\) Perhaps in Nubia, as in the northern empire, then, the Egyptians were content to leave far-flung regions or those with relatively few valuable natural resources in the hands of vassal rulers, so long as these individuals maintained friendly relations with the imperial government. Such a policy would have obviated the need to finance wars of conquest or to install a completely new bureaucratic infrastructure.

Certainly, Egyptian presence in Upper Nubia during the reign of Amenhotep II does appear to have been extremely limited. Although he sponsored a temple at Sai, other evidence is confined to a cartouche carved at Tombos and an isolated doorjamb found at Sesebi that could well have been brought to the site at a later date.\(^{263}\) Evidence for Amenhotep II’s influence at Napata, on the other hand, is demonstrated from the account of the fate of the rebellious rulers of Takhasy (Urk. IV, 1297: 13–16) and from fragments of a sphinx and a private statue found in secondary contexts at the site.\(^{264}\) Like his father, Amenhotep II also worked on temples and chapels that weren’t associated with walled town enclosures. These include Amada and Qasr Ibrahim.\(^{265}\) The stele discovered in the Ramesside temple of Amara West, however, must be taken as intrusive.\(^{266}\)

Like his father, Thutmose IV was not particularly active on his southern frontier. The one campaign that may be securely assigned to his reign occurred in year seven or eight and was recorded upon a rock stele at Konosso (Urk. IV, 1545: 6–1548: 5).\(^{267}\) The inscription tells of Thutmose IV receiving the news, “a Nubian has descended

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\(^{263}\) For Sai, see Trigger 1976: 126. For Tombos, see Porter and Moss VII: 173. For Sesebi, see Porter and Moss VII: 173. It should be noted, however, that cemetery evidence demonstrates that an Egyptianized population inhabited Sesebi in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty (Porter and Moss 1951: 174), even though no standing architecture appears to date from this time.

\(^{264}\) See the references cited in Der Manuelian 1987: 94, n. 230.

\(^{265}\) For Amada, see Badawy 1968: 272–273. For Qasr Ibrahim, see Der Manuelian 1987: 92–93.

\(^{266}\) Fairman 1975: 172.

\(^{267}\) Another rock stele at Knossos depicts Thutmose IV sacrificing prisoners. As it is dated to year seven, this monument may have been associated with the same campaign (Urk. IV, 1555: 11–1556: 3). The text, however, bears little historical import.
from the vicinity of Wawat, having planned rebellion against Egypt. He is gathering to himself all the disreputable wanderers (šm3w) and all the rebels of other countries” (Urk. IV, 1545: 11–13). As discussed above with reference to the name of Thutmose III’s Lebanese mnnw-fortress, the term “šm3w” typically has as its determinative an individual carrying his belongings in a sack—and thus likely refers specifically to migrant or displaced peoples. In Syria-Palestine, as the Amarna archive bears witness, such groups of unemployed mercenaries and disaffected riffraff commonly attacked crown property and wreaked havoc amongst the settled population (see chapter four). Presumably such troublesome raiders could also be found in the south among seminomadic Nubians and also groups that fostered anti-Egyptian sentiments.

After securing permission from the gods, Thutmose IV and his army proceeded southward by ship “in order to overthrow the one who attacked him in Nubia (t3-stfy)” (Urk. IV, 1546: 6). The king recorded that he and his army stopped at least twice en route to participate in temple rituals, perhaps an inadvertent indication that the revolt was not deemed particularly pressing. Indeed, by the time the Egyptian forces arrived in Nubia, the rebels had apparently retreated to a hidden wadi in the eastern desert.268 Once ferreted out, the rebel base was easily eradicated and its inhabitants, cattle, and movable possessions were seized. It is not unlikely, then, that some of the Kushite prisoners of war that Thutmose IV settled in the vicinity of his mortuary temple had in fact been captured in this campaign (Urk. IV, 1556: 15).

The only other possible evidence for a Nubian campaign under Thutmose IV is controversial in date. A fragment of a historical inscription from Bubastis (Urk. IV, 1734: 5–1736: 7), which traditionally has been ascribed to Amenhotep III,269 has been assigned

268 Some of the scholars who have discussed the Knossos inscription (Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 156; Bryan 1991: 334–333; 1998: 56–57) have characterized the campaign as one directed against desert nomads, a group perhaps situated in the Eastern Desert far to the north of Nubia. The ringleader’s Nubian origin, however, together with the fact that he and his band had attacked Egyptian possessions in Nubia, mark this campaign as important for the understanding of Egypto-Nubian relations, even if the battle itself took place east of the Nile Valley. As O’Connor (1987: 127) has suggested, the Eastern Desert nomads may in fact have posed a threat to Nubia’s lucrative gold-mining industry.

269 Breasted AR II: 337; Davies 1992: 35; and (very tentatively) O’Connor 1998: 268.
by Redford to the reign of Thutmose IV on the basis of a coronation date. This badly damaged inscription is difficult to understand, but it seems to report on a Nubian expedition that focused upon the sandbank of Huwa, the western desert, and a well. Both the length of the inscription and the fact that the king is stated to have executed captured individuals with his own mace suggests that the Egyptians chose to present the battle as a particularly significant event. Overall, however, the net booty amounted only to an unknown number of Nubian prisoners and 124 cattle and donkeys. The limitation of the spoil to humans and animals would seem to indicate that the conquered population was seminomadic and not particularly numerous.

Although various scholars have debated the extent of Thutmose IV’s activity in Nubia—based upon toponyms that he included on various monuments (notably Katia, Irem, Miu, Gwrss, Karoy, and Terek)—the military activities known or thought to have taken place in his reign occurred in areas peripheral to the Nubian Nile Valley. Two assumptions may be drawn from this fact. First, it seems that by the reign of Thutmose IV any forces that openly defied Egyptian power had been forced or had elected to occupy areas outside Egypt’s direct control. Secondly, it may have been a priority of the pharaonic government to secure those desert routes crucial to mining and quarrying expeditions.

In the Nile Valley proper, however, there is surprisingly little evidence of Thutmose IV’s presence. Blocks bearing his cartouche suggest that the pharaoh sponsored work at Elephantine. At Buhen, meanwhile, the viceroy of Kush erected a stele (Urk. IV, 1636: 6–16), and a boundary marker commemorates the endowment of five

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270 Redford 1966: 120; 1982a: 58; but see Bryan 1991. In excluding this inscription from her discussion of Thutmose IV’s activities in Nubia, Bryan presumably does not agree with Redford’s analysis.

271 The word has been alternately translated “height” (Redford 1982a: 58).

272 The three strokes following the word for prisoners of war (Urk. IV, 1735: 16) could indicate that three prisoners were taken, but more likely the strokes simply designate plurality.


275 Several scholars (see the references cited in Bryan 1991: 250–251) have argued that the appearance of the title “king’s son of Kush” (as opposed to “king’s son” and “overseer of the southern foreign lands”) and the title “fanbearer on the king’s right” indicate some sort of rethinking of the office of the viceroy during Thutmose IV’s reign.
arouras of land to a first prophet at the temple of Horus of Buhen (Urk. IV, 1637: 11–14). Otherwise, the evidence at Buhen is limited to a reused door lintel and a smattering of jar sealings. The only other evidence of contemporary fortress-related activities consists of a block that may date to Thutmose IV’s reign at Faras and a temple foundation at Napata. Work at temples not associated with fortress-towns appears to be restricted to Amada and Tabo.

Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for mid-Eighteenth Dynasty southern fortress-towns

In order to eradicate the danger posed by the powerful kingdom of Kush and then to extend their political hegemony upstream to the fourth cataract, the early Eighteenth Dynasty rulers campaigned on a regular basis and erected a number of mnnw-fortresses, which they then stocked with cattle and colonists. By means of their efforts, these pharaohs were able to bequeath their mid-Eighteenth Dynasty successors a southern frontier that appears to have been largely pacified. Certainly, archaeological evidence suggests that almost all Lower Nubians who did not wish to conform to Egyptian cultural norms had either fled or been exiled.

Pharaohs of the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, then, campaigned little, and their efforts were largely restricted to troublemakers who raided the valley from areas peripheral to it. Lower Nubia in particular was evidently much subdued by the reign of Thutmose III, and the kings of this period did not deem it necessary to restore or embellish any of the crumbling Middle Kingdom fortifications. What paltry hostilities remained to threaten contemporary imperial settlements clearly caused neither their inhabitants nor the Egyptian government undue alarm.

In lieu of sponsoring defensive architecture, the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty rulers poured their resources into temple construction and refurbishment in already existing communities. Indeed, the vast majority of the inscriptions relating to fortresses in Nubia address cultic rather than military concerns. Archaeological evidence complements this picture. With the possible exception of Napata, there is no sign that rulers of this period either added to older fortifications or erected

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277 For Faras, see Bryan 1998: 48. For Napata, see Reisner 1931: 79.
new ones. Instead, archaeologists and epigraphers have demonstrated that mid-Eighteenth Dynasty constructions were primarily limited to storehouses, to temples located within fortress-towns, and also, newly, to temples erected independently of walled domains. Such a focusing of resources on cultic structures surely indicates recognition of the fact that—even more than protection from outside hostile forces—these peripheral communities required a strong socioeconomic center, capable of connecting them in real and symbolic ways to the imperial core.

The border-fortress of Elephantine, like its northern counterpart at Tjaru, could not have served any significant military function by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. At this time Egypt had already achieved the outer limits of its military power abroad, and the true areas of border contestation ranged from the Euphrates River to the fourth cataract in Nubia. Paired with the neighboring fortress of Bigeh, however, Elephantine still fulfilled a vital function as the customs checkpoint at which authorities monitored the flow of people and goods crossing over the first cataract border with Nubia. Men stationed at the htm-fortress of Tjaru on Egypt’s northeastern border carried out analogous duties, and indeed Hatre’s inscription demonstrates that the two fortresses could be invoked together to call to mind the entirety of Egypt.

Valuable information about the first cataract fortresses of Elephantine and Bigeh is provided by the “Duties of the Vizier” and the tax list copied in the tomb of Rekhmire, even if these sources were somewhat outdated by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. It can be gathered, for instance, that Elephantine and Bigeh were both nominally under the jurisdiction of the vizier of Upper Egypt, although they may also have sent digests of border activity to the viceroy of Kush. Further, judging from the wealth of typically southern products that their commanders and high officials paid as taxes to the vizier’s office, the authorities stationed at these border-fortresses must have benefited handsomely from their position as conduits for Egypto-Nubian trade.

In the texts from the tomb of Rekhmire, the first cataract fortresses are termed mμμw, although Nineteenth Dynasty texts unambiguously identify them as htmw. The employment of the older term may either betray the early composition of these texts or the fact that the southern border-fortresses were not known as htmw until the Nineteenth Dynasty. Perhaps significantly, one of Neby’s titles has occasionally been read “overseer of the htm-fortress of the land of Wawat” (imyr-
which might imply that Neby commanded a $htm$-fortress at either Elephantine or Bigeh prior to assuming his position at the $htm$-fortress of Tjaru. The unorthodox feminine gender of $htm$ in Neby’s text, however, throws considerable doubt on this theory.

South of the border, only a restricted number of the older fortress-towns received significant attention from two or more of these mid-Eighteenth Dynasty rulers. An examination of these few targeted compounds aids in identifying the settlements that served as centers of pharaonic control. In Lower Nubia, the bulk of imperial funds were invested in Aniba, Faras, and Buhen. The importance of Aniba and Faras undoubtedly was due to their location in the same extremely fertile areas of the Nubian Nile Valley that had been traditionally centers of C-group population. Indeed, it is no surprise that these two sites would at different times serve as the seat of the Lower Nubian deputy ($idnw$). Buhen must have retained importance primarily due to its strategic position at the head of the second cataract, while Uronarti and the southernmost twin fortresses of Semna and Kumma were the sole centers to receive significant royal attention in the second cataract itself.

So far as can be determined with regard to Upper Nubia, only the fortress-towns of Sai and Napata witnessed substantial mid-Eighteenth Dynasty construction activity. As discussed in chapter two, Sai served two primary functions for the Egyptian government. First, it provided the Egyptians with a stronghold that had been erected directly atop a formerly threatening settlement of Kerman Nubians. Second, it was located just south of the second cataract and in close proximity to a series of minor oases and desert wells that could be employed by those who wished to travel northward while evading Egyptian authorities. Proximity to an important desert transit route was in all likelihood crucial to the founding of Napata as well. From this fortress, which was located in a fertile area just south of the fourth cataract, it was possible to strike east across the Bayuda and arrive before long in the region of the fifth cataract. The important trading center at the split of the Blue and White Niles could be arrived at much more quickly and safely by land than by boat. After all, not only were boats forced to sail upstream along a sinuous Nile, but they also faced the dual hazards of the fourth cataract and the inhospitable Abu Hamed reach.

Considering that Sai in the north and Napata in the south virtually book-ended Egyptian-controlled Upper Nubia and left a great
swath of Nile Valley between them, such narrow imperial focus is somewhat puzzling. Indeed, this great expanse of land apparently unembellished by pharaonic construction has prompted some scholars to suggest that much of this region was left in the hands of semi-independent, Egyptian-friendly indigenous rulers. Certainly, as Morkot and O’Connor have pointed out, Egyptian presence could not have been strong in the Dongola Reach. Such a situation was likely due to the relative absence of valuable natural resources in this region and perhaps also to the presence of strong indigenous political entities. Further research into this little explored terrain, however, will no doubt enhance our understanding of the sociopolitical structure of Upper Nubia in the New Kingdom.

The two fortresses at Sai and Napata are explicitly designated as mnnw, although the plan of Sai appears for all intents and purposes to resemble little more than a walled Egyptian town transplanted onto foreign soil. The plan of Napata as it existed in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty has not yet been recovered, although the fate of the ruler of Takhasy requires that it must have been walled. What is especially interesting, however, is that at both these sites Thutmose III erected temples to Amun, the patron deity of the Egyptian state. Whereas the majority of the Lower Nubian fortress-towns had temples dedicated to Horus-gods, to the Nubian god Dedwen, to the deified Senwosret III, or to the gods of the first cataract, Amun himself had previously been all but ignored in the Nubian pantheon.

Two opposing points of view could be put forth to explain the choice of Amun as an appropriate patron deity of Upper Nubian fortress-towns. According to the first scenario, the Egyptian government may have specifically chosen Amun to appeal to the Egyptian settlers with which they had populated their new communities. Given the rapid transition at Sai from a Kerman settlement to an Egyptian planned town, it might be presumed that the native population had been purposely excluded from this hotbed of former insurrection. Likewise, the Gebel Barkal stele appears to have been composed for the benefit of Egyptians living abroad. Thus, the choice of a purely Egyptian patron god at these two centers could have reflected the predominantly Egyptian population inhabiting them.

On the other hand, one could take the view that the god Amun may have been chosen specifically with the Kermans in mind! Kerman

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graves show ceremonial burials of rams dressed in elaborate costumes. As the ram was one of the manifestations of Amun, and indeed one of those most revered in Nubia, Thutmose III and his successors may well have strategically promoted his cult among the ram-worshippers of Upper Nubia as a way of acclimatizing the native population to Egyptian culture and religion. Given the tenacity with which the cults to Amun persisted in Nubia, long past the political domination of the Egyptian government itself, it is possible that this last scenario has merit and that the policy in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty with regard to the Nubian population as a whole was predominantly inclusive and even, perhaps, proselytizing.

Textual references to mid-Eighteenth Dynasty southern fortress-towns

Reign of Thutmose III

1. smi.tw n.f ḫrt mnnw rṣy mḥ[t] . . . smi.tw n.f ḫrt mnnw rṣy281 ("The Duties of the Vizier" from the tomb of Rekhmire; Davies 1973: pl. 26, 27; Urk. IV, 1105: 4; 1113: 10)

The affairs of the southern and northe[rn] mnnw-fortresses are reported to him. [. . .] The affairs of the southern mnnw-fortress are reported to him.

As discussed above with regard to the northern frontier, one of the official duties of an Egyptian vizier was to receive reports detailing the affairs of fortresses in the north and south. Perhaps because the text was written with an emphasis specifically upon the duties of the Upper Egyptian vizier, only the fortress-system on the southern border is mentioned twice. Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell whether the southern vizier had jurisdiction over just one fortress on the Nubian frontier (as Urk. IV, 1113: 10 would seem to indicate) or a whole series (as Urk. IV, 1105: 4 could possibly suggest). Given the fact that Urk. IV, 1105: 4 can be read as signifying one southern fortress or many, whereas Urk. IV, 1113: 10 is quite clear about the singularity of the fortress concerned, however, it may make sense to assume that the southern vizier was only responsible for keeping tabs on the activities of one specific southern fortress.

281 Although van den Boorn (1988: 250) interprets this sign as a šm’ḥ, or Upper Egyptian plant, the sign appears in fact to be a rṣy (van den Boorn 1988: pl. 2, col. 26). It is also interpreted as such in the Urkunden der 18. Dynastie.
Figure 18. Mid-Eighteenth Dynasty Nubia
While van den Boorn believes that the southern *mmnw* of Urk. IV, 1105: 4 refers to a guard-post attached to gates of the Theban palace, he does identify the southern *mmnw* of Urk. IV, 1113: 10 as a Nubian fortress. He utilizes the singular nature of this fortress, in fact, as one of the centerpieces for his argument that the “Duties of the Vizier” was composed in the reign of Ahmose. Briefly, van den Boorn suggests that if the text had been written in the late Middle Kingdom or later in the New Kingdom, it would be odd for only a single fortress of the whole chain of Nubian fortresses to be mentioned. In the reign of Ahmose, however, he argues that Elephantine (and perhaps Bigeh as well) would have been the single southern installation(s) accessible to the Egyptian forces, given that the Kermans still controlled all of the *mmnw*-fortresses upstream of the first cataract.282 Unfortunately for his argument, however, contemporary records at Buhen and other Lower Nubian fortresses demonstrate that Kamose and Ahmose each penetrated and pacified Nubia as far as the second cataract (see chapter two).

There is perhaps another explanation, however, for why only one fortress would be referred to in this text. In the division of duties between the southern vizier and the viceroy of Kush, it is highly probable that only the affairs of Elephantine would in fact have been pertinent to both officials. Because it was a border control point, all those who desired to enter or leave southern Egypt probably passed through the fortress of Elephantine and were registered in its daybook.283 Such trans-border traffic surely included royal messengers, army personnel, trade or tribute-bearing parties, and fugitives—all of great potential interest to the southern vizier. This daybook, then, would have greatly aided the vizier in his efforts to monitor all official business in Upper Egypt. The exhausting task of keeping track of the movements of Nubian tribesmen and travelers *within* Nubia, on the other hand, would appear more likely to have fallen under the jurisdiction of the viceroy of Kush. Given that this official effectively

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283 For daybooks as a genre, see Redford 1986a. For a specific parallel to a daybook kept at a border-fortress, see P. Anastasi III, vs. 6: 1–5: 9, discussed in chapter five. In Nineteenth Dynasty records, Elephantine is designated as a *htm* or border-fortress (see KRI II, 822: 9; KRI III, 261: 1, 8), and the fact that it is termed a *mmnw*-fortress in the “Duties of the Vizier” may have to do with the earlier models upon which this text was based. The term *htm* for “border-fortress” does not seem to have entered common usage until the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.
acted as Nubia’s vizier, it is likely that reviewing reports from the many fortress-towns south of Elephantine, as well as duplicate reports from Elephantine itself, would have comprised an integral part of his duties.284  

2. m33 ipw ipw n ḫ3 n ḫty n niwt rsy t ḫtyw- ḫkw-lwt knb[w]t nw w whm[w] nw sp3 t sw.sn sww ‘Ḥwtyw.sn nty m ṭp-rsy ṣ3’ m 3bw mnnw sn-mwt iry ḫt sw n isw(t) (Tomb of Rekhmire; Davies 1973: pl. 29; Urk. IV, 1119: 16–1120: 5)  

Inspecting payments: what is allotted to the office of the vizier of the southern city (and) what is exacted from the mayors, the district governors, the magistrate[s] of the region, the reporter[s] of the nome, their scribes, (and) the scribes of their cultivators, who are in the Head of the South—beginning with Elephantine (and) the mnnw-fortress of Bigeh. It was done according to the writings of ancient times.285

In addition to provisioning his tomb with a copy of the “Duties of the Vizier,” a vizier named Rekhmire also chose to commemorate the perhaps traditional payment of goods to the office of the southern vizier by eighty-some officials. These men had been appointed to high posts in districts stretching from Bigeh in the south to Asyut in the north, precisely the bailiwick of the southern vizier. Because these “payments” to the vizier’s office were levied specifically upon selected officials, rather than upon landowners in general, it appears likely that they could be viewed, in effect, as annual tokens of appreciation, or even kickbacks, skimmed from proceeds that their offices had netted them. Whether these payments were thereupon transferred to the state coffers or were considered the property of the vizier himself, however, is not certain.

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284 For examples of Nubian fortress reports of Middle Kingdom date, see Smither’s (1942: 3–10) publication of the Semna dispatches.
285 Gardiner (1947: 47) has suggested, based upon the reference to the “writings of ancient times” and the appearance in the list of two towns named after Twelfth Dynasty kings (which are otherwise unattested except for a late Middle Kingdom papyrus) that the taxation list had been copied wholesale from a Middle Kingdom original (see also Helck 1958: 2 n. 1; 214). Based on an analysis of similar district lists, however, van den Boorn (1988: 19–20, n. 42) firmly believes that the document was originally composed in the New Kingdom. Interestingly, in an inscription carved upon the Khnum temple at Semna, Thutmose III renews cultic offerings originally instated by Senwosret III. The offerings, he specifies, were to be supplied by the mayors and district governors of the Head of the South, beginning with Elephantine (Urk. IV, 196: 7–8). The evident antiquity of the positions of mayor and district governor of the Head of the South may indicate that as late as the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty Nubia was still run according to a Middle Kingdom blueprint.
Of the officials who bore their goods to the vizier’s office, the commanders of the fortresses of Bigeh and Elephantine are of particular interest with regard to this study. As the representative from the southernmost locality, the commander in charge of Bigeh apparently led the procession of officials before Rekhmire. His contribution included “monkeys (gf), skins in a basket, two bundles of reed arrows, a sack of some substance with an illegible name, twenty-odd units of some kind of wood, and various products of the nbs-tree, namely ten bows made of its wood, three skins full of pats made from its fruit, and ten larger cakes of the same.”

The fortress of Bigeh, originally built in the Middle Kingdom, has never been excavated nor even definitively located. Säve-Söderbergh has, however, suggested that traces of mud-brick walls on the eastern bank of the Nile opposite Bigeh Island be identified with this fortress. Because it is consistently overshadowed by nearby Elephantine in textual evidence, and because logic would dictate that its military importance would have precipitously declined as the frontier-zone moved farther and farther south, some authors have concluded that the fortress at Bigeh played little if any important role in the New Kingdom. As discussed in chapter five, however, this installation was apparently still quite active as a border checkpoint in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

While it is undoubtedly true that Bigeh could not have served a particularly vital defensive function in the mid-Eightheenth Dynasty, the wealth of its commander’s payments to the southern vizier, in contrast to those offered by officials located north of the first cataract, is notable. Bigeh’s commandant provided the vizier with 20 deben of gold, which is at least twice as much as the richest official north of Elephantine and well above the average offering of 2–3 deben. The gold, apes, and perhaps also the wood, all indicate that Bigeh was well situated to take advantage of the southern trade and that its primary importance at this period may have been as a subsidiary

286 Although Sethe transcribes a š sign (Urk. IV, 1120: 13), indicating “commander” (šsw), no such sign is visible in Davies’ (1973: pl. 29) copy of the scene. Both Sethe and Breasted (AR II: 283), however, provide more detail in their respective transliteration and translation than Davies’ copy indicates.
287 Davies 1973: 35, pl. 29; see also Urk. IV, 1120: 13–1121: 4.
288 Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 81, n. 3.
border checkpoint and as a facilitator of naval travel in the dangerous cataract region. If the commandant of Bigeh had been twice as affluent as the richest of his northern contemporaries, the commandant of the border-fortress of Elephantine (tsw n mnnw n 3bw) was twice again as wealthy. This official provided 40 deben of gold, chests of cloth, nbss-cakes, and skins.²⁹⁰ Given the wealth indicated by this payment, it would be highly surprising if the commandant of Elephantine—and to a lesser extent probably his colleague at Bigeh as well—did not possess the power to exact tariffs on goods transported across the Egypto-Nubian border. It is evident, at any rate, that to preside at Elephantine was to occupy an extremely lucrative position.

In addition to the commander of the mnnw-fortress, officials associated with the fortress or town of Elephantine include a scribe of the herald of Elephantine, a magistrate of Elephantine, and another scribe. While each of these individuals brought goods to the vizier, the value of their combined contributions was considerably less than that of the goods brought by the commander alone. It is notable also that unlike the majority of the other polities evidenced in the tax list, no mayor or other civil leader is listed for Elephantine. The office of mayor and that of fortress commander, then, may possibly have been combined at Elephantine just as the two offices were at the northern border-fortress of Tjaru. Certainly, it is impossible to discern a discrete citadel in the ruins of New Kingdom Elephantine that would have served to segregate soldier from civilian.

3. mn-hpr-r’ s3 r’ dhwt-ym nfr-hprw ‘nhw dt [. . .] [s3] nsw nthy kd hwt-ntr m [. . .] mn[nw] n ś’t ‘ḥ’, n ir.n s3 nsw imy-r ḫst [. . .] n śwr m hwt-ntr [n]t imn [. . .] m rnt-s 25 3bd 3 prt sw 2 [. . .] inr ḫsw.ti m dbt [. . .] k.ti m ḫry (Text on a sandstone pillar found at Sai; Vercoutter 1956: 74–75)

Menkheperre, son of Re, Thutmose, beautiful of forms, may he live forever. [. . .] the [vice]roy Nehi built a temple in [. . .] the mn[nw]-fortress of Shaat. Then, the viceroy and overseer of the foreign lands made [. . .] sheseru in the temple of Amun [. . .] in the regnal year

²⁹⁰ Davies 1973: pl. 29; Urk. IV, 1122: 13–1123: 3. As with the “Duties of the Vizier,” the fact that Elephantine is designated as a mnnw-fortress (rather than a htm-fortress) and that it was commanded by a tsw (rather than an imy-r htm) supports a date for the original text in either the late Middle Kingdom or the very early Eighteenth Dynasty.
25, 3rd month of Peret, day two [...] stone, it being (formerly) built in brick [...] (it being adorned) with paint.

This text offers further testimony for a concerted program of temple reconstruction in fortress-towns during the reign of Thutmose III. Although Vercoutter believes that the inscription provides evidence for two temples at Sai, it is quite possible that work on only one temple is meant. Temple A, first constructed in the early Eighteenth Dynasty, exhibits design characteristics in common with Thutmosid architecture and could well have been the temple that received this reconstruction work. In addition to refurbishing the temple to Amun, Thutmose III’s viceroy Nehi was active in redesigning the storage facility at Sai, as indicated by inscriptions. Indeed, archaeological evidence clearly shows that circular grain silos were abandoned at this time in favor of regularized storage magazines. These new magazines at Sai were of the type generally associated with monumental structures in Egypt proper.

Of special relevance to this study, it is interesting to note that Sai is specifically designated as a mnnw-fortress, despite the fact that the settlement demonstrates very little in common with the strongly fortified, defense-oriented Lower Nubian fortresses of Middle Kingdom origin. Sai, for all practical purposes, most strongly resembled a simple walled town. It must be understood, then, that by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty the term mnnw could as easily apply to a fortified town built on foreign soil as to a purely military installation.

4. ir.n.f m mnw.f n it [jm-m-r”] nb nswt tawy m mnw sm3 ḫṭṣṭwy irt n.f ḫnw n ḥḥ ḫr ntt st’ān.f nḥtw ḫm.i r nsw nb ḫpr (Gebel Barkal stele; Urk. IV, 1228: 12–14)

291 Interestingly, nearly identical wording is employed on a statue base of the viceroy Nehi with regard to “Southern Elephantine” or Buhen. The relevant section reads: “Satet, lady of Southern Elephantine; [she says: His majesty built?] in stone what had been constructed] in brick at the time of the remote past. His [majesty] made it [intentionally inasmuch as he loved all the gods] of Nubia, more than any king which appeared since the primeval times” (Karkowski 1981: 273).
292 Vercoutter 1956: 75.
293 It should be noted that the temple plan at Sai is quite similar to the temple of Buhen, which Thutmose III also altered from its early New Kingdom design (Arkell 1966: 87; Badawy 1968: 276). Both temples consist of a tripartite division, with the rearmost area of the temple accessed rather unusually from the left rather than the center room.
He made (it) as his monument for (his) father [Amun-re], lord of the thrones of the two lands, in the mnnw-fortress (called) “Slaying-the-foreigners,” making for him a resting-place for eternity, since he had increased the victories of my majesty more than (those of) any (other) king who had (ever) existed.

The Gebel Barkal stele, discovered in the forecourt of a later temple to Amun-re, commemorates the building of a sanctuary to this god within a mnnw-fortress at Napata. Although the fortress is often attributed to Thutmose III, it is significant that this pharaoh made no claim to have constructed “Slaying-the-foreigners,” nor, apparently, did he name the mnnw-fortress after himself. The possibility remains, then, that the fortress had in fact been constructed by one of his predecessors. Thutmose I’s inscription upriver at Kurgus suggests that the Egyptians had encountered Napata—and possibly settled it—two generations prior to Thutmose III. In fact, as discussed in chapter two, Napata’s particularly strategic location, the presence of Thutmose II’s cartouche at the site, and the fact that Thutmose III is credited only with the construction of a sanctuary all conspire to make an early Eighteenth Dynasty foundation for the fortress plausible, if not preferable.

Unfortunately, this installation has not been discovered in survey or excavation at Napata. If the mnnw-fortress was simply a walled settlement, similar to that at Sai, such an inability to recover it could be due both to intense erosion from sandstorms and to an appreciable amount of later construction at the site. The sanctuary to

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295 The word ḫ3ḏw may also be translated “desert-dwellers” (Wb. III, 236; Lesko 1984: 162; Faulkner 1986: 185), which might be deemed a preferable translation if the name of the fortress was based upon its specific function. If, however, the intention upon naming the fortress was to commemorate the pharaoh’s victories more broadly, in Syria-Palestine as well as Nubia, “Slaying-the-foreigners” would have proved suitably universal.


297 As discussed in chapter two, it is possible to arrive at Kurgus from Lower Nubia via a desert trail that bypasses Napata. The arduous nature of such a journey, however, makes it extremely unlikely that any but experienced desert scouts attempted this route.

298 Morkot (1987: 41; 1991: 295) has suggested that the fortress may have been defensively situated on one of the large islands in the Nile near Napata, given that Lepsius discovered New Kingdom “fragments” on Omm Oscher. These artifacts, however, may have been transported to the island at a later date. Reisner (1931: 80) reports having discovered a polished black statuette of a king, apparently Thutmose III, at the site of Napata proper. Unfortunately, since the statuette was found in a secondary context, little information can be drawn from it.
Amun sponsored by Thutmose III, however, may have fared better. Indeed, Reisner has tentatively equated it with the foundation of temple B 300, a structure upon which one of Taharqa’s temples was subsequently superimposed.\textsuperscript{299}

Clues as to the nature and purpose of the settlement at Napata may perhaps be gleaned from a close reading of the Gebel Barkal stele. Thutmose III prefaces part of his narration with the words: “Again, I am speaking to you. Listen people (\textit{rmt})” (Urk. IV, 1234: 6–7). Later, his audience is designated as “people (\textit{rmt}) of the southern-land who are in the pure mountain, which was called (by) the name “Thrones of the Two Lands” among the people, when it was not (yet) known” (Urk. IV, 1238: 6–7). The use of the word \textit{rmt} to address and designate his audience,\textsuperscript{300} when taken together with the twin implications that the inhabitants of this remote outpost could understand Egyptian speech and that they once had not known the holy mountain of Gebel Barkal, suggests that Thutmose III’s audience consisted primarily of Egyptian settlers. Elsewhere in the stele (Urk. IV, 1236: 15), Nubians are specifically designated as \textit{ndlt} (serfs) rather than \textit{rmt} (people). Whether the text was addressed to a small population of colonial elite or to a larger transplanted Egyptian population, however, is uncertain.

The location of Napata (Gebel Barkal) opposite a major trade route to the Butana region—through which many of the more exotic southern goods were likely channeled—is undoubtedly vital to understanding its emplacement in an area otherwise only sparsely populated by Egyptians. Indeed, while the primary emphasis in the stele with regard to Syria-Palestine is upon the battles fought, the portions concerned with Nubia instead deal largely with the influx of southern goods to the Egyptian court during Thutmose III’s reign. These imports included gold, of course, but also ivory, ebony, and timber.

The Gebel Barkal inscription twice mentions the locality “Beginning-of-the-land” (\textit{wp t3}), once as the origin of numerous desired products

\textsuperscript{299} Reisner 1931: 76–77; Reisner and Reisner 1933: 24. It is perhaps significant to note in this context that the Napata sanctuary and the temple to Amun renovated at Sai in fact herald a movement in Nubia away from cultic buildings dedicated to Horus-deities and other locally oriented gods. From the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty and for centuries to come it would be Amun who would receive the lion’s share of cultic attention south of the second cataract.

\textsuperscript{300} See Gardiner 1947a: 100*. 
(Urk. IV, 1236: 18) and again as Thutmose III’s southern boundary (Urk. IV, 1230: 17). Given that wtp can mean “horns” as well as “beginning,” it is possible that the toponym held a double meaning. The “Horns-of-the-land” would appear to admirably describe the Butana region at which the Nile split into two major branches.\(^{301}\) Although this area had certainly not been conquered militarily in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, it is quite likely that small-scale Egyptian embassies had reached it via the trade route located opposite Napata. Thus, Thutmose III may simply have claimed for his southern border the southernmost point to which his representatives had journeyed.\(^{302}\)

Interestingly, the Gebel Barkal stele imparts the impression that the feature that most attracted the Egyptians to Kush was its wood. The inscription states, “a wealth of timber comes to me from Kush, consisting of beams of dom-palm and furniture without limit consisting of Nile acacia of the southland. It is in Kush that my army, which is there in millions, hews them” (Urk. IV, 1237: 4–7). Just as Thutmose III’s Lebanese mnnw-fortress appears to have been at least partially built in order to secure a steady supply of timber for the Egyptian court, so the garrison stationed at the mnnw-fortress at Napata may also have been charged with such a mission. Certainly, the comparatively wide expanse of the Dongola reach would have provided richer supplies of timber than any of the regions in Lower Nubia.\(^{303}\) Such southern timber was likely used for boat building, for new construction work in the region, and for export to Egypt.

Although obviously exaggerated, the reference to the millions of Thutmose III’s soldiers present in Kush may provide a partial answer to the question of who inhabited Napata in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Later instances in which banishment to Kush served as the potential punishment for oath-breakers suggests that the prospect of such garrison duty was not relished. Following early Eighteenth Dynasty precedents, however, it is likely that the crown also attempted to sponsor civilian settlement at Napata, perhaps allotting colonists

\(^{301}\) As discussed in chapters five and six, the same toponym is applied to a Libyan fortress located at the westernmost point of Egyptian control.

\(^{302}\) Perhaps not coincidentally, this geographic term is also utilized to signify Egypt’s southernmost border in the reign of Thutmose II (Urk. IV, 138: 7)—the earliest king whose cartouche is attested at Napata.

\(^{303}\) For the fertility of this region, see Adams 1984: 29–30; Morkot 1995: 176; 2001: 242.
land grants and other incentives to make the move more palatable. Such a transformation from a primarily military to a civilian population would result eventually in Napata acquiring far more fame as a religious capital than as a military stronghold.

**Reign of Amenhotep II**

1. ink ḫmww ‘k. īrty n šm’w mḥw kāt ḫwy.i ḫḥ n ḥbwy mḥt m ḫrw (Statue of Hatre, Louvre E. 25550; de Cenival 1965: 17, fig. 3)

   I am one who is a competent craftsman for Upper and Lower Egypt, the work of my hands having reached to Elephantine (and) north to Tjaru.

This inscription, which has been discussed above with regard to the northern border-fortress of Tjaru, boasts that Hatre’s handiwork had reached the northernmost and southernmost extensions of Egypt proper. Although it is nowhere stated that the border-fortress at Elephantine is specifically meant, as opposed to the town, Elephantine’s juxtaposition with Tjaru renders this assumption appealing. The extent of his fame as a craftsman, Hatre seems to be saying, reached to the very gates of civilization itself. Indeed, no matter how Egyptianized Lower Nubia had become by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, this text makes it clear that the region was still viewed by the average Egyptian as foreign territory.

2. wn.in.tw ḫr ‘ḫ ḫs 6 mn n ḫrw m ḫḥt-hṛ sbty n ḫst n3 n ḫrw r-mitt ‘ḥ’.n šḥnt.tw ḫs ky ḫrw r ḫḥt-sty ḫḥw n ḫs sbty n npt r rdīt m3.tw ḫḥtw ḫm.f r ḫḥw ḫn’ ḫt (Text of the Amada stele, with duplicate at Elephantine; Urk. IV, 1297: 9–1298: 2)

Thereupon the six men from among these enemies were hung in front of the wall of Thebes, the hands likewise. Then the other enemy was transported south to Nubia and hung on the wall of Napata in order to cause that the victories of his majesty be seen forever and eternally.

After quelling a rebellion in the northern province of Takhasy, Amenhotep II advertised his achievement both at home and abroad. In a very vivid materialization of his claim to hold sway over both the northernmost and southernmost frontiers of his empire, the Egyptian king hung a Syrian rebel from the wall of his southern fortress at

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304 Such a division may be artificial, of course, if the town itself was regarded as a fortress-town.
Napata. The decaying body of the northerner would presumably have drawn inhabitants of the mnnw-fortress as well as Nubians from the surrounding area to marvel at the far-reaching power of the Egyptian empire. Although the inscription does little to further our knowledge of the fortress at Napata, it provides substantiation for the existence of a walled settlement at the site. Unfortunately, material evidence for Amenhotep II’s presence at Napata is slight. Only a granite fragment from a lion or sphinx foreleg bears his cartouche, and it—like most Eighteenth Dynasty material at the site—was found in a secondary context. Evidence for Amenhotep’s son, Thutmose IV, however, is more substantial. The small temple of B 600 that is ascribed to him is the earliest definitively dated New Kingdom structure. Temple blocks, a foundation deposit, and a statue base from Napata also bear this king’s cartouche.

Thutmose IV in Nubia

1. di(t) i3w sn t3 n wnnfr in wr n md3yw hry pdt n t3rw nby [ . . . ] n k3 n iry-p’t ḫȝty-2 wr m i3t.f ‘t3 m pr-nsw wr n md3yw imy-r ḫḥmt n t3 n w33308 hry pdt n t3rw imy-r ḫḥm imy-r ḫn ḫȝty-2 n t3rw nby [ . . . ] hry pdt ḫȝty-2 n t3rw nby (Leiden stele V 43; Urk. IV, 1634: 13–14, 17; 1635: 7–11)

Giving praise (to Osiris) and kissing the ground before Wennefer, by the great one of the Medjay and the troop commander of Tjaru, Neby [Offering formula omitted] . . . for the ka of the hereditary noble and count, the great one in his office, grandee in the palace, great one of the Medjay, overseer of the sealed chamber(?) of the land of Wawat, troop commander of Tjaru, overseer of the ḫtm-fortress, overseer of the canal/lake, mayor of Tjaru, Neby . . . [Caption to a figure of Neby, himself]: Troop commander and mayor of Tjaru, Neby.

Like the inscription of the craftsman Hatre, this text also has been discussed previously with regard to its relevance to the border-fortress of Tjaru. Although the bulk of Neby’s titles are pertinent to his position as mayor and overseer of the ḫtm-fortress at Tjaru, he possesses one title that appears to predate his northern career, namely “over-

305 Reisner 1931: 81.
306 Reisner 1931: 79.
308 This is a strange spelling for ḫȝst in which a sp sn substitutes for the repetition of the second symbol.
seer of the $htmt$ (?) of the land of Wawat.” It is tempting to translate this word as “$htm$-fortress” and to assume that prior to his appointment as overseer of the $htm$-fortress at Tjaru, Neby had served in a similar capacity in a Lower Nubian border-fortress. Such a translation may in fact be correct, and it is certainly appealing logically. There are, however, two major problems with this interpretation.

First, the title $imy-r\ tmt$ is written in its standard form ($k + t + seal$) just two lines down from $imy-r\ htm$ (seal + $t + t$). If $htmt$ indeed was written for $htm$, not only would it be an unparalleled spelling in general, but it also would be consciously variant from the same title in the same document. The second problem is that there is no evidence until the Nineteenth Dynasty that the border-fortresses of Elephantine and Bigeh were termed $htm$-fortresses. This in itself may be an argument from silence, however, seeing as the two incidences in which Elephantine and Bigeh were termed $mnnw$-fortresses in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty both come from texts in the tomb of Rekhmire, which are generally suspected of having been based on Middle Kingdom prototypes. Given the variant writing of $htm$ in this text, however, the translation “overseer of the sealed chamber” (or $imy-r\ htmyt$) has been preferred.

**Northern and Southern Fortifications and Administrative Headquarters in the Mid-Eighteenth Dynasty:**

A Cross-Frontier Perspective

What is immediately remarkable from a cross-frontier perspective on fortresses and administrative headquarters is the dearth of archaeological evidence pertaining to the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. While garrison headquarters and fortress-towns such as Tell el-Ajjul and Sai continued to be occupied during this period, no specific work on defensive features at any of these sites can be identified from the architectural remains. Likewise, although Thutmose III constructed at least one $mnnw$-fortress in Lebanon and perhaps another at Napata,

309 It is accepted as correct by Schulman 1964a: 144, no. 368b; Björkman 1974: 47; Cumming 1984: 320; Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 208; Chevereau 1994: 61.

310 See chapter five.

neither of these fortresses has been discovered on the ground. It is to be hoped that further survey and excavation—particularly in current and formerly war-torn regions such as the Sudan, Lebanon, and the Gaza Strip—will improve our knowledge of mid-Eighteenth Dynasty imperial activity.

From textual evidence, it is clear that the border-fortresses at Tjaru, Tjeku, the ḫtm-fortress of the sea, Elephantine, and Bigeh were manned at this time, although each was located too far from the contested frontiers to serve an appreciable military function. Undoubtedly, it was the strategic positioning of each of these fortresses at a vulnerable point on Egypt’s border, however, that led to their continued importance as administrative checkpoints. Judging from the mention of northern and southern fortresses in the “Duties of the Vizier” and the tax-list also included in Rekhmire’s tomb, the commanders of border-fortresses may have fallen under the ultimate authority of Egypt’s viziers and may even have been appointed by these officials.312

Interestingly, despite the similar functions of these border-fortresses, their commanders bore a variety of different titles. A ts(w) n mnnw (commander of the mnnw-fortress) oversaw Elephantine, whereas a hry pdt (troop commander) was stationed at Tjeku, and a hry pdt (troop commander) who was also an imy-r ḫtm (overseer of the ḫtm-fortress) and a ḥty-p₁ (mayor) officiated at Tjaru. The commander in charge of the ḫtm-fortress of the sea was likewise an imy-r ḫtm. These variations, however, may seem less arbitrary if examined closely.

As the following chapters demonstrate, border-fortresses were regularly termed ḫtm-fortresses in the New Kingdom, a designation that almost certainly stemmed from the fact that they served “to seal” (ḥtm) the border, closing it off from all unauthorized international traffic, whether this was commercial, migratory, or military.313 These ḫtm-fortresses were typically manned by “overseers of ḫtm-fortresses,” who themselves were almost always drawn from the rank of troop commander. The fact that the border-fortresses at Elephantine and

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312 While these two texts were composed at or prior to the very beginning of the New Kingdom, their inclusion in Rekhmire’s tomb implies that they were not entirely outdated.

313 The ḫtm erected outside of Megiddo in the reign of Thutmose III, while it was not specifically a border-fortress, did serve to seal off passage in—and especially out—of the besieged town.
Bigeh were termed *mnnw*- rather than *htm*-fortresses, however, is almost certainly attributable to the fact that the “Duties of the Vizier” and the tax list copied in the tomb of Rekhmire were composed from Middle Kingdom models and date to the reign of Ahmose at the very latest. As the stele of Turi from Buhen demonstrates, the title *tsw* was still employed at the time of Ahmose, although following his reign it was to be retired.

The presence of a *mnnw*-fortress in Lebanon is more difficult to explain, given that this term would never again be employed with regard to a Syro-Palestinian installation. It may have been, however, that as Thutmose III was in fact the first pharaoh to construct a fortress in this region, the vocabulary utilized to describe such structures had not yet been codified. Alternatively, it is possible that the fortress built in Lebanon would in fact have qualified as a “fortress-town” and that nothing of its scale would be constructed in Syria-Palestine for the remainder of the New Kingdom. Certainly archaeologists have yet to uncover an Egyptian fortress in Syria-Palestine that is structurally comparable to the *mnnw* fortress-towns erected in Nubia and Libya.

With regard to the military bases that lay farther from Egypt’s border, such as Tell el-Ajjul and the Nubian fortress-towns south of the first cataract, the imperial government’s apparent lack of interest in erecting serious defensive fortifications likely indicates that the core areas of Egypt’s empire were in fact relatively docile. Even in Lebanon and Napata, where one might expect the *mnnw*-fortresses to have been primarily defensive in nature, the texts imply otherwise. In the relevant inscriptions, the procuring of valuable resources such as timber is given precedence over the description of martial pursuits. It is important to bear in mind, then, that the term *mnnw* in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty often seems to have indicated little more than a walled settlement erected in foreign territory.

While due to the lack of archaeological evidence it is difficult to gauge cross-frontier policies with regard to the distribution and purpose of various fortresses, textual evidence demonstrates that Thutmose III, in particular, frequently attempted to apply similar policies in the north and the south. Both Nubia and Syria-Palestine, for instance, were expected to provide income to the Egyptian court from *b3k*-taxes and *inw*-gifts. The biography of Minmose also makes it quite clear that the two regions were subjected to *htr*-taxes. He writes, “(I) taxed *(htr)* [Upper] Retenu [in silver, gold], lapis lazuli, all (sorts) of
stones, a chariot, horses without number, cattle and goats, according to their multitudes. I let the leaders of Retenu know their yearly tributes (ḥ3kw). I taxed the leaders of Nubia in gold in its raw state, in gold, ivory, ebony, and many ships of dom-palm wood as each year’s ḫtr-taxes” (Urk. IV, 1442: 4–11). From these statements it is obvious that the Egyptian government, despite the different economies inherent in the diverse environments of Syria-Palestine and the southern Nile Valley, expected both regions to produce the equivalent categories of revenue for the state.

Likewise, on both frontiers Thutmose III instituted the policy of taking the heirs of native rulers back with him to Egypt. Such a practice not only provided an incentive for vassals to behave themselves, but it also provided the Egyptians with a chance to familiarize future rulers with Egyptian culture and hopefully to garner for themselves a generation of vassals favorably inclined to Egyptian rule. Judging from this policy, as well as from outside sources, it is apparent that the indigenous populations of both Syria-Palestine and Nubia were allowed to maintain their own rulers, so long as these were properly solicitous of the Egyptian government and its interests. The numerous administrative titles witnessed in the south, however, testify that Lower Nubia at least also possessed a thick overlay of Egyptian officials, men whose job it was to facilitate the goals of the imperial government.

Finally, a central facet of Egypt’s reorganization of Nubia included the provision of nearly every substantial polity with a temple that served vital social and economic functions in the community. It has often been stated that whereas the Egyptian government felt comfortable introducing such institutions into Nubia, they declined to do so in their Syro-Palestinian territories due to an inherent respect for the sophistication of Canaanite culture. This view, I would argue, misses the mark on two counts.

First, when one looks in depth at the historical records, it is apparent that the Egyptians did indeed claim cultic space for their own gods on the northern frontier as well. Religious structures established or embellished in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty include the temple to “Hathor” at Byblos, the storehouse of offerings at which Thutmose III worshipped Re-Horakhty and Amun, a temple to Amun (or per-

haps a deity identified with Amun) noted in Minmose’s list, and the temple in Tunip in which Thutmose III had established Egyptian gods. Although the temple at Byblos is the only one of these buildings to be verified archaeologically, it is clear that the establishment of Egyptian gods on foreign soil was a priority on the northern as well as the southern frontier.

Second, the differences that admittedly existed between northern and southern religious institutions had nothing to do with respect but everything to do with practicality. In Nubia, texts and archaeology clearly indicate that Egyptians and Egyptianized Nubians lived in “temple towns” that had been modeled after prototypes in Egypt proper. These temples served important economic and redistributive functions in addition to providing the community with spiritual solace and social glue. With respect to mid-Eighteenth Dynasty Canaan, however, such elaborate temples would have been wasteful and gratuitous, for no such large-scale colonies of Egyptians existed.

What the Egyptians in Canaan required, however, they got. The government, for example, erected a series of small chapels associated with harbor depots at which traveling functionaries could offer incense to their gods. Likewise, the state could mask large-scale financial transactions, such as the purchase of timber, through “gifts” to deities like the lady of Byblos, whom the Egyptians identified with the goddess Hathor. Finally, the Egyptians may have ensured the loyalty of frequently troublesome polities like Tunip by donating composite statues of deities, fashioned from highly valued materials, to local temples in solidification of a treaty. Certainly, the Amarna letters furnish numerous examples of the Egyptian king sending precious statues as “gifts” to his allies (EA 24, 26–27, 29, 41, 55). As is typical of cross-frontier policies in general, then, the desire by the Egyptians to celebrate their gods in foreign lands manifested itself differently according to the varying sociopolitical reality and imperial agenda for each region.
CHAPTER FOUR

FRONTIER POLICY IN THE LATE EIGHTEENTH DYNASTY

OVERVIEW OF EGYPTIAN INTERACTIONS WITH SYRIA-PALESTINE

Historical summary

New sources: the Amarna and Hittite archives
Although sources other than the traditionally utilized hieroglyphic corpus\(^1\) have always provided Egyptologists with important historical information, it may rightly be stated that such “outside sources” are at no time more crucial to a proper understanding of Egyptian imperialism than in the late Eighteenth Dynasty. Were it not for the recovery of two extraordinary diplomatic archives, Egyptian martial and administrative activity in its northern empire at this time would remain virtually unknown. Thanks to the dual discoveries of the Amarna letters and the Hittite archives at Boghazköy, however, scholars are instead faced with an embarrassment of riches. Because the information gleaned from these sources will loom so large in the following historical overview, and indeed in the chapter as a whole, it is important to preface the historical summary with a brief discussion of the nature and scope of these two archives.

In 1887 on the site of Tell el-Amarna, ancient Akhetaten, a local villager stumbled upon the first of the 350 or so clay tablets that would later be known collectively as the Amarna letters.\(^2\) In the fourteenth century B.C. Akhenaten, Smenkhkare, and Tutankhamun all ruled from this city, although for varying proportions of their reigns.

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\(^1\) For the New Kingdom this standard corpus is well represented by the historical texts included in *Urkunden der 18. Dynastie* and Kitchen’s eight-volume series entitled *Ramesside Inscriptions*.

\(^2\) The Amarna letters are published as a series by Knudtzon et al. (1964) and have been translated into English by Moran (1992). Other important publications of these texts include Winckler and Abel (1889–1890); Bezold and Budge (1892); Winckler (1896); Sayce and Petrie (1894: 34–37 and tab. 31–33); Schroeder (1915); Mercer (1939); Gordon (1947); Youngblood (1961); Rainey (1970). Tablets discovered at Tell el-Hesi (Albright 1942) and Kamid el-Loz (Edzard 1970; Wilhelm 1973)
When Akhenaten moved his court from Thebes to Akhetaten, he appears to have carried with him at least fifteen years of archived diplomatic correspondence. Included in these older letters were tablets sent and received by his father over the course of almost ten years. At Akhetaten these letters and those archived during the lifetime of the city were housed together in a building called the "office of the letters of pharaoh, l.p.h." 3

The number of extant tablets is certainly far lower than the total archive once stored at Akhetaten, undoubtedly due in part to the notoriously circuitous route by which the tablets reached modern attention. 4 In addition, however, the noticeable absence of any letters that can, without controversy, be ascribed to the reigns of Tutankhamun or Smenkhkare suggests that Tutankhamun transported the most recent letters in the archive to Thebes upon his final abandonment of Akhetaten. 5 Be this as it may, the corpus of known documents is still impressive.

Over a period of roughly thirty years, 6 Amenhotep III and Akhenaten received letters from six great kingdoms (Babylon, Assyria, Mitanni, the Hittite kingdom, Arazawa, and Alashiya) as well as a myriad of smaller polities that claimed vassal status to Egypt. Through these letters it is possible to trace local rivalries, larger political clashes

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4 A. H. Sayce (1916–1917: 90) claims informants told him that as many as 200 tablets had been destroyed by local peasants during exhumation. Fully as many, Sayce reports, were significantly damaged at this time. According to popular lore, the remaining tablets were then transported to the antiquities dealers in Luxor via camelback. While the extent of the damage inflicted on the archive by the excavation and the transport of the tablets is widely believed to be overstated (Aldred 1991: 185; Moran 1992: xiii), it would be surprising if the process did not result in more than a few casualties.


6 Proponents of a co-regency between Amenhotep III and his son suggest a telescoped chronology for the Amarna letters of ten to twenty years (Kitchen 1962: 10; Waterhouse 1965: 200–205; Giles 1972: 68–69; Aldred 1991: 190–194). The lack of irrefutable proof for such a co-regency, combined with the need to account for a great number of sequential events within the archive, however, has led a majority of scholars to opt for a span of three decades for the archive (Campbell 1964: 136–141; Redford 1967: 154–169; Several 1974: 127; Albright 1980: 100; Murnane 1990: 115–116; Moran 1992: xxxiv; Weinstein 1998: 225).
between the “superpowers” of the day, the machinations of Egyptian officials, and the expeditions of various armies. For no other time in the history of Egypt is such detailed information on Egyptian frontier policy available.

If the archive at Amarna is impressive in the depth of information that it provides about ancient imperialism, the 10,000-some tablets unearthed during excavations at Boghazköy exceed all imaginings. From the fourteenth century B.C. until the end of the Hittite kingdom around 1200 B.C., Hittite foreign affairs can be traced in great detail. While Egypt appears relatively infrequently in the archive, references to it are often quite informative. The Egyptian government’s policy of not recording their own military defeats has meant that battles referred to in Hittite letters, treaties, annals, and prayers are not infrequently the sole records of such events. Our understanding of foreign affairs under Akhenaten, Tutankhamun, Ay, and Horemheb is, thus, significantly augmented by Hittite sources.

*Imperial activity in the reign of Amenhotep III*

The first two decades of Amenhotep III’s reign are not illuminated by either the Amarna letters (excepting vague retrospective references) or the Hittite archive. This loss is deeply felt, for it is impossible to pinpoint any major campaigns that might have been undertaken on the northern frontier in this period. One stele of Amenhotep III, discovered reused in the mortuary temple of Merneptah, depicts the king’s chariot riding roughshod over a tangle of defeated Syro-Palestinians. A scene on the same monument in which Nubian prisoners—rather painfully strapped to the king’s chariot—are brought to Egypt in bondage, however, suggests that the images were both

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7 The extensive Hittite archives, not surprisingly, are still in the process of being published. Copies of the texts are usually found in one of two series: *Keilschripttexte aus Boghazköi* or *Keilschrifturkunden aus Boghazköi*. English translations of some of the more important of these documents are found in Pritchard (1969) and Beckman (1996), among other sources (Gurney 1990; Murmane 1990; and Bryce 1999).

8 See EA 116, 117, 138. The first of these letters implies that Amenhotep III actually accompanied his troops on campaign at least once prior to the period of time covered by the Amarna archive. The remaining letters dwell upon sweeter times, when the requests of a vassal for garrisons or provisions were filled promptly and with alacrity.

9 For publications of this stele, see Petrie 1897: 10, 23, pl. 10; Lacau 1909: 59–61, pl. 20–21; Saleh and Soursouzian 1987: no. 143; and Urk. IV, 1657: 15–1658: 20.
static and symbolic in nature. Moreover, the pointedly bland caption referring to “[all lands] and [every] foreign country, all of mankind, all the sun-folk, Naharin, vile Kush, Upper Retenu and Lower Retenu (being) under the feet of this good god like Re forever” (Urk. IV, 1658: 18–20) is unabashedly ahistorical.10

Numerous other monuments of Amenhotep III also refer to his northern empire with stock phrases that by the late Eighteenth Dynasty had calcified with usage. For example, in one inscription Amenhotep III establishes his northern border (Urk. IV, 1736: 18–13); in another, “his war cries circulate through Naharin and he places terror” in the hearts of its inhabitants (Urk. IV, 1693: 8–9). On a text inscribed on an architrave at Luxor, the king’s own mace struck Naharin (Urk. IV, 1696: 11). Likewise, Amenhotep III’s temple workshop is filled with “children of the rulers of every foreign land from his majesty’s plunder” and surrounded with settlements of the Levant (dmiw n ḫrw) (Urk. IV, 1649: 9). Indeed, even seemingly specific descriptions, such as how the rulers of every foreign country transported cedar logs from the mountains of Retenu for Amun’s divine barque (Urk. IV, 1652: 14–16), are paralleled elsewhere (cf. Urk. IV, 1241: 13–1242: 4; and the Karnak relief of Seti I).

In the genre of topographical lists, however, Amenhotep III exhibited originality. Names never before witnessed on such lists allow a view of the ancient Near Eastern political entities with which Egypt had only recently come into contact or, alternatively, with which preexisting diplomatic relationships had soured. Toponyms in this category cluster primarily in the Aegean,11 the Transjordan,12 and

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10 Despite the deliberate universality of the reliefs and the inscription on this stele, both Giles (1972: 196) and Schulman (1988: 73, n. 70) argue that its erection may have been occasioned by specific military activity.

11 A number of toponyms belonging to mainland Greece and Crete appear in Egyptian sources for the first time on a statue base erected in the mortuary temple of Amenhotep III (Edel 1966: 37–40, 52; Cline 1987: 26–29). Of the toponyms that can be identified with relative confidence, six relate to Crete and five to areas on mainland Greece and its adjacent islands. Hankey (1981: 45–46) and Cline (1987: 1–36) have suggested that the list may in fact represent a series of “ports of call,” not unlike the New Kingdom “itineraries” that have been suggested for portions of Thutmose III’s topographical lists (Redford 1982a: 59–60). Cline (1987; 1998: 246–248) cites in support of his thesis a general correlation between the toponyms on the list and the known findspots of objects bearing Amenhotep III’s cartouche. Poignantly, the Cretan names found on Amenhotep III’s list are one of the last glimpses of this civilization before the Mycenaean kingdom sent it into permanent eclipse. For an excellent review of the archaeological material, controver-
areas in the northern frontier zone. Caution should be expended, however, in associating these newly found toponyms too intimately with Amenhotep III, as the topographic lists of his father and grandfather are few in number and poorly preserved. There is always the possibility, then, that some of these newly named territories could have debuted in the vanished lists of Amenhotep II or Thutmose IV.

The widespread distribution of objects adorned by Amenhotep III’s cartouche demonstrates that, whether or not this king campaigned regularly, his symbolic presence was evidenced throughout the empire to a degree rivaled only by Thutmose III and Ramesses II. 

12 In the topographical list carved at Soleb and copied by Ramesses II at Amara (Giveon 1964: 244, no. A. 2; Fairman 1940: 165), six names are preceded by the toponym 3ššenu, “land of the Shasu.” Traditionally these polities have been placed in the Transjordan (see Grdseloff 1947), where the Shasu are often presumed to have originated (Giveon 1964: 244–245; 1971: 235–236; Ward 1972: 50–53; Redford 1992: 272–273). There are a few scholars (Astour 1979; Görg 1979: 200–202), however, who locate the land of the Shasu in northern Syria. For evidence pertinent to Amenhotep III’s relations with the Transjordan, see Ward (1973: 45–46).

13 The coastal cities of Tyre, Byblos, and Ugarit debut in the topographical lists in the reign of Amenhotep III (see Wilson 1969: 242–243). While all these towns profess loyalty in the Amarna letters, it is unknown what their position vis à vis the Egyptian empire was at the beginning of Amenhotep III’s reign. Farther inland, the polities of Nukhasse and Yenoam are also for the first time represented on the topographical lists, although officially both had been donated to the estate of the god Amun in the reign of Thutmose III (see chapter three). Evidence of revolts prior to Amenhotep III’s reign, however, shows that these areas were not easily enfolded in the Egyptian empire, and Nukhasse, at least, would flip-flop between Mitanni, Egyptian, and Hittite overlordship for years to come (see the historical prologues to treaties 5, 7, and 8 in Beckman 1996; see also Goetze 1933: 110–113; Redford 1967: 222–223; Astour 1969; Murnane 1990: 30; Klengel 1992: 115; Bryce 1999: 221–223).

14 Simons (1937): lists VI–VIII.

15 Sites that have yielded significant quantities of objects bearing the cartouche of Amenhotep III include Gezer (Porter and Moss VII: 375; Macalister 1912, II: 322; Weinstein 1998: 233), Beth Shemesh (Porter and Moss VII: 373; Gonen 1992b: 65; Weinstein 1998: 235), Lachish (Porter and Moss VII: 372), and Ugarit (Liverani 1979b: cols 1298–1303; Weinstein 1998: 231–232, 235)—among others. Amenhotep III is, in fact, termed the “eternal king” in a letter found at Ugarit that concerned trade matters (Lipinski 1977: 213–217; Knapp 1983: 38–45). Interestingly, the objects found at Lachish bearing Amenhotep III’s cartouche come mainly from foundation deposits in the so-called Fosse Temple, prompting speculation as to whether Amenhotep III simply bestowed gifts upon this temple or whether it may have been patronized by Egyptians stationed in the region.
Such artifacts—generally scarabs, votive plaques, and alabaster vessels—have been found at most major Syro-Palestinian settlements of the Late Bronze Age. As the items tend, however, to be easily portable, and occasionally to be fashioned out of highly valued materials as well, their distribution serves only as an abstract gauge of the extent of Amenhotep III’s fame and influence abroad.

Far more telling archaeologically is the study of the contemporary buildings in the Sinai and Syria-Palestine that have been identified by most scholars as Amarna Period Egyptian installations, namely Haruba site A–345, Bir el-‘Abd, Deir el-Balah, and Tell el-Ajjul. These sites will be discussed individually and in detail farther along in this chapter. For present purposes, however, it is pertinent to note that all of these bases cluster along the Ways of Horus military route across the northern Sinai and its eastern edge in the Negev—this despite the fact that Egyptian political control at this time extended as far north as the Phoenician coast and parts of southern Syria.

As I will argue below, this distribution of archaeologically observable Egyptian bases suggests that the pharaonic government only erected homespun infrastructure in barren or relatively deserted areas where none existed to be co-opted from local polities. It may also suggest, however, that surveillance of Egypt’s natural borders was of particular concern. Certainly, an inscription of an Egyptian official named Amenhotep son of Hapu would corroborate this impression strongly. Amenhotep son of Hapu, who served among his many other offices as chief recruiting officer and overseer of public works, boasts, “I have put a company of soldiers at the head of the road in order to repulse the foreigners upon their places, which surround Egypt, by keeping an eye on the movements of the bedouin. I have done likewise at the head of the bank at the river mouth, surrounded by my troops, quite apart from the crews of the royal sailors” (Urk. IV, 1821: 10–14). The road mentioned in this text is not specifically stated to be the Ways of Horus, but given the distribution of contemporary Egyptian emplacements along and at either end of this military route, such an identification is indeed compelling.

Depending upon which end of the Ways of Horus Amenhotep son of Hapu meant, he may have quartered his soldiers at the ḫtm-fortress at Tjaru in the west or at the administrative headquarters at either Tell el-Ajjul or Gaza in the east.16 The company stationed

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16 Amenhotep son of Hapu may, of course, have been referring to Libyan bedouin,
at the Nile mouth, on the other hand, could have resided at the htm-fortress of the sea. What is particularly interesting about this inscription, however, is that tst, the word for troops, is here determined with the signs for both a male and female assemblage of people. Thus Amenhotep son of Hapu may also have purposefully bolstered the population of border towns in order to render them less permeable to foreign invasion.

Problems in Amurru and the hill country of Canaan

Despite the fact that Egypt may have been significantly more concerned with the maintenance of its traditional borders than official propaganda would indicate, the Amarna letters clearly demonstrate that the imperial government was active far to the north as well. Indeed, as of the last decade of Amenhotep III’s reign, conflicts that necessitated Egyptian intervention brewed on two major fronts. Not coincidentally, both trouble spots were located in hard-to-control, mountainous regions of Syria-Palestine, namely the Lebanese mountains and the central hill country of Canaan.

To the north, the territorial kingdom of Amurru dominated the Lebanese mountain range from a point somewhere north of Byblos to another south of Ugarit, and from the Orontes River to the Mediterranean coast. This area, which is difficult to farm due to its rugged terrain, had long been the domain of seminomadic peoples and brigands. Due to the especially heavy blow dealt urban life at the very start of the Late Bronze Age (see chapter two), the population of the mountains had swelled substantially by the late Eighteenth Dynasty with displaced urbanites and farmers. Indeed, these uprooted people made up the core of the much-maligned Apiru population

but Egypt’s interactions with Libyan tribes in the reign of Amenhotep III appear fairly limited. A stele from the mortuary temple of Amenhotep III alludes to a possible military confrontation with the Tjehenu from which were generated the prisoners of war used to build the temple (Urk. IV, 1656: 14). Otherwise, however, evidence for interactions with Libya is limited to a shipment of Meshwesh cattle-meat that arrived at Malkata during Amenhotep III’s reign (Hayes 1951: 91).

17 The title “overseer of every river mouth belonging to the sea” is in evidence as early as the reign of Thutmose III (Gardiner, Peet, and Cerny 1955: 160, no. 196, pl. 64), as is the title “overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea” (Capart 1900: 105–106).

18 The Apiru are known from numerous sources throughout the second millennium B.C. to have been a rather amorphous grouping of disaffected individuals, united not by a common ethnicity or geographic homeland but instead by a rootless
with whom Abdi-Ashirta, the ruler of Amurru, was consistently associated (cf. EA 68, 71, 73, 74, 75, 79, 85, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94).

In the earliest letters of the Amarna archive, Abdi-Ashirta is reported to have been vigorously augmenting his mountain kingdom at the expense of lower-lying coastal city-states. His motives, presumably, were twofold: to gain access to foodstuffs, on the one hand, and to lucrative profits from trade, on the other. The main chronicler of these events is Rib-Hadda, the ruler of Byblos. This man, the most famously prolific of all the king’s correspondents, wrote frantic letters to Amenhotep III as coastal cities, one by one, either fell to¹⁹ or formed alliances with²⁰ Abdi-Ashirta. By far the most disturbing of Abdi-Ashirta’s conquests in Rib-Hadda’s opinion, and presumably also in that of Amenhotep III, was the Egyptian base at Sumur (EA 62, 71, 83, 84, 91, 138, 371).

First brought into the empire in the reign of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 689: 13), the harbor city of Sumur had subsequently become the northernmost coastal outpost of Egyptian power. By the late Eighteenth Dynasty, an Egyptian governor resided in and administered from a “palace”²¹ at Sumur (EA 68, 103, 106, 107). Although this building has yet to be identified in the archaeological record, the ancient site of Sumur is confidently placed at modern Tell Kazel.²²

In antiquity this town not only possessed an excellent harbor, but its position at the mouth of the Eleutheros River provided a relatively easy point of access through the foreboding Lebanese mountain range and into the vicinity of the strategically situated Syrian city of Kadesh.

For the Egyptians, possession of Sumur was crucial to their imperial strategy as it allowed southern Syria’s main highway, the Biqa

¹⁹ Abdi-Ashirta directly or indirectly brought about the downfall of Irqata, Ardat, Ammiya, Shigata, Bit-Arha, Batruna, and possibly Tyre. See EA 73–76, 79, 81, 83, 87–91.
²⁰ The rulers of Beirut and Sidon reportedly formed an alliance with Abdi-Ashirta (EA 83 and 85).
²¹ The Akkadian word that Moran (1992: 133) translates as “palace” is ekallu, which derives from the Sumerian for “big house.”
²² Dunand and Saliby 1957; Dunand et al. 1964; Klengel 1984.
Valley, to be penetrated in a timely and cost-effective fashion. For Abdi-Ashirta, on the other hand, control of Sumur meant a substantial elevation in his own power. If the Egyptians had, in effect, to pay protection money to him for the continued well-being of their base, and indeed for the privilege of access to it generally, his own personal wealth and influence in the region would be unparalleled.

A few letters dictated by Abdi-Ashirta himself survive in the archive and transmit his own rationalization, or at least that which he presented to the Egyptian government, for his abrupt assumption of power in the town. Sumur had, it appears, been threatened by a neighboring town (perhaps, one suspects, at the instigation of Abdi-Ashirta), and it was thus out of unadulterated altruism and loyalty that Abdi-Ashirta intervened. He writes, “If I had not been staying in [Irqata], if I had been staying where life was peaceful, then the troops of Sekhlal [would certainly have s]ent Sumur and the palace up in flames.”

His explanation for why the four surviving personnel of the Egyptian base at Sumur were no longer present, however, sounds a particularly hollow note. Contrary to what any of Abdi-Ashirta’s enemies might have reported to pharaoh, these individuals had fled of their own volition (EA 62). The functioning and fate of this base at Sumur will be discussed further below.

Abdi-Ashirta’s death roughly coincided with Amenhotep III’s own. While it is almost certain that the ruler of Amurru was murdered,

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23 According to Abdi-Ashirta (EA 62), the troops from Sekhlal “came” with a man named Yamaya, who was a correspondent of the king. While Albright (1946: 13–14) believes this name to be a hypocoristicon of Ahmose, Moran (1992: 134, n. 10; 385) is not so sure. Certainly it does not make immediate sense as to why the attacker from Sekhlal should have borne an Egyptian name.


25 EA 81 implies that a garrison had been resident at Sumur during Amenhotep III’s reign. It is unknown, however, how many of the stated 29 occupants of the base at the time of Abdi-Ashirta’s attack had been soldiers who belonged to the garrison. Given the fact that 25 men perished in the battle, however, it is reasonable to assume that at least some of these were members of the military.

26 Campbell 1964: 87–88; Redford 1967: 219. For chronological matters pertaining to the Amarna letters, I will in general follow the scheme outlined by Campbell (1964) in his chart E. Campbell’s is the most detailed study of the chronological placement of the letters yet, and it does not subscribe to the co-regency theory.

27 Klengel (1969: 257–258) is the only scholar who suggests that Abdi-Ashirta died of natural causes. He bases his assertion on EA 95, in which Rib-Hadda reports that Abdi-Ashirta was gravely ill and speculates as to what would happen if he died.
the author or authors of his demise are unknown. According to EA 108 and 117, Abdi-Ashirta had been captured by an Egyptian expedition sent to quell his insurgency.\textsuperscript{28} Thus some historians believe that he was executed on the spot or that he was brought back to Egypt and ceremonially executed there.\textsuperscript{29} Other scholars, however, lend more credence to EA 101, also penned by Rib-Hadda, which states that Abdi-Ashirta had been killed by his own countrymen for failing to provide Mitanni with the requisite tribute in wool.\textsuperscript{30} Indeed, Rib-Hadda’s accusation that the Egyptian army was losing respect after failing to respond to the murder of Abdi-Ashirta (EA 124) strongly suggests that the Egyptians were not directly responsible for his death. Whatever the true story, however, it was no doubt convenient that access to Sumur was promptly restored following Abdi-Ashirta’s untimely end.

Egypt’s main irritant to the south in the reign of Amenhotep III was another mountain warrior. This man, named Lab’ayu, was based at Shechem but ruled a much wider area, as his far-flung conquests attest. The main opponents of Shechem in battle were the towns of Megiddo, Jerusalem, Akshapa, and Akko (EA 242–244, 366), while his sometime allies included Gezer and Ginti-kirmil (EA 249).\textsuperscript{31}

\textsuperscript{28} See also EA 131 and 138. EA 65 implies that Abdi-Ashirta may even have known about the imminent arrival of the Egyptian troops. Prior to this time, Egypt had attempted to aid Rib-Hadda’s fight against Abdi-Ashirta indirectly, by requesting that the rulers of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre send troops to him. The lack of response this summons evoked, however, suggests that some of these towns may already have been allied to or at least implicitly in support of Abdi-Ashirta (EA 92; see also EA 83 and 85). Rib-Hadda’s admission to his Egyptian overseer that “all the men whom you gave me have run off” (EA 82: 31–32, trans. Moran 1992: 152), however, is the only indication that Egypt put its own troops at the disposal of the ruler of Byblos.

\textsuperscript{29} Altman 1979: 1–11; Schulman 1988: 78, n. 119; Bryce 1999: 184; David 2000: 60; James 2000: 121. The standard head-smiting scene is present in Amarna art and therefore may have had its origins in a real practice (Schulman 1964b: 54; 1988: 56). Based on an idiosyncratic interpretation of a passage repeated in both EA 108 and 117, Schulman (1988: 78, n. 120) believes that Abdi-Ashirta was captured in the reign of Akhenaten. Further, he assigns the Karnak talatat that depict Egyptian forces fighting Hittite soldiers to this event, which he terms Akhenaten’s “First Hittite War” (Schulman 1988: 75, n. 101; the relevant talatat are specifically discussed in his article). His interpretation of these events is not followed here.

\textsuperscript{30} Kitchen 1962: 28; Moran 1969: 94–99. The specification that the tribute was to be paid in wool is a testament to the predominantly pastoral nature of Amurru’s economy.

\textsuperscript{31} Lab’ayu’s relations with Gezer, at least, had not always been friendly. Gezer had originally fought with the allies and had written to the Egyptians for military aid (EA 271). Lab’ayu, likewise, admits to having received the condemnation of his
Rib-Hadda’s jealous complaint that the ruler of Akko had received 400 soldiers and 30 chariots from the Egyptians, whereas he himself had none (EA 85), perhaps indicates that Egypt may have directly supported the confederation mounted against Lab’ayu. Megiddo is also reported to have hosted a garrison at some point early in the war, but subsequent to the departure of these troops Lab’ayu apparently redoubled his attacks (EA 244). A force expected by the ruler of Gezer, presumably prior to his alliance with Lab’ayu, may also have been related to the same Egyptian intervention (EA 269).

Eventually, the tide appears to have turned against Lab’ayu, and at one point he barely escaped deportation to Egypt by paying what must have been an exorbitant ransom to the ruler of Akko (EA 237, 245). Moreover, Shechem appears finally to have been seized by Lab’ayu’s opponents, whom the subdued warlord was then instructed by Amenhotep III to protect. Lab’ayu viewed this command as a violation of the oath that he and his Egyptian overseer had sworn together, and he none-too-subtly warned the pharaoh, “When an ant is struck, does it not fight back and bite the hand of the man that struck it? How at this time can I show deference, and then another city of mine will be seized?” It is perhaps surprising, given this impertinence, that the end of Lab’ayu’s ninth life did not come at the hands of the Egyptians. Instead credit for the deed went to men of the neighboring town of Gina (EA 250).

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32 It is interesting to note that one of the two palaces at Megiddo that dates to this period possessed an Egyptian-style lotus-form capital (Oren 1992: 107)—although its architecture is otherwise typically Canaanite. Fritz (1995: 30) attempted to explain the existence of the two contemporary palaces at Megiddo by arguing that the local mayor occupied one and the Egyptian governor another. Unfortunately, there is no archaeological or textual evidence to support this contention. City plans do, however, show something very similar to an Egyptian-style center-hall house in the vicinity of the city temple (Loud 1948: figs. 382, 402).


34 Gina has been equated with the ruins found at Beth-Haggan (Moran 1992: 389). It is interesting, given the seemingly quite tense relations between Egypt and Shechem during the Amarna Period, that at least one contemporary burial in the
Motivations for pharaonic involvement in these conflicts

Egypt’s intervention in the battles against Abdi-Ashirta and Lab’ayu constitute notable exceptions to its general imperial policy. Egypt did not intercede in the vast majority of Syro-Palestinian internecine wars. Indeed, some scholars have even suggested that the imperial power had a vested interest in fostering political tension amongst its vassals and thus would happily tolerate a certain amount of local feuding.35 The unexpected decision to take action against Lab’ayu, then, may have been due to his direct interference with one of Egypt’s national interests—namely, the smooth functioning of the Jezreel Valley’s corvée labor system.

Since the time of Thutmose III, when the fields of Megiddo had been surveyed and harvested for the support of the troops (Urk. IV, 667: 10–15), Egypt seems to have imposed an annual quota of grain upon the Levant (Urk. IV, 713: 7; 723: 8; 727: 11). This produce came from lands that Egypt claimed as crown property but farmed with Canaanite labor. EA 365, written by the ruler of Megiddo to pharaoh, provides valuable information on how this system functioned in the Amarna Period. Megiddo, it seems, was in charge of cultivating nearby fields along with teams of men sent from Jaffa, Nuribta, and several other towns. Due to the war in the hill country, however, the allotted workers were apparently not being sent. Megiddo’s warriors were forced to guard the fields with chariots (EA 243), and harvesting could not be accomplished (EA 244).36

There is plentiful evidence that a portion of Canaan’s grain tax in the reign of Amenhotep III was stored in a place called Yarimuta (EA 74, 75, 81, 85, 86, 90). This town, agricultural area, or storage depot37 was supervised by an official named Yankhamu (EA 83,
late eighteenth dynasty

86), 38 who appears to have possessed a “house” 39 in which Canaanites could be kept against their will (EA 83). Although Yarimuta has not been definitively located, the fact that the ruler of Beirut could occasionally act as a caretaker of the grain stores (EA 85) suggests that he lived in the general vicinity. 40 Likewise, a coastal location is necessitated by the references in the Amarna letters to ships involved with the transport of Yarimutan grain (EA 82, 85, 105). 41

Yarimuta’s identity as a seaside granary makes it likely that it belonged originally to the series of harbor storehouses instituted by Thutmose III (see chapter three). 42 While an enumeration of these equipped harbors is never provided in the annals, Sumur 43 and Jaffa 44 must certainly also be viewed as survivors of this inspired system. It is interesting and important to note that this northern line of grain depots seems essentially to have been an extension of the system already in place all along the banks of the Nile. As a case in point, administrators of the national storehouses “from this land of Kush until the border of Naharin” (Urk. IV, 1841: 13–14) were rewarded

cumbersome documentation, it certainly cannot have been a town or region of any great size. Yeivin has suggested that Yarimuta should be equated with the otherwise unknown ismt in Amenhotep III’s Soleb list (Giveon 1964: 243).

38 Although his name is Semitic in origin (Helck 1962: 259), this man appears to have achieved the rank of fanbearer (EA 106) in the Egyptian court. His career will be discussed in greater detail below.


40 Various less likely locations have been suggested for Yarimuta, including the Nile Delta (Niebuhr 1903: 18; Giles 1972: 171), the lower Galilee (Gonen 1992a: 214), and the plain between Megiddo, Tyre, and Akko (Galan 1994: 98).

41 In EA 224 a vassal boasts of his long-standing practice of shipping grain at the command of the king. The provenience of the vassal and the destination to which he shipped the grain, however, remain unknown.

42 Indeed, like the storehouses of Thutmose III, Yarimuta did not solely contain grain. Clothing and silver are also stated to have been stored there (EA 82). A letter from Jerusalem (EA 287) likewise implies that pharaonic storehouses commonly stockpiled items such as food, oil, and clothing.

43 In EA 60, Abdi-Ashirta claims to guard Sumur’s grain stores. Although grain was shipped to the port of Sumur in the reign of Akhenaten (EA 98), this was likely necessitated by the strains that an extended siege had placed upon the local grain supply.

44 Jaffa was the most important harbor in southern Canaan (Rogerson 1991: 81), so it would be quite odd if Thutmose III did not take possession of it following his conquest. Grain was stored at Jaffa in a šum-štu (EA 294: 22), which must be the transliteration of šewt—the Egyptian word for granary (Helck 1960: 11; Moran 1992: 337, n. 2). Significantly, a sick and exiled Rib-Hadda was urged by the Egyptians to go to Jaffa and regain his strength (EA 138), a recommendation that perhaps anticipates the function of Jaffa as described in P. Anastasi I (see chapter five).
by Amenhotep III for fulfilling their harvest tax quotas in time for
his year 30 Sed-festival.

Internecine warfare, in addition to disrupting corvée labor and the
transport of fresh grain to the imperial depots, significantly strained
the existing grain supplies. The city of Byblos, for example, had its
crops so decimated by the war tactics of Abdi-Ashirta that the civil-
ian population was reported to have suffered greatly (EA 91). To
alleviate this crisis in his city, Rib-Hadda specifically requested that
grain be given to him from the granary in Yarimuta (EA 83). In
better times, Egypt’s grain resources would have been used specifically
to support resident garrisons—as it once had in Byblos—45—but starv-
ing Canaanites—46

While Yarimuta certainly possessed a state granary, the mention
in EA 83 of Yankhamu’s house, in which this official detained a
Canaanite citizen, strongly suggests that the site contained an admin-
istrative headquarters as well. During the reign of Amenhotep III,
Yankhamu is consistently associated with the grain supplies of Yari-
muta (EA 83, 85, 86). He may, however, also have overseen other
Canaanite towns in the region as well. At least this would appear
to have been the case judging from the mayor of Byblos’ request
to be placed within Yankhamu’s bailiwick: “Tell Ya<n>khamu, ‘I
declare Rib-Hadda to be in your charge and whatever <ha>ppens
to him is to be your responsibility.’”47 Ceremonies in which Egyptian
governors assumed responsibility for their Canaanite vassals included
a sworn oath48 and carried legal ramifications for both vassal and
overseer.49

45 In EA 125, Rib-Hadda makes reference to a garrison that Amenhotep III had
once placed in Byblos and supplied with grain from Yarimuta. Likewise in EA 117,
121, 122, and 130, he recalls an Egyptian garrison that had been stationed at
Byblos in the time of his own ancestors. In those days, the town had supposedly
been supplied with provisions given by the king himself. Less precise is the vague
statement in EA 131 that Byblos formerly possessed a garrison. EA 79, 85, and 86
specifically request that this arrangement be reinstituted in the future. A reference
to a garrison in EA 81 could be interpreted as indicating that this force had pre-
viously been stationed in Byblos or perhaps in Sumur.

46 It must be stated, however, that the Egyptians charged hungry vassals for grain
distributed from state storehouses. Once Rib-Hadda finally gained access to the
stores at Yarimuta, his complaints shift to the exorbitant cost of this grain and the
damage it inflicted on the Byblite economy (EA 74–75, 81, 85, 90).


48 That both vassal and overseer swore this oath is evident from Lab’ayu’s indig-
nant charge that his city and his god had been seized, despite the fact that he and
his Egyptian overseer had sworn their oaths together. Presumably, then, this shared
Rib-Hadda’s request to serve under the guardianship of Yankhamu at Yarimuta may have been spurred by the fact that prior to his attack on Sumur, Abdi-Ashirta had enjoyed an apparently amicable relationship with the town’s Egyptian overseer. Significant grain harvests were warehoused at Sumur (EA 60), just as they were at Yarimuta. Although the Egyptian overseer, a man named Pakhamnate, normally oversaw these stores, it fell to Abdi-Ashirta to guard the foodstuffs when he left on business (EA 60). Similarly, the mayor of Beirut officiated at Yarimuta when Yankhamu was elsewhere occupied (EA 85). Rib-Hadda, one suspects, was thus none too eager to have his access to the imperial stores at Sumur left at the mercy of his archrival.

It was during one of Pakhamnate’s imperial missions that Abdi-Ashirta took over the residency at Sumur—as previously discussed—under the pretext of saving it. Indeed, a letter in which Abdi-Ashirta attempts to explain his actions to Pakhamnate provides particularly valuable information about the functioning of the base. The letter reveals that the “palace” had been staffed by at least 29 people. Twenty-five of these had been killed in the battle (although not, assuredly, by Abdi-Ashirta himself!) and another four fled of their own volition. Of the four, only one man, Maya, bore an Egyptian name. It is clear from the missive, however, that Pakhamnate considered the coup ample cause to sever his working relationship with Abdi-Ashirta (EA 60).

oath should have prevented such a calamity from occurring without Egyptian interference (EA 251). The ceremony at which a vassal swore his loyalty involved the pharaoh, or more usually his representative, anointing the head of the vassal with oil. Such anointments were also a common feature of both coronations (EA 34) and engagements (EA 31).

Rib-Hadda admonishes another Egyptian official, Amanappa (imm-m-ipt—Albright 1946: 9), “The [legal] violence done to me is your responsibility if you neglect me” (EA 82: 33–34, trans. Moran 1992: 152). Amanappa, discussed below, was an Egyptian general who possessed a good deal of authority along the Phoenician coast. It is possible from the text of EA 73 to surmise that Amanappa may in the past have been stationed at Sumur and have acted as Rib-Hadda’s Egyptian governor, although at the time of the Amarna archive he resided in Egypt.

This man may have succeeded Amanappa as governor of Sumur. Pakhamnate had access to armed forces, according to EA 60, although it is unclear how many were Egyptian and how many were native Canaanite levies. He is posthumously accused of having betrayed Rib-Hadda (EA 131—perhaps through his patronage of Abdi-Ashirta?) and of having turned the cities into enemies (EA 132—perhaps by siding with Abdi-Ashirta against the interests of Byblos?).
Further details about the residency at Sumur are provided by Rib-Hadda’s outraged reports on Abdi-Ashirta’s post-conquest behavior. He writes, “Now, indeed, Sumur, my lord’s court and [h]is bedchamber, has been joined to h[i]m. He has slept in the bedchamber of my lord, and opened the treasure room of my lord.”\(^{51}\) The reference to the king’s bedchamber may suggest that the residency at Sumur also functioned as a campaign palace, akin to those that Thutmose III provided for himself at various locations in Syria-Palestine (Urk. IV, 975: 2–11). Indeed, Rib-Hadda may have consciously conjured the image of a barbarian defiling the pharaoh’s bed in order to rouse the righteous anger of the king.

Whether out of pure pragmatism or an offended sense of propriety, the Egyptians did indeed spring to action after the loss of Sumur. The Egyptian general Amanappa and his soldiers captured Abdi-Ashirta (EA 117). Pakhamnate regained possession of Sumur (EA 68), and order was presumably restored.

While the governors who occupied the residencies at Yarimuta and Sumur appear to have been concerned primarily with the disturbances in Amurru, there is a hint that the wars in the central hill country, fomented by Lab’ayu, may have fallen within the sphere of Addaya (EA 254). This official is known to have occupied a post at Gaza early in the reign of Akhenaten (EA 289),\(^ {52}\) and it is thus likely that he held his position already in the later years of Amenhotep III. If Addaya already operated out of Gaza, then it would appear that at least three Egyptian bases were operational in Syria-Palestine during the reign of Amenhotep III: Sumur, Yarimuta, and Gaza. Two out of these three headquarters are also known to have contained significant grain depots.\(^ {53}\) Unfortunately, the lack of contemporaneous letters from southern Syrian vassals makes it impossible to determine whether further bases should have been found inland. Likewise, good candidates for garrison officers are scarce among the remaining active officials in this reign.\(^ {54}\)

\(^{52}\) Although Campbell (1964: chart E) places this letter in the liminal zone between the end of the reign of Amenhotep III and the beginning years of Akhenaten, the prominence of the sons of Lab’ayu leads me to place it later, rather than earlier, in the sequence.
\(^{53}\) Jaffa likely should be included in this list as well. Unfortunately, the only reference to this town that might fall in the reign of Amenhotep III (EA 365) is not particularly informative.
\(^{54}\) Hanya was a ḫny ḫḏḥ, or troop commander (EA 369: 6; Redford 1990: 12),
Regarding the appearance of Egyptian troops on Canaanite soil in general during the reign of Amenhotep III, we are at something of a loss for the first couple of decades of his rule. Retrospective references give the impression that “For years archers would come out to inspect [the country]” (EA 76: 31–33, trans. Moran 1992: 146–147). If Rib-Hadda was not referencing the distant past, then it must be that within his lifetime Egyptian troops still conducted yearly tours. Like the harbor installations and the Canaanite grain tax, such annual armed visitations were originally an innovation of Thutmos III.

As is evident from the annals, the purpose of such armed tours was to display Egyptian power, to quell nascent rebellions, and to collect tribute. By the end of the reign of Thutmose III’s great-grandson, however, the tradition of annual campaigns had fallen by the wayside. Instead, Egyptian troops appeared in the region by necessity only. Egypt continued to make ample use of local Canaanite militias to achieve its purposes, but its own troops are known to have appeared on the scene only twice: once to put an end to the intrigues of Abdi-Ashirta and again to quiet unrest in the central hill country.

who in the course of his duties traveled from Gezer (EA 369) to Ugarit (EA 47). Although fortress commanders were often culled from this rank, this particular official does not appear sedentary enough in his activities to have filled such a post. Haramassa, on the other hand, is specifically designated as a mar sipri, or messenger (EA 27: 58) whose diplomatic duties carried him to Mitanni in the reign of Amenhotep III (EA 20; 21). Egyptian officials known from sources other than the Amarna letters who may have been intimately involved in foreign affairs during the reign of Amenhotep III include Khaemwast and Penhet. Both of these men held the title “overseer of northern foreign countries” (Helck 1962: 260; Weinstein 1998: 227–228).

55 Similar recollections of times past are to be found in EA 116 and 138.
56 Two distinct types of troops are mentioned in the Amarna letters, garrison troops (amelut massarti) and royal archers (sabe pitati). Whereas the former could be stationed in small numbers throughout the country, it was the latter that had in the past come out annually. Given the dearth of information for such campaigns, however, it appears likely that following the reign of Thutmose III the Egyptian pharaoh ceased to accompany his troops on such tours. For specific discussions of military organization at this period, see Helck 1962: 263; Schulman 1964a; 1964b; Pintore 1972; 1973; Galan 1994: 92–96.
57 For a very general discussion of Thutmose III’s influence upon the infrastructure of the Syro-Palestinian territories in the Amarna Period, see Galan (1994).
58 For example, Amenhotep III ordered the kings of Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre to assist Rib-Hadda in his fight against Abdi-Ashirta (EA 92). Likewise, the mayor of Megiddo appears to have spearheaded the offensive against Lab’ayu with Egyptian sanction but no troops (EA 245).
International relations in the reign of Amenhotep III

Thus far, our treatment of Egyptian foreign policy in the reign of Amenhotep III has centered upon Syria-Palestine, the area in which Egyptian control manifested itself in the emplacement of resident officials and garrison troops. It would be remiss, however, to close an investigation into the foreign affairs of this king without attempting to situate at least some of the events so far described within the wider geopolitical framework of the day. The relations of Amurru with the kingdoms of Mitanni, Hatti, and Egypt are of particular concern.

It is well known that Amenhotep III’s favorite form of diplomacy was the marriage alliance.59 An overwhelming percentage of the letters exchanged between this king and other monarchs of equal status involve negotiations of dowry and brideprice (EA 1–5, 13–14, 19–22, 24–25, 31–32). Indeed, all told, Amenhotep III is known to have negotiated five such unions.60 While these marriages can be viewed primarily as thinly veiled economic transactions,61 or even as evidence for a certain cupidity of character on the part of Amenhotep III, there is good reason to see the marriage ties with Arzawa, Mitanni, and Babylon as a very rational step toward a Hittite containment policy.62

After a long period of relative quiet, during which time its kings were preoccupied with internal rebellions, the Hittite imperial war-machine reared its head under the leadership of Suppiluliuma. Hittite thrust (EA 75)63 and Mitanni counter-thrust (EA 17)64 are witnessed

60 Negotiations appear to have been far less intense in the case of unions with vassal princesses. EA 99 records a summons to an unknown ruler to send his daughter to Egypt along with a dowry of silver, slaves, chariots, and horses. Likewise, in EA 187 the ruler of Einshasi reports that he was following orders and sending his daughter to the king. Unfortunately, it is not known in either case whether the reigning pharaoh was Amenhotep III or Akhenaten.
61 Kitchen (1998: 259) estimates that the dowry that accompanied Tushratta’s daughter amounted to somewhere in the vicinity of a quarter of a million dollars according to 1993 prices—and this in bullion value alone. The exchange of wealth that a diplomatic marriage entailed should surely not be discounted as an attractive feature of such a union.
63 This campaign is sometimes referred to as the “First Syrian Foray” (Kitchen 1962: 25, 40). For a comprehensive review of the terminology and chronological debates regarding these initial skirmishes, see Murnane 1990: 2.
64 Redford (1967: 218) chooses to see instead a Mitanni thrust and Hittite counter-thrust.
in the Amarna letters at this time. Suppiluliuma claimed that Amenhotep III had personally initiated “only the most friendly relations,” and some scholars believe a peace treaty bound Egypt and Hatti at this time. Overall, however, given Egypt’s close relations with Mitanni in the reign of Amenhotep III, it is likely that the two countries would have had a vested interest in curbing Hittite intrusions into Syrian territories and that they would have worked together to staunch such advances.

Hatti may well have possessed a secret weapon of its own in the form of Abdi-Ashirta. Although the leader of Amurru professed loyalty to Egypt and paid tribute to Mitanni (EA 86)—as well,
purportedly, as a diplomatic visit (EA 90)—he appears to have acted against the wishes of both his overlords. A very close relationship did exist, however, between Amurru and the Hittites in the reign of Akhenaten, a tie that was eventually ratified by a treaty.\textsuperscript{70} In light of this commonality of interests, it is not unlikely that the friendship between Hatti and Amurru had in fact blossomed a generation earlier. Certainly, it seems that Abdi-Ashirta’s sabotage of Egyptian interests in Lebanon would have served Hittite purposes very well.

Presumably if Egypt and Mitanni had learned of such a contraband relationship between their vassal and the Hittites, it would have angered both allies. Tushratta’s campaign into Amurru, which evidently reached as far as Sumur (EA 85), then, could be seen as an example of Mitanni utilizing its martial muscle in support of the interests of both countries.\textsuperscript{71} Likewise, Mitanni may have fabricated or enhanced the importance of a claim of withheld tribute as an excuse to rid itself of a Hittite henchman in its own political sphere. If so, it is highly ironic that the descendants of Abdi-Ashirta would still hold their dynastic seat well after the Mitanni empire had dwindled to a distant memory.\textsuperscript{72}

\textit{International relations in the reign of Akhenaten}

The end of the Mitanni kingdom as a vigorous military power would in fact come during the reign of Akhenaten. In the course of this king’s tenure, the hostilities between Hatti and Mitanni erupted into a full-scale war.\textsuperscript{73} Suppiluliuma charged into Syria, converted most

\textsuperscript{70} See the treaty between Suppiluliuma and Aziru (Beckman 1996: 33) and references to it in later Hittite treaties with Amurru (Beckman 1996: 55, 95–96).

\textsuperscript{71} Kitchen 1962: 13; Redford 1992: 171; Goetze 1980: 8. The self-same raid is likely referred to in EA 58, 86, and 95 as well. The king of Mitanni is said to have personally visited Amurru (EA 95), but EA 60 makes it abundantly clear that Abdi-Ashirta was none too happy with such an intensive Mitanni presence in his realm. Goetze (1980: 8) would see the Mitanni visit to Amurru as mounted in response to Suppiluliuma’s “First Syrian Campaign” (see below). As this Hittite offensive occurred well within the reign of Akhenaten, however, the \textit{casus belli} must be looked for elsewhere.

\textsuperscript{72} For the treaty signed between Abdi-Ashirta’s great-grandson and the Hittite king Hattusili III, see Beckman (1996: 96).

\textsuperscript{73} KUB XIX, 9, I 6–23 (Kitchen 1962: 3). Amarna letters presumed to have been written in the course of the war, or shortly thereafter, include EA 55, 59, 126, 157, 164–167 (Schulman 1978: 45; Kitchen 1962: 16–17; 1983: 278; Astour 1969: 396; Murnane 1990: 118).
of Mitanni’s former vassals into his own, and then dared to attack Mitanni’s capital directly. Perhaps unprepared for this onslaught, Tushratta fled the capital, thereby disgracing himself. The battle-shy king was later murdered, and fights ensued between rival claimants for the throne, each backed by Hatti or Assyria. For the remainder of the Late Bronze Age, the contested remnant of the Mitanni kingdom served as little more than a buffer zone between these two ascendant empires.

Suppiluliuma’s blitzkrieg into Syria, his “Great Syrian Campaign,” had one major impact on the Egyptian empire. Although the Hittite king later avowed that he had not intended to attack Kadesh, a preemptive strike by this city’s forces on Suppiluliuma’s army left the king little choice. The pro-Egyptian ruler and his son were deported to Hatti, and the latter returned as a committed Hittite vassal. While Suppiluliuma had numerous problems over subsequent years quelling rebellions in his newly conquered territory, Aitakama of Kadesh never wavered in his loyalty.

Remarkably, the Amarna archive is deluged during the reign of Akhenaten with letters from countries that appear not to have written in the past. Some of these newly defenseless former Mitanni vassals solicited Egyptian intervention by appealing to ties forged, however

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74 Hittite archives have yielded treaties concluded with Ugarit (PRU IV, 32–34) and Nukhasse (PD no. 3, CTH 53, Bryce 1999: 175). See also the historical preambles of the Sattiwaza treaty (PD no. 1, CTH 51: 14–15, obv. 45–7, Bryce 1999: 177) and that concluded with Talmi-Sharrumma of Aleppo (Beckman 1996: 89). Many of the treaties were contracted not immediately following the Great Syrian Campaign but during the six or more years it took Suppiluliuma to quell revolts in these newly conquered lands (Redford 1992: 175–176—but see Murnane 1990: 10). Sherds bearing the name of Akhenaten and specific forms of the name of the Aten found at Ugarit may indicate that this city maintained some ties to Egypt early in Akhenaten’s reign (Kitchen 1962: 35–36; Klengel 1992: 131, n. 242). Within several years, however, Cypriot pottery ceased to be imported to Egypt, and Merrilles speculates that this was due to the closure of Ugarit to Egyptian traders (Merrilles 1968: 202; Aström 1972: 774; Gittlen 1977; 1981: 51).

75 Kitchen 1962: 42–44; Beckman 1996: 37–40. From EA 56 it is possible to gather that following the defeat of Tushratta, Mitanni fragmented into at least four discrete kingdoms.

76 This campaign has also been referred to as the “First Syrian War” (Kitchen 1962; Astour 1969: 396; Goetze 1980; ten Cate 1963) and the “First Amki Attack” (Waterhouse 1965). See Murnane (1990: 2, n. 4) for a concise summary of the terminology and chronological debates pertinent to this campaign. See also Campbell 1964: 117–120.

briefly, in the reign of Thutmose III (EA 51, 59). Somewhat disingenuously, the representatives of these polities assured Akhenaten that over the subsequent centuries their loyalty had never wavered. It is significant, then, that the letters of these newly enthusiastic vassals are laced, almost to a one, with alarmed reports of military invasions by Aitakama and his Anatolian overlords (EA 53, 140, 174, 175, 176, 197, 363).

Indeed, it may have been Aitakama’s Hittite-backed invasion of the southern Syrian province of Upe (EA 53) that prompted Akhenaten to station an Egyptian governor and his troops in the strategically important town of Kumidi (EA 116, 129, 132). Located in the Lebanese Biqa, near the headwaters of the Litani River, Kumidi was ideally situated to monitor two important military and trade routes, one running north-south along the Biqa Valley and another east-west between Sidon and Damascus. Kumidi’s proximity to Damascus, moreover, allowed a partnership to be formed between the Egyptian governor at Kumidi and the ruler of Damascus, who was himself deeply embroiled in the conflict (EA 151, 189, 196, 197).

Significantly, the Egyptian governor at Kumidi, named Pakhuru, was also charged with oversight of Kadesh (EA 189, 190). Given

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78 It is fairly common in the archive to find vassals appealing to the antiquity of their ties to Egypt. See, for example, EA 52, 55, 74, 88, 106, 109, 116, 139, 194, 224, 241, 253, 295, 300, 317, and 371.
79 The greater province of Upe included Kadesh, the Biqa Valley, Damascus, parts of Lebanon, the Hauran, and the northern part of the Transjordan (Drower 1980: 472).
80 In EA 198 the ruler of Kumidi expressed his loyalty (citing the Egyptian messenger Khamashsha as a witness) and asked to be welcomed and to be given life by the pharaoh. This would seem to imply that Kumidi had not previously been in direct vassalage to Egypt. His letter, in which he declared that he possessed neither horse nor chariot, may have sparked Egyptian interest in temporarily utilizing his town as a base of operations.
82 In EA 195 the ruler of Damascus obsequiously promises to place his troops at the disposition of the Egyptian archers, and thus it would not be surprising if the letter was written when the Egyptian governor and his garrison were first installed in the nearby base at Kumidi.
83 I.e., ḫr-wḥw, “the Syrian” (Albright 1946: 18; Redford 1990: 16–17). Given his name, it is probable that Pakhuru, like Yankhamu and Addaya, was an Egyptian official of Syro-Palestinian heritage.
84 Early in the reign of Akhenaten, Aitakama still outwardly professed loyalty to the Egyptian crown (EA 189), although it was readily apparent to his contemporaries that he was already in dialogue with the Hittites.
this apparent lack of partisanship, it is likely that Pakhuru attempted to settle the conflict between Aitakama of Kadesh and Biryawaza of Damascus—at least at first—by diplomatic means. Pakhuru certainly had troops at his disposal, as is demonstrated by Rib-Hadda’s assertion that both Pakhuru and Yankhamu, together with their troops, should be ordered to come fight against Amurru (EA 117). Pakhuru does appear finally to have sent troops to the front in Amurru, although—to Rib-Hadda’s dismay—he sent only a single detachment of Suteans. This, of course, did not satisfy the irascible ruler of Byblos, who complained that three of his men were seized by these forces and transferred to Egypt (EA 122–123). Kumidi may also have been the “garrison city” mentioned in EA 234.

A cuneiform letter discovered at Kumidi, however, may indicate that at some point Akhenaten did attempt, at least indirectly, to intervene specifically on the side of Damascus. While the ruler of Kadesh may perhaps have employed the Apiru in question as mercenaries, these men could just as easily have been associated with Aziru of Amurru, the ruler of Kadesh’s ally in this war. Indeed, like his father Abdi-Ashirta, Aziru was infamous for consorting with the Apiru (EA 116, 117, 132, 197). It is unclear from the letter, however, whether Akhenaten’s claim to have plundered the Apiru was due to his having provided Egyptian troops or whether he simply appropriated the victory of his Damascene vassal as his own.

In the Kumidi tablet, which was addressed to the ruler of Damascus (who must at that time have been resident at Kumidi), Akhenaten commands: “Send me the ‘Apiru of the pastureland (?) concerning whom I sent you as follows ‘I will settle them in the cities of the land of Kush insomuch as I have plundered them.’” While the ruler of Kadesh may perhaps have employed the Apiru in question as mercenaries, these men could just as easily have been associated with Aziru of Amurru, the ruler of Kadesh’s ally in this war. Indeed, like his father Abdi-Ashirta, Aziru was infamous for consorting with the Apiru (EA 116, 117, 132, 197). It is unclear from the letter, however, whether Akhenaten’s claim to have plundered the Apiru was due to his having provided Egyptian troops or whether he simply appropriated the victory of his Damascene vassal as his own.

It has become almost a truism in discussions of the Egyptian administrative system in Late Bronze Age Syria-Palestine to state that the empire consisted of three provinces: Canaan (governed from Gaza), Phoenicia and Amurru (governed from Sumur), and Upe (governed from Kumidi). While this arrangement would indeed be a

85 Pakhuru certainly had troops at his disposal, as is demonstrated by Rib-Hadda’s assertion that both Pakhuru and Yankhamu, together with their troops, should be ordered to come fight against Amurru (EA 117). Pakhuru does appear finally to have sent troops to the front in Amurru, although—to Rib-Hadda’s dismay—he sent only a single detachment of Suteans. This, of course, did not satisfy the irascible ruler of Byblos, who complained that three of his men were seized by these forces and transferred to Egypt (EA 122–123). Kumidi may also have been the “garrison city” mentioned in EA 234.


most logical and satisfying parceling out of territory, there is noth-
ing to suggest that the Egyptian governor and his garrison occupied
Kumidi for much longer than the beginning portion of Akhenaten’s
reign. Certainly prior to this period no such base existed (EA 198),
and by the end of Akhenaten’s reign it appears that the town was
again ungarrisoned (EA 196)\(^8\) and relied on the ruler of Damascus
for its protection (EA 197). Likewise, the fact that Kumidi appears
in Seti I’s topographical lists\(^9\) implies that the base had not remained
under direct Egyptian authority.

*Fresh troubles in Amurru*

The other Egyptian base, aside from Kumidi, that did not survive
Akhenaten’s rule was Sumur. At the end of Amenhotep III’s reign,
Egypt’s timely intervention and Abdi-Ashtira’s murder had restored
the base and its surrounding territories to Egyptian control. Pakham-
nate, the governor who oversaw the base prior to Abdi-Ashtira’s
coup, was reinstated (EA 68), and the status quo returned. This
interlude of relative peace, however, was not to persist for long. In
short order, Abdi-Ashtira’s sons set about reconquering the territory
won by their father.

Abdi-Ashtira’s son Aziru, in particular, caused Egypt and its loyal
vassals a tremendous amount of trouble. Aziru, like his father, out-
wardly professed loyalty to the Egyptian crown, but surreptitiously
acted in his own best interests, as well as the best interests of the
Hittite empire. Although it appears that he did not formally declare
himself a Hittite vassal (and thus receive his own personalized treaty)\(^10\)
until relatively late in his career, his dealings with the Hittites (EA

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\(^8\) The restoration of the relevant lines (EA 196: 10–11) is admittedly uncertain
(Moran 1992: 274, n. 6).
\(^9\) Simons 1937: XIII, 55; XIV, 57; XV, 60.
cantly, a treaty between the grandson of Aziru and the son of Suppiluliuma (CTH 62, trans. Beckman 1996:
55–59) mentions that Aziru had originally been hostile to the Hittites but that he
was “brought to servitude” (Campbell 1964: 88–89). Likewise, in the course of the
“Second Great Syrian War,” Suppiluliuma “tarried in the land of Amurru because
the lands were strong (i.e., refractory) and it took six years until he had reduced
them to order”\(^\) (KUB XIX, 9, trans. Kitchen 1962: 3). As no mention is made in
the contemporary treaty or in the Amarna letters of any separation of Amurrite
and Hittite interests, it is difficult to know what to make of these reports.
late eighteenth dynasty

55, 59, 127, 129, 140, 161, 197) and his partnership with Aitakama (EA 140, 151, 162) were well known to his contemporaries. Aziru and his brothers enjoyed prodigious military success. Indeed, nearly all territories within Amurrus greater sphere either fell victim to their attacks\(^91\) or hastened to offer alliance.\(^92\)

Of all the concerned vassals, it was Rib-Hadda, Abdi-Ashirtas old arch nemesis, who most stridently decried the rebuilding of Amurrus power. Through his letters, and some assorted others, it is possible to chronicle the second siege of Sumur. The letters detail Azirus attack on the town and its garrison (EA 103, 104, 106), his blockade of it by land and sea (EA 98, 105, 108–109, 112, 114, 116–117), the flight of Sumurs garrison and personnel (EA 67, 96, 103, 106, 114),\(^93\) the murder of one Egyptian governor (EA 124, 129, 131–132), the surrender of another (EA 132, 149), Azirus occupation of the house of the king (EA 59) with his own troops and his chariots (EA 67), and the eventual destruction of the city (EA 159–160, 162).\(^94\)

The succession of Egyptian governors at Sumur prior to its capture is not entirely clear, but a workable scenario may be reconstructed. Pakhamnate, who reoccupied his office after Abdi-Ashirtas murder, appears to have died himself shortly thereafter (EA 106).\(^95\) His son, a man named Ha\textsuperscript{ip},\(^96\) succeeded him in his post. H\textsuperscript{ip} may well have been raised at Sumur, and if so he would have witnessed at close quarters the growing power of Amurrus. For whatever

\(^{91}\) Towns and polities attacked by Aziru include Irqata (EA 100, 139, 140), Ardata (EA 109, 140), Ammiya (EA 139, 140), Eldata (EA 139), Ullaza (EA 104, 105, 109, 140), Tunip (EA 59, 161), Damascus (EA 151, 197), Qatna (EA 55), Amki (EA 140), and Niy (EA 59).

\(^{92}\) Towns that reportedly acted in consort with Aziru included Shigata (EA 98, 104), Arwada (EA 98, 104–105), Am\textsuperscript{pi} (EA 98, 102, 104), Beirut (EA 103, 106, 118), Sidon (EA 103, 106, 118), Ardata (EA 104), Ibrita (EA 104), Wahliya (EA 104), Ugarit (EA 67, 98), and eventually Byblos (EA 67, 98). Many of these allied territories had in fact been conquered by Azirus father, Abdi-Ashira, in the recent past.

\(^{93}\) Some of the men fleeing Sumur evidently carried pestilence (EA 96). While they likely suffered from the same plague that afflicted large portions of the ancient Near East at this time (EA 35, 244, 362; Redford 1970: 45, 49; Goedicke 1984), the contagion could have been rendered even more severe due to the cramped and unhygienic conditions of life under siege.

\(^{94}\) More general references to Azirus capture of Sumur include EA 134, 138–140.

\(^{95}\) The governor may in fact have died of natural causes, given that the report contains no elaboration of the circumstances of his death. Rib-Hadda, who undoubtedly would not have hesitated to lay blame on Aziru and his confederates if they could be implicated, is silent in this case.

\(^{96}\) Egyptian “\text{r\textsuperscript{p}py}” (Albright 1946: 10). See EA 131, 132.
reason, Ha’ip seemed—like his father—to have followed a more conciliatory path with regard to his aggressive neighbors than Rib-Hadda of Byblos would have preferred. For this reason, the latter strongly suggested that Ha’ip be brought to Egypt for questioning (EA 107). If a letter from Rib Hadda referring to Ha’ip’s presence at the Egyptian court can be taken as evidence, it might appear that for once the advice of the ruler of Byblos had been heeded (EA 133).

In the interim of Ha’ip’s absence, a man named Pawuru7 took over governorship of Sumur. He appears to have been transferred from an erstwhile post at Gaza (EA 289), where he had been deeply involved in the wars that still plagued the central hill country (EA 263, 287). Upon his arrival he met with Aziru, who seems to have felt that he had thereby convinced Pawuru of his loyalty (EA 171). Much to Aziru’s dismay, however, Pawuru did not continue the relatively pro-Amurru policies of Pakhamnate or Ha’ip (EA 132). Although renowned for his wisdom (EA 129), Pawuru may not in fact have made particularly wise choices, for he appears next in the letters as a corpse—cast aside and denied funerary rites (EA 131). Indeed, the particular manner in which Aziru disposed of his victim seems to have been perfectly calculated to strike dread in the heart of an Egyptian. Perhaps it is not surprising then that when Ha’ip regained leadership of Sumur, he promptly ceded it to Aziru (EA 132, 149).98

Oddly enough, Akhenaten appears to have tolerated Aziru’s actions, ordering him only to rebuild the city99 and to present himself at

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7 Egyptian $\text{py-wr}$, “The great one” (Albright 1946: 19). Pawuru may have been a $\text{hry pdl}$, or troop commander, if Moran’s (1992: 258) restoration of EA 171: 15–16 is correct. As is noted throughout this work, men of this rank often commanded Egyptian bases.

98 EA 127: 7–8 may also refer to Ha’ip’s abandonment of Sumur to Aziru, although the interpretation is difficult (Knudtzon 1964: 543). It should be noted that in addition to the governors of Sumur already mentioned, Yankhamu (EA 102, 105, 106, 131), Haya (EA 109, 112), and Amanappa (EA 109) were all at different points involved in the attempt to liberate Sumur from Aziru’s attacks. Yankhamu may still have been operating out of Yarimuta, although during his absences the granary was overseen by Yapa-Hadda of Beirut (EA 98, 105). EA 116 appears to imply that Yarimuta still possessed a garrison—as Rib-Hadda specifically requests that “the king send archers (and) Yankha<mu> along with [the prefec]ts (interpretation uncertain) from the land of Yarimuta” (EA 116: 72–74, trans. Moran 1992: 192).

99 As Liverani (1990: 239) suggests, Aziru’s evident reluctance to rebuild Sumur was probably a delaying tactic intended to postpone the installation of another Egyptian governor at the base. Aziru presumably hoped that the Egyptians would assign him sole guardianship of the city.
Bryce suggests, quite astutely, that this apparent leniency may have arisen out of a very real fear that Aziru would defect to the Hittites and that Egypt would thereby lose both its annual tribute and its access to the Eleutheros Valley transit corridor, a path that led straight into the heart of southern Syria. Akhenaten’s patience finally ran out, however, after Aziru abetted the dethronement and eventual murder of Rib-Hadda (EA 137, 138, 162). Like his father before him, Aziru was forcibly summoned to Egypt, where he was held for an apparently alarming period of time (EA 169, 170). Upon his release, however, Aziru promptly contracted a formal treaty with Suppiluliuma. Egypt’s anxiety must have increased markedly, then, as it witnessed the absorption of both Sumur and Amurru into the ever-enlarging Hittite empire.

A descendant of Suppiluliuma would boast in a historical preamble to a treaty concluded with Aleppo that by the end of his forebear’s reign the land of Kadesh and that of Amurru had been forcefully taken from the possession of Egypt. Whether these territories had been won from Egypt directly or indirectly, however, has remained a disputed question. According to Kitchen, the claim likely refers to the defection of Kadesh and Amurru from Egyptian vassalage. Schulman, however, envisions a direct confrontation between

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100 Although chronological issues are far from certain, Akhenaten may have been especially eager to have Aziru in Egypt to attend the elaborate state ceremonies that took place at Amarna in his twelfth year (Redford 1988: 14–15). Paintings in the tombs of Huya and Mery-re II show that many foreign dignitaries were indeed present at this festivity (Aldred 1957–1958: 116).

101 Bryce 1999: 186. In a similar vein, Murnane suggests that Egypt may actually have ratified a formal arrangement “by which Egypt would allow Aziru a free hand, and pay him subsidies, in return for his protection of the pharaoh’s interests in northern Syria” (Murnane 1990: 121). Helck (1962: 177) likewise argues that Egypt may have been willing to provide concessions to Amurru due to its importance as a buffer state between Egyptian territory and that controlled by the Hittites (see also de Vaux 1978: 102). Certainly, the gold and silver that Aziru reports having received from the king in EA 161 might argue in support of this theory.

102 This was not Aziru’s first time to Egypt, as is evident from his statements in EA 161. He had apparently explained himself in the presence of the pharaoh at some point previously. Given his reference in the same letter to having been made “mayor” by the king himself, the visit may have been at the death of his father.

103 For a discussion of the chronology of Aziru’s rapprochement with the Hittites, see Redford 1967: 223–224.

104 KUB XIX, 9; Beckman 1996: 89; also Kitchen 1962: 3.
Hittite and Egyptian armies in which the latter were dealt a solid defeat. 106

A number of letters from the Amarna archive order vassals to prepare before the arrival of Egyptian troops, perhaps indicating that a military operation was at least in an advanced stage of planning before Akhenaten’s death. Polities that received these letters included Ashkelon (EA 324–325), Beirut (EA 141–142), Siribashani (EA 201), Shashkhimi (EA 203), Qanu (EA 204), Tubu (EA 205), Naziba (EA 206), Hazor (EA 227), Akshapa (EA 367), and Rukhizza (EA 191). 107 Although it is not certain that the letters all refer to the same Egyptian campaign, 108 the distribution of these towns on routes both inland and coastal may well imply that a double-pronged invasion of Amurru and Kadesh—Egypt’s two most wayward vassals—was in the works. 109

Significantly, the letters to Beirut coincide with the Amurrite-backed revolution of Byblos (EA 142), about which Akhenaten was apparently furious (EA 162). Although it is not certain by any means, the purpose of the campaign to Amurru may well have been to capture Aziru and forcibly

106 See Kitchen (1962: 3, n. 2) and Schulman (1978: 43–48; 1988: 57, 75, n. 101). Schulman believes that the attack would have occurred in the southern Biqa territory of Amki. EA 174–176 and 363 report a joint attack on districts of Amki by the Hittites and the king of Kadesh. The letters do not, however, report any Egyptian activity in the area.

107 Similar letters in which the geographic locality of the recipient cannot be ascertained include EA 213, 216, 337.

108 The general uniformity of the message in these letters suggests that the orders may well have been issued simultaneously. For the opinion that the planned attack never occurred, see Campbell 1964: 132. Several letters from the king of Tyre (EA 150, 153, 154, 155), however, clearly indicate that Egyptian troops were indeed active along the Phoenician coast near the end of Akhenaten’s reign.

109 Egypt’s enemies, as well as its vassals, may have been preparing for the arrival of the Egyptian army, judging from an Ugaritic letter in which a general reports to his king that he is guarding the southern frontier for signs of an Egyptian army (Nougayrol 1968). Although the letter was previously dated to the Nineteenth (Goetze 1929; Liverani 1962: 76–78; Rainey 1971) or Twentieth Dynasties (Schaeffer 1968; tentatively Schulman 1977–1978: 127, n. 38), strong stylistic similarities to the letters of Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru have led to a redating in recent years. For extensive discussions of the controversy surrounding this letter, see the discussions in Schulman 1981: 17–18; 1988: 61; Murnane 1990: 12, n. 55; Klengel 1992: 137. The informant’s description of the Egyptian king traveling with only light forces but expecting to acquire equipment, foodstuffs, and reinforcements on the way is consistent with what we know of Egyptian military practice as gleaned from the Amarna archive. The presence of the king himself is unsettling, however, as neither Amenhotep III nor Akhenaten is known to have campaigned personally in the north during the period of time covered by the Amarna letters.
bring him back to Egypt. Certainly, as discussed previously, the ruler of Amurru had been delaying a concrete response to Akhenaten’s summons for some time (EA 164, 165, 166, 167, 168). If so, the mission evidently succeeded. A presumably similar raid on Kadesh, however, did not manage to capture this city’s ruler, although it may have engendered an armed reprisal on the part of the Hittites. While in Egypt, Aziru received a report of a Hittite attack on the Egyptian territory of Amki led by a general named Lupakku\textsuperscript{10} (EA 170; see also 174–176, 363).\textsuperscript{11} As is implied by the plague prayers of Mursili II, this particular Hittite attack was likely mounted in response to an earlier Egyptian attack on Kadesh.\textsuperscript{12}

Continuing wars in the hill country of Canaan

Although Egypt was mainly preoccupied with its attempts to stem the triple threat posed by the Hittites, the ruler of Kadesh, and the

\textsuperscript{10} See also EA 173–176 and 363, in which Syrian rulers complain of Hittite attacks led jointly by the Hittites and Aitakama of Kadesh. The name of the Hittite general leading the attack on Amki in EA 170 is identical to that of a general mentioned as leading an attack on Amki in the Deeds of Suppiluliuma. This fact has led some scholars to conflate the two battles and argue that it was the widow of Akhenaten or Smenkhkare who asked Suppiluliuma to send her a son to wed (see Redford 1967: 158–162, especially the citations on p. 159, n. 300). For numerous reasons, discussed below, scholars generally prefer to place the attack on Amki in the Deeds of Suppiluliuma at the end of the reign of Tutankhamun (see the extensive citations in Redford 1967: 159, n. 299, n. 302; Murnane 1990: 127–129).

\textsuperscript{11} Ironically, judging from EA 140, it appears that Aziru may have been intimately involved in this campaign, even though he was held in Egypt at the time. The mayor of Byblos writes, “Aziru even [com]mitted a crime [wh]en he was brought [in]to you. The crime [was against] us. He sent [his] men [to] Itakkama[and] he smote all the lands of Amqu, lands of the king. Now he has sent his men to seize the lands of Amqu and (their) territories” (EA 140: 20–30, trans. Moran 1992: 226).

\textsuperscript{12} Murnane 1990: 18–20, 127, 137. The Karnak talatat depicting Egyptian and Hittite warriors in combat cannot pertain to this battle, as work on Akhenaten’s Theban temples would have been abandoned by year 5. Indeed, given that there appear to have been no direct military clashes between the two empires early in Akhenaten’s reign, it seems safer to assign the talatat to Tutankhamun (Murnane 1990: 18–19). Schulman (1988: 56, 61) believed the talatat depicted a skirmish with the Hittites during the Egyptian expedition to seize Abdi-Ashirta. His theory, however, makes it necessary to explain how it was that Abdi-Ashirta was seized in the reign of Akhenaten and why it was that Hittite forces would necessarily have been involved. The case put forward by Schulman in this respect does not appear particularly convincing. In an earlier article, Schulman (1978: 45–46) suggested that the scenes of Hittite prisoners of war in the Memphite tomb of Horemheb may have stemmed from this final campaign of Akhenaten’s to Kadesh. This theory relies upon Horemheb’s military career stretching back into the reign of Akhenaten, which may have been the case but is as yet unproven.
ruler of Amurru, conflicts continued on other fronts as well. Tyre\textsuperscript{113} and Sidon feuded (EA 146, 147–149, 151–152, 154), the ruler of Hazor was in the process of actively enlarging his kingdom (EA 148, 364), and war still raged in the central hill country. It was in efforts to quell this last conflict, however, that Egypt expended the most energy.

Lab'ayu of Shechem had been murdered at the end of Amenhotep III’s reign or perhaps at the beginning of Akhenaten’s, but his sons quickly set out to revive their father’s conquests.\textsuperscript{114} In this cause they enlisted the aid of Gezer, Ginti-Kirmil, Qiltu, and Gimtu, while Ashkelon and Lachish supported them with supplies (EA 287). The coalition proceeded to attack Megiddo, Rubutu, and Gina (EA 246, 250, 286, 287, 289, 290), but their ultimate goal was the defeat of Jerusalem (EA 280, 287–289).\textsuperscript{115}

In order to restore peace to the hill country, Egyptian officials and their garrison troops were stationed at both Gezer and Jerusalem. Significantly, on both occasions these officials commandeered houses that belonged to the local rulers. In the case of Gezer, the vassal Adda-Danu wrote, “There being a war against me from the mountains, I built: b[a]-n[i]-t[i] a house—its (= the village’s) name is Mankhatu—to make preparations before the arrival of the archers of the king, my lord, and Maya\textsuperscript{116} has just taken it away from me.

\textsuperscript{113} Based on references to Tyre in EA 155 as “the city of Mayati” and to Tyre’s ruler as the “servant of Mayati,” numerous authors have argued that Akhenaten bestowed Tyre upon his daughter Meritaten as part of her personal fortune (Albright 1937; Von Soden 1952: 432; Alt 1959a: 117–118; Helck 1962: 262; Kitchen 1962: 20, n. 1; 11, n. 1). Such a bequeathal of the proceeds from a particular polity would be analogous to the donation of other Syro-Palestinian towns to Amun (cf. Urk. IV, 744: 3–8 and P. Harris I: 11: 11; 68a, 1). Katzenstein (1973: 34, n. 29; 38), however, views the repeated invocation of Meritaten as outright flattery of a newly appointed queen.

\textsuperscript{114} According to Finkelstein, “the exceptional strength of Shechem during the Late Bronze Age should be understood in the light of the special composition of its population: Shechem was the only hill country center with a relatively strong and dense rural and urban “countryside” (esp. in northern Samaria) which gave it economic strength and with a large number of non-sedentary groups (mainly south of Shechem) which gave it military strength” (Finkelstein 1993: 122).

\textsuperscript{115} Individuals the confederacy was said to have slain included Turbazu, Yaptikh-Hadda, and Zimredda of Lachish (EA 288).

\textsuperscript{116} Maya is known from EA 216, 217, 218, 300, 328, and 337. He is discovered in all but the last of these letters delivering messages to Canaanite rulers that often concerned the imminent arrival of the Egyptian archers. The fact that one of the vassals was commanded to guard Maya, however, may indicate that this official was normally based in the region. There have been attempts to identify Maya with
and placed his commissioner\textsuperscript{117} in it. Enjoin Reanap,\textsuperscript{118} my commissioner, to restore my village to me, as I am making preparations before the arrival of the archers of the king, my lord” (EA 292: 26–40, trans. Moran 1992: 335). Adda-Danu’s letter clearly demonstrates, then, that vassals could be held responsible for housing as well as for feeding occupying forces. It is also clear, however, that local rulers did not hesitate to complain if the imperial burden proved too taxing.

With regard to Jerusalem, the Egyptian official Yankhamu\textsuperscript{119} had sent a garrison of archers under the command of Addaya to the city at the ruler’s own request (EA 284). When the officer and his troops quartered themselves in one of the ruler’s own houses, however, Abdi-Heba fired off an irate letter to Akhenaten asking the king to provide for his own troops (EA 285). Matters deteriorated further after an episode—which involved Nubians, tools, and a rooftop—almost resulted in the death of Abdi-Heba. Whether the incident had to do with a failed attempt to fortify an already fortified house,\textsuperscript{120} or whether it represents an illegal entry and an attempt on Abdi-Heba’s life, is unclear (EA 287).\textsuperscript{121} The specification that the men involved were Kushites,\textsuperscript{122} however, is interesting, for it sheds additional

\textsuperscript{117} The Akkadian word \textit{rabisu} can refer to Egyptian officers stationed in Syria-Palestine as well as to those who just passed through on errands. The word will be discussed in more detail below.

\textsuperscript{118} I.e., Egyptian \textit{r’-nfr} (Albright 1946: 20). This official is otherwise attested in EA 315 and EA 326, sent from Yurza and Ashkelon respectively. It seems clear, then, that his sphere of influence was concentrated in Canaan proper, suggesting that he may well have operated out of Gaza.

\textsuperscript{119} This portion of the war in the central hill country appears to have predated much of the conflict at Sumur, for both Yankhamu and Pawuru were intensively involved in quelling this feud (EA 287).

\textsuperscript{120} The description of the event is prefaced by a remark concerning the fortification of the house. Moran (1992: 328) translates: “though the house is well fortified, they attempted a very serious crime. They \lbracket\,\lbracket\,took their tools, and \textit{I had to seek shelter by a support for the roof}\rbracket\rbracket\,“ (EA 287: 34–37).

\textsuperscript{121} One wonders, however, what the motive for such surreptitious behavior would have been. If the Egyptians truly wished to kill Abdi-Heba, surely they could have accomplished it openly or have sent the ruler of Jerusalem to Egypt. The text at this juncture is extremely difficult to interpret, and many readings for this passage have been offered. For extensive references to other translations, see Moran 1992: 287, n. 9.

\textsuperscript{122} \textit{“AmeluKu-ši,”} EA 287: 33, trans. Moran 1992: 328. For other references to
light on Egypt’s practice of utilizing Nubian soldiers in its military (see chapter two).

Whatever had happened with Abdi-Heba, the Nubians, and his roof, his situation was shortly to worsen further. Evidently due to charges of treason levied at the ruler (EA 286), Addaya withdrew his garrison from Jerusalem and returned to his own “house” at Gaza (EA 289), where Pawuru was also stationed. These men—Abdi-Heba’s supposed guardians—then left their charge to face the wrath of his enemies alone, vainly pleading for the garrison’s return (EA 286, 287).

Another indication that the Egyptians may finally have sided against Jerusalem in this war is that the rulers of Gezer and Ginti-Kirmil enjoyed a relatively high status with respect to other Canaanite vassals. The ruler of Gezer, for example, felt free to request a shipment of myrrh from Egypt (EA 269) and was himself handsomely paid by the king for a shipment of forty “extremely beautiful female cupbearers.” The ruler of Ginti-Kirmil, meanwhile, evidently received from the king as a gift twelve sets of linen garments and a golden goblet (EA 265). Further, the Egyptians entrusted the garrisoning

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123 Gaza clearly served as a base for Egyptian officials in Canaan. Garrisons were issued from Gaza and lodged there as necessary. The Egyptian official Addaya resided at Gaza, as did Puvuru, at least on a temporary basis. All this led Abdi-Heba, rather petulantly, to ask why Jerusalem was not of concern to the king as Gaza was (EA 289). Interestingly, Addaya apparently held jurisdiction over both Jerusalem (EA 289) and its archrival Shechem (EA 254). This would appear equivalent to Kumidi’s mediating position between Kadesh and Damascus or Sumur’s former jurisdiction over both Byblos and Amurru. The governor of Gaza may in fact be mentioned in the same breath as the governor of Kumidi by Rib-Hadda, who requests their help in combating Abdi-Ashirta, but the reading is not entirely clear (EA 129: 84; see Moran 1992: 209, 210, n. 29).

124 As part of his plea for the return of the garrison, Abdi-Heba writes, “As the king has placed his name in Jerusalem forever, he cannot abandon it—the land of Jerusalem” (EA 287: 60–63). Akhenaten, unlike Ramesses II, does not appear to have decorated the jambs of Canaanite buildings with his own cartouche, so it is unclear what Abdi-Heba is referring to in this instance.

125 EA 369, trans. Moran 1992: 366. Significantly, this is the sole instance in the Amarna corpus of a vassal being directly paid by the pharaoh for a shipment of chattel or goods. Gezer’s position as “probably the most important city-kingdom in southern Canaan, commanding a vital crossroad of the Via Maris and the main road leading up from the northern Shephelah to the hill country” (Singer 1986: 26) likely accorded it special status.

126 In the text of EA 266, the same ruler of Ginti-Kirmil, Tagi, reports sending a gift to Akhenaten of a harnesses, a bow, a quiver, a spear, and covers. The personal character of the gift distinguishes it from the more normal shipments by vas-
of the strategically important, and apparently leaderless,\textsuperscript{127} town of Beth Shan to troops from Ginti-Kirmil (EA 289).\textsuperscript{128}

\textit{The occupation of Beth Shan and other Egyptian bases in Akhenaten’s reign}

Judging from the recent discovery at Beth Shan of a letter penned by the ruler of Ginti-kirmil to Lab’ayu of Shechem, it appears that the former also enjoyed the responsibility of garrisoning Beth Shan during the reign of Amenhotep III.\textsuperscript{129} Due to its locale, a garrison stationed at Beth Shan would have been capable of guarding three fords of the Jordan River as well as the juncture of two major trade routes. It is not surprising, then, that this town was to become one of Egypt’s most important bases in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties (see chapters five and six).

While Beth Shan may have been garrisoned in part by men from Ginti-kirmil in the Amarna Period\textsuperscript{130} (and there is indeed nothing remotely Egyptian in the style of the architecture so far uncovered),\textsuperscript{131} the unusual quantity of Egyptian and Egyptian-style artifacts suggests that Egyptians may also have been resident at the site. Due to its substantial size and the richness of its material culture, excavation

\textsuperscript{127} The corpus of Amarna letters includes neither a letter from nor a reference to Beth Shan’s ruler. It may be that like Sumur, Ullaza, Yarimuta, Jaffa, or Gaza, the town was nominally in the hands of the Egyptians as a crown possession—while neighboring rulers were also charged with its protection. Indeed, it is even possible that Beth Shan had belonged to the Egyptians ever since its original conquest by Thutmose III (Simons 1937: 112; Na’aman 1977: 173, n. 7).

\textsuperscript{128} Alt (1926: 248) believed that the ruler of Ginti-Kirmil had conquered Beth Shan and garrisoned it with his own men without the consent of Egypt. Given the high standing of this ruler with the king, however, it appears more likely that this was simply another case in which Egypt preferred to draw upon local troops rather than to expend its own resources. For the opinion that Tagi’s occupation of Beth Shan was indeed sanctioned, see also Dhorme 1927: 99; Rowe 1930: 23; Horowitz 1997: 99. Such use of local soldiers in “Egyptian” garrisons is reminiscent of Taanach letter 6, which was discussed in chapter three. In this letter Amenhotep rebukes a Canaanite ruler, saying “Further, in the garrison there are none of your retainers, and you do not come to my presence, nor do you send your brother” (Schulman 1962: 194).

\textsuperscript{129} Horowitz 1996; 1997.

\textsuperscript{130} The Amarna Period, or LB IIA, is coeval with the University of Pennsylvania’s level IXA and Mazar’s R1 or R1a (A. Mazar 1993a: 216).

\textsuperscript{131} Rowe 1930; A. Mazar 1993a: 216.
has primarily concentrated upon a massive temple complex dedicated to the god Mekal, among other deities. The Egyptian or Egyptian-style votive goods discovered in the temple precinct include a nude goddess grasping a w3-s-scepter on a gold pendant, the head of an Egyptian official carved in basalt, an alabaster drinking cup, lids of alabaster kohl jars, the pottery snout of a hippopotamus, an ivory inlay depicting a Nubian captive with his hands raised high, an ivory cosmetic pot, several scarabs, and numerous Egyptian-style pendants that decrease in frequency with distance from the temple’s core.132

Unfortunately, the ceramic corpus of level IX at Beth Shan has never been published. The only Egyptian-style pottery fragment that Rowe describes in his reports is a jar handle bearing a scarab impression of a man standing with both hands at his sides.133 Given that subsequent excavators have discovered Egyptian-style ceramic in the levels both preceding and postdating this stratum, however, it is likely that other examples of Egyptian-style pottery in fact went unnoticed by the original excavators.134

Of far more importance to illuminating the relationship between the Egyptian nationals stationed at Beth Shan and local Canaanite culture, however, are two items that were discovered in the temple precinct. The first, a faience bowl, depicts on its interior an Egyptian man whose arms are raised in adoration. Above this individual is a hieroglyphic text that refers both to Beth Shan and to its patron god, Mekal.135 Far more impressive, however, is the so-called Mekal stele136 dedicated by Pareemheb in memory of his father—an architect or builder (\(\dot{\text{k}}d\)) named Amenemopet.137 The stele depicts both

132 For these Egyptian-style items, see Rowe 1928: 145; 1929: 44, 52; 1930: 13; 1940: pl. 68A, 5; pl. 69A, 4; pl. 71A, 3, 4, 6, 7; James and McGovern 1993: 128.
133 Rowe 1929: 51.
134 The simple, utilitarian nature of Egyptian-style ceramic in Canaan, combined with the fact that these wares were almost always fashioned from local clays, meant that until recently this pottery was hardly ever recognized in the archaeological record (Weinstein 1981: 22).
137 An individual bearing the same name but the titles of “overseer of the granaries of the lord of the two lands” and “steward” donated a stele found out of context in the post-Egyptian level V. This stele is similar in phraseology but is dedicated to purely Egyptian gods. Given the very different titles borne by the two Amenemopets, however, it is doubtful that one man dedicated both steles. For discussions of this stele, see Rowe 1930: 37–38; Albright 1938b: 77; Thompson 1970: 54–55.
men offering before Mekal, who is depicted seated, cloaked in Canaanite garb,\textsuperscript{138} and grasping a \textit{w3s}-scepter. Below the scene runs a standard New Kingdom \textit{htp-di-nsw} formula that wished for the deceased, among other things, keen vision, honor, and love.\textsuperscript{139}

The Mekal stele provides the information that an Egyptian, apparently unaffiliated with the military, resided at Beth Shan along with his son. The presence of these two generations (like Pakhamnate and Ha’ip at Sumur) may either indicate that Egyptians were encouraged to settle in the occupied territory along with their families or that they were free to marry locally. Likewise, if the Mekal stele and the abundance of Egyptian-style artifacts in the temple are any indication, these expatriates can be said to have worshipped at Canaanite temples and quite possibly to have been buried in Canaanite soil.\textsuperscript{140} The plethora of Egyptian-style artifacts likewise suggests that craftsmen as well as architects supplemented the Egyptian military population.

Despite these glimpses into expatriate life on the frontier, no clue is given as to what it was, exactly, that Amenemopet and the Egyptians were building at Beth Shan. Given the highly planned, Egyptian-style architecture that would predominate at the site as early as the Nineteenth Dynasty, it would not be surprising if tentative first steps had already been instituted toward transforming the shape of the town in the late Eighteenth Dynasty. Unfortunately, the temple

\textsuperscript{138} Mekal’s attributes are reminiscent of Egyptian depictions of the Canaanite gods Resheph and Baal (Stadelmann 1967: 52–56; Thompson 1970: 60).

\textsuperscript{139} That a Canaanite deity is honored in a \textit{htp di nsw} formula is extremely interesting. If interpreted literally, it would imply that the reigning pharaoh had provided goods to the temple of Beth Shan that would then be redistributed to the funerary cult of Amenemopet. Even if the formula is taken as a purely traditional inclusion, however, the presence of the inscription still implies that a foreign god could be relied upon to fulfill traditional funerary wishes.

\textsuperscript{140} Only two Beth Shan tombs exhibit a vague stylistic affinity with level IX. Tomb 27 possessed an Egyptian plaquette bearing the cartouche of Amenhotep II and a carnelian scarab. Tomb 29 included two Egyptian-style tazzas (Oren 1973: 100). Almost certainly the Late Bronze cemetery for the site as a whole remains undiscovered, especially since Canaanite graves from this period are scarce as well. It is interesting, however, that the Amenemopet of the level V stele fervently wishes for a “burial in the cemetery of my town” (Rowe 1930: 38). Given this statement, it may have been that the majority of Egyptians who died abroad at this time were brought back to Egypt for burial. On the other hand, it is unclear why Paraemheb would have chosen to commemorate his father in a funerary stele at Beth Shan, if the man was safely at rest in a tomb in Egypt.
precinct and an adjacent but poorly understood monumental building are all that has been uncovered of the Amarna Period at Beth Shan. It would be extremely interesting, however, to know whether Egyptian cultural influence extended beyond this limited area.

Beth Shan, Sumur, Kumidi, Gaza, Yarimuta, Gezer, and Jerusalem were not the only semipermanent Egyptian bases in Akhenaten’s northern empire, as is apparent from other references in the Amarna letters. In EA 67, for example, a vassal complains that after Aziru took over Sumur “all the fortress commanders of your land […] became friendly with him.” While, admittedly, the term “fortress commanders” may have been a euphemism for Canaanite mayors, it could likewise refer to Egyptian fortress commanders—as the same term certainly does in EA 30.

One candidate for such a fortress-town is Ullaza. This site was first garrisoned in the reign of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 1237: 9–15), presumably as part of this pharaoh’s effort to secure and equip important coastal harbors. Although not definitively located, Ullaza is generally thought to have lain at the mouth of the Nahal Barid on the Lebanese coast. Thus, like Sumur, Ullaza would have provided the Egyptians with both a working harbor and a convenient route inland through the mountains. While it is uncertain whether Ullaza was still garrisoned in the reign of Amenhotep III, it was definitely occupied by Egyptians in the reign of his son. As at Sumur, however, Aziru and his brothers eventually vanquished the base (EA 104, 109, 117, 140), expelled the Egyptian governor (EA 104), and caused the flight of the garrison personnel to Byblos (EA 105).

Jaffa is another site that quite possibly had been established originally by Thutmose III as a coastal base. This town served as the main harbor for Jerusalem in most historical periods and also was located only a short distance from the main north-south highway,

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144 Abdi-Ashita claimed guardianship over Ullaza, as well as Sumur, under the direction of the Egyptian governor Pakhamnate (EA 60), but the actual presence of Egyptians at the site is nowhere mentioned.
145 See Alt 1926: 224, n. 2 and the famous tale chronicling the capture of Jaffa by one of Thutmose III’s generals (trans. Simpson 1973: 81–84). If Jaffa lost its independence after its capture by Thutmose, this might hearken back to the early Eighteenth Dynasty policy of evicting the inhabitants of particularly rebellious areas and constructing a purely Egyptian settlement over the ruins (see chapter two).
the Via Maris. While no garrison is specifically mentioned in connection with Jaffa, the town does appear to have possessed a resident governor named Api (EA 138). In addition, Jaffa supported a granary (the above-mentioned šîwl) at which men from nearby towns like Gezer served as guards (EA 294) and likely also as corvée labor. Considering the extremely small size of the contemporary settlement—less than 2.5 acres—there could have been very little else at Jaffa besides the Egyptian installation and its support facilities.

From the text of EA 333, a tablet unearthed at Tell el-Hesi in southern Canaan, it is clear that Egyptian officials were also resident both at this site and at Lachish. The more important official in the letter’s text, designated only as a rabu, apparently resided at Tell el-Hesi—possibly in the large building adjacent to the findspot of the tablet. Although this structure exhibits no recognizably Egyptian features, it is certainly significant that what looks to have been a full-fledged Egyptian-style administrative headquarters was constructed at the site in the Nineteenth Dynasty (see chapter five).

Lachish was situated approximately half a day’s walk from Tell el-Hesi. As was noted above, significant quantities of small items dating to the reign of Amenhotep III have been recovered from the so-called Fosse Temple at this site. Judging from the highly localized distribution of these items, it is to be wondered whether the temple at Lachish, like the temple at Beth Shan, served the religious functions.

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146 This official is likely also attested under slightly variant names in Amarna letters EA 69, 100, 105, and 145. All of these sources show him to have been active along the Phoenician coast, delivering messages and intervening in various affairs.

147 Gonen (1984: 64) classifies Jaffa at this period as “tiny.”

148 The fact that one Canaanite mayor claimed responsibility for guarding both Jaffa and Gaza (EA 296) has been cited as evidence that neither town possessed a local dynasty (Alt 1926: 223; Helck 1962: 313). While this argument is convincing and places these towns in the same category as Sumur, Ullaza, and Yarimuta (Na’aman 1981a: 178), it does not necessarily follow that both Jaffa and Gaza were administered by the same Egyptian official, as Helck (1962: 190) believes. Indeed, evidence from the Amarna letters appears to indicate otherwise.


150 Albright 1942.

151 It is perhaps important to remember that the Egyptians often disguised payments to foreign governments as gifts to the region’s patron deity (see chapter three). Certain Amarna letters hint that this may also have been a practice in the late Eighteenth Dynasty. In EA 55, for example, the city of Qatna—whose loyalty it would have been in Egypt’s interest to court—requests a sack of gold in order to fashion a statue of the god Shimgi. Likewise, gods that are stated to have enjoyed some special connection to the pharaoh apparently resided in Tunip (EA 59) and Byblos (EA 84).
needs of an Egyptian garrison as well as a local Canaanite population. Judging from a report of Lachish’s treasonous activities in EA 333, however, one might assume that such a force—if present—was relatively inconsequential.

Situated roughly in a horizontal band across southern Canaan, the bases at Gaza, Tell el-Hesi, and Lachish guarded the three main roads leading to Egypt. The htm-fortress of Tjaru, which had safeguarded the entrance to Egypt since the time of Ahmose, may also be mentioned in the Amarna letters under the name Silu (EA 288; see also 335). If so, the ruler of Jerusalem supported his assertion that Egypt had badly bungled its affairs in Canaan by pointing to a loyal Canaanite vassal who had been murdered at the town gates of Tjaru—right under the nose of Egyptian authorities.

Tjaru may also be mentioned in EA 30, although the fortress is not specifically named. Dispatched by the king of Mitanni, EA 30 functioned as a sort of diplomatic passport—intended to speed the way of a Mitanni messenger to Egypt. Any Canaanite ruler who might read the tablet was instructed to “provide him (i.e., the messenger) with a safe entry into Egypt and hand him over to the fortress commander of Egypt.” As the location of this fortress did not need to be specified, one suspects that it was known by all to be Tjaru, the last and most important fortress encountered on a journey south into Egyptian territory.

A retrospective on Egypt’s northern empire as glimpsed in the Amarna archive
Before abandoning the Amarna archive to pursue the foreign policy of pharaohs from Smenkhkare to Horemheb, a quick review of pertinent issues relevant to Egyptian fortresses and administrative headquarters is warranted. During the reigns of Amenhotep III and Akhenaten, it can be seen that Egyptian officers and their troops at times occupied Sumur, Ullaza, Byblos, Yarimuta, Jaffa, Gaza, Kumidi, Beth Shan, Jerusalem, Akko, Gezer, Megiddo, Tell el-Hesi, Lachish, and Tjaru. It cannot be proven, however, that any of these cen-
ters—except perhaps Tjaru and Gaza—were occupied throughout the duration of time covered by the Amarna letters. Indeed, it is clear that most were not.

What the Amarna letters illustrate most vividly, however, is that the Egyptian system of administration was flexible. Troops and their officers could locate themselves in trouble spots, commandeering local houses for their headquarters, and remain only so long as their services were needed. Likewise, Canaanite rulers might oversee seemingly important bases like Sumur, Kumidi, Beth Shan, and Yarimuta if the resident Egyptian officials left for a short expedition or indeed had abandoned the base altogether.

Flexibility in the assignment of garrison troops to different polities is also witnessed in the careers of commanding officers.\(^{156}\) Pawuru and Yankhamu, for instance, are each witnessed in various letters deeply enmeshed with the politics of city-states in widely separated areas of the country. Because of this apparent fluidity in the placement of garrisons and their officers, it seems best to argue that the Egyptian empire cannot be neatly parcelled into well-defined administrative units, each governed by an officer stationed at his permanent base. Instead, one should view the empire as peppered with representatives of the Egyptian government—some Egyptian, some Egyptian officials of Syro-Palestinian origin,\(^ {157}\) and some trusted

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\(^{156}\) Overseers of garrison troops (\(i\text{my}-\text{rt} \ i\text{w} \ y\text{t}\)) are not infrequently evidenced in late Eighteenth Dynasty inscriptions. Examples include the overseers of garrison troops who were taxed together with troop commanders in the tomb of Tutu (Urk. IV, 2008: 13, 2011: 7), an officer named Ineni (Hayes 1951: 101), and a chariot warrior of the garrison of pharaoh (Schulman 1964a: 155, no. 435). If a damaged word in the tomb of Tutu (N. de G. Davies 1908: pl. 17) is to be read as \(i\text{w}\) (cf. Murnane 1995a: 193, apparently) rather than \(\text{sm}\text{sw}\) (Urk. IV, 2008: 16), then overseers of garrison troops, troop commanders, overseers of horses, royal scribes, and generals were all specifically associated with houses of pharaoh (\(\text{pr}\text{w n pr}^{-2}\)). Although it is tempting—given the overwhelmingly military nature of these titles—to envision the “houses of pharaoh” as Egyptian garrisons or administrative headquarters abroad, this is nowhere directly stated, and it may well be that the preferred reading should be \(\text{sm}\text{sw}\), which would be of no importance for our discussion.

\(^{157}\) In practice, many of Egypt’s officials seem to have been ethnically Canaanite. Yankhamu and Addaya, for instance, bear names suggesting a Semitic ethnicity (Drower 1980: 472–473; but see Murnane 1997: 257, n. 40; 2000: 109, who suggests that such ethnic names could have belonged to Egyptians whose parents exhibited a taste for the exotic). Although one could read much into the employment of Egyptianized Canaanites in the foreign service, it should also be remembered that an individual bearing a Semitic name occupied the extremely important position of northern vizier at this period in Egypt proper (see Zivie 1990 for extensive discussion and bibliography).
vassals—whose bailiwicks constantly shifted according to the political situation at any given time. This is not to say that Egyptians did not possess headquarters that they attempted to maintain on a more or less permanent basis—as one can argue from the archaeological evidence presented later in the chapter—only that this cannot be deduced from the Amarna letters alone.

The Amarna letters demonstrate that power in Egypt’s northern empire was shared between local Canaanite rulers (ḥazanū) and Egyptian officials. The former, known amongst themselves as kings (šar), were apparently viewed by the Egyptians as roughly equivalent to Egypt’s own mayors. As such, the Canaanite rulers received their appointment to office through the grace of the king (although in practice succession was usually hereditary) and swore an oath of loyalty. As authorized representatives of the pharaonic government, they provided taxes and specific requested goods to the crown.

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158 In EA 149 the mayor of Tyre writes to Akhenaten, “The king knows whether you installed me as commissioner (i.e., rabisu) in Tyre” (EA 149: 47–48, trans. Moran 1992: 236). Although this is the only known instance of a vassal claiming to fulfill the role of an Egyptian official, the mayor of Damascus appears to have been delegated authority similar to that enjoyed by an Egyptian official (EA 52; see Edel 1953b: 55; Hachmann 1970: 65). Significantly, many of the vassals may well have spent their youth in Egypt under the practice introduced by Thutmose III of raising the heirs of Syro-Palestinian (and Nubian) vassals in Egypt (Urk. IV, 690: 2–5; see Urk. IV, 1656: 9–12 for an example of this same policy from the reign of Amenhotep III). Such an upbringing has been proposed for the rulers of Tunip (EA 59), Tyre (EA 147), Tushultu (EA 185, 186), and Jerusalem (EA 286–288) based upon their statements, the particular phraseology of their letters, or even their names (see also EA 296: 31–33; Several 1947: 129; Redford 1990: 69). Arguments based on phraseology are undoubtedly the weakest of the lot, however, as it is extremely difficult to separate a vassal’s own flowery Egyptian-style phrases from scribal epistolary tradition. For examples of vassals sending their sons or brothers to Egypt in the Amarna archive, see EA 194 and 254.

159 My view most closely approximates that of Redford (1985: 193; 1990: 34–35; 1992: 201–202), who believes that the majority of Egyptian officials were so-called circuit (phr) officials. These men occupied an area as long as necessary, generally basing themselves at a specific headquarters for the interim but also returning to Egypt on a fairly regular basis. For similar views, see Alt 1966: 145; Marfoe 1978: 494–498.


162 See EA 51, 286–288.

163 See the case of Abdi-Ashirta and Aziru, as well as Lab’ayu and his sons. See also EA 300, 317, and 371.

164 EA 51 and 252; similarly EA 148 and 165.

levied work forces\textsuperscript{166} and militia,\textsuperscript{167} attended state festivities or sent their representatives to do so,\textsuperscript{168} provided the king with updates on activities in their area,\textsuperscript{169} and supported crown expenses\textsuperscript{170} in much the same manner as did Egyptian mayors.\textsuperscript{171}

While Canaanite rulers were expected to obey Egyptian orders on penalty of death (EA 162), they appear also to have enjoyed certain perks. As a reward for their loyalty they could receive presents from the pharaoh (EA 49, 265)\textsuperscript{172} and even make requests (EA 49, 55, 100, 148, 149, 269). Likewise, when the quota for tribute had been filled, the king might even provide a Canaanite ruler with proper payment for goods sent to Egypt (EA 369).\textsuperscript{173} In theory, vassals were also assured military protection, and this may in fact have been a sworn obligation,\textsuperscript{174} even if the pharaoh and his governors often ignored it in practice. Moreover, where such help was afforded in the way of troops, vassals might in special cases receive food, silver, oil, clothing, and other supplies from royal stores to help support the occupying force.\textsuperscript{175}

Ideally, each Canaanite ruler was assigned to the oversight of an Egyptian official (usually loosely designated as a \textit{rabisu} or a \textit{sakin mati})\textsuperscript{176}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[166] EA 226, 249, 294, 365.
\item[167] EA 92, 100, 103, 105, 117, 189, 191, 193, 195, 201–206, 250. EA 155, 162, and 249 refer to doing “service,” although it is unclear what exactly this entailed.
\item[169] See especially, EA 145, 149, 151, 200, 259.
\item[170] EA 53, 141, 144, 147, 161, 193, 226, 324, 325, 367. As will be discussed in detail below, the practice of charging Canaanite rulers for the expenses of imperial troops temporarily stationed in or passing through their area appears to have been a legacy of Thutmose III.
\item[171] Canaanite rulers were also responsible for capturing fugitives who entered their territory and for returning them to Egypt (EA 45, 162, 245, 256). Likewise, there is evidence from EA 280 and 281 that vassals may have been expected to clear proposed military actions against other polities with the Egyptian authorities before undertaking them.
\item[172] On the Egyptian side, this would be similar to the policy of “giving things to those who were loyal,” which was explicitly practiced in the reigns of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 1246: 6–8) and Amenhotep II (Urk. IV, 1301: 16).
\item[173] See Kemp 1978: 49.
\item[174] EA 51, 82, 83, 153, 252.
\item[175] EA 70, 74, 76, 79, 85, 86, 100, 112, 125, 126, 130, 137, 138, 152, 161, 263, 287; see also Liverani 1983: 53.
\item[176] On these broad terms—respectively translated “commissioner” and “governor”—see Moran 1992: xxvi, n. 70. The Ugaritic kingdom was organized in a
\end{footnotes}
whose headquarters were located in the general vicinity. To this designated representative of the Egyptian government, a vassal could look for physical protection\textsuperscript{177} or for the administration of justice.\textsuperscript{178}

This officer likewise acted as the vassal’s liaison to the Egyptian court. Unlike the multitude of generals and messengers whose stints in Canaan were merely episodic, many of these Egyptian officials appear to have been based in Canaan, to have raised their families there, and to have undertaken only periodic visits to Egypt.

Whereas it has become commonplace for scholars to assume that rabisu-officials should be equated with holders of the title “overseer of northern foreign countries” (\textit{imy-\textit{r h\textit{s}wet m\textit{hltt}}}),\textsuperscript{179} an examination of the Amarna letters reveals that in fact the Egyptian governors in Canaan held the offices of “troop commander” (\textit{hry pdt—EA 107: 14–15; 171: 15–16}) or “fanbearer” (\textit{ty \textit{hw—EA 106: 38}).\textsuperscript{180} Indeed, the resumes of Egyptians bearing the title \textit{imy-\textit{r h\textit{s}wet (m\textit{hltt)}} demonstrate that this title, like that of \textit{rabisu}, was more descriptive than functional—i.e., an official received the designation “overseer of northern foreign countries” precisely \textit{because} his duties required him frequently to travel to Syria-Palestine.\textsuperscript{181} Not surprisingly, then, troop commanders (\textit{hry pdt}), such as those who probably filled the Egyptian foreign service in the Amarna Period, often bore the subsidiary title “overseer of northern foreign countries.”\textsuperscript{182} Significantly, however, it would have been the former title, rather than the latter, that qualified them for the job.

In light of the almost incessant demands for military assistance, the frantic tone of many of the vassal letters, and the widespread allegations of deceit and corruption amongst officials,\textsuperscript{183} one might rightly wonder how efficacious this system of governance in fact was. The pessimistic view is that by providing their vassals with too few

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{177} EA 51, 64, 68, 73, 77, 82, 83.
\bibitem{178} EA 105, 113, 116–118. For a much more comprehensive discussion of the responsibilities fulfilled by an Egyptian governor, see Abdul-Kader Mohammad (1959).
\bibitem{180} Moran 1992: 180, n. 9; 181, n. 1; Redford 1990: 19; Murnane 1997: 256, nn. 34 and 35.
\bibitem{181} Redford 1990: 5–7.
\bibitem{182} See Murnane 1997: 255; Higginbotham 2000: 40.
\end{thebibliography}
troops and by often ignoring their cries for help, Amenhotep III and Akhenaten were responsible for a significant diminishment of Thutmose III’s empire.\textsuperscript{184} Likewise, Egypt’s loss of Amurru, Kadesh, Ugarit, and other Syrian localities to the Hittites during the reign of Akhenaten has been blamed on this pharaoh’s single-minded pursuit of his religious revolution.\textsuperscript{185} The apparent state of almost constant warfare and Egypt’s burdensome exaction of tribute\textsuperscript{186} have similarly been identified as contributing causes to an area-wide impoverishment at this time. Such a downturn in fortunes is allegedly exhibited in LB II A architecture, art, ceramics,\textsuperscript{187} and in the dearth of precious metals and luxury goods included in contemporary burials.\textsuperscript{188}

There are others, however, who argue that, considering the strength and vigor of the Hittite resurgence in Syria, Egypt’s loss of only its northernmost territories is not particularly shameful.\textsuperscript{189} Moreover, they contend that internecine warfare was par for the course in Syria-Palestine\textsuperscript{190} and that Egypt practiced a deliberate—and economically

\textsuperscript{185} Redford 1987: 168. See the copious references given in Schulman 1964b: 51, n. 1.
\textsuperscript{187} Kenyon 1980: 556; Leonard 1989: 19. It should be noted that the artifact category most often criticized for its degeneration during this period is pottery (Leonard 1989: 16). Given the large-scale importation of Mycenaean and Cypriot luxury ware to Canaan in the LB II A, however, Levantine potters may simply have abandoned the market for luxury ware to the Aegean potters (Several 1974: 128; Leonard 1989: 20).
\textsuperscript{188} Halpern 1983: 66–68; Gonen 1992b: 52.
\textsuperscript{189} Several 1972: 122–133; Weinstein 1981: 15–17; Redford 1992: 179. Redford (1984: 199) estimates that Egypt would have had to muster a force of 10,000 or so soldiers to secure themselves a victory over Suppiluliuma’s Hittite army. Even then, presumably, Kadesh and Amurru could still remain in Hittite hands—as happened despite the utmost expenditure of effort on the parts of Seti I and his son Ramesses II.
\textsuperscript{190} Several 1972: 123–126. Manley (1996: 65) states that Egypt had an incentive to intervene in these essentially local squabbles only when its national interests were affected adversely, i.e., if the disputes led to the interruption of trade or tribute (see also Knapp 1992: 90).
sound—policy of minimum investment in its northern empire.\footnote{Giles 1972: 144; Aharoni 1968: 138–139; Weinstein 1981: 16; 1998: 229; Murnane 1990: 2–3, 69; Knapp 1992: 93–94. But see Na’aman (1981a: 184) and Groll (1983: 239), who view Egyptian investment in Syria-Palestine as slightly more intensive. The fact that the number of Egyptian soldiers requested by the vassals is on average quite small is yet another argument for the limited scale of these conflicts and the power that Egypt still held as a force of intimidation (Aharoni 1968: 158).} Indeed, the fact that many of the letters in the Amarna archive are primarily standardized expressions of loyalty has led many scholars to assume that Egyptian presence in the Levant, if not in Syria itself, was in fact relatively efficient.\footnote{Several 1972; Giles 1972: 159; Liverani 1979; Knapp 1989: 66–67; Bienkowski 1989.} Rich funerary assemblages,\footnote{Leonard 1989: 22.} high-quality decorative arts,\footnote{Liebowitz 1987: 3–27; 1989: 63–64; Gonen 1992a: 211.} and increased trade\footnote{Several 1972: 127–128; Weinstein 1981: 13; Gittlen 1977; 1981: 51; Astrom 1990: 308.} are employed by such scholars as well to support their assertion that the LB IIA was a time of high culture and prosperity in Canaan. They also note that a good many towns were newly founded, reoccupied, or expanded at this juncture in time.\footnote{Several 1972: 128; Kemp 1978: 54; Kenyon 1980: 556; Na’aman 1986: 277.}

A balanced view likely lies between these two poles.\footnote{Leonard 1989: 16; Knapp 1989: 67; 1992: 85, 93–94; Fritz 1995: 42.} While a certain amount of intercity feuding no doubt was endemic to the city-states of Syria-Palestine, it was likely exacerbated by the progressive nomadization of urban defectors such as the Apiru.\footnote{Liverani (1979a: 17–18) suggests that people defected due to general unrest and high tribute burdens. This situation necessitated in turn further Egyptian investment in peacekeeping activities, which likewise led to a hike in tribute—and then further nomadization (see also Bienkowski 1989: 61). See Hopkins 1993: 208–210 for a discussion of the process of nomadization in general and with respect to the Late Bronze Age Canaan specifically.} Such a fraught situation, however, aided Egypt insomuch as it allowed the occupying government to “divide and conquer.”\footnote{Giles 1972: 174–175, 183–184; Aldred 1980: 85; Campbell 1964: 101; Bernhardt 1971: 138; but see Several (1972: 129), who warns that the potential disruptions to the functioning of the imperial infrastructure would have prevented Egypt from having followed such a risky policy.} Likewise, it must always be kept in mind that it was in the interest of Egypt’s vassals to exaggerate, to obfuscate, and to impugn.\footnote{Kitchen 1962: 14; Bernhardt 1971: 142–144; Cohen 2000: 93–97.} Rib-Hadda, for exam-
people, easily the loudest-voiced of the bunch, made approximately 37 requests for personnel and goods and a further 37 requests for troops in the course of his 62 letters. On the other hand, he sent goods or military aid to the Egyptian government only 4 times and offered 11 excuses for his laxity. Given these ratios, it may be surmised that his well-being as a loyal vassal may not have been a top priority for Egypt. Given the tendentious nature of the vassal reports, the pharaonic government likely relied primarily upon their own officials for a neutral assessment of the varying situations.

With regard to the archaeological record, on the other hand, the situation is also complex. It appears that the fortunes of the towns of Canaan in the Late Bronze Age varied greatly. Although there was indeed some growth and new settlement during the late Eighteenth Dynasty, this was balanced by village decline or abandonment in other areas. Generally, places that received significant Egyptian patronage—such as Beth Shan, Deir el-Balah, and Megiddo—experienced an upswing in their prosperity. Others, denied such attention, tended to exhibit less of a bloom. Likewise, studies have shown that Egyptian influence upon the culture of various polities appears to have been directly proportional to their accessibility and strategic importance. Lowland towns along trade routes, for example, experienced a progressive Egyptianization in burial customs and

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201 The 62 letters include only reasonably well preserved tablets.
202 See also Na’aman 1981a: 185. Egypt may even have suspected Rib-Hadda of treasonous activities, as EA 119 and 162 would seem to indicate. Interestingly, as Na’aman (2000: 129–130) points out, it is precisely brigands such as Aziru and Lab’ayu who appear to have been most conscientious about sending Egypt gifts. This “blood money” must have been proffered to Egypt by the warlords in hopes that the imperial government would then turn a blind eye to their own expansionist tactics. Rib-Hadda’s successor in Byblos was not slow to point out to the Egyptian king that Aziru’s “tribute” consisted primarily of ill-gotten gains (EA 139: 33–39).
203 Aldred 1980: 82.
204 Albright (1980: 110) points to a great disparity even within individual cities “between the spacious, well-built houses of the patricians and the hovels of the poor.” Such disparities likely also contributed to the social revolutions that appear to have plagued Syria-Palestine in the Amarna Period (Mendenhall 1947; Artzi 1964; Altman 1978; Halligan 1983; Rainey 1995).
some cultural artifacts, while polities in the troublesome hill country clung more tenaciously to traditional Canaanite culture.208

The Amarna archive for all intents and purposes ceases to be an important historical source after the reign of Akhenaten. Although a few letters have been assigned by certain scholars to the reign of Smenkhkare209 or Tutankhamun,210 controversy surrounds most of these attributions, and in isolation the letters are of limited value. For the remainder of the late Eighteenth Dynasty, then, the historian must rely upon Egyptian textual sources and references to Egypt in Hittite documents.

Imperial activity in the reign of Tutankhamun

Given the brevity of Smenkhkare’s rule and the fact that most or all of it was coeval with that of Akhenaten, nothing is known of any independent foreign policy undertaken in his reign. Considerably more evidence, however, exists for Egypt’s involvement in northern conflicts during the reign of Tutankhamun. For instance, Horemheb’s preroyal epithet “companion at the feet of his lord upon the battlefield on that day of slaying the Syro-Palestinians,”211 must have been earned in a battle in which Tutankhamun himself was physically present. Likewise, the Memphite tomb of Horemheb highlights the participation of this general in military ventures that are said to have destroyed Levantine towns, although the references are indeed frustratingly vague.212 Stereotyped scenes of Tutankhamun battling Syro-

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208 Gonen 1992b: 34–38. It is precisely along the military highways that the majority of Egyptian artifacts have been discovered (Drower 1980: 475). This evidence is further support for de Vaux’s (1978: 99) assertion that the nature of Egypt’s domination of Syria-Palestine differed significantly according to the economic or strategic importance of a particular region to the empire. Such differences can also be explored via the highly variant greeting formulae employed by rulers in different areas of Syria-Palestine.


211 Gardiner 1953: 3.

212 Gardiner 1953: 3.
Palestinians\textsuperscript{213} or accepting their tribute\textsuperscript{214} should not, however, be utilized as historical sources.

Interestingly, a scene in the Memphite tomb of Horemheb provides evidence that Syro-Palestinians in the time of Tutankhamun suffered from the effects of famine. According to the text, a crowd of starving northern refugees arrived at Egypt’s border and requested permission to emigrate. Although the context is fragmentary, the statement that “pharaoh, l.p.h., has placed them in your hand in order to guard their borders” (Urk. IV, 2085: 9–10) may imply that Horemheb, like Amenhotep son of Hapu before him, had been assigned the task of augmenting the population of Egypt’s borderlands.

It is only the Hittite archives, however, that truly illuminate Egyptian activity in Syria during the reign of Tutankhamun. Documents such as KUB XIX, 9; KBO V, 6; KUB XIV, 8; and the historical preamble to various treaties detail the events in an extended series of campaigns known collectively as the Second Syrian War or, conversely, the Six Year Hurrian War.\textsuperscript{215} This protracted conflict appears to have been touched off by a simultaneous, two-fronted attack on Hittite principalities. Assyrian-backed Mitanni forces had invaded Hatti’s Syrian empire to the northeast, while the Egyptian army struck at Kadesh in the south.

Such fortuitously timed attacks almost certainly betray the collaboration of the aggressors.\textsuperscript{216} Egypt and Assyria had reentered into diplomatic correspondence in the reign of Akhenaten (EA 15 and 16),\textsuperscript{217} and since then Assyria had to a large degree expanded to fill the vacuum left by Mitanni’s collapse. Both empires, then, must have felt that the Hittite kingdom had usurped territories that were rightfully theirs.

Unfortunately for the would-be conquerors, neither attack proceeded as planned. The Hittites repelled the Assyrians and successfully defended Kadesh against Egypt. Although the Egyptians made no headway in southern Syria, once back in Egypt they may well

\textsuperscript{213} Schulman 1978: 45–46; 1988: 69, n. 5.
\textsuperscript{214} Davies and Gardiner 1926: pls. 19, 20; Giles 1972: 197.
\textsuperscript{216} Kitchen 1962: 15.
\textsuperscript{217} Initial contact between Assyria and Egypt had been made in the reign of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 668: 6–15), but the two empires had apparently lost touch during a waning period of Assyrian power.
have recast the battle to make it look like a victory. Numerous talatat found disassembled in the Theban area depict the siege of a Syro-Palestinian city and a heated battle between Egyptians and Hittite soldiers. Due to the context of the reliefs, presumably once having decorated a temple wall, Egypt’s victory would have been a foregone conclusion. A similar revisionist tactic would be employed years later by Ramesses II after his own unsuccessful bid to recapture Kadesh.

An international succession crisis

Although the Egyptian campaign was in the end for naught, Suppiluliuma was not one to forgive or forget. In retaliation for Egypt’s attack on Kadesh, he sent two generals and their troops to the Egyptian territory of Amki in the Lebanese Bqi. The fact that one of these generals had been involved in an attack on Amki during the reign of Akhenaten (EA 170) has led to a vast amount of confusion as to whether there were indeed two attacks or only one. This debate has great import in terms of Near Eastern chronology.

What has decided the matter for numerous scholars, however, is a narrative intimately connected with the attack on Amki in the Hittite texts. Several sources relate that in Egypt, at the time of the attack on Amki, the reigning pharaoh died. Relatively soon there-

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218 Redford 1988: 19–20; 1992: 177; Schulman 1988: 54–55—although Schulman believes the majority of the talatat with battle scenes to have come from an early temple of Akhenaten at Karnak. Johnson (1992) studied the talatat ascribed to Tutankhamun for his Ph.D. dissertation and has reconstructed a monumental assault scene similar to those that were to become popular in the Nineteenth Dynasty. The scenes of Hittite prisoners in the Memphite tomb of Horemheb may also relate to this Egyptian raid on Kadesh (Weinstein 1981: 16). Schulman (1978: 45–46) suggests, however, that the prisoners were netted in Akhenaten’s final campaign to the north.

219 Although Egypt was not able to wrest Kadesh from Hittite control in this instance, the fact that Kadesh is known to have rebelled against its overlord late in the reign of Suppiluliuma and again in the first decade of Mursil’s reign (see the historical prologues to the Hittite treaties with Aziru and Tuppı-Teshup of Amurru—Beckman 1996, nos. 5 and 8) demonstrates that the city may well have been receptive to, and even desirous of, an Egyptian “liberation.”

220 The Hittite sources include the Deeds of Suppiluliuma (KBO V, 6, trans Güterbock 1956); the Plague Prayer of Mursil II (KUB, XIV, 8 and duplicates KUB XIV, 10 + KUB XXVI, 86 and KUB XIV, 11, trans. Goetze 1969: 394–396); and an alternate version (KUB XXXI, 121a, trans Güterbock 1960). Some of the many scholars who have discussed this event include Spalinger 1979e; Bryce 1990; 1999: 193–199; Murnane 1990: 131–136.
after, his distraught widow dispatched a messenger to Suppiluliuma bearing a letter, which requested that the Hittite king send her one of his sons to wed, as she herself had no heir and was loathe to marry one of her subjects. Perhaps rightly suspicious, the Hittite king then sent a messenger to confirm that there was indeed no legitimate heir to the throne. Only upon the return of his emissary, nearly half a year later, did he dispatch his own son to Egypt.

Zannanza, Suppiluliuma’s chosen son, never reached Egypt. Whether Egyptians with a vested interest in pharaonic succession murdered him or whether he met with some unhappy accident, sickness, or attack is unknown. His death, however, enraged Suppiluliuma and provoked a flurry of diplomatic correspondence in which the Hittite king vented his fury, while Egypt’s new pharaoh apologized profusely and denied responsibility. Weary of diplomacy, Suppiluliuma eventually assuaged his wounded feelings in another attack on Egyptian territory. Catastrophically for the Hittites, however, this campaign netted him Egyptian prisoners who bore the plague. Suppiluliuma’s revenge, then, wound up unleashing an epidemic in Hatti that would last for nearly twenty years and devastate the country.

Scholars who have viewed the attack on Amki by General Luppaki in EA 170 as identical to that led by the same general in the Deeds of Suppiluliuma, assume that the dead pharaoh was Akhenaten and that his widow would then have been either Nefertiti or Meritaten. For numerous reasons, however—most notably those concerning the form of the king’s name and the stated lack of male heirs of royal blood—a majority of scholars now believes that it was Tutankhamun who died and Ankhesenamen who was wary of marrying a commoner.

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221 The widow is referred to solely as Da-ha-mu-ua-zu-ui, a cuneiform rendering of ts-hmt(nsu); see Federn 1960: 33.
222 By fabulous luck, a small fragment of this original correspondence has been discovered in the Hittite archives at Boghazköy (Edel 1978: 33–35).
226 For a sampling of this majority viewpoint, see Sturm 1933: 161–176; Edel 1948: 11–24; Campbell 1964: 54–62, 121–122 (although this author is attracted by the possibility that Nefertiti could be the widow; see 1964: 62); Kitchen 1962: 22; 1983: 276–277; Giles 1972: 188; Schulman 1978: 43–44; Spalinger 1979b: 39;
Whereas Ay may\textsuperscript{227} or may not\textsuperscript{228} have been ultimately responsible for the death of the Hittite prince, he does appear to have attempted earnestly to avoid further armed struggles with the Hittites. Given Suppiluliuma’s state of fury, of course, such ameliorating tactics were futile. It is significant, then, that the only remaining piece of pertinent evidence from the reign of Ay is a donation stele found at Giza in which the king bestowed profits from agriculture in a district called “the Field of the Hittites” (Urk. IV, 2109: 16) upon an overseer of the harem and his wife. Although the fields originally belonged to the cults of Thutmose I and Thutmose IV, it is reasonable to suppose that the district gained its name due to the large numbers of Hittite prisoners of war employed as agricultural laborers on these royal estates. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to determine whether these Hittite laborers would have been seized during the reign of Ay or in reigns prior to his.\textsuperscript{229} Other sources connecting Ay with activities in Syria-Palestine are strictly of the traditional, nonspecific variety.\textsuperscript{230}

\textit{Imperial activity in the reign of Horemheb}

Although Horemheb held the rank of general prior to ascending the throne as the last pharaoh of the Eighteenth Dynasty, there is surprisingly little evidence of foreign campaigns during the course of his reign.\textsuperscript{231} The only secure report, in fact, comes from Hittite sources. According to the annals of Mursili II, the Egyptians attempted another raid on Kadesh in Mursili’s seventh year.\textsuperscript{232} This Hittite monarch, Suppiluliuma’s son, is generally regarded to have been a close contemporary of Horemheb, and it would thus appear that the

\begin{footnotesize}
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\item\textsuperscript{227} See the copious references to this traditional viewpoint in Schulman 1965: 61.
\item\textsuperscript{228} Bryce 1990: 104–105.
\item\textsuperscript{229} Some of the Hittite prisoners depicted in the Memphite tomb of Horemheb could conceivably have come from campaigns led by Ay as well (Spalinger 1979e: 87).
\item\textsuperscript{230} For example, Ay adopted the epithet “the one who defeated Syria-Palestine” (Kadry 1982: 89) and portrayed himself on a chariot shooting at a target under which two northerners crouch helplessly (Schulman 1964b: 57).
\item\textsuperscript{231} Spalinger (1979e: 85) characterizes his reign as primarily pacific.
\item\textsuperscript{232} Goetze 1933: 86–87; see also Spalinger 1979b: 40; Beckman 1996: 55; Murnane 1990: 30; Bryce 1999: 218–219.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
latter also tried his hand at recapturing Kadesh. Before the Hittite king could arrive on the scene, however, he received word that the Egyptians had been defeated.

Redford has attempted to correlate the raid on Kadesh in Mursili’s year seven with a “first victorious campaign from Byblos as far as the land of the wretched ruler of Carchemesh.” This foray is mentioned in a funerary inscription of a stablemaster in Horemheb’s sixteenth year, and the text is notable also due to the fact that four of the five gods invoked are Syro-Palestinian. This inscription is, however, highly controversial. Due to a faulty writing of Horemheb’s personal name, many suspect that the granite bowl bearing the inscription is a modern forgery. Yet even if the artifact itself is proven to be a fake, Redford maintains that the forger would almost certainly have utilized an authentic inscription as a model. Redford also points out that the one known topographical list contemporary with Horemheb contains only northern Syrian toponyms.

Although the Egyptian attempt to reclaim Kadesh in year seven of Mursili failed, the fact that the city rebelled yet again in the ninth year of this king may mean that Egypt had succeeded in reasserting its influence in southern Syria. Whether due to a fear of an

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233 Murnane (1990: 69–70) suggests that the escalating international tension between Egypt and Hatti prompted Horemheb’s reoccupation of Avaris (Tell el-Dab’a).

234 Redford 1973: 37, 42 fig. 1. Perhaps significantly, Mursili II records in his annals, “When I arrived in Ziluna [in Hatti] the news was brought. The soldiers of Egypt, he [the king of Carchemesh] had fought them” (Giles 1972: 195). See also Helck 1975a: 144.


236 Redford 1992: 177, n. 250. Redford (1983) agrees with Schulman (1978: 46–47) that Horemheb may actually have been claiming as a “first campaign” an expedition that he led in year 16 of Akhenaten (see also Pitard 1987: 74–75). This theory stems from the fact that a Nineteenth Dynasty inscription in the tomb chapel of Mose adds to Horemheb’s own regnal years those of the heretical Amarna Period pharaohs (Gaballa 1977). There is no reason, however, to believe that Horemheb himself practiced such inclusive dating during his own reign.


238 Goetze 1933: 86; Giles 1972: 195; Spalinger 1979e: 56; Bryce 1999: 221–223. Paradoxically, the fomenter of both these rebellions was Aitakama of Kadesh, the same ruler who had avidly worked against Egyptian interests in the reign of Akhenaten (see Mursili II’s annals, trans. in Bryce 1999: 222). Egypt may also have attempted to back the revolts in Nukhasse that occurred simultaneously (Klengel 1992: 115, 155; Bryce 1999: 241–242), and one particularly interesting document may provide evidence for Egyptian and Hittite governments courting each other’s vassals (KUB XIX, 15; Liverani 1990: 111—but see Spalinger 1979e: 61–62). In terms of Amurru,
Egyptian resurgence or to a general battle-weariness on the part of the Hittites, Egypt and Hatti are suspected by many scholars of having drawn up a formal treaty (nt-$^2$mty) sometime after these conflicts.\textsuperscript{239} With the thawing of tensions between the two powers, Hatti appears to have sanctioned Egypt’s renewed commercial and diplomatic ties with Ugarit.\textsuperscript{240} As for the core of Egypt’s northern empire at this time of peace, there is no evidence of anything out of the ordinary: tribute still flowed in (Urk. IV, 2126: 16–17), and Syro-Palestinians are portrayed as duly submissive in monumental art\textsuperscript{241} and inscription (Urk. IV, 2127: 3–12).

**Final summary of late Eighteenth Dynasty imperial activity in the north**

Given the length of this historical introduction, which was in fact necessitated by the incredible richness of the Amarna archive, only

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\textsuperscript{239} This agreement may be mentioned in the historical prologue to the treaty drawn up by Hattusili III and Ramesses II. The relevant wording reads, “the treaty that existed in the time of Muwatalli, the Great Prince of Hatti, my father” (KRI II, 228: 1–2). Giles (1972: 195; see also Langdon and Gardiner 1920: 203) suggested that Muwatalli be amended to Mursili II, as the latter was Hattusili’s true father, whereas Muwatalli was actually his brother. Sürenhagen (1985: 29, n. 30; 86) prefers to emend the word “father” to “brother” rather than to change the name of the Hittite king. Further, he (1985: 27–28) believes that the mention of a treaty under Muwatalli means only that such a document existed under this king, not that he drafted it. Murnane (1990: 34, n. 168; 170) cautions that “father” may here have been used more generally to mean “ancestor” or “forbearer” and believes the reference should be taken to mean that Muwatalli broke this agreement rather than forged it. If Muwatalli did not draft the treaty, Murnane (1990: 31, 37–38) and others (Wilson 1969: 199, n. 6) have suggested that it might have been composed in the reign of Horemheb. The lack of evidence for military skirmishes along the mutual border after the first decade of Mursili II’s reign and the evident warming in relations over the course of his rule is the cause for this speculation. For contrary views, see Spalinger 1979e: 83–89; Kitchen 1982: 25; Bryce 1999: 251; and Redford 1992: 181–182. For generalized negative depictions of Egypt in the Hittite archive, see Murnane 1990: 38, n. 189. For a discussion of the term nt-$^2$mty, see Murnane 1990: 73–74.

\textsuperscript{240} Nougayrol 1956: 57; Kitchen 1962: 36; Helck 1962: 304; Bryce 1999: 218. This theory is based upon the fact that, although Egyptian alabaster vessels inscribed with royal names are a relatively common find in Ugarit, there are none that date between year six of Akhenaten and the reign of Horemheb (Schaëffer 1954: 41). Presumably, if Egypt had been at war with the Hittites in the intervening period, Ugarit would have been barred from trade or diplomatic intercourse with Egypt.

\textsuperscript{241} Porter and Moss II: 183.
the most basic facts will be stated here by way of summary. In the late Eighteenth Dynasty, the demise of the Mitanni empire brought an end to the harmonious relationship that Egypt and Syria had enjoyed for generations. Relatively early in Akhenaten’s reign, Egypt lost Kadesh and Amurru to a newly vigorous Hittite kingdom, and Egyptian attempts to regain control over these territories would occupy the remainder of the late Eighteenth Dynasty. While these regions were not to be reconquered, it appears that a treaty agreement drawn up with Hatti in the reign of Horemheb returned to Egypt the peace that it had known prior to Mitanni’s downfall.

In general, the Amarna pharaohs appear to have retained most of the basic outlines of the imperial infrastructure first imposed by Thutmose III. Harbor depots still lined the coast, and their granaries were filled by way of a grain tax imposed on Canaanite towns. Loyal vassals continued to send their sons to court and were periodically rewarded for good behavior. Likewise the network of campaign palaces located throughout the empire may well have been maintained.

The only major feature that had changed in the Amarna Period was that the king no longer sent out annual expeditions to collect tribute and to display Egypt’s martial strength, nor was the pharaoh in the habit of campaigning himself. Perhaps the long peace with Mitanni had rendered such shows of force obsolete. Still, however, small garrison forces and band-aid campaigns do not appear to have leant Egypt’s presence in the Levant the kind of potency and permanence that it would achieve again—with a little reworking of the imperial infrastructure—in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for late Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

The nature and distribution of Egyptian military bases in the late Eighteenth Dynasty appears very different depending upon whether one consults the Egyptian textual sources, the archaeology, or the Amarna archive. Judging from the hieratic and hieroglyphic texts alone, for example, it would be easy to conclude that the Egyptians possessed only one military base, that at Tjaru. Witnessed in wine docketts, official titles, and other miscellaneous sources, Tjaru—or simply ḫm (the fortress)—is the only military installation with which the Egyptians appear to have been particularly familiar or
concerned. Given the plentiful evidence for Egyptian garrisons stationed abroad, such a preoccupation with a single military installation seems peculiar.

There are likely two primary explanations for such a phenomenon. First, although located at the junction between the easternmost edge of the Delta and the road to the Sinai, Tjaru was in fact situated in Egypt proper. Egyptians may thus have had relatives living in the district or have had business there. Likewise, certain products from the region, such as wine and honey, seem to have been exported widely. Considering all of these factors, the name of the border-fortress surely rang familiar to most ears.

Second, the fortress at Tjaru had been a permanent fixture since the very beginning of the New Kingdom, whereas—as demonstrated above—the numerous and seemingly rather obscure Syro-Palestinian bases often functioned for only years or decades at a time. Given the short duration for which many of these installations were occupied and the fact that troop commanders seem to have been shifted from base to base with a bewildering frequency, such men simply did not bother to include the names of the northern bases that they commanded in their resumes. These foreign toponyms, after all, carried little currency among those who had never traveled north of the Nile Valley.

So Egyptian texts provide information pertinent to only one military base—that at Tjaru. If one were, on the other hand, to look solely at the archaeological evidence for Egyptian emplacements on foreign soil, two things would appear quite clear. First, archaeological evidence demonstrates that the Egyptian government was most interested in expending resources on sites clustered around its own immediate border territory. Excavated late Eighteenth Dynasty military bases—i.e., Tell Heboua I (Tjaru—see figure 9), Tell el-Borg, Bir el-'Abd, Haruba site A–345 (see figure 22), Deir el-Balah (see figure 23), and Tell el-Ajjul (see figure 24)—are all either situated along the Ways of Horus or clustered just at its eastern end.

Second, of the latter four bases, only Bir el-'Abd was provided with anything resembling a true fortification system (and this did not enclose the site’s major storehouse!). While it is true that a fortified structure may have escaped detection at Haruba site A–345 and that the walls of Building IV at Tell el-Ajjul had been thickened, the Egyptian-occupied sites in the Sinai and southwestern Canaan are remarkable overall for their apparent disregard of defensive measures.
Perhaps the Egyptian installations on the border were constructed in such a vulnerable manner because Egypt was strong enough in the Amarna Period that it did not fear any major insurrection or invasion so close to its home territory. It is also possible that if a rebellion or attack were fomented in this border zone, the substantial garrisons stationed at Tjaru and Gaza would be close enough to deal with the situation promptly. Therefore, the supply stations along the Ways of Horus and the small administrative and garrison posts in the Negev could exist relatively secure in the notion that they would not be molested—Egypt’s enemies being either too distant or too politically fragmented to pose much of a threat.

Without reference to the Amarna archive, then, the archaeological and textual evidence regarding late Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian investment in its foreign territories appears straightforward. Egypt concentrated the majority of its imperial resources on sites that lay along its immediate border with Canaan and kept soldiers and personnel stationed in the north to a minimum. In this respect, the late Eighteenth Dynasty deployment of bases would seem to resemble quite closely that typical of the earlier Eighteenth Dynasty. In both periods the government’s major concern appears to have been with the border-fortresses at Tjaru and Tell el-Borg (both of which were fortified) and with Tell el-Ajjul and adjacent sites (which generally were not).

With the introduction of extremely informative and otherwise unparalleled documentary sources such as the annals of Thutmose III or the Amarna archive, however, the picture of Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian involvement in Syria-Palestine becomes much more complex. As discussed in chapter three, the annals of Thutmose III provide information on numerous northern installations, the existence of which would never be suspected from the archaeological record. The Amarna letters provide a similarly remarkable cache of data. According to information contained in the archive, within a period of thirty years the Egyptian government stationed garrisons at the towns of Ullaza, Byblos, Gaza, Akko, Kumidi, Jerusalem, Gezer, Megiddo, Tell el-Hesi, Lachish, Jaffa, Yarimuta, and Sumur. Officials stationed at the last three headquarters on this list likewise administered harbor depots that stored grain, oil, silver, clothing, as well as other valuable and/or practical material for the use of imperial functionaries.

Given the combined evidence for quite substantial Egyptian investment and involvement in its northern empire during the mid- and
late Eighteenth Dynasty, then, the scarcity of supporting archaeological evidence is surprising. Indeed, this dearth of material confirmation is particularly striking in light of the quite ample Nineteenth Dynasty attestations of such involvement. In the Eighteenth Dynasty, the only sites north of the Sinai that exhibited signs of significant Egyptian-style architecture and/or material culture were Tell el-Ajjul, Deir el-Balah, Byblos, and Beth Shan. These same four sites continued to betray indications of Egyptian occupation and activity in the Nineteenth Dynasty, but now the size of this roster suddenly increased more than threefold. Tell el-Farah South, Tel Haror, Tell el-Hesi, Tel Sera’, Ashdod, Tel Mor, Jaffa, Aphek, and Gezer each hosted a newly attested Egyptian administrative headquarters in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Despite this dramatic increase in indicative Egyptian-style material culture, an examination solely of the textual sources for the Nineteenth Dynasty provides absolutely no indication of any substantive policy change on the part of the Egyptian government—as will be demonstrated in chapter five. This conclusion leads, then, to a fundamental puzzle. Why should the archaeological evidence for Egyptian involvement in Syria-Palestine drastically increase in the Nineteenth Dynasty, when the texts of the two periods suggest that Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian investment in the region was of equal or perhaps even greater intensity?

Three passages contained in the Amarna letters may perhaps provide insight into this problem. The first is a missive sent from the ruler of Gezer to Akhenaten. In his letter, which was briefly discussed in the historical summary above, the ruler complains, “I built a house . . . to make preparations before the arrival of the archers of the king, my lord, and Maya has just taken it away from me and placed his commissioner in it. Enjoin Reanap, my commissioner, to restore my village to me as I am making preparation before the arrival of the archers of the king, my lord” (EA 292). This quotation provides two key pieces of information. First, it indicates that vassals of the king were expected to provide lodging for Egyptian troops passing through, or stationed in, their area. Second, the complaints clearly demonstrate that government officials had the right to commandeer local buildings, as needed, to serve imperial purposes.

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The next letter, written by Abdi-Heba of Jerusalem, airs a similar grievance. The vassal asserts that Yankhamu, one of Egypt’s most important imperial functionaries, “sent a military force here, and it has not vacated the house that I want . . . and as for the garrison that belongs to Addaya, the commissioner of the king, I want their house. So may the king provide for them” (EA 285). Abdi-Heba’s letter, then, serves as further evidence that the Egyptian government routinely co-opted local buildings to serve as administrative or garrison headquarters—although this practice was rarely appreciated by the local government.

The final piece of evidence from the Amarna letters concerns Sumur, the Egyptian base that is variously described in diplomatic correspondence as the king’s “garrison city” (EA 76: 35–36), “the palace” (EA 62: 23–24), and “my lord’s court and his bedchamber” (EA 84: 12–13). As discussed above, this town guarded one of the major passes from the coast inland, and thus its safety was of paramount concern to both Egypt and its allies. Following Aziru of Amurru’s attack on Sumur, then, it was imperative that he be forcibly brought back within the Egyptian fold. Threatened with a major military offensive, Aziru swore to Akhenaten that he would rebuild the destroyed city, writing: “And, O king, my lord, as to Sumur, about which [the king] says ‘Why have you not (re)built Sumur?’ . . . The kings of Nukhasse have been at war with me and so I have not (re)built Sumur . . . O king, do not listen to the treacherous men that denounce me before the king, my lord . . . Now you are going to hear that I am (re)building the city of the king” (EA 160). In the midst of all his emphatic promises, Aziru provides a surprising revelation—namely that an Egyptian vassal, apparently unsupervised, could be charged with the (re)construction of an Egyptian administrative headquarters.

The passages just quoted are unique in the corpus of the Amarna letters in providing specifics as to the origin of Egyptian-occupied architecture. Taken together, they indicate:

- **One**: that the Egyptian government could require vassals to build or provide suitable dwellings for imperial administrators and troops.

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Two: that, on occasion, vassals could be entrusted to supervise work on the most important bastions of Egyptian power.

Three: that if the provided accommodations were deemed insufficient, representatives of the Egyptian government were at liberty to co-opt local buildings of their choosing.

In light of this evidence, it seems reasonable to suggest that a large percentage of Egyptian-occupied installations from the time of Thutmose III until the end of the Eighteenth Dynasty were in fact built by local Canaanites. Further support for this idea, outside the evidence of the Amarna archive, is perhaps to be found on a wall of Amun’s temple at Karnak. In the midst of reflections on his first campaign of victory, Thutmose III boasts that he incarcerated Syro-Palestinian captives in a prison (or ḫmrṭ) that they themselves had built (Urk. IV, 184: 15–16). If the “prison” is not in fact a metaphor for Megiddo itself, the quote may provide a mid-Eighteenth Dynasty example of Canaanite labor being harnessed for Egyptian purposes. Certainly, a policy of erecting imperial infrastructure via the utilization of an indigenous workforce or the co-option of existing resources would have freed the bulk of the army for the ever-pressing task of subduing new and rebel territories.

If the majority of Egyptian administrative and military structures were indeed both built and supplied by resident Canaanites, it is no surprise that they should prove so difficult to identify in the archaeological record. What remains to be explained, however, is why the situation should have changed in the Nineteenth Dynasty. At this later period, the Egyptians seem not only to have constructed their own military bases but also to have supplied their garrisons with many of the material comforts of home, including Egyptian-style pottery and religious items.

It is possible that such a shift in policy may perhaps be traced to an administrative reform that took place in Egypt following the internal upheaval of the Amarna Period. In an important document known as the Edict of Horemheb, the last king of the Eighteenth Dynasty put forth a series of decrees designed to curb abuses, which had purportedly been allowed to run rampant in times past. Included among these edicts is a proposal to reform the manner in which the royal court was provisioned on its travels within Egypt.

Horemheb introduces the problem as an “instance of dishonesty [about which] one [hears] in the land” (Urk. IV, 2149: 14–15).
According to the edict, royal agents had long made it a practice to “go after the local mayors, oppressing them and searching for [material] for the progress northwards or southwards” (Urk. IV, 2150: 1–3). According to Horemheb, “the [agents] of the royal courtiers would approach the mayors saying, ‘Give [the] material for the journey which is lacking . . . [everything] which [should be at] the quay [under the authority of the agents] of the royal quarters!’; and one goes after [the] material [bringing the mayors] and has them prepared by force . . . This is [an instance of cravenness]” (Urk. IV, 2150: 10–12; 16–17; 2151: 9). 245

Although one might expect Horemheb’s reforms to have been composed primarily in response to abuses instigated by the recently reviled Amarna pharaohs, the practice of supplying quays by displacing royal costs onto local mayors is twice explicitly stated to have been instituted in the reign of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 2150: 4, 7). As this king enjoyed a great deal of posthumous admiration and respect, Horemheb presumably would not have laid a “craven” policy at his door dishonestly. It is significant, then, that the practice described in Horemheb’s Edict appears virtually identical to the policy that Thutmose III instituted in Syria-Palestine, namely requiring local governments to provision harbors utilized by the Egyptian army. As the annals state: “Behold, every harbor was supplied with every good thing according to their agreement of each [year]; in going northwards or southwards: the $b\tilde{\text{k}}$-taxes of [Lebanon], so too [the harvest] of Djahy, consisting of grain, oil, incense, wine, and honey” (Urk. IV, 719: 7–11).

If under the regime of Thutmose III a policy requiring local governments to assume the costs of royal ventures was enacted unilaterally in Egypt and its foreign territories, it would make sense that a subsequent reform to this practice in Egypt would have ramifications in foreign territories as well. In forbidding the routine cost displacement of the past, Horemheb implies that the crown will henceforth assume more direct administrative and fiscal responsibility for its own undertakings. In Syria-Palestine, as well as in Egypt proper, local governments would presumably have welcomed such a move. Certainly, the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty vassals consistently expressed

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245 The restorations are based on the translation of this text in Murnane 1995a: 237–238.
a profound disillusionment with the Egyptian administration, and thus the new policy may have acted in part as a palliative designed to inspire renewed loyalty from elites in subject territories.

It is tempting to view the observed transformation in the nature of the archaeological record in Syria-Palestine as directly reflective of the policy shift initiated by Horemheb. Under the kings of the Nineteenth Dynasty, Egyptian bases appear by and large to have been built, administered, and maintained by Egyptians themselves—although always in partnership with the local Canaanite community. As had happened much earlier on the Nubian frontier, it is possible that revolving garrisons came to be replaced, at least in part, by more permanent forces. Endowed with land, herds, and a subject local population, these Nineteenth Dynasty Egyptian bases would have been more or less self-sufficient. In addition to removing a burden from Canaanite vassals, the new system may also have functioned more reliably to meet Egypt’s needs.

In this summary of (late) Eighteenth Dynasty textual and archaeological evidence for Egyptian emplacements on foreign soil, it has been suggested that the transformation in the archaeological record between the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties is in a large part due to the ramifications of an internal policy reform. While the Egyptian government in both dynasties occupied administrative headquarters, storage depots and temples—in the Eighteenth Dynasty the burden for both the construction and the supply of these Egyptian centers may have fallen upon the shoulders of local authorities, as it did in Egypt. Under the last king of this dynasty, however, this practice—now perceived as an abuse of royal authority—may have been reformed. As a result, the Egyptian government would have invested more permanently in its Syro-Palestinian holdings and, for the first time, have left a substantial impression on the archaeological record.

Textual references to late Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

Reign of Amenhotep III

1a. irp n Ṭ WR n p3 imy-r ḫtm (Malkata jar label; Hayes 1951: fig. 7, no. 76; four examples)

Wine of Tjaru of the overseer of the ḫtm-fortress.
Figure 19. Late Eighteenth Dynasty northern Sinai
Figure 20. Late Eighteenth Dynasty Canaan
Figure 21. Late Eighteenth Dynasty northern Syria-Palestine
although the connection between viticulture and the district of Tjaru has been touched upon in chapters two and three, firm evidence for the association of the štmt-fortress at Tjaru with the wine industry is not apparent until the reign of Amenhotep III. The fifteen wine labels and three wine stamp impressions listed above were recovered during excavations of Amenhotep III’s palace at Malkata.248 Like
most of the inscribed material recovered from this context, the examples that can be dated fall within Amenhotep III’s last decade.\footnote{Although the recovered dates fell between Amenhotep III’s eighth and thirty-eighth regnal years, the vast majority clustered in the last decade of his rule. Cartouches of Akhenaten, Smenkhkare, Tutankhamun, and Horemheb have also been found at Malkata, but there is no evidence that the palace was still receiving shipments of goods after the death of Amenhotep III (Hayes 1951: 36–37).}

The most interesting of these labels from our standpoint is 1a, which states that the four wine jars in question were provided by the overseer of the \textit{hmt}-fortress at Tjaru. The lack of a date renders it impossible to determine whether these jars were sent as contributions to one of the sed-festivals in years 30, 34, or 37—although this scenario is probable. Certainly, high-ranking individuals and heads of important institutions are known to have provided contributions in the way of food and drink for these massive state celebrations.\footnote{Hayes 1951: 36, 83–86, 100–101.}

The jars of wine provided by the overseer of the \textit{hmt}-fortress of Tjaru may, on the other hand, have been solicited as part of a more mundane process of revenue collection. The taxation list from the tomb of Rekhmire—discussed in chapter three—demonstrates that payments (\textit{ipw}) had long been extracted from fortress commanders, as well as from other leading officials of administrative districts (cf. Urk. IV, 1119: 16–1120: 5). If wine was one of the mainstays of the northeastern Delta economy, as all evidence suggests,\footnote{See Kees 1977: 196.} it would have made sense that the overseer of the \textit{hmt}-fortress at Tjaru would have paid at least part of his taxes in this commodity.

In 1a, d, g, and h, the toponym Tjaru was determined by the “foreign-hill country” sign (Gardiner N 25), whereas the “city” sign (Gardiner 0 49) determined examples 1c, e, and f.\footnote{The determinative was not preserved in 1b.} Both determinatives were in use with regard to Tjaru prior to the late Eighteenth Dynasty and bear witness to its character as a thoroughly settled
region that still retained its frontier feel. The reference to a crown estate in 1d is likewise interesting, for it is tempting to speculate that the land had remained a royal possession since its original seizure from the Hyksos at the opening of the Eighteenth Dynasty. From the other wine labels, little can be concluded save that a master vintner had once resided at Tjaru and produced “very good” wine.

2a. irp n ḫrwr [n] imy-r ḫm ḫwty-msw (Malkata jar label; Hayes 1951: fig. 7, no. 77; eight examples)

Wine of Syria-Palestine [of] the overseer of the ḫm-fortress, Djehutymes.

2b. irp n p3 ḫm (Malkata jar sealing; Lepsius 1900: 185, Berlin 1758; Hope 1977: 50–53, nos. K 49, 131, 183 A & B, 212, 224, 279, 308, 386 and perhaps 367)253

Wine of the ḫm-fortress.

2c. [hnkt]254 n kdy n p3 imy-r ḫm (Malkata jar label; Hayes 1951: fig. 9, no. 118)

[Beer] of Kedy of the overseer of the ḫm-fortress.

2d. bšk wšd n p3 ḫm (Malkata jar sealing; Hayes 1951: fig. 27, EE; three examples)

Fresh moringa-oil of the ḫm-fortress.

2e. bit n p3 ḫm (Malkata jar sealing; Hayes 1951: fig. 27, DD)

Honey of the ḫm-fortress.

Although “the fortress” (p3 ḫm) referred to in the above inscriptions is not explicitly designated as Tjaru, scholars have frequently made this equation.255 Whereas the commanders of ḫm-fortresses elsewhere on Egypt’s borders may have been easily confused in the minds of ordinary Egyptians, Tjaru stood apart. Not only was Tjaru the oldest northern fortress extant, having been conquered by Ahmose even

253 Unit K at Malkata was a rubbish heap containing material that appears to have been dumped around Amenhotep III’s 29th and 30th years, roughly coeval with the celebration of his first sed-festival (Hope 1977: 3, 24). Wine of the ḫm-fortress consisted of roughly 24% of the total number of attested wine sealings.

254 The word may also be srmt (“ale”), and a sealing reading “srmt kdy” was indeed found in later excavations at Malkata (Hope 1977: 75, K 346). Hayes (1951: 91) preferred to reconstruct the word as hnkt due to the fact that there are more references in texts to hnkt kdy than to srmt kdy.

255 Hayes 1951: 91; 93; 101; 159, n. 291; Hope 1977: 45.
before his ascension to Egypt’s throne, but it also served as a physical and symbolic border between “us” and “them.” In the inscriptions of both Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 647: 12–648: 1) and Ramesses II (KRI II, 13), Tjaru was expressly designated as the place of departure into the wilds of Syria-Palestine. Likewise, in the Karnak relief of Seti I, Egyptian dignitaries assembled at Tjaru to welcome their sovereign back into home territory. As with Elephantine, Tjaru symbolized both the real, political border of Egypt as well as the immediately symbolic border that divided order from chaos and civilization from barbarism.

In the reign of Amenhotep III’s father, a man named Neby served as overseer of the ḫtm-fortress, but the title would pass in the next reign to Djehutymes. As this name did not belong to any known offspring of Neby, the relationship between the two men is unclear. However, since most of the inscriptions at Malkata cluster in the last decade or so of Amenhotep III’s reign, it is possible that Djehutymes may even have been a grandson of Neby. 256 Certainly, a generation or so would likely have separated the two men.

Of the commodities sent to Malkata from the overseer of the ḫtm-fortress, honey and moringa-oil may, like the wine of Tjaru, have been local products (although moringa-oil was produced in the Levant as well). Concerning the foreign origin of the beer of Kedy and the wine of Kharu, 257 however, there is little doubt. Syro-Palestinian wine was evidently highly prized, judging from the quantities imported 258 and the relatively frequent employment of Syro-Palestinian vintners in Egypt. 259 Similarly, beer from Kedy, a country to the northwest of Syria, appears to have been an equally prized product. 260 It may

256 Given his name, it is not unlikely that Djehutymes was born during the reign of Thutmose IV.
257 Hayes (1951: 160–161) speculates that the jar stoppers bearing the patently Near Eastern design of a rampant gazelle nibbling at a plant may have originally belonged to the jars of wine from Kharu. For an excellent, in-depth discussion of the wine of Kharu and of Kharu itself, see Gardiner 1947a: 180–187. See also Edel 1953: 171–173; Na’aman 1977: 171–172; Spalinger 1983: 93, n. 26. Most scholars agree that the toponym Kharu designated a loosely bounded region comprising Canaan and areas slightly farther to the north.
258 Syro-Palestinian wine appears frequently in lists of tribute (cf. Urk. IV, 670: 8; 694: 5; 707: 5; Gardiner 1947: 180–187), and jars of foreign wine are often found on archaeological sites in Egypt (see Hayes 1951: 101–102).
260 Beer from Kedy, or Kode, is mentioned with relative frequency in the Late
have been, therefore, that like his counterparts stationed at the border-fortresses of Elephantine and Bigeh, the commander of the border-fortress of Tjaru was able to levy a small tariff on items that passed in or out of the country and then to draw upon these resources when contributing to state funds.\textsuperscript{261}

\textit{Reign of Akhenaten}

1a. [\textit{rnpt-sp}] 13 \textit{irp n t\textsuperscript{\textash{-}frw ss nsw \textit{\textash{-}nyy pn-h\textsuperscript{\textash{-}y}}} (Amarna jar label; Pendlebury 1951: pl. 89: 123)

[Regnal year] 13, wine of Tjaru (of the) royal scribe Huy, (son of) Pen-khay.

1b. \textit{rnpt-sp} 15 \textit{irp t\textsuperscript{\textash{-}frw} (Amarna jar label; Gunn 1923: 166, pl. 63)

Regnal year 15, wine of Tjaru.

Wine from Tjaru continued to be transported from the \textit{htm}-fortress to the state capital in the reign of Akhenaten. The wine sent by the royal scribe in 1a is particularly interesting because a text found in the contemporary tomb of Tutu specifically requisitions special taxes to be sent to the king from royal scribes and from other high officials (including troop commanders and overseers of garrison troops—Urk. IV, 2008: 14–2009: 10). Although the royal scribe of 1a is not specifically stated to have operated out of the fortress itself, one can imagine that a scribe of the highest stature would have been stationed at Tjaru in order to aid in the endeavor of monitoring the great quantity of peoples and goods that entered or exited Egypt on a regular basis.\textsuperscript{262} Pendlebury suggested that a further label, his number 122, had been sent from the overseer of the fortress (\textit{imy-r htm}) to Amarna.\textsuperscript{263} Given the state of the existing signs, however, this identification is tenuous at best.

\textsuperscript{261} Redford (1990: 60) suggests that the \textit{htm}-fortress may have acted as a depot for taxes collected in Syria-Palestine.

\textsuperscript{262} The so-called border journal (P. Anastasi III, verso) and the Semna dispatches (Smither 1942) are good examples of the types of documents or daybooks that one may suppose the scribe of Tjaru to have composed in the late Eighteenth Dynasty. As discussed in chapter three with regard to the taxation list in the tomb of Rekhmire, scribes were definitely among the core personnel stationed at border-fortresses. Also, the proportion of \textit{imy-r htm} who list “scribe” or “royal scribe” among their titles is extremely high (see chapter seven).

\textsuperscript{263} Pendlebury 1951: 114; pl. 89, no. 122.
Reign of Tutankhamun

1a. rnpt-sp 5 irp nḏm n pr-ītn [. . .] τηρw ḫry k₃mw pn-imn (Wine label from the tomb of Tutankhamun; Cerny 1985: 2, no. 8. c 411 = G 3209 = J. 62309)

Regnal year 5, sweet wine of the house of Aten (from) Tjaru. Chief vintner264 Pen-Amun.

A taxation list inscribed upon a number of Karnak talatat demonstrates that a temple to Horus of Tjaru still functioned (and indeed was taxed to support the cult of the Aten)265 until perhaps as late as year 6. Sometime after the move to Akhetaten, Akhenaten may have decreed that the Horus temple be forcibly converted into an Aten temple. If so, the wine that used to be sent to Egyptian kings from the temple of Horus of Tjaru or Horus of Mesen would now have been sent from the House of Aten. This situation appears to have persisted until roughly midway through the reign of Tutankhamun.

Reign of Horemheb

As for the servant of the chamber of offerings about whom it shall be heard said, “he goes” and it is he who seizes a boat of any person of the army or any people who are in the entire land,”—the law

264 A chief vintner (ẖry k₃mw) had been associated with the Ways of Horus already in the reign of Hatshepsut (Urk. IV, 523: 16).

265 Traunecker 1984: 63. The text itself remains unpublished and is available only in summary form. The temple has not been located at Tjaru, but architectural fragments dedicated to Horus of Mesen and found obviously out of situ in the Qantara region have occasionally been assigned to a temple at Tjaru (Cavillier 1998: 9–10).

266 For an extremely detailed study of this document, see Kruchten 1981.
will be carried out against him by cutting off his nose and deporting (him) to Tjaru. [. . .] As [for] the servant of the [chamber of offerings of pharaoh, l.p.h., about whom it shall be heard said, “he goes and seizes the boats of the freemen who deliver to the kitchens and offices] together with those who are admitted into the harem (or) likewise to the offerings of all the gods, (while) they levy from the two deputies of the army together with the [boats of] any person of the army (or) any people who are in this entire land] on any day that he makes [a following of pharaoh, l.p.h. [. . .],”—the law [will be carried out] against him by cutting off his nose and deporting (him) to Tjaru. [. . .] [Now as for any servant of the chamber of offerings of pharaoh, l.p.h., about whom it] shall be heard said, “they are requisitioning in order to gather the saffron,” and about whom another comes in order to report, saying “my male and [female] slaves are being taken away [for six or seven days],”—the law will be carried out against him by cutting off his nose and deporting (him) to Tjaru].

Upon Horemheb’s ascension to the throne, the former general issued a series of edicts designed, purportedly, to “crush evil and destroy iniquity” (Urk. IV, 2142: 18). Each section in the document described abuses that had supposedly run rampant until Horemheb’s time and prescribed fitting punishments for the perpetrators. Such punitive measures included the confiscation of stolen goods, financial penalties, beatings, and—in an extreme case—death. The most common punishment, however, was for the guilty party to have his nose cut off and to be sent to Tjaru. This punishment was inflicted on servants of the chamber of offerings who commandeered boats that had been built with the intention of helping an individual perform his state service. Likewise, the unauthorized requisitioning of male or female slaves for state projects also warranted an amputation and a trip to Tjaru.

Amputation of the nose as a punishment is attested in numerous ancient Egyptian records dating to the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. Whereas the severing of the nose (and sometimes the ears) might be viewed as punishment enough, in a large proportion of cases the guilty party was also deported to Kush. There the hap-

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267 The Nauri decree of Seti I meted out this punishment for encroachment on the boundaries of foundation land (ll. 50–52) and for stealing animals belonging to the temple (ll. 71–74). See Lorton 1977: 25–26, 28. Likewise, in a libel case the amputation of nose and ears was the penalty imposed for any future repetition of offenses (Ostracon Cairo 25556, 7–9; Allam 1973: 62, n. 30).

268 This fate was admitted in oaths to be the punishment imposed for false testimony in cases relevant to tomb robbery (P. BM 10052, 3: 22–23; 5: 4–5; 5:
less criminal would presumably serve out the rest of his life as a miner, a quarryman, or a garrison soldier. The decree of Horemheb is unique, however, in naming Tjaru as the specific destination for the newly noseless.

Tjaru’s frequent association with vineyards hardly evokes images of dust, sweat, and suffering, yet like Kush and the mining regions—it too was viewed as a quasi-foreign territory. The alternation in punitive destinations between Tjaru and Kush may imply that the prisoners in both cases served in the garrisons associated with the border fortifications. Perhaps just as likely, however, the criminals may have been destined to participate in state projects, such as nearby mining ventures or cultivation. In whichever case, the intensive military presence at the fortress proper almost assuredly served as a strong deterrent to thoughts of escape or disobedience.

Significantly, the practice of punishing individuals by cutting off their noses and exiling them to border regions is memorialized in the name of a Greco-Roman frontier station, Rhinocorura (modern El-Arish). In classical times, the state sent criminals to Rhinocorura to serve out their sentences as garrison soldiers.269 As the name of the settlement implies, the poor souls stationed at the Sinai border-fortress—like their pharaonic predecessors—must have been a particularly gruesome lot!

2. [d]w3 itm m šrw di.f ūnk n imy-ht.f in sš nsw n nb t3wy imy-r pḥw n imy-r ḫtm p3-r’-m-hb [. . .] [in mh-ib] n ḫm.f imy-r pḥw n imy-r ḫtm (Stele from Heliopolis, CG 34175; Urk. IV, 2171: 14–16; 2173: 7–8)

[Ad]oring Atum in the evening, so that he may make offerings to those who are in attendance on him, by the royal scribe of the lord of the two lands, overseer of the marshland, overseer of the $\ddag$-fortress, Pareemheb. [. . .] [By the confidant] of his majesty, the overseer of the marshland (and) overseer of the $\ddag$-fortress.

Pareemheb is yet another example of an overseer of a $\ddag$-fortress who appears to have been chosen for his job from among the intimates of the pharaoh. In the text of his dedicatory stele, this man refers to himself as “the praised one of the good god, one who can


\[269\] Gardiner 1920: 115.
approach the palace, the chosen one of the king” (Urk. IV, 2172: 11–12). Given Horemheb’s military background, however, it is not surprising that many of his closest associates should have been drawn from a cadre of military men.

Indeed, the fact that Pareemheb also bore the title “greatest of seers of the estate of Re” (Urk. IV, 2173: 12) is perhaps testimony to the enactment of one of Horemheb’s post-Amarna reforms. Whereas most of the major temples appear to have been reopened in the time of Tutankhamun, many provincial temples may as yet have lain vacant, their riches having been stripped during the Amarna heresy to support the construction of Akhetaten and the prodigious cult appetites of the Aten. Horemheb claimed to have rebuilt temples that lay as ruined heaps, to have refurnished them with gold and silver, and to have newly staffed them with “wab-priests and lector priests from the pick of the army” (Urk. IV, 2120: 9).

The ħtm-fortress that Pareemheb commanded is nowhere designated by name, but his own offices as “greatest of the seers of Re’s estate” and “overseer of the marshland” both suggest a location in Lower Egypt. It would appear likely, then, that Pareemheb presided either over the ħtm-fortress of the sea or that he exercised his jurisdiction at Tjaru. However, given Tjaru’s well-known association with the marshy lagoons of the northeastern Delta,270 and the fact that the location of Pareemheb’s ħtm-fortress was felt to be self-evident, the more likely of the two options is perhaps Tjaru.

What is given as favors from the king for the troop commander, overseer of the horses, overseer of the ħtm-fortress, overseer of the river mouths, charioteer of his majesty, royal messenger to every foreign land, royal scribe, troop marshal, general of the lord of the two lands, overseer of the ħm-priests of all the gods, deputy of his majesty in Upper and Lower Egypt, chief justice and warden of Nekhen, ħm-

270 In the Onomasticon of Amenemope, for instance, Tjaru is found at the end of a list of Delta toponyms, directly adjacent to the papyrus marshes (ps-tsuf—Gardiner 1947b: 202).
priest of Maʿat, hereditary noble, overseer of the city, vizier, overseer of the great mansions (*i.e.*, law courts), Paramesses. [...] What is given as favors from the king [for the troop commander, overseer of the hor[s]es, overseer of the ḫtm-fortress, [...] [royal mess]enger to all foreign lands...

3b... stḥy m3'-ḥrw s3 ḥry-p'ṭ ım-y-r nıw̄ ḥry pmat ım-y-r ḫm n tɔrw s$n iım-y-r ssmw̄ p3-r'm-s$k m3'-ḥrw (400 year stele; dates to the reign of Ramesses II, but bears relevance to the reign of Horemheb; KRI II, 288: 8–9)

... Seti, justified, son of the hereditary noble, overseer of the city, vizier, troop commander, overseer of foreign lands, overseer of the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru, royal scribe, (and) overseer of the horses, Paramesses, justified.

Under Horemheb, the most powerful man in Egypt was undoubtedly Paramesses, the future Ramesses I.271 This man held a number of civil and religious titles throughout his life, the most recognizably important of which included vizier, deputy of his majesty in Upper and Lower Egypt, overseer of the law courts, and overseer of the ḫm-priests of all the gods. The great bulk of his career, however, appears to have been spent in the military, where, again, he reached the highest echelons of his profession.

As is common with the exhaustive resumes that officials regurgitated on their monuments, it is difficult to assess the order in which Paramesses attained his positions. Kitchen speculates that his career escalated from troop commander, to overseer of the horses,272 to

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271 It is not in fact certain that Paramesses and his son Seti, the two viziers in the 400-year stele, are to be equated with the future Ramesses I and his son Seti I (Stadelmann 1965; 1984: 912; Goedicke 1966b: 37–38). Weighing in against the equation is Seti’s wish for a “happy lifetime,” a request that would seem inappropriate for a monarch whose life had long since passed. Likewise, there is the fact that Seti I’s mother was a woman named Sitre, whereas the “400 Year” Seti is the son of a woman named Tiu—although Kitchen (1994: 171) admits that Tiu may simply be a hypocorism of Sitre. Given the stele’s stated purpose of honoring the forbears of Ramesses II, the prominent position of the vizier Seti in art and text (not to mention his depiction with a royal bull’s tail), and the very nearly identical titles shared between the “400 year” Paramesses and the future Ramesses I, the assumption that the two viziers were in fact the father and grandfather of Ramesses II is here followed (see also von Beckerath 1951; Faulkner 1980: 217; Kitchen 1994; Murnane 1995b: 192–196; Brand 2000: 336–340).

272 A set of coffins found at Medinet Habu and also Gurob that bore the name of Paramesses (later altered to Paramesses-neb-weben) may originally have belonged to this Paramesses (Helek 1958: 310). The owner of the coffin bore the titles of hereditary noble, troop marshal (*ts pḥb*), overseer of the horses of the lord of the two lands, and fanbearer on the king’s right.
charioteer, to royal envoy, to general, to fortress commander and overseer of the river mouths, and finally to vizier.\textsuperscript{273} Certainly, given the fact that Paramesses’ father held the title of troop commander,\textsuperscript{274} it might make sense that his entry position in the military would have been at this level.\textsuperscript{275}

Troop commander ($hny \ pdt$), however, was a very inclusive title in ancient Egypt. Indeed, from the Eighteenth Dynasty examples cited in this work alone, it is demonstrated that bearers of this title, in addition to serving as overseers of $htm$-fortresses, could—like Paramesses himself—fill the positions of overseer of horses (Menna), royal messenger (Amenemhet), and royal scribe (Kenamun and Pareemheb). Indeed, Schulman’s study of military ranks and titles lists 68 known troop commanders who, among them, attained very nearly every recorded military rank.\textsuperscript{276} Paramesses is also one of the first attested holders of the title $\Delta s \ pdt$, which evidently referred to the officer responsible for “designating the routes the army would use, coordinating its activities while underway, and perhaps organizing its tactics in battle.”\textsuperscript{277}

It is likely, given Paramesses’ titles, that before his promotion to generalship he and the troops that he commanded were stationed at the $htm$-fortress of Tjaru. From this base, Paramesses would have overseen not only the fortress and his own men but also the army’s horses (which as a charioteer he was quite qualified to do). Likewise, by virtue of his station on the border of Egypt and its northern territories, Paramesses would have been ideally situated to undertake military and diplomatic missions abroad.\textsuperscript{278} Indeed, it would have

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\textsuperscript{273} Kitchen 1982: 16.
\textsuperscript{274} Helck 1958: 308.
\textsuperscript{275} Presumably if Paramesses had been given scribal training during his youth, as his title of royal scribe suggests, he would have entered the army as an officer. Possession of such a rare and valuable skill would have rendered a gradual rise through the ranks unnecessary.
\textsuperscript{276} Schulman 1964a: 150–153.
\textsuperscript{277} Murnane 1990: 108. For discussions of this title, see also Schulman 1964a: 72–73; Yoyotte and Lopez 1969: 7, 19; Berlandini 1979: 254, 263.
\textsuperscript{278} The title “royal messenger” ($\textit{wpttj wsw}$) had been held already by Neby, an overseer of the $htm$-fortress and troop commander at Tjaru during the reign of Thutmose IV (Urk. IV, 1635: 10–11). Amenemhet, a troop commander at the border-fortress of Tjeku in the Wadi Tumilat, who also held his position during the reign of Thutmose IV, likewise served as a royal messenger (Giveon 1969a: 172). Whereas royal envoys were by no means always culled from officers stationed already at border-fortresses (cf. Vallogia 1976; El-Saady 1999), pure convenience no doubt frequently led to the assignment of such men to diplomatic tasks.
been just this sort of participation in affairs north of the border that would have earned him the honorary title “overseer of foreign lands.” One does not, then, need to see Paramesses’ titles as necessarily progressing in an orderly fashion from one to the next. Rather his status as troop commander of an important border-fortress likely allowed this man to wear many hats during his tenure in office.

Due to Horemheb’s background as a military man, Paramesses’ high position in the army would have garnered him a great deal of status and power. The late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Dynasties witnessed a surge in the social prestige and administrative clout of the military, and at this period of time an unprecedented number of professional officers ascended to positions of national importance. Indeed, it may have been Paramesses’ attainment of generalship that paved the way to his eventual appointment as vizier. As is well known, however, Paramesses would yet ascend to even greater glory. After Horemheb died without issue, kingship fell to him. This former overseer of the ḫtm-fortress at Tjaru, one imagines, must have been more than a little surprised to find himself so suddenly raised to the ranks of divinity.

4. n k3.k stḥ s3 nwt di.k ‘ḥ’w nfr ḫr šmsw k3.k n k3 n ḥty-p’t [iṃy-r nḥt t3ty] sš nsw iṃy-r ssmwt iṃy-r ḫswt iṃy-r ḫtm n t3rw [ṣṭḥ y m3’-ḥrw] [. . .] iwt pw ir.n iṛy-pṭt iṃy-r nḥt t3ty t3y ḫw ḫr wnm n nsw ḫryn pḥt ḫryn pḥt iṃy-r ḫswt iṃy-r ḫtm n t3rw n mḏ3w sš nsw iṃy-r ssmwt sḥm m ḫḥ b3-nb-dḥ ḫm-nṯr tpy n stḥ ḫny-hḥ n ḡḏ3yt wpt t3wy iṃy-r ḫm-ḏrw n nṯrw ṯḥw nḥw t3y m3’-ḥrw (400 year stele; dates to the reign of Ramesses II but bears relevance to the reign of Horemheb; KRI II, 287: 10–11; 288: 7–8)

For your ka, Seth, son of Nut. May you grant a happy lifetime in following your ka. For the ka of the hereditary noble, [overseer of the city, vizier,] royal scribe, overseer of horses, overseer of foreign lands, overseer of the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru, [Sety, justified]. [. . .] It was a coming that the hereditary noble, overseer of the city, vizier, fanbearer on the king’s right, troop commander, <troop commander>, overseer of foreign countries, overseer of the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru, great one of the Medjay, royal scribe, overseer of horses, leader of the festival of

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279 For the high correlation of the title “overseer of foreign lands” and “troop commander,” see Higginbotham 2000: 40 and the references cited therein. Redford (1990: 5–7) has argued persuasively that this title was honorific in nature and commonly applied to those whose preexisting duties gave them some jurisdiction in foreign lands.

Ba-neb-djed, first prophet of Seth, lector-priest of Wadjet who judges the two lands, overseer of the htm-priests of all the gods, Sety, justified, made.

The scene that graced the top of the 400 year stele depicts Ramesses II offering wine to the god Seth. A man named Seti stands behind Ramesses and likewise worships the deity. Although this second participant bears no royal titles or insignia, save his “royal” bull’s tail, there are, as noted above, a number of compelling reasons to identify him with Seti I. If the equation is in fact correct, the preroyal career of both pharaohs bears incontrovertible testimony to the importance of the office of “overseer of the htm-fortress of Tjaru” in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Dynasty.

Like his father, Seti eventually rose to fill the preeminent office of vizier. Moreover, given the brevity of his father’s reign, it is likely that Seti occupied this post during or just prior to his tenure as crown prince. Seti’s humbler responsibilities as overseer of the htm-fortress of Tjaru, then, he almost certainly executed in the reign of Horemheb, during the time that his own father served as the king’s vizier. Indeed, judging from the close similarity of their titles, Seti appears to have assumed a great many of his father’s former functions. In addition to commanding the htm-fortress at Tjaru, Seti, like his father, served as overseer of the horse and troop commander. These military offices, then, likely also earned him his father’s honorary title “overseer of foreign countries.”

Given the extant sources, it appears that Seti in fact bore only two relevant titles unattested in his father’s resume: “great one of the Medjay” and “fanbearer on the king’s right.” The former title, however, had already been held by an overseer of the htm-fortress and troop commander of Tjaru in the reign of Thutmose IV (Urk. IV, 1635: 8). As discussed in chapter three, the position “great one of the Medjay” had been stripped of any strictly ethnic connotation by the early New Kingdom. Instead of designating a tribal chief, as it had in the Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period, the title now signified something akin to “police chief” or “leader of desert rangers.”

Given Tjaru’s position at the border between the desert and the sown, it makes eminent sense that the htm-fortress served as a base

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281 For more information on this title, see Gardiner 1947a: 73–85*; Andreu 1982: 1068–1070.
not only for soldiers but also for desert scouts. As documents such as the Semna dispatches and the Late Egyptian Miscellanies\textsuperscript{282} demonstrate, the Egyptian government was extremely preoccupied with monitoring all traffic across its borders. The regular patrolling of scouts, then, would obviously be crucial to identifying the unauthorized passage of potential illegal immigrants or fugitives.

Whereas the title “great one of the Medjay” almost certainly reflected Seti’s actual command over security forces at Tjaru, the title “fanbearer on the king’s right,” like the title “overseer of foreign lands,” was fundamentally honorary in nature. Although titular and artistic evidence agree on the antiquity of the office of fanbearer, its elaboration—fanbearer on the king’s right—first appears in the dossier of a contemporary of Amenhotep II.\textsuperscript{283} The title continued to be utilized throughout the remainder of the New Kingdom, with the only distinguishing commonality between its holders being a close personal or professional tie to the reigning king. Indeed, before ascending the throne both Ay and Horemheb were appointed fanbearer on the king’s right.\textsuperscript{284} It is tempting then, to see the bestowal of this title upon Seti as an acknowledgment of the primacy of his position in the ruling hierarchy of the day. Interestingly, as chapter five will bear evidence, the Nineteenth Dynasty would see many fanbearers on the king’s right intimately involved in frontier management.

\textit{Archaeological evidence for late Eighteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters}

\textit{Tell Heboua I, Tjaru (see figure 9)}

The Egyptian border-fortress of Tjaru continued to function during the late Eighteenth Dynasty. There seems, however, to have been little in the way of architectural embellishment undertaken at this time, making it difficult for excavators to isolate this period in the archaeological record.\textsuperscript{285} The summary of the site provided in chapter two is therefore still relevant with regard to the late Eighteenth

\textsuperscript{282} See below.

\textsuperscript{283} Urk. IV, 1395: 16. This man, like Seti, also held the office of troop commander (Der Manuelian 1987: 115).

\textsuperscript{284} Sources relevant to the title include Gardiner 1947a: 23*; Kadry 1982: 12; Schmitz 1986: 1162.

Dynasty. The next great era of royal patronage and construction at the htm-fortress was to be the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Tell el-Borg (no plan available)

The border-fortress of Tell el-Borg, which lay barely 6 km from Tell Heboua I, seems to have been the focus of a fair amount of attention in the Amarna Period. In limited excavations and surveys undertaken at the site between 1999 and 2001, James Hoffmeier and his Eastern Frontier Archaeological Project discovered numerous talatat throughout the site, which they presumed to represent the dismantled remains of at least one Amarna Period temple. Further, in association with a number of these talatat the excavators discovered Amarna blue ware and other LB IIA ceramic. Of paramount importance for dating activity at the site, however, were two stamped jar handles that bore the cartouche of Smenkhkare and one that bore the cartouche of Tutankhamun.286

Significantly, it appeared that the destruction of the talatat temple(s) coincided with a refortification of the site. At a time evidently coeval with or closely following the reign of Smenkhkare, the earlier fosse (Fosse D) had been filled in with a great volume of limestone chips, which Hoffmeier interprets as the detritus of temple dismantlement. Meanwhile, builders employed reused talatat along with fired bricks in the subsequent construction of a new fosse (Fosse A). Fosse A protected a 3.8 m thick wall (Wall C) that proceeded to make a right angled turn at a bastioned corner and continue as Wall D. Due to a highly disturbed context, only 30 m of these fortress walls could be followed, and thus the final dimensions of the fortress remain obscure. Given the compound’s comparatively narrow walls, however, it is extremely unlikely that it occupied anywhere near as large an area as did Tell Heboua I.

Although the proper dating of these fortifications is not entirely clear, Hoffmeier tentatively suggests that either Horemheb or Seti I would have erected them. He reaches this conclusion presumably because of the known anti-Amarna bias of these two pharaohs and also because of Seti I’s known patronage of forts located along the

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286 For this and other information pertinent to Tell el-Borg, see Hoffmeier’s forthcoming preliminary report in JEAI 89 (2003).
Ways of Horus. Further work at the site will no doubt clarify matters greatly.

*Bir el-‘Abd* (no plan available)

Bir el-‘Abd, which was first discovered by Margowsky in 1967, was examined in 1972 and excavated in 1973 as part of the North Sinai Expedition of Ben Gurion University led by Oren. In the course of a wider survey, Oren and his team excavated two late Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian emplacements: Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A–345. Both installations were located along the Ways of Horus military route. Even more significant, however, was the fact that the two sites possessed storage magazines “identical in building method down to the size of the individual bricks and the bonding pattern.”

Even more significant, however, was the fact that the two sites possessed storage magazines “identical in building method down to the size of the individual bricks and the bonding pattern.”

Obviously erected in tandem, Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A–345 must have been predecessors of the great line of Egyptian bases depicted on the battle reliefs of Seti I at Karnak and listed in P. Anastasi I (see chapter five). The presence of such installations already in the late Eighteenth Dynasty belies the notion that Seti I was the first monarch to erect permanent way stations along the Ways of Horus.

Bir el-‘Abd lay midway along the military route, roughly 75 km east of Tjaru—or a good three days’ march. Although additional late Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian emplacements may yet be discovered between Tjaru and Bir el-‘Abd, three days march would have been an appropriate distance between refueling points for an army on the move. A satiric literary text provides the information that Egyptian soldiers carried their food rations individually. If this were indeed the case, it would seem that a burden of more than three days worth of food, borne in conjunction with weapons and other supplies, would have been heavy indeed.

The installation at Bir el-‘Abd, then, may have been the first way station encountered by late Eighteenth Dynasty soldiers, messengers,

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288 Indeed, as discussed in chapter three, Oren believes that Bir el-‘Abd may even have been founded as early as the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, although the specific evidence supporting this position is not elaborated upon (Oren 1987: 78–84; 1993a: 1389).
290 “Come, let me describe to you the condition of the soldier, that much tormented one. . . . His bread and his water are upon his shoulder like the load of an ass” (P. Anastasi III, 5: 6, 10–11, trans. Caminos 92).
and other functionaries on their way from Egypt to Syria-Palestine. Like the buildings depicted on the battle reliefs that Seti carved at Karnak, the fort at Bir el-'Abd was square in shape and possessed an associated reservoir. Storage magazines, granaries, cooking installations, and a town dump rounded out the archaeological picture.

The fortified enclosure at Bir el-'Abd, although poorly preserved, appears to have occupied an area of 40 m by 40 m, or 1,600 m². The way station was thus significantly larger than either palace 2041 at Megiddo or the Ramesseum palace. Although the architecture of Bir el-'Abd exhibited none of the defensive ingenuity of the Middle Kingdom fortresses in Nubia, the 3 m wide wall that enclosed the fort would nonetheless have represented a formidable enough barrier. Certainly, the fact that the granaries and storage magazines were located outside the fort does not suggest that attacks were much feared. It is hoped that more work will eventually be undertaken at Bir el-'Abd so that the entirety of its plan may be ascertained and more of its assemblage published.

As necessarily limited as Oren’s excavations were, however, his team did find more than enough evidence to ascertain the thoroughly Egyptian character of the fort and its outbuildings. Not only was the style of masonry and the size of the bricks (44 × 22 × 12 cm) characteristic of those used in New Kingdom state buildings, but the foundation deposits buried beneath the architecture at Bir el-'Abd also suggested a clear Egyptian tradition. A lamp and bowl deposit was of particular interest, given that similar offerings have been discovered in association with numerous Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty Egyptian emplacements in Syria-Palestine.

The pottery assemblage at Bir el-'Abd also strongly reinforced its connection with Egypt. Numerous forms characteristic of the late Eighteenth Dynasty assemblages at Malkata and Amarna were found in and around the fort. These included storage jars, ring-stands, bowls, flasks, and drop-shaped jars that bore typical Amarna-style

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291 For the palace at Megiddo, see Oren 1992: 107–108. For the palace at the Ramesseum, see Badawy 1968: 37.
293 Oren 1993a: 1389.
294 Egyptian military bases at which lamp and bowl deposits have been found include Deir el-Balah, Aphek, Haruba site A-289, Tel Sera’, Aphek, and possibly Tell el-Hesi and Gezer; see chapters five and six. For an overview of the significance of lamp and bowl deposits, see Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 108.
late eighteenth dynasty

297 painted designs. Most ubiquitous, however, were the thick-based, thumb-indentated, open form vessels reminiscent of “flowerpots.”

More than likely these relatively standardized vessels would have been employed for rationing purposes.

It is particularly interesting that, unlike the situation at a majority of proposed Egyptian installations in Syria-Palestine, Egyptian pottery predominated at Bir el-‘Abd. Canaanite vessels and Mediterranean imports, usually numerically dominant in such cases, made up a relatively insignificant proportion of the corpus as a whole. Canaanite forms, in fact, were limited mainly to cooking pots and storage jars. The presence of Canaanite culinary vessels might perhaps imply that the Egyptian authorities had hired locals—bedouin perhaps—to serve as domestic servants in the fort. This practice, if it could be validated, might indicate a policy on the part of the Egyptian government of active engagement with nearby indigenous populations, such as appears to have been the norm in Nubia.

The Canaanite storage jars, however, are a different matter. On the one hand, the presence of these jars could suggest that Bir el-‘Abd was supplied, at least in part, by taxes levied on Canaanite principalities—and this would be important. Conversely, however, it is also possible that the jars were in fact Egyptian imitations of Canaanite storage jars, as this form was popular in Egypt as well. Indeed, given the base’s closer proximity to the Nile Valley, transporting food from this direction would appear to have been more efficient. This question of origin could, of course, be answered easily by means of ware analysis.

Indications of food processing and storage are abundant at Bir el-‘Abd. In the courtyard of the fort itself, brick installations point to the on-site activities of cooking and baking. Numerous refuse pits in the courtyard and one large dump outside the fort likewise yielded large quantities of animal and fish bones, as well as stone grinding tools. Particularly illuminating, however, were the fort’s four typically

297 Based on his observation of the sooty interiors in many flowerpots, Holthoer has suggested that these vessels were frequently used as bread molds (Holthoer et al. 1991: 17).
Egyptian grain silos. Bir el-ʿAbd, located in an agriculturally marginal area, could not have been an institution of any size and still have supported itself. Much less could it have fed an army. Whether the imported grain came from Egypt or Canaan, however, the shipments must have been quite large. After all, Oren has estimated that if filled to capacity the silos could have stored roughly 40 tons (44,600 liters) of grain.\textsuperscript{301}

A suite of magazines some 20 m west of the fort provided a further storage area. Although the foundation courses are all that survive, the layout of the magazines was not difficult to determine. Like the storage facilities commonly associated with state temples, the individual compartments were long and narrow. At Bir el-ʿAbd, however, the magazines were also provided with their own relatively wide courtyard.\textsuperscript{302} It is not unlikely that this extra area of enclosure may have been deemed necessary due to the fact that these magazines were located outside the fort itself, and therefore were patently less secure. At Haruba site A–345, which possessed a very similar storage magazine, plans show that entrance to the facility was relatively restricted.\textsuperscript{303}

It is almost certain that in order to support the drinking needs of its residents, not to mention of passing armies, Bir el-ʿAbd must have possessed a well.\textsuperscript{304} Indeed, it would appear from Seti’s relief that the way stations strung along the Ways of Horus were in fact little more than a series of fortified wells. Access to fresh water meant the difference between life and death in the desert, so one would expect the protection of these resources to have been of paramount concern. The fort was also, however, provided with a 10 × 15 m reservoir. Lined with silty clay, the depression could have caught rainwater or have held water poured in from a local well.\textsuperscript{305} As will be discussed below, a similar and contemporaneous reservoir has been excavated at the Egyptian installation at Deir el-Balah.

\textsuperscript{301} At approximately 4 m in diameter, the grain silos were especially large (Oren 1987: 81; 1993a: 1389). Later in the life of the fort, however, the Egyptians apparently used these granaries for the ignominious purpose of storing trash.
\textsuperscript{302} Oren 1987: 80.
\textsuperscript{303} Oren 1993a: 1391.
\textsuperscript{304} Indeed, perhaps the ancient well and the modern “bir” are to be equated.
\textsuperscript{305} The bedouin today still utilize a similar system to catch rainwater (Oren 1987: 83). Such a large trough may have been desirable both for watering animals and/or perhaps for bathing in the scorching heat of the summer months.
Among the finds at Bir el-‘Abd, bronze spearheads and arrowheads are the only items noted that strike a particularly martial chord. Until the site is published in its final form, however, the full spectrum of the associated objects remains unclear. Egyptian or Egyptian-style artifacts briefly mentioned in the summaries and preliminary reports include scarabs, clay vessels decorated with gazelle heads, and small vessels of alabaster and faience. Judging from the somewhat decadent nature of the recovered artifacts and the location of the granaries outside the enclosure walls, it is likely that the activities at Bir el-‘Abd centered more upon administration and supply than strictly defensive concerns.

**Haruba site A–345 (see figure 22)**

Like Bir el-‘Abd, the roughly six acre concentration of buildings and industrial installations now known as Haruba site A–345 was discovered by the North Sinai Expedition of Ben Gurion University. The site was nestled within a larger cluster of twenty or so sites, all grouped in an area of 4 to 5 km². The time frame and goals of the North Sinai Expedition, however, only allowed excavation to be carried out at two of these sites: a fort that appears to have been built in the reign of Seti I (see chapter five) and the installation here described. Excavation of this latter complex was undertaken in three seasons, between 1980 and 1982, although work was rendered difficult due to the active coastal dunes that blanketed the area.

Haruba site A–345 lay at the far eastern end of the Ways of Horus military route. Although no late Eighteenth Dynasty fort was recovered, it is not improbable that one existed in the nearby vicinity—especially given the noted similarity in architecture, masonry, and ceramic assemblage to Bir el-‘Abd’s fort and outbuildings.

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307 A poorly understood architectural level, Phase IV, which preceded the Nineteenth Dynasty fort, is described very briefly in the reports. Oren believes it to have been an unfortified Eighteenth Dynasty way station or encampment (Oren 1987: 92; 1993a: 1390; 1999: 735).
309 Oren (1993a: 1390; see also 1987: 98) reports that “the architectural features—the ground plan, building and bonding techniques, and the standard brick size are purely Egyptian.”
310 The ceramic repertoire of A–345 was most similar to the assemblages of Malkata and Amarna. Oren (1987: 103, 105) calls it “Egyptian in every respect.”
Although the site has yet to be published in its final form, preliminary reports and extant plans reveal the presence of a storage magazine, an industrial area, a mysterious casemate-walled building and numerous other small structures of unknown function. As at Bir el-'Abd, the storage magazine at A–345 consisted of a series of long, narrow rooms fronted by an impressive courtyard.\(^{311}\) Whereas the storerooms at Bir el-'Abd had been too denuded for their original contents to be ascertained, however, at A–345 a thick layer of carbonized grain on the floors of the facility left little doubt as to its function.\(^{312}\)

Given that the circular grain silos of Bir el-'Abd had been used as trash repositories while the fort was still active, it is tempting to speculate that the site’s rectangular storage magazines had been constructed as a replacement for the silos. Such a situation would mimic that observed at the fortress-town of Sai during the mid-Eighteenth dynasty, when Thutmose III’s viceroy replaced a series of grain silos with rectangular storage magazines.\(^{313}\) Indeed, as some remains at Bir el-'Abd are reportedly indicative of a mid-Eighteenth Dynasty date, it is not entirely without basis to suggest that this site had been established prior to the fort at Haruba site A–345, which itself had no circular grain silos. This conclusion, in turn, would imply that construction on the new, rectangular granary at Bir el-'Abd began concurrently with the erection of Haruba site A–345. Alternatively, as Bir el-'Abd and A–345 both show evidence for a light occupation in the Nineteenth Dynasty,\(^{314}\) it could be that the storage magazines were in fact constructed by Seti I or perhaps Horemheb.

In addition to administrating a grain depot, the inhabitants of Haruba site A–345 were deeply invested in pottery manufacture. A busy, sooty ceramic workshop flourished behind a partition wall just east of the granary. Three large kilns, installations for the storage and preparation of local clays, numerous ceramic wasters, and a thick layer of industrial refuse attest to the prolific production of

\(^{311}\) The individual compartments measured 10 m × 3 m, while the central courtyard extended 20 m × 15 m (Oren 1993a: 1390).


\(^{313}\) Vercoutter 1958: 155; Azîm 1975: 116. Kemp (1991: 296) made the general observation that after a certain size, silos at Amarna tended to be replaced by narrow, vaulted storage magazines. He also stated, however, that since a greater variety of materials tended to be stored in these structures, estimating typical grain capacity becomes much more difficult.

\(^{314}\) Goldwasser 1980; Oren 1987: fig. 7; 1993a: 1390.
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these resident potters.\textsuperscript{315} Appearing to adhere strictly to Egyptian tradition, the workshop produced characteristic late Eighteenth Dynasty forms, including drop-shaped jars, flowerpots, bowls, and offering stands.\textsuperscript{316} As was the case at Bir el-'Abd, very little ceramic on the site was not Egyptian in style.\textsuperscript{317}

Oren speculates that the potters at Haruba site A–345 may possibly have provisioned nearby Egyptian installations with Egyptian-style ceramic.\textsuperscript{318} In supplying their bases with standardized wares, the Egyptian government may have aimed to secure control over logistical matters, such as rationing. Such internal production, however, would also have lessened the community's reliance on their Canaanite neighbors—and this may have been desirable. Finally, in the case of the forts along the Ways of Horus, on-site pottery production may indeed have been the only practical manner by which to provide the garrison (and traveling armies) with enough pottery to suit their needs.

In addition to the granary and the ceramic workshop, the Ben Gurion expedition uncovered a number of other buildings that Oren speculates were probably domestic and administrative in nature.\textsuperscript{319} The most intriguing of all, however, was undoubtedly the “casemate” structure located at the very northwestern edge of the exposed area. This 25 m long building of unknown function was located to the northwest of the thin curving wall that appears to have encircled the core of the settlement. It possessed thin plastered walls, buttresses, and benches. Like all of the buildings on the site, it does not appear to have been surrounded by any manner of substantial fortification, and its exact function remains unknown.\textsuperscript{320}

\textsuperscript{315} Oren 1987: 97–103; 1993a: 1391.
\textsuperscript{316} Whether the clay cobra found at Haruba site A–345 (Oren 1980: 31, no. 8) was crafted by one of these artisans or by a pious member of the community is uncertain. This type of artifact, however, has parallels at Amarna, Deir el-Medina, Beth Shan (see James and McGovern 1993: 172), and Haruba site A–289 (Oren 1993a: 1390).
\textsuperscript{317} Canaanite wares were apparently limited to storage jars. If these were not Egyptian imitations, their presence could indicate that A–345 was supplied in part from taxes imposed on southern Canaan. Alternatively, the inhabitants of A–345 may well have traded grain or ceramics in return for Canaanite goods, particularly wine. Imported ceramic was otherwise limited to Cypriot pottery and to a very few examples of Mycenaean ware (Oren 1987: 103; 1993: 1391).
\textsuperscript{318} Oren 1993a: 1391.
\textsuperscript{319} Oren 1987: 98.
\textsuperscript{320} Oren 1987: 99; 1993a: 1391.
Whether or not an undiscovered contemporary fort lay nearby, the relative vulnerability of substantial buildings and key granaries at Haruba site A–345 must indicate a predominantly peaceful milieu for this administrative center. Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that the stratigraphy of the site is free from signs of traumatic disruption. In the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, the Egyptians may have felt it wise to invest in stronger defenses, for a true fort would at that point be established quite near Haruba site A–345.

Deir el-Balah (see figure 23)
The Egyptians founded Deir el-Balah at the tail end of the Ways of Horus military route, a short 13 km distance southwest of the well-established Egyptian headquarters at Gaza. Deir el-Balah, like most of the contemporary constructions built by Egyptians outside of Egypt, appears to have been unfortified. The evident lack of concern with defensive measures was likely a result of the successful pacification of the region closest to Egypt during the early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. The proximity of Deir el-Balah to Gaza—where numerous troops and military personnel were apparently stationed—may also have rendered fortification unnecessary or largely gratuitous.

The Institute of Archaeology of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem undertook excavation at Deir el-Balah for fifteen seasons, after they had been alerted to the site by a sudden flood of Egyptian-style artifacts on the antiquities market. Massive, migrating sand dunes made digging at Deir el-Balah challenging, and all in all only one half acre of the site was uncovered. In this small space, however, the Israeli team discovered an Egyptian-style administrative complex, complete with its own reservoir.

Although later building and drifting sand dunes had obscured much of the plan of Residency I at Deir el-Balah, portions of the structure could be reasonably well discerned. It seems that three

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322 Gonen (1984: 64) estimates that the entire settlement may have extended only up to 10 dunams, or roughly five times the excavated area.
Figure 22. Egyptian base at Haruba Site A–345
(after Oren 1993: 1391)
joined mud-brick buildings bordered the reservoir on its eastern and southern perimeters. The building oriented east-west measured approximately 20 m in length and included at least four or five rooms, while its counterparts, oriented north-south, together ran approximately 50 m in length and contained upward of ten rooms each.\footnote{The width of the buildings could not be discerned due to the encroachment of dunes.} The northern and western portions of the building, unfortunately, lay beneath formidable sand dunes.\footnote{T. Dothan 1985a: 58; 1985b: 37.}

The residency’s walls were relatively thin—the most substantial being only 1.1 m thick—and there is nothing in its architectural plan to signal a fundamentally militaristic character. Indeed, if the square kurkar blocks found in a room of the complex can truly be compared to the bed bases discovered within a sleeping niche at Amarna, this would signal an at least partly residential function.\footnote{T. Dothan 1983a: 59–60; 1985b: 38.} Given these clues, excavator Trude Dothan reconstructed the building to look something akin to the palaces excavated at el-Amarna.\footnote{T. Dothan 1982b: 755; 1985b: 37.}

The artifacts specifically mentioned in reports as having been associated with the site also appeared to be either domestic (pestles, mortars, flint implements, an Egyptian-style razor) or administrative (steatite seal). Indeed, one of the most interesting and indicative of the finds was a clay bulla, originally employed to seal a papyrus. This bulla bore the impression of two udjat-eyes and two nefer-signs, a design closely paralleled at Amarna.\footnote{T. Dothan 1981: 127; 1982b: 760; 1985a: 60; 1985b: 37.} Similarly notable was the find of a ceremonial flail constructed of blue frit and carnelian; the flail is said to closely resemble in dimensions and style an example found in Tutankhamun’s tomb.\footnote{T. Dothan 1985a: 60; 1985b: 39–40. In the reports there appears to be some doubt as to whether the reddish stone was made of carnelian or jasper.}

Although no kilns were discovered on site, the bulk of both Egyptian-style and Canaanite pottery appeared to be local. As in the other Amarna Period sites along the Ways of Horus, Egyptian-style pottery predominated and included Amarna blue ware, drop-shaped jars, and chalices. Imported ware included Cypriot white-slip II, milk bowls, and Mycenaean ware.\footnote{T. Dothan 1985a: 60; 1985b: 37.}
Significantly, the complex as a whole seems to have been designed around a 400 m² pond. Formed as an intended consequence of quarrying for mud-bricks, this feature signaled the elite or monumental nature of the building. Only temples, palaces, and the most important of estates possessed adjacent pools of water. The architect’s fondness for designing buildings around ponds is indeed a hallmark of Amarna Period architecture, but the presence of the pond at Deir el-Balah is also reminiscent of Bir el-‘Abd’s reservoir and of the water sources associated with the forts along the Ways of Horus on Seti I’s Karnak relief. As mentioned previously, aside from its aesthetic purpose, such an associated reservoir could provide washing, drinking, and perhaps even gardening water to the inhabitants of the base.

Unfortunately for our understanding of the use of Deir el-Balah during the Amarna Period, the contemporary cemetery has not been identified. According to Dothan, however, relevant material—including coffins, scarabs, alabaster vessels, and Aegean pottery—has surfaced in private collections. Further work at the site will hopefully round out our picture of this base.

It is unclear exactly how stratum 9 met its end, but a “destruction” is referred to in the site reports. Perhaps the installation fell victim to local attacks during the aftermath following the abandonment of Amarna and the temporary preoccupation of the Egyptian government with reasserting order within Egypt proper. In any case, the destruction of the residence may also have destroyed Egypt’s faith in the passivity of southern Canaan—for the next residency to occupy the site would be well fortified (see chapter five).

Tell el-Ajjul (see figure 24)
Following its capture by Ahmose, the fortunes of Tell el-Ajjul (Sharuhen) declined markedly. Whereas before its defeat the city extended an impressive 33 acres and boasted a substantial urban population, in the early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasty one small Egyptian garrison

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333 T. Dothan 1985a: 60.
335 A small settlement that occupied the site, perhaps during the reign of Horemheb, is not well understood. It does not appear, however, to have been monumental in nature (T. Dothan 1985b: 40; 1987: 128; 1993: 344).
Figure 23. Egyptian base at Deir el-Balah
(after Dothan 1985: 56, fig. 1)
and a greatly diminished settlement were all that remained (see chapters two and three). Finally, by the late Eighteenth Dynasty, the Egyptian outpost appears to stand alone as virtually the only structure occupying the tell.

Although incompletely preserved, this Egyptian base (Building IV) appears to have been essentially a rebuilding of the early Eighteenth Dynasty structure (Building III). Like its predecessor, the headquarters consisted of a main building of apparently square or rectangular shape and a row of what might have been storerooms. According to Weinstein, Building IV likely possessed a plan similar to those of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty administrative headquarters found at Aphek, Tel Mor, stratum IX at Tel Sera’, the commander’s residence in level VII at Beth Shan, and the smaller Egyptian building at Tell el-Far’ah (see chapters five and six). These structures he classifies as “a third type” of Egyptian-style building, defined by the presence of a courtyard along one side and rows of short and long rooms occupying the rest of the structure together with connecting corridors. Little of Building IV remains, but if it can be reconstructed in the way Weinstein envisions or as a center-hall house, which also seems plausible, the structure would anticipate a common type of Ramesside administrative building in Canaan. Other scholars, however, have emphasized the more fortlike characteristics of Building IV. Some of the walls of Building III had been thickened in its succeeding phase, and Tufnell suggests that this strengthening would have allowed Tell el-Ajjul to serve primarily as a fortified hilltop observation post along the Via Maris.

Significantly, the notable absence of contemporary residential buildings makes it quite likely that the inhabitants of the site had been ordered off the tell, as one might expect in a high security zone.

336 Originally Petrie (1932: 5, 14; 1952: 5) dated this “palace” to the Sixteenth Dynasty, largely on the basis of a horse burial. Albright (1938: 355–359) believed that the building dated to the LB IIB, while Kempinski (1974: 149, n. 18; 1993: 53) has taken the middle road (followed here), suggesting a LB IIA date.
337 Petrie 1932: 5, 14.
339 Petrie 1932: 5.
341 There are, of course, alternate hypotheses to explain the substantial depopulation of the mound. Petrie (1952: 5), for example, believed that an epidemic of malaria probably was the culprit. Tufnell (1993: 52), on the other hand, thought that erosion might have artificially erased the evidence for the population that
Building IV and its immediate environs, meanwhile, contained a ceramic assemblage with as much as 30% of the wares being Egyptian in style. This pattern suggests that the Egyptians who occupied the outpost had access to the services of potters well versed in Egypt’s ceramic tradition. Whether or not these wares came from the pottery workshop discovered at Haruba site A–345, however, is impossible to tell without source analysis.

The exact relationship between the Egyptians and the indigenous population, which may have inhabited scattered settlements around the tell, is unclear. Therefore, it is unfortunate that excavation of the cemeteries surrounding the site has not done more to illuminate the situation. Because both Egyptians and Canaanites were interred in family vaults, it is often extremely difficult to gauge the relationship between various bodies, their grave goods, and their ethnicities. This inherent difficulty, combined with the premodern archaeological techniques and notation employed at Tell el-Ajjul—not to mention the effects of thousands of years of plundering—makes interpreting the funerary remains at the site a risky and trying endeavor.

According to Gonen, who analyzed the cemetery at Tell el-Ajjul in depth, 164 graves can be dated to the late Eighteenth Dynasty. This figure exceeds the 133 graves that can be assigned to the previous 150-year period. It is still, however, a mortality rate that could be explained away as naturally occurring amongst a garrison of fifty soldiers and their support staff over a century or so. In the cemetery, archaeologists discovered numerous graves containing scarabs of late Eighteenth Dynasty date and assorted Egyptian-style burial goods. Most impressive amongst these tombs were those made up of not only a burial cist but also a dromos. While it should not be surprising that these tombs generally contained more expensive goods

342 Higginbotham (2000: 84). Egyptian-style wares include ovoid jars, handleless pyxides, saucer bowls, spinning bowls, and other miscellaneous forms.
than the ordinary tombs, they also possessed higher than average quantities of weaponry and Egyptian-style objects.\textsuperscript{345}

That power and wealth would correlate with Egyptian ethnicity in an Egyptian administrative headquarters is not surprising, and there is good reason to suspect that a large percentage of the individuals buried in these tombs were indeed Egyptian. Gonen, however, has suggested that the burials, in fact, belonged to a wealthy military aristocracy whose desire it was to emulate their Egyptian conquerors.\textsuperscript{346} Taking into account the rather deserted state of the tell, however, this Canaanite elite would have to be imagined as dwelling atop a nearly empty city mound. Considering this apparent isolation as well as the nature of the grave goods, it appears preferable to assign the elite burials to Tell el-Ajjul’s Egyptian administrators.

By far the most important and intriguing of the cist and dromos burials is the so-called governor’s tomb (no. 149). The architecture of the sepulcher, with its steps, slab paneling, and relatively large size, signaled its importance—as did the 45 burials that clustered around it.\textsuperscript{347} Of particular note, however, was a gold signet ring bearing the cartouche of Tutankhamun that was found within the tomb. Signet rings such as this were commonly bestowed upon high officials who served the king or filled important offices. Many other fine artifacts were also discovered in the tomb, including an Egyptian wine set, an Egyptian-style bronze mirror, bronze arrowheads, an Egyptian-style bronze knife, an alabaster bowl, a duck-shaped dish, and lead fishing-net weights.\textsuperscript{348} Some of these items, however, may have belonged to the burial equipment of the tomb’s other occupants, as corpses continued to be interred at least until the reign of Ramesses II.

The presence of the governor’s tomb at Tell el-Ajjul, then, suggests that in the late Eighteenth Dynasty an important Egyptian

\textsuperscript{345} Gonen 1992b: 80.
\textsuperscript{346} Gonen 1992b: 82.
\textsuperscript{347} Petrie 1933: 5–6; Gonen 1992b: 78.
\textsuperscript{348} Petrie 1933: 5–6. While the date of most of these other burial goods is unclear, the lead fishing-net weights are said to be of a typical Eighteenth Dynasty type. A similar set of lead fishing-net weights was found in tomb 1969, also of cist and dromos type, which is assumed to be of roughly the same date (Gonen 1992b: 80, 82). Gonen (1992b: 82) explains the appearance of this nonluxury, Egyptian-style object in what she believes to be a Canaanite tomb by stating that it was “the desire of the local aristocracy to emulate Egypt’s upper classes and their favorite pastimes such as fishing and hunting.”
official occupied an isolated and defensible outpost together with his troops and/or administrative assistants. Although by no means certain, it is possible that the official occupied the site on a full-time basis and raised his family there (hence the evidence for the family tomb). The local population, which at first had been allowed to occupy the city along with the troops, had by the late Eighteenth Dynasty been mostly banished. Instead a small group of Egyptians, and perhaps service staff as well, lived on the tell and employed Egyptian-style ceramics, luxury goods, and fishing techniques.

Overview of Egyptian interactions with Nubia

Historical summary

Before delving into an examination of late Eighteenth Dynasty activity in Nubia, it is appropriate to deal first, briefly, with the character of Nubia itself at this period. By the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, the vast majority of Nubians had discarded their traditional material culture in favor of an artifact assemblage identical or nearly so with their neighbors to the north. This transfer of cultural allegiance or “Egyptianization” has rendered Egyptian settlers and Nubian inhabitants almost impossible to distinguish in the archaeological record. There were, however, a few isolated groups in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty that still followed their traditional ways of life. These conservative holdouts are extremely difficult to identify after the reign of Amenhotep III.349

Another trend evident in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty and amplified in the late Eighteenth Dynasty is the progressive impoverishment of the population in general. Excavations at Fadrus, a provincial Lower Nubian cemetery that appears in no way anomalous compared to other contemporary cemeteries, revealed that by the late Eighteenth Dynasty fully 91% of the tombs fell into the “poor” category. In the early Eighteenth Dynasty the percentage of poor graves was only 35%, increasing to 70% in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.350 This alarming spike in poverty rates appears to have been accompanied by a

349 Trigger 1965: 108; Adams 1984a: 235. The discovery of K. Grzymski’s Letti Basin Culture may indicate that this picture does not hold true for the Dongola Reach and other areas peripheral to Egypt’s direct sphere of interest.

Figure 24. Administrative headquarters at Tell el-Ajjul
(after Petrie 1932: pl. 49)
widespread abandonment of Lower Nubia in general. Late Eighteenth Dynasty graves are far fewer in number than are earlier graves, presaging the even more marked depopulation of Lower Nubia in the Ramesside era. Less is known of Upper Nubia, of course, but there is no evidence that the trends in this area were particularly different.

It is against this backdrop that the “campaigns” of the late Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs should be viewed. Their forays into Nubia, which as good warrior-kings they were obliged to carry out, were directed against a crippled foe that resembled more an overburdened Egyptian peasantry than the exotic and dangerous peoples that the Egyptians depicted in their art. Similarly, seminomadic desert-dwellers—targeted as perhaps the last indigenous peoples who dared defy Egyptian control—constituted only a somewhat less dismal opponent.

While the picture derived from archaeological evidence is one of a thoroughly subdued people, the reality may have been a bit more complex, at least on the outskirts of the empire. In the fifth year of his reign, Amenhotep III mounted a campaign against an army led by a man named Ikheny. The Egyptian authorities had apparently obtained information that Ikheny had “planned rebellion in his heart” (Urk. IV, 1666: 4), and thus it was as a preemptive strike that Amenhotep III and his troops mounted their expedition.

Just where Ikheny and his compatriots were located is unclear. The toponyms Kush (Urk. IV, 1662: 10; 1666: 4) and Ta-Sety (Urk. IV, 1959: 17) are too general to allow a precise localization. Likewise,

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351 Säve-Söderbergh 1964: 36; Adams 1984a: 236; Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 13; Shinnie 1996: 90. As discussed in chapter five, the decrease in the agricultural population of Lower Nubia during the Ramesside period is unlikely to have been as severe as once claimed. Even taking into consideration the changes in burial practice that undoubtedly have helped to obscure Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty mortuary remains, however, there is no denying the fact that—as in Canaan—Egyptian rule over the long term did not contribute to the overall demographic health of the region.

352 Helck 1980a: 125; Schulman 1982: 304, n. 37. It is not known to what extent these peoples had adopted Egyptian customs or rule. As with nomads in general, the ephemeral nature of their presence has left next to no trace on the archaeological record.

353 This expedition is recorded in stelae erected at Konosso (Urk. IV, 1661: 12–1665: 4), at Sai (Urk. IV, 1959: 11–18; Porter and Moss VII: 155), and in the vicinity of Aswan (Urk. IV, 1665: 10–1666: 20). Other references to the campaign include Urk. IV, 1654: 14–15; 1793: 11–12, and perhaps Urk. IV, 1736: 15. For an excellent review of the relevant primary sources, see Topozada 1988.
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an associated scene of Amun-re handing Kush, Irem, Tarek, and Weresh to Amenhotep III (Urk. IV, 1661: 17) is more puzzling than helpful. The locations of Tarek and Weresh are not known, and various scholars have situated Irem in or adjacent to Upper Nubia or, alternatively, south of it. Amenhotep III’s boasts that he placed his boundary as far as the four supports of heaven (Urk. IV, 1661: 11) and brought back gold from Karoy (Urk. IV, 1654: 14–15) in conjunction with this battle, however, certainly bolster arguments in favor of a deep Upper Nubian locale.

There is still the question of what exactly the four toponyms on the Konossos stele signify. Were these places that Amenhotep III passed through on his way to conquer Ikheny? Did the different territories all contribute people to the rebel army? Or, alternatively, did Ikheny actually manage to unify all these places under his leadership? As O’Connor has pointed out, the fact that the stele mentions the rebel leader by his proper name is unusual and may point to the fact that this man represented a particularly formidable foe. Certainly the tens of thousands—or 30,000—prisoners captured by the Egyptians in the ensuing battle is a large number by any standard and, if not a gross exaggeration, would confirm the impression that this rebellion represented something out of the ordinary.

The only other well-known Nubian campaign to take place during the reign of Amenhotep III occurred in the last decade of his reign and was, in fact, led by his viceroy of Kush, Merymose. The

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355 If Lacau’s stele CG 34163 is indeed to be dated to the reign of Amenhotep III, the mention of Miu in conjunction with the first campaign (Urk. IV, 1736: 15) would be yet another southern Upper Nubian marker (Kemp 1978: 29, n. 68; Zibelius-Chen 1972: 120; 1988: 192).

356 O’Connor 1998: 265. O’Connor also draws attention to a depiction of Amenhotep III trampling one specific Nubian. O’Connor argues that the prone individual should be identified as Ikheny and that the fact that the king is depicted subduing Ikheny personally can be read as an inadvertent testimony to Ikheny’s own status as a worthy opponent.

357 The triad of $db$-signs (Urk. IV, 1666: 10) can be interpreted either way. The text appears to state that Amenhotep III let a good portion of the prisoners go, so that “the offspring of vile Kush would not be cut off” (Urk. IV, 1666: 12). Such mercy following a victory over a rebellious foe is uncharacteristic in Egyptian inscriptions, however, and it leads one to wonder whether there was more to the story than Amenhotep III and his scribes cared to relate.

358 Urk. IV, 1659: 8–1661: 5. While some scholars have viewed this campaign as identical to that of year five (see the extensive references cited in Topozada 1988:...
target this time was the locality of Ibhet, which is known from various Old and Middle Kingdom sources to have been a Lower Nubian territory associated with the desert-dwelling Medjay people. Unfortunately, the section of the Semna stele that would have related the crimes committed against the Egyptians by the Ibhet Nubians is not preserved. One can assume, however, that Ibhet was guilty of ill intentions, general noncompliance, or of harassment of some sort, but certainly not any action that would have merited immediate retaliation.

Just as with the campaign against Ikheny, the Egyptians planned a surprise attack, catching the inhabitants of Ibhet at harvest time. While not exactly honorable, this tactic was extremely effective, and the battle was apparently won “in one day, in a single hour” (Urk. IV, 1659: 19). Although obviously agriculturists, the population of Ibhet quite possibly also contained a pastoral element. The people of Ibhet are, for example, referred to as ḫꜣꜣšyw, a word that can mean “foreigners” or “desert dwellers.” Given the fact that Lower Nubians were almost never referred to as ḫꜣꜣšyw in the New Kingdom, however, it makes sense to view the word as signaling their partially nomadic lifestyle. Supporting this notion as well is the fact that the booty from the campaign consisted solely of humans and cattle.
Some scholars have indeed suggested that the seminomadic inhabitants of Ibhet may have interfered with Egyptian gold-mining activities in the Wadi Allaqi.\(^{362}\) Given the vast amount of gold that Amenhotep III was utilizing internally in palace and temple constructions and the prodigious amount that he was exporting to foreign courts as bridewealth or as greeting gifts, the security of the gold mines must have been of paramount concern to the Egyptian government. It is perhaps not coincidental, then, that Akuyuta debuts in a Nubian toponym list during the reign of Amenhotep III (Urk. IV, 1742: 14); Nineteenth Dynasty inscriptions explicitly associate Akuyuta with the lucrative gold mines of the Wadi Allaqi.\(^{363}\)

These two campaigns, then, the one against Ikheny and the other against Ibhet, are the only securely attested military ventures in Amenhotep III’s almost forty-year reign. There is, however, a historical text known as the Bubastite fragment (Urk. IV, 1734: 5–1736: 7) that is often attributed to him and is sometimes equated with one or both of the previously mentioned campaigns.\(^{364}\) The text chronicles an expedition mounted by a king and his army to a place called the “sandbank \((\text{Δ} \text{s})\) of Huwa” and to a nearby well.\(^{365}\) On the way,
the Egyptians fought at least one battle against a generalized Nubian foe, and they fought yet another upon reaching the well.366 Because the booty from the second skirmish consisted of only Nubians, cattle, and donkeys, and because the peoples captured appeared to have been settled in the vicinity of the well, there is a high likelihood that this last group may also have been nomadic.

Other references to battles and to martial activity in the reign of Amenhotep III are decidedly vague. A small stele found reused in Merneptah’s temple depicted Amenhotep III returning home from battle with Nubians strapped to his chariot and trailing along behind. This scene, however, complemented a similar one on the same monument in which the king’s chariot flew across a tangled field of prone northerners. The stele’s text, referring blandly to all countries existing under the feet of the pharaoh forever and ever, only serves to emphasize its static and generalized nature.367

While the aforementioned stele is only illuminating insofar as stereotyped royal propaganda is concerned, the Egyptian army certainly did return home with Nubian prisoners following a successful campaign. Amenhotep son of Hapu, who himself claimed to have acted “as master in front of the braves in order to smite the Nubians” (Urk. IV, 1821: 17), was apparently one of the officials who both registered the new prisoners of war and decided their fate. Judging from his inscription, the majority of these unfortunates were either assigned to work crews or were drafted to serve in the self-same army that had just denied them their freedom (Urk. IV, 1821: 6–9).

Far more numerous than records of Amenhotep III’s Nubian conquests, however, are those relating to his construction or patronage of Nubian temples. Items bearing his name or inscriptions have been

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366 At the sandbank proper, the king’s entourage appears to have been protected by “garrison troops” (\(iw\)yt), although the relevant passage is extremely fragmentary (Urk. IV, 1735: 7–8). The word \(iw\)yt could indicate troops occupying temporary outposts as well as those stationed at fixed military bases (Schulman 1964a: 17), and the former reading would appear to be most likely in this particular case. Compare also the northern and southern \(iw\)yt that protected Thutmose III and his army on their march to Megiddo in his first campaign (Urk. IV, 656: 16).

367 Petrie 1897: pl. 10, pp. 10, 23; Lacau 1909: pl. 20–21, pp. 59–61; Saleh and Soursouzian 1987: no. 143. See Giles (1972: 196), however, who believes the stele to have been erected in order to commemorate some successful military action.
found at the Lower Nubian temples of Buhen, Mirgissa, Uronarti, and Semna. Likewise, there is evidence for substantial temple construction at Elephantine, Kubban, and Aniba.

Between the second and third cataracts, Merymose, the same viceroy of Kush who led the expedition against Ibhet, left an inscription at Tombos. Likewise, at Sai at least one stele had been erected in honor of Amenhotep III’s first victorious campaign, and a figure of the king was carved on the temple wall. Amenhotep III also built wholly new temples at Soleb and Sedeinga. Although both temples are referred to, separately, as mnnw-fortresses, this term must be regarded as a symbolic designation of the temples themselves, rather than as a literal reference to the undoubtedly modest settlements with which they were associated. Further, in sponsoring such grand and relatively isolated temples for the honor of the state gods, himself, and his queen, Amenhotep III would later be zealously imitated—and finally entirely outdone—by Ramesses II (see chapter five).

Like his father, Akhenaten campaigned sparingly in Nubia. In fact a single expedition is all that can be securely ascribed to Akhenaten, and this campaign was led by his viceroy of Kush. The venture was

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368 For Buhen, see H. S. Smith 1976: 210–211. For Mirgissa, see Porter and Moss VII: 142; Vercoutter 1965: 66. For Uronarti, see Dunham 1967: 35–36. For Semna, see Urk. IV, 1659: 8–1661: 5.
369 For Elephantine, see Habachi 1975b: 1218. For Kubban, see Badawy 1968: 290; Donadoni 1984: 52. For Aniba, see Porter and Moss VII: 81; Badawy 1968: 276.
370 Porter and Moss VII: 175.
372 For Soleb, see Giorgini 1958; 1959; 1961; 1962; 1964; 1971; Schiiff 1965; Leclant 1984: 1076–1080. For Sedeinga, see Leclant 1984: 780–782; Porter and Moss VII: 166. The possibility that Amenhotep III also founded Kawa will be discussed below.
373 Amenhotep III, for example, described his own mortuary temple at Thebes as a mnnw (Urk. IV, 1648: 8; 1656: 15). For mnnw as a generic term for a walled temple, see Hayes 1959: 240; Leclant 1984: 1078. For Soleb as a mnnw, see Urk. IV, 1748: 8–9; 1750: 6–7, 20; 1751: 4; Breasted AR II: 362–363, no. 894 and 895; Murnane 1995a: 217; no. 100E; see also Arkell 1966: 93; Leclant 1984: 1078; Kozloff 1992: 220–221. For Sedeinga as a mnnw, see Breasted 1908: 78, 98. The associated settlements at Soleb and Sedeinga, which presumably existed in order to protect and support these temples, have yet to be identified archaeologically. The size of their cemeteries as well as common sense, however, allow us to assume their original presence as a given.
mounted against the nomadic peoples of Akuyuta, the region briefly discussed above that had first appeared in the toponym lists of Amenhotep III (Urk. IV, 1742: 14). Akhenaten had apparently heard that the inhabitants of the Wadi Allaqi “[were plotting rebellion and (even) had invaded the land of] the Nilotic Nubians, while taking all sustenance away from them.”374 Although the total number of Nubians captured or killed in the retaliatory measure was only a few hundred, rendering the battle comparatively small in scale, the action was presumably necessitated in order to safeguard the gold mines, their employees, and continued Egyptian access to the life-giving desert wells in the wadi.375

The great majority of Akhenaten’s activity in Nubia, however, appears to have been of a peaceful nature. In Lower Nubia there is evidence for activity during the reign of Akhenaten at Buhen in the form of one stele and numerous jar sealings.376 Akhenaten expended the bulk of his imperial resources, however, on building activity in Upper Nubia, and this shift in pharaonic attention to the south has indeed often been blamed for the continuing deflation of population and wealth in Lower Nubia.377 Just as likely, however, the move south could have been caused by an exhaustion of resources or a worsening of environmental conditions in Lower Nubia.378 Regardless, the Dongola reach must have appealed to the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasty pharaohs, whether for its greater agricultural potential or for its closer proximity to southern goods.

In Upper Nubia, Akhenaten commissioned reliefs at Soleb and

374 Murnane 1995a: 101. The campaign was recorded on steles erected at Buhen (MacIver and Woolley 1911a: 91–92; H. S. Smith 1976: 125–126; Helck 1980a: 123; Schulman 1982: 301–303; Murnane 1995a: no. 55) and at Amada (Urk. IV, 1963: 4–12; Murnane 1995a: 56). Akuyuta is also found in Akhenaten’s toponym list at Sesebi (Schulman 1982: 303, n. 31; 305). The only other hints at martial activity involving Nubia or Nubians are found on reliefs discovered at Karnak and elsewhere that depict Nubian warriors and prisoners (Schulman 1964b: 51, 54–55; 1982: 300, n. 5; 307–312; 1988: 68, n. 3). While some of these may indeed illustrate the results of the battle against the people of Akuyuta (especially the depictions of bound prisoners in conjunction with Akhenaten’s festival of year 12), others are surely conventional.


the erasure of references to Amun at Napata. Akhenaten’s interest in these sites, however, was relatively inconsequential compared to his role as the patron of two new towns: Sesebi and Kawa. Unfortunately, very little of the latter has been excavated to date, and so the form and extent of the settlement that Akhenaten named Gem-Aten (“[The]-Aten-is-found”) is unknown. What little remains of the town wall, however, suggests that it was once square or rectangular in plan, much like the enclosure walls of Sai and Sesebi.

If Kawa’s form is not particularly clear, its function is far easier to discern. Kawa lay at the western end of the Sikkat el-Miheila desert path to Napata. This well-worn trail extends for 100 km and significantly shortens the journey of a traveler, who would otherwise be forced to sail for a much greater distance upstream. Given the fact that no Egyptian emplacements have yet been discovered along the Nile between Kawa and Napata, it is not unlikely that this trail may in fact have been the usual route by which the Egyptians accessed the fourth cataract region.

Unlike Kawa, Sesebi was located in the more familiar and settled stretch of the Nile between the second and third cataracts. This town has been thoroughly excavated, and its plan is strongly reminiscent of that of Sai, upon which it may well have been modeled. As a

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379 For Soleb, see Porter and Moss VII: 169. For Napata, see Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 162.
380 Scattered inscribed objects and some items from a nearby cemetery suggest New Kingdom occupation at the site prior to Akhenaten (Porter and Moss VII: 173; Blackman 1937: 149; Badawy 1968: 57). Foundation deposits, however, indicate that the major architectural work at the site was undertaken by Akhenaten prior to his move to Akhetaten (Fairman 1938: 153–154).
381 Given the presence at Kawa of a granite fragment bearing the cartouche of Amenhotep III, the town may actually have been founded in his reign (Macadam 1949: 82–83, pl. 37). This possibility will be discussed in greater detail below. Gem(pa)aten, however, is also the name of one of Akhenaten’s major temples at Karnak. Considering that Akhenaten did in fact have temples constructed to the Aten at nearby Sesebi, it is not unlikely that he intended Kawa to be yet another city sacred to his sun god (Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 194; Macadam 1949: 82–83; 1955: 9–10, 13–14; Badawy 1968: 281). Although no in situ architecture has been found that predates the Amun temple of Tutankhamun, it is very unlikely that a post-Amarna pharaoh would have dared incorporate the Aten’s name in a new town. If Tutankhamun initiated work at Kawa prior to his third year, however, there is always the possibility that he could have founded and named the settlement himself. In the reign of Tutankhamun, Kawa was referred to as a town and even possessed its own governor (ḥapy) (Macadam 1949: 2, pl. 3).
382 Macadam 1955: pl. 3.
fortified town, Sesebi will be discussed in more detail in the archaeological section below. With regard to both new towns, however, it is appropriate to keep in mind Akhenaten’s request of the ruler of Damascus, “Send me the ‘Apiru of the pasture land (?) concerning whom I sent you as follows: ‘I will place them in the cities of the land of Kush to dwell in them inasmuch as I have plundered them.’”

The utter lack of any but the most stereotypical references in art and inscriptions to southern military campaigns in the reign of Tutankhamun strengthens the image of late Eighteenth Dynasty Nubia as a predominantly pacified land. The altogether typically Egyptian tomb constructed by the Nubian prince of Miam (Aniba) further emphasizes the pervasive acculturation of the Nubian population at this time. Hekanefer’s tomb is not only architecturally Egyptian, but it is decorated throughout in a manner perfectly befitting an Egyptian noble. Indeed, the prince himself, who is portrayed with black skin in the viceroy’s Theban tomb, is depicted as a brown-skinned gentleman in his own funerary monument.

It is unknown whether this adoption of all things Egyptian was the case for the other contemporary princes of Wawat as well, since their graves remain undiscovered. The continuing practice of raising foreign heirs at the pharaonic court, however, would have encouraged Egyptianization by the elite, even if Egyptian culture had not eclipsed traditional Nubian aesthetics long before. Hekanefer’s title “child of the (royal) nursery” (ḥyd n kšp) suggests that he himself had

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384 Edzard 1970: 56–57; Redford 1990: 38–39. See Schulman (1982: 315), however, who suggests that the Apiru may have been destined to settle in the depopulated areas of Akuyuta instead.


386 For more information about Hekanefer and Huy, see the publications of their tombs (Simpson 1963; Davies and Gardiner 1926; Zaba 1974: 227–228). It should be kept in mind, however, that the artists working on the tomb of Huy may well have been motivated to purposefully darken the skin of Hekanefer in order to emphasize his identity as a Nubian.

387 In the tomb of Huy there are two rulers of Wawat depicted in addition to Hekanefer (Davies and Gardiner 1926: pl. 27). As speculated in chapter two, the administrative zones overseen by these rulers may have centered upon mi’m (Aniba), bški (Kubban), and bwhn (Buhen). For Kush, at least six indigenous rulers are depicted (Davies and Gardiner 1926: pls. 27, 29), although there is no indication given as to their respective bailiwicks. Indeed, it is not even certain whether all six resided in the Nile Valley proper or whether some, at least, hailed from semiarid or desert locales.
indeed been raised at court.\textsuperscript{388} It is of particular interest, then, to witness him bringing a group of "children of the rulers," some of them presumably his own, to Tutankhamun in the tomb of Huy (see figure 25).\textsuperscript{389} The children are easily distinguished from the other Nubians in the scene due to their rich Egyptian attire.

Of the six children provided by the three rulers of Wawat, two were young women. Both women wore linen gowns and floral collars, and while one led the procession, another brought up the rear in an ox-drawn chariot. Although it is nowhere specified, it is not at all unlikely that these princesses were destined for the royal harem. On analogy with the marriages brokered in the Amarna archive, Tutankhamun’s unions with the young women perhaps cemented political alliances between the pharaoh and their fathers. Given that no children accompanied the rulers of Kush, however, it is likely that the Egyptians exacted children solely from the Lower Nubian vassals who were already well under their thumb. Presumably, just as there is no record of northern Syrian rulers sending their sons to Egypt, the more southern Nubian rulers were likewise exempted from this requirement—whether as a special mark of status or simply because Egyptian forces had very little jurisdiction in their territories.\textsuperscript{390} If the Nubian princesses in Huy’s tomb were indeed the daughters of already docile Lower Nubian vassals, then it is likely that they—like their southern Canaanite counterparts—were welcomed into the harem with little fanfare.

During the reign of Tutankhamun, Egyptian expenditure in Nubia appears to have been funneled primarily into creating a new walled town at Faras, which was provided with the rather peaceable name “Satisfying-the-gods” (\textit{shtp-ntrw}).\textsuperscript{391} This new town displaced Aniba as the acknowledged capital of Lower Nubia, and primary control of the latter town must have been left in the capable hands of Hekanefer. Faras will be discussed in greater detail below.

The only other construction that can be confidently assigned to the reign of Tutankhamun is a temple dedicated to Amun-re at Kawa.\textsuperscript{392} Although the purpose of the construction was not explicitly

\textsuperscript{388} Simpson 1963: 26; Feucht 1985.
\textsuperscript{389} Davies and Gardiner 1926: pls. 23, 27, 28.
\textsuperscript{390} See Morkot (1991; 2001), who argues on a number of different grounds that the rulers of Kush and those of Syria held a similar status in the New Kingdom.
\textsuperscript{391} \textit{shtp-ntrw} is Tutankhamun’s Golden Horus name.
Figure 25. Hekanefer in the tomb of the viceroy of Kush
(after Davies 1926: pl. 27)
stated as such, it is probable that Tutankhamun erected the temple to Amun expressly to counteract the heretical stench of a site that previously had been strongly associated with the worship of the Aten. Why the name of the site was not changed at this time as well, however, is unknown.

Perhaps due to the brevity of his reign, Tutankhamun’s successor, Ay, devoted even less attention to his southern frontier. This king’s only surviving monument in Nubia is a rock shrine in the vicinity of Abu Simbel, and otherwise he seems only to have dedicated a stone lion at Soleb.393 No known campaigns date from his tenure in office.

About Horemheb’s activities in Nubia, also, little is known. Warlike inscriptions regarding Punt (Urk. IV, 2127: 16–2128: 7) can hardly be taken at face value, and otherwise information is scant. Reliefs and inscriptions on the rock grotto of Gebel Silsila indicate that at some point in his reign Horemheb defeated arrogant Nubians and brought some or all of them back with him to Egypt (Urk. IV, 2138: 16–2139: 20). Many scholars doubt, however, that this campaign amounted to much more than a demonstration of royal power.394 Likewise, despite his claim to have restored the temples from the Delta marshes to Nubia (Urk. IV, 2119: 13), only the barest traces of this king have been found at sites such as Aniba, Faras, and possibly Kubban.395 Morkot’s tentative suggestion that Horemheb founded Amara West and temple B500 at Napata must remain pure supposition.396

From this summary of late Eighteenth Dynasty activity in Nubia, then, it can be seen that military expeditions were markedly few and far between; indeed only one or possibly two known campaigns postdate the reign of Amenhotep III. Likewise, the few late Eighteenth Dynasty campaigns that are recorded were waged against desert

394 Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 167; Emery 1965: 192; Shinnie 1996: 91. Indeed, some scholars have even speculated that the scene at Gebel Silsila is simply a conflation of different campaigns led by Horemheb, some or all of which took place while he was Tutankhamun’s general. The fact that Ramesses II copied some of Horemheb’s “imprecise and conventional” rhetoric for his own dubiously historical battle scenes at Beit el-Wali and Derr throws further doubt on the specificity of this purported campaign (Schulman 1982: 304, n. 45; 305, n. 47; Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 5).
395 Porter and Moss VII: 81 (Aniba) and 83 (Kubban); Karkowski 1981: 73 (Faras).
396 Morkot 1987: 37.
dwellers and those living at the southern extremities of the empire. These border areas, it is tempting to suggest, may well have attracted culturally traditional Nubians, who had fled the Nile Valley due to their opposition to Egyptian rule. The Nilotic Nubians, on the other hand, appear to have led lives very much like their counterparts in Egypt, although in Lower Nubia, at least, population was in decline and contemporary graves exhibit unmistakable signs of impoverishment.

In terms of pharaonic building projects, it is likewise significant that almost all activity in Lower Nubia centered upon temples. Indeed, Tutankhamun’s construction at Faras is one of the only known civil projects undertaken at this time. To the south, however, new towns were erected at both Kawa and Sesebi. Whether settlements of any appreciable size were also associated with the temples erected at Soleb and Sedeinga is unfortunately unknown, but the existence of a mayor at Soleb (Urk. IV, 2068: 12) suggests that further excavation in this area should be able to identify a modest town. It is important to note that by the reigns of Ay and Horemheb major building activity in Nubia as a whole seems to have ground to a halt.

**Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for late Eighteenth Dynasty southern fortress-towns**

Five Nubian *mn mw* are attested from late Eighteenth Dynasty textual sources: Baki, Taroy, Faras, Soleb, and Sedeinga. Significantly, however, only two of these, Baki and Taroy, are discovered in anything resembling a military context. In preparation for his campaign against Ibhet, Amenhotep III’s viceroy of Kush raised an army, “every man according to his village, beginning from the *mn(n)*w-fortress of Baki (and) down to the *mn(n)*w-fortress of Taroy, 52-iters of sailing having been made” (Urk. IV, 1659: 17–18). Of these two *mn mw* that bookended the zone from which men were drafted, only the physical location of Baki (Kubban) is certain.

Kubban, of course, had originally been built in the early Middle Kingdom to be a working military fortress—a classic *mn mw*. In the New Kingdom, however, the reoccupied fortress seems to have served primarily as a base for gold workers and as a treasury; certainly no known defensive architecture was constructed or refurbished at this time. Given the nomadic incursions that seem to have plagued the desert areas in the vicinity of the Wadi Allaqi, however, Kubban
may well have housed more military personnel than other *mnnw* in this predominantly peaceful period.

The situation with respect to Taroy is more difficult to determine. A distance of 52-iters south of Kubban would place the *mnnw* of Taroy somewhere in the vicinity of the third cataract. Whether Taroy should be identified with Tombos, Kawa, or some other place, however, is unclear. The term *mnnw* in this case might designate a genuine military fortress if Taroy can in fact be identified with one of the *mnnw*-fortresses built by Thutmose I. As discussed in chapter two, however, Thutmose’s *mnnw* have proved notoriously elusive, even at such promising sites as Tombos. A second possibility, then, is that the term *mnnw* was here used simply to refer to a walled settlement. Certainly, one salient point concerning the viceroy’s inscription is that it specifically states that troops were levied from every village that lay *between* Baki and Taroy. Thus, there is little reason to believe that these two *mnnw* were evoked as anything more than convenient landmarks, citizen soldiers having been levied in the same manner from these walled towns as from the settlements that lay between.

The third attested late Eighteenth Dynasty *mnnw*, Satisfying-the-gods, seems a quintessential example of a *mnnw* that had been defined as such principally by virtue of its status as a walled town, an ancient gated community. As was typical, this new town at Faras—constructed to replace Aniba as the administrative capital of Lower Nubia—almost certainly held more political than military importance. Although Satisfying-the-gods at Faras was indeed the only walled town newly erected in Lower Nubia, similar late Eighteenth Dynasty projects were undertaken in Upper Nubia at Kawa and Sesebi.

Excavation at Faras and Kawa has unfortunately centered almost exclusively upon the monumental stone temples erected in these communities by Tutankhamun. Thus, at neither site is the full extent of the town wall known, much less what sort of civil and residential buildings were contained within. The case is somewhat clearer with regard to the walled town of Sesebi, although even here the eastern half of the town had almost completely eroded away (see figure 27). What is significant, however, is that with the exception of the storehouse, the most substantial extant building at Sesebi was without a doubt the large state temple. Like its counterparts at Faras and Kawa—but unlike state temples in Egypt itself—Sesebi’s temple lacked a surrounding temenos wall.
In New Kingdom Egypt, temple enclosure walls had achieved a monumentality that consciously invited comparison to fortified structures. Indeed, in the reign of Amenhotep III alone, the term mnnw was applied to newly built temples at Thebes, Soleb, and Sedeinga.\footnote{Urk. IV, 1648: 6–9; 1656: 13–17. There is also a slight possibility, explored below, that the mnnw at Faras may possibly have referred to the walled temple at the heart of the town rather than to the town itself.} In a thought-provoking essay, Kemp has observed that the walls of New Kingdom Upper Nubian towns “appear to be unmodified copies of a type of temple enclosure wall in Egypt itself.”\footnote{Kemp 1972a: 653; see also Kemp 1978: 23.} According to Kemp, “in Nubia the Egyptians attempted to turn what must have seemed to them to be an unbearably backward land into an extension of their own country, building temple-centered towns of the type which probably now formed the backbone of urbanism in Egypt. But, because of the dangers from raids, real or imagined, the very real defensive possibilities provided by what in Egypt were primarily symbolic fortifications were utilized to give protection to the houses which in Egypt spread around outside the walls.”\footnote{Kemp 1972a: 654.}

Given the proximity of the main temple to the storehouse at Sesebi, and the massive size of both these installations, the economy at this walled town certainly does appear to have centered predominantly upon the temple itself.\footnote{The temple of Sesebi is far more prominent, for example, than its counterpart at Sai. In the older town the main granary and storage area lay directly adjacent to two massive administrative buildings. The nearest temple, meanwhile, was dwarfed in size.} Moreover, it is remarkable to note the ever-evolving importance that temple building enjoyed throughout the New Kingdom in Nubia. New construction in the early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, for example, centered almost exclusively upon the erection or refurbishment of temples in reinhabited Middle Kingdom fortresses. Further, in the new walled towns erected by rulers of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties, the architects invariably designed prominent stone temples to serve as the social, spiritual, and economic focus for the community. Finally, in the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties, absolutely stunning temples, such as those at Wadi es-Sebua, Soleb, and Abu Simbel, are discovered in grand isolation, with virtually no archaeologically visible attached settlement at all. Adams is most assuredly right in suggest-
ing that “a subtle change of policy is observable here: the temple has begun to replace the fortress as the primary symbol of Egyptian rule.”

In the walled towns of the late Eighteenth Dynasty, then, it seems as if the Egyptians were in the midst of a compromise or a transition. Imperial architects erected impressive temples and vast associated storehouses to serve as the focus of their towns. The temple wall, which would normally have enclosed these institutions as well as the houses of a few priests, was in effect inflated so as to encompass the entire town. Thus, the boundary that had once definitively separated the sacred from the profane perhaps now served instead to demarcate civilization from barbarism, if indeed such a distinction could still be made in the largely Egyptianized Nubian Nile Valley.

Just how much protection these late Eighteenth Dynasty walled towns would have afforded their populations, however, is questionable. Judging from the case at Sesebi, it seems that any concerted armed force would have had little difficulty penetrating the town gateways, as these clearly had not been designed with an eye toward elaborate defense. Quite probably, however, the enclosure walls at Sesebi, Kawa, and Faras were adequate enough for the purposes required. Lightning raids from the motley groups of desert dwellers, who seem to have made up the bulk of the occasional troublemakers in the late Eighteenth Dynasty, would likely have been discouraged by the high thick walls of the towns, even if these same walls and gateways had not been engineered to withstand siege conditions.

One important and fundamental question remains, however, namely: what was the ultimate point in erecting walled towns in Upper Nubia during the late Eighteenth Dynasty? This area had been under Egyptian control for roughly two centuries, with no major towns—except perhaps Tombos—erected between Sai and Napata. Adams has argued that the rise of Egyptian interest in Upper Nubia strongly coincides with a seeming depression and depopulation in Lower Nubia. He suggests that some sort of damaging ecological trend in Lower Nubia—such as low floods—made agriculture and herding in the area less profitable. Upper Nubia, with its different geological structure, may well have escaped this fate—prompting increased

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401 Adams 1984a: 220.
Egyptian interest. Indeed, Breasted himself was shocked at the prodigious agricultural productivity of the Dongola Province.

S. T. Smith has put forth another primarily economic theory to explain Egypt’s investment in creating new temple-centered towns. He suggests that the installation of self-sufficient communities, whether run by Egyptians or Nubians loyal to the Egyptian empire, would eventually underwrite the costs of imperial ventures—such as mining or long-distance trade. This is an intriguing possibility, although no important gold mines or major quarries lay in the vicinity of the late Eighteenth Dynasty walled towns. Kawa’s position at the western end of the trail to Napata, on the other hand, was almost certainly related to the facilitation of trade and the protection of functionaries traveling across the desert trail to Napata.

Others have suggested that the new walled towns may have been primarily administrative in nature, serving as the seats of local governments and/or imperial institutions. Likewise, Adams believes that the towns could have been erected as part of a concerted Egyptian effort to colonize and thereby pacify the southern land. The ethnicity of the inhabitants of such towns—whether Egyptians, Nubians, transplanted northerners, or a combination of these populations—is unfortunately impossible to determine. By the late Eighteenth Dynasty, however, the dichotomy between Egyptians and Nubians may have been less visible and important in ruling the land than that which still existed between agriculturalists and nomads. By erecting fortress-towns at certain key locations, then, such as along major trade routes, the Egyptians likely intended both to physically assert their claim to the land and to facilitate the northward transport of resources that flowed through the region or were extracted from it.

403 “Having now traveled the entire length of the Dongola province, viewed its broad fields and splendid palm groves, sheltering and feeding so many prosperous communities, the economic value of the region to the Pharaohs became at once apparent and much more strikingly so than from any report of some other traveler” (Breasted 1908: 44).
Figure 26. Late Eighteenth Dynasty Nubia
Textual references to late Eighteenth Dynasty southern fortress-towns

Reign of Amenhotep III

1. wn.in.tw hr snḥy [mšʔ] pr-2ḥ ʿnh ḫḏ s nb nty r-ḥt ḫ3 s3-nsw irw iswt šḥn w ḫ ḫnw s nb m-2ḥ3 ḡḥt.f ḥ3 m mnw n ḫšk ēnfr ṭ mnw n t3-r-y irw.n ḫrw n škw ḫ 52 (Semna stele; Urk. IV, 1659: 13–18)

Then the [army of] pharaoh, L.p.h., which was under the authority of the viceroy, was mustered (and) companies (of troops) were made, which were commanded with commanders, every man according to his village, beginning from the mn(n)w-fortress of Baki (and) down to the mn(n)w-fortress of Taroy, 52-iders of sailing having been made.

In preparation for vanquishing the rebellious population of Ibḥet, Amenhotep III’s viceroy of Kush levied an army of conscripts from various villages under his jurisdiction. Military leaders had practiced this method of raising an army ad hoc since at least the time of Wenḥ, and it almost certainly had been the norm before the institution of a professional army. In the New Kingdom, this system allowed ordinary civilians to supplement the regular corps of professional soldiers at times when an armed confrontation required a particularly large fighting force or when professional troops were unavailable.

It appears that conscripts levied in this manner were often kept together in units according to their place of origin and that the leaders of these squadrons were frequently men of the same region. Such companies could be represented by standards bearing the images of their local sacred deities or by evocative names. Indeed, McGovern believes that the patterning of Egyptian-style amulet types in Canaan is evocative primarily of the different regions from whence the troops were drawn.

It is interesting, then, to glean from this text that precisely the same system operated in Nubia. Merymose, the viceroy of Kush, relates that he not only commanded his army but that he also had been responsible for marshaling it in the first place. A like system

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409 See Faulkner 1941.
410 James and McGovern 1993: 129.
411 Significantly, faced with a similar disturbance, Akhenaten “charged the king’s son [of Kush and overseer of the southern countries with assembling an army in order to defeat the] enemies” (Murnane 1995a: 101–102).
is well documented for Syria-Palestine in the Amarna archive, where local rulers repeatedly affirm their willingness to contribute soldiers from their own regions to support the cause of the pharaoh’s representative. The same practice is evidenced in the Taanach letters as well.

Of particular relevance for our discussion is Merymose’s claim that the men he drafted to bolster the size of his army came from the area between “the \textit{mn(n)w}-fortress of Baki down to the \textit{mn(n)w}-fortress of Taroy, making 52-ites of sailing.” The fortress of Baki is, of course, better known by its modern name of Kubban. Along with Ikkur, this fortress had been built in the early Middle Kingdom to safeguard the Wadi Allaqi gold mines. Although Ikkur seems to have been abandoned shortly after the early New Kingdom, Kubban’s position directly adjacent to the entrance to the mines granted it a greater longevity. It is notable, however, that all state-sponsored New Kingdom construction at this site appears to have been either religious or administrative in nature.

While the history and physical structure of Kubban indeed qualified it to be termed a \textit{mnna\textit{w}}, or fortress-town, nothing about the site suggests a highly militarized character. At Kubban, as elsewhere in New Kingdom Nubia, then, the emphasis of the term \textit{mnna\textit{w}} had definitively shifted from “fortress” to “town.” For this reason, the fact that troops were levied from the \textit{mnna\textit{w}}-fortresses of Kubban and Taroy does not necessarily imply that active garrisons were still quartered in these centers. Indeed, the fortress-towns may simply have served, like the villages that lay between them, as population centers from whence available manpower could be commandeered.

Despite the likelihood that by the reign of Amenhotep III the \textit{mnna\textit{w}}-fortress of Taroy no longer functioned as a traditional fortress, if indeed it ever had, its location is still of interest. The only clue offered by the text is that Taroy lay 52-ites or “river lengths” from

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412 EA 141, 142, 189, 190, 193, 195, 201–206, 296.
413 Glock 1983.
415 Cultic building at Kubban during the early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasty has been covered in earlier chapters. In the reign of Amenhotep III, likewise, the sole new construction appears to have been limited to a barque chapel (Badawy 1968: 290; Donadoni 1984: 52). Some scholars have suggested that Kubban functioned in the New Kingdom primarily as a treasury (Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 192; Trigger 1965: 110; Arkell 1966: 101).
the mnnw-fortress of Kubban. One iter has been calculated at approximately 10.5 km,\textsuperscript{416} which means that the distance between the two fortresses would be somewhere around 546 km. Such an impressive figure automatically disqualifies a number of the identifications of Taroy that have been suggested previously, including Aniba.\textsuperscript{417}

The text is unfortunately not clear about whether Taroy was situated to the north or south of Kubban. The expression $\text{nfr}$ means literally “end to” or “down to,” which might imply that Kubban lay downstream of Taroy.\textsuperscript{418} The likelihood of this, however, is slim, as 546 km north of Kubban lay far north of the viceroy of Kush’s jurisdiction—even if he indeed controlled territory as far as Elkab.\textsuperscript{419} Orienting 546 km south of Kubban, however, would place Taroy roughly in the zone of the third cataract.

There are two intriguing candidates for Taroy, if this fortress is indeed to be located somewhere in the vicinity of the third cataract. The first is Tombos, the island on which Thutmose I may have built a fortress to aid his conquest of Kerma. While such a fortress has yet to be identified archaeologically (see chapter two), an American survey has recently discovered the remains of a substantial New Kingdom cemetery just opposite the island.\textsuperscript{420} Likewise, Merymose himself is known to have left an inscription at Tombos.\textsuperscript{421}

The other strong contender for the location of Taroy is Kawa, the walled town founded by either Akhenaten or more likely—given the presence of a granite fragment bearing his name—by Amenhotep III. It is unknown, however, which of these two kings christened Kawa “Gem-Aten.” The culprit certainly could have been Amenhotep III, given that this king incorporated the Aten into the names of various boats, buildings, and even one of his own epithets. As is immediately obvious, however, a far greater emphasis was laid upon the Aten in the reign of his son. Likewise, there is the fact that

\textsuperscript{416} Gardiner 1988: 199, no. 266.
\textsuperscript{417} Emery 1965: 188; Trigger 1976: 117. For a summary of other suggestions, based solely on linguistic similarities, see Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 159.
\textsuperscript{418} As the Nile flowed south to north, the Egyptians generally oriented themselves to the south, with geographic lists almost invariably progressing in this direction.
\textsuperscript{419} Huy, the viceroy of Kush in the time of Tutankhamun, wielded authority from Nekhen to Napata (Urk. IV, 2064: 8, 19).
\textsuperscript{420} S. T. Smith (personal communication) has not located a fortress at Tombos, but there is a possibility that it may have been constructed in an area that does not lie within his concession.
\textsuperscript{421} Porter and Moss VII: 175.
Akhenaten constructed a very important temple at Karnak called Gem-pa-Aten and likewise a sanctuary within the Great Aten Temple at Amarna called Gem-Aten. Given these considerations, it is perhaps likely that this king applied the name Gem-Aten to the Nubian town as well. According to such a scenario, then, the mnnw fortress-town—renamed Gem-Aten in Akhenaten’s reign—may well have been known as Taroy in the time of Amenhotep III.

Outside of its temple precinct, Kawa remains largely unexcavated, but the observed portion of its enclosure wall suggests that it would have been similar in structure to the Upper Nubian fortress-towns of Sai and Sesebi, the former of which we know definitely to have been classified as a mnnw-fortress (see chapter three).422 Perhaps even more importantly, barring Napata, which lay 100 km distant, Kawa was the southernmost Egyptian fortress-town in Nubia. It would have been logical, then, for Merymose to have levied troops for his campaign against Ibhet south specifically to the region of Kawa.

Reign of Tutankhamun


Huy, Tutankhamun’s viceroy of Kush, chose to have himself buried at Thebes (TT 40), as did all the holders of this title whose tombs have been identified. Moreover, like a good high official of his day, he commissioned scenes from his professional life to be painted upon the walls of his tomb. In one of these vignettes, Huy, who had just received his appointment as viceroy of Kush, is depicted journeying

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422 Kawa will not be included in the archaeological discussion below precisely because it has never been excavated outside the temple precinct.
to Nubia. Upon disembarking, the new viceroy was met by nine men.

While the titles of all nine individuals are provided, the scene is glossed with the personal names of only five of them. It is extremely interesting and perhaps counter-intuitive, then, that the same officials whose titles one immediately recognizes as being of paramount importance are precisely those who remain unnamed. For instance, the anonymous deputies of Wawat and Kush423 are given prominence of position in this little welcome committee as would have befit their status. In the Nubian administration, these two men were functionally equivalent to the viziers of Upper and Lower Egypt, and they would have served directly under Huy. Given the importance of cattle to Nubia’s economy, the unnamed overseer of cattle, too, must have been a very high-ranking official.

The presence among these dignitaries of the last unnamed high official, the mayor of Soleb (Kha-em-ma’at),424 is likewise interesting, for it betrays the existence of a substantial civilian population at Kha-em-ma’at. Certainly, one would expect that such a population should have existed at the site. After all, the temple to his own divine image that Amenhotep III sponsored at Soleb is undoubtedly one of Nubia’s most impressive monuments,425 and thus a substantial service staff would have been required just for its minimum upkeep. Likewise, given the vast riches with which Amenhotep III claims to have decorated this temple, one would expect that a sizable community would have been required to discourage looters.426 So far, however, with the exception of a smattering of graves in a badly destroyed cemetery,427 archaeologists have failed to identify evidence of a settlement in Soleb’s environs. The information from Huy’s tomb, then—that Kha-em-ma’at not only had enough of a population to warrant the creation of the office of mayor but that this mayor also was depicted among the shining stars of the Nubian adminis-

423 The deputy of Kush who served under Huy is known from a temple graffito to have been named Amenemope (Davies and Gardiner 1926: 17).
424 Hm-m3’t is named after Amenhotep III's Horus name.
425 The temple at Soleb is most often compared to Luxor temple in size and elegance (Emery 1965: 188; Arkell 1966: 91; Trigger 1976: 127; Shinnie 1996: 86).
426 Cf. Urk. IV, 1655: 2–13. Amenhotep III boasts that he embellished the temple with large quantities of gold, silver, and electrum—as well as other precious materials.
427 Soleb’s cemetery included 47 family tombs that ranged in date from Thutmose III to the Ramesside period (Giorgini 1962: 168; Shinnie 1996: 86). Most of the burials, however, were late Eighteenth Dynasty in date (Leclant 1984: 1078). See also Derchain 1973: 37.
tration in the viceroy’s tomb—is particularly welcome. Indeed, this honor has prompted some scholars to suggest that Soleb may even have served as the capital of Kush in the late Eighteenth Dynasty.\textsuperscript{428}

The remaining five officials who lined up to greet their viceroy occupy lower registers than the two deputies, the overseer of cattle, and the mayor of Soleb. Interestingly, four out of five of these men are named, and all hailed from the town Satisfying-the-gods, where, indeed, it is likely that the welcoming ceremony took place. The construction of this town at Faras must have been largely supervised by Huy, himself, in his position as Tutankhamun’s viceroy. For this reason, the town’s mayor, its deputy, and its first and second prophets would have been well known to the viceroy, and perhaps even have been relatives of his.\textsuperscript{429} Indeed, personal ties to Huy might suitably explain the inclusion of a relatively lowly wab-priest in this gathering of the town’s elite.\textsuperscript{430}

In just this brief text, Satisfying-the-gods is referred to as a \textit{mnnw} three times. One individual is labeled “the deputy of the \textit{mnnw} of Nebkheperure, (that is) Satisfying-the-gods.”\textsuperscript{431} The two remaining references are found with regard to the second prophet and the wab-priest of the deified Tutankhamun, both of whom apparently resided in the \textit{mnnw} of Satisfying-the-gods. In view of the latter two examples, it is tempting to suggest that the term \textit{mnnw} in fact designated the temple rather than the town itself. Despite a plethora of religious inscriptions, however, the temple at Faras is not elsewhere designated as a \textit{mnnw}.\textsuperscript{432}

\textsuperscript{428} Morkot 1987: 34; O’Connor 1993: 60.
\textsuperscript{429} Indeed, the second prophet at Satisfying-the-gods is introduced as “his brother.” Given the position of this man at the head of the third register, it would appear almost certain that the possessive “his” refers to Huy himself (Davies and Gardiner 1926: 18, pl. 15).
\textsuperscript{430} Although only one wab-priest is mentioned in the text, two identical figures are represented below. There may, thus, have been two wab-priests of Satisfying-the-gods who attended the welcoming ceremony (Davies and Gardiner 1926: pl. 15).
\textsuperscript{431} Alternatively, the full writing of the name of the town could well have been “Nebkheperure-is-the-one-who-satisfies-the-gods.” This would be in keeping with fortress and city names in which the royal moniker was soon dropped from common usage.
\textsuperscript{432} The word \textit{mnnw} has been restored into religious texts at Faras twice. In neither case, however, was the word actually preserved [“who is in the midst of the \textit{mnnw}-fortress] Satisfying-the-gods”—an epithet of Amun] (Karkowski 1981: 117) and “(Nebkheperure) the great god (who is in the midst of the \textit{mnnw}-fortress of Sehe-tep\textit{intr}(u)] (Karkowski 1981: 119). Other religious contexts simply give the name of the town (Urk. IV, 2075: 11; Karkowski 1981: 116, 122, 134).
It is probable, then, that the term *mmnw* applied to the entire walled town at Faras. Satisfying-the-gods, of course, was a separate entity from the Middle Kingdom *mmnw*-fortress, which seems to have been located a kilometer or so to the northeast. Pitifully little is known, however, about Tutankhamun’s town. Due to its extremely confusing stratigraphy, churned up by a series of later building events, the New Kingdom town at Faras never received more than a summary examination. This situation is unfortunately now irrevocable, due to the construction of the Aswan Dam.

It is quite likely, however, that Tutankhamun had constructed his new town not only to satisfy the gods (who purportedly had forsaken the preceding heretical pharaohs) but also to replace Aniba as the capital of Lower Nubia and to parallel Soleb as the locus for a Lower Nubian divine cult. Indeed, it is quite likely that the viceroy of Kush may even have resided at the town, at first to supervise its construction and later to administer from a brand new capital. Just how long Satisfying-the-gods might have served this purpose is unknown, however, as evidence for Egyptian presence of any kind radically declines after the late Eighteenth Dynasty, and New Kingdom family tombs at the site are generally either badly plundered or extremely poor.

*Archaeological evidence for late Eighteenth Dynasty southern fortress-towns*

*Sesebi* (see figure 27)

The only late Eighteenth Dynasty fortress-town in Nubia that has been excavated in any detail is the walled town of Sesebi, apparently founded in the reign of Akhenaten. This town, situated “in the heart of the most inaccessible region of Nubia,” lay between the second and third cataracts in a region not otherwise distinguished by the presence of quarries, trade routes, or superlative agricultural

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433 There is still some question as to the precise location of the Middle Kingdom fortress at Faras (Karkowski 1981: 66–67).
434 Griffith 1921; Michaelowski 1962; Trigger 1965: 109; Karkowski 1981: 8–9, 14.
435 O’Connor 1993: 60. The cult of the deified Tutankhamun was central to Faras, much as the cult of the deified Amenhotep III dominated Soleb (Morkot 1987: 36).
438 Breasted 1908: 51.
potential, although the surrounding area did possess some gold ore.\textsuperscript{439}

Like Sai, the settlement at Sesebi was rectangular in plan and enclosed by a thick wall, punctuated at 13 m intervals with brick towers. Although this enclosure wall was sturdy enough at 4.65 m thick, it bears scant resemblance to the elaborate defensive wonders erected by the Middle Kingdom pharaohs. Its lack of a true defensive orientation is most obviously noted with regard to the gateways, which could have been easily penetrated as they lacked any special protection.\textsuperscript{440} As Kemp has rightly noted, the walls around New Kingdom Nubian towns, such as Sesebi and Sai, bear a marked resemblance to the temenos walls that regularly enclosed contemporary state temples.\textsuperscript{441}

Sai and Sesebi, aside from being comparable in size and structure, also shared a similar architectural inventory, which included temples, magazines, probable administrative buildings, and houses. Conditions at the site of Sesebi unfortunately dictated that \textit{in situ} preserved architecture could only be recovered along the western portion of the town.\textsuperscript{442} Interestingly, however, even with this handicap, a very distinct zoning could nonetheless be observed. Religious (and perhaps administrative) installations occupied the northern end of the town and residential buildings clustered in the south.

Two separate religious complexes, both oriented to the east, occupied the northern sector at Sesebi. The northernmost building is not well understood but may perhaps have been an open-air shrine to the Aten.\textsuperscript{443} The other temple, however, was certainly dedicated to the Aten. Not surprisingly, it had been subsequently defaced, remodeled, and redecorated in the reign of Seti I. Despite this damage,
however, it is possible to see that the temple originally possessed three chapels. The most impressive occupied the center, and a large forecourt fronted the three together. Given the reliefs that escaped total obliteration, it is certain that the Aten occupied one if not all of the chapels in this larger temple.\footnote{Blackman 1937: 146–149; Badawy 1968: 274–275.}

A storage magazine that equaled if not exceeded the temple in size lay directly south of it. This immense complex contained over 2,675 m\textsuperscript{2} of storage space alone—an area only slightly smaller than that occupied by the entire Middle Kingdom fortress at Semna South! Such a building could have stored more than enough grain to support the needs of Sesebi’s population, and it is indeed likely that it did just that, as granaries are a rarity in the residential district. Almost certainly, then, the temple would have served as the town’s major employer and as a central depot for grain, trade goods, and accumulated wealth.\footnote{For a meditation on the importance of temples to Nubian towns in the New Kingdom and to towns in general, see Kemp 1972b: 667. Badawy (1968: 59) does suggest that the cellars often found in houses at Sesebi were utilized for food storage, although no evidence has surfaced to directly support this conclusion.} Unfortunately, we have no ability to test the validity of this statement, as the eastern area in which a comparable secular institution could have been located is almost entirely denuded.\footnote{Adams (1994: 226) suggests that Sesebi quite probably served as an administrative center. While this may well be so, the only major state building preserved at the site is the large Aten temple. Fairman (1938: 152) suggested that the buildings immediately south of the magazines were administrative in nature, apparently judging from the plans alone. If this were the case, however, their relatively informal nature suggests that they would have been lower-level administrative buildings and not the residences or workplaces of the city leaders.}

Unlike the north end of the town, which was exclusively devoted to temples and storage magazines, residential buildings dominated the southern portion of Sesebi. Although this area has been only incompletely excavated, an examination of the town plan shows that its houses varied significantly in size between roughly 40 m\textsuperscript{2} and 270 m\textsuperscript{2}. This closely fits the range at Amarna between very humble dwellings and upper middle class villas.\footnote{See Kemp 1991: 300.} Sesebi’s elite dwellings, like those at Amarna, took the form of center-hall houses,\footnote{For a more detailed account of the houses at Sesebi, see Blackman 1937: 149–151; Badawy 1968: 58–59.} and, indeed, comparisons to Amarna may even be extended to
late eighteenth dynasty

Sesebi’s rather organic layout. While a regular block pattern appears to have been obligingly adhered to in general, larger and smaller houses are intermixed in a fashion uncharacteristic of rigid state planning. Of the inhabitants of Sesebi dismayingly little is known—and this despite the existence of a New Kingdom cemetery in the vicinity.\textsuperscript{449} Judging from Akhenaten’s avowed wish to settle Apiru in his Nubian towns, however, it is likely that the population may have been fairly heterogeneous. Sesebi’s ancient name remains unknown.

Northern and southern fortifications and administrative headquarters in the late eighteenth dynasty: A cross-frontier perspective

There is very little evidence for concrete cross-frontier policy in the late Eighteenth Dynasty. A reward scene in the tomb of the overseer of the granary of Upper and Lower Egypt informs us that granaries from Naharin to Kush all contributed grain quotas to the celebration of Amenhotep III’s sed-festival (Urk. IV, 1841: 13–14). This information may imply the existence of some sort of centralized administration for the gathering and collection of agricultural resources. Significantly, the Amarna archive contains copious references to grain depots at sites like Sumur, Yarimuta, and Jaffa.\textsuperscript{450} Likewise, at Sesebi an enormous storehouse occupied a position of importance next to the town’s temple. In both regions, however, the vast majority of the grain harvested must have remained in the area to support resident troops (in Syria-Palestine) or townspeople (in Nubia).

There is also evidence in both Syria-Palestine and Nubia that indigenous leaders shared power with Egyptian authorities. Thutmose III’s policy of raising the heirs of these rulers at court and incorporating their daughters into the Egyptian harem also persisted into the late Eighteenth Dynasty. Several of the rulers in the Amarna archive make explicit reference to their own experience at court or swear eagerly to send their own son as soon as possible. In Nubia, meanwhile, the ruler of Miam (Aniba) bore the title “child of the (royal) nursery” and delivered “children of the rulers” to the Egyptian

\textsuperscript{449} Zibelius-Chen 1984: 888.

\textsuperscript{450} Although granaries have been discovered at Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A–345, these were most likely stocked with grain imported from Egypt or Canaan. The agricultural potential of the northern Sinai is extremely limited.
Figure 27. Fortress-town at Sesebi
(after Adams 1984a: 221, fig. 34)
court. As in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, this policy would have helped to ensure Egyptian-friendly behavior among vassals who wished to see their sons again. Likewise, the Egyptians must have hoped that the heirs raised at court would develop a proper awe and respect for all things Egyptian. In the case of the ruler of Miam, whose Egyptian-style tomb has been discovered in Nubia, this internalization of Egyptian values appears to have been accomplished seamlessly.

The Syro-Palestinian leaders, it is clear from the Amarna archive, commanded their own towns, but they could also man Egyptian bases or granaries if the Egyptian governors were absent. Very little is known about the situation in Nubia. If the sole control of Aniba was left in the hands of the ruler of Miam after the capital of Lower Nubia moved to Faras, however, a like situation could perhaps be posited. Attempting to decipher the administrative division in Nubia between Nubians and Egyptians, however, is nearly impossible, thanks to the adoption of Egyptian names by the Nubian elite and, indeed, to the pervasiveness of Egyptian-style material culture in general.

It is more relevant to a study of Egyptian fortresses and administrative headquarters to observe that the Egyptians appeared to have invested heavily on both frontiers only in areas in which no prior infrastructure existed. In Egypt’s northern empire, where urban centers administered their own agricultural holdings, investment was kept to a minimum. The lack of Egyptian-style architecture in this region, combined with evidence from the Amarna archive, suggests that Egyptians tended to co-opt indigenous buildings and institutions wherever possible. This gave the Egyptian government significant flexibility with regard to where to station governors and/or troops. Likewise, resources that could profitably have been funneled into imperial coffers did not have to be expended on the erection of bases throughout the land.

Along the Ways of Horus and in the Negev, however, the Egyptians did create new way stations and administrative bases wholesale. At least two refueling posts were constructed along the Ways of Horus at Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A–345. These centers possessed identical granaries, as well as a number of administrative buildings and workshop areas. Everything about their form suggests that they served to facilitate the movement of troops and travelers across a region that was otherwise barren of foodstuffs and potable water. Of these
two stations, only Bir el-ʿAbd was fortified. Given that the main granary lay outside the enclosure walls, however, it appears that the site planners expected little trouble either from the indigenous population or from invaders.

The unfortified buildings at Tell el-Ajjul and Deir el-Balah, on the other hand, seem to have served a slightly different function. Both lay very close to the eastern end of the Ways of Horus, and it seems likely that officials were stationed in this border region primarily to maintain an Egyptian presence. In conjunction with officials (and troops) stationed at Gaza, Tell el-Hesi, and Lachish, the Egyptians resident at Deir el-Balah and Tell el-Ajjul could have kept an eye on the comings and goings of travelers, nomads, and the local population. The lack of any sort of fortifications, however, indicates that the architects may have believed that the proximity of these centers both to Gaza and to the Egyptian border would serve as an adequate deterrent to troublemakers.

The Egyptian policy in Upper Nubia in the late Eighteenth Dynasty seems to have been loosely akin to that employed along the Sinai and in southern Canaan. No indigenous Nubian settlements of any size have been discovered south of Kerma. In order to extract revenue and to assert its presence, then, the imperial government was forced to erect an infrastructure where none existed previously. In all probability, the primary purpose of the walled towns at Sesebi and Kawa was fourfold: to serve as a base for administrators and other functionaries or expeditions, to generate revenue through agriculture, to protect Egyptian interests in the region, and to monitor sensitive arteries of communication. Bearing these specific purposes in mind, it is doubtless not coincidental that the major Egyptian settlements in Upper Nubia (Sai, Sesebi, Tombos, and Kawa) are roughly equidistant from one another.

Whether Egyptians or Nubians moved into these new walled towns is a moot point, as the material culture demonstrates that the inhabitants, regardless of their ethnicity, lived like Egyptians. The walls surrounding the settlements served as an adequate protection against any razzias that surrounding nomads might launch, and the temples lent both an economic structure and a cohesive communal identity to the town. Had Upper Nubia already been dotted with such settlements, however, it is doubtful that the late Eighteenth Dynasty government would have felt the need to create them from whole cloth.
CHAPTER FIVE

FRONTIER POLICY IN THE NINETEENTH DYNASTY

OVERVIEW OF EGYPTIAN INTERACTIONS WITH SYRIA-PALESTINE

Historical summary

Like Ay before him, Horemheb met his death without an heir of his own blood to install upon the throne. The great majority of Horemheb’s professional career had been spent in the army, where he eventually rose to the position of “great general.”1 It is perhaps not surprising, then, that upon his death he nominated as his successor another military man, a general and a former overseer of the htm-fortress of Tjaru, named Paramesses (see chapter four). This man, who would come to the throne as Ramesses I, ruled for less than two years total; very little is consequently known about his activities or policies with respect to Syria-Palestine.

As discussed in chapter four, Ramesses I’s son Seti almost certainly functioned as vizier and city governor during his tenure as crown prince. His prior experience as troop commander (hry pdt) and overseer of the htm-fortress of Tjaru (KRI II, 287: 11, 288: 7), however, must have served him well, for it appears likely that he undertook at least one northern campaign on behalf of his father. In a stele that Seti later dedicated to Ramesses I at Abydos, the king reminisced about this early mission, “I [subdued] for him the lands of the Fenkhu, and I repulsed for him dissidents in foreign countries (or upon the hills), so that I might protect Egypt for him according to his desire... I mustered his army and gave it unity of purpose... I wielded my strong arm as his bodily protection in foreign lands whose names were (previously) unknown” (KRI I, 111: 10–11, 13).

While the phraseology employed in this passage is predominantly nonspecific in nature, the “lands of the Fenkhu” may well designate

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1 The title imy-rt ms2 wmt was perhaps the highest military title in the Egyptian army. For this reason, it was frequently held by the crown prince (Schulman 1964a: 44).
the Lebanese coastal area. As Amurru had remained a Hittite vassal since the close of the Amarna Period, many of the adjacent coastal cities were likely allied to the Hittites as well—if only to protect themselves from the otherwise incessant onslaught of Amurrite armies. It would have been in Egypt’s interest, therefore, to regain the loyalty of these beleaguered seaports. Certainly, Seti’s warm reception in this area on his first victorious campaign as sole ruler nearly a year later implies that the army had indeed met with success.

Although the details and full extent of Seti’s activity in Syria-Palestine during his father’s reign are unknown, the venture appears to have procured the state a healthy supply of captive labor. In Ramesses I’s second year, he donated to the temple workshop at Buhen “male and female servants of his majesty’s plunder” (KRI I, 2: 15). In a nearly identical stele, commissioned by Seti I after his father’s death nearly six months later, the exact same quantity of vegetables, bread, cakes, and beer were rededicated to the temple. This time, however, the unspecified number of “male and female servants of his majesty’s plunder” (KRI I, 38: 8–9) likely came from Seti’s own “first victorious campaign” mounted as sole ruler.

The most comprehensive and also the most frustrating source of information for Seti’s activity in Syria-Palestine as pharaoh is a set of reliefs engraved upon the northern exterior wall of the hypostyle hall at Karnak. A total of six vignettes depicting Seti’s military victories flank a doorway leading into the temple. From bottom left to bottom right the reliefs depict:

- **Bottom left**: a journey across the Sinai and two battles with Shasu bedouin.
- **Middle left**: a battle at Yenoam and another unnamed town. The submission of eight Lebanese rulers.
- **Top left**: relief destroyed.

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3 See also Spalinger 1979c: 230.

4 Faulkner (1980: 217) and Murnane (1990: 48–49) have suggested that the prisoners referred to on Seti’s Buhen stele came from his Shasu campaign. As the stele was dedicated shortly after Seti’s return, this would seem to be a strong possibility. According to a stele found at Karnak, other prisoners from the victorious campaign of year 1 were dedicated to a workshop associated with the temple of Ptah (KRI I, 41: 4).

5 Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 2. See figures 31 and 32 in this chapter.

The only surviving date found upon the reliefs is “year 1,” a marker clearly pertinent to the struggles against the Shasu. Virtually all scholars who have studied these reliefs, however, have concluded that the set as a whole must chronicle at least three separate campaigns. Just which battle scenes should be equated with which campaigns, however, has been the font of much scholarly speculation. For the purposes of this overview, the schema proposed by Murnane in his seminal study of the battle reliefs of Seti I will be loosely followed. Other theories will be referenced, where relevant, in footnote form.

As noted above, the sole relief unambiguously assigned to Seti’s first campaign is that detailing two skirmishes with bedouin along the Ways of Horus highway in the northern Sinai. This relief will be analyzed in-depth in the textual section of this chapter, as it provides a wealth of information about Egyptian emplacements along this strategic overland route to Canaan. Although Egyptian texts reveal that New Kingdom armies had utilized the route from at least the reign of Thutmose III, the first archaeological evidence for a fortified enclosure along the Ways of Horus dates to the late Eighteenth Dynasty (see chapter four). In Seti’s relief at Karnak, however, a grand total of ten fortified strongholds monitored the route between Tjaru and Gaza. If these installations were evenly distributed along the highway, they would have been located, conveniently, a day’s journey apart. Other considerations, such as the location of potable

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7 Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 23.
8 Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 27.
9 Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 33.
10 Murnane 1990.
11 The Ways of Horus, of course, must have been utilized by Ahmose for his campaigns against Hyksos remnants in Canaan and, indeed, by Egyptian armies since the time of Narmer (see Oren 1993a: 1387–1388).
12 The fortress labeled “settlement (đmi) of Pa-Kanaan” is almost universally identified with the Egyptian base at Gaza (see, for example, Helck 1962: 313; Spalinger 1979b: 30; Epigraphic Survey 1986: 5). For an in-depth discussion of Gaza and its appellations in the New Kingdom, see Katzenstein 1982. The town of Raphia, which appears on the relief in the vicinity of Gaza, is represented in Seti’s topographical lists (KRI I, 29: no. 70; 32: no. 65)—perhaps suggesting that it may not have housed Egyptian troops.
13 The distance from Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) to Gaza is approximately 220 km, and the speed of an army on the march is generally estimated at 20 km a day (Astour
well, however, almost certainly also affected the distribution of the way stations.

According to the relief, Seti encountered his first band of bedouin somewhere midway along the Ways of Horus in an area dominated by three forts: the bḥm-fort of Menmaatre, (named) the [...] is his protection; the nḥtw-stronghold of Seti Merneptah; and the town (dmi) that his majesty [built] a[new] (KRI I, 7: 5–6; see below). As the artists appear to have subjugated strict topographical accuracy to the niceties of composition, however, such a placement might be overly specific. Indeed, the battle may, in fact, have taken place in a modest oasis of some kind, as a few wayward fronds of palm trees poking out among the heap of dead bedouin could indicate.14

The word “battle,” when employed to describe the action depicted in this episode, is technically inaccurate. The term “rout” or even, perhaps, “massacre” would be more fitting. Although the Egyptians always portrayed their opponents sprawled in tangled disarray, utterly defeated, the fact that absolutely none of the Shasu possessed any sort of weaponry whatsoever is unusual. One wonders, then, whether the relief documents a surprise attack by Seti upon a group of bedouin—peaceful for the moment—camped in a relatively verdant area of the northern Sinai.

The second group of Shasu that Seti met, this time in the hills outside Gaza, appears to have been significantly better prepared for his onslaught than the first had been. In this exchange, the Egyptian army, artistically embodied in the personage of Seti himself, faced a group of bona fide warriors. These men wore some limited armor about the torso and carried spears, but despite this protection, they nonetheless were quickly reduced to a hopeless state of chaos and confusion. About the outskirts of the battle—in what looks to have been hilly, lightly wooded terrain somewhere near the fortified town of Gaza—a frenzied melee ensued.15 Men, women, and children fled

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14 Although it is difficult to tell, some of the Shasu appear to have attempted escape from the slaughter by scrambling atop a steep embankment. One man seems to be climbing, while another grabs a fellow’s arm to pull him up. Perhaps the Egyptian artist intended to depict the bedouin fleeing toward the formidable cliffs that sometimes border desert wadis.

15 Although the battle is depicted as taking place in the general vicinity of Gaza,
to safer ground, and upon a hill one leader gestured in supplication while another snapped his own spear in half upon his knee.  

The text accompanying the scene of Seti traveling triumphantly back to Tjaru with his bound Shasu prisoners in tow provides at least a partial explanation of what prompted the campaign in the first place. One segment reads, “Year 1, Repeating-of-births, (of) the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Lord of the Two Lands, Menmaatre, given life. Then one came to tell his majesty, ‘the fallen-ones of Shasu are plotting rebellion. Their clan leaders are united in one place, standing upon the ridges of Kharu. They have taken to confusion and quarrelling, each slaying his fellow. They disregard the edicts of the palace’” (KRI I, 9: 3–5). Likewise a similar synopsis states, “(As for) the hil[ls of the] rebels, none could [get past] them, because of the fallen-ones of Shasu who had attacked” (KRI I, 7: 1–2).

This description of the state of affairs “among the fallen-ones of Shasu, beginning from the ḫmtm-fortress of Tjaru as far as Gaza” (KRI I, 8: 8–9) is indeed echoed in the reliefs, which depict two separate groups of Shasu, each inhabiting its own terrain. Seti may well have found it necessary to subjugate each group individually in order to cease this tribal feuding. Although the hostility was apparently directed inward, not at the Egyptian government per se, two by-products of this inter-Shasu war would have been unacceptable to Egypt. First, due to the state of war and its attendant chaos, bedouin

there is absolutely nothing to suggest that the scene depicted “a great massacre of the people of the city of Pakanaan,” as Gaballa (1976: 101) and Faulkner (1980: 219) would have it. Gaza was firmly in Egyptian hands at this point, and indeed it is shown in an identical fashion to the other Egyptian emplacements along the Ways of Horus. No Shasu are depicted within the city, the city is not damaged in any way, and the text accompanying the relief quite explicitly stresses the nomadic characteristics of the Shasu bedouin.

16 The deliberate breaking of a weapon is a well-known ancient Near Eastern signal of surrender (Hoffmeier 1983: 64–65). Spalinger (1979d: 272–274) suggests that a scene at Beit el-Wali depicting Ramesses II attacking a group of bedouin in fact is Ramesses’ own version of this same Shasu campaign. If Ramesses’ insertion of himself into Seti’s Karnak scene (replacing the fanbearer Mehy) is not a historical fiction, Spalinger argues, the scene at Beit el-Wali would then simply be Ramesses’ own version of events, which, characteristically, highlighted his own role in the battle.

17 Indeed, it is tempting to interpret the two men depicted standing on a hill supplicating and breaking a spear as an illustration of the clan leaders “united in one place, standing on the ridges of Kharu.”
groups no longer abided by palace laws; perhaps the bedouin even resorted to armed razzias on Egyptian stores of water, food, and weapons. Second, the fighting among the Shasu rendered normally safe roads impassable.

Under any circumstances, imperial maintenance requires an effective infrastructure to ensure the efficient transfer of people, goods, and information from one region to another. One of the key links in Egypt’s system was the Ways of Horus military route, as it directly connected the eastern Delta to southwestern Canaan. When all functioned like clockwork, as it did in the days of Thutmose III, an army could traverse the route in ten days’ time—thus allowing Egypt to respond to a crisis in its northern empire with alacrity. Obviously the safety of this route, and especially of the life-giving wells and reservoirs that punctuated it at intervals, was paramount. It is quite logical, then, that intensified fortification of this trans-Sinai route should have been undertaken precisely at a period when warlike bedouin activity had rendered the area unsafe. Likewise, Seti’s attack on an unarmed group of oasis dwellers may have signaled a shift to a zero-tolerance policy where potentially aggressive bedouin were concerned.

While some scholars have suggested that the register chronicling Seti I’s victory over the Shasu bedouin is the only Karnak relief that should be dated to year 1, most other scholars agree that the register above it should be included in the first campaign as well. This middle left register depicts Seti triumphing over Yenoam and another

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18 Two of the fortified towns (dmiw) depicted along the Ways of Horus route are designated specifically as those his majesty built anew (KRI I, 7: 6; 8: 2). Spalinger (1979b: 30) believes that construction work may have been necessitated at these sites due to Shasu attacks. There are other possible explanations, however, which will be discussed below.

19 The “Shasu” appear in Seti’s toponym lists (KRI I, 28: no. 38; 31: no. 42), although it is unclear whether the Shasu as a people are meant or whether a settlement bearing the Shasu name had been subdued.

20 Breasted AR III: par. 81, n. c. (Breasted explored other scenarios as well, however, including one in which Seti campaigned against the Shasu, Yenoam, and reached the Phoenician coast in his first year—Breasted AR III: par. 81); Gardiner 1920: 120; Gaballa 1976: 103–104. Murnane (1990: 47–49) believed that while the campaign into Canaan and Lebanon did not directly follow the Shasu expedition, both would have occurred in year 1 (although he did allow for the possibility that Seti could have fought the Shasu just prior to his assumption of sole rule).

similar fortified town, the name of which is unfortunately not preserved. It also illustrates vividly the submission of eight Lebanese rulers.

The primary reason for supposing the middle left register to belong to year 1 is that the “first Beth Shan stele” (KRI I, 11: 11–12: 14), a monument erected at Beth Shan to commemorate the defeat of Yenoam and other nearby towns, is dated to regnal year 1.\(^2^2\) Other scholars likewise point to the fact that Syro-Palestinian prisoners as well as Shasu were dedicated to Amun in the bottom register (KRI I, 10: 15), whereas one would have expected only Shasu prisoners had the campaign ended in the vicinity of Gaza.\(^2^3\) Finally, there is the strongly held view that Seti I would certainly not have returned home after a first campaign occupied solely with quieting bedouin unrest in the Sinai. The young pharaoh, according to this view, must undoubtedly have had more formidable foes in mind.\(^2^4\)

The scene of Seti I subduing the inhabitants of Yenoam and the other settlement is unfortunately partially destroyed. Enough detail remains, however, to determine that the battle took place in an open field adjacent to a wooded area outside the two towns.\(^2^5\) Unlike the previous conflicts, the Egyptians here fought against an enemy that utilized chariots as well as foot soldiers. As is typical, the opposing army is shown pierced with arrows and trod beneath the hooves of Seti’s steeds. The only northerners pictured alive, in fact, are those

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\(^2^2\) Breasted (AR III: par. 81, n. c) and Gardiner (1920: 100) both believed the Shasu and Yenoam campaigns to be separate; however, they formulated their theories before Rowe’s discovery of the “first Beth Shan stele” in 1923. Gaballa (1976: 104) admits that Yenoam must have been defeated in year 1, but he maintains that the Karnak scene chronicles the quelling of a subsequent rebellion at the site. The first Beth Shan stele is dated only a few weeks before Seti is known to have already returned to Egypt. Those who support the equation of the Karnak attack on Yenoam with the text narrated on the first Beth Shan stele have been forced to devise schema to explain the chronological crunch that a subsequent trip to Lebanon entails (see Spalinger 1979c: 238; Murnane 1990: 46–47). The Karnak alabaster stele (KRI I, 39: 2, 10–11) also alludes to military activity in Seti’s first year, although the text is unfortunately nonspecific in nature. Murmane (1990: 49) cautioned that events dated to year 1 may not actually have occurred at this time. Seti’s battle against the Fenkuh-lands could have been subsumed into year 1, or, alternatively, subsequent battles could have been antedated.

\(^2^3\) See Murnane 1990: 41–42. The prisoners from this campaign appear to have been carved originally to resemble typical Canaanites rather than Shasu (Epigraphic Survey 1986: 25).


\(^2^5\) Alternatively, it is possible that the scene is meant symbolically to represent two battles, one outside each town.
fleeing on horseback, hiding in the woods, or suing for peace atop the town’s battlements.\footnote{Spalinger (1979d: 274–275) suggests that the scene of Ramesses II storming an unnamed Syro-Palestinian town in the Beit el-Wali temple may, in fact, give Ramesses II’s version of one of the battles he participated in while accompanying his father to Canaan and Lebanon.}

Any explanatory texts that may once have glossed the scene no longer remain. Indeed, the only surviving glyphs are the label identifying the lower town as Yenoam (KRI I, 13: 4) and a reference to the king’s horses subduing the Nine Bows for him (KRI I, 13: 5). If the first Beth Shan stele does indeed pertain to this campaign, however, the story behind the scene begins at last to unfold. According to the stele, Seti I received news while he was on campaign that the leader of the town of Hamath and the people of Pella had captured the town of Beth Shan and were in the process of besieging Rehob.

As discussed in chapter four, Beth Shan had been garrisoned by Egyptian-friendly troops in the late Eighteenth Dynasty, and artifacts exhumed from the contemporary settlement suggest that not a few Egyptians occupied the town as well. Beth Shan’s position at the intersection of two important trade routes and near three fords of the Jordan River rendered it strategically invaluable. The news, therefore, that forces hostile to the Egyptian empire had forcibly gained control of the town may well have been enough to spur Seti to action. To quell these insurrections, the pharaoh ordered one division of his army to attack Hamath, another to recapture Beth Shan, and a third to defeat the town of Yenoam.\footnote{The three divisions that Seti sent against the Transjordanian towns were those named after the gods Amun, Re, and Seth. Ramesses II divided his army into these three divisions and also a division named for Ptah. If Seti also possessed a division of Ptah, it likely stayed with him, as Seti himself was not present at any of the battles narrated on the first Beth Shan stele.} According to the stele, victories were achieved in all these conflicts within the space of a single day.\footnote{For the localization of Yenoam, Rehob, and Hamath in the same general compact area along the Jordan River as Beth Shan and Pella and in the vicinity of the Sea of Galilee, see Aharoni 1968: 165, 167; Faulkner 1980: 219; Hasel 1998: 138, 146–150. The location of Yenoam is the most contentious issue, as candidates include Tell el-‘Abeidiyeh (13 miles north of Beth Shan), Tell esh-Shihab (in the Bashan, where a stele of Seti I was found—KRI I, 17: 5–6); Tell en-Na’ameh in the Huleh Valley, and Tell en-Na’am in the Jabneel Valley (localizations of the two last are based on toponymic similarity). For comprehensive overviews of these debates, see Na’aman 1977; Giveon 1980: 244–245; Hasel 1998: 147–148. Pella}
The nature of Yenoam’s involvement in these Transjordanian troubles is nowhere stated, and one must assume that the town became a target of Egyptian aggression due to its complicity with the upstarts in Hamath and Pella. Indeed, it is tempting to speculate that the other town pictured in the Karnak relief may have been Hamath, given its role as the residence of the rebellion’s ringleader. Just how far the reliefs reflected reality, however, is a legitimate question, for even Seti’s own appearance in this relief must be taken as suspect, or at least as symbolic. The first Beth Shan stele is quite explicit about the fact that the pharaoh was not actually present at any of the armed conflicts.

Significantly, the archaeological record allows an insight into changes in Egyptian policy that the unrest in this area may have instigated. As will be discussed in-depth below, Beth Shan appears to have been transformed into a full-scale Egyptian base sometime early in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Contemporary levels at this site exhibit plentiful evidence of Egyptian-style architecture, inscriptions, and material culture. This spurt of building activity, like that undertaken along the Ways of Horus military route, was almost certainly a direct consequence of anti-Egyptian activity in a strategically vital region.

A second stele erected at Beth Shan (KRI I, 16: 2–17) also records a victory won by Seti’s forces in the region around Galilee. Although undated, this “second Beth Shan stele” may likewise have narrated events associated with the first campaign. The “second stele” certainly opens in a similar manner to the “first,” with Seti receiving a dispatch informing him of insurrection in his realm. The Apiru

(KRI I, 29: no. 54; 32: no. 49 and no. 2; 33: no. 15; 34: nos. 13, 15), Hamath (KRI I, 29: no. 55; 32: no. 50 and no. 2), Beth Shan (KRI I, 29: no. 56; 32: no. 51 and no. 1; 33: no. 16; 34: no. 16), and Yenoam (KRI I, 29, no. 57; 32: no. 52 and no. 1; 33: no. 17; 34: no. 17) frequently appear as a cluster in the topographical lists, suggesting that these towns were viewed as a distinct interactive sphere. It is perhaps significant that Rehob, which is not listed as conquered in the first Beth Shan stele, also does not appear in the topographical lists (cf. Faulkner 1947: 36).

The fate of Pella is left unexplained in the first Beth Shan stele. It may have been that the citizens of the city surrendered peacefully as, one by one, their allies fell.

Spalinger 1979b: 32. See, however, Helck (1962: 203) and Aharoni (1968: 168), who believe the second Beth Shan stele may date to a subsequent Transjordanian campaign.

Both Beth Shan steles utilize the iw.tw formula, a conventional literary device employed by Egyptian scribes “to provide a terse account of the military venture
and Tayaru-folk, it seems, were attacking the inhabitants of Ruhma. Just as the Apiru troublemakers in the Amarna archive occupied the mountainous regions of Amurru and the central hill country, the Apiru of this inscription utilized the mountain of Yarmutu as their base. The Egyptian scribe in this monument was careful to designate by his choice of determinative the seminomadic status of both the Apiru and the otherwise unattested Tayaru-people.

Ostensibly to save a loyal town from the depredations of these rootless troublemakers, Seti duly dispatched “a detachment of men from his ample [infantry and ch]ariotry” (KRI I, 16: 13) to quell the disturbance. The men returned, mission accomplished, within the space of two days. As the precise location of Ruhma is as yet unidentified, it is unclear why Seti should have chosen to interfere in this seemingly local affair. It may have been, however, that the same nomads who harassed Ruhma also utilized their mountain base to harry caravans destined for Egypt or otherwise to interfere with imperial business. Alternatively, mention of the b3k-taxes that the army brought back with them from this conflict (KRI I, 16: 14) may betray yet another motivating factor. Murnane has suggested that the Egyptians were on occasion liberally remunerated by vassals upon whose side they intervened in internecine conflicts.32 Had the ruler of Ruhma, then, solicited Seti’s help in return for a substantial donation to the Egyptian cause? It is certainly possible.

That the victories narrated on the two Beth Shan steles should have been published in Canaan but largely ignored in Egypt is surely due to two main factors. First, royal inscriptions in Egypt emphasized the greater glory of the king himself, and actions undertaken by subordinates, military or otherwise, were typically ignored. Thus, Seti’s absence from the scene in these battles would have deprived them of front page status. Secondly, Egypt’s partisan participation in any of the endless internecine squabbles between Syro-Palestinian rulers could not have been of much interest to the Egyptian

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32 Murnane 1990: 41–42. This suggestion was made with regard to the scene of Canaanite rulers bringing presents to Seti I as he cleared the Ways of Horus of aggressive bedouin.
public or to its gods. In Canaan, on the other hand, it was of the utmost importance whether the Egyptian king—in person or not—fulfilled his duty to protect loyal vassals. A pharaoh perceived as negligent in this duty prompted a high attrition rate among his vassals, as the Amarna letters illustrate quite aptly.\textsuperscript{33} The fact that these two steles were erected at Beth Shan rather than at each individual site of battle presumably indicates that after its recapture by Seti I, Beth Shan had officially become the region’s most important military base.

The final scene in the middle left Karnak register depicts Seti personally receiving homage from Lebanese rulers, who were represented in the act of “hewing cedar trees for the great river-barge U\[serhau\]t, and likewise for the great flagstaves of Amun” (\textit{KRI I}, 13: 8–9). Significantly, the relief is a pictorial rendering of Amenhotep III’s boast that he had cedar dragged from the mountains of Retenu by the rulers of every foreign country for the great river barge Amenre-em-Userhat (\textit{Urk. IV}, 1652: 12–15).\textsuperscript{34} The towering trees and textual glosses make it abundantly clear that the event took place within the famed cedar forests of the Lebanese coast, but the exact whereabouts are nowhere specified.

Seti left a largely illegible stele at Tyre (\textit{KRI I}, 117: 6–10), a city that also appears in his topographical lists (\textit{KRI I}, 29: no. 62; 32: no. 57 and no. 3; 33: no. 21; 34: no. 21). This island polity, however, was never famed for its forests. Akko (\textit{KRI I}, 29: no. 59; 32: no. 54; 33: no. 13; 34: no. 12) and Uzu (\textit{KRI I}, 29: no. 63; 32, no. 58 and no. 4; 33: no. 22; 34: no. 22), two other northern coastal towns found in Seti’s toponym lists, are likewise located south of the heavily forested zone. Conspicuous by its absence in the lists, however, is Byblos, a long-time Egyptian ally and a town used as a base by Thutmose III for timbering expeditions (see chapter three). Given its forest-side locale and its largely loyal leanings, Seti I may well have found Byblos a suitable venue at which to receive his Lebanese vassals.\textsuperscript{35}

\textsuperscript{33} See chapter four for references to the numerous Egyptian vassals who defected to the side of Amurru and the Hittites after promised Egyptian aid never arrived.

\textsuperscript{34} Thutmose III likewise claimed to have embellished “the great riverbark Amunershet with new cedar, which his majesty felled in the foreign land of Retenu” (\textit{Urk. IV}, 1552: 5–6). See also, \textit{Urk. IV}, 1241: 13–1242: 4.

\textsuperscript{35} See Redford (1992: 181), however, who suggests that the leaders of Lebanon gathered at Yenoam to meet Seti. Although such a scenario admittedly fits more
There is no indication from the Karnak relief that Seti’s interaction with the eight rulers of Lebanon was anything but peaceful. The trip northward from Yenoam, however, may not have been free of conflict. Between the forelegs of Seti’s horses appears an iconic representation of the otherwise unknown “town of Qader in the land of Henem.” The Egyptian artists depicted the gateposts of this fortified settlement decidedly askew, suggesting that Qader’s defenses had been both broken and entered by the Egyptian army.

Whether Seti’s trip ended in the cedars of Lebanon or whether he and his army pushed northward is unknown, due to the almost total destruction of the top left register. Just which of Seti’s known or suspected battles occupied this space, however, has been the source of substantial speculation. While some have tentatively suggested a scene of Seti slaughtering Nubians or even the Apiru and Tayaru-folk of the second Beth Shan stele, the most popular consensus is that the register depicted Seti’s recapture of the lost Egyptian bases of Sumur, Ullaza, and perhaps even Kumidi.

Easily into Seti’s tight schedule toward the end of his first campaign, it makes little logical sense. It would seem hardly necessary to import rulers of Lebanon to cut Galilee timber, when they themselves had access to much finer wood directly adjacent to functioning harbors. Further, if the goal was abject humiliation, the recently rebellious Transjordanian rulers would have made better axe men.

Helck (1962: 202; cited approvingly by Spalinger 1979b: 32 and Murnane 1990: 43, no. 35) has suggested, primarily on linguistic grounds, that Qader should be located at modern Gadara, 17 km south of the Yarmuk. This would place the town in the same general Transjordanian locale as Pella and Beth Shan. It is slightly troubling, however, that Qader is not mentioned on either Beth Shan stele if it, indeed, was located in the thick of things. Likewise, its inclusion in the relief depicting Seti’s visit to Lebanon, rather than his defeat of Yenoam and its neighbor, would suggest a locale for Qader somewhere northwest of the Sea of Galilee. The town is listed in the toponym lists (KRI I, 29, no. 67; 32: no. 62) in the vicinity of northern towns—both inland and coastal.

There is no evidence to support Aharoni’s (1968: 165) contention that the scene of the rulers cutting timber took place at Qader and that the men themselves were leaders of this city, although Faulkner (1980: 220) also places Qader in Lebanon.

Murnane 1990: 43. The Nubian campaign of year eight is generally felt to have occurred too late in the reign of Seti I for inclusion among the Karnak reliefs (Kitchen 1977: 215; Spalinger 1979b: 42; 1979c: 232).

Murnane 1990: 43.

Faulkner 1947: 35, 37; Spalinger 1979b: 33–34; Murnane 1990: 44–45; by implication, Breasted AR III: par. 81. The suggested move to consolidate power in the coastal towns of Amurru prior to moving inland is frequently compared by these authors to the strategy of Thutmose III as gleaned from his annals. It is debated, however, whether the expedition was part of the first campaign (Breasted AR III: par. 81; Spalinger 1979b: 33; El-Saady 1992: 294), constituted its own cam-
All three toponyms appear in Seti’s lists of conquered territories, but there is a more important reason to suspect that at least one or two of these towns may have occupied the missing register. If Seti held as his end goal the defeat of Kadesh—as hindsight suggests—he almost certainly would have engaged in preparatory work to ensure that strategically vital gateways to the Syrian city would not be barred to him. Kumidi is situated in the Lebanese Biqa Valley, the straight cut north through which Egyptian armies traversed on their march from Canaan to Kadesh. Given that it was the last substantial town to be encountered on this journey, a hostile Kumidi could have interfered substantially with Egyptian plans.

Sumur and Ullaza, on the other hand, each dominated a harbor from whence troops could strike eastward through mountain passes and, in short order, arrive in the vicinity of Kadesh. The strategic value of both coastal towns was well recognized and had resulted in their transference among Egyptian, Mitanni, Hittite, and Amurrite overlordship for centuries. Given the vital role that the coastal route inland was to play in Ramesses II’s own bid for Kadesh, it would not be surprising if Seti had secured for himself access to one or both of these ports in anticipation of a similar two-pronged attack.

The importance of Kadesh to Egyptian eyes, ironically enough, was this city’s own function as the premiere gateway to northern Syria. Kadesh lay at the junction of the two main highways open to Egypt—one leading inland along the Biqa Valley north of Kumidi and the other leading east from Sumur through the Eleutheros Valley. Located at “perhaps the most important crossroads in Syria,” a hostile Kadesh held the power to block both of Egypt’s routes to the north. And, indeed, thanks to Hittite interference, the gateway of Kadesh had remained firmly barred to Egypt since the reign of Akhenaten.

The top register to the right of the temple doorway at Karnak depicts Seti assaulting Kadesh in an attempt to depose the Hittite-friendly local government. According to the relief, the bulk of the campaign (Faulkner 1947: 37; Gaballa 1976: 104), or is to be viewed as the direct precursor to the battle at Kadesh (Faulkner 1980: 220).

41 Ullaza (KRI I, 29: no. 61; 32: no. 56; 33: no. 19; 35: no. 19) and Kumidi (KRI I, 29: no. 60; 32: no. 55; 33: no. 20; 34: no. 20) appear on Seti I’s topographical lists, as does Sumur, if $\textit{gmr}$ is indeed to be read this way (KRI I, 33: no. 14; 34: no. 14).

42 Breasted 1903: 21.
battle took place outside the city proper. While Kadesh’s defenders lay scrambled in a hopeless pile of dead and wounded, those within the city itself reportedly begged for mercy and offered incense to the king. As befitting an urban power, the local army consisted of both chariot-warriors and foot soldiers. If Hittites or other powerful allies were among those the Egyptians encountered at Kadesh, however, they remain anonymous in text and illustration.

As the Karnak relief is the only record of the assault on Kadesh, aside from an undated stele erected within the city proper (KRI I, 25: 6–7), the chronological placement of “the ascent which Pharaoh made to destroy the land of Kadesh and the land of Amurru” (KRI I, 24: 14) within Seti’s reign is uncertain.\textsuperscript{43} Indeed, it is not even clear whether Seti’s conquest of Kadesh pre- or postdated his confrontation with Hittite forces, an event depicted on the bottom register to the right of the door. The fact that the artists interposed a scene of an attack on Libyans between the two battles, however, suggests that the Egyptians did not encounter the Hittites on the same campaign as that in which they defeated Kadesh.

Some scholars, believing that the reliefs on both sides of the doorway would have been chronologically ordered from bottom to top, view Seti’s clash with the Hittite forces as predating his assault on Kadesh.\textsuperscript{44} As Spalinger and Murnane\textsuperscript{45} have cogently argued, however, it makes for a far more logical progression to see an Egyptian attack on Kadesh as precipitating a Hittite reprisal.\textsuperscript{46} Certainly, one would have expected an active Hittite force at Kadesh had the

\textsuperscript{43} Only a few scholars place the Kadesh campaign in Seti’s first year (see El-Saady 1992: 286–287, 294), and given the tight timing evidenced by the late date on the first Beth Shan stele, this would indeed be difficult to justify. Toponyms that may relate to this campaign in Seti’s lists include Tunip (KRI I, 28: no. 28; 31: no. 27; 34: no. 32, 38), Kadesh (KRI I, 28: no. 29; 31: no. 28; 34: no. 31), and Qatna (KRI I, 28: no. 31; 31: no. 30). For a discussion of the northern Syrian toponyms in Seti’s list and their relevance for the reconstruction of his campaign, see Spalinger 1979d: 278.


\textsuperscript{46} Indeed, the historical preamble to the treaty drawn up between Ramesses II and Hattusili III suggests that a treaty had been in place between Egypt and Hatti in the reign of a relatively recent king (KRI II, 228: 1–2). Were such a treaty valid in the reign of Mursili, as is likely (see chapter four), Seti’s capture of Amurru and Kadesh would certainly have been in violation of it, thus instigating a justified Hittite retaliation (Murnane 1990: 57–58, 63).
Hittites previously tasted defeat at the hands of the Egyptians. Further, a later Hittite treaty clearly indicates that Egyptian pressure at this time prompted the people of Amurru to transfer their loyalty from Hatti to Egypt. The loss of both Amurru and Kadesh would have been as unacceptable to Hatti as it previously had been to Egypt. Thus, this reverse in fortunes would most certainly have prompted a strong response. Given this cause-and-effect reasoning, it seems practical to envision the Karnak scenes as progressing clockwise from the bottom left register of the door to the bottom right.

The final scene of Seti's war reliefs, then, is particularly interesting. It depicts Seti battling an army seemingly made up largely of charioteers. The enemy soldiers are clearly differentiated from Syrians such as those depicted at Kadesh by their clean-shaven faces and unusually long hair. Of the group of fleeing, terrorized Hittites, one

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47 See the historical preamble to the treaty between Tudhaliya IV of Hatti and Shaushga-muwa of Amurru. Tudhaliya writes, “When Muwatalli, uncle of My Majesty, became king, the men of Amurru committed an offense against him, informing him as follows: ‘we were voluntary subjects. Now we are no longer your subjects.’ And they went over to the king of Egypt” (CTH 105; Beckman 1996: 99). For general discussions of Amurru’s renunciation of its vassal status with regard to Hatti, see Spalinger 1979b: 40–41; Murnane 1990: 57–58; Klengel 1992: 117; Bryce 1999: 262. Other scholars (see Redford 1992: 182) believe that Amurru’s renunciation of its vassal status occurred just prior to Ramesses II’s battle at Kadesh and, in fact, occasioned it. This belief is due in part to a preference for the high chronology, which would see Seti I and Mursili II dying almost simultaneously. Likewise, it hinges upon the wording of the Shaushga-muwa treaty. This document follows the statement quoted above with: “Then my majesty’s uncle Muwattalli and the king of Egypt fought over the men of Amurru. Muwattalli defeated him, destroyed the land of Amurru by force of arms, and subjugated it. And he made Shapili king in the land of Amurru” (Beckman 1996: 99–100). This summary statement could, however, just as likely describe the contest between Seti and the Hittites depicted upon the Karnak relief, if the Egyptians were not entirely assiduous about correctly reporting the outcome of the battle.

48 In his investigation of Hittite military strategy, Spalinger (1979c; see also 1979b: 34) finds that the Hittites generally adopted a wait-and-see policy with regard to Egypt, striking back if Hittite interests were directly interfered with and lying low if Egyptian armies merely veered a little too close for comfort.

49 In reality, it is likely that the group opposing Seti was not nearly so homogeneous. Muwatalli explicitly stipulated in his treaties that his vassals were to provide him with military aid in the case of invasions from Egyptian armies (see the treaty between Muwatalli and Alaksandu of Wilusa, trans. Beckman 1996: 85). Significantly, although the prisoners of war are all depicted as Hittites, in the inscription they are referred to as “the great rulers of vile Retenu whom his majesty brought away by his [victo]ries over the foreign countries of Hatti” (KRI I, 19: 6), and in the text Seti “smashes the Syro-Palestinians and tramples the Hittites” (KRI I, 18: 1; see also Murnane 1990: 58, 61).
individual stands out for being portrayed several sizes larger than any of his compatriots, although he remained, of course, still several sizes smaller than Seti himself. This “wretched ruler (‘3) of the Hittites” (KRI I, 17: 10), although unfortunately unnamed, has been surmised to be an extremely important individual—perhaps even the Hittite king’s viceroy from Carchemesh.50

Interestingly, neither the accompanying text nor the relief itself provides any hint as to where the Egyptian and Hittite forces met.51 This lack of specificity could perhaps indicate that the Egyptians were thwarted in reaching their final destination by this Hittite offensive, even if the Hittites themselves were likewise prevented from recapturing Kadesh and Amurru. Certainly, the statement that on this occasion Seti made his boundary as far as the land of Mitanni (Naharina) is much more likely conventional rhetoric than historical fact.52

Seti’s Karnak reliefs and the two steles that he erected at Beth Shan account for almost the entirety of the detailed information we possess concerning his activities in the north. Other sources are limited to vague statements in largely rhetorical steles53 and to intriguing place names included in his toponym lists.54 It is commonly agreed that all the conflicts depicted at Karnak occurred prior to his eighth year,55 and there is no indication whatsoever that Seti campaigned in Syria-Palestine later in his reign.

51 The statement that Seti “trampled down the land of Hatti” (KRI I, 18: 15–19: 1) should not be taken to indicate that the Egyptians actually penetrated the Anatolian homeland of the Hittites, for this would have been unprecedented. Spalinger (1979b: 35) and Bryce (1999: 250–251) suggest that the confrontation probably took place somewhere slightly north of Kadesh and resulted in the Egyptian army’s capture of many Hittites, if not of any new towns or territories in particular. Hatti is listed in Seti’s topographical lists (KRI I, 28: no. 23; 31: no. 22; 33: no. 10) but always in the foremost position reserved for Egypt’s most formidable enemies. Murnane (1990: 60) suggests that the more northerly locales in Seti’s toponym list should not be dismissed out of hand, even if they indicate only that soldiers levied from these areas participated in battle.
53 Klengel 1992: 117. For example, British Museum stele 1665 (KRI I, 6–9); Qasr Ibrim stele (KRI I, 98: 16–99: 11); West Silsila sele (KRI I, 80: 9–10).
During the years that he was active abroad, however, Seti I invested great care in grooming his eldest son Ramesses to follow in his footsteps. By the tender age of ten, Ramesses was appointed overseer of the infantry and chariory (KRI II, 327: 14–15) and chief of the army (KRI II, 356: 6), although in reality the attendant duties must have been performed by men more advanced in years.\textsuperscript{56} Indeed, it may well have been in these pseudo-capacities that Ramesses accompanied his father on Seti’s Canaanite, Libyan, and Nubian wars.\textsuperscript{57} Ramesses does not appear to have presided in any sort of independent fashion over his armies, however, until he ascended the throne as sole ruler.

The first conflict known from Ramesses II’s reign may or may not have involved him personally. In or prior to his second year,\textsuperscript{58} Egyptian forces successfully stanch a raid by an unspecified number of Sherden warriors, who “sailed in warships from the midst of the sea” (KRI II, 290: 3). The Sherden were just one of the many groups of pirate raiders, or “people of the sea,”\textsuperscript{59} that began to plague Mediterranean waters in the thirteenth century B.C.

The details of the battle with the Sherden are unfortunately nowhere evident—perhaps a clue that Ramesses himself did not participate. The contest must, however, have netted Egypt a fair number of prisoners of war, because as early as the battle of Kadesh in Ramesses’

\textsuperscript{56} For information pertaining to Ramesses’ activities prior to assuming sole rule of Egypt, see the Great Dedicatory Abydos Inscription (KRI II, 327: 11–334: 9) and the Kubban stele (KRI II, 356: 1–6), as well as studies of this period (Seele 1940; Spalinger 1979d; Kitchen 1982; Murnane 1990: 107–114).

\textsuperscript{57} The fact that Ramesses later carved himself into all but his father’s northernmost campaigns and that he decorated his temple at Beit el-Wali as a co-regent with similar scenes suggests that he accompanied Seti to war on a number of occasions (Spalinger 1979d; Kitchen 1982: 24–25).

\textsuperscript{58} The Aswan stele, dated to Ramesses II’s second year, places the conflict with the Sherden at some indefinite time in the past, “He has destroyed the warriors of the sea, the Delta slumbers and can sleep” (KRI II, 345: 3). There is a good possibility, then, that the incursion could have occurred during the later years of Seti I (Kitchen 1982: 40–41); certainly Ramesses does not count the defeat of the Sherden as his first victorious expedition. This honor seems to have been reserved for the campaign to Syria-Palestine in year four. Another scenario, following Redford (1971: 118–119), would have Ramesses antedating the Aswan stele to his second year, and thus inserting an anachronistic battle against the Sherden into the text.

\textsuperscript{59} The term “Sea People” was coined by Maspero in the late nineteenth century to describe the Aegean and western Anatolian peoples who terrorized the eastern Mediterranean in the late thirteenth and early twelfth centuries B.C. For a review of early scholarship concerning these people, see T. Dothan and M. Dothan 1992: 6–11.
year five, Sherden warriors “of his majesty’s capturing” (KRI II, 11: no. 26) were incorporated into the Egyptian army. Sherden warriors would continue to serve as imperial soldiers as late as the reign of Ramesses III at least (see chapter six).

Ramesses II’s first known campaign into Syria-Palestine does not seem to have occurred until late in his fourth year as sole ruler, and this must undoubtedly have been undertaken in preparation for his much more ambitious campaign in year five. The only records of the year four expedition are two steles, one erected in Byblos in the fourth month of Shomu (KRI II, 224: 3–15) and another in the Nahr el-Kelb in the fourth month of Akhet (KRI II, I: 4–9). Nothing of historical note is preserved on the Nahr el-Kelb stele. The Byblos stele, however, mentions that at some point in the expedition Ramesses’ army went on ahead, leaving the king alone. The danger inherent in such a scenario was to be clearly demonstrated to Ramesses in his subsequent campaign.

Even without detailed annalistic texts, much can be determined about Ramesses’ strategic aims simply due to the placement of his steles. Both the Nahr el-Kelb and the harbor of Byblos lie on the Lebanese coast, an area that had been strongly affected by pro-Hittite activity on the part of the rulers of Amurru during the Amarna Period (see chapter four). After Seti I visited the coast in person and later bent Amurru to his will, Egypt was ready to reassert its presence in the strategically vital harbors that formed the link between the Mediterranean Sea and the mountain passes inland.60

Like Thutmose III, his illustrious predecessor, Ramesses II constructed at least one, and possibly two, chapels in the temple of the lady of Byblos—a deity identified by the Egyptians with their own goddess Hathor.61 This sanctuary, like all others in the sacred precinct, had been entirely dismantled by later inhabitants of the town for building material. Despite this disturbance, however, archaeologists were able to piece together a virtually complete version of one of

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60 Redford (1992: 183) believes Ramesses II’s rush northward to have been occasioned by the news of Amurru’s switch of loyalties from Hatti to Egypt. It is difficult to understand, however, why Amurru would have spontaneously seceded from the Hittite empire at a point when Egypt does not appear to have campaigned in the area for nearly a decade. Zuhdi (1977–1978: 141) holds that Ramesses undertook the journey in order to woo Amurru to Egypt’s side.

Ramesses’ doorways. On a jamb of this grand entranceway, the pharaoh struck an offering pose, while on the doorway’s lintel he was declared “beloved of (some foreign god or goddess).” Finally, in good Egyptian fashion, a uraeus-frieze crowned the top portion of the lintel.62

Dunand discovered two additional jambs of Ramesses’ at Byblos.63 Without plans, drawings, or even in-depth descriptions of either, it is difficult to determine whether they also belonged to the religious precinct at Byblos. In all likelihood they did. The lack of any text but the names and titles of Ramesses, however, renders it plausible that they could have fronted a more secular governmental building, such as a harbor storehouse or an administrative headquarters. Depending on their size, they may even have been incorporated into a city gate, as at Jaffa. Regardless of exactly what types of monumental buildings he erected, however, it is clear that through his works Ramesses intended to emphasize the resurrection of Egyptian interest in Byblos.

This first Syro-Palestinian campaign almost certainly took Ramesses II and his army north of Byblos and perhaps even as far as Sumur.64 On the way home, Ramesses carved a stele along the Nahr el-Kelb River (KRI II, I: 4–9). Although most of this text is now missing, the pharaoh in all likelihood commemorated the grading of a nearby ford.65 New Kingdom pharaohs as well as most subsequent conquering imperial powers manipulated the fords in this river near Beirut to facilitate transport and communication.66 Ramesses was to

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62 Dunand 1939: 54, 56; no. 1317–1318, 1320; pl. 27; KRI II 400: 7–11. Of the deity’s name, only a hill-country determinative remained. It is likely, however, that the building was dedicated to the city-goddess of Byblos. A relief fragment depicting a Nineteenth Dynasty pharaoh offering to the “lady of Byblos” may be a further attestation of Ramesses II’s devotion to this cult (Woolley 1921: 200). Judging from their findspots, both the goddess and the king of Byblos seem to have been the recipients of alabaster and serpentine vessels dedicated by Ramesses II (Dunand 1939: 93, no. 1360; 399, no. 6031; Montet 1998: 225, no. 883; 227–228, no. 890).

63 Dunand 1939: 53, no. 1315; 92, no. 1354.

64 Kitchen (1982: 51) believes that Benteshina of Amurru renounced his vassalage to Hatti after an armed visit from Ramesses on this occasion.

65 Some scholars (see Breasted 1903: 9; Katzenstein 1973: 50) have suggested that Ramesses commemorated his passage at the Nahr el-Kelb because this river formed the contemporary border with Hatti. A locale near Beirut, however, would be extremely far south for even an unofficial border, especially considering Seti’s recent campaigns in Syria and Amurru.

leave two more steles in this area during his long reign, one in year ten (KRI II, 149: 8–15) and another undated (KRI II, 1: 13–14) — yet these two steles would fare even worse from weathering than did the first.

Although the details of Ramesses II’s excursion in year four remain obscure, his year five campaign to Kadesh is undoubtedly the best understood military venture of the entire second millennium B.C. Ramesses memorialized his “victory” against the Hittites and their myriad allies 67 ten times in three different formats (the literary record, the bulletin, and in a series of reliefs), 68 which he inscribed on five temples (Abydos, Karnak, Luxor, the Ramesseum, and Abu Simbel). 69 Information about the battle can also be gleaned from Hittite sources. 70 As a consequence of this glut of textual material, the battle of Kadesh has been analyzed and discussed by a dizzying array of scholars. 71 The perfidy of the Shasu spies, the fool-hardy rush northward by Ramesses and only a few of his troops, the flogging of the Hittite scouts, and the near-fatal ambush by enemy chariots by the unprepared Egyptian infantry are, as a result, all well-known events.

67 The Hittites had reportedly solicited military aid from numerous polities, including Naharina, Arazawa, Pidassa, Dardanaya, Masa, Qarqisha, Lukka, Carchemish, Qode, Ugarit, Mushnathu, Gasgas, Arwanna, Kizzuwatna, Nukhasse, Mushnathu, Aleppo, Alshe, and Qabasu (KRI II, 3: par. 2–4, par. 6; 17: par. 43; 18: par. 47). As the Egyptians suggest (KRI II, 20: par. 52–53), many of these polities may have been persuaded to support the Hittite cause due to substantial payments in silver. Many more, however, were likely bound to Hatti by mutual defense treaties.

68 For the literary record, see KRI II, 3: 2–101: 14. For the bulletin, see KRI II, 102: 2–124: 15. For the reliefs, see KRI II, 129: 4–147: 16.

69 Parts of the literary record were also later copied onto P. Chester Beatty III, P. Raife, and P. Sallier III. The battle of Kadesh was even famous in classical times, due no doubt to the many reliefs still visible on temple walls. By this point, however, Egypt’s enemy was thought to be Bactria rather than Hatti, as a result of an error in orthography and greater familiarity with the former country (Spalinger 1977–1978: 16).

70 According to one Hittite historical text, Egypt was not only defeated at Kadesh but lost territory farther south in the land of Upe as well (KUB XXI 17 + XXXI 27, trans. in Goetze 1929: 837; Schultmann 1981: 10). Further, Ramesses’ portrayal of the battle as a resounding defeat for the Hittites was a bone of contention years later in the official correspondence between the two nations (KBo 15 + CTH 156 = AHK I no. 24, 58–61, obv. 15–33; cf. Bryce 1999: 308).

71 These include Breasted 1903; Burne 1921; Wilson 1927; Kuentz 1928; Goetze 1929; Alt 1932; 1943; Edel 1949; 1951; Botterweck 1950; Faulkner 1958; Gardiner 1960; Montet 1960; Goedicke 1966a; 1985; Cazelies 1970; Desroches-Noblecourt et al. 1971; Rainey 1973; Tefnin 1981; Assman 1983–1984; Fecht 1984a; 1984b; von der Way 1984; Spalinger 1985; Okinga 1987; Warburton 1997.
For the purpose of this work, only one aspect of the battle of Kadesh merits special consideration, namely the nature and function of the \( n'm \)-troop. Judging from the battle reliefs, it was the timely arrival of this corps of soldiers that truly snatched the Egyptian forces from the jaws of defeat. This group has long puzzled scholars, however, for two main reasons. First, although \( n'm \) is a Semitic word for “youth,”\(^{72}\) the members of “the \( n'm \)-troop of pharaoh” (KRI II, 131: par. 11) are depicted in the relief as typical Egyptians.\(^{73}\) Second, as the \( n'm \)-troop is otherwise not explicitly alluded to in the inscriptions, its appearance at Kadesh in the reliefs is both unexpected and unexplained.

The caption adjacent to the depiction of the soldiers states simply that the \( n'm \)-troop of pharaoh arrived from the land of Amurru to find the king and the remnants of his army besieged by Hittites. Due to the fresh and organized assault mounted by the \( n'm \) on the Hittite attackers, the Egyptian army was able to emerge victorious.\(^{74}\) Significantly, in the entire Kadesh corpus this is the only instance in which credit for Egypt’s “victory” is awarded to anyone other than Ramesses himself.

There is a good possibility, despite the fact that the \( n'm \)-troop is nowhere else designated by that name, that it should be equated with “the first troop (\( skw \ tpy \))\(^{75}\) that his majesty made of all the leading

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\(^{72}\) See the extensive references cited in Schulman 1981: 8, no. 5. Due to the Semitic derivation of the word, a number of scholars have suggested that the \( n'm \) were Apiru mercenaries (Goedicke 1966a: 79–80), vassal troops from Amurru (Olmstead 1931: 222; Sturm 1939: 141–142; Zuhdi 1977–1978: 141), vassals from other Syro-Palestinian polities (Meyer 1928: 462), or a Semitic auxiliary to be identified with the battalion of Seth (Goedicke 1985: 87, 95). For the interpretation of \( n'm \) troops as younger soldiers, see Breasted 1903: 38; Burne 1921: 193; Meyer 1928: 462; Faulkner 1958: 93, 98.

\(^{73}\) Scholars who believe the \( n'm \) to have been foreign generally explain away their Egyptian appearance by suggesting confusion on the part of the artists (Sturm 1939: 141–142) or a general reluctance to admit that it was foreigners who saved the day (Zuhdi 1977–1978: 141–142). Those who believe, however, that the \( n'm \) were in fact Egyptian explain the Canaanite moniker as yet another example of Egyptian borrowing of northern military terminology (Schulman 1964a: 24) or simply as an Egyptian scribe flaunting his knowledge of Canaanite (Schulman 1962: 51–52).

\(^{74}\) KRI II, 131–133: par. 11.

\(^{75}\) KRI II, 23: par. 63. \( skw \) is often translated as “battle line,” although “troop” or “company” would appear a more straightforward reading (Wb. IV, 313; Schulman 1964a: 58; Faulkner 1986: 251; Lesko 1987: 106). \( tpy \) can also have the connotation of “picked” or “chosen,” which appears particularly appropriate in this context (Wb.
men (*ḥrwtiw*)\textsuperscript{76} of his army.” The position of this troop is listed immediately following a summary of the positions of the four main divisions of Ramesses’ army. While the divisions of Amun, Pre, Ptah, and Seth occupied various locales south of Kadesh, the “first troop” is clearly stated to have been “upon the shore of Amurru” (*KRI II*, 21: par. 57–24: par. 64).

Many scholars have argued that the *n’m*-troop (a.k.a. *skw tpy*) had been created on the spot by Ramesses II to form a “battle-line,” which would guard his troops as they forded the Orontes River.\textsuperscript{77} This is an unsatisfying hypothesis, however, on two main counts. First, Ramesses naively believed the Hittite king to be in Aleppo and, thus, threw caution to the wind in his own approach northward. Given this brazen disregard for his own safety, it seems peculiar that he would have conscientiously formed a “battle line” of all the leading men of his army to guard a ford that lay hundreds of kilometers south of Aleppo.\textsuperscript{78} Second, a position next to the Orontes ford would still not place this troop “on the shore of Amurru.” The area directly south of Kadesh might be termed Amki, or perhaps Takhasy,\textsuperscript{79} but it was always clearly distinguished from the mountainous region of Amurru.

This same *n’m*-troop is also likely mentioned in a letter sent from Ramesses II to Hattusili III, which retrospectively gives troop positions

\textsuperscript{76} *Áwty* is generally translated as “leader,” although Schulman (1964a: 49) suggests it is used “not as a rank but as a descriptive element.” It can hardly be a coincidence, however, that in one of the very few other examples of *n’m* in Egyptian usage, the writer of a satiric letter sarcastically praises his fellow scribe, calling him, “Oh chosen scribe, Oh capable *maher*, leader (*ḥrwtiw*) of *n’m*-troops” (*P. Anastasi I*, 26: 9–27).

\textsuperscript{77} For this view and variations upon it, see Breasted 1903: 116; Burne 1921: 193–194; *Sturm* 1939: 140; Schulman 1962a: 50–51; 1981.

\textsuperscript{78} Likewise, given that men stationed at the ford would have experienced firsthand the devastating Hittite ambush, it is extremely improbable that they could have arrived to the battle at Kadesh from Amurru, as did the *n’m*, fresh-faced and in impeccable marching order.

just prior to the battle of Kadesh. Ramesses writes, “An army of mine found itself in the midst of the land of Amurru, another army [in the land of]—, and (still) another army in the land of Taminta, in truth.”

Although the armies involved are usually presumed to be the divisions of Pre, Ptah, and Seth, it would not be odd for Ramesses II to have mentioned his first troop’s placement first, especially with hindsight highlighting their special importance in the battle.

Assuming, then, that all the troops stated to have been in Amurru are to be equated with the n’rn-troop of the relief scene, their existence as a discrete military unit, separated physically from the rest of the army, remains to be explained. Given that the king is said to have formed their unit from the best of his army, it is likely that the soldiers of the n’rn, or “first troop,” had been selectively culled from the regular four divisions of the army for their speed and skill. Deemed eminently suitable for a special mission, the n’rn could well have served as the Marines of their day.

The Egyptian “first troop” may have reconnoitered with auxiliary troops provided by Lebanese vassals at Sumur, Egypt’s recently reconquered base in Amurru. From Sumur the troops could cut through the mountains via the Eleutheros Valley and arrive at Kadesh in a matter of days. Such a short trip, especially if the n’rn-troops had traveled by ship to Sumur in the first place, would account for the energy and enthusiasm that the reinforcements displayed in battle. Although Ramesses surely did not envision that he would have to rely upon the n’rn to the extent that he did, the pharaoh’s two-pronged insurance policy definitely paid off. The n’rn-troop that he had sent upon an alternate route arrived unscathed, and their help—as it turned out—was essential to salvaging the battle for the Egyptians.

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80 KBo 15 + CTH 156 = AHK 1 no. 24; trans. in Schulman 1962: 49.
83 Numerous authors have suggested that the n’rn followed this route (Meyer 1928: 462; Gardiner 1947a: 189*; Faulkner 1958: 93, 98; 1980: 226–227; Helck 1962: 215; Goedicke 1966a: 79; Gaballa 1976: 115–116). The distance between Kadesh and Sumur is barely 60 km as the crow flies and probably not much longer on the ground.
Ramesses II’s real victory at Kadesh, apparently, was that he and the remnants of his army managed to return home in one piece. Ramesses claimed in the official accounts of the battle that he magnanimously desisted from attacking Kadesh after he received an exceedingly humble letter from the king of the Hittites pleading for an armistice (KRI II, 92: par. 304–95: par. 319). Hittite sources, however, are quite clear not only that the Egyptian army was roundly defeated but that following the battle the Hittites themselves moved south of Kadesh and attacked traditionally Egyptian territory in Upe. It is a testament to the determination of the Egyptian propagandists, then, that Ramesses succeeded in presenting his loss of Kadesh, Amurru, and parts of Upe as one of Egypt’s most glorious victories.

Remarkably, the same king who recorded his campaign to Kadesh with exemplary attention to detail commemorated his later expeditions in such a terse and stereotypical manner as to prompt endless confusion among scholars about exactly when he did what. Ramesses II festooned temple walls at Karnak, Luxor, and the Ramesseum with so-called minor war scenes, commissioned to celebrate his various victories throughout the years. The problem with these reliefs, however, is that they are for the most part undated, and nearly all depict the same image: an oversized Ramesses assaulting one or more fortified towns. With the addition only of topographical lists and scattered steles, historians have found themselves hard-pressed to construct much more than a thumbnail sketch of Ramesses’ martial activities for the remainder of his long reign.

Judging from the available evidence, Ramesses does not appear to have campaigned personally in his northern empire again until year seven at the earliest. An expedition to Moab and its environs is witnessed in reliefs that this king commissioned at Luxor. In these

84 KUB XXI 17 + XXXI 27, trans. in Goetze 1929: 837; Schulman 1981: 10.
85 Following the battle of Kadesh, the Hittites deposed Benteshina, the pro-Egyptian ruler of Amurru, and installed a pro-Hittite ruler in his stead. Although Benteshina was eventually reinstated to his kingdom, Amurru was lost to Egypt forever. For recent discussions of Hittite relations with Amurru in the reign of Ramesses II, see Klengel 1992: 169–171; Beckman 1996: 95–98; Bryce 1999: 262–263, 278–279.
86 Among those who have expressed despair at the idea of utilizing Ramesses’ minor war scenes to reconstruct historical events with any chronological accuracy, see Kitchen 1964: 62–63; Gaballa 1976: 113; Redford 1992: 186, n. 287.
87 Ramesses II’s campaign to Moab and the Negev has been dated to years 7–8
conventional scenes, Ramesses is depicted attacking the town of $y\nu(?)d$ in the mountain of $Mrm$, the towns of $B(w)trt$ and Dibon in Moab, as well as other towns whose names have not survived intact. Prior to this campaign, the Egyptian government had expressed little interest in Moab, and it is undoubtedly significant that archaeological surveys have identified an intensification of settlement in the areas south and west of the Dead Sea in the LB IIB period, or roughly contemporary with the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Moab's neighbor to the south, Edom, appears also to have experienced the wrath of Ramesses at some point during his reign. On an obelisk erected at his new capital at Pi-Ramesses, the king is described as one “destroying the land of Shasu, plundering the mountain of Se[‘ir]” (KRI II, 409: 1). More explicitly, on a stele found at the fortress of Tell er-Retabah (Tjeku), Ramesses is reported to have made “a great massacre in the land of (the) Shasu; he plunders their ridges, slaughtering them, building in towns (dmiw) in his (own) name forever” (KRI II, 304: 14–15). A fragmentary rhetorical
stele likewise refers to Shasu prisoners (KRI II, 298: 3), men whom Ramesses might well have captured on an Edomite campaign.

Significantly, it may have been only in the southern and easternmost regions of his northern empire that this warrior pharaoh could hope to make good on the ever-present pharaonic goal of extending the boundaries of Egypt. In Nubia, Egyptian forces had achieved their farthest reach already in the early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Likewise, to the north, Hittite interference rendered any inroads into northern Syria transitory at best.

Ramesses II did, however, doggedly attempt to recoup some of his losses in the northern portions of his empire. Reliefs at the Ramesseum—which are clearly dated to Ramesses’ eighth year—and probably at Luxor and Karnak as well, chronicle the numerous towns subdued during the course of this campaign. Indeed, the battles seem to have been so numerous that the court artists despaired of individually commemorating them all. Instead, the relief at the Ramesseum shows eighteen fortresses, each labeled “Town which his majesty plundered, [GN].” Moreover, a different son of Ramesses II is depicted leading a woeful group of prisoners away from each of these towns (KRI II, 148: 1–149: 5). As Gaballa has aptly noted, the entire relief bears a closer resemblance to an elaborate topographical list than it does to a series of battle scenes. While most of the towns included in the relief are too damaged or obscure to identify, Merom and Beth-Anath are known from Galilee, while to the building of the royal reputation in Shasu towns. It seems that in the LB IIB period—whether of their own accord or as part of a pacification program sponsored by Ramesses—the Shasu bedouin began to inhabit towns. While the observable intensification of settlement both south and east of the Dead Sea in the thirteenth century has long been attributed to migration into the region, progressive sedentarization of nomadic elements like the Shasu may well account for much of the growth (see the extensive discussion and references in Hasel 1998: 161).

93 Gaballa 1976: 112.

94 But see the attempt in Helck 1962: 219–220. Helck, basing much of his work on an earlier study by Noth (1941), tentatively identified a number of the more complete place names on this relief as belonging to the coastal area north of Byblos. As the equations between the ancient and modern toponyms are linguistically based, however, the majority of the suggestions must remain provisional. Likewise, although all toponym lists must be used with great caution in reconstructing the activities of Egyptian armies, those of Ramesses II are especially suspect. This king, after all, is known to have borrowed liberally from the lists of earlier kings (Noth 1941: 41–48; Fairman 1940: 165; Horn 1953: 202).

95 Aharoni 1968: 169; Kitchen 1982: 219. A stele depicting Ramesses II offering to a Syrian deity, discovered some 50 km east of Galilee, may conceivably have
Dapur, as stated in the relief, lay in Amurrite country (KRI II, 148: 12).

Ramesses commissioned a scene of himself conquering the town of Dapur at Luxor Temple as well as at the Ramesseum. In the texts Dapur is twice referred to as a “town of Hatti” (KRI II, 173: 3; 174: 13–14), and the appellation appears appropriate given that the town’s inhabitants are indistinguishable from the Hittite soldiery that Ramesses fought against at Kadesh. It is quite likely, however, that Dapur had been loyal to Egypt prior to the Hittite victory at Kadesh, for Ramesses states that a statue of himself lay within the town (KRI II, 174: 13–14). Alternatively, it may be that Ramesses fought against Dapur not once but twice. If this were the case, he may have erected the statue following his victory in year eight and have been forced to reconquer the city a second time in year ten or later.

Interestingly, the text that accompanies the Luxor relief is far-and-away the liveliest of the pharaoh’s post-Kadesh military narratives. To Ramesses, the most memorable aspect of the battle at Dapur was anecdotal. The point of pride for the pharaoh, and practically the only detail he found worth recording, was that he spent a full two hours attacking the city before he even bothered to don his coat of mail (KRI II, 175: 3–12). Judging from the fact that Ramesses II doted most fondly upon the battle of Kadesh, in which he was nearly killed, and the battle at Dapur, in which he fought unprotected,

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been commissioned on the eighth campaign (KRI II, 223: 1–7. For background on this stèle, sometimes known as the “Job Stone,” see Erman 1892; Albright 1926: 45; Gieven 1965: 197–200). Helck (1962: 221–22; following Noth 1941) tentatively identifies certain toponyms in Ramesses II’s Karnak list with places to the north of Galilee in the Biqa Valley (KRI II, 161: 5–10, nos. 26–33). These could also conceivably have been encountered on the eighth campaign.

96 Dapur is also stated to be “in the region of the town of Tunip, in the land of Naharina” (KRI I 175: 1–4, 9–13; Helck 1962: 219, 223). Clearly this particular area of Syria, like Kadesh, was fated to lie at the borders of numerous competing empires. As seen in chapter four, it was exactly the area around Tunip that in the Amarna Period had been claimed by Mitanni, the Hittites, the rulers of Amurru, and the Egyptians.

97 Some authors (Kemp 1978: 53; Faulkner 1980: 228) place the statue in Tunip. From the context, however, it is quite clear that the statue resided in Dapur, which was in the region of Tunip, not in Tunip itself.

98 Kitchen 1982: 68–70. Redford (1992: 186) believes that Ramesses fought at Dapur once, after year 10, and that Dapur’s inclusion among the towns in the year eight relief at the Ramesseum is in error.
it would appear that the young pharaoh savored most of all the adrenaline rush of a war fought dangerously.

Ramesses’ strategy in attacking Dapur may well have been to isolate Amurru and Kadesh from their Hittite overlords. Clearly, the king must have known that a renewed attack on Kadesh itself would be futile and difficult to garner support for among the army and his advisors. In order to bypass Kadesh, and any armies that might have been stationed there to protect it, then, Ramesses likely took a northern route, branching off from the Eleutheros Valley.

The choice of such an inland path may perhaps have meant that Sumur continued to serve as an Egyptian base, as the toponym Sumur of Sese, found in a contemporary papyrus, might indicate. Certainly, Sumur nowhere appears in Ramesses’ toponym lists, even if Irqata, a near neighbor to the south, earned its own attack scene at Amara West (KRI II, 213: 12–16). Other demonstrably northern sites that Ramesses may have conquered in his eighth campaign include “Han . . .,” a town situated in the land of Kode in the district of Naharina (KRI II, 170: 15), and Satuna—a town located in a forest populated by bears (KRI II, 176: 5).

With regard to attempts to assess Ramesses’ activities in his northern territories at specific points in his reign, there is very little to go upon. In year ten he carved another inscription along the Nahr el-Kelb pass near Beirut (KRI II, 149: 9–15), but this has unfortunately almost entirely eroded away. Likewise, in year 18 he left a

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100 Helck (1962: 220–221), again following Noth (1941), has provisionally identified twelve names on a toponym list at Karnak (KRI II, 160: 15–161: 1, nos. 1–12) as belonging to towns in the vicinity of Kadesh.
102 Redford (1992: 186, 188) places these battles, like that at Dapur, between years 11 and 21 due to the six sons accompanying Ramesses in the conflict at Dapur and the nine accompanying him in the land of Qode. Certainly, the Hittites may have had more incentive to form a nonaggression pact with Egypt in year 21 if Egyptian armies had been campaigning successfully in their bailiwick in the recent past.
103 As Kode is generally equated with Kizzuwatna in southern Anatolia (Helck 1962: 223), one must imagine that Ramesses penetrated a territory under the control of Kizzuwatna, not a territory in Anatolia itself. The concurrent mention of Naharina would support this assertion.
104 Oddly enough, although the artists were very careful to present the landscape as typically Syrian, they portrayed the enemy at first as typical Libyans! This grievous error was soon realized, and the foes were modified to resemble Syrians (Gaballa 1976: 111).
largely rhetorical stele at Beth Shan (KRI II, 150: 1–151: 15). As will be discussed below, there is a great deal of archaeological evidence to indicate that Ramesses II played an active role in transforming Beth Shan into one of Egypt’s most important northern bases.

Returning briefly to the undated iconic reliefs of Ramesses storming various Syro-Palestinian towns, two other scenes are of particular interest for understanding the development of Egypt’s imperial infrastructure. First is the attack on Akko (KRI II, 155: 16), a coastal town just north of the Carmel mountain range. Akko would have undoubtedly been the most important Canaanite harbor for Egypt to control, as it was not only the busiest of the southern harbors but also provided direct access to a mountain pass that led inward to the Jezreel Valley and the Galilee. Given that Ramesses II met opposition in the Galilee in year eight, it is not unlikely that Akko had become embroiled in the conflicts and thus required subduing as well.

Weinstein has put forth a very plausible theory that Ramesses transformed Akko into a full-fledged Egyptian base following its conquest. Unfortunately, this supposition has been impossible to verify or refute archaeologically. Given the strategic importance of the town, however, Egyptian authorities must certainly have closely monitored Akko in the wake of its insurrection.

Whereas it is unclear whether Akko functioned as an Egyptian base following its conquest by Ramesses, the fate of another besieged town is less ambiguous. Aphek is located at the foot of the springs of the Yarkon River, the only true river in Canaan leading to the Mediterranean Sea. The town also lay only a few days’ march north along the Via Maris from Gaza, so a rebellion on the part of its inhabitants was quite bold indeed. Based on analogy to the Amarna Period, the settlement may well have been seduced to sedition by rogue powers in the hill country, such as Shechem. What is of

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105 Cerny 1958: 80. This stele had for a long while mistakenly been assigned to year nine of Ramesses II (Rowe 1930: 34–36).
106 See Helck (1962: 222–223) for tentative identifications of a number of the besieged fortified towns.
107 Akko also appears on a topographical list of Ramesses at Karnak (KRI II, 163: 14).
particular interest, however, is that Ramesses appears to have erected an administrative headquarters at the site, presumably following his victory. Indeed, a gateway emblazoned with Ramesses II’s name at nearby Jaffa (KRI II, 401: 6–7) may have been commissioned at the same time. Certainly, the presence of royal works at both locales indicates an intense interest in manifesting the imperial presence along the main north-south artery in Canaan and in its adjacent harbor towns.110

As will be discussed in-depth farther along in this chapter, there is far more evidence for Ramesses II’s construction activity in Syria-Palestine than there is for his martial endeavors. When one considers that Ramesses II ruled for 67 years, the restriction of known campaigns to his first ten years as sole ruler is extraordinary, especially for a king known popularly as one of Egypt’s greatest warrior pharaohs. A major contributing factor to the seemingly peaceful conditions prevalent in the latter two-thirds of Ramesses reign, however, would undoubtedly have been the treaty concluded between Egypt and Hatti in his 21st year.

The treaty had originally been engraved on identical silver tablets, sanctified with depictions of the gods and embossed with an official seal. Although these imposing items will probably never be recovered, numerous copies of the text have survived. Two of the versions had been inscribed in Egyptian on temple walls at Karnak and the Ramesseum (KRI II, 225: 7–232: 14), and two further copies are preserved on clay tablets exhumed from the official archives of the capital at Hattusas.111 Despite the problems inherent in translation and the undoubtedly strong temptation for each side to present itself in a particularly favorable light, the Egyptian and Hittite versions of the treaty are virtually identical.112

110 M. Dothan describes further discoveries at Ashdod, consisting of “a Ramesses II scarab and cartouches, a segment of a stone doorpost, probably from the destroyed city gate or the fortified residence, that bears a fragmentary but significant hieroglyphic inscription possibly dating to the XVIII or XIX Dynasty” (M. Dothan 1989: 65). Given the associated items bearing Ramesses II’s name as well as his known tendency to adorn monumental entranceways with his cartouche, it is very probable that the doorposts had been dedicated in his reign.

111 Confusingly enough, the “Hittite version” found on the tablets at Hattusas represents the text sent to Hattusili by Ramesses, and the “Egyptian version” inscribed upon temple walls is an Egyptian translation of the document that Hattusili sent to Ramesses (cf. Schulman 1977–1978: 114–115).

112 For studies and translations of the different versions of this treaty, see espe-
In the two treaties each nation promises to respect the other’s borders, to provide the other with military aid, and to extradite fugitives. The only imbalance, in fact, is that the Egyptians were honor bound to see that the descendents of Hattusili III succeeded him on the throne, while Ramesses II extracted no similar promise from the Hittite king (KRI II, 228: 13–229: 2). Moreover, as many scholars have pointed out, Hattusili’s inclusion of this clause likely had been prompted by his own ongoing feud with Urhi-Teshub, the nephew whom he had earlier deposed from the Hittite throne. The Egyptians, on the other hand, were likely leery of inviting Hittite interference into their domestic politics. Although unstated in the treaty, the lifting of trade embargoes—between Egypt and Hatti but also between their vassal territories—would undoubtedly have been a feature of benefit to both sides.

Given Ramesses II’s tendency to spin historical events to his own advantage, his assertion that the first overtures toward peace came from the Hittites obviously cannot be trusted on its own merit. There are a couple of very good reasons to suspect, however, that in this particular instance Ramesses may have been telling the truth. The fact that the treaty was inscribed upon silver rather than gold tablets, for example, is a hint that Hittite craftsmen may have been at work. Likewise, the inclusion of the clause devoted to Ramesses’ sworn duty to safeguard the Hittite throne for Hattusili’s descendants would be of interest, of course, only to the Hittites. Finally, in his detailed comparison of the two versions of the text, Spalinger noticed...
that the treaty authored by Hattusili III is tellingly more specific in legalese language and attention to detail. As over the years the Hittites had perfected the genre of the diplomatic treaty, Spalinger concluded that the original Akkadian version of the contract had in fact been drafted at the Hittite court.

Considering that Ramesses II never reconquered Kadesh, and that his subsequent victories in northern Syria must have been more of an irritant than a true threat to Hittite authority in the area, it is mildly surprising that Hattusili would propose a treaty. With Amurru and Kadesh as loyal vassals, his aim does not appear to have been territorial in nature. Indeed, precise borders are never mentioned in the new treaty, interested parties being referred back to the text of two previous treaties. Likewise, although Hattusili III included a clause obligating Egypt to safeguard the succession to the Hittite throne, even he must have realized its futility. The farthest an Egyptian army had ever penetrated into Syria was the Euphrates, and the Hittite capital lay hundreds of mountainous kilometers to the north.

Perhaps the most convincing suggestion put forth regarding Hattusili III’s motivation for initiating a peace settlement is that the Hittite king felt genuinely threatened by the recent rise in Assyrian power. Assyria, like Egypt, had a great interest in the Syrian territory formerly held by the Mitanni empire and had recently reduced the king of Hanigalbat to vassal status. Thus, instead of simply having to keep an eye on Egypt’s encroachments into southern Syria, the Hittite king also had to guard his northern Syrian holdings from Assyria. Further, were Assyria and Egypt ever to join forces in an

117 Spalinger (1981: 334) writes, “the Egyptian version does indeed represent a more complete version of the treaty—one that was drawn up at the Hittite court and therefore composed by a bureaucracy that was more aware of treaty formation and treaty making. The Egyptians, on the other hand, having drawn up fewer treaties, were less aware of all the possibilities that had to be written into such a document.”

118 Schulman (1977–1978) and Spalinger (1981) suggest that Hattusili III’s fear of an Egyptian-backed attempt by Urhi-Teshub to reclaim his throne was the impetus for the formation of the Egyptian-Hittite treaty. Given Egypt’s failure in the recent past even to secure Kadesh and Amurru to itself, however, it seems improbable that Urhi-Teshub’s presence in Egypt could have been the driving force behind such a treaty.

119 For an in-depth discussion of the strained relations between Hatti and Assyria at this time due to Assyrian aggression in northern Syria, see Rowton 1959; Bryce 1999: 280–284.
anti-Hittite treaty of their own, as they once had in the reign of Tutankhamun, the two empires together would pose a formidable challenge to Hatti’s supremacy in Syria. By neutralizing Egypt in a treaty of brotherhood, however, Hattusili III would be free to concentrate solely upon Assyrian aggression.120

The peace between Egypt and Hatti was eventually celebrated by the marriages of not one, but two, Hittite princesses to Ramesses II.121 Moreover, it was further cemented by the initiation of a lively diplomatic correspondence in which even the royal wives and children participated.122 Topics discussed in the letters included the first marriage alliance,123 the possibility of royal visits,124 the whereabouts

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120 Interestingly, the Assyrian king had himself proposed a treaty of brotherhood to Hattusili III or his immediate predecessor, but the offer was rejected contemptuously (Rowton 1959: 10–11; Bryce 1999: 283–284). Although such a peace could have halted hostilities on Hatti’s southeastern flank, it would presumably have meant that Hatti would have had to surrender claims on Syrian territory that the Hittites regarded as rightfully theirs. Also, as Bryce (1999: 304–305) points out, Hattusili III may have realized that a treaty with Egypt, the older, more illustrious power, brought with it significantly more glory than peace with a powerful upstart. Indeed, the Hittite public may well have been inclined to interpret any concessions to Assyria as weakness. Likewise, a recent, rather scathing aspersion on Hattusili’s legitimacy by the Assyrian king (KBo VIII 14, CTH 216; = AHK 1 no. 5, 24–25, obv. 10; Bryce 1999: 305) must have further inflamed tensions.

121 The first marriage took place in Ramesses’ 32nd year (cf. KRI II, 244: 7–256: 4; KRI II, 256: 8–257: 16), and, as will be discussed at length below, the troop commander of Tjaru served as an escort for the bride on her journey to Egypt. The date of the purported second marriage (KRI II, 283: 3–6), however, is unknown (see Kitchen 1982: 88–89, 92, 94–95, 110). A distant memory of these lavish and exotic nuptials may be preserved in the Bentresh stele (Louvre C.284; KRI II, 285: 3–5), which tells of Ramesses II’s marriage to a foreign princess from a rich and powerful land (Spalinger 1977–1978: 11–16).

122 In excavations of the Hittite royal archives, archaeologists discovered the remains of more than 100 letters sent between the Egyptian and Hittite courts during the reign of Ramesses II and Hattusili III. Hattusili’s queen was especially active in the marriage negotiations. For examples of letters penned by members of the royal family other than the kings, see KUB XXI 381; KBo XXVIII 44; CTH 158 (= KBo XXVIII 23); CTH 167 (KBo I 29 + KBo IX 43); CTH 169 (= KUB III 70); CTH 176 (= KUB XXI 38); Singer 1983: 5; Beckman 1996: 125–129, no. 22a–c, E; Bryce 1999: 356–357. Of the few Egyptian envoys of whose identities we are relatively certain, one was a troop commander at Tjaru and later a viceroy of Nubia (KRI III, 79: 15–80: 1), another a troop commander at Tjeku (Edel 1948: 21; 1976: 96), and a third was a vizier (KRI III, 65: 9).


of Hattusili’s nephew,\textsuperscript{125} medical matters,\textsuperscript{126} and the growing danger of famine in Hittite lands.\textsuperscript{127} Relations between the two superpowers, with the exception of an occasional epistolary squabble,\textsuperscript{128} remained amicable until the collapse of the Hittite empire amidst the chaotic conditions of the twelfth century.

Merneptah, Ramesses II’s thirteenth son, inherited an empire from his father that was largely unplagued by threats of Hittite incursions. Relations between the two empires were so congenial, in fact, that Merneptah shipped grain to the Hittites in order to help stave off the country’s famine, which had only worsened since his father’s time.\textsuperscript{129} This did not mean, however, that all was peaceful in the Egyptian realm. In year five, Merneptah was forced to repel an invasion of Libyans and their seafaring allies; this battle will be discussed at length in the section of this chapter pertaining to Libya. Even more unsettling, however, was a Canaanite revolt that occurred prior to the Libyan invasion or perhaps simultaneously with it.

\textsuperscript{125} As Urhi-Teshub was, technically, the rightful occupant of the Hittite throne, his long sojourn in Egypt was a topic of much discussion. See CTH 156 (= KBo I 15 +); CTH 166 (= KBo I 24 + KUB III 84); CTH 176 (= KUB XXI 38); CTH 172 (= KBo I 10 + KUB III 72); Wouters 1989; Beckman 1996: 126, no. 22D, 22E; Bryce 1999: 289–291, 309–310.

\textsuperscript{126} KBo XXVIII 30; CTH 155 (= KUB III 22 + KBo XXVIII 3); CTH 163 (= KUB III 67); CTH 164 (= KUB III 66); CTH 170 (= KUB III 51); Edel 1976: 46–50, 82–91; Beckman 1996: 131–132, no. 22G; Bryce 1999: 313, 336. The Bentresh stele (Louvre C.284; KRI II, 285: 6–286: 6) preserves a late tale in which an Egyptian doctor is sent to cure a foreign princess in the reign of Ramesses II. Although the tale is fantastic, Egypt did indeed regularly export medical practitioners for diplomatic purposes during the New Kingdom (see Spalinger 1977–1978: 11).

\textsuperscript{127} KUB XXI 381 17–18; Klengel 1974; Singer 1983: 4–5. The persistent lack of rain in Hatti is also mentioned in the Egyptian record of the first Hittite marriage as one of the factors that drove the Hittite king to “plead” for peace with Egypt (KRI II, 10–12).

\textsuperscript{128} See CTH 155 (= KUB III 22 + KBo XXVIII 3); CTH 176 (= KUB XXI 38); Beckman 1996: 126–127; Goetze 1947; Bryce 1999: 305.

\textsuperscript{129} KRI IV, 5: 3. For the effect of this drought on Hatti, see Heltzer 1988: 15; Bryce 1999: 356–357, 364–365. Egypt also seems to have maintained good relations with Ugarit, a Hittite vassal, as there is evidence for commercial contact between the two nations at this time (Astour 1981: 25; Klengel 1992: 117). Likewise, a sword bearing Merneptah’s cartouche was found in the destruction level at Ugarit, although it is highly doubtful that the weapon indicates the participation of the Egyptian military, as some have suggested (Wainwright 1960: 25; Helck 1962: 304). More likely, the sword had arrived at the city as a diplomatic gift or a luxury item (see Astour 1981: 26).
Until relatively recently, information concerning the troubles in Canaan was gleaned almost solely from a short hymn engraved on a stele that was primarily concerned with Merneptah’s Libyan victory. The relevant lines are as follows: “Wasted is Tjehenu. Hatti is pacified. Plundered is the Canaan with every evil. Carried off is Ashkelon. Seized upon is Gezer. Yenoam is made as a thing not existing. Israel is desolated; his seed is not. Kharu is become a widow for Egypt. All lands are united; they are pacified” (KRI IV, 19: 3–9). The boasts of Egypt’s supremacy over Tjehenu, Hatti, Canaan, and Kharu are generalized enough to be passed off as simple rhetoric, although Merneptah is known to have triumphed over Libyan forces, and the Hittite empire was indeed no longer a threat. The presence of specific toponyms (i.e., Ashkelon, Gezer, and Yenoam) as well as the tribal name of Israel, however, is what has drawn special attention to the hymn.

While some scholars have dismissed the poem as bearing little or no historical merit, three important factors have convinced the majority to take the hymn seriously. First, Merneptah in his Amada stele is given the epithet “subduer of Gezer” (KRI IV, 1: 9). Second, the appearance of the name Israel is unprecedented in Egyptian records. And third, four battle scenes at Karnak—previously thought to belong to the reign of Ramesses II—have recently been reassigned to Merneptah.

The Karnak scenes have long been dated to Ramesses II on the basis of three factors: their proximity to a copy of the Hittite peace treaty, the appearance of Ramesses II’s name on a band of text below the cornice, and the presence of an Egyptian prince named Khaemwase. As Yurco has demonstrated, however, two of the scenes appear to have been carved over a previously existing depiction of the battle of Kadesh, which would account both for their proximity

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130 Although the city of Gaza could at times be referred to as $\partial \text{ kn}\dot{n}$, scholars are unanimous in interpreting “the Canaan” in this context as the Palestinian province of “Canaan,” or $\text{ kn}\dot{n}$ (see the discussion in Yurko 1986: 190).
131 An impressive body of literature has grown up around the versification of this hymn, concentrating primarily upon exactly which elements stand in opposition to one another (Ahlstrom and Edelmann 1985; Stager 1985; Yurco 1986; 1990; Emerton 1988; Ahlström 1991; Bimson 1991; Hasel 1994: 47–51; 1998: 260–271). For our purposes, however, only the relatively specific people and place names are of interest.
132 See Yurco 1986: 190–191, n. 7; and especially Hasel 1998: 179, n. 179 for an extremely thorough synopsis of the nature of the debate and the major scholars who have either denied or affirmed the historicity of the victory hymn.
to the treaty and for the presence of Ramesses II’s name. Likewise, although a prince named Khaemwase is otherwise unattested among Merneptah’s brood, this was the name of the king’s own blood brother. As such, Khaemwase would have been a fitting moniker for one of the royal children. Facts fitting an assignment specifically to Merneptah’s reign include the presence of this king’s name in associated texts—previously thought to be secondary additions—and the fact that Ashkelon is numbered among the besieged towns.

Of the three scenes depicting an assault upon a fortified town, Ashkelon is in fact the only one specifically named. Yurco has suggested, however, that based on the victory hymn, the two other towns likely represented Gezer and Yenoam. Further, he argues that the fourth scene, which depicts Merneptah fighting a seemingly nomadic population, illustrates a campaign mounted against the still migratory people of Israel.

That the Israelites, if this is indeed the correct identification of these people, are specifically depicted wearing the long galibiyah-type robes common to Canaanites is an important point. Kilt-wearing Shasu appear also among the prisoners associated with these campaigns, and references in the text allude to their subjection. Due to the association of the Shasu with a toponym incorporating the name Yahweh, the Israelites have often been thought to have

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134 The reassignment of these scenes to Merneptah has been accepted by scholars such as Schulman (1977–1978: 125, n. 32), Stager (1985), Singer (1988a: 2), Rainey (1991: 56), Kitchen (1993a: 304–305; 1993b: 38–42), and Fisher (2001: 99). Redford (1986b: 188–200; 1992: 275, n. 85; 2000: 4–5; followed by Sourouzian 1989: 150 and Higginbotham 2000: 30) adamantly disagrees with the redating, citing among other reasons that the name of the royal horse team is identical with one of Ramesses II’s teams. However, given the degree to which Ramesses III emulated Ramesses II—down to the names of his children and even his chariot team (!)—it is not impossible that Merneptah would have been likewise inspired to imitate his famous father in ways both large and small.

135 KRI II, 167: 4 and, perhaps KRI II, 167: 11; see Kitchen 1993: 41. The scenes in this relief are a close copy of Seti I’s Shasu prisoner relief, and the long rhetorical text to the right of the prisoner-binding scene is a duplicate of Seti’s (Yurco 1986: 209). These suspicious similarities, when taken together with the lack of any scene depicting Merneptah assaulting the Shasu, cannot help but throw doubt upon the historicity of a campaign against the Shasu in the reign of Merneptah.

136 The toponym is found in Amenhotep III’s Soleb list (Giveon 1964: 244, no. A. 2) as well as in Ramesses II’s copy of this list at Amara West (KRI II, 217: 10, no. 96).
emerged from a Shasu milieu. Yurco has explained the appearance of the Shasu among the prisoners, however, as indicating either a separate campaign—led perhaps by a crown prince—or simply that Merneptah’s foes had hired Shasu men as mercenaries.

With the exception of the appearance of the Shasu-warriors among Merneptah’s prisoners, the Karnak relief adds no new information to that already provided by the victory stele. What is of particular importance in both documents, however, is the designation of Ashkelon as an object of Merneptah’s wrath. The other two towns, Yenoam and Gezer, had been periodic irritants to Egypt since the reigns of Thutmose III and Thutmose IV respectively (see chapter three). Moreover, both Merneptah’s father and his grandfather had already campaigned at Yenoam, suggesting that the town was something of a hub for anti-Egyptian activity in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Ashkelon, however, was located barely 20 km north of Gaza along the Via Maris. Egyptian troops stationed at Gaza could reach the town in an easy day’s march. The very fact that this polity would even contemplate a revolt indicates that something had gone fundamentally wrong in Egypt’s maintenance of its northern empire. Heretofore Ashkelon had been a loyal, even a groveling, vassal.

The text glossing the attack on Ashkelon reads: “The despicable town which his majesty carried off, it having been bad: Ashkelon. It says ‘happy is he who is loyal to you and woe is he who transgresses your boundaries’” (KRI II, 166: 2–3). Presumably, Ashkelon would never have attempted insurrection had Egypt been in full fighting form. Even though inscriptive evidence suggests that Egyptian campaigns into Syria-Palestine had been few and far between in the half-century or so since the Hittite peace treaty, archaeological evidence clearly demonstrates that the imperial government had taken an unprecedented, hands-on approach to managing their northern territories in this interim.

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139 The letters of Yidya, a ruler of Ashkelon in the Amarna Period, are among the most obsequious in the entire Amarna archive (EA 320–326).
It may well be, then, that the only window of opportunity Ashkelon discovered for rebellion was at the time of the joint attack mounted upon Egypt by the Libyans and the Sea People.\textsuperscript{140} As will be discussed below, this thrust from the west resulted in more than 6,000 dead and 9,000 captives among the Libyans and their allies alone. Such a dramatic invasion of the western Delta surely would have been of sufficient magnitude to absorb almost all of the Egyptian army’s attention at that time. Thus, Ashkelon may have counted either upon the success of the invaders or upon the conflict weakening Egypt enough that it would be forced to turn its eyes inward for the foreseeable future.

Whether or not such a scenario would indicate actual Sea People presence in Ashkelon or perhaps an active alliance with these maritime raiders is another question. Ashkelon would eventually become a Philistine capital, and Sea People settlement in the town is first archaeologically visible in the Twentieth Dynasty.\textsuperscript{141} Given Ashkelon’s coastal setting and the fact that in the reign of Ramesses III the Sea People mounted an attack on Egypt from the east, such cooperation is an intriguing possibility.

At the very least, due to the town’s proximity to Egypt, the inhabitants of Ashkelon would have been well apprised of the events on Egypt’s western border and certainly could have capitalized on the distraction of their overlord.\textsuperscript{142} Indeed, the opportunity to rebel was

\textsuperscript{140} Kitchen (1993a: 305) suggests that the revolt might have taken place at Ramesses II’s death, but this would still seem a rather bold move for towns located so close to Egypt’s borders.


\textsuperscript{142} Alternatively, or perhaps additionally, Ashkelon may have relied for support on Gezer—Egypt’s gateway to the hill country—and Jerusalem. Ashkelon and Gezer are reported to have aided the same cause in a war against Jerusalem during the Amarna Period (EA 287: 14–16). Likewise, although it remains pure speculation, it is tempting to suggest that the people of Israel were encountered in the hill country east of Gezer (Singer 1988a: 4; Yurco 1997: 30). It is precisely this area in
not lost upon Lower Nubia, an area just as vulnerable to Egyptian invasion as southern Canaan. News of Wawat’s rebellion reached Merneptah on the very same day as he had marshaled all his forces to fight the Libyans and the Sea People. 143

Unfortunately for Ashkelon, as well as for Yenoam, Gezer, and the people of Israel (not to mention the inhabitants of Lower Nubia), Merneptah and his forces emerged victorious from their battle with the Libyans and the Sea People. In fact, the ranks of the Egyptian army may potentially even have swelled following it, due to the prodigious numbers of prisoners of war captured in the conflict. Reestablishing order in the rebellious Canaanite towns and among unruly nomads must have seemed like small potatoes for the Egyptian army in comparison to stanching a full-scale invasion. Indeed, as various authors have suggested, Merneptah’s failing health may even have prompted him to delegate leadership of the punitive Canaanite expeditions to others. 144

The limited excavation of Late Bronze Age levels at Ashkelon and the debates over the location of Yenoam have unfortunately rendered it impossible to determine whether Egyptian bases were erected at these towns following their conquest. As will be discussed below, however, certain scholars have identified contemporary buildings at Gezer as administrative headquarters. Certainly, the presence of a monumental stone block inscribed with hieroglyphic text at Gezer might well indicate that the Egyptians established a base at the town in order to discourage further insurrection.

Archaeological evidence for the three ephemeral rulers who finished out the Nineteenth Dynasty in the fifteen years or so following Merneptah’s death is, not surprisingly, hard to come by. None of these monarchs left record of a Syro-Palestinian campaign. 145 Moreover,
given Egypt’s internal troubles, it would be surprising if loyal troops could have been spared at home or supported abroad.

Egypt may, however, have retained its garrisons or administrative outposts in at least two southern Canaanite towns. Fragments from vessels impressed with the cartouches of Seti II have been found associated with the administrative headquarters at both Tell el-Far‘ah South and Haruba site A–289. The names of Seti II, his wife Queen Tawosret, and Siptah, however, are otherwise evidenced solely upon a few scarabs and a faience vase found in a temple at the Transjordanian site of Deir ‘Alla.

Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for Nineteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

Between Seti I’s Karnak relief, P. Anastasi I, and the Late Egyptian Miscellanies, the volume of textual evidence pertinent to fortresses and administrative headquarters skyrockets in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Moreover, the archaeological evidence for the presence of these same institutions exhibits a similar explosion in volume. Whereas only a few Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian bases have been identified in Syria-Palestine to date, at least eleven such structures, and probably more, are discovered in Nineteenth Dynasty levels. Clearly, a very important shift in imperial policy took place between the two dynasties. It is curious, then, to find more similarities than differences in the information that the texts of these two periods convey.

Border-fortresses

With respect to the htm-fortresses that guarded and effectively “sealed off” Egypt’s immediate periphery, all but the fort that monitored the Wadi Hammamat transit corridor had already been evidenced in

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for instruction in weaving and perhaps other matters as well (P. Gurob III.1 rt.; Wente 1990: 36; Sauneron and Yoyotte 1950: 67). It is not stated whether Seti II had acquired the women from Syria-Palestine, Nubia, or Libya. Syrians appear, however, to have been regarded as excellent weavers by the Egyptians (Drower 1980: 482). Likewise, although these human chattel may well have been acquired on campaign, they certainly could also have been drawn from Syro-Palestinians resident in Egypt or have even been purchased by the pharaoh himself (cf. EA 369).

146 For Tell el-Far‘ah, see KRI IV, 242: 10; Macdonald et al. 1932: pl. 61 and 64, no. 74. For Haruba site A-289, see Goldwasser 1980; Oren 1987: fig.7.

147 For the scarabs, see Ward 1966: 176; Singer 1988a: 4. For the faience vase, see Singer 1988a: 4.
the Eighteenth Dynasty. Tjaru continued to produce and export wine, as well as to serve as the launching point for various pharaonic campaigns. Officials at Tjeku, which was termed both a htm- and a sgr-fortress in different inscriptions, regulated passage along the Wadi Tumilat with the aid of Medjay desert scouts. Further, the overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea received shipments of slaves from Syria-Palestine and exported goods such as wool and fish.

Many of these htm border-fortresses shared features in common. The names of the installations in their “formal” form, for example, were composed according to a strict formula, namely “the htm-fortress of [regnal name X] which is at [toponym Y].” The far more common employment of traditional toponyms (such as “Tjaru” and “Tjeku”) in the texts, however, indicates that the shorter regional name was preferred in daily usage. As a rule, htm-fortresses were also most often supervised by overseers of htm-fortresses (imy-r htm) or troop commanders (hry pdt), although most individuals likely bore both titles. Stationed under these commanders were not only resident garrison troops but also scribal administrators as well as the Medjay-scouts who patrolled the surrounding desert for signs of fugitives.

Both Tell Heboua I (Tjaru-see figure 9) and Tell er-Retabah (Tjeku-see figure 33)—the sole archaeologically explored northern htm-fortresses—were once quintessential fortress-towns. Thick, bastioned walls enclosed an area that was at both sites well over 65,000 m² and tightly packed with administrative buildings, storage facilities, a temple, a residency, and numerous habitations. The population of both centers must have been comparable to or have exceeded the populations of major regional towns elsewhere in Egypt, and it is likely that this was by official design. Ever since the First Intermediate Period, if not before, pharaohs had recognized that a well-populated border zone is far less vulnerable to foreign penetration than a sparsely settled one. The presence of robust fortress-towns right at Egypt’s major points of entry, then, would no doubt have discouraged any would-be eastern invaders.

For the purposes of this study, it is particularly interesting that similarly sized administrative buildings were erected at both Tell Heboua I (Tjaru) and Tell er-Retabah (Tjeku) in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Although the “Great House” at Tell er-Retabah and the BAT II building at Tell Heboua I possessed different floor plans, both were roughly 18 × 18 m in area and were identified by their excavators as the most important administrative or residential
building yet excavated at that site. Further, it is likely in both cases that architectural elements carved with Egyptian hieroglyphs had once fronted the entrance to the building. While the jambs at Tell er-Retabah provide the name and titles of a troop commander (ḥry ḫḏl) and overseer of foreign lands (ḥmr ḥswt), the jambs at Tell Heboua I bore Seti I’s cartouche.

The reason these two buildings merit special remark is that this type of structure seems to have served as the model for the “residences” erected at numerous venues across Canaan. Square, unfortified, and often utilizing inscribed stone blocks as architectural features, such headquarters seem to have served the purposes of Egyptian officials stationed throughout Syria-Palestine. It is a testament to the largely subdued nature of southern Canaan, in fact, that it would be these buildings, and not the massive walls that enclosed them at Tell er-Retabah and Tell Heboua I, that Egypt exported to Syria-Palestine in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Fortified way stations

Textual and archaeological data are also plentiful with regard to the ten or so fortified way stations that according to Seti’s Karnak relief and P. Anastasi I punctuated the 220 km route from the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru to the ḥmr-town of Gaza. The number of these installations—when viewed in conjunction with the length of the route—strongly suggests that the way stations were situated at a day’s journey from one another. Indeed, this supposition has largely been confirmed via an archaeological survey undertaken by a team from Ben Gurion University. According to the findings of this team, clusters of intensive New Kingdom occupation along the northern Sinai were generally discovered at intervals of some 15 to 20 km.

Judging from the relief, some of the texts, and the aridity of the region in general, it appears likely that one of the main purposes of these fortified way stations was to safeguard important water sources. Certainly, it is notable that even unfortified wells were nonetheless provided with troop commanders to assure their safety. By controlling all available water sources of any significance along this northern Sinai route, the Egyptians possessed the power to dictate just which humans and animals were allowed to cross the Sinai.

Although not highlighted in art or text, a substantial granary complex discovered at Bir el-ʿAbd was likely also a feature typical of these northern Sinai way stations. Given that food was as scarce a
resource as water along the barren coastline, a secondary purpose of the forts was likely to replenish the foodstuffs of authorized passersby. With victuals and drink provided at regular intervals, imperial functionaries could expect to travel at a fast clip across the Sinai littoral. Indeed, considering the increasingly restless and bold behavior of Shasu bedouin in the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth Dynasties, the construction of these complexes to safeguard personnel, foodstuffs, and water sources may have been a particularly wise precaution.

It is unfortunate that none of the excavated Egyptian installations along the main body of the Ways of Horus can be definitively identified with the named forts in the Karnak inscription or in P. Anastasi I. Tell el-Borg (see figure 36), which might possibly be included among the way stations, is perhaps a correlate to the Dwelling of the Lion, as its excavator suggests. The location of the fortress, roughly 6 km from Tell Heboua I, seems rather close for comfort, however, and in any case the plan of this fort is too fragmentary for much more than its general outlines to be observed. Of far more interest, due to their greater preservation, are two further fortified compounds, namely Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A-289 (see figure 34). These installations, rather uniquely in the Egyptian repertoire, fall in an intermediate position between fortress-towns (such as Tell er-Retabah and Tell Heboua I) and the administrative buildings or residencies characteristic of emplacements farther to the north.

Archaeologically, not only are the two excavated bases quite similar to one another, but the plan of each also corresponds closely to the schematic renderings on the Karnak relief. While Haruba site A-289 extended 50 × 50 m in area and Bir el-‘Abd occupied only 40 × 40 m, both installations were square and fortified. Further, Bir el-‘Abd demonstrably possessed a rectangular reservoir like those associated with the forts in the relief. Uniquely, however, the excavations allowed an x-ray view behind the thick outer walls visible in the relief. The exposed interior plans revealed a good number of administrative and storage-related buildings, all clustered closely around a central plaza.

Like the htm border-fortresses, each fort along the Ways of Horus apparently had both a formal name, which incorporated the throne

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148 Hoffmeier, forthcoming.
name of the reigning king, and an informal name. The latter, often Semitic in origin, was frequently also the locally employed toponym by which the well and later the fort itself came to be known. According to the lists in the Karnak relief and in P. Anastasi I, the way stations themselves may have been designated by a wide variety of vocabulary. Architectural terms as various as “‘t,” “bhn,” “nhtw,” and “mkdr” were all employed in the formal names of installations that—judging from artistic and archaeological evidence—do not seem to have differed substantively from one another in form or function.

It is difficult to know, then, how to interpret the variability in the terms employed. The degree to which a “migdol” really differed from a “nhtw-stronghold” in the ancient Egyptian mind is simply not known. It is, however, notable from a perusal of fort names that the Egyptians also made a valiant attempt to vary the regnal name as often as possible. Thus, one compound is identified as “the nhtw-stronghold of Menmaatre,” while yet another is called “the nhtw-stronghold of Seti Merneptah.” The scribes responsible for naming and keeping track of the business affairs of all of these way stations, then, apparently made liberal use of loose synonyms for “fort” and of variants of the king’s own throne name in order effectively to distinguish one way station from the next in their records. Strict semantic accuracy was thus in this particular instance sacrificed in favor of administrative clarity.

As a postscript, it is undoubtedly significant that despite this seemingly profligate employment of near synonyms, the term “htm” does not appear in a formal name east of Tjaru, nor is the term “mnnw” ever demonstrably utilized with respect to these way stations. This, I would argue, is due to the fact that both htm and mnnw had very specific definitions (as “border-fortress” and “fortress-town” respectively) that could not be utilized to describe the northern Sinai way stations. Of the various synonyms that were employed, however, the most interesting is “nhtw.” According to Ramesses II, various transplanted foreigners were resettled in nhtw-strongholds, some of which may have been located along the Sinai. The use of nhtw-strongholds to house foreigners is likewise paralleled in the reigns of Thutmose III and Ramesses III, as will be discussed at length in chapter six.

Administrative headquarters as known through excavation
While Egypt’s border-fortresses and its fortified way stations were built to withstand siege, in Canaan archaeological evidence suggests
that Egyptian-style bases were never walled. Indeed, most consisted solely of one or two Egyptian-style buildings—the majority of which tended to be square, to possess thick walls, and to hover between 18 and 25 m to a side. Although the Egyptians evidently found it advisable to guard their borders with strong fortress-towns and to protect stores of food and water along the Sinai with fortified way stations, elaborate defensive measures were evidently not deemed necessary in Canaan. This fact, although surprising at first blush, becomes less remarkable when one considers that by the time the Egyptians began consistently to construct their own bases in the territory, they had already been administering it for 250 years.

Although Egyptian bases erected north of the Ways of Horus were qualitatively different constructions from the Sinai forts, the government appears to have retained the idea that each compound should be situated a day’s journey from its nearest neighbor. From Gaza one could travel along the Via Maris in one day to Ashdod (see figure 41), in a second to Gezer (see figure 43), and in a third to Aphek (see figure 44). Shorter distances separated Ashdod from Tel Mor (see figure 42) and Aphek from Jaffa, as both bases along the Via Maris were closely associated with harbor towns. The other Egyptian headquarters were located in wadis heavily utilized by bedouin among others (i.e., Tell el-Faraḥ [see figure 38], Tel Sera’ [see figure 39], and Tell el-Hesi [see figure 40]) or along an important long-distance trade route (Beth Shan [see figures 45 and 46]).

It is worthwhile, by way of summary, briefly to outline the salient features of these administrative headquarters in the order that each might have been encountered by an Egyptian messenger on his travels. The closest to home was Deir el-Balah (see figure 35), which due to its thick walls, bastions, square reservoir, and location along the Ways of Horus has often been mistaken for one of the way stations celebrated on Seti’s Karnak relief. Deir el-Balah’s position between Gaza and Raphia, however, is proof positive that its existence went unremarked by the authors of either P. Anastasi I or Seti’s Karnak relief. The reason for this apparent slight becomes clear when the architecture of Deir el-Balah is compared with that of either Bir el-‘Abd or Haruba site A–289.

The most obvious difference between Deir el-Balah and the excavated way stations is that—at only 20 m to a side—Residency II constituted a single building and not a walled complex of four times that size at minimum. Indeed, the architecture of Residency II
resembles closely the lightly fortified storehouses or residencies at Tel Mor and at Beth Shan level VII. Likewise, while the artifacts discovered at all three Sinai bases were predominantly Egyptian, it was Egyptian-style funerary objects that dominated the assemblage at Deir el-Balah! The strong mortuary bent to the material culture at the site suggests that Deir el-Balah may have been devoted primarily to the maintenance of a cemetery for Egyptians resident in the Sinai and in southern Canaan.

Just to the northeast of Deir el-Balah, the Egyptian bases of Tell el-Ajjul (see figure 38) and Gaza were located at the very end of the Ways of Horus highway. Situated several kilometers from each other, these two bases seem redundant, especially since textual evidence implies that in the Nineteenth Dynasty Gaza served as Egypt’s premier base in Canaan. Indeed, this may have been the opinion of the Egyptian government as well. The drastic reduction in the number of Egyptian-style artifacts in the Nineteenth Dynasty levels at Tell el-Ajjul suggests that the base may have been in the process of being phased out. Indeed, given that no inscriptions manifestly postdate Ramesses II, the resident garrison may even have been discontinued or relocated during the long reign of this king.

A more regular spacing for Egyptian bases seems to have been a day’s journey on foot from one to another. As mentioned above, Gaza, Ashdod, Gezer and Aphek were all located roughly 25 to 30 km from their nearest counterpart along the Via Maris. Of these bases, Gaza, of course, has never been precisely located. Those at Ashdod and Gezer, on the other hand, are primarily known from monumental architectural elements that had been anciently inscribed with hieroglyphic text. The doorjamb at Ashdod, for instance, preserved the title “fanbearer on the king’s right,” while the nb-sign at Gezer almost certainly comprised part of a royal titulary. Although neither was found in situ, archaeologists believe the blocks to have derived from specific monumental buildings at each site.

No similar carved architectural element has been discovered at Aphek, although it is significant that a “fanbearer on the king’s right” apparently occupied the main building at the site in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Aphek’s 18 × 18 m residency is virtually identical in pro-

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149 This is working on the assumption that scholars have been correct in identifying Haya with the Egyptian Huy.
portion to the administrative buildings at Tell er-Retabah and Tell Heboua I, and internally its plan is remarkably similar to the administrative headquarters at Tel Mor. A large amount of utilitarian “Egyptian” pottery and other Egyptian-style artifacts were discovered in and around the residency, along with items indicative of diplomatic correspondence, and the associated detritus of a wine-making industry.

The fanbearers on the king’s right who were apparently stationed at Ashdod and Aphek may have been responsible, as part of their duties, for overseeing affairs at a nearby port. Although situated on the Via Maris, Ashdod lay in close proximity to a tiny harbor town called Tel Mor. Likewise, Aphek enjoyed a similar relationship to Jaffà. From the Egyptian point of view, pairing these harbor towns with towns located on the Via Maris proper would have greatly facilitated trade and the transshipment of goods. It would also have allowed Egypt to enjoy a secure monopoly over the very few serviceable ports in southern Canaan.

At Tel Mor, the Egyptians constructed a 23 × 23 m bastioned storehouse or residency, the exterior of which resembled Residency II at Deir el-Balah. Internally, however, the building had a closer match in Aphek—likely indicating that both installations had been modeled after the plan of an Egyptian granary. To find an Egyptian-style storage facility in the port town of one of Egypt’s bases is not at all surprising, and there are likely numerous comparable buildings in Canaan that await discovery.

The northern equivalent to the intimate relationship of Ashdod and Tel Mor was that enjoyed by the towns of Aphek and Jaffà. The prefect of Ugarit, for example, sent a letter to the fanbearer at Aphek urging him to intercede on his behalf with an official stationed at the Egyptian granary at Jaffà. Judging from the paucity of detail provided in the letter, the fanbearer’s familiarity with the case was assumed, as was his ability to influence the official. Unfortunately, because the vast majority of ancient Jaffà is covered in modern habitation, neither the Egyptian granary nor any other Egyptian-style architecture has ever been discovered. Archaeologists did manage to locate Jaffà’s city gate, however, and found it emblazoned with the cartouches of Ramesses II.

Just as the sites along the Via Maris were spaced some 25 to 30 km from one another, a similar distance separated—from south to north—the bases of Tell el-Far’ah, Tel Sera’, and Tell el-Hesi.
Located on the ruins of Hyksos enclaves, these bases dominated three important east-west transit corridors through wadi systems in the Negev and southernmost Canaan. In a similar fashion to Tell er-Retabah, then, the residencies must have served primarily to monitor traffic. Moreover, given their isolated locales, it is likely that much of this traffic consisted of seminomadic herders and their flocks. As his Karnak relief and historical texts illustrate, Seti I encountered a great deal of hostile bedouin activity in his realm. By monitoring the wadis, then, Seti or his successors may have hoped to closely regulate the activity of potentially troublesome groups.

Of the three residencies, it is notable that the builders of both Tel Sera (at 25 × 25 m) and Tell el-Hesi (at 18 × 18 m) employed the same, and otherwise quite rare, method of protecting their brick foundations from water accumulation. Lamp and bowl foundation deposits were likewise discovered at both sites. These “invisible” similarities suggest that despite the variations in the internal plans of both buildings, the two Nineteenth Dynasty administrative headquarters—located a day’s walk from each other—had been built under identical auspices. Tell el-Far’ah (at 22 × 23 m), on the other hand, seems to have been modeled after Tell el-Ajjul, whose functions (and even perhaps whose name) it assumed in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Even such minutiae as the placement of Tell el-Ajjul’s storehouse in relation to its residency were carefully replicated at Tell el-Far’ah.

The last Egyptian base left to discuss is the most thoroughly excavated and, consequently, also the most fruitful for analysis. Erected in order to monitor trade and traffic across the Jordan River, Beth Shan possessed a repertoire of material culture that encompassed variations upon practically every Egyptian-style artifact or architectural type found in Canaan. The site incorporated one building, for instance, that had been constructed—like the residency at Tell el-Far’ah—on an Egyptian center-hall house model. Another building, this time located in Beth Shan’s administrative district, exhibited the square plan and thick walls common to many other residencies in Canaan. Likewise, to the southwest of this building lay a fortified storehouse or residency that bore parallels in its relatively compact size, massive walls, and bastioned exterior to structures at Deir el-Balah and Tel Mor.

Beth Shan’s town temple, on the other hand, while unique among Nineteenth Dynasty Egyptian bases, does possess close parallels not
only in Egyptian village chapels but also in the workmen’s chapel at Timna. Indeed, the fact that the Egyptians would have constructed a cultic building in the isolated mining settlement at Timna makes it quite likely that virtually every Egyptian base was associated with a religious institution of some sort. At certain bases, such as Tel Sera’, the Egyptians may have worshipped alongside Canaanites at local temples. Meanwhile, at others, like Beth Shan, new cultic facilities were likely constructed. Certainly, evidence for the worship of Anat at both Gaza and Beth Shan suggests that the Egyptian government may purposefully have attempted to promote the worship of deities that were common to both Egyptian and Canaanite pantheons.

Where it is possible to determine ethnic background from personal names, it seems that foreign officers were not infrequently drawn from the ranks of Egyptianized Canaanites, presumably because a fluency in both Egyptian and West Semitic was desirable. Even native Egyptians, however, appear routinely to have been stationed abroad for as long as six years at a stretch. During this time it seems likely that in addition to worshipping Canaanite deities, many Egyptians may have married locally. Certainly, there is evidence for the commanders of military bases passing on their office to their sons, inadvertently indicating perhaps their long-term affiliation with a particular place.

Significantly, Egyptian-style chapels may perhaps have been most important at sites at which Egyptians chose to be buried. In LB IIB Canaan there are only three cemeteries that are thought by most scholars to contain Egyptian burials: Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Far’ah, and Beth Shan. Naturalistic anthropoid clay coffin interments were found at all three of these cemeteries, while Egyptian-style funerary steles and shabtis were discovered at Deir el-Balah and Beth Shan. All of these items, as well as many others found at these three sites, specifically resonate with the Egyptian religious experience.

Administrative headquarters as known from texts

Although the archaeological record provides evidence of at least eleven administrative headquarters in the core of Egypt’s northern...
empire, the textual record is largely mute. An infrastructure composed of bases arrayed strategically along the major highways is never discussed. Instead, reference is made simply to Egyptian garrisons (iw’yt), which were usually under the control of troop commanders (ḥry pdt) who also served as overseers of garrison troops (imy-r iw’yt). As discussed above, these men occasionally bore the honorific title “fanbearer on the king’s right” as well. From their outposts, such officials maintained close contact with the Egyptian court and kept the king informed about events of importance in their region (iw). In this respect, these functionaries probably fulfilled much the same duties as their Eighteenth Dynasty counterparts.

Just where these overseers of garrison troops were based, however, is unclear. They may, like their counterparts in the Amarna archive, have moved frequently from trouble spot to trouble spot. On the other hand, given the large number of administrative headquarters that have been excavated in Canaan, it would appear likely that many of these men inhabited bases designed especially for their residency. What is remarkable is that the sudden visibility of administrative headquarters in the Nineteenth Dynasty is not in the least reflected in the terminology utilized to describe Syro-Palestinian bases. A bhyn in d–r–r–m is noted, but otherwise Egyptian headquarters are identified simply as dmiiw—the same generic word used for population centers anywhere in Egypt, the Near East, or Nubia.

In certain cases, as with towns (dmiiw) like Gaza, Jaffa, and Beth Shan, we are fortunate in possessing information in texts or through excavations that these centers were indeed imperial bases. The situation is similarly revealing with respect to a select number of royal towns (dmiiw) that the Egyptians renamed after the reigning pharaoh and administered directly. One of the most famous of these was Sumur, which the Egyptians held until Ramesses II’s defeat at the battle of Kadesh. Sumur had, of course, also enjoyed status as a royal town in the Amarna Period. The allure of Sumur in the Nineteenth Dynasty, as earlier, undoubtedly had to do with the convenient access it provided both to a prime harbor and a to mountain pass leading inland to the region of Kadesh.

Kumidi is another Amarna Period Egyptian base that occupied an extremely strategic position with respect to Kadesh, for it effectively regulated passage along the Biqa Valley. Many authors have thus suggested that Kumidi should be identified with “the town (dmii) of Ramesses Meryamun, which is in the Valley of the Cedar” as well.
as “the town (\textit{dmi}) of Ramesses in Upe.” According to a cuneiform letter, the town of Ramesses in Upe was the seat of an Egyptian governor (\textit{sakin mati}) in the reign of Ramesses II, just as it had been for a brief period of time in the reign of Akhenaten. Whether or not the Ramesside royal town was located at Kumidi itself, however, the \textit{sakin mati} in Upe must certainly have been stationed in its general vicinity.

While one Egyptian \textit{sakin mati} governed from the town of Ramesses in Upe in the reign of Ramesses II, another officiated from a second town named Ramesses, this time almost definitely located in Canaan. The majority of scholars place this royal town in Gaza, which is likely correct. Certainly, Gaza appears to have been a bustling hub of Egyptian activity in the Nineteenth Dynasty. As LB IIB Canaan had no shortage of administrative headquarters, however, there are indeed numerous other potential candidates for this town as well.

Two further royal towns are noted in texts contemporary with the Nineteenth Dynasty: “Merneptah Hotehpirmaat, which is in the district of \textit{ps i-r-m}” and Ramesses-nakht. Unfortunately, neither town can be securely located. The former toponym could plausibly be emended to read “Amurru.” Given that this polity once again became a Hittite protectorate following the Egyptian loss at Kadesh, however, the toponym, if correct, must have blandly designated the southern Lebanese coastal region rather than Amurru proper.

As for Ramesses-nakht, the border journal provides no information concerning its location. Nonetheless, an equation with Beth Shan is tempting. Archaeological remains indicate that Beth Shan was one of Egypt’s most important Canaanite bases at the time. Further, it may be significant that Beth Shan possessed a resident steward (\textit{imy-r pr}) in the Twentieth Dynasty, just as did Ramesses-nakht in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

From the textual information gathered generally, then, perhaps the most concise statement that can be abstracted is that the Egyptian empire in the Nineteenth Dynasty was divided into districts (\textit{ww}), each of which subsumed numerous towns (\textit{dmiw}). A troop commander, who doubled as an overseer of garrison troops, administered his district from a royal town or from a subsidiary headquarters. Moreover, communication between the Egyptian officials and the pharaonic court appears to have occurred with relative frequency, as garrison commanders were under contractual obligation to report all potentially valuable reconnaissance.
Persistent archaeological invisibility in the north of Egypt’s empire

It is a truism that archaeological and textual evidence, when examined together, compensate for each other’s weaknesses. In the case of Egypt’s Nineteenth Dynasty Syro-Palestinian bases, this is undoubtedly true. While plentiful archaeological information exists about administrative headquarters in the heart of Egypt’s empire (such as Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Ajjul, Tell el-Far’ah, Tel Sera’, Tell el-Hesi, Ashdod, Tel Mor, Gezer Aphek, Jaffa, and Beth Shan), the texts are largely silent. Conversely, with regard to Egypt’s northernmost territories, textual references abound, but no archaeological correlates can be identified. Textual evidence makes it clear that royal towns and at least one bēn were located to the north of Egypt’s empire. One of these bases was situated at Sumur, another likely in the Biqa Valley, and yet a third possibly on the Lebanese coast south of Sumur. The fact that these installations and the numerous others that the Egyptians must have occupied on the northern fringes of their empire are not archaeologically recoverable is likely due to one or perhaps two major factors.

The first, quite simply, is that extensive archaeological excavations have never been undertaken in Lebanon and southern Syria. Thus, were these regions subjected to the same intensity of fieldwork as has been undertaken in Israel, our impressions could be quite different. Two challenges for the archaeologist are paramount. First, Egyptian bases tend to be relatively small and so could easily be missed in selective excavations. Second, as savvy imperialists, the Egyptians erected their bases at the same geographic points that have been chosen by numerous subsequent political powers. For this reason, at harbors and other strategically crucial locales, Late Bronze Age Egyptian remains lie buried under the accumulated debris of many centuries or even millennia of habitation. The limited size of Egyptian installations and the layers and layers of ruins atop them have meant that even at sites at which Egyptian bases are known to be located, the buildings themselves elude discovery.

Alternatively or additionally, however, it may well be that the Egyptian government in fact made a conscious decision to invest heavily only in the core of its empire. Due to prohibitive transport costs, to a lack of faith in the stability of the region, or to a policy respecting the rights of allied northern kings to manage their own affairs, the Egyptians may have refrained from erecting permanent bases in these areas. Instead, it is highly probable that they preferred to follow their previous, tried-and-true, low-cost strategy of com-
mandeering resources and installations from local potentates on an “as needed” basis.

_Nineteenth Dynasty foreign policy_
What, then, can we regard as the fundamental shifts from the Eighteenth to the Nineteenth Dynasty in Egyptian foreign policy? With regard to the northern periphery of the Egyptian empire, there is in fact little evidence in either the archaeological or the textual record for such a shift. Business seems to have been carried out, with minor adjustments, in the Nineteenth Dynasty much as it had previously. The intensification of Egyptian investment in the province of Canaan, however, is obvious. To account for this phenomenon, a number of scholars have argued that Egypt stationed more personnel in Canaan than ever before in the Nineteenth Dynasty.\textsuperscript{151} And this may well be true. In the typical trajectory of empires, core governments tend to intensify their investment in peripheral territories as time progresses.\textsuperscript{152}

The fact that the shift from almost no archaeologically known bases in the Eighteenth Dynasty to a good many in the Nineteenth Dynasty is so dramatic, however, makes it likely that the intensification did not evolve gradually, but rather reflects a clear-cut policy decision on the part of the Egyptian government. It is argued in chapter four that this change from requisitioning local resources to constructing bases that would be essentially self-sufficient stemmed from an internal reform initiated by Horemheb. According to Horemheb’s Edict, this king reversed a policy initiated by Thutmose III, which had allowed the costs of royal processions to be displaced upon local mayors. From his reign forward—Horemheb promised—this abuse would be corrected, and the Egyptian government would thenceforth underwrite its own costs. Such a reform, if extended to the imperial territories, would be expected to result in the archaeological picture that is indeed evident in Nineteenth Dynasty Canaan. Egypt would, then, sponsor its own buildings and installations instead of co-opting them from local governors and thereby incurring disaffection.


Figure 28. Nineteenth Dynasty northern Sinai

Unlocated Egyptian bases = ḫm-fortress of the sea; 7 forts along the Ways of Horus

[]= Egyptian base
• = City or town

Site A-289

Red Sea

Mediterranean Sea
Figure 29. Nineteenth Dynasty Canaan
Figure 30. Nineteenth Dynasty northern Syria-Palestine

Unlocated Egyptian bases = the town of Ramesses Meryamun, which is in the Valley of the Cedar; the town of Ramesses in Upe; the town of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, which is in the district of p3 i-r-m
NINETEENTH DYNASTY

Textual References to Nineteenth Dynasty Northern Fortifications and Administrative Headquarters

Reign of Ramesses I

1. rmpt-sp 1 tpy šmw sw t 10 ḫm .. [r'-ms]-sw di ‘nh ḥt nhḥ hrw pw dd(t) in ḫy pdt imy-r ḫtm yṯ3 r-nṭy [di].i 3ḥt st3 50 r ḫṭq n imn-r’ n p3 bḥn (Strasbourg stele 1378; KRI I, 4: 2–3)

Regnal year 1, first month of Shomu, day 10 under the majesty of . . . [Rames]ses, given life forever and eternally. [On] this day, what was spoken by the troop commander and overseer of the ḫtm-fortress, Aia; to the effect that: “I [give] 50 arourae of arable land for the god’s-offerings of Amun-Re of the bḥn.”

Early in the first year of Ramesses I’s reign, an otherwise unknown overseer of a ḫtm-fortress named Aia publicly bequeathed parcels of his own land to various religious establishments. The stele that commemorated the donations is unfortunately damaged, but enough text remains to ascertain that he divided 74 arourae of land among three recipients. An aroura, the Greek term for the standard ancient Egyptian land measurement, is roughly two-thirds of an acre. To put things into perspective, then, a plot of land three to four arourae in area could easily be maintained by and support a family of five to eight individuals. Given this, Aia’s gift of three arourae of fields to the funerary foundation of a man named Hatiay (KRI I, 4: 4) should likely be understood as the bestowal of just enough land to support a funerary priest and his family. Aia’s allotment of 21 arourae for the establishment of his own mortuary cult (KRI I, 4: 4), on the other hand, represents a substantially less frugal endowment.

By far the most impressive of Aia’s donations, however, was the 50 arourae earmarked for the god’s-offerings of Amen-re of the bḥn. The word bḥn is generally translated as “villa” or “castle,” and

154 Wb. I, 471: no. 7; Caminos 1954: 141–142, 166, 344, 403, 411, 413; Meeks 1981: 128, no. 78.1352; 1982: 91, no. 79.0926; O’Connor 1972: 693–694; also the very nearly similar “mansion” (Gardiner 1947b: 204*; Faulkner 1986: 84).
155 Wb. I, 471: no. 6; Gardiner 1920: 113; 1947b: 204*; 1948a: 34; Caminos 1954: 38; 47; Badawy 1968: 527; Hayes 1951: 180. Other terms less frequently encountered than “castle” but essentially bearing the same connotation include “stronghold” (Badawy 1968: 446), “tower” (Badawy 1968: 446, 527), and “citadel” (Badawy 1968: 527; Meeks 1982: 91, no. 79.0926).
its meaning appears to vary substantially according to its context. In some cases it is quite clear that the word refers to a mansion or an estate belonging to a privileged individual\textsuperscript{156} or to a king.\textsuperscript{157} A \textit{bh\textbar n} belonging to a god is attested in the reign of Ramesses III, as discussed below. In other cases, however, the word, like its Hebrew cognate,\textsuperscript{158} may refer to a fortified building of some sort.\textsuperscript{159} A \textit{bh\textbar n} is found among the fortified way stations that dotted the Ways of Horus during the reign of Seti I (KRI I, 7: 5). Likewise, a \textit{bh\textbar n} of Mernephtah is attested in Syria-Palestine in the reign of Seti’s grandson (P. Anastasi III, vs. 5: 1–2).

Establishing just which type of \textit{bh\textbar n} was the recipient of Aia’s generosity, however, is a difficult endeavor. Given the fact that Aia was an \textit{imy-r htm}, and that there is no attestation of an equivalent title, such as \textit{imy-r bh\textbar n}, it may be that the particular fortress that Aia commanded was a \textit{bh\textbar n}-fortress. Likewise, Amun of the \textit{bh\textbar n} could well have been the resident deity to whom the fortress temple was dedicated. While this is indeed a possible scenario, the Egyptian usage of the word \textit{htm} is very specific, designating a border-fortress or a fortress specifically designed to regulate movement in or out of a particular area. In no known instance are \textit{htm} and \textit{bh\textbar n} employed as synonyms.

There is a further possibility that the \textit{bh\textbar n} of Amun, in this case, was an estate founded for the sole purpose of providing revenue to the god Amun. On the walls of Medinet Habu, Ramesses III boasted to Amun that he “built \textit{bh\textbar nw} in your name in Egypt (\textit{t3-mri}), in Nubia (\textit{t3-stt}), and likewise in the land of Syria-Palestine (\textit{t3-stt}). I taxed them for their \textit{b\textbar kw} every year, every town (\textit{dmi}) by its name, gathered together, bearing their tribute to bring them to your ka” (KRI V, 117: 13–14). Grandet cogently argues that these \textit{bh\textbar nw} (i.e.,

\textsuperscript{156} Wb. I, 471: no. 7; P. Anastasi IV, 3,7; 8,9; P. Lansing 9,1; 11,3; 12,1; Caminos 1956: plate 2A, lines 8 and 10.

\textsuperscript{157} See Wb. I, 471: no. 6; P. Anastasi II, 1, 1; 5, 5; Leiden V I (Gardiner 1947a: 52); Hayes 1951: 180; P. Leiden 348, vs. 6, 1–7 (Schulman 1964a: 109, no. 129).


\textsuperscript{159} The German word “Schloss,” offered as a definition for \textit{bh\textbar n} in the Worterbuch (Wb. I, 471), encompasses the exact same breadth of meaning. “Castle,” “palace,” “manor-house,” and “chateau” are all viable translations for the term (Messinger 1977: 926). Tukh el-Qaramus, a known \textit{bh\textbar n} of the Late Period, was indeed highly fortified (Quie 1999: 845–846).
which Ramesses III constructed in Egypt, Syria-Palestine, and Nubia in Amun’s name, should be equated with the Egyptian, Syro-Palestinian, and Nubian towns (dmiw) whose revenues the same king dedicated to Amun in P. Harris I (P. Harris I, List A 11: 11; 68a: 2). Thutmose III, of course, made a very similar gift of the revenues of three Syro-Palestinian towns to Amun after his first campaign of victory (Urk. IV, 664: 17–665: 3; 744: 3–8—see chapter three).

The equation between bhnw and dmiw in Ramesses III’s text may further imply that the towns or large settlements in question were viewed both symbolically and economically as the personal estate (bhn) of a particular deity. In his economic and administrative study of the Theban memorial temples, Haring interprets the bhnw of Medinet Habu as farms or estates, but not as specific buildings or settlements. Such an interpretation, however, fails to explain Ramesses III’s claim to have “built” (kw) the bhnw themselves.

Unfortunately, it hardly matters whether the bhn of Amun was a temple-estate or a fortress temple in attempting to ascertain just where the bhn was located. With regard to the first scenario, bhnw-estates are known to have been situated in Egypt’s imperial territories, on its border, and well within the heartland of Egypt proper. Given Aia’s profession as an overseer of a htm-fortress, however, it is reasonable to suppose that the bhn he patronized lay somewhere near Egypt’s border—whether in the eastern Delta, near the mouth of the Pelusiac, or in the first cataract zone.

It is in fact tempting to suggest that Aia may have been based at Tjaru, as he apparently felt no need to specify exactly which htm-fortress he commanded. As discussed in chapter four, it is evident that to the Egyptian public, Tjaru was perhaps Egypt’s most famous htm-fortress. Likewise, at least three former overseers of the htm-fortress at Tjaru, like Aia, also held the title troop commander (hry

162 A bhn of Syro-Palestinians (bhn n n3 hnyw) was apparently located in close proximity to a vineyard belonging to the Ramesseum (KRI II, 680: 7–12). Given the high regard in which Egyptians held Syro-Palestinians as vintners (see chapter three), it is likely that the inhabitants of the bhn toiled in the vineyard, having been assigned to this duty following capture in battle. If this was indeed the case, it is perhaps significant that the name of the chief vintner on one surviving ostracon is given as p3-hry-pdt (the troop commander—KRI II, 680: 12). Obviously, even well within the heartland of Egypt, troop commanders could be associated with bhn-buildings, which were themselves closely associated with the god Amun.
Also of potential significance for this hypothesis is the fact that a temple or estate (pr) of Amun at Tjaru is evidenced in a wine docket dating from the reign of Ramesses II (see below). On the other hand, as will be discussed below, textual sources also clearly attest to the presence of htm-fortresses, bhfn-buildings, and temples to the god Amun in Syria-Palestine and Nubia. Likewise htm-fortress overseers who do not specify their locales and those who also held the title hry pdt are by no means limited to Tjaru.

Reign of Seti I

1a. rnpt-sp l nsw-bity mn-m3’t-r’ p3 [fḏ] ir.n p3 ḫpš tr n [pr-‘3] ‘nh wd3 snb [n3] n ħrw n š3sw š3’ m p3 htm n ḳr mw r p3 k3n’n (Karnak relief; KRI I, 8: 8–9)

Regnal year 1 (of) the King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Menmaatre. The [destruction] which the strong arm of [pharaoh], l.p.h., made (among) [the] fallen ones of Shasu, beginning from the htm-fortress of Tjaru to Pa-Canaan.

As discussed in the historical summary above, the full extent of Seti I’s first campaign as pharaoh is unknown. The reliefs and associated texts commissioned by Seti to decorate the exterior of his hypostyle hall at Karnak, however, make it clear that the campaign included at least two hostile encounters with Shasu bedouin. These took place along the 220 km stretch of desolate coastal land known as the Ways of Horus, a route bookended by the Egyptian bases of Tjaru on the west and Gaza (or Pa-Canaan) on the east. These two fortress-
nineteenth dynasty

towns, and the ten other Egyptian bases that lay between, are all labeled and represented in a simple, pictographic manner in Seti’s relief (see figures 31 and 32). Each will be addressed separately in the sections below in an order progressing from west to east, according to their purported geographic positioning on the Karnak relief.

Interestingly enough, a satiric letter that was probably first composed during the reign of Ramesses II also lists various forts and wells situated along the Ways of Horus. This document, referred to here as P. Anastasi I—in honor of its longest extant copy—falls in the genre of didactic literature. Although the text superficially takes the form of a rather saucy missive sent by one scribe to another, within the often-humorous letter are thinly veiled math problems, vocabulary lists, and even geography lessons. Given its largely pedagogical content, as well as the fact that most of the transcribers of the text appear to have been scribal students, it is virtually certain that the letter had been deliberately composed as a teaching text.

One of the many goals of the author seems to have been to acquaint his audience, at least in passing, with the line of forts that spanned the northern Sinai military highway. In order to accomplish this task the writer not only listed each fort, one by one, but he also made sure to insult his correspondent’s lack of familiarity with its location and/or associated landmarks. In this manner, it must have been hoped, the student copying the text would familiarize himself with important details concerning the Ways of Horus highway. It is not surprising, then, that P. Anastasi I is often studied in parallel with Seti I’s relief, despite the fact that the former belongs to a literary genre and was composed in a subsequent

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167 The paleography of P. Anastasi I suggests that a Lower Egyptian scribe of the late Nineteenth Dynasty penned the papyrus (Gardiner 1911: 1). The original text, however, is believed to have been written at Pi-Ramesses during the opening years of Ramesses II’s reign (Gardiner 1911: 4; Brunner 1982: 676; Fischer-Elfert 1986: 261–270; Wente 1990: 98). For basic studies of the text, see Gardiner 1911 and Fischer-Elfert 1986.

168 The satiric letter is known from 5 papyri and 73 ostraca, most of the latter having been found at Deir el-Medina (Brunner 1982: 674–676). Even P. Anastasi I itself has corrections, at least some of which are thought to have been made by a teacher (Gardiner 1911: 1). Given the frequency with which this text was copied, it is estimated by Andrea McDowell that P. Anastasi I ranked fourth in popularity for school texts at Deir el-Medina (Andrea McDowell, “Teachers and Students in Deir el-Medina.” Talk presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the American Research Center in Egypt, Atlanta).
reign. In this examination, as well, the relevant sections of P. Anastasi I will be excerpted and discussed together with the various forts depicted in the Shasu relief. Other pertinent Nineteenth Dynasty documents, which shed significant light upon the string of bases along the Ways of Horus, will also be analyzed in tandem with Seti’s Karnak relief.

1b. PRI h[m-n trw] (Karnak relief; KRI I, 9: 15)

The h[m-fortress of Tjaru].

According to the Karnak relief depicting Seti’s campaign against the Shasu, the h[m-fortress of Tjaru quite literally straddled the border between the familiar, civilized world of Egypt and the barbarous regions beyond. In the artistic rendering, the fortress is directly adjacent to t3 dnit, a long, marshy, and crocodile-ridden waterway to which it was connected via a wide bridge. The word dnit is translated literally as “canal,” but as Gardiner pointed out in his 1920 study of the relief, the word also is related to the verb “to divide.” Thus, given that the canal in Seti’s relief divided Egypt from its northern territories, some modern scholars have adopted Gardiner’s translation of t3 dnit as “the dividing water.”

Indeed, whether or not Gardiner’s translation is technically correct, there is no question that to the Egyptian artist who drafted the Karnak reliefs, and presumably to his contemporaries as well, the canal delineated not only a political but also a very marked cultural border. To the east of this prominent feature, the artist depicted a tangle of wretched foreigners in strange garb, fomenting their futile hostilities. In diametrical opposition is the jubilant crowd of linen-clad priests and nobles that the artist depicted just west of the canal, assembled in an orderly fashion to provide the victorious king with an enthusiastic reception upon his return to Egypt. In quite blatant cosmological terms, then, “the dividing waters” separated the orderly world of Egypt from the chaos that lay beyond, and it was left to the border-fortress of Tjaru to regulate and restrict the passage between these two spheres.

169 Oren (1987: 73) has suggested that both the draftsman of the Karnak relief and the scribe who wrote P. Anastasi I worked from a single source, an “itinerary” of sorts. Given the significant variations in how the forts were designated, however, it would seem more likely that two separate master lists had been utilized.

170 Gardiner 1920: 104; see also Wb. V, 464–466.

Figure 31. Western Ways of Horus
(after Gardiner 1920: pl. 11)
Figure 32. Eastern Ways of Horus
(after Gardiner 1920: pl. 12)
Tjaru is unique among the numerous fortified strongholds illustrated in this relief in possessing an identified, excavated counterpart with which its artistic representation can be compared. According to Seti’s relief, the border-fortress of Tjaru consisted of a capacious walled area, which was connected via a bridge crossing over “the dividing water” to another more western installation.\textsuperscript{172} Although the equation between the $hbm$-fortress of Tjaru and the fortress excavated at Tell Heboua I is no longer in doubt,\textsuperscript{173} the major stumbling block for those trying to reconcile the relief with the exposed architecture has been the identity of $t3$ $dnit$. In the mind of the artist at least, this distinctive topographical feature and the fortress itself were intimately associated.

One notable feature of Tell Heboua I is that it appears to have been situated in the midst of an extensive system of paleolagoons, once watered by the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Indeed, this now defunct riverway has been reconstructed by at least one scholar to have flowed directly between Heboua I (the fortress of Tjaru) and Heboua II (a poorly explored agglomeration of domestic and mortuary installations).\textsuperscript{174} Could $t3$ $dnit$ have referred to this branch of the Nile, or even to the lagoons themselves? Both types of water sources would have been freshwater environments wherein the reeds and crocodiles depicted on Seti’s monument could flourish.\textsuperscript{175} Indeed, it is even possible that the eastern and western portions of the fortress complex on the Karnak relief should be interpreted as representing Heboua I and Heboua II.

The neat, linear appearance of $t3$ $dnit$ in the relief does not really pose a significant challenge to the above suggestions, given the

\textsuperscript{172} Only the eastern half of the complex is labeled, so it remains ambiguous whether Tjaru spanned both banks or was limited to the eastern installation. Given that the excavated fortress-town at Tell Heboua I appears to consist of a single walled structure, I am following the latter interpretation.

\textsuperscript{173} See chapter two.

\textsuperscript{174} Marcolongo (1992: fig. 1). Sneh and Weissbrod (1973: 59–61), on the other hand, reconstruct the course of the Pelusiac as running 8.5 km north of Heboua. The lagoons have been identified and studied by the geomorphologist Bruno Marcolongo (1992), who inspired Hoffmeier (1997: 185–187) to examine the area surrounding Tell Heboua I specifically. Hoffmeier found that Tjaru would indeed have been bordered by water in antiquity. For the nature of Heboua II, see Valbelle et al. 1992: 17.

\textsuperscript{175} In P. Anastasi IV, 15: 7, “bulti-fish of Tjaru” are listed amidst a number of supplies readied in preparation for the arrival of pharaoh. This type of fish inhabited the shallow, marshy lakes and canals of the Delta (Hoffmeier 1997: 186).
Egyptian artist’s propensity to privilege immediately recognizable and symbolic traits at the expense of strict realism. The choice of the labeling word “dnit” itself, which in other contexts clearly indicates a ditch or a canal, however, is somewhat troubling. The niceties of translation would suggest that $t3 \text{dnit}$ should in fact refer to a man-made canal, a suggestion that would also account for the very regular proportions of the waterway on Seti’s relief.

Due to a few intriguing textual references, scholars have long suspected the existence of an ancient frontier canal that connected the Mediterranean, the Ballah lake systems, and Lake Timsah for purposes of defense, transportation, and irrigation. It was not until the 1970s, however, that a candidate for such a canal was discovered. By closely examining satellite photographs, a team of scholars identified several disconnected traces of a canal that did indeed appear to run the length from the Mediterranean to Lake Timsah. Like $t3 \text{dnit}$, this canal was highly regular, maintaining a consistent 70 m width for much of its course. Although this finding would seem to strengthen the case for $t3 \text{dnit}$ being equated with such an important frontier canal, satellite photos reveal that 6 km separated the canal from Tell Heboua I. This fact frustrates those who wish to read the Karnak relief literally and situate the canal in direct proximity to Tjaru.

The key to the proper interpretation of Seti’s relief, however, may lie precisely in the Egyptian artist’s desire to render the maximum amount of information in the most aesthetic and recognizable form possible. It would be surprising indeed if the Egyptian artist who drafted the scene—presumably himself based in Thebes—ever visited Tjaru. More likely, the artist was charged with the task of conveying the idea of Tjaru, a border-fortress located in close proximity

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178 See Shea 1977: 33–35; Oren 1984b: 8–10, and especially Hoffmeier 1997: 164–172 for extremely thorough discussions of the history of investigation, purported discovery, and controversies surrounding this so-called eastern frontier canal. For a much more skeptical view of the canal’s relations to Tell Heboua, see Redford (1998: 48–49, no. 19), who follows Mumford in suggesting that $t3 \text{dnit}$ may simply have been a local canal that connected two nearby lagoons.
180 Hoffmeier 1997: 186.
to the waterway that officially demarcated the Delta from the desert wasteland of the Sinai beyond. Whether Tjaru was situated directly adjacent to it or a few kilometers away may have been immaterial to the artist, whose main concern would have been to communicate to his audience the fact that Tjaru did, indeed, represent the official boundary of Egypt.

The plan of Tell Heboua I, as it is known, has been discussed in chapter two and will be revisited below with regard to refurbishments and new construction undertaken in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Due to the extreme stylization of the Karnak relief, there is very little to pinpoint in terms of correspondences between the artistic rendering and the archaeology.\(^{181}\) It is worth noting, however, that the fortress is depicted in the relief as possessing only two gateways, one to the west and another to the east. On the ground, a monumental gateway has indeed been discovered in the midst of the fortress’ western enclosure wall. This gateway would have been located on the “Egyptian” side of the fort.\(^{182}\) Presumably, based upon the relief and also upon practical requirements, a corresponding gateway should have been located along the “Canaanite” wall of the fortress. Remnants of the eastern wall, let alone of the gate itself, however, remain to be discovered.

\(^{1b-1.}\) my sḏḏ-[i n].k [k]m[nw t-r.k p3 htm n w3(wt-hr)] (P. Anastasi I, 27: 2)

Come, [and I will] describe [for] you [ma]ny things. Head [toward](() \(^{183}\) the htm-fortress of the Way[s of Horus].

Hori, the purported author of P. Anastasi I, opens his geography lesson on the northern Sinai with the directive that his correspondent should begin his exploration at “the htm-fortress of the Ways of Horus.” As discussed in chapter two, the htm-fortress of the Ways of Horus is undoubtedly to be identified with the htm-fortress of

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\(^{181}\) According to the Epigraphic Survey of the University of Chicago (1986: 16–17), the artist attempted to convey a parade ground and a viewing stand within the fortress walls. Such facilities would be appropriate for a border-fortress and the assembly point of outgoing armies. While the fortress uncovered at Heboua I would certainly have been large enough to incorporate such a public assembly area with ease, so little has been excavated that the existence of such a parade ground is impossible to substantiate.


\(^{183}\) In this interpretation of r-r.k, I follow Wente 1990: 109.
Tjaru. In its position as Egypt’s most northeasterly Delta border-fortress, Tjaru was the logical point of embarkation for a trip eastward across the Sinai. Indeed, the texts of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 647: 12–648: 1), Seti I (KRI I, 8: 8–9), and Ramesses II (KRI II, 12: no. 28–30) indicate that the departure of an army from Tjaru marked the official beginning of a northern campaign. Both the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru in Seti’s Karnak relief and the ḫtm-fortress of the Ways of Horus in P. Anastasi I are likewise similar in that each was located to the west of a compound that incorporated the term ‘t (“dwelling”) in its name. 184

1c. t\texttt{ Ä} ḫpm [m\texttt{ Ä}i] (Karnak relief; KRI I, 10: 1)

The Dwelling of the [Lion]

By the time the University of Chicago’s Epigraphic Survey arrived to copy Seti’s war scenes, much of the lower portion of the Shasu register had suffered irreparable damage. It is fortunate, then, that enough early epigraphers had copied the monument that the subsequent destruction resulted in only a minimal loss of information. Had the earlier copyists not labored at Karnak, the names and images of the first three fortresses east of Tjaru would have been almost entirely lost.

The Dwelling of the Lion, Tjaru’s immediate neighbor to the east, is depicted as a square fort, apparently bastioned at all four corners, crenellated upon its wall tops, and in possession of a gateway. In close proximity to the fort, the artist represented a landscaped, outdoor garden area, which consisted of a perfectly square pool of water, flanked by two tall trees. Another, more significant water source is shown bisecting t\texttt{ Ä} ḫpm\texttt{n}it at a right angle and veering off eastward toward the Dwelling of the Lion. Unlike the canal, which the artist depicted as populated by crocodiles, the only creatures represented in the second waterway are fish.

It is tempting, then, to suppose that the artist here was attempting to differentiate saltwater from freshwater. If this were the case, the fishy waterway could serve as an indication of the proximity of the fort to the Mediterranean Sea. 185 Alternatively, a branch of the

184 The many authors who specifically note that the fortress of the Ways of Horus in P. Anastasi is to be equated with Tjaru include Gardiner (1911: 28; 1920: 113), Wilson (1969: 478, no. 47), and Wente (1990: 110, no. 15).
Pelusiac could have been indicated. As will be discussed below, the association of this particular fort with water is bolstered by two separate Ramesside documents. Until the archaeological site of the Dwelling of the Lion itself is discovered, however, the question of whether it was situated upon the bank of the river or the shore of the sea will remain unclear.\footnote{In his 1920 study of the Ways of Horus military route, Gardiner (1920: 107) suggested that the Dwelling of the Lion be equated with Tell Heboua. Maksoud’s recent excavations at Heboua, however, have rendered this suggestion obsolete. While the remains of a New Kingdom installation near Tell Qedwa have yet to be identified, Redford (1998: 49) suggests that the site’s position—some 17 km from Tell Heboua and near the southern lagoon—would be ideal for the Dwelling of the Lion. Alternatively, Hoffmeier (forthcoming) presents a case that Tell el-Borg should be identified with this fort. Given the close proximity of Tell el-Borg to Tell Heboua, however, this suggestion remains as yet tentative.}

Although a secure candidate for the Dwelling of the Lion has not yet been put forth, excavated stations along the northern Sinai provide a model for what it may have looked like. Solidly built, square, Egyptian-made forts have been excavated along the Ways of Horus at Bir el-‘Abd (see chapter four) and Haruba site A-289 (see below). These installations measured 1,600 and 2,500 m\(^2\) respectively, rendering them quite modest in comparison to Tjaru and the contemporary fortress-towns in Nubia and Libya. Within their enclosure walls, Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A-289 could accommodate only a limited number of buildings, and in scale these compounds resembled a modest state temple or a small palace.\footnote{Comparably sized structures include the palace associated with Medinet Habu (2,142 m\(^2\)-Badawy 1968: 2,142), the royal temple at Amarna (2,040 m\(^2\)-Badawy 1968: 209), and the temple to Amun-re and Montu at Karnak (1,512 m\(^2\)-Badawy 1968: 265).}

Rectangular, obviously man-made water reservoirs, such as that associated in the relief with the Dwelling of the Lion, have likewise been identified in association with the Egyptian installations at Bir el-‘Abd (see chapter four) and Deir el-Balah (see chapter four and below). Such artificial pools were standard features in the villas and palaces of Egypt itself, where they lent beauty and elegance to an important building. Along the dusty route of the Ways of Horus, such a reservoir, filled by a local well and the occasional rainstorm,\footnote{Oren 1987: 83; 1993a: 1389. According to Oren (1987: 83), the Sinai bedouin still today utilize a similar system of reservoir catchments.} would also very likely have served as an area for bathing in the...
scorching summer weather or for watering horses, donkeys, or livestock. The importance of a fresh water reservoir would have been particularly marked if, as appears likely, the fish-filled waterway were to be understood as the Mediterranean Sea.

1c.-2. š3ʾi n.k m ʾt n ssʾw ʾnḥ ʾfd s nb bw dgs.k sw m-kf3 bw wnm.k rmw n [. . .]189 bw ṣwb.k m ḫnwʾst (P. Anastasi I, 27: 2–4)

I begin for you with the Dwelling of Sese, l.p.h. You have not entered it at all. You have not eaten fish from [its water source]. You have not bathed in its interior.

As discussed above, P. Anastasi I is yet another source that sheds valuable light upon the chain of forts along the northern Sinai military route. The purported author of the letter first directs his correspondent’s attention to the ḫtn-fortress of the Ways of Horus (i.e., Tjaru) and then proceeds to the next station to the east, the Dwelling of Sese. Here, as at nearly every stop along the way, he highlights his colleague’s lack of familiarity with the area.

The Dwelling ʾt of Sese and the Dwelling ʾt of the Lion are universally accepted as the same installation.190 From Predynastic times, the lion had served in Egypt as a royal symbol,191 much as this animal has cross-culturally in many areas of the world. Thus, in the reign of Seti I, the Dwelling of the Lion could be symbolically read as the Dwelling of Seti I. In this vein, it is not surprising to find the first fortress east of Tjaru dubbed the Dwelling of Sese in Ramesses II’s reign. Sese, after all, is but a hypocorism of Ramesses II’s own name.

P. Anastasi I, like Seti I’s Karnak relief, indicates that the fort was located in direct proximity to at least one significant water source. Further, this body of water, according to the papyri, was suitable both for bathing and for fishing. What is frustrating, however, is that only the determinative for the word designating the water source remains—the phonemes having been rendered illegible over time. Judging from the water determinative (Gardiner sign N35) alone, then, the water source in question could be the Mediterranean Sea, a stream, a canal, a river, an irrigation basin, or the like.192 There

189 The determinative indicates a water source of some sort.
190 Gardiner 1911: 29, n. 3; 1920: 106; Helck 1962: 324.
are, however, two helpful bits of information that can be gleaned from the remnants of the word. First, the presence of the foreign throwstick (Gardiner sign T14) and the hill-country sign (Gardiner sign N25) should be taken as an indicator that the word was foreign in origin. Second, if a possessive indeed preceded the word (i.e., “you have not eaten fish from [its water source]”—the foreign word should have been rather short.

To solve this problem, Fischer-Elfert has suggested that the word be restored as “bir” or “well.”\(^{193}\) Given, however, that one would expect neither fish nor bathers in a well, this translation is not fully satisfying.\(^{194}\) One alternate possibility is that the lacuna be restored as “\(\text{pry.s ym}\)” (i.e., “its sea”). As discussed above, the Karnak relief clearly depicts a water source filled with fish, which ran perpendicular to the canal. Judging from its appearance, this body of water must have been of substantial size, thus leaving either the Pelusiac branch of the Nile or the Mediterranean Sea as the two most likely candidates. The Semitic loan word for “sea,” ym, is both short and foreign\(^{195}\)—two conditions left unfulfilled by the Egyptian word for river, itrw.

\[1c.-3\] pt[r] tw.n \(\text{hr ss p3 htm [n r']-ms-[sw mr]y-imn 'nḥ wd3 snb nty m t3rw m rmt-sp [3]3 3bd 2 šmw sw 23 iw.n r šm r šw n3 'h.w m t3 't r'-ms-sw mry-imn 'nḥ wd3 [snb] m.tw.n ith [n]3 mnw [m p3 wb3] n pr-s3 'nḥ wd3 snb (P. Anastasi V, 24: 6–25: 1)\]

Loo[k], we passed the htm-fortress [of Ra]mess[es Mer]yamun, l.p.h., which is in Tjaru, in regnal year [3]3, second month of Shomu, day 23, and we will go to empty the ships at the Dwelling of Ramesses Meryamun, l.p.[h.], and we will drag [t]he monuments [before the butler] of pharaoh, l.p.h.

Like P. Anastasi I, P. Anastasi V, no. 18 (i.e., lines 23: 7–25: 2) belongs to the genre of school text, but the two documents are in fact quite distinct. P. Anastasi I, although it takes the form of a letter, had been composed very deliberately as a teaching text. A perusal of the document makes it patently obvious that the “letter” was in fact an encoded set of lessons in math, vocabulary, geography, and


\(^{194}\) The same caveats of length and activity sphere apply for the translations: “\(\text{hnmt-cistern}\)” (Fischer-Elfert 1986: 231, 232) and “\(\text{brkt-pool}\)” (Wente 1990: 109).

\(^{195}\) See Gardiner 1947a: 74; Lesko 1982: 32.
the like. Matters are not quite so clear with respect to P. Anastasi V, no. 18, however.

This text belongs to an entire corpus of documents known as “model letters.” Unlike P. Anastasi I, model letters are virtually indistinguishable from “real letters” and may have been culled from scribal archives as exemplars of proper “business” letters. Quite a number of these documents have been grouped together by Gardiner and published under the heading *Late Egyptian Miscellanies*. Given the markedly realistic character of the model letters, they are invariably discussed as historical documents. Here, too, they will be included among other contemporary texts. Letters such as this one, however, which are particularly relevant to questions concerning the forts along the Ways of Horus, will be addressed in tandem with the Karnak reliefs and P. Anastasi I.

The text of P. Anastasi V, no. 18, was purportedly composed by two deputies (\(\text{idnw}\)) of the army and sent to a butler (\(\text{wb}3\)) of Ramesses II. After a quite proper epistolary introduction, the two men get down to business. They inform the king’s butler that they have left the royal residence with three steles, which they were commissioned to deliver to him. As the excerpt above relates, the two men had reached the \(htm\)-fortress of Ramesses Meryamun at Tjaru and planned thence to transport the steles by ship to the butler at the Dwelling (\(\text{\'t}\)) of Ramesses Meryamun. They wished to know, however, whether the butler had any special instructions for them.

The Dwelling (\(\text{\'t}\)) of Ramesses Meryamun is, of course, to be identified with the Dwelling (\(\text{\'t}\)) of Sese and the Dwelling (\(\text{\'t}\)) of the Lion. Likewise, it is interesting in this context to note that Tjaru is here dubbed the \(htm\)-fortress of Ramesses Meryamun, which is at Tjaru. This rampant renaming of previously existing structures after the currently reigning pharaoh is a vivid illustration of the difficulties in identifying particular buildings, or even whole towns, after successive regnal christenings. In such cases, continuities in building type (such as \(\text{'t}\) or \(htm\)) or geographic region become crucial for proper identi-

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197 Gardiner (1937) published a transcription of the texts, while Caminos (1954) subsequently translated the corpus and provided detailed commentary.
198 Although the papyrus as a whole seems to date to Seti II (Gardiner 1937: xvi), the letter could certainly have been procured and copied from an archive.
fication. In this particular case, it is comforting to note that in all three sources (Seti’s Karnak relief, P. Anastasi I, and P. Anastasi V) the ‘t of the king is situated in close proximity to the htm of Tjaru.

The other continuity between P. Anastasi V and the other contexts in which the ‘t of the king is evidenced is the presence of water. In this case, however, the water is demonstrably navigable, for the two army deputies plan to transport their steles by boat from Pi-Ramesses to Tjaru and thence to the Dwelling of Ramesses Meryamun. It is very tempting, then, to see the Karnak relief as essentially a map for just how such a feat could be accomplished. One would, presumably, take the Pelusiac to the lagoons, access ts dnit or more lagoons, and head north to Tjaru itself. From the border-fortress, a traveler would fare northward and then eastward—either on a further Nile branch or at the Mediterranean Sea itself.

Although there is no indication of the ultimate destination of the steles, it is likely that all three monuments were not intended for erection at the Dwelling. More likely, the steles would be sent to various points in the Egyptian empire where Ramesses II wished to emphasize his imperial power. In fact, three such steles of this king have been found in Syria-Palestine, one at Sheikh Sa’id (KRI II, 223: 5–7) and two along the Lebanese coast (KRI II, 223: 10–15; 224: 4–15). While a simple concordance is extremely doubtful, the steles that the army deputies were charged with delivering to the Dwelling may well have been transferred onto sea-going ships and transported to one or more of the coastal ports. If this were indeed the case, it would bolster the argument for locating the Dwelling on the shores of the Mediterranean Sea.200

1d. pt mktr nm mn-m3’t-r’ (Karnak relief; KRI I, 10: 1)

The Migdol of Menmaatre

According to Seti’s Karnak relief, the migdol that bore his name lay just east of the Dwelling of the Lion. The building, as it is depicted, is architecturally identical to its western neighbor but much reduced

200 In classical times, transport ships did not generally land on the shallow shores of the Sinai. Instead, the ships would anchor off the coast and utilize smaller boats for ferrying goods and people to land and back. Whether this was the case in the New Kingdom is unclear, but probable anchorages have been discovered in association with the Egyptian installations at Haruba and Tell Riddan (Oren 1987: 114, n. 8).
in scale. As discussed earlier with regard to the verisimilitude of the rendering of Tjaru’s architecture, as well as the fortress’ precise relation to the canal, it is very unlikely that the artist who drafted the Karnak reliefs had ever visited the Ways of Horus. The vast majority of his earthly audience, however, would likewise never cross the Sinai. Given these two complementary ignorances, then, strict representational accuracy would not only have been difficult for the artist to achieve, but it was also very likely immaterial to his goals.

In the layout of the Karnak relief, the forts along the Ways of Horus served essentially as a backdrop to the main action, which was, quite clearly, Seti’s slaughter of the Shasu bedouin. Concerning the forts themselves, in fact, the artist seems only to have been interested in conveying certain specific pieces of information. Interestingly, these important facts were very nearly identical to those that the author of P. Anastasi I wished to impress upon his own students: the names of the buildings themselves and the presence of any important or unusual associated features.

While making sure to preserve this essential information, however, the artist had to observe significant space limitations. It is likely, therefore, that the Migdol of Menmaatre is depicted in such a diminutive manner due to the artist’s wish to squeeze his rendering of the fort into the tight space between the chariot team’s back legs and their tails. Likewise, the elevation of the three easternmost buildings to the top of the register almost certainly had more to do with the niceties of composition than with a desire to translate the area’s topography accurately onto a two-dimensional “map.”

If the size of the forts with respect to one another, then, cannot be trusted to represent reality, there is less agreement as to the trustworthiness of the architectural drawings themselves. No one would argue with the assertion that the renderings are highly schematic and definitely not literal portraits of each building in particular. Oren and Shershevsky, however, believe the artist to have taken a rather “hieroglyphic” approach to the depictions, essentially stamping the sign for “fort” all across the landscape of the northern Sinai.201 According to this view, variations in the representations were perhaps mainly intended to spruce up the visual interest of the scene.

201 Oren and Shershevsky 1989.
Certainly, it must be stated that according to the relief, the Dwelling of the Lion and the Migdol of Menmaatre resemble each other quite closely. Square, bastioned, compact, and crenellated, the two forts differ only in size—as well as, perhaps, the placement of the gate. Without their excavated counterparts, the degree to which these two forts actually adhered to the same plan is difficult to assess.\(^{202}\) It is more than likely, however, that the architects behind the concerted effort at fortifying the length of the Ways of Horus in the late Eighteenth or very early Nineteenth Dynasty did in fact employ the same basic blueprint on a number of occasions.\(^{203}\) Such a tactic is often both practical and cost efficient, and the architects of the Nubian fortresses north of the second cataract had set a precedent for this strategy already in the Middle Kingdom.

Forts possessing the compact, square design exhibited by the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasty installations at Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A–289—the presumed archaeological correlates of the one tiered forts depicted in Seti’s relief—are frequently characterized as “migdols” by archaeologists. The word “migdol” in Egyptian is a Semitic loanword, and the translation in both languages is something akin to “tower,” “watch-tower,” or “fortress.”\(^ {204}\) Architecturally speaking, the term “migdol” is useful in distinguishing compact, self-contained forts from walled fortress-towns. The fact that several known settlements in both Egypt and Canaan were named “Migdol,” of course, complicates matters.\(^ {205}\) In these cases, however, it is very

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\(^{202}\) Gardiner (1920: 108; 1924: 89) identified this migdol with the “Migdol” known from classical and biblical sources, which he placed at Tell el-Herr. This site, however, has recently been excavated by Oren (1984b). While a Late Period fortress was indeed found upon the site, no New Kingdom remains have been uncovered (Oren 1984b: 33–35; 1987: 113, n. 3). Alternatively, based on strategic reasoning, Redford (1998: 48–49) suggests that Seti’s migdol should be located in the “ideally defensible” high ground east of Balluza. As of yet, however, surveys in the area have revealed no suitable candidate.

\(^{203}\) See, for example, the nearly identical masonry and architecture exhibited in some features of the outbuildings and installations at late Eighteenth Dynasty Haruba site A–345 and Bir el-‘Abd (see chapter four).

\(^{204}\) For discussions of the word “migdol” and its derivation, see Wb. II, 164: 2–3; Giveon 1982: 124–125; Oren 1984b: 31; Hoffmeier 1997: 18.

\(^{205}\) For Migdols in Canaan, see Urk. IV, 784: no. 71; Wilson 1969: 243; Oren 1984b: 31. For a Migdol (lit. Magdalu) in Egypt, see EA 234: 28–30. There is, however, some reason to think that the context in this case might be a military one. Demotic papyrus Cairo 31169 (recto, col. 3, nos. 20–23) provides evidence for no less than four Delta towns named Migdol; another Migdol was located in the Faiyum (Gardiner 1920: 108).
likely that the towns derived their name from their proximity to such a structure rather than from their locus within it.

The last major piece of information that the Seti relief reveals about the Migdol of Menmaatre is that the fort possessed an associated water source. While an unnamed pool or small reservoir had fronted the Dwelling of the Lion, the water at the Migdol of Menmaatre was clearly of a different nature. Depicted as if viewed in cross-section, the water was apparently held in a deep, cisternlike container and is labeled “the ḫmnṯ water source” of ḫ-p-n.” Very likely, this particular ḫmnṯ would actually have been the raison d’être of the migdol, for in an arid environment like the Sinai, potable water would have been a precious commodity. Further, in a hostile environment, plagued with Shasu bedouin, the only way to guarantee access to a vital water source would have been to station armed personnel in its vicinity. Indeed, the lack of any associated trees makes it possible that, in this case at least, the well may even have been located within the interior of the migdol.

1d-2. ḫn-m-y sḥ3.i n.k ḫ-t-y-n ḫȝm r-ṯw (P. Anastasi I, 27:4)

O’ that I might recall for you Husayin. Whereabouts is its ḫtm-fortress?

After berating his correspondent for his lack of knowledge about the Dwelling of Sese and its attendant water source, the purported author of P. Anastasi I turns to the next installation to the east. On the Karnak relief, this fort is dubbed the Migdol of Menmaatre, but in P. Anastasi I the writer refers to a ḫtm-fortress in a district called ḫ-t-y-n. Given that the well associated with the Migdol of Menmaatre (ḥ-p-n) is very nearly similar in spelling, most scholars have been con-

206 The word “ḥmnṯ” is variously translated as “spring,” “basin,” “cistern,” “well,” or “watering place,” and it is particularly common with regard to desert—as opposed to Nilotic—environments (Wb. III, 382, n. 10; Gardiner 1947a: 7*, 8*; 1948a: 30; Lesko 1984: 206–207). There are many arguments as to what types of water containers are represented in the Karnak reliefs, so when the type of water is ambiguous, the term “ḥmnṯ water source” will be employed. The importance of these water sources is stressed by Esarhaddon, who described his journey across the northern Sinai in his annals. The Assyrian king relates, “There is no river (all the way)! By means of cords, chains (and buckets) I had to provide water for my army by drawing from wells” (Oppenheim 1969: 292).

207 As Helck (1962: 325), following Spiegelberg, suggests, it is likely that the majority of the wells were in fact located inside the fortress precincts. The Egyptian artist may have depicted the wells as lying outside the forts, however, simply because the presence of the wells would otherwise have been difficult to communicate visually.
vinced that the name of the well and the name of the district should be equated.\textsuperscript{208} Indeed, Gardiner has suggested that one or the other of the scribes must have mistaken the $t\eta$-bird for a $p\varphi$-bird, or vice versa, an easy mistake, as the two signs are quite similar in hieratic script.\textsuperscript{209}

While the $htm$-fortress of $h\cdot t\cdot y\cdot n$ and the Migdol ($mktr$) of Menmaatre almost certainly designated the same complex, it is curious that one structure should be termed both a $htm$-fortress and a $mktr$. Indeed, this is especially the case given that scribes tended to be quite careful to preserve the key elements of a building’s identity in order to compensate for the fact that its royal moniker switched from reign to reign. There are, however, three possible rationales for this uncharacteristic confusion.

The first explanation might be, as Fischer-Elfert has suggested, that the author of P. Anastasi I was indulging in a bit of wordplay, juxtaposing the near homonyms $h\cdot t\cdot y\cdot n$ and $ht\cdot m$ and hoping thereby to evoke the Semitic word “$h\cdot s\cdot i\cdot n$,” or “small fortress.”\textsuperscript{210} Barring this lexical exercise, a second suggestion might be that the northern Sinai itself was in fact viewed as an extended border zone. Thus, in keeping track of passers-by and in guarding against fugitives, the inhabitants of the migdol may have acted in a manner not too dissimilar from the personnel stationed at $htm$-fortresses directly on Egypt’s borders. The application of the term $htm$ to the migdol, then, may not have been entirely out of keeping with its broader function.

Finally, the employment of the two terms for the same structure might simply be chalked up to the fact that, as Haeny observes, “Egyptians did not use their building terms very consistently. Evidently they liked to express their ideas in phrases repeated with small variations. Attributing too much importance to the Egyptian word used in a particular text could be misleading.”\textsuperscript{211} As will be discussed below, it can indeed be argued that the scribes responsible for naming the forts along the Ways of Horus employed deliberate

\textsuperscript{208} Gardiner 1911: 29, n. 5; 1920: 107; Helck 1962: 324; Fischer-Elfert 1986: 233; Redford 1998, 46, n. 9. Authors have, however, suggested numerous different etymologies for the word, including “little stronghold” (Erman, followed by Müller, in Gardiner 1920: 107) and “military personnel” (Murtonen in Redford 1998: 46, n. 9).

\textsuperscript{209} Gardiner 1920: 107, followed by Helck 1962: 324.

\textsuperscript{210} Fischer-Elfert 1986: 233, h.

\textsuperscript{211} Haeny 1997: 97.
variation as an administrative tool. This variation, however, should not have included the application of different terms to the same fort!

1d-3. hry pdt k3–kmt-wr n ṭkw n hry pdt iny hry pdt b3k-n-pth . . . r-nty tw.i wd.w, kwi m n3 ṣsn hr ṣw pr-nsw ‘nh ṣdw snb m b3k 3 ṣmwn sw 9 ḥr tr n ṣwḥ3 m-s3 p3y b3k 2 ḥr ṯw.i ḥr ṯm r p3 sgr n ṭkw [m 3]b3 3 ṣmwn sw 10 ḥw ḥr ṭd n.i st ṭw.i ṭyw r-d[d] ṣdw ṭm w b3k 3 ṣw[m sw 10 ḥr ir tw.i] ḥr ṯm r p3 ṭw[m] ṭiw. ḥw ṭm ṭd n.i p[3 m8]rw ṭiw. ḥr smt [r-ṭd] ṣw. w t3 inbt ṭmty [n] p3 ṭmty n stḥy-mr-n-pṭḥ ‘nh ṣdw snb mry m ṭḥ (P. Anastasi V, 19: 2–3; 19: 6–20: 3)

The troop commander of Tjeku, Kakemwere, (writes) to the troop commander Iny (and) the troop commander Bakenptah . . . Further, I set forth from the broad halls of the palace, l.p.h., in the third month of Shomu, day 9, at the time of evening following after these two servants. When I reached the ṣgr-fortress of Tjeku [in the] third [mō]nth of Shomu, day 10, they said [to me]: “They spoke in the south, say[ing] ‘They passed in the third month of Sho[mu, day 10.’” When I arrived at the ḥṭ[m]-fortress, they said to me: “Th[e gro]om212 is come from the desert, saying, ‘They passed the northern enclosure wall213 [of] the Migdol of Seti Merneptah, l.p.h., beloved like Seth.’”

P. Anastasi V, 19: 2–20: 6, has received, by a fair margin, more attention than any other model letter included among the Late Egyptian Miscellanies. Despite the obvious interest inherent in a runaway slave story, the letter has garnered the bulk of its scrutiny due to the seeming similarity between the escape route favored by the two fugitives and that followed by the proto-Israelites.214 Hundreds of scholars have published on the subject of the historicity of the Exodus,215 and yet books and conferences still routinely tackle the

212 The word masharu is unknown and is thus generally emended to the Semitic word maru, meaning “groom” or “squire,” i.e., a military position involving horses (Hoch 1994: 133). See Wilson (1969: 259), however, who suggests that in this case the word should be emended to a noun based on the Semitic verb shamar, which means to “watch” or “guard.”

213 The word ṭmty in the Middle Kingdom occasionally signifies a fortress (Ward 1982: 89, n. 743; 146, no. 1256); however, in this case it makes more sense to interpret ṭmty ṭmty as the northern enclosure wall of the migdol (Gardiner 1920: 109) rather than as a separate northern fortification (Caminos 1954: 255; Wilson 1969: 259).

214 Both Tjeku (i.e., Succoth, see below) and a fort called “Migdol” appear in the Exodus narrative. Whether these signify the Nineteenth Dynasty structures bearing this name or buildings dating to the Late Period, however, is quite controversial.

215 The literature is far too massive to cite here. Some quite thorough and measured explorations of this topic, which approach the question through the Egyptian evidence and contain extensive bibliographic references, however, are Redford 1963; 1987; Hoffmeier 1997; Freirichs and Lesko 1997.
subject. For this reason, and because the issue is fraught with chronological pitfalls, the topic of the Exodus will not be addressed in this discussion. The papyrus contains, however, a great deal of important information on its own merit.

According to the text of the letter, preserved as a copy in P. Anastasi V, two servants or slaves (ḥ₳₴ᵏ₴ᵘ) escaped from the area of the royal palace in an unspecified regnal year of king Seti II. A troop commander of Tjeku (ḥ₴ʳₚᵯᵗ ṭ₱₷₴ₒ) himself presumably at the palace on business—was sent out on the evening of the third month of Shomu, day 9, to apprehend them. Although the location of the palace is left unspecified, the fact that the ḥ₴ʳₚᵯᵗ was able to arrive at Tjeku sometime the following day suggests that the royal residence at Pi-Ramesses was indicated. The distance from Pi-Ramesses to Tjeku (Tell er-Retabah)\(^\text{216}\) is substantial, just under 60 km as the crow flies.\(^\text{217}\) It has been estimated, however, that an envoy in a hurry could cover as many as 73 km in a day by chariot.\(^\text{218}\) Given the urgency of his mission, the troop commander of Tjeku must assuredly have traveled at maximum speed.

Any fugitive wishing to exit Egypt from the east would have had to follow one of two major routes, either north past Tjaru and the forts along the Ways of Horus or south via the Wadi Tumilat.\(^\text{219}\) The troop commander of Tjeku had obviously been dispatched in an attempt to intercept the two men at this southern pass. During the New Kingdom, Tjeku is the only known fortress that guarded the Wadi Tumilat.\(^\text{220}\) Given the fact that the wadi itself was less than 6 km wide at any given point, however, the southern route would not have been particularly difficult to police.

\(^\text{216}\) Hoffmeier (1997: 181) believes the Wadi Tumilat to have been occupied by a number of Ramesside fortresses and so theorizes that the ṣʳ of Tjeku is close to or at Tell el-Maskhuta. New Kingdom remains, however, have not been found at this site or in its environs.

\(^\text{217}\) This is assuming that the messenger did not cut across the desert. If he did so, the journey would have covered only 30 km.


\(^\text{219}\) Holladay 1982: 1–2; Redford 1997: 65, n. 29.

\(^\text{220}\) Here I differ in opinion with Bleiberg (1983: 24–25) and Hoffmeier (1997: 181), as these scholars would like to see in P. Anastasi V and VI evidence for four or five New Kingdom fortresses in the Wadi Tumilat. Neither the archaeological nor, I believe, the textual evidence supports such a claim. Archaeological data, discussed below, have so far indicated that Tell er-Retabah was the only New Kingdom site of any importance in the wadi.
Although textual evidence indicates that the fortress of Tjeku existed already in the reign of Thutmose IV, at which point it was also staffed by a “troop commander of Tjeku” (ḥry pdt n tkw),\(^{221}\) archaeological excavations at Tell er-Retabah have uncovered almost exclusively Ramesside remains. With walls enclosing an area of more than 66,000 m\(^2\), the Nineteenth Dynasty fortress of Tjeku was of substantial size, even in comparison to settlements located within the Nile Valley itself. Significantly, P. Anastasi VI, 53–61, discussed below, specifically identifies Tjeku as a ḥtm-fortress. Such a label, it seems, would be entirely appropriate given the position of this installation astride a major transit corridor from the Sinai to the Delta.

The use of the term sgr to designate Tjeku in this text, then, is slightly puzzling. Originally Sumerian in origin (SI.GAR), sgr entered the Egyptian language in the New Kingdom via the Semitic word segôr, which means “enclosure.”\(^{222}\) As the word is not otherwise employed with regard to a fortress erected at Egypt’s borders or in its foreign territory, its precise meaning remains unclear. Possibly, however, the term sgr may have been utilized somewhat generically in this instance to designate a fortified structure. By employing sgr instead of ḥtm, the troop commander may perhaps have sought to avoid repetitive or potentially confusing references to more than one ḥtm-fortress in the same text.

Upon reaching Tjeku, its troop commander received the news that people in the south had informed officials at Tjeku that the two fugitives had been sighted earlier that very day. Presumably, the men had detoured to the south for the express purpose of avoiding interrogation and/or interception at Tjeku.\(^{223}\) They seem, however, to have steered a more northern route upon reaching the end of the Wadi Tumilat, for the scent of their trail finally brought the weary.

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\(^{221}\) Giveon 1969a: 172. See chapter three.

\(^{222}\) Translations of sgr include “secured building” and “fort.” For discussions of the word, see Wb. IV, 324, no. 6; Lesko 1987: 110–111; Hoch 1994: 270; Hoffmeier 1997: 179. For evidence of seven sgr-installations in Upper Egypt during the Twentieth Dynasty, see Gardiner 1948a: 35.

\(^{223}\) There is always the possibility that the fugitives were sighted south of Tjeku because they were, in fact, headed south. If so, both the ḥtm and the migdol would have been located south of Tjeku (see Bleiberg 1983a: 25; Hoffmeier 1997: 181). As no contemporary fortresses are known from the southern regions, however, it seems more likely that the fugitives took a southern route simply to avoid running into the authorities at Tjeku but that their main intention was to head northward.
troop commander of Tjeku to “the htm-fortress.” As discussed previously, where it is possible to ascertain, “the” htm-fortress almost invariably designates Tjaru.

At the htm-fortress, information had just been obtained from a groom that tracks of the two men had been picked up in the vicinity of the Migdol of Seti Merneptah. Whether this groom was simply returning from a horse-related journey to the north Sinai or whether he was specially dispatched as a messenger, however, is not known. Given that the chase was now roaming far afield, it seems that the troop commander of Tjeku was officially out of his jurisdiction. It is likely, then, that responsibility for the chase was at that point handed over to the troop commander of Tjaru or to a related official.

Eager to keep abreast of the situation, however, the troop commander of Tjeku sent the two troop commanders stationed at the Migdol of Seti Merneptah (i.e., Seti II)224 a letter explaining the background of the escape and the subsequent chase. He also peppered his colleagues with requests for information. Presumably in order to find out how cold the trail had become, he inquired as to which watch discovered evidence of the fugitives’ passing. He likewise queried the troop commanders about the size and the constituency of the posse that they had sent to capture the men (P. Anastasi V, 20: 3–6).

This document—whether a copy of an actual missive, as seems perfectly plausible, or an artificial, albeit realistic creation—provides important information as to the administration and organization of Egypt’s border-fortresses. Significantly, there is no mention at either Tjeku or Tjaru of an overseer of the htm-fortress (imy-r htm). Instead, the officials in charge of the fortress at Tjeku and also the Migdol were troop commanders (hry pdl) who resided in the fortresses along with their troops. A doorjamb belonging to one Nineteenth Dynasty hry pdl of Tjeku, found at Tell er-Retabah itself, will be discussed below. As an extremely high percentage of imy-r htm were demonstrably drawn from the rank of hry pdl, however, it is possible that

224 This letter dates, like the text of P. Anastasi V as a whole, to Seti II (Gardiner 1937: xvi). Most scholars agree that the “Migdol of Seti Merneptah” should be equated with the “Migdol of Menmaatre” on the Karnak relief and that we are here provided with yet another instance of royal renaming (Gardiner 1920: 109–110; Helck 1962: 324; Oren 1984b: 31; Redford 1998: 48–49). Certainly, if ps htm is indeed Tjaru, the former Migdol of Menmaatre would fit the geography of the chase scene perfectly.
the title hry pdt was preferred to that of imy-r htm in correspondence but that in reality both titles were held.

Second, this document provides vivid evidence for desert reconnaissance. The Semna dispatches demonstrate that in the Thirteenth Dynasty it was common practice for desert scouts to meticulously monitor the environs of a Nubian fortress in order to determine if any unauthorized individuals had passed by under cover of darkness. As such a clandestine crossing would not be difficult in the dead of night, the desert scouts were as invaluable in maintaining security in the New Kingdom as they had been in the Middle Kingdom. Although it is not stated specifically, it is quite likely that the men who recovered the tracks of the two fugitives at the Migdol would have been Medjay-scouts.

In the mid- and late Eighteenth Dynasty teams of these desert scouts were housed at Tjaru under the command of the individual who combined the office of troop commander and overseer of the htm-fortress. In the Nineteenth Dynasty, Medjay were also closely associated with the fortress at Tjeku, as will be explored below. Certainly, as is well illustrated by this particular letter, the officials who manned the eastern Delta and northern Sinai border-fortresses kept close tabs on their immediate environs and maintained regular contact with neighboring fortresses in a joint effort to monitor sensitive regions.

1e. wdʒt n stḥy mr-n-pṭḥ (Karnak relief; KRI I, 10: 2)

Wadjet of Seti Merneptah

The third fort east of Tjaru on Seti’s Karnak relief is labeled simply “Wadjet of Seti Merneptah.” Wadjet, of course, was the Lower Egyptian cobra goddess whose visage graced the pharaoh’s brow in the form of his uraeus. Indeed, it must have been Wadjet’s role as the divine protector of the king that sparked the metaphoric linkage of her name to Seti’s fort. It is unknown, however, whether any cultic installation existed within the fort to honor the goddess. A num-

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225 See Smither 1942.
226 Indeed, in the Story of Sinuhe, Sinuhe made his flight from Egypt under cover of night “lest the watchmen upon the wall where their day’s (duty) was might see me” (Wilson 1969: 19).
227 See the resumes of Neby in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty and Seti in the late Eighteenth Dynasty (chapters three and four).
ber of Egyptian bases did contain a small temple or shrine for the use of the resident garrison and associated individuals, and in such a venue she may well have been honored as the patron deity of the fort.\(^{228}\) It is interesting to note in this context that clay cobra figurines have been excavated at a number of different Egyptian forts and administrative headquarters.\(^{229}\)

As Wadjet of Seti Merneptah has not been identified on the ground,\(^ {230}\) the Karnak relief is unfortunately our only source for what it might have looked like. According to the monument, the fort is portrayed as comparatively narrower, and perhaps also taller, than either the Dwelling of the Lion or the Migdol of Menmaatre. Again, however, an examination of the layout of the scene shows that the fort had been crammed by the artist into the very limited space between the wheels of Seti’s chariot and the feet of his loyal fan-bearer.\(^ {231}\) While it is always possible that the fort did indeed possess a tower-like plan, it is perhaps more likely that the rendering of the installation fell victim to yet another instance of artistic expediency.

Whatever constraints the draftsman of this scene may have been under, he did take care to highlight “the \(\text{hnmt}\) water source of the region of Imy-a(?)”\(^ {232}\) (KRI I, 10: 3), which is depicted in a manner very different from the water sources associated with either of the two preceding forts. Viewed in cross-section, the \(\text{hnmt}\) appears both wide and relatively shallow. This is in marked contrast to the rectangular garden pool of the Dwelling or the deep and narrow \(\text{hnmt}\) of the Migdol. While there is ethnographic evidence of bedouin fashioning wide and shallow cisterns to catch rainwater,\(^ {233}\) the presence of the tree beside the water source suggests that the \(\text{hnmt}\) may

\(^{228}\) It is perhaps significant that Seti I in his preroyal career served as lector priest of Wadjet (KRI II, 268: 8). Whether he held this post during his tenure as \(\text{imy-r hbm}\) and \(\text{hry pdt}\) at the \(\text{hbm}\)-fortress of Tjaru, however, is impossible to tell. Given the fact that Wadjet was the patron deity of Imet (Tell Nebesheh) in the eastern Delta, Redford (1998: 48, n. 12) suggests that the goddess may well have been a tutelary deity of the frontier region.

\(^{229}\) Namely at Haruba site A–345, A–289, and Beth Shan (see chapter four and below).

\(^ {230}\) Helck (1962: 324) hazards a guess that the fortress was located at “\(\text{qat.ija}\),” but provides no explanation of his reasoning.

\(^ {231}\) The image of Mehy here, as elsewhere, had been replaced at a later date with an image of Ramesses II as a young prince. See Murnane 1990: 107–114.

\(^ {232}\) Following Kitchen 1993: 8.

\(^ {233}\) Oren 1987: 83.
in fact have been substantial enough to support a very small oasis of its own.

\[
1e-2. \, \text{my} \, \text{r.k} \, r' \, n \, wdyt \, ssw \, 'nḥw \, wd3 \, snb \, m \, p3y.f \, nḥtw \, wrs-m3't-r' \, 'nḥw \, wd3 \, snb \, (\text{P. Anastasi I, 27: 5})
\]

Come to the region of Wadjet (of) Sese, l.p.h., (and) into its nḥtw-stronghold “Usermaatre,” l.p.h.

The fort christened “Wadjet of Seti Merneptah” in the Karnak relief is clearly identical to “Usermaatre”—P. Anastasi I’s nḥtw-stronghold, which was itself located in the region (‘) of Wadjet (of) Sese. Thus it is obvious that some sort of renaming had taken place between the reign of Seti and that of his son. According to the Karnak relief, the hnumt water source that belonged to the fort of Wadjet of Seti Merneptah lay within the region (‘) of Imy-a.234 Yet in the reign of Ramesses II, the district had assumed the name of the fortress, with the substitution, of course, of Ramesses’ name for Seti’s. The fort itself, meanwhile, had been re-dubbed the nḥtw-stronghold of Usermaatre. Just why this should have happened is unknown.

The significance of this installation being termed a nḥtw, as opposed to any other architectural term for “fort,” is likewise unclear. Conceivably, one could argue that the unusually compact appearance of the fort in the Karnak relief related to the fact that it was a nḥtw. The problem with this approach, however, is that two other of the Ways of Horus forts were also nḥtw, and while it is not exactly clear always which name is meant to link up to which fort (see below), none of the other candidates are of similar appearance. Indeed, the closest parallel—the fort labeled “N” in Gardiner’s publication—was also forced by the artist into a very narrow spot.

The word “nḥtw,” is quite clearly cognate to “nḥtw,” the Egyptian word for “strength,” hence the common translation of the word as “stronghold.”235 Interestingly enough, in a number of texts, pharaohs seem to have employed nḥtw to house foreigners who for one reason or another had become protectorates of the state. In the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, for example, Thutmos III lodged the heirs

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234 There is some doubt as to the proper reading of the region’s name, but it is generally accepted as Imy-a (Gardiner 1920: pl. XI; KRI I, 10: 3).

apparent of his vassals in \( nhtw \), which he constructed in Egypt.\(^{236}\) Likewise in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, \( nhtw \) were erected in Egypt and perhaps abroad as well to house foreign prisoners of war who had elected to join the imperial army.\(^{237}\)

Analyses of the skeletal remains at Haruba site A-289, one of the fortified installations presumed to have been listed among the Ways of Horus forts, has demonstrated that the individuals buried in association with the compound can be classed anthropometrically with inhabitants of the northern Sinai and southern Canaan. This may be due, as the excavator suggests, to the recruitment of garrisons from the local population, although it is quite likely that many of these burials postdated the Egyptian abandonment of the fort (see chapter six).\(^{238}\) The possibility that the pharaonic government had resettled captured prisoners of war as mercenaries at Haruba, however, should not be entirely discounted.

\[
1e-3. \; p3 \; rwdw \; [n] \; t3 \; \text{humn} \ldots \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; p3 \; mk[\ldots] \ldots \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; t3 \; \text{humn} \ldots \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; t3 \; \text{humn} \ldots \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; t3 \; \text{humn} \ldots \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; t3 \; \text{humn} \ldots \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; t3 \; \text{humn} \ldots \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; p3 \; nhtw \; n \; r^2-m\text{s(-sw)} \; \text{mr(y)-imm} \; (\text{nh \; wd3 \; snb})^{239} \; nty \; m \; t3 \; br[\ldots] \; p3 \; rwdw \; n \; p3 \; nhtw \; n \; r^2-m\text{s(-sw)} \; \text{mr(y)-imm} \; (\text{nh \; wd3 \; snb}) \; nty \; m \; t3 \; \text{h-s-n} \; (\text{Turin Tax Lists; KRI II}, 826: 2–5)
\]

The administrator [of] the well. . . . The administrator of the mig-[dol?] . . . The administrator of the well (Ramesses Meryamun)\(^{240}\) . . . The administrator of the [well] (Ramesses Meryamun). . . . The administrator of the well Rames(ses)-Mer(y)amun, (l.p.h.), which is in the pool\(^{241}\) . . . The administrator of the \( nhtw \)-stronghold of Rames(ses) Mer(y)amun, (l.p.h.), which is in the Khasanu . . .

The Turin tax list, compiled in the reign of Ramesses II, shares a papyrus with the Turin Canon king list.\(^{242}\) Although far less famous

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\(^{236}\) Urk. IV, 690: 2–5. Wb. II, 317: 14 translates the term as “hostage” rather than “stronghold,” presumably due to the context and the lack of a house-determinative. This would be, however, a singular usage of the word. Scholars who concur that \( nhtw \) should be translated as “stronghold” include Säve-Söderbergh (1941: 185), Blumethal et al. (1984: 203), and Feucht (1990: 199, n. 86).

\(^{237}\) For the Nineteenth Dynasty, see KRI II, 206: 15–16. For the Twentieth Dynasty, see KRI V, 24: 1–3; 91: 5–7; P. Harris I, 76: 7–9; 77: 3–6.

\(^{238}\) Oren 1987: 94–95.

\(^{239}\) The signs are represented by four ticks.

\(^{240}\) The remnant of the outer edge of a cartouche here and below suggests that Ramesses II’s name would have been incorporated into the name of the well.

\(^{241}\) The Semitic word \( \text{birket} \) survives in Arabic with the meaning “pool” (Gardiner 1948a: 29; Hoch 1994: 107).

\(^{242}\) Both are published in Gardiner 1959. The excerpted segment is found on pl. VIII, in column VIII.
than its neighbor, the tax list is in itself extremely interesting. As a vast compendium of titles and payments, it is a latter-day counterpart to the tax list that Thutmose III’s vizier, Rekhmire, memorialized upon the walls of his Theban tomb (see chapter three). Both lists carefully recorded the tax contributed by an individual office holder to state coffers. Although the revenues in the two lists were destined for different purses, the two taxes were similar—their ultimate aim being to return to the state some of the profits that an office holder reaped by virtue of his position.

Just as the officials based at the Nubian first cataract fortresses paid dues to the Upper Egyptian vizier in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, the Turin lists demonstrate that at least some of the officials stationed at the forts along the Ways of Horus also paid income taxes. The condition of the Turin tax list is unfortunately extremely fragmentary, and so neither the heading to the excerpt above nor the quantities of the goods that each administrator contributed remain. Despite this, however, much information can be obtained from the text.

The greater context of the excerpt, for instance, reinforces the northern, frontier status of these particular wells and forts. While about eleven lines are lost prior to the beginning of the passage, it seems that the officials listed therein were bookended by a superintendent of Nile mouths (KRI II, 825: 8), numerous officials in charge of Medjay-scouts (KRI II, 825: 11–14), and officials working in the northern and southern oases (KRI II, 826: 6–10). Thus, while it is not entirely certain that the excerpt concerned the Ways of Horus, the context in which the officers are listed would certainly appear both northern and on the periphery of the Egyptian heartland. Likewise, the presence of so many administrators of hmnt-wells indicates a desert region, far from the Nile’s reach or from the more fertile regions of Syria-Palestine.

Because the Egyptians often renamed installations at the accession of a new pharaoh, it is impossible to tell whether the names of the wells coincide with any of those documented in Seti’s relief. The presence of a migdol and a nh tw-stronghold in short succession, however, parallels the order of both the Karnak relief and P. Anastasi I for the Ways of Horus forts. Further, the name of the nh tw-stronghold, the “nh tw of Ramess(es) Meryamun,” is very similar to the name of the P. Anastasi I stronghold, the “nh tw of Usermaatre.” The
sole difference between them rests in the preferred throne name of Ramesses II.243

Judging from this section of the Turin tax list, two particularly important conclusions can be drawn. First, it seems that not every well or water source along the Ways of Horus was fortified with buildings like those depicted on the Karnak relief. Others must have existed along the route, which could have been accessed by local populations or bedouin. Perhaps, then, the Egyptian government only chose to fortify water sources that lay at strategic distances from one another or ones that were particularly attractive due to their size or for some other reason. The numerous Sinai graffiti left by a troop commander (ḥry pdt) of the ḫmnt water source of Ramesses Meryamun,244 however, suggests that for security reasons the Egyptian military may have monitored even these less important wells.245

Second, it seems that some or all of the water sources and forts along the Ways of Horus were administered by rw+w-officers. The title rw+w comes from the verb rw+d, “to control or administer,”246 and the title itself translates well as “administrator.”247 It is tempting to suggest, then, that the rw+w represented the more stable counterpart in fort administration to a troop commander (ḥry pdt). The

243 As demonstrated below, the different nḥtw-strongholds of Seti I are primarily distinguished by the variant versions of Seti’s throne name that were incorporated into the designation of each. This being the case, it is quite possible that the nḥtw of Usermaatre and the nḥtw of Ramesses Meryamun are in fact to be differentiated. As only one nḥtw appears in P. Anastasi I, however, and the region of Khasanu is not otherwise attested, we have chosen to discuss the nḥtw of Ramesses Meryamun in this context. This placement, however, does not indicate a belief that the two strongholds are to be equated, only that the nḥtw of Ramesses Meryamun should be sought along the Ways of Horus.

244 Gardiner, Peet, Cerny 1955: 176, no. 247, pl. 68; 178, no. 252, pl. 70; 180, no. 260, pl. 71; 181, no. 261, pl. 71.

245 A troop commander of a ḫmnt-well is also evidenced in P. Anastasi V, 12: 3–4, although the particular well that he protected is not identified. Likewise, as discussed below, the so-called border journal from the reign of Merneptah provides evidence for a number of troop commanders of ḫmnt-wells, all of whom were in some way associated with Tjaru (P. Anastasi III, 6: 4–5).


latter might occupy and—by virtue of his rank—command a fort, but a ḫrt pdḥ was always potentially mobile. The commander and his troops needed to be available to participate in nearby battles, and eventually both commander and troop would be relieved of duty and return home. It may have been, then, that the more humble administrator, who made his permanent home at the fort and who oversaw its day-to-day affairs, played a very important backstage role in the proper functioning of the base. This juxtaposition of the stable fort manager and the frequently shifting military commander, although hypothetical in this case, would neatly explain why it was ḫwḥw, and not ḫḥw pdḥ, who were taxed by virtue of their connection to a particular fort.

1f. p3 ḫḥn n mn-m3’t-r t3 i3(?) ... s3.f (Karnak relief; KRI I, 7: 5)

The ḫḥn-fortress of Menmaatre, (called) the Ia...-is-his-protection

From the ḫḥn of Menmaatre east, it becomes increasingly difficult to correlate the depictions of forts and their wells with the labels provided by the sculptors of the Karnak relief. Indeed, it seems as if the artisans may have been working from two separate lists, one of fort names and the other of well names. Further, it appears that the artisans confused these two lists in the latter portion of the relief, causing names and images to become rather badly entangled.

The fort labeled “I” in Gardiner’s copy of the relief, for example, has two names. It is labeled “the ḫḥn of Menmaatre, (called) the Ia...-is-his-protection,” but directly under the fort is the additional label “the nhṭw-stronghold of Seti Merneptah” (see below). Meanwhile, the water source associated with the fort is left unlabeled. Given that some forts farther east possess two labels, both of which are the names of wells, it would appear that the labeling system had gone awry. Taking into consideration this evident confusion, I would suggest that the nhṭw-stronghold of Seti Merneptah is not an alternate name of the ḫḥn of Menmaatre, as is commonly suggested, but that it instead properly belongs to another fort.

The ḫḥn of Seti Menmaatre is depicted in a similar manner to the other forts that lay between it and Tjaru, namely as a square fortification with bastioned corners. Adjacent to it is the unnamed

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248 Gardiner 1920: 111. Helck (1962: 324–325) regarded the second name as perhaps one of the towers of the fortification system.
well or pool, and all about the fort in a jumble are dead and dying Shasu bedouin. The head and shoulders of one such bedouin, who is depicted apparently trying to rouse a fallen comrade, protrude from the side of the fort, but it seems doubtful that the artist intended to represent the bedouin as physically inside the compound. If so, one assumes that the man would have been shown poking out the top of the fort rather than its side. Whether the fighting actually took place in the direct vicinity of the bhn of Menmaatre and its neighbors to the east or whether the placement of the fort in relation to the battle was dictated by artistic concerns is unfortunately unknowable.

Finally, there remains the problem as to what exactly the word bhn signifies. As discussed above, the term bhn often refers to a mansion or estate belonging to a king or a noble. In a few cases, such as this one, however, bhnw are found in contexts outside Egypt where one might expect the translation “fort” to be applicable. Given that the depiction of the bhn of Menmaatre does not appear to differ substantially from those of the migdols and strongholds to its west, one would assume the compound to have possessed the same general form and function as the other way stations. Indeed, this brings up the question of whether the word bhn—as employed here—carried a true military connotation at all. An alternative explanation might be that a term from the realm of domestic architecture had simply been borrowed to embellish the fort’s name for the sake of variety (as was evidently the case with the incorporation of “t,” or dwelling, in the “t of the Lion”).

1f-2. my r.k r ʾ n wd3 ssy ʾnh wd3 snb m pʾy.f ʾnhw wsr-mȝt-rʾ ʾnh wd3 snb sb-ʾsr lmʾ ibsqb (P. Anastasi I, 27: 5–6)

Come to the region of Wadjet (of) Sese, l.p.h., into its nḥtw-stronghold of Usermaatre, l.p.h., (to) Seb-el together with Ibesqeb.

In the long list of Ways of Horus forts, which the supposed author of P. Anastasi I recounted in order to flaunt his worldly knowledge, Seb-el is listed directly after the nḥtw-stronghold of the region of Wadjet of Sese. The geographic ordering of the toponyms within P. Anastasi I seems to be internally consistent, and so Seb-el should rightly be expected to lie east of its predecessor. This would equate the fort with the bhn of Menmaatre in the Karnak relief.

Although the two names bear absolutely no resemblance to one another, the equation of Seb-el and the bhn-fort is compelling for a
different reason. The well associated with the fort just east of Seti’s bḥn on the Karnak relief is labeled “the well (of) Ibesqeb.” This toponym, although here applied to a well, is obviously identical to the Ibesqeb of P. Anastasi I. Thus, Seti’s bḥn occupies the same position between the toponyms Wadjet and Ibesqeb in Seti’s relief that Seb-el does in P. Anastasi I.

Given that Ibesqeb in Seti’s relief is the name of the well rather than the fort, one might suggest that the toponym Seb-el—if it were present in the Karnak scene—would also have been applied to the appropriate well. Certainly, the fact that the water source is left unla-beled in the relief makes this a distinct possibility. In P. Anastasi I, however, both Seb-el and Ibesqeb employ the foreign throwstick and hill country determinatives rather than the determinative associated with bodies of water.249 The names of the wells in the Karnak relief, it can thus be argued, bore the name of the district as a whole. This would follow the pattern of the wells so far discussed, i.e., the “well of h-p-n,” and the “well of the region of . . .” (see above).

Further, Seb-el, Ibesqeb, and h-t-y-n (i.e., h-p-n)—although provided with geographic rather than building-related determinatives in P. Anastasi I—can be assumed from their context in the papyrus to have been the common names of particular forts. These installations, like Tjaru or Tjeku, then, likely would have derived their popular name from the region in which they were situated. The more for-mal and cumbersome fort names, which employed ever-changing royal monikers, on the other hand, would presumably have been frequently ignored in everyday usage.

Within the context of an informal satirical letter, allegedly written by a scribe eager to display his vast knowledge of all things foreign, it is easy to see why the short, geographically based names were preferred. With regard to an intensely formal context such as a temple relief, however, the elaborate, royally based names were emi-nently more suitable. Certainly, they served to highlight the patronage of the king and to add to his prestige. Moreover, these formal names also agreeably masked the fundamentally foreign nature of the north Sinai. The persistence of the older, Semitic names250 was a reminder

249 For the foreign throwstick determinative, see Gardiner sign T14. For the hill country determinative, see Gardiner sign N25. For the water determinative, see Gardiner sign N 35.

250 As noted above, h-t-y-n is likely derived from a Semitic word. Similarly, Seb-
that Egypt had not always possessed this strategic highway. Thus, while a foreign toponym applied to a well added a dash of the exotic, it would not have done for an Egyptian fort to bear a patently foreign name in an official context. The fact that the wells in the Karnak relief frequently bore the “true” name of the district, however, provides yet another rationale for their inclusion in the scene. Not only was the associated water source an important feature of each fort, but the labels on the wells also provided the viewer of the relief with secure topographic markers.

The [nḥtw-stronghold of] Seti Merneptah

As discussed above, the label “the nḥtw-stronghold of Seti Merneptah” seemingly designates the same fort as does the label “the bḥn of Menmaatre.” It is plausible, then, that due to scribal mishap “the nḥtw-stronghold” label had inadvertently taken the place of a well name (perhaps “the well of Seb-el’”). Were this the case, it may be that the nḥtw-stronghold label was in fact meant to be applied to Gardiner’s fortress K,\(^{251}\) itself labeled “the town (which) his majesty (built) anew.” In this case it would, in turn, be conceivable that the well of Ibesqeb, discussed above, truly belonged to the nḥtw-stronghold of Seti Merneptah.

But whether the nḥtw-stronghold label properly should be affixed to fort I or K, two important factors remain the same. According to the relief, both forts were architecturally similar, adhering to the square, bastioned plan typical of the forts so far encountered. Second, the artist depicted both forts I and K as situated deep in a thicket of Shasu carnage. The battle zone of Seti’s western conquest of the Shasu, if the relief has any topographical validity, encompassed the territory of forts I, K, and M.

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\(^{251}\) Gardiner 1920: pl. 12.
Fortress K, in Gardiner’s copy of the Karnak relief, is designated as the “town (dmi), which his majesty built newly,” and its accompanying water source is labeled “the well (nm) of Ibesqeb.” At casual examination, then, all would appear straightforward. As discussed above, however, a case can be made for adjusting the labeling of the forts. Since fort I possessed two names, fort K is labeled with one name, and fort M is not named, it is possible that the second name of I should be given to K, and K’s name should be reassigned to M. According to this scheme, then, way station M would be the town that his majesty built anew.

Further support may perhaps be mustered for this position upon an examination of the appearance of fortress M. All the forts west of M and east of Tjaru are portrayed in a more or less similar fashion. Square, bastioned, and crenellated, all are depicted as self-contained, single-tiered structures. Fortress M, however, is different in that just above the standard representation of a fort rises yet another, smaller fort. Egyptian artists typically depicted towns (dmūw) in Syria-Palestine in this manner, and according to Egyptian convention it is likely that the double fort motif was intended to represent the towers of a citadel emerging from behind an impressive enclosure wall. Significantly, the three other installations depicted in a similar manner along the easternmost end of the Ways of Horus are all uniformly labeled “dmi” (town).

Fortress M, which we identify with the “town (dmi), which his majesty built newly,” is different from the forts to its west in two additional, albeit less dramatic, ways. First, it is presented as possessing a monumental gateway instead of the doorlike opening present in most of these forts. Second, above the gateway is what appears to be a window. Given its positioning, it is hard to escape the conclusion that this must be a window of appearance, from which Seti could address his loyal subjects and officiate at public reward ceremonies.

It is occasionally suggested that Seti should be given credit for the erection of the forts along the Ways of Horus, since the vast major-

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252 Gardiner 1920: pl. 12.
ity of the installations bear his name.\textsuperscript{254} There are, however, two major problems with this theory. First, the entire string of forts is depicted as fully built and operational already in the first year of Seti’s reign. This would have necessitated remarkably quick construction work—and such a feat would be particularly impressive if undertaken at a time when funerary and coronation ceremonies must have consumed a hefty chunk of the national budget.

Second, as P. Anastasi I vividly demonstrates, buildings of any importance whatsoever were routinely renamed at a change of reign to flatter the new pharaoh. Thus, the appearance of a contemporary king’s name on a building is absolutely no guarantee whatsoever of sponsorship. With regard to the forts along the Ways of Horus, these compounds could well have been erected in the reign of Horemheb,\textsuperscript{255} Ramesses I,\textsuperscript{256} or even at some point in the latter half of the Eighteenth Dynasty.\textsuperscript{257}

It is interesting in this respect, then, that fortress-town M is specifically designated as having been built anew or newly (\textit{m mšwt}) by Seti I. Like forts K and I, the fortress-town M was apparently located in the general area of Shasu unrest. Spalinger, who believed the \textit{dmi} to be located at fort K, theorized that Seti had built the town anew after it had been damaged in fighting with the Shasu.\textsuperscript{258}

The label could just as easily be interpreted, however, to indicate that Seti constructed the town from scratch during his own reign. As discussed earlier with regard to the eastern Delta border zone, the Egyptians often settled potentially vulnerable or hostile areas with new towns that they populated either with loyal Egyptian citizens or with displaced peoples who—by virtue of transplantation—had become wards of the state.

1h-2. \textit{sdd.i n.k kî n ‘ynn bw rḥ.k pꜣy.f tp-rdw (P. Anastasi I, 27: 6)}

I will describe for you the form of Aiyanin. You do not know its governance/duties.

\textsuperscript{255} See chapter four.
\textsuperscript{256} James and McGovern 1993: 236.
\textsuperscript{257} Considering the speed with which Thutmose III and his army crossed the Sinai on his first campaign, there is always a possibility that a rudimentary version of the fortress-system had already been inaugurated during his co-regency with Hatshepsut (see chapters two and three).
\textsuperscript{258} Spalinger 1979b: 30.
While it is true that the $\textit{hnmt}$ water sources depicted in the Karnak relief on occasion provide a clue as to the local name of the military base, the water source of fortress M is not helpful. It is designated generically as the $\textit{hnmt}$ of Seti Merneptah (KRI I, 7: 7). It would be interesting to know, however, whether the local name for the area in which Seti constructed the town was Aiyann, as P. Anastasi I might indicate.

Aiyann is the Semitic word for “two springs” or “two wells,” and the $\textit{hnmt}$ associated with fortress M, although apparently one coherent water source, does indeed seem unusual enough to commemorate in a toponym. While the other water sources along the eastern portion of the route are vaguely circular in shape, M’s water source is comparatively long and narrow. Indeed, given its anomalous appearance, it is tempting to speculate that the artist was consciously attempting to differentiate this $\textit{hnmt}$, which was capable perhaps of supporting the population of an entire town, from the other more modest water sources of the region. Certainly, the palm fronds that emerge from the nearby carnage could perhaps also be used to argue that the new town ($\textit{dmi}$) of Aiyann was located in a particularly fertile area.

If the toponym Aiyann can indeed be associated with the town at M, it is interesting to note that the scribe of P. Anastasi I calls particular attention to the town’s form. As discussed above, a traveler who proceeded east from Tjaru would certainly be surprised by the novel presence of a town rather than a simple fort along the route. Its form, then, would be worth remarking upon. Likewise, it is potentially meaningful that the scribe chose to highlight the governance or duty ($\textit{tp-rd}$) of the town as a factor of importance. If Seti had indeed constructed and populated the town for the express purpose of protecting Egyptian interests in an area ridden with hostile bedouin, then the town itself would be charged with a duty that would certainly distinguish it from other, “organically grown” towns.

\textbf{Ii. n-ḥ-s n p3 wr} (Karnak relief; KRI I, 8: 4)  
Nekhes of the ruler

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260 This word may also be translated as “principal,” “rule,” “position,” “instruction,” “regulation,” “plan,” etc. (Gardiner 1911: 29, n. 11; Faulkner 1986: 297; Lesko 1989: 79–80.)
Two labels are associated with fort N, and although only one is specifically written within the circular body of water, both are the names of ḫmn t water sources: the ḫmn t of Menmaatre, great of victories, and the ḫmn t (called) sweet water (KRI I, 8: 1). If one works according to the assumption that the labels had been misapplied in the eastern half of the relief and makes adjustments, however, it is possible to come up with a plausible solution. Gardiner’s fort S, to the east of N, is labeled the Nekhes-of-the-ruler. While reapplying this name to fort N would leave S unnamed, the next fortress to the east (Gardiner’s P) was in fact given two separate names. If P relinquishes its extra name to S, then all the forts depicted on Seti’s relief are provided with proper names.

Whether or not one applies the name “Nekhes of the ruler” to fort S or N, however, matters very little in terms of attempting to reconstruct the architecture and environment of the fort from the relief. The depiction of both compounds conforms to the square, self-contained, single-tiered architectural type. Likewise, N’s unusually tall appearance versus S’s short and squat demeanor can effectively be explained away by a consideration of the space available to the artist. The water sources are also extremely similar. Both are the wide, irregular type of ḫmn t typical of the majority of forts from the ḫjn of Menmaatre east. Other than being located along an apparently peaceful stretch of the Ways of Horus, there is little contextually upon which to remark.

The name of the fort, however, is a bit confusing. The meaning of the word n-ḥ-s is unknown, although judging from its determinative it might have referred to a water source of some sort. Likewise the identity of the wr is left unspecified. Given that both forts N and S were located well within Egypt’s sovereign border zone, it is unlikely that a foreign ruler was intended. Indeed, the heavy emphasis in the names of the forts upon the reigning pharaoh would suggest that the title wr should be interpreted as an allusion to Seti himself.

\[\text{\footnotesize 261 The word ḫḥtw is here spelled, unusually, with a pr-house determinative. It makes more sense, however, to translate the epithet as the traditional “great of victories” rather than the otherwise unattested “great of strongholds.”}\]

\[\text{\footnotesize 262 As further evidence of scribal confusion, the “Nekhes of the ruler” is written on the accompanying body of water, while S itself is labeled the ḫmn t of Menmaatre.}\]
Nekhes, Heberet, you have not visited them since your birth.

It seems clear that the n-ḥ-s of the ruler in the Karnak relief and the n-ḥ-s of P. Anastasi I designate the same fort, despite the substitution of a sā-sign for a sw-sign in the spelling of the latter. Unfortunately, however, the papyrus provides no details of interest concerning the n-ḥ-s, save that it might be comfortably paired with the way station at Heberet. Given that the two fortified installations were neighbors (if n-ḥ-s of the ruler is interpreted as the name of fort S) or were separated by a single fort that is omitted in P. Anastasi I (if n-ḥ-s is assigned to N), their grouping in P. Anastasi I would likely have been based upon proximity. A grouping due to similarity in form is unlikely, however, given that ḥbrt/hw...t is depicted as a two-tiered town (dmi) whereas the n-ḥ-s—whether located at S or N—adhered to the more compact, single-tiered model.

The nḥtw-stronghold [of] Menmaatre, heir of Re

Gardiner’s fortress P is labeled with two separate names, the “nḥtw-stronghold of Menmaatre” and the “Town (dmi), which his majesty built newly at the ḥnmt of Hu...t.” It has been argued above that in the process of adding labels to the forts along the eastern half of the Ways of Horus, somehow the images and the complementary list of wells and forts had gotten badly mismatched. Due to this mix-up, some forts possessed two names, while others were associated only with the name of wells. If, however, one adjusts the labels, allotting the “extra” fort names to those forts without, all of the buildings along the Ways of Horus can be assigned names.

Given this confusion, then, it is suggested that the “extra” name of fortress P, the nḥtw-stronghold of Menmaatre, should instead be assigned to fort N or fort S. As N does not have a proper name of its own, however, the main question is whether P donated its extra name directly to N or whether the label was intended for S—whose name (Nekhes of the ruler) would then be shifted to fill the void at N. Archaeology cannot settle the problem, as there is no way specifically to associate the very few excavated Sinai forts with those depicted in the Karnak relief between Tjaru and Raphia. Likewise, we are at a particular loss with regard to the nḥtw-stronghold of Menmaatre as it is the only fort unattested in P. Anastasi I. Given that both S
and N appear to possess the same compact, square plan and virtually identical associated water sources, however, the question of which name should be assigned to which fort is relatively moot.

\[\text{k. dmi kdn \ h.m.f m m3wt m t3 hnmnt hw-[ . . . ]-t} \ (\text{Karnak relief; KRI I, 8: 2})\]

The town, which his majesty built newly at the well of Hu . . . t

Although there is no definite way to distinguish which of fortress P’s two names was its “real” name, its two-tiered appearance in the Karnak relief strongly suggests that the installation should be designated as a town (\text{dmi}) rather than as a stronghold (\text{n\textasciitilde tw}). As discussed earlier, the artistic motif of the “fort within a fort” seems to have been an attempt by the Egyptian artist to depict a citadel surrounded by an enclosure wall. This sort of arrangement, typified by the Middle Kingdom fortress at Buhen, was potentially capable of housing a substantial resident population.

According to the relief, Seti I had constructed this “new town” at the site of a specific well and in close proximity to a wide pool.\textsuperscript{263} Given the importance of water sources in as dry an area as the regions of the northern Sinai and southwestern Canaan, it would be surprising if Seti’s new town did not disrupt a previously existing settlement. For this reason, it is very tempting indeed to interpret the hill upon which the fortress was evidently perched as a “tell,” i.e., a pronounced mound formed from the debris of a succession of older towns.

If Seti’s “new” town had been occupied prior to his arrival, one might suggest that its transformation into an Egyptian installation followed a similar trajectory to that observed at Tell el-Ajjul (Sharuhen). As outlined in chapters two and three, the vast majority of the inhabitants of the formerly flourishing Hyksos capital at Tell el-Ajjul had been forcibly exiled by the Egyptian government at the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty. Once depopulated of its hostile inhabitants, however, the town served nicely as an Egyptian base. Thus, if this older settlement had indeed been occupied.

\textsuperscript{263} Kitchen describes the feature as a “circular fort” (KRI I, 8: 3) and transcribes its label in a manner different than his eventual translation would suggest (Kitchen 1993: 7).
formerly by townspeople who either aided or abetted the Shasu bedouin, such an “eradication and replacement” policy may have presented Seti with an appealing option. Not only would this move have secured for Egyptian forces the well and the wide pool associated with the tell, but it also would have added yet another barrier to the westward movement of hostile peoples.

Whether Seti repopulated the town with Egyptian soldiers, Egyptian civilians, or transplanted individuals who had become wards of the state, Seti would have supplanted a hostile center with one loyal to Egypt. Further, in doing so, he would have admirably obeyed the advice given by a First Intermediate Period king several hundred years earlier. This monarch had warned his successor, “Guard your borders, secure your forts... From Hebenu to the Way(s) of Horus, it is settled with towns, filled with people, of the best in the whole land, to repel attacks against them.”

1k-2. mḥs ḫbrt bw ptr.k st m-ḏr mswt.k (P. Anastasi I, 27: 6–7)

Nekhes, Heberet, you have not visited them since your birth.

Although by no means exact, the spellings of the well ḫ(w) . . . t and P. Anastasi I’s ḫbrt are close enough to convince most scholars that the two installations should be equated. Once again, this would provide an example of the local name for an area (and the informal designation of its fortress) being demoted in Seti’s relief to the name of a water source. P. Anastasi I, however, provides no other information about the fortress except for its implied proximity to the bases at Nekhes of the ruler and Raphia.

1l. dmi n... (Karnak Relief; KRI I, 8: 5)

Town of...

The label that once identified Gardiner’s fortress U is only partially preserved. Enough remains to ascertain that the installation was classified as a town (dmi), as might have been surmised from its two-tiered representation. The name itself, however, is no longer extant. Perched atop a mound or tell, the town appears to have been of substantial size and located in relatively close proximity to Gaza.

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265 The derivation of this toponym is not well understood, and many widely differing translations have been put forth (see Redford 1998: 48, n. 10).
Thus, even if P. Anastasi I were not to be taken into consideration, the southern coastal town of Raphia would remain the obvious candidate for the “town-of...”

Archaeological excavations have never been undertaken at Raphia, but neither textual evidence nor survey data suggest that the town predated the Late Bronze Age. If Raphia were founded at this time, the Egyptian government must have either sponsored or sanctioned the town’s construction. But, despite the fact that in the Karnak relief Raphia is depicted in a manner that suggests its similarity in form and function to other Egyptian fortress-towns, it is very difficult to discern whether Egyptian forces did in fact occupy the town. For one thing, it is remarkable that Raphia appears in the toponym lists of both Seti I and Ramesses II. The rationale that could have prompted a town that lay only 35 km from the main Egyptian base at Gaza to have rebelled in either reign is unclear, but the fact that Gaza is included on neither of these lists suggests that some sort of unrest may indeed have plagued the town. It is possible, even likely, then, that Raphia found itself caught up in the Shasu wars.

If the inhabitants sided with the bedouin, this of course would have provoked an Egyptian attack, thus landing the town a place in the toponym lists. But there is also the possibility that Raphia instead found itself under attack and in need of rescue by Egyptian forces. Were this to have been the case, Raphia would have earned its place in the toponym lists in a similar manner to Beth Shan, which also suffered at the hands of outside forces. Whether Raphia was attacked or aided by the Egyptian troops, however, it is curious that the Karnak relief provides no indication of trouble in the town’s immediate environs.

Indeed, instead of battles, such as raged at a distance to the east and west of Raphia, an extraordinarily peaceful scene is depicted in

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266 The site is generally thought to be located at Tell Rafah (Aharoni 1968: 44), but site 07750 07925 (Ahituv 1979: IV) has also been suggested.

267 Aharoni (1968: 139–140) speculates that Raphia may have been founded with Egyptian help to serve as a seaport. This stretch of the southern Canaanite coast, however, was not an ideal area for harbors.

268 KRI I, 29: no. 70; 32: no. 65A; KRI II, 216: no. 66.

269 See below. Kumidi, the late Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian base in Upe, may also appear on Seti’s toponym list, but the reading is quite doubtful (KRI I, 29: no. 60; Kitchen 1993: 23, no. 60). If so, a similar scenario might have accounted for its presence.
its vicinity. Directly outside of the town gates, a group of Canaanite men is shown genuflecting before Seti and offering him elaborate gifts. It is possible that the men should be interpreted as the rulers of Syria-Palestine (\(\text{"uwnw h5\text{3}\text{w}-KRI I, 7: 12}\)) whose mouths Seti is stated to have stopped from boasting in a nearby rhetorical text. If this were the case, the placement of this gathering outside Raphia might have had more to do with artistic design and symbolism than with strict topographic accuracy.

On the other hand, the artist could have been depicting the townspeople of Raphia involved in the kind of elaborate tribute-giving ceremony that pharaohs must have experienced repeatedly while on campaign. It is of interest in this regard, then, to note that the design of the vessels offered to the king are patently Egyptian in style. Such blatantly imitative decorative design would not be entirely unexpected from the output of artisans working in an area just a stone’s throw from Egypt itself.

Where is Raphia? What are its ramparts like? How many irrw-lengths does it take in going to Gaza?

The final questions regarding the Ways of Horus military route, which were lobbed at the unfortunate “correspondent” in P. Anastasi I, concerned the town of Raphia. Specifically the queries focused upon the whereabouts of Raphia, the appearance of its ramparts, and the distance from that town to Gaza. The correct answers, one might surmise, would be that Raphia lay at the far end of the Ways of Horus, some 3.3-iters from Gaza, and that it was enclosed by a bastioned wall with crenellated parapets.

The town of Pa-Canaan.

Judging from the royal or formal name applied to Gaza in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, namely “the town (\(\text{dmi}\)) of The-Ruler-Seized-(It), its Syrian name being Gaza” (Urk. IV, 648: 10–11), this southern

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270 An irr is believed, based on later sources, to have been about 10.5 km in length (Spalinger 1985: 4; Gardiner 1960: 17; 1988: 199).
271 This is based upon the appearance of Fort U in the Karnak relief (Gardiner 1920: pl. 12).
fortress-town had served as an Egyptian base in Syria-Palestine since at least the reign of Thutmose III. In the Amarna Period too, Gaza played a key role in the administration of southern Canaan (EA 129, 289). Given the position of the town—at the tail end of the Ways of Horus and at the very beginning of the Via Maris—Gaza’s importance is of no surprise. Its border locale made the town an efficient node through which imperial functionaries in Syria-Palestine could transmit goods, personnel, and information.

In Seti’s Karnak relief, Gaza is clearly designated as the easternmost Egyptian fortress-town along the Ways of Horus. Moreover, like the other fortress-towns (dmtw) in the relief, Gaza is represented with the two-tiered image by which the artist intended to indicate both an enclosure wall and a citadel. Also, true to its kind, the town is depicted perched upon a mound. Given the geography of the area, however, such a mound must certainly have been far more modest than the artist suggests.

Perhaps the most perplexing feature of the relief is the presence of what looks like a long extended sack, seemingly wrapped around the eastern end of the fortress-town. While some have suggested that the peculiar image portrayed a moat or a cistern,272 neither option is particularly satisfying. It is hoped that renewed excavations at Gaza will eventually shed light upon the problem.

Providing the larger context for the fortress-town in Seti’s relief is the writhing mass of dead, wounded, and fleeing Shasu warriors whom the king bested in the plains below Gaza. Although the enemy is scattered all about the Egyptian base, it is significant that none appear in, or particularly near to, the fortress-town itself—suggesting that Gaza remained essentially unmolested throughout the fighting. Certainly, there is no reason to believe, as some have suggested,273 that Gaza served as an enemy stronghold during this confrontation. More likely, were the artist to have depicted Egyptians other than the king himself, the resident garrison of the fortress would have been seen to have played an active part in the battle.

2. sw pn iw.t(w) r-dd n ḫm.f r-nty p3 ḫr ḫsy nty m dmi n ḫm nwy.f n.f rmt ʾs3 iw.f ḫr nḥm dmi n bt-ṣr ḫr ṣm3 m-ʾ nšy.w pḥr bw di.n.f

272 For the interpretation as moat, see Yadin 1963a: 230; Epigraphic Survey 1986: 5. For the interpretation as cistern, see Spalinger 1979b: 44, n. 9, following a thesis presented by Malamat in 1977 lecture at Yale.

(On) this day, one came to say to his majesty thus: “The vile enemy who is in the town of Hamath has assembled to him[self] many people, seizing the town of Beth Shan, and is joined up with those from Pehel; he is not allowing that the ruler of Rehob might come outside.” Then his majesty sent out the first division of Amun, “Powerful-in-bows,” against the town of Hamath; the first division of Re, “Abounding-in-valor,” against the town of Beth Shan; and the first division of Seth, “Strong-of-bows,” against the town of Yenoam.

As discussed in the historical introduction, following his victories against the Shasu bedouin, Seti continued northward with his army. While he was in Galilee or perhaps the Jezreel Valley, the king received word of rebellious activity in the Transjordan. According to his informant, the ruler of Hamath and the people of nearby Pella had seized Beth Shan and laid siege to Rehob.

An examination of the Amarna archive demonstrates that the Egyptian government interfered quite selectively in internecine struggles. Many Syro-Palestinian towns suffering aggression from neighboring polities were quite unabashedly left to their own fate. It is interesting, then, that Seti took such decisive measures to quell the disturbances in the Transjordan. According to the stele, immediately upon learning of the attacks, Seti dispatched three divisions of his army to the region: one to Hamath, one to Beth Shan, and one to Yenoam. Within the space of a day, apparently, the revolts were quelled. Although the stele gives no indication of Seti’s personal involvement, the Karnak relief, which depicts him single-handedly defeating the town of Yenoam, might suggest that he accompanied the division of Seth.274

It may be particularly significant that although the stele indicates that local potentates ruled at Rehob and Hamath, the same cannot be said regarding Beth Shan and Pella. In the late Eighteenth Dynasty, when both textual and archaeological evidence suggests that Beth Shan functioned as an Egyptian garrison-town, the polity was also apparently leaderless (see chapter four). If, as is likely, then, Beth Shan had retained an Egyptian garrison into the Nineteenth Dynasty,

274 See the historical summary above, however, for the opinions of others who argue that Seti attacked Yenoam himself on a subsequent campaign.
Hamath’s capture of the base almost certainly served as the impetus for Seti’s attack. Beth Shan, which was located in an ideal position to monitor three fords across the Jordan River and numerous important highways, was simply too valuable a foothold to lose.

The Amarna letters indicate that for at least a short period of time in the late Eighteenth Dynasty the Egyptians delegated the actual garrisoning of the town to soldiers from nearby Ginti-Kirmil (EA 289). Likewise, although Egyptian-style objects proliferated at the site, excavations reveal that the architecture of Beth Shan remained strictly Canaanite. Thus, it may be surmised that the Egyptians, while at all times maintaining control of the city, made little attempt to alter their base to conform to an Egyptian model. This rather hands-off approach to garrison maintenance, however, underwent a radical reformation following Seti’s reconquest of Beth Shan. Virtually no architecture of the LB IIA (late Eighteenth Dynasty) was to survive the transition.

Given that the archaeology of Nineteenth Dynasty Beth Shan will be discussed in-depth below, it will suffice here simply to present a broad overview of the site’s transformation. Basically, the Egyptian government leveled the Canaanite temple precinct, which had formerly occupied the tell’s acropolis, and replaced it with a military complex. The new plan included a small building with thickened walls and corner bastions. Adjacent to it, the Egyptians also erected a monumental structure that excavators have termed a “commandant’s house.” Further, the base included numerous storerooms and residences—at least one of the latter of which resembled in type the typical Egyptian center-hall house.

Finally, occupying the middle of the new Beth Shan was a small chapel, strongly reminiscent of the community chapels that serviced settlements in Egypt itself. In nearly all of these buildings, Egyptian-style artifacts were found en masse. These items included not only luxury goods and the usual assortment of scarabs and pendants but also copious quantities of artifacts such as utilitarian ceramics and clay figurines—both unlikely to have been traded or brought casually to the site.

275 Dorsey (1991: 110) counts “at least ten thoroughfares that led into Canaan through this important corridor.”
This marked transformation of Beth Shan—from a predominantly Canaanite town into one in which Egyptian culture was everywhere evident—is perhaps a throwback to early Eighteenth Dynasty practices at sites like Tell el-Ajjul and Sai. In these towns, the rebellious or troublesome population had been largely exiled by the Egyptians, who subsequently redesigned the town so that it might serve effectively as an Egyptian base. As discussed in chapters three and four, imperial practice evidently shifted somewhat in the mid to late Eighteenth Dynasty. From Thutmose III onward, the Egyptian government appears to have relied heavily on extant Canaanite infrastructure, commandeering both supplies and garrison headquarters from local Canaanite rulers. Indeed, an examination of the archaeological evidence at Beth Shan at this time period suggests that the site fits admirably into this pattern.

Beth Shan in the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, is a particularly dramatic testament to the same change in governing philosophy that would result in numerous Egyptian-style buildings and complexes sprouting up throughout Canaan. For practically the first time since the early Eighteenth Dynasty, and in a much more expanded fashion, Egypt would manifest its presence in previously rebellious or strategically vital areas by erecting imperial architecture. What it lost in construction costs through building its own bases, Egypt must certainly have gained in ideological impact. By literally leaving its mark upon Canaanite soil, the Egyptian government expressed visibly both ownership and control over its subject territory. Indeed, the very presence of an imperial edifice directly within the precincts of a formerly rebellious city vividly conveyed the message that its inhabitants were now directly under the eye of the Egyptian state.

3. štwy hwti s₃ kdn₃ nty m p₃ pr n ss mry n p₃ ḫtm nty m 3w (Palace Timber Account; KRI I, 274: 5–6)

(The) merchant Huti, son of Qatna, who is in the house of the scribe Mery of the ḫtm-fortress who is now deceased.

Papyrus Bibliothèque Nationale 203–213, 237 is an example of an administrative daybook, i.e., a document chronicling, day by day, the events of particular importance to a governmental institution. In this case, it was the scribes of the king’s house in Memphis who recorded on the papyrus numerous deliveries and expenditures relating to palace life during Seti I’s second and third regnal years. This document is not only interesting with regard to economic and social
history, but it is also important in that each time the king left the capital for a trip, his departure was duly noted. This meticulous record keeping allows historians to pinpoint Seti’s whereabouts for much of his second and third regnal year.

It was in year 3, first month of Shomu, day 17—the very same day that the king himself was in Heliopolis (KRI I, 273: 2)—that the merchant Huti made his debut in the daybook of the king’s house. In Seti’s absence, the scribes of the palace requisitioned timber from religious chapels and from various officials in the southern quarter of the city. Given that military or naval officers outnum-

bered their civilian countrymen by a ratio of more than two to one in the list, the quarter may have been one in which veterans were allotted property as one of the special perks of their profession. Alternatively or additionally, military men could easily have been particular targets of the tax for administrative reasons.

The merchant Huti, who provided the palace with one 13-cubit support beam, was not himself a military man. He bore a connection, however, whether familial or business-related, to the house of the deceased htm-fortress scribe Mery. It is not stated where Mery had held his post during his lifetime, but Tjaru, Egypt’s most famous htm-fortress, is a distinct possibility. Certainly, numerous scribes must have been enlisted to record systematically—for security and administrative reasons—all individuals and goods that passed through this exceptionally busy border-fortress. Scribal record keeping and letter writing, however, would presumably have been required at every htm-fortress, and so it is dangerous to hazard too confident a guess as to Mery’s workplace.

Reign of Ramesses II

1. n’t pw ir.n hm.f m-hd m3.f nt-htrim.f hm’f sp.n.f tp w3t nfrt r m3’ m rmp-sp 5 3bd 2 n šmw sw 9 šš hm.f p3 htm n ḫ3rw (Kadesh poem; KRI II, 12: no. 28–30)

It was a proceeding that his majesty made northward, his army (and) his chariotry together with him. He started upon a good road in order to depart in regnal year 5, second month of Shomu, day 9, when his majesty passed the htm-fortress of Tjaru.

277 For this practice, see especially Katary (1983: 74), who estimates that military men occupied their civilian residencies for an appreciable portion of the calendar year.
Ramesses II fought many battles in his career, but none loomed larger than his contest with the Hittites at Kadesh in terms of the sheer quantity of monuments and texts in which the king commemorated it. This preoccupation with a single battle is reminiscent of Thutmose III’s obvious fascination with Megiddo, which likewise overshadowed any other armed contest fought by this famed warrior pharaoh. The battle narratives of Kadesh and Megiddo, in fact, are the two longest and most detailed descriptions of any war undertaken in the second millennium.

It is interesting, then, that the principal records of both battles initiate the narration of the campaigns with the precise moment at which the pharaoh and his army passed through the border-fortress of Tjaru. The symbolic importance of this event is likewise highlighted in Seti’s Karnak relief, which vividly depicts Tjaru as the border between the familiar homeland and the wilder world beyond. Tjaru’s inclusion in these war records is not due to any events of importance that transpired at the fortress itself. Rather, it must be understood as a framing device. The pharaoh’s passage through Tjaru marks the beginning of his adventure, just as the bestowal of booty and tribute before Amun signifies its closure. While lesser campaigns did not warrant such a dramatic retelling, the campaign of a lifetime required a story—one complete with a beginning, middle, and end. The evocation of Tjaru, then, aided the Egyptian scribe or artist in imbuing his subject matter with an epic flavor.

2. n k3 n iry-p’t ḫtyt- st3 nsw r-ḥry m t3-sty t3y ḫw ḫr wnm nsw ḫṣy n ntr-nfr ḫry pdt ḫmy-r šsmsm tdmw n ḫm.f m ti-nt-ḥtr ḫry pdt m ṭḥw wpwty nsw ḫr ḫṣt [nbt] ii ḫr ḫt in wrt.s smi ḫ nn p3.f ḫpr sš nsw ḫwy (Berlin stele 17332; KRI III, 79: 15–80: 1)

... for the ka of the hereditary noble and count, king’s son, chief minister in Nubia, fanbearer on the king’s right, one favored of the goodly god, troop commander, overseer of horses, deputy of his majesty in the chariotry, troop commander in Tjaru, royal messenger to [every] foreign land, one who returned from Hatti (and) who brought its great lady. (Another) one who can report on (its) whereabouts, he has never existed—the royal scribe, Huy.

Ramesses II’s viceroy Huy is known from a number of monuments and graffiti, which highlight three of his titles in particular: king’s son of Kush, overseer of southern foreign countries, and fan-
bearer on the king’s right.\textsuperscript{280} When exactly he filled these positions in Nubia is not entirely clear, although his relative position among other vicerocks is. Huy seems to have occupied his office between the tenures of Paser and Setau. Thus, while Paser probably assumed office sometime around Ramesses’ 25th year, Setau definitely was viceroy already by year 38.\textsuperscript{281}

Only one document, a stele carved for Huy by a draughtsman named Kheti, alludes to the events in Huy’s life and the offices that he held, which may have led to his promotion to viceroy. According to the stele, Huy served as deputy of his majesty in the chariots, overseer of horses, royal scribe, troop commander (\textit{hry pdt}), royal messenger to every foreign country, and troop commander of Tjaru (\textit{hry pdt n (\textit{3rw})}). With the exception of the first, all of these titles are common to the resumes of former senior officials at Tjaru.\textsuperscript{282} The title fanbearer on the king’s right, although common among vicerocks,\textsuperscript{283} was also held by Seti, who likewise commanded troops and oversaw the \textit{htm}-fortress at Tjaru (see chapter four).

It is Huy’s possession of the title “troop commander at Tjaru” that places him within the purview of this study. Another title of particular interest in Huy’s resume, however, is that of “royal envoy to every foreign land.” At least two officials who served as \textit{wpwty nsrw} prior to the reign of Ramesses II also were drawn from the ranks of “troop commander of Tjaru.”\textsuperscript{284} By virtue of their proximity to the border and their easy access to protective bodyguards, the troop commanders stationed on the fringes of the eastern Delta must have been called upon to serve as diplomats with relative frequency.

Royal envoys, whether or not they had ever commanded at Tjaru, often had backgrounds in the chariots.\textsuperscript{285} By virtue of his achieved

\textsuperscript{280} KRI III, 77: 16; 78: 5; 79: 5. For Huy’s career generally, see Habachi 1980b: 72–73; 1957; Singer 1983: 18–23.

\textsuperscript{281} Kitchen 1982: 135.

\textsuperscript{282} The title \textit{hry pdt (n (\textit{3rw})}) was held by Menna, Amenemhet, Neby (see chapter three), Paramesses, and Seti (see chapter four). Likewise \textit{imy-r ssm(aw)t} appeared in the resumes of Menna (see chapter three), Paramasses, and Seti (see chapter four). Amememhet, Neby (see chapter three), and Paramesses (see chapter four) were all \textit{wpwty nsrw}. The title \textit{s Rw nsrw} was held by Paramesses and Seti (see chapter four). Given that Neby (see chapter three), Paramasses, and Seti (see chapter four) all likewise bore the title \textit{imy-r htm}, it is not unlikely that Huy had functioned in this capacity as well.

\textsuperscript{283} Reisner 1920: 32, 80–81.

\textsuperscript{284} Neby (see chapter three) and Paramesses (see chapter four). Amenemhet, a troop commander of Tjeku, was likewise a royal messenger (see chapter three).

\textsuperscript{285} Valloggia 1976; Redford 1990: 26; El-Saady 1999: 421.
position as both troop commander at Tjaru and deputy of his majesty in the chariots, then, Huy would have been an eminently suitable official to send as an envoy of the king in one of the more important diplomatic missions of Ramesses II’s reign. Certainly, it is impressive that to Huy was assigned the incomparably prestigious task of retrieving the Hittite princess—Ramesses II’s long sought-after bride—and escorting her back to Egypt.

If Huy is indeed to be identified with Haya, the addressee of a cuneiform letter found in a storeroom of the administrative headquarters at Aphek (see below), one can add further luster to his pre-viceregal career. The letter, authored by a governor (lit. sakin mati) of Ugarit named Takuhlina, requests Haya’s help in arbitrating a dispute between Takuhlina’s representatives, who hailed from Akko, and an official who oversaw the Egyptian granaries at Jaffa. The quarrel concerned some fifteen tons of wheat, which belonged to Ugarit but had been handed over to the official at Jaffa. The refusal of the latter to return the grain upon request seems to have been at the crux of the matter.

In the letter found at Aphek, Takuhlina also assures Haya that the grain shipment expected from Ugarit is well on its way. Just what these negotiations imply is unclear, but the letter provides evidence that shortly following the thaw of Egypto-Hittite relations, commercial exchanges between Egypt and Ugarit had already been resumed in full force. Such large-scale exchanges of grain are likewise of particular interest when one considers that only a short time later the land of Hatti would be struck by a devastating famine.

There are many indications that the letter’s recipient, Haya, was regarded as a particularly important individual. Not only was he addressed as a “magnate” (rabu) rather than as a “commissioner” (rabisu), but Takuhlina also referred to him as “father.” In the letter, Takuhlina verbally genuflects before Haya, claiming to fall at his feet, and also mentions an appreciable quantity of fine wool that

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287 The amount of wheat would have been worth some 250 silver shekels (Singer 1983: 4).
288 For the high status of the title rabu, which seems to indicate the upper echelon of officials in Egypt’s foreign service, see Hachmann 1982a: 23–25; Singer 1983: 20–21; Redford 1990: 8. See also chapter four for a discussion of the title rabu vs. rabisu.
he was sending along as a gift. All this is particularly significant when one considers the high status that Takuhlina must have enjoyed as the second most powerful person in one of Syria-Palestine’s mightiest city-states. The fact that Ugarit had not been in vassalage to Egypt since it defected to the Hittite cause in the Amarna Period also renders this deference remarkable.

Haya’s status as a magnate (rabu) would place him in the category of foreign official known from the Amarna letters to have often been based in Egypt but to have traveled north with troops from time to time on business. Higginbotham suggests that it may have been in the course of one of these “circuit tours,” during a stop at Aphek, that Haya received the sakìn matì’s letter. In order for the Ugaritic official to know where to address his missive, however, it must be assumed that Haya had based himself at Aphek for an appreciable length of time.

The building at Aphek in which the letter was found will be discussed in detail below, but the excavators and most scholars are convinced that its architecture and material culture fit the general profile of an Egyptian governor’s residency. It is quite possible, then, that around 1230 B.C., when scholars estimate that the careers of Huy and Takuhlina would have intersected, Huy served as governor at Aphek. As discussed above, the Egyptians may have co-opted this town as a base shortly following rebellious activity in or around Ramesses’ eighth year. Aphek’s position along the Via Maris, at the springs of the Yarkon River, and in close proximity to the pharaonic granaries at Jaffa would have made it a highly attractive base of operations and a suitable seat for a powerful regional governor.

The cuneiform letter found at Aphek, then, may well shed light upon Huy’s early career, a point at which he already held a particularly

290 Redford 1990: 8.
292 The excavation report is rather unambiguously entitled Aphek in Canaan: The Egyptian Governor’s Residence and Its Finds (Kokhavi 1990). Others who have classified the building in this manner include Oren (1984a: fig 2) and Hasel (1998: 95, 102). Higginbotham (2000: 290) disagrees, but she is more skeptical than most scholars about the presence of governors’ residencies in Canaan.
important position in the foreign service. Kitchen theorizes that it was essentially in appreciation for a job well done as troop commander at Tjaru and as escort to the Hittite princess that Huy received his promotion to the office of viceroy. 294 Although Huy was destined to serve in Nubia for only four years at most, 295 the vast territory and mineral wealth over which he then exerted control must have rendered the post of viceroy the pinnacle of his achievements. In such a prestigious career as his, however, the office of viceroy would have been simply the most recent of his many honors.

Regnal year 7, wine of the vineyard of the hwt-chapel of User[maat]re-[Setepenre], l.p.h., in the temple of Amun in Tjaru, (from the) vineyard “Sustenance and provision”—under the authority of the overseer of the storehouse, Mahu/Pinudjem.

Numerous hieratic dockets, which once identified shipments of “wine of Tjaru,” have been discovered in late Eighteenth Dynasty contexts (see chapter four), and so it is not particularly surprising to find counterparts in sites dating to the Nineteenth Dynasty. At the Ramesseum, Ramesses II’s vast mortuary complex, in fact, one would expect to find evidence of wine from nearly every wine-bearing region in Egypt.

It is interesting, however, that in the two ostraca that contained the titles of the officials under whose authority the wine was sent, both men are designated as “overseer of the storehouse” (imy-r st). The first attested holder of this title at Tjaru (i.e., the Ways of Horus)

294 Kitchen 1982: 136. See also Edel 1953: 62; Helck 1975a: 104; Valloggia 1976: 254; El-Saady 1999: 414. There are others, however, who tentatively suggest that Huy served as viceroy prior to his duties escorting the Hittite princess (Habachi 1980c: 634; Spalinger 1980: 98; Singer 1983: 22). Although the position of troop commander at Tjaru was undoubtedly a high one, it would nonetheless have represented a demotion with respect to the office of viceroy.

295 The royal marriage is known to have taken place in Ramesses’ 34th year, and an inscription commissioned by the next viceroy, Setau, is dated to year 38 (Spalinger 1980: 98).

296 A docket also found at the Ramesseum, but dating to year 49, may possibly refer to the same vineyard, but the text is very fragmentary (KRI II, 693: 14; Kitchen 1996: 438).
was a contemporary of Thutmose I, who lived some two centuries previously (see chapter two). Whether the Thutmosid and Ramesside storehouses at Tjaru contained the same categories of goods, however, is unknown.

Finally, the Ramesseum dockets are significant in that they provide the information that Ramesses II had incorporated a hwt-chapel of his own into the Amun temple at Tjaru. Such encroachment is not particularly odd, considering that the cults of the king of the gods and those of the king of men were always closely interwoven. It would be interesting to know more about the social and economic interrelations between the temple of Horus, the temple of Amun, and the chapel of the king, however, as well as the nature of the roles that each played in the greater community of Tjaru.

3b. [rnpt-sp] 12 irp n ḫ3r . . . [nsw]-bity ṣwr-m3’t-r’ stp-n-r’ ‘nhl [wš3 sub] (Wine docket found at Buhen; KRI II, 776: 10)

[Regnal year] 12, wine of Tjaru . . . King of [Upper] and Lower Egypt, Usermaatre Setepenre, l.[p.h.].

The text of this particular wine docket is less remarkable than its provenience. Situated at the head of the second cataract, Buhen lay at the opposite end of Egypt from Tjaru. In form and function, however, the two fortress-towns were not essentially dissimilar. Moreover, unlike a good many of the Lower Nubian fortress-towns, Buhen apparently flourished in the Nineteenth Dynasty (see below).

The year 12 wine docket was found outside block A at Buhen, the building occupied by the commandant of the fortress-town.297 Inside the residence, which had been constructed in the Middle Kingdom and remodeled in the New Kingdom, numerous inscribed jar sealings accumulated. Perhaps not surprisingly, the majority of the wine had been imported from the Delta region, especially during the reigns of Hatshepsut, Thutmose II, Amenhotep II, Thutmose IV, and Amenhotep III.298

The vast majority of the wine-related artifacts found at Buhen hailed directly from the wine cellar of the commandant’s house. This fact prompted the excavators to conclude that the stash of wine was reserved “for the consumption of the viceroy and troop-captain of

Nubia and their retinues, the mayors and high priests of Buhen, the royal envoys, and other such officers of state as resided in or visited Buhen.” Indeed, wine imported from so far afield must have been beyond the reach of most individuals who inhabited the fortress.

3c. r IPT SP 7 IR P N T [3Rw] . . . W B IMN-M-IT.f N Hr Nsw (Deir el-Medina wine docket; KRI VII, 68: 8)

Regnal year 7, wine of Tj[aru] . . . The wab-priest Amenemitef of the royal necropolis.

3d. . . n PR RE . . . IR P NfR N T [Rw] (Deir el-Medina wine docket; KRI VII, 68: 9)

. . . of the temple of Re. . . . good wine of Tjaru.

3e. r IPT SP 8 NW IR P N T [Rw] (Deir el-Medina wine docket; KRI VII, 68: 10)

Eighth regnal year, wine of Tjaru.

3f. r IPT SP 10 IR P N T [Rw] rHry K3Mw . . . (Deir el-Medina wine docket; KRI VII, 68: 11)

Regnal year 10, wine of Tjaru. Chief vintner . . .

In the last three years of the first decade of the reign of Ramesses II, it would seem that the workmen of Deir el-Medina received shipments of wine from Tjaru. Given that the workmen were well off, but not wealthy, wine from Tjaru must have represented an affordable luxury. The presence of so few such dockets over the period of the New Kingdom—taken in conjunction with their marked temporal clustering—however, may indicate that the infusion of such wine into the community was neither preceded nor necessarily repeated.

4. . . [33]yT M P3 LHTM N P3 W3D-WR . . . (Deir el-Medina docket; KRI VII, 93: 9)

. . . [tax]es from the htm-fortress of the sea.

This damaged docket once belonged to food or drink that had been requisitioned as tax from the htm-fortress of the sea. Although the docket does not specify the donor, 33yt-taxes are known to have been levied on individuals, often in conjunction with important festivals.300

It is likely, then, that an overseer of a *htm*-fortress, a scribe, or another *htm*-official had donated the goods in honor of a particular occasion. These items, once in state or temple coffers, would have been redistributed to state employees. In this case, judging from the find-spot of the docket, it is likely that the goods had been shared out to the workmen at Deir el-Medina—either as part of their regular rations or for a special occasion. Given that the donated item hailed from the *htm*-fortress, it would be interesting to know whether it had been obtained from the Delta estate supporting the *htm* or whether it instead had been requisitioned from a ship inspected by *htm*-Officials.

5. wsr-m3’t-r’ stp-n-r’ r²-ms-sw mry-imn grg ṯ3[rw] di ‘nh mi r’ ḏt (scarab; KRI II, 784: 4)

Usermaatre Setepenre Ramesses Meryamun is the one who provides (for) Tja[ru] (and who is) given life like Re enduringly.

This small, unprovenienced scarab, now known as the “Golénischeff scarab,” resides in Moscow. Although the text etched upon it is by necessity quite limited, it is intriguing. The verb *grg* has numerous translations. It can mean, “to found,” “to establish,” “to people,” “to settle,” “to provide for,” “to set in order,” or “to ready.” Just which sense of the word is apropos in this case is difficult to decide. Certainly, it would have been inappropriate for Ramesses II to claim to have founded or established Tjaru, as the town may well have been settled already in the First Intermediate Period. Likewise, as early as the reign of Thutmose III, the town’s fortifications had already been built. As will be discussed below, however, Ramesses II may well have refurbished some of these earlier fortifications. Likewise, the fact that he was not responsible for founding the fortress-town evidently posed no barrier to his plan to rename it after himself, as witnessed in P. Anastasi V, 24: 7 (see above).

The translations of *grg* that relate to populating or settling an area could also be relevant to Ramesses II’s reign. As will be discussed below, this particular pharaoh utilized displacement as an imperial tactic, and it is quite possible that Ramesses may have augmented the population of this border region with prisoners of war that he transplanted from some other region of his empire. Isolated from their countrymen and placed under the watchful eyes of the Egyptian

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army, such transplanted groups could be expected over a period of time to be transformed into dutiful subjects. Alternatively, Ramesses II may have encouraged native Egyptians to settle at Tjaru in a simple effort to repopulate his border district.

Finally, there is a strong possibility that grg should be translated “to provide for” or “to ready” and that the inclusion of this epithet highlighted Ramesses’ fulfillment of his duty as a strong leader to equip military bases both at home and abroad. Similarly, it is tempting to interpret the epithet “one who made ready Tjaru” as a not-so-veiled allusion to the many campaigns undertaken by Ramesses as a young man. If his army received its weapons and supplies from Tjaru before the long cross-Sinai trek, Ramesses II would indeed be one who “prepared” Tjaru on a regular basis.

Whatever the exact meaning of grg, it is clear that Ramesses II wished to stress his close association with the fortress-town. Other efforts of this kind include the renaming of Tjaru as “the htm-fortress [of Ra]mess[es Mer]yamun, l.p.h., which is in Tjaru” (P. Anastasi V, 24:7). The fact that he erected a hwt-temple dedicated to himself in the town is likewise significant. Further, the Leiden statue-cult stele suggests that Ramesses II also instituted a statue-cult of himself somewhere just “south of the field of Tjaru” (KRI II, 928: 4). These royal attentions, while not unique to Tjaru, do demonstrate that the border district still remained a visible and important entity at the height of the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Troop commander, overseer of foreign lands, overseer of the temple, Usermaatre-nakht of Tjeku. Troop commander, overseer of foreign lands (and of) God’s land, Usermaatre-nakht of Tjeku.

During Petrie’s excavations at Tell er-Retabah, he uncovered an inscribed doorjamb reused in the temple of Ramesses III. Petrie assumed that the fragment had come from a nearby tomb, but it

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302 According to a scribal text dating to the Twentieth Dynasty, weapons were indeed stored at Tjaru (P. Lansing, 9: 10), and the granaries excavated at the site indicate that a large amount of foodstuffs were likewise stored in the fortress (see below).

is equally plausible that the jamb had fronted the entrance to Usermaatre-nakht’s residence. Tjeku, the fortress-town that guarded the southern corridor of the Wadi Tumilat, had been overseen by a troop commander (ḥry pdl) and royal envoy (wpwty-nsw) in the reign of Thutmose IV (see chapter three). If P. Anastasi V, 19: 2–20: 3 is not a purely fictional document, a ḥry pdl likewise oversaw Tjeku in the reign of Seti II (see above).

Just as it is not surprising, then, to find a ḥry pdl in residence at Tjeku during Ramesses II’s reign, it is not particularly odd that this official also held the title “overseer of foreign lands.” Paramesses and Seti, the troop commanders and overseers of the htm-fortress at Tjaru under Horemheb (see chapter four), also held this title. Redford has suggested that the designation “overseer of foreign lands” was more honorary than functional—applied as extra gloss to the resume of those men whose duties already took them to foreign lands on a regular or semiregular basis. Troop commanders, then, were good candidates for this honor.

Although Usermaatre-nakht does not list the title royal messenger (wpwty-nsw) in his resume, as did the troop commander of Tjeku in the reign of Thutmose IV, there are two intriguing reasons to suppose that he may have performed this function as well. First, the addition of “God’s land” to the otherwise generic “foreign countries” suggests that Usermaatre-nakht may have been particularly familiar with the Phoenician coastal region of Syria-Palestine. More concrete evidence for Usermaatre-nakht having fulfilled a diplomatic rather than strictly military function abroad, however, comes from the Egypto-Hittite correspondence, which was taken up with fervor between the two courts following the first overtures of peace. In KUB III, 66, mention is made of an Egyptian diplomat named Wasmu’ri’a-nakhta (i.e., Usermaatre-nakht as transliterated into Akkadian). Although this name was admittedly not unpopular in the reign of Ramesses II, many scholars have suggested that this particular diplomat be equated with the troop commander at Tjeku.

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305 Giveon 1969a: 172; see chapter three.
306 In the inscriptions of Thutmose III, “God’s land” is unambiguously placed in the mountinous and heavily timbered regions of Lebanon (Urk. IV, 1232: 2–3; 1241: 13–1242: 4).
The final point of interest concerning the doorjambs relates to the presence of a ḫwt-temple at Tjeku. This is not in itself surprising, for the majority of the New Kingdom fortress-towns incorporated temples. Indeed, Tjaru, as discussed above, also possessed a ḫwt-temple dedicated to Ramesses II. In the case of Tjeku, however, the architectural remains of Ramesses’ temple have actually been identified on the ground. Indeed, the fact that the facade apparently showcased the deity “Atum, lord of Tjeku” has rendered it of particular interest to scholars who wish to identify the fortress with biblical Pithom (Per-Atum).

Words spoken by the hereditary noble and count, he of the curtain, (and) senior king’s son [... the nobles of the palace, companions of their lord, their father, lord of the two lands, Usermaatre Setepenre [lord of appearances] Ramesses Meryamun, given life—(namely) the overseer of the city (and) vizier, the courtiers of the king, the treasurers of the palace, the overseers of the two houses of silver and gold, the overseers of the army, the overseers of the infantry, the troop commanders, the controllers, the overseers of the southern and northern countries, the overseers of ḫtm-fortresses, the overseers of river [mouths]... when they came in obeisance, bearing their in[w] as (the) bꜣkꜣ-revenues of the land of the Nubians, all the products of the foreign lands of Syria-Palestine, (and) the accounts of Egypt in order to see the beauty of their lord...i n  his beautiful festival of Opet.

The Opet festival, one of the most important religious celebrations in Thebes, was largely centered upon Luxor temple. It is only fitting,

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308 It may have been within this temple that the gods of Tjeku, invoked by the writer of Deir el-Medina ostracan 1076, were lodged. Within the text of this badly damaged ostracan are mentions of horses and a “meadow (?) of Pi-Ramesses Great-of-Victories,” but there is no way to tell from the context whether the horses and meadow were situated at Tjeku. For a translation of the text, see Hoffmeier (1997: 180), who worked from an unpublished text discovered by Kenneth Kitchen.

309 Gardiner 1918: 267; Goedicke 1987a: 14–16; Petrie and Duncan 1989: pls. 29–30. Further items from this temple were discovered in secondary contexts at Tell el-Maskhuta. Among these was a fragmented naos with the inscription “Usermaatre [Setepenre] Ra[messes] <beloved of> the lord of Tjeku” (KRI II, 404: 14).
then, that a significant portion of the reliefs and inscriptions carved upon the temple walls concerned the festival and the various activities associated with it. In the forecourt at Luxor, a segment of text describes the ushering in of some of Egypt’s highest officials to the presence of Ramesses II. These men had come, literally, with heads bowed (\(\text{iwa}-\text{tp}\)) to present the king personally with gifts (\(\text{inw}\)), which had reportedly come from the general taxes (\(\text{b3kw}\)) levied in Egypt, Nubia, and Syria-Palestine.\(^{310}\)

The passage excerpted above is remarkable for the number of military officials listed in it. Likewise, it is extremely interesting that the \(\text{inw}\) these men presented to the king potentially came from the \(\text{b3kw}\) imposed upon the inhabitants of Syria-Palestine or Nubia. Of particular note in this respect are the tax-paying troop commanders, the overseers of the southern and northern countries, the overseers of \(\text{htm}\)-fortresses, and the overseers of river mouths.

Schulman, in his study of military rank and title, utilizes the Luxor list to address questions of military hierarchy.\(^{311}\) This approach, however, is somewhat problematic in that many of these titles appear from the resumes of the individuals thus far discussed to have been held simultaneously. Paramesses, for example, held all of these titles, while his son Seti fulfilled all but that of overseer of river mouths (see chapter four). Neby and Aia both combined the office of troop commander with that of overseer of the \(\text{htm}\)-fortress (see chapter three and above, respectively), and Usermaatre-nakht of Tjeku was both troop commander and overseer of foreign countries (see above). Given the frequency with which these titles tend to congregate in the resume of a single individual, it must be accepted that the functions implied in each, while not wholly merged, overlapped significantly.

The delivery of special payments by imperial officials of goods garnered by virtue of their office has been witnessed already in the tax lists discovered in the tomb of Rekhmire and in the Turin tax list (see chapter three and above, respectively). It is thus clear that those who worked for the Egyptian government abroad were treated in much the same fashion as those who worked within the country’s

\(^{310}\) For \(\text{inw}\) as a gift given by an individual to the king to augment his personal wealth, see most recently Bleiberg 1996. For studies on \(\text{inw}\) and \(\text{b3kw}\) more generally, see Aldred 1969; 1970; Bleiberg 1981; 1984; 1988; Gordon 1985; Muller-Wollermann 1983; Liverani 1990: 255–257; Janssen 1993.

\(^{311}\) Schulman 1964a: 8, 115–116.
borders. It would be interesting to know, however, how seriously to take the term *b3kw* in this instance.

As is known from the annals of Thutmose III, a certain amount of *b3kw* was assigned as tax to regions in both Syria-Palestine and Nubia. It is unclear, however, whether or not the *b3kw* that the military men in this inscription offered as personal gifts to the king came from this financial category of *b3kw*-taxes. If these officials did have access to the *b3kw* collected in the regions in which they were stationed, this would be an important fact. Evidence from the annals and from the Amarna archive suggests that a good portion of tax revenue actually stayed in the country from which it was requisitioned and was subsequently reapportioned to underwrite the costs of imperial maintenance. Thus, part of these costs would presumably have gone to supporting officials and troops stationed locally.

In the Luxor inscription, then, the officials may indeed have presented the king with a token portion of the *b3kw*-taxes—originally paid by foreigners—that they themselves utilized as private revenue.

As discussed above, Ramesses II faced an unpleasant shock just prior to the famous battle of Kadesh when he realized that his enemy—rather than being holed up far to the north in fear of the pharaoh and his army—was actually lying in wait for him just kilometers

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away. After receiving this information from two captured spies, the king summoned his high officials (srw) and launched into a verbal indictment of his intelligence sources. According to the king, two classes of officials should have provided him with accurate information as to the whereabouts of the Hittite army.

The first category of informant consisted of the rulers of the lands of the pharaoh (wrw n p3 t3w n pr-3), i.e., the leaders of city-states and territories loyal to Egypt. From an examination of the Amarna archive, it is abundantly clear that vassals were required to report information on treasonous activities or hostile movements undertaken by Egypt’s enemies. As Rib-Hadda put it, “I am your loyal servant, and whatever I hear I write to [my] lord” (EA 116: 15–16).313

While the majority of the vassal letters did include intelligence information,314 often accompanied by a plea for assistance, the pharaoh on occasion actively solicited such reports.315 Presumably, judging from the similarities between the Egypto-Hittite diplomatic correspondence and the high-level communications in the Amarna archive, this system still functioned in the Nineteenth Dynasty. If so, the failure to provide information about enemy movements, if such were known to the vassals, would indeed have been a crime in the strict juridical sense.

The other category of lax official in the mind of the pharaoh was his overseers of foreign countries (imyw-r h3swt). Interestingly, in the versions of the text carved at the Ramesseum and at Abu Simbel, the imyw-r h3swt are replaced with imyw-r iw’yt, or “overseers of garrison troops.” As discussed previously, the title “overseer of foreign lands” is generally believed to be a catchall honorific for officials whose duties directly bore upon foreign relations. It is helpful, then, that the term can be directly equated—in this case at least—with the title “overseer of garrison troops.”

The comparative rarity with which one finds the title overseer of garrison troops (imyw-r iw’yt) is interesting. It may be that this is because the office was usually filled by troop commanders (hry pdt), who only became overseers of garrison troops once they and their soldiers set

314 See, for example, EA 58, 68, 74, 75, 83, 86, 90, 114, 170, 174, 175, 176, 287, 335, 363, and 366.
315 See EA 145 and 151. For a specific analysis of intelligence gathering in the Amarna archive, see Cohen 2000.
up base in one area for a prolonged period of time.\textsuperscript{316} Additionally or alternatively, it is conceivable that the \textit{hr\textasciitilde{w} pdl} may have preferred this title to \textit{imy-r iw\textasciitilde{y}t} because they felt that its association with active combat rather than peacekeeping duties lent it more prestige.

A further point of interest concerning the title \textit{imy-r iw\textasciitilde{y}t} in this inscription is that unlike the title \textit{imy-r htm} (overseer of a \textit{htm}-fortress), it does not specify the type of accommodations in which the troops were quartered. Perhaps the preference for this loose term was due to the fact that whereas some garrison troops may have been housed in specially built structures, others perhaps occupied buildings that had been commandeered for the purpose. Thus, a specification of the type of troops commanded, rather than the buildings occupied, would have been a far more inclusive designation.

The overseers of garrison troops, who by virtue of their position also oversaw foreign lands, then, were the other lynchpins in Ramesses’ intelligence operation. The Amarna letters again provide an apropos analogy. In the letters sent to the Egyptian court, many vassals provided the king with information, which they said could be verified by the officials stationed in their region.\textsuperscript{317} Clearly, with all the infighting, dubious loyalties, and slanderous accusations proffered by the different vassals in the Amarna Period, the Egyptian government must have relied heavily on reports from officials based in the area. Again, there is no reason to suggest that this situation would have been significantly dissimilar in the Nineteenth Dynasty. These men, then, whom Ramesses trusted to give him the straight story about events in Syria-Palestine, had clearly also failed him just prior to the contest at Kadesh.

\textsuperscript{316} For the close connection between the titles \textit{imy-r iw\textasciitilde{y}t} and \textit{hr\textasciitilde{w} pdl}, see also chapter seven and Schulman 1964a: 51. It is interesting in this venue to note that an unpublished and unprovenienced doorjamb now in the Egyptian Museum of Cairo bears the titles of an unnamed individual who was at once fanbearer on the king’s right (\textit{ty \textasciitilde{y}w fr \textasciitilde{w}wm n nsw}), troop commander (\textit{hr\textasciitilde{w} pdl}), overseer of foreign countries (\textit{imy-r \textasciitilde{h}swt}), and overseer of garrison troops (\textit{imy-r iw\textasciitilde{y}t}) (\textit{KRI III}, 262: 6–8). This resume demonstrates quite clearly the overlapping functions inherent in the offices of troop commander, overseer of garrison troops, and overseer of foreign lands. On the other hand, in the record of the famous trial of Mes, both a \textit{hr\textasciitilde{w} pdl} and an \textit{imy-r iw\textasciitilde{y}t} took part as judges (\textit{KRI III}, 432: 10–11).

\textsuperscript{317} See EA 68, 74, 109, 112, 127, 131, 133, 148, 151, 155, 161, 171, 189, 208, 264, 271, 272, 283, and 296. It is interesting to note that \textit{hr\textasciitilde{w} pdl} are twice explicitly noted in the correspondence; both times the individuals were stationed at Sumur (EA 107, 171).
The scribe Ramose speaks to Djehtyemheb, as follows: This document is brought to you, saying: What are you still doing there? The overseer of the "tm-fortress sent a letter, saying “You should bring...silver vessels as cargo along with fish (and) wool so that I may cause that they be issued for the captains of the cargo-ships, (namely), 600 blocks of wool, 70 (+ x) deben of silver [...], (being) the stores which are in your charge in the year (at) the worth given. You should issue it as cargo in one day solely. Likewise, I hear that “The sailor of the cargo-ship—Anuy, son of Piay—of (the settlement) Aperel of the great statue of Ramesses Meryamun, l.p.h., Sun-of-rulers, has died together with his children.” Is it the truth (or) is it a falsehood? What is that which the overseer of the "tm-fortress has done to the contents of his house?

This letter, addressed by the scribe Ramose to an associate whose duty it was to oversee the provisioning of various ships, is preserved as a copy in P. Anastasi VIII. The text of the missive as a whole is largely occupied with the transport by ship of various lower Egyptian commodities, i.e., fish, wool, and papyrus rushes. In the excerpt above, however, Ramose focuses upon two specific concerns. First, he urges his associate to prepare and deliver a shipment of goods to an impatient "tm-fortress commander as soon as possible. Just exactly whom the goods were to be requisitioned from, however, is unclear. Certainly, 600 blocks of wool and 70+ silver debens’ worth of fish would significantly exceed the amount of property that one individual could be expected to provide the state. Given that Ramose instructs his correspondent to investigate the “wool of the god which lies in the dockyard of Pi-Ramesses” (KRI III, 500: 10–11) and “his (the god’s) fishermen’s output (b3w)” (KRI III, 500: 16), it can be assumed that the request fell either on the temple or on a governmental body that felt free to exploit the coffers of the god.318 The

318 The name of the god is not specified, but Pi-Ramesses is known to have housed temples to the gods Amun and Seth (P. Anastasi II, 1: 4), among others.
htm-fortress commander himself, however, appears to have been acting simply as a servant of the state. According to him, the taxes were not for his use but were to be promptly distributed among various ship captains.

Ramose’s second item of business in the excerpt is relevant to the question of where exactly this particular htm-fortress should be situated. For some unexplained reason, the scribe was quite interested in the manner in which the overseer of the htm-fortress had disposed of the estate of a man who lived in the “town of Aper-el, belonging to the great statue of Ramesses II.” Based on the fact that the fortress commander evidently exercised jurisdiction over the property of the deceased, one could surmise that the two men inhabited the same polity. The problem remains, however, that this town is otherwise unattested in Egyptian sources.

Aper-el is a Semitic phrase meaning “servant of (the god) El,” which might suggest that the town should be located somewhere on the Syro-Palestinian coast. The presence of the king’s statue within Aper-el, likewise, brings to mind Ramesses II’s boast that his statue resided in the Syrian town of Dapur (KRI II, 13–14). If the b3kw-taxes of foreigners were indeed delivered to Egyptian-sponsored temples already in the Nineteenth Dynasty, as Bleiberg suggests, a royal statue would serve as an appropriate cult focus for these “offerings.” Certainly, a good number of the temples that Ramesses II erected in Nubia included his own statue as an object of worship.

Divine statues of Ramesses II are, however, known from Egypt as well as its imperial territories. Further, there is good reason to suspect that this particular htm-fortress lay within the Delta. For instance, the correspondent, who is otherwise based exclusively in the Delta, is assumed to possess an intimate familiarity with the situation at Aper-el. Detailed questions as to the activities of the fortress commander with respect to the estate of a single individual would otherwise have been inappropriately directed.

State utilization of temple finances is well known from studies of how Deir el-Medina tomb workmen received their pay.


Nubian temples at which Ramesses II was worshipped alongside other Egyptian and Nubian gods include Abu Simbel, Beit el-Wali, Derr, Gerf Husein, and Wadi es-Sebua. It should be noted, however, that Ramesses II was famed for erecting deified statues of himself in Egypt as well as abroad (Habachi 1969).
In the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty an official named Sat-Amun served as the overseer of a “great htm-fortress of the sea” (see chapter three). A htm-fortress of the sea is also mentioned from time to time in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties (see below and chapter six). The exact location of this htm-fortress (or fortresses) unfortunately remains unknown. In chapter three it was theorized that the Eighteenth Dynasty fortress may have been constructed at Tell ed-Dab’a. Subsequent to the founding of Pi-Ramesses, however, it is likely that the fortress of the sea would have moved north, perhaps to a position near the mouth of the Pelusiac.

It is a tenable suggestion, then, that the htm-fortress of P. Anastasi VIII should be identified as the htm-fortress of the sea. Such an equation would eloquently explain why the cargo of fish and wool was to be distributed to various captains at the htm-fortress rather than at Pi-Ramesses itself. The harbors of this latter town, as Egypt’s capital, must have bustled with ships that routinely ferried up and down all stretches of the Nile. Such a secondary redistribution, then, would have only been efficient if the ships that received the goods at the fortress were in some way special—different from the usual riverboat. If the htm-fortress of the sea, as is likely, served as a depot at which riverine ships could transfer their cargo into sea-going ships, the transport of the goods from Pi-Ramesses to the border fort would make sense. This arrangement of shifting cargo from one type of boat to another, in addition to being practical, would facilitate the precise recording of all goods destined for import or export.

Just where the shipments of fish and wool were finally destined, however, is uncertain. It may be that some responsibility for provisioning the Egyptian coastal bases fell to the overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea. As the bases likely supported themselves on produce from local estates or taxes, however, such shipments may not have been required. Alternatively, it could have been that the boats receiving the cargo were involved in international transactions in which wool and fish were exchanged for foreign goods. Both commodities, however, were widely available in the Mediterranean region, so this scenario is perhaps also unlikely. Finally, and most prosaically, there is always the possibility that the wool and fish were simply intended as payment for ship captains and their subordinates.

10. ist ẖm.f ʿnḥ wd3 snb m ḫf-st ms-sw mry-imn ʿnḥ wd3 snb p3 dmi nty m t3 int ʿš (battle of Kadesh poem; KRI II, 14: no. 35)
Lo his majesty, l.p.h., was in Ramesses Meryamun, l.p.h., the town which is in the Valley of the Cedar.

Ramesses' journey north to Kadesh is narrated in a very terse fashion in the poetic retelling of the battle of Kadesh. The text duly notes the king's passage through Tjaru, his navigation of some narrow mountain passes, and his arrival at the town of Ramesses Meryamun in the Valley of the Cedar. Shortly thereafter, according to the text, Ramesses and his army arrived in the vicinity of Kadesh itself.

The whereabouts of the town of Ramesses II in the Valley of the Cedar is of interest because—as has been noted frequently in this work—pharaohs often named fortresses and administrative headquarters after themselves. Such a renaming signaled direct pharaonic control over the named entity, suggesting that the power of the previous local authority must have been sharply curtailed, if indeed it still existed at all. Thus stripped of its Canaanite identity and its former autonomy, the polity became an Egyptian base and, as such, property of the Egyptian crown.

There seem to have been a number of ways that a Syro-Palestinian town could end up in pharaonic hands. First, the Egyptians could found a military base on virgin soil, and many examples of this type of new settlement will be discussed below. Second, the Egyptian king could assume direct authority over a town as a partial punishment for a recent rebellion. This type of appropriation can be seen in the histories of the Egyptian bases at Tell el-Ajjul and Aphek. Finally, in certain cases, such as that of Kumidi (see chapter four), the Egyptians seem to have been actually invited into the town by the resident ruler in hopes that an Egyptian presence would deter invaders.

Without a concrete identification of the town of Ramesses II in the Valley of Cedar, it is impossible, of course, to determine by which of these routes the town fell under Egyptian sovereignty. The sheer fact, however, that Ramesses II possessed a base in the Lebanon mountain range, home of the famed Lebanese cedar forests, is extremely interesting. It implies that despite periodic Hittite incursions and near constant Hittite machinations, Seti's campaigns into Lebanon and Amurru—as well as Ramesses' own campaign in year four—had secured for Egypt a strong foothold in Lebanon.

Just where the town of Ramesses in the Valley of the Cedar should be located is closely linked to the northward path followed by Ramesses and his army on their way to Kadesh. Studies of the toponyms listed
in the battle narrative strongly suggest that Shabtuna and the wood of Rebawy should be located directly south of Kadesh. If so, these localities would have been encountered by the king and his army only if the route northward traversed the Lebanese Biqa Valley.321 For this reason, suggestions that the Valley of Cedar should be identified as one of the inland passes leading from the Lebanese coast eastward have been largely discarded.322

The most popular suggested identification for the town of Ramesses is Kumidi, which appears in the toponym lists of Seti I.323 This town served as an Egyptian base at least intermittently in the reign of Akhenaten, when Egyptian presence at the site may have been instituted in order to check the southerly ambitions of Aitakama of Kadesh and his Hittite allies. As mentioned above, Kumidi was the largest town south of Kadesh, and by virtue of its position, the base could effectively control northern or southern traffic along the Biqa Valley. Thus, not only would Kumidi have been a key town for the Egyptians to secure, but it also would have been the last landmark of significant note before Ramesses II and his troops reached the area just south of Kadesh.

Kumidi has also been plausibly suggested as the seat of an Egyptian sakin mati (i.e., governor) of the town of Ramesses in Upe.324 This individual, named Suta,325 is mentioned in a letter sent by Ramesses II to Hattusili III, in which the Egyptian monarch assures his Hittite counterpart that the latter’s daughter would be safely escorted through Egyptian territory.326 The borders of the land of Upe are not well understood, but they appear to have encompassed the Damascus Oasis and neighboring towns like Kumidi as well.327 Kumidi and

322 For such suggestions, see Breasted 1903: 89; Sturm 1939: 63; Edel 1953: 63; Alt 1959a: 121–122.
324 Redford 1992: 191; Na’aman 1999: 34.
325 Suta is usually identified with the apecy-nsw Seti, buried in Sedment (KRI III: 234–237: no. 131, XI.1; Edel 1953: 57; Singer 1983: 20).
327 For extensive references to the debate about the exact boundaries of Upe, see Murnane 1990: 10, n. 45. To these add de Vaux 1978: 128; Drower 1980: 431;
Damascus lay less than 50 km distant from one another, a two-day journey on foot and half that by chariot. Given this close proximity, it would be surprising if Ramesses in the Valley of the Cedar and the town of Ramesses in Upe were not in fact one and the same.

Presumably, then, Egyptian and Hittite forces would have met to exchange the Hittite princess not terribly far from Kadesh, where the two powers had clashed in battle since the late Eighteenth Dynasty. The Egyptian *sakin mati* of Upe would then lead the princess southward until he reached the borders of his province, at which point he would deliver her to another *sakin mati*, who was based in yet another town named Ramesses. Although the broader purview of this official is unfortunately missing, the restoration of *kinahhī*, or Canaan, seems probable. If so, the town of Ramesses at which this second official likely maintained his base would almost certainly have been Gaza (*p3 k3nʾn*), the long-established seat of Egyptian authority in Canaan.

Based upon the mention of only two Egyptian *sakin mati* in this letter, some authors have argued that in the Nineteenth Dynasty Egypt possessed only two administrative divisions, Upe and Canaan. Whereas it is undoubtedly true that Amurru and some of the northernmost coastal bases—such as Sumur and Ullaza—would have been lost to Egypt following the near-catastrophe at Kadesh, there is no evidence for any loss of Egyptian sovereignty over coastal towns from Byblos southward. These Lebanese towns lay too far north to be

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Klengel 1992: 179. It is interesting that in P. Anastasi I, the hapless correspondent is taunted, “you do not know the name of Khalsu, which is in the land of Upe, a bull on its border and the place troops of heroes are seen” (P. Anastasi I, 22: 5–7). Khalsu (e.g. *hrd*) is Akkadian for “fortress” (Fischer-Elfert 1986: 187; Hoch 1994: 247), and it is tempting to suggest that the scribe was simply employing the Canaanite word for “fortress” in place of the proper name of the installation, which may have been “Ramesses Meryamun in the land of Upe” or “Ramesses Meryamun in the Valley of Cedar.”

328 Edel 1953: 50; Helck 1962: 259; Singer 1983: 20. The name of this official seems to be Atakh[. . .], which has led some scholars to tentatively suggest a possible equation with *ph-nw-r3*, who served as a *wpwty-nsw* toward the end of Ramesses II’s reign. (Edel 1953: 58 considered the equation but discarded it. Singer 1983: 20, n. 29 believes it to be a reasonable possibility.)


effectively administered by an official stationed at Gaza. Likewise, given the barrier of two mountain regions between the northern harbor towns and the heartland of Upe, it is unlikely that a *sakin mati* of this region held any jurisdiction on the coast.

It would seem quite reasonable, then, that the omission of a *sakin mati* from this area in Ramesses II’s letter did not necessarily mean that such an individual did not exist. Rather, the omission appears purely practical in nature. Given that the Hittite princess would be traveling the overland route from Hatti to Egypt, she would not require an escort along the coast. Consequently, there existed no need for the king to include reference to an official of this region in his missive. 331

11. *sw m i ḫ p 3 ḏmr n ss w ‘nḫ w ḏ3 snb ḫ m ḫ ḏ hr ṭ3y. ṭ mr ṯ3rw ẖt ṭ3y. ṭ ḫ m ḫ ḏ (P. Anastasi I, 18: 8–19: 1)

What is Sumur of Sese, l.p.h., like? In which direction from it lies the town of Aleppo? 332 What is its river like?

P. Anastasi I provides evidence that, for a few years at least, there was yet a third town in Syria-Palestine named after Ramesses II. Unlike the other royal towns, however, Sumur of Sese can be securely identified. Undoubtedly this polity was the same port town of Sumur that had been first conquered in the reign of Thutmose III and had later served as the seat of a series of Egyptian governors in the Amarna Period. 333

The fact that in this instance Sumur is specifically named after Ramesses II is important in that it implies that Egypt once again directly controlled this strategic harbor. It is also crucial for the dating of P. Anastasi I. As discussed above, it would appear that the n’nm-troops of Ramesses II utilized the harbor and its adjacent mountain pass to effect their timely arrival at Kadesh. Following the battle, which Egypt for all intents and purposes lost, however, this town

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331 As Edel (1953: 55) points out, Amarna letters EA 7 and EA 8, sent by the Kassite king Burna-Buriash, mention that Babylonian caravans were molested in the provinces of Upe and Canaan. It is quite likely, then, that Babylonian and Hittite travelers followed the same route as the Hittite princess on their trips to Egypt and back.

332 Following Wente 1990: 106.

almost certainly swung back into the Hittite sphere, as did the neighbor-
ning polity of Amurru. Only during the first five years of Ramesses reign,
then, could Sumur truthfully have been dubbed “Sumur of Sese.”

It seems likely that up until the battle of Kadesh a sakin mati, or
governor, of the Lebanese coastal region occupied a seat at Sumur. If
this man shared his governorship over Egypt’s northern territ-
ories with a sakin mati of Upe, ruling from Kumidi, and a sakin mati
of Canaan, ruling from Gaza, the situation would resemble very
closely the tripartite division of Syria-Palestine envisioned by a num-
ber of scholars for the late Eighteenth Dynasty. As discussed in
chapter four, however, it is doubtful that even then the situation was
so clear-cut. At various times in the Amarna Period Sumur and
Kumidi appear to have been abandoned by Egyptian officials, and
throughout the era powerful Egyptians are witnessed at a number
of other locales. Likewise, given the many contemporary adminis-
trative headquarters discovered in the archaeological record, it is
obvious that much about Egypt’s administrative system remains
unknown.

Before abandoning discussion of P. Anastasi I for good, it is appro-
priate to briefly mention two other known Egyptian centers that
appear within it, Beth Shan and Jaffa. Due to the fact that in neith-
er case is the Egyptian connection rendered explicit, it will here
suffice to summarize the context in which they are found within the
papyrus. Beth Shan is touched upon briefly in the litany of Canaanite
localities of which the author’s supposed correspondent was woefully
ignorant. Specifically, it is listed along with other towns like Megiddo
and Rehob to which it lay in close physical proximity. Further, given
that Beth Shan itself guarded at least three major fords of the Jordan,
it can be no coincidence that the correspondent is subsequently grilled
about the river Jordan and the manner in which it could be most
easily crossed.

The writer of P. Anastasi I waxes considerably more poetic with
regard to Jaffa, with which he imagines his correspondent to have

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335 For the division of Egypt in the late Eighteenth Dynasty into three adminis-
trative units, see Helck 1960: 5–8; 1962: 258–259, 261; Aharoni 1968: 152, 161;
336 For this section of text, see P. Anastasi I, 22: 7–23: 1.
been much more familiar. He envisions a scenario, in fact, in which his colleague would venture into Jaffa and find not only verdant meadowland but also a beautiful young woman who would entice him into an amorous interlude. Following an imprudent exclamation of pleasure, however, the lovers would be discovered, and the local authorities would penalize the correspondent by divesting him of his linen garment. Following this, the correspondent would soon find most of his other accouterments either requisitioned or stolen.  

More pertinent to this study, however, is the author’s taunt that his fellow scribe, following his escapade with the girl, would be unable to get into Jaffa’s armory or its workshops. Were he inside, carpenters and leatherworkers would repair his chariot and he would be on his way. The Ugaritic letter found at Aphek and discussed above provides the information that the Egyptian granaries at Jaffa still functioned in the Nineteenth Dynasty. The carved royal names of Ramesses II—found reused in the monumental entranceway of a citadel—likewise suggest active, hands-on Egyptian control. P. Anastasi I supplies the only evidence, however, for a chariot workshop within the town. Given the active Egyptian sponsorship of Jaffa, it is hard to imagine that this installation would not have been explicitly intended for charioteers in the Egyptian service. Just why this compound would have been barred to the scribe is unclear, but it may be that ancient armies, like their modern counterparts, carefully regulated fraternization between occupier and occupied.

A common tactic of imperial governments when faced with subduing hostile or troublesome regions is to practice displacement. According
to this strategy a significant portion of a problematic population is forcibly resettled in an area far from their homeland. This approach alienates the group from its traditional social and economic support base and thereby undercuts its effectiveness as a rebellious entity. In fact, if the region in which the population is resettled is potentially dangerous or agriculturally marginal, it may render the group dependent upon imperial largess for survival. Alternatively, it must have been hoped that, if settled among subjects loyal to the Egyptian empire, either the group would eventually assimilate and become likewise docile, or at the very least the surrounding populations would be able to keep a close eye on their activities.

Although prisoners of war had been brought to Egypt as human booty from the dawn of the New Kingdom, it is not until the reign of Thutmose III that texts reveal the practice occurring on a large scale. Indeed, the numbers of prisoners that Thutmose III’s son claimed to have transported to Egypt in bondage is large enough to inspire incredulousness in numerous scholars (see chapter three). The fate of these mid-Eighteenth Dynasty prisoners of war is well documented. Many were donated to temples as field hands or laborers in temple workshops; some were settled on temple property in enclaves with their countrymen. Other prisoners of war worked in various capacities on royal or private estates, and as the New Kingdom wore on, an increasing number of foreign populations served in work gangs or in the military. No doubt the influx of foreigners to fill positions of menial labor in Egypt played a not inconsequential role in the national economy.

The first evidence, however, for populations having been shifted from one area of Egyptian domination to a wholly different frontier of the empire comes from the reign of Akhenaten. In a cuneiform letter unearthed at Kumidi, Akhenaten commands his vassal in Damascus, “send me the ‘Apiru of the pastureland (?) concerning whom I sent you as follows ‘I will settle them in the cities of the land of Kush insomuch as I have plundered them.’”

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340 Urk. IV, 1556: 10–11.
such a policy in the late Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties is obviously important in terms of expanding our understanding of Egyptian foreign policy. It also provides an incentive for archaeologists who investigate Egypt’s frontiers to pay special attention to issues of ethnicity in the archaeological record.

As will be discussed in chapter six, the practice of settling prisoners of war in foreign territories and employing them as mercenaries is very much in evidence in the reign of Ramesses III. Indeed, numerous scholars have employed archaeological data from Egyptian bases in Canaan to argue that Sea People and Egyptian soldiers resided together in the garrisons of this region. It is very tempting on analogy, then, to postulate that at least some of the populations that Ramesses II transplanted from north to south or from west to east were settled in their new regions not simply as civilians but as resident mercenaries.

Significantly, however, the $n\text{tw}$-strongholds into which Ramesses III settled prisoners of war before their transfer elsewhere appear to have been located in Egypt itself. At these $n\text{tw}$, prisoners were branded, assigned clothing and provisions from state treasuries and granaries, and forcibly acculturated. It is unknown, however, whether this was an innovation specifically of Ramesses III’s. Certainly, there is evidence from Seti I’s reign (see above) that $n\text{tw}$ could be located a short way beyond Egypt’s borders.

13. ntk wlm.k mw n\text{tw} mi w[dt].n it.k r’ [dm.tw] 346 rn.k m t\s{2} [m] rsy lyr-nf$m$ m pstd nt s-r-mn r’ hswt rt\text{tw} m wbyw nt\text{tw} n nsw dmi grg[w] ’p[r]w m rnt (Dedicatory inscription at Abydos; KRI II, 330: 13–15).

It is you who will erect monument after monument for the gods according to what your father Re com[manded] so that your name [will be uttered] in every land, beginning [in] the south (in) Khentennefer,

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343 Most scholars who have discussed this inscription take it at face value (Sauneron and Yoyotte 1950: 70; Leahy 1995: 229). See Ward (1972: 43), however, who believes it to be a generalized “universal” statement. An official’s claim that he settled the estates of the gods in Abu Simbel with workers from Syria (i.e., $rt\text{tw}$$=$KRI III, 204: 4–5) is thus important, as are the references to $n\text{tw}$-strongholds of Sherden in two undated steles from Ihnasya el-Medina (Petrie 1905: 22 and pl. 27, nos. 1 and 2).

344 KRI V, 91: 5–7, see also P. Harris I, 76: 7–9; P. Harris I, 77: 3–6.

345 KRI V, 24: 1–3; P. Harris I, 76: 6–10; 77: 3–6.

north from the shores of the lake until the limit of the foreign lands of Retenu, and in the villages, the nḥtw-strongholds of the king, and the towns which are provided for and equ[ipp]ed with people.

On the walls of Seti I’s temple at Abydos, Ramesses II recorded a consultation he held with his royal companions (smr nsw) over whether to finish work on this temple after the death of his father. The response of the companions is mostly laudatory in nature, urging him on for purely selfless reasons: “a son should care for him that begot him” (KRI II, 329: 6), etc. As a side benefit of this filial piety, however, the nobles reminded Ramesses that if he constructed monuments for the gods, they in turn would surely spread his own fame throughout the empire, i.e., from the frontier of Nubia to the outer reaches of Retenu.

Ramesses’ southern empire is described as extending from Khenthennefer, the area upstream of the last Egyptian fortification,347 northward—presumably to Elephantine. The northern empire, on the other hand, consisted of the land from the shores of the sea to the foreign countries (or alternatively, “the deserts”) of Retenu. A frustratingly vague toponym, “Retenu” encompassed much of Egypt’s northern empire, from Canaan to southern Syria and Lebanon, up to and excluding lands under Hittite control.348

It appears likely from the context that the villages (wḥyt), nḥtw-strongholds of the king, and towns (dmiw), which were provided for and equipped with people, might be located in Egypt’s imperial territories as well. As discussed above, entities that could be termed nḥtw-strongholds of the king were definitely situated along the Ways of Horus military road. Likewise, from the Abu Simbel text, one might suppose that more such strongholds existed and that they may have been staffed, at least in part, with foreign recruits from other regions of the Egyptian empire. If analogies from the Twentieth Dynasty hold, the nḥtw-strongholds would truly have been “provided for and equipped with people” (see above and chapter six).

The Ways of Horus military route also provides evidence for towns (dmiw) “which his majesty built newly” and which his majesty also

347 Goedicke 1965: 111. This toponym does not appear to have had a definite physical locale, but rather it seems to have shifted southward as the empire expanded (Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 144). In the Nineteenth Dynasty it would have indicated, presumably, the area upstream of Napata.

very likely equipped with people. Whether these new colonists were
recruited from Egypt, from other frontier zones, or from loyal indige-
nous populations, however, is unknown. Towns such as Beth Shan,
which show extensive rebuilding along Egyptian lines in the Nineteenth
Dynasty, and towns renamed after Ramesses II may also fit into this
general category. It is less certain, however, what to make of the
villages (\textit{\textit{whyt}}) mentioned in this inscription. Given that one would
expect an imperial government to have little interest in traditional
villages, it is tempting to equate them with some of the smaller set-
tlements of governors, garrisons, and support staff excavated in
Nineteenth Dynasty Syria-Palestine (see below).

\textit{Reign of Merneptah}

\begin{verbatim}
1. iri.i smtr p3 ḫərw n pr-ḥwty i.ḥəbk.k n.i ḫr r.f gm.i sw iw.f di.ti r
 ḫwty n pr-ḥwty r-ḥt.k m rmt-sp 3 ṣḥd 2 šmwn 10 m n3 ḫmwn n
 sb mnš inn p3 imy-r ḫtm r-r ḫt ḫk rm.f ḫrw n-k-d-y s3 s-r-r-|= mwt.f
 ḫdy n ḫst i-r-d ḫm n sb mnš n pr pn m ḫpt n ḫry mnš knr iw t3y.f
 ḫy ḫr ḫd m ḫry ṣḥwn n mš ḫ’-m-ipt n t3 ṭw\textsuperscript{ḥ} ṭw i ṭw\textsuperscript{ḥ} ṭw k n ḫry ṣḥwn n mš ḫ’-m-ipt n t3
 ṭw\textsuperscript{ḥ} ṭw i ṭw\textsuperscript{ḥ} ṭw ʿnḥ wd\textsuperscript{ḥ} snb
 r ṭw sp sw r ḫpt i ṭw\textsuperscript{ḥ} ṭw k n ḫry ṣḥwn n mš ḫ’-m-ipt n t3
 ṭw\textsuperscript{ḥ} ṭw i ṭw\textsuperscript{ḥ} ṭw ʿnḥ wd\textsuperscript{ḥ} snb iry.f sḥw\textsuperscript{ḥ} f m-|= i (P. Bologna 1086; KRI IV,
79: 12–80: 6)
\end{verbatim}

I investigated the Syro-Palestinian (\textit{lit.} Kharuian) of the temple of
Thoth, about whom you sent to me. I found him, he having been
assigned to be a field laborer of the temple of Thoth under your
authority in regnal year 3, second month of Shomu, day 10 from
(among) the slaves (\textit{ḥmew}) of the contents of the cargo ships, which the
overseer of the \textit{ḥtm}-fortress brought. In order to cause that you know:
his Syro-Palestinian name is Nakady, son of Serertja, his mother being
Kedy of the foreign land of Arvad; (he was) a slave of the contents
of the cargo ship belonging to this temple in the boat of the captain
of the cargo ship Kener, and his document says, “It is the captain of
the heralds of the army, Khaemopet, of the garrison troops of pharaoh,
l.p.h., who received him in order to cause that he be conscripted.” I
went to the captain of the heralds of the army, Khaemopet, of the
garrison of pharaoh, l.p.h. He disclaimed responsibility with me.

The text excerpted above is from a letter sent by a scribe of the
offering table to a priest (\textit{ḥm ntr}) of the temple of Thoth. Apparently,
the priest had been promised a Syro-Palestinian from a particular
shipment of slaves as a field hand on the god’s estate. When
the individual never arrived, however, the priest had written to the
scribe of the offering table and asked him to discover the slave’s
current whereabouts. The purpose of this particular missive, then, was for the scribe to report to the priest the information that he had obtained.

The scribe’s first clue as to the whereabouts of the slave was an entry in the daybook of the cargo ship. In the terse phraseology characteristic of these documents, the entry stated that the slave was to be received by a certain captain of the heralds (ḥry wḥmwt) of the army of the garrison (ḥwtyḥ) of pharaoh. This in itself would not have been surprising, as military officials in the New Kingdom were frequently accused of illegally commandeering temple personnel to serve as soldiers.

When the scribe went to interrogate the captain, however, he received information that the slave had instead been delivered into the charge of the vizier Merysakhmet. The vizier, in his turn, denied responsibility and presumably pointed his finger at a captain of assault officers (ḥry skt).349 This last scrap of information must have been accurate, for the scribe informed the priest that he was currently contending with the captain of the assault officers in the great court (knbt ʿ3) over the fate of the slave.

Of special interest with regard to this study is the information that the slave had originally arrived on a cargo ship (mnš) that had been “brought” by an overseer of a ḫtm-fortress. The association of a mnš-cargo ship with an overseer of a ḫtm-fortress is reminiscent of P. Anastasi VIII, discussed above. In that letter, an overseer of a ḫtm-fortress had requisitioned a large amount of wool and fish from a temple so that the supplies might then be issued to the captains of mnš-cargo ships. Based on the proximity of the overseer of the ḫtm-fortress to a Delta temple, not to mention his obvious connection with an active harbor, it was suggested above that the ḫtm of P. Anastasi VIII should be equated with the ḫtm-fortress of the sea.

The ḫtm-fortress of P. Bologna 1086, on like criteria, should perhaps also be equated with this same ḫtm-fortress of the sea. While it is true that the Dwelling of Sese and the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru also possessed harbors (see above), the former fort was not easily accessible from the Delta, and the harbor of the latter was situated on a
canal or a lagoon. One would expect that a fortress receiving shipments of goods or humans from Mediterranean ports such as Arvad would have been located near the coast, just inside one of the mouths of the Nile. Although it cannot be proven that the Syro-Palestinian slave, like his mother, in fact hailed from Arvad, wherever his homeland, he would presumably have boarded the cargo ship from one of the harbor towns of Lebanon or Canaan.

Finally, it is potentially important that the slave of P. Bologna 1086 had been of interest to an official in charge of the garrison of pharaoh. Whether the garrison of pharaoh designated a particular garrison or whether it served as a more inclusive term is unclear. The interest itself, however, may provide partial support for a Nineteenth Dynasty antecedent to the well-attested Twentieth Dynasty practice of settling foreigners in garrisons, perhaps even in nhtw-strongholds, in service of the state.

2. [t3y] ḫw wnm [n] nsw ktn tpy n [ḥm.f iḥnw n ti-nt-h]tri wpwty-nsw [n n3 wrw] nṯswt n ḫrw ḫ3’ m t3rw r ip . . . . n n3 wrw styyw [īmm-m-ipt] (P. Anastasi III, 1: 9–11)

Fan[bearer] (on) the king’s right, first charioteer of [his majesty, deputy of the chario]try, royal messenger [to the rulers] of the foreign lands of Syria-Palestine, beginning from Tjaru to Upe352 . . . . to the rulers of Asia, [Amenemopet].

P. Anastasi III, 1–11, written in the reign of Merneptah,353 is a glowing encomium to a royal envoy. In the course of his composition, the author lavishes many compliments upon his subject, but almost all are conventional in nature. What has interested scholars who have discussed this document, then, is not so much the impressive

350 For the location and politics of Arvad, see Drower 1980: 475; EA 98, 101, 104, 105, 149. Given that there is no evidence for a Syro-Palestinian campaign in Merneptah’s third year in this area, it is safe to assume that if the slave did come from Arvad, he arrived as part of the region’s taxes or perhaps as part of a commercial slave shipment. The slave himself, however, is simply stated to be “Kharui,” and Kharu in the New Kingdom could designate the entirety of Egyptian-dominated Syria-Palestine (Gardiner 1947a: 180*-187*; Murnane 1990: 40, no. 10; Hasel 1998: 270).
351 Here written “nt.”
352 Ip, once commonly translated as Jaffa (Alt 1959a: 107, n. 1; El-Saady 1999: 419), is now generally agreed to read “Upe” (Gardiner 1947a: 152*, 181*; Edel 1953: 231, n. 40; Caminos 1954: 73; Singer 1988a: 4).
353 Gardiner 1937: xiv.
array of Amenemopet’s epithets but rather the intriguing assortment of offices that he held. In particular, his title “royal messenger to the rulers of the foreign lands of Kharu, beginning from Tjaru to Upe” has sparked ruminations about the nature of contemporary administrative divisions in Egypt’s northern empire.

As discussed above, the reference to one Egyptian sakin mati in Upe and another in Canaan in a diplomatic letter has led some scholars to suggest that Syria-Palestine was divided into two districts in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Based upon P. Anastasi III, 1:10, however, still other scholars have proposed that the entirety of Canaan, from Tjaru to Upe, was administered as one undifferentiated unit. Whereas the reasons for skepticism with regard to the first hypothesis have been investigated above, the second argument harbors even deeper flaws.

The official in P. Anastasi III was a charioteer and a royal envoy, two titles that often accompanied one another. He was not, however, a troop commander, an overseer of a garrison troop, or even an overseer of foreign countries—all titles held by individuals whose duties often kept them in Canaan for an appreciable period of time. It would have been these latter functionaries, and not the more transient diplomats and message carriers, who potentially exercised administrative authority in the region.

Indeed, the qualification in the envoy’s title, “from Tjaru to Upe,” can be understood quite simply as a testament that his duties took him from one end of Egypt’s Syro-Palestinian empire to the other. In this context, then, Upe may simply have been chosen as an appropriate northeastern counterpart to Tjaru’s southwestern locale. Obviously, this fragment of a title is an extremely poor basis from which to draw conclusions about the administration of the empire in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

3. rpt-sp 3 sbd 1 šmwt sw 15 ṭst šmsw b’r-ry s3 dpr n gdy, nty m- f r ḫṛwr whḏ 2 wp.st imy-r iw’yt ḫḏy whḏ 1 wr ḫb r-trmg whḏ 1

Regnal year 3, first month of Shomu, day 15. Going up (by) the retainer Ba’alry, son of Djaper, of Gaza to Syria-Palestine; (that) which is in his hand is 2 dispatches, namely (for) the overseer of the garrison troops, Kha’y—1 dispatch; (for) the ruler of Tyre, Ba’al-termeg—1 dispatch. Regnal year 3, first month of Shomu, day 17. Then the troop commanders of the wells of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, l.p.h., which are in the ridges, arrived in order to bear witness in the tparam-structure of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, which is on the approach to Djarrem; (that) which is in his hand (to go) to Syria-Palestine is 2 dispatches, namely, (for) the overseer of the garrison troops, Penamun—1 dispatch; (for) the steward of this town Ramesses-nakht—1 dispatch. Coming (by) the stablemaster Paemyerkhetem, son of Any, of the town Merneptah Hotephirmaat, l.p.h., which is in the district of Pa-irem; (that) which is in his hand (to go) to the (place) where the king is 2 dispatches, namely (from) the overseer of the garrison troops, Pareemheb—1 dispatch; (from) the deputy, Pareemheb—1 dispatch. Regnal year 3, first month of Shomu, day 25. Going up (by) the charioteer Inwa of the great stable Ba(en)re Meryamun, l.p.h., [to] the residence.

358 Another variant spelling of Gaza.

359 Literally in.tw, but this has been interpreted as a corruption of inw, with the t-breadloaf written in place of the me-jar (see the references cited in Gardiner 1937: 31a; also Caminos 1954: 109).

360 The verso of line 6 is meant to be read prior to line 5 (Gardiner 1937: 31).

361 The literal translation, “one,” is a circumlocution for “king” (see Caminos 1954: 112).
The so-called “border journal”\textsuperscript{362} of P. Anastasi III belongs to the genre of teaching text, as it shares space with hymns, model letters, account entries, and the like. Despite the fact that the text has obviously been excerpted from its original context, and despite the slim possibility that it may have been fashioned from whole cloth, the border journal remains one of the most important texts for our understanding of the day-to-day maintenance of Egypt’s northern empire. Through its dated entries, which cover ten days in the third year of Merneptah’s reign, it is possible to trace the movements of numerous functionaries in the service of the Egyptian government as they traveled back and forth from the “place where the king is” to various points in Syria-Palestine.

The actual physical locale at which the journal would have been compiled is a bit obscure. Officials at Tjaru, of course, must have kept a daybook such as this one to document who and what crossed Egypt’s border, and Tjaru has in fact been suggested as the origin point of the journal.\textsuperscript{363} The only problem with this theory is that one entry refers to Tjaru rather formally as “the htm-fortress, which is in Tjaru.” Were the border journal actually compiled at the fortress, one would have expected a more convenient shorthand of its name to have been utilized.

If the checkpoint at which the journal was composed lay east of Tjaru, it would likewise have occupied a spot west of Gaza. A majority of the envoys were men from Gaza whose duties took them back and forth from the royal residence to the Egyptian base and to points farther north. It would seem, then, that if the journal did stem from a fortress daybook, the installation in question must have been located along the Ways of Horus. While the entry logs of these forts would obviously have been of secondary importance to those at Tjaru, they would still have been extremely useful in tracking traffic along the northern Sinai transit corridor. Indeed, the communication concerning the missing slaves in P. Anastasi V (see above) vividly illustrates the necessity of careful record keeping all along the entire chain of way stations.

The first record in the border journal was entered on the fifteenth day of the first month of Shomu in Merneptah’s third year. On this

\textsuperscript{362} Gardiner 1937: 31; Caminos 1954: 108.

\textsuperscript{363} Caminos (1977: 898) suggests the fortress was Tjaru “or some place nearby.”
day, a retainer (šmsw) named Ba’alry, who carried with him two dispatches, registered at the fort. The Canaanite ethnicity of Ba’alry is suggested by his name, by the name of his father, and by the fact that he is specifically stated to have hailed from Gaza. This reliance on Canaanite envoys, judging from the remainder of the entries in the journal, appears to have been typical.

It seems a viable suggestion that Canaanites resident in Egyptian centers such as Gaza may have been more frequently bilingual than Egyptian nationals. Given that a command of West Semitic would have been essential for a traveler in Syria-Palestine, loyal Canaanites who could communicate in both languages possessed an inherent value to the Egyptian government. Indeed, the high percentage of Egyptian officials bearing foreign names in the Amarna letters (see chapter four) suggests that the government had already recognized the potential utility of loyal Syro-Palestinians by the late Eighteenth Dynasty.

The Canaanite envoy, Ba’alry, had been charged with delivering two letters to recipients in Egypt’s northern territories. One letter was destined for Ba’al-termeg, the ruler of Tyre. This missive would very likely have borne a strong resemblance to dispatches sent from the king to his vassals in the Amarna archive. Although it is unfortunate that no comparable cache of correspondence has been discovered for the Nineteenth Dynasty, the border journal does indicate that the fundamental system of communication between pharaoh and his vassals may have remained essentially unchanged for well over a century at least.

Whereas the Amarna archive may present us with numerous parallels for correspondence between the king of Egypt and petty rulers, Ba’alry’s second dispatch was addressed to an overseer of garrison troops. This genre of royal communication has no parallel in the archive. As it is inconceivable that such letters were not exchanged on a regular basis, it must be concluded that at Amarna they had been stored separately from the other letters. As noted in the discussion of Ramesses’ stinging indictment of his officials at Kadesh, the king undoubtedly relied heavily upon his overseers of garrison

364 The number of envoys who carried dispatches prompted Smither (1939: 103) to compare this document to a Ptolemaic postal register. As not all of the individuals bore missives, however, the “border journal” is much more likely to be a generalized daybook.
troops to provide him with unbiased information on events that occurred within his empire.

It is not known just where this particular overseer of garrison troops, who bore the wholly Egyptian name Kha'y, was stationed. Judging from the fact that his name appears again in the daybook several days later, however, he may have been situated in a rather volatile area. In or before his fifth year, Merneptah is known to have sent troops to Gezer, Yenoam, Ashkelon, and to combat largely unsettled populations such as Israel and the Shasu bedouin. Given that Ba'alry's mission was eventually to take him up to the island of Tyre, practicality would dictate that the garrison lay at no great distance from the Via Maris. Such a placement would exclude Yenoam and quite probably Israel and the Shasu as well. 365

On the other hand, it is interesting that in both cases in which his name comes up, Kha'y is associated with retainers from Gaza. In other sources Gaza is termed a "town" (dmi) rather than a "garrison" (iwyt), 366 but the Amarna letters quite clearly indicate that the town hosted an officer and his troops in the New Kingdom. Thus, Gaza could, technically, have been referred to as a garrison. 367 Were Kha'y in fact stationed at Gaza, there is a greater chance that the second missive, which he sent to the royal residence, was actually a response to the first, which had passed by the same checkpoint barely a week earlier. This short turn-around time, however, would necessitate not only a very efficient messenger system but also a location for the journal-writing scribe toward the eastern end of the Ways of Horus.

Two days following Ba'alry's arrival, the scribe noted the passage of troop commanders (hryw pdt) of the water sources (hmwt) of Merneptah Hotehpirmaat, which were in the hills. The association of troop commanders with hmwt-wells has been discussed above with regard to the Turin tax list and the Sinai graffito of a troop commander of the hmwt of Ramesses Meryamun. Wells, as valuable

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365 Edel (1953: 60) suggested that the garrison post should in fact be located in Tyre, as the same envoy carried letters to both. There is no reason, however, that the letter to Kha'y could not have been delivered on the way to Tyre.

366 Urk. IV, 648: 10–11; KRI I, 8: 16.

367 For Gaza as an Egyptian base in the Amarna Period, see chapter four and EA 289. Helck (1964: 246) believed Kha'y to be based at Gaza. A hry iwyt may have commanded garrison troops at Gaza in the reign of Seti II as well (see Ostraca Michaelides 85, below).
resources in arid lands, necessitated active safeguarding, for without access to drinking water armies and other imperial functionaries could easily find themselves in dire straits.

Just where these amply guarded wells of Merneptah Hotephirmaat were located is a difficult question, given the ever-present problem of royal renaming. The fact that they were situated on hills or ridges (\textit{tst}) has led some scholars to suggest that they be equated with the "waters of Nephtoa" known from the Bible (Joshua 15: 9, 18: 15).\textsuperscript{368} These wells, located in the hill-country of Canaan near Jerusalem, still bore a corrupted version of Merneptah’s name well into the first millennium B.C.

It must be stated, however, that Merneptah likely, in good royal fashion, named \textit{almost all} wells after himself. There is no reason, then, to assume an equation between the wells in the border journal and those of the Bible simply due to the presence of a similar royal moniker. A better argument, mounted by some authors who do support the equation, is that Merneptah would have been especially active in the hill country early in his reign due to conflicts with the restless peoples of Israel.\textsuperscript{369}

\textit{st}-ridges were not strictly a hill country phenomenon, however. They could also be found toward the eastern end of the Ways of Horus, as is evident from the Karnak reliefs themselves and from Seti’s reference to the Shasu rebels being situated upon "ridges" (\textit{tst}) (\textit{KRI I}, 9: 4). This area possessed numerous wells that troop commanders (\textit{hryw pdl}) are known to have supervised. Indeed, the fact that these particular troop commanders had been called to Tjaru either to bear witness or to investigate matters (depending on one’s interpretation of the verb \textit{smtr}) suggests that these officials may have been based in the northern Sinai. In comparison to officers occupying posts farther afield, troop commanders stationed along the Ways of Horus undoubtedly possessed an intimate acquaintance with issues pertinent to Tjaru.

On the 22nd day of the month, yet another flurry of activity at the checkpoint is noted in the journal. Only one individual, however, is recorded as traveling to Syria-Palestine. This man bore the


Egyptian name Nakhtamun, but his father’s name, Tjar, has only two other parallels in Egyptian sources. Whatever his true ethnicity, it is likely that the retainer was traveling back to the “bhn of Merneptah Hotephirmaat” from whence he came. The proper location of this installation, however, is also somewhat controversial. It is tempting to equate it with the bhn-fort illustrated in Seti’s Karnak relief along the Ways of Horus (see above), but the specification that Nakhtamun’s bhn was situated near Djarrem gives one pause. This toponym is otherwise unknown, but some have suggested that d-r-r-m is a mistake for d-r-ḥ-m—known from P. Anastasi I, 21: 9 to have indicated the mountain pass just south of Tyre.

On his route, Nakhtamun was charged with carrying two dispatches. One was to go to another overseer of garrison troops, named Penamun, and yet another was destined for the steward (imy-r pr) of the town Ramesses-nakht, or Ramesses-is-strong. It would, of course, be of tremendous interest to know where the garrison troop and the town were located, but this again is problematic. The numerous Egyptian-occupied sites in Nineteenth Dynasty Canaan prevent educated guesses as to where any one specific garrison might have been located. Similarly, evidence from the reign of Ramesses II suggests that there were at least three and possibly four towns (dmw) named after him: Ramesses in the Valley of the Cedar, Ramesses in Upe, Sumur of Sese, and Ramesses in Canaan. Whether Ramesses-nakht should be equated with any of the latter three or whether it represents yet another town directly administered by Egypt is unclear. It is extremely interesting to note, however, that in the Twentieth Dynasty an imy-r pr was stationed at the town of Beth Shan. While this site served as one of Egypt’s more important military bases in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, its formal name remains unknown.

The other passersby recorded for the 22nd day of the first month of Shomu were traveling from Syria-Palestine to the royal court. Three retainers from Gaza—two of whom bore Egyptian names, but all of whom had Canaanite fathers—passed the fort on their way to

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370 Ranke I, 392: 15.
372 James 1966: fig. 96: 1, 3; 92:1. See chapter six.
bring a personal gift and a letter from the overseer of garrison troops, Kha’y, to the king. As mentioned above, this missive may have been a direct response to the letter carried by Ba’alry to Kha’y barely a week before. Alternatively, it could have been that the two messages had simply crossed paths.

The final traveler of the 22nd day was also on his way to the royal court to deliver messages. This man, whose name translates as “the-overseer-of-the-ḥtm-fortress (ḥ3 iny-r ḫtm),” was, in fact, a stablemaster (ḥry īḥw) from the town of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, located in the district (w) of ḫ3 i-r-m. The toponym i-r-m is, again, unknown. Some scholars, however, have amended it to Amurru (i-m-r), while others have suggested that a district of Arameans (i-r-m) in the area around Damascus was meant. Neither explanation is particularly satisfying. Arameans are not known in Late Bronze Age contexts, and Amurru would have been lost to Egypt following the battle of Kadesh (see above). It is, on the other hand, quite interesting to find evidence for the Syro-Palestinian empire having been segmented into districts (uwt) in the New Kingdom. Ostraca Michaelides 85 likewise refers to these divisions (uwt) in the northern territories (see below).

The stablemaster cum envoy carried messages from a deputy (idnw) and an overseer of garrison troops. Both men, rather confusingly, were named Pareemheb, but whether they, like the stablemaster, also hailed from the town of Merneptah Hotephirmaat is unknown. In any case, the assemblage in this entry of a stablemaster, a deputy, and an overseer of garrison troops showcases the wide variety of officers stationed in Syria-Palestine in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

The final entry in the border journal, penned some ten days following the first, registered the passage of a charioteer of the great stable of Baenre Meryamun on his way to the royal residence. The charioteer’s stable may well have been the same as was overseen by the stablemaster of the town of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, who passed the fort just three days previously. A stronger possibility, however, given that the charioteer bore no dispatch, is that the official was

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373 Alt 1959a: 122–125. Alt tentatively proposes Ullaza as a likely locale for the town of Merneptah Hotephirmaat in Amurru, while Helck (1964: 314) prefers to see it as the updated name of Sumur of Sese. Both of these towns, however, should have been firmly ensconced in Hatti’s sphere of influence by Merneptah’s reign.

simply returning home. Pi-Ramesses, after all, possessed a very famous stable, which is noted in a variety of other sources.  

Reference from the reign of Seti II, of relevance to the reign of Merneptah

Another (matter) to inform my [lord], namely we finished with allowing that the tribes of Shasu of Edom\(^{376}\) pass the \(b[t]m\)-fortress [of] Merneptah Hotephirmaat, l.p.h., which is [in] Tjeku, to the pools of the temple of Atum [of Merne]ptah Hotephirmaat, which are in Tjeku, in order to sustain them and to sustain their flocks by the great will of pharaoh, l.p.h., the good sun of every land, in regnal year 8, day 8 upon [the birth] of Seth. I caused that they (i.e., their passings?) be brought as a tabular document\(^{377}\) to the (place) [where] my lord is together [with] the other names of the days of passing the \(b[t]m\)-fortress of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, l.p.h., which is in [Tj]ek[u].

The date of the letter from which this passage is excerpted is slightly confusing. The papyrus itself was inscribed in the reign of Seti II, and the pairing of the scribes Inena and Kageb is witnessed in two other papyri of the same date (P. Anastasi IV, 7: 9–8: 7; P. Anastasi VI, 5: 6–6: 16).\(^{378}\) At the same time, however, the regnal date con-

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\(^{375}\) See P. Bologna 1094 2: 9–10; P. Sallier I, 9: 2, 5; P. Sallier III, 1: 7; Caminos 1954: 12, 113.

\(^{376}\) The equation between \(i-d-m\) and Edom is phonologically sound (Caminos 1954: 294) but a bit dubious. While Shasu are indeed attested in the Transjordanian region, bedouin from Edom would have been very far a field from their home territory. As Goedicke (1987b: 89–90) points out, the trek from Edom to the Wadi Tumilat would have been hundreds of kilometers through arid terrain. One must either assume, then, that the bedouin had come from Edom but had decided to settle in Egypt permanently, or that \(i-d-m\) indicated an otherwise unknown toponym. Goedicke’s (1987b: 91) argument for equating \(i-d-m\) with “the red region . . . in the general area of northern Sinai beginning with the Isthmus of Suez,” however, appears rather convoluted.

\(^{377}\) Following Caminos (1954: 295), who believes the phrase to indicate “a document of columns or sections.” Goedicke (1987b: 84, 87–88) translates the phrase as “protocol announcement.”

\(^{378}\) For discussions concerning the date of these two papyri, see Gardiner 1937: xvi–xvii.
tained within the letter—year 8—is higher than Seti II ever achieved in his lifetime. Furthermore, the formal names of Tjeku and an associated landmark include the royal name ‘Merneptah Hotephirmaat,’ which ordinarily would be an indication that the letter had likely been composed in Merneptah’s reign. It is tempting to speculate, then, that either the archive had been copied years after the two men had first worked with one another or that the scribe who compiled P. Anastasi VI substituted his own name and that of a colleague for the names of the original correspondents. 379

As with other of the late Egyptian miscellanies, P. Anastasi VI has received a fair amount of attention because of details that some scholars believe illuminate the biblical narrative. The description in the papyrus of seminomadic Semitic peoples coming to Egypt to gain pasturage for their flocks resonates for many with the biblical story of the descent into Egypt. The papyrus likewise contains two toponyms purportedly encountered by the Hebrews in their flight from Egypt. Tjeku has long been equated with biblical Succoth, and the temple of Atum (pr-itm) is universally accepted as Pithom. 380 For the purposes of this work, however, P. Anastasi VI is primarily of interest for the information that it provides about Egyptian border maintenance and the kind of negotiations that must have regularly occurred between Egyptians and foreigners over access to Egyptian-controlled resources.

The toponym Tjeku could be employed broadly to designate an unspecified extent of the Wadi Tumilat. 381 It was also, however, the informal name of a specific fortress, one that has been unambiguously

379 While it is true that the scribe could also have composed the letter himself as a training exercise, it seems odd that he would have set the letter in either a previous reign or in a regnal year of Seti II that had not yet occurred. Goedicke (1987b: 84–85 and n. 10) believes that year eight could refer to Tawosret’s reign, since she combined her regnal years with Siptah’s. He argues, however, that the original document was written in Merneptah’s reign. Redford (1992: 203, 228) tentatively assigns the letter to Merneptah’s eighth year.

380 Exodus 1: 11, 12; 37; 13: 20; Numbers 33: 5, 6; See Gardiner 1920: 268; Redford 1982b: 1054–1058; 1987: 140–142; Goedicke 1986: 609; 1987; Hoffmeier 1997: 179–180. While the associations between the toponyms Succoth and Tjeku—as well as Per-Atum and Pithom—have never been in doubt, before recent explorations at Tell er-Retabah, scholars often situated the place names elsewhere (see Helck 1965: 35–40).

located at Tell er-Retabah. Considering the potentially quite wide scope of this toponym, then, it is of interest that systematic surveys along the Wadi Tumilat have demonstrated intensive New Kingdom occupation only in the vicinity of the fortress itself. Thus, the degree of difference between Tjeku the district and Tjeku the fortress-town may not be particularly pronounced. The architecture of the Nineteenth Dynasty fortress, insofar as it can be reconstructed, will be addressed in-depth below. In terms of lexical issues, however, it may be pointed out here that the fortress apparently fit into the categories of both “sgr” (P. Anastasi V, 19: 7) and “htm” (P. Anastasi VI, 55, 60).

As discussed earlier, htm-fortresses almost certainly earned their name due to a metaphoric association with the “sealing” or “locking” of a border. This particular missive aptly demonstrates Tjeku’s qualifications as a htm-fortress. In the letter, the author reports that a family grouping or band of Shasu had been allowed past the fortress to nourish themselves and their flocks at the pools of Per-Atum. The pools, also located in Tjeku, may have been situated directly adjacent to the temple or the town. Indeed, archaeological investigations have shown that the north side of Tell er-Retabah did, in fact, border on a sizable pond. On the other hand, the statement that the pools were “of the temple of Atum” could simply imply ownership of this resource by the temple. In that case, then, the pools might have been located almost anywhere west of the fortress.

Goedicke has argued that because the passage of the bedouin was authorized on the birthday of Seth, the event must have been religiously motivated. Why else, he argues, would the Egyptians have indulged in such humanitarian and altruistic behavior? That the

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382 See below and chapter three.
383 Bleiberg (1983: 25) argues that the htm- and sgr-fortresses are two separate installations, although neither the archaeological nor the textual evidence supports this view.
384 Goedicke 1987b: 96. Helck (1965: 39) argues that the fort of Tjeku and the pools of the Temple of Atum should be thought of as a unit, just as the fortresses of the Ways of Horus and their associated water sources were clearly intimately associated. A very impressive freshwater lake was also located nearby in the central region of the wadi (Holladay 1999: 878).
386 Goedicke 1987b: 87–89.
movement of the bedouin was both regulated and registered there is no doubt. The letter refers to a document of some sort, which recorded in detail the days on which the htm-fortress at Tjeku had been passed, and one can imagine that this would have closely resembled the so-called border journal of Merneptah’s reign. There is no reason, however, to think that the penetration of the bedouin into Egyptian territory was either unique or particularly altruistic.

Almost without a doubt, the Egyptian government would have profited in some manner from allowing the bedouin to utilize the water pools. The Egyptians may have pastured temple flocks with the bedouin or simply have received gratuities of animals or animal products (meat, milk, hides, wool, etc.) from them. The symbiotic relationship between nomadic and settled populations is generally profitable to both groups, and almost assuredly it was in this case as well.

**Reign of Seti II**

The scribe of the garrison troop, Ipuy, the garrison troop, Bakenamun, in l.p.h. It is a communication to the effect that the towns of pharaoh, l.p.h., which are in the districts of (my) lord, are prosperous and of pharaoh, l.p.h., who are in them are prosperous and healthy, and they say to [ . . . . ] the goddess, their mistress, who is in the districts of the land (sic) of the land of Syria-Palestine . . . .

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387 In the Prophesy of Neferty it is stated that Amenemhet I had built the Wall of the Ruler so that “the Asiatics will not be permitted to come down into Egypt that they might beg for water in the customary manner in order to let their beasts drink” (Wilson 1969: 446). This quotation implies that such migrations had been occurring since the early Middle Kingdom if not from time immemorial.

388 Alternatively, these words can be interpreted as a suffix pronoun in this Late Egyptian context. Considering that the letter focuses specifically upon the offerings for the festival of Anat, however, I have preferred the translation provided above.
pharaoh, l.p.h., (m)y lord, l.p.h., every land being prostrate beneath the sandal[...]. my lord when he is praised. Another (matter) to inform m(y lord) [...]. the opening of the festival of Anat (of) Gaza [...]. to their limit, and I received [my/this(?) ...] for the goddess, and while one of the scouts [...]. Kār cargo ship\textsuperscript{389} [...]. See, the... 

Ostraca Michaelides 85, although unfortunately unprovenienced, appears to have been a schoolboy’s copy of a letter originally sent from a scribe of garrison troops to a colleague also associated with the same garrison troop. The latter was presumably the scribe’s superior and was likely away at the time of the letter’s composition on business in Egypt or abroad. In the letter, the scribe reports that the towns (dmiw) of pharaoh, which were in the districts (ww) under his correspondent’s oversight, and their occupants were prosperous and well. Further, he acknowledges the receipt of items, presumably offerings,\textsuperscript{390} that the garrison troop official had sent to Gaza for the festival of Anat.

The letter is of interest on several fronts. First, it provides the information that a garrison troop officer apparently held jurisdiction over a number of towns (dmiw) located in his districts (ww). This suggests an organized division of territory within Syria-Palestine, although it does not illuminate the nature of the division itself. The second major point of interest is that the scribe mentions in passing that the inhabitants of the region invoke in their encomiums a goddess, “their mistress, who is in the districts of the land <of the land> of Kharu.” This goddess, given the remaining portion of the text, must be none other than Anat, a Canaanite divinity whose cult also became important in Egypt. Indeed, in the New Kingdom this goddess became officially incorporated into the Egyptian pantheon following her marriage to Seth, lord of foreigners. Indeed, Ramesses II even named one of his daughters in her honor.\textsuperscript{391}

It appears extremely likely, given the scribe’s account of the offerings he received for the festival of Anat, that the goddess possessed a temple in Gaza. Further, the fact that the offerings had been sent

\textsuperscript{389} It should be noted that the word mniš is the same used in conjunction with the īmy-r ḫtn in P. Anastasi VIII and P. Bologna 1086 (see above). Further, it is evident that the individual associated with it, perhaps as the captain of the ship, possesses an obviously foreign name.

\textsuperscript{390} See Wente 1990: 127.

\textsuperscript{391} For Anat and her Egyptian connections, see Pritchard 1943: 76–82; Stadelmann 1967: 88–96; Leclant 1975: 253–258; Bowman 1978.
by the commander of garrison troops suggests that Egyptian authorities patronized her cult. As will be discussed below, there is plentiful evidence that the Egyptian government actively sponsored—or at least contributed to the maintenance of—temples at Beth Shan and Lachish. Further, it is particularly significant in this context that a stele discovered in a contemporary level at Beth Shan depicted a woman in the act of paying homage to a goddess, who in all likelihood should be identified with Anat.392

In her dual capacity as a traditional Canaanite deity and a goddess whose cult enjoyed a large following in Egypt, Anat would have been an ideal divinity to serve as the focus of worship for a mixed population of Egyptians and Canaanites.393 Moreover, as the Mekal stele indicated already in the late Eighteenth Dynasty (see chapter four), far from imposing purely Egyptian deities upon their imperial subjects, the Egyptians themselves appear to have adopted at least some aspects of Canaanite religious practice.394 Whether this apparent inclusiveness was born out of a desire to meld harmoniously with the Canaanites among whom they were living or whether it was simply a reaction to a belief that Egyptian gods could not function effectively outside of Egypt is not certain.

2. idnw my n tkw n wr n md3yw in-hr-n-n[ht] n p3-rwd-n-p3-r` hry pdt yy n p3-rwd-n-r` m `nh wd3 [snb] . . . hny` dd r-nty h3b,n hry pdt iny hry pdt p3-hry-pdt r-` dd p3 wr h` dd n.n imi tw.w` [i]pt rm`t h` wnn n h` dd n.f `5 s.n n n3 rw` r imy-rn.f in.tw.st bn iw.i r `5 sw n.[t]n imi tw.[w m] idnw my n tkw i.di.sn n.n m s`w h.r.f (h3b) n.n h`w h3b n.i di.i st n.tn m s` n m3` t-mitt-n p3 h3b.t(n) r-` dd i.irt st `5 s n n3 rw` nty m drt.mn m.tw.w int.w n.tw is bn dd n.tn hsf n.tn p3 imy-rn.f h.r` m.tw.tn i3.f iw.tn h` dd is bn tw.i r[h](k) n3 h` y n md3yw h` `5 h3y.sn hnw` knw n.k h` tw.k r[h].sn n m3` m ntk ms n n3 smdt bn m ntk sr

392 The unnamed goddess is portrayed in an identical fashion to another goddess designated as “Anat, queen of heaven,” who was also venerated by an Egyptian on a stele found in a secondary context at Beth Shan (Rowe 1930: 19, 32–33; 1940: 33–34; pl. 65A: 1; James 1966: 34; James and McGovern 1993: 240).

393 As will be discussed in-depth below, at nearly all Egyptian installations north of the Ways of Horus, there is plentiful archaeological evidence for a coexistence of Egyptian and Canaanite material culture. Just as the Egyptians effectively integrated Canaanite rulers into their administrative system, they also apparently employed Canaanites in their outposts both as soldiers and as administrative personnel.

394 Another example is the dedication of a (probable) Nineteenth Dynasty stele to “Baal of the North” at Ugarit by an Egyptian “royal scribe and chief treasurer” (Schaeffer 1939b: 24; Leonard 1989: 32). For the worship of foreign deities by Egyptians in the New Kingdom generally, see Stadelmann 1967.
iw in(w).k m kt st r di.tw.k r-min3 tw.k rḥ n3y.sn s ḫn ‘š n.w n3 nnw i.di.i n.k m.tw.w (ḥr) int.w y3[ir n3 n]ty ḫr smt tiwy.sn ḫr tiwy.w n3 nty ḫr kmt m ntk p3 rd n3 mḏyw m ḫy dd n ny ḫy ndtw m.tw.cn šdm n.w i.iri.k m p3 nty m ḫr.t.k y3 bn iw.sn ḫr ḫy.f nfr snb.k (P. Anastasi V, 25: 2–4; 25: 6–27: 3)

May, the deputy of Tjeku, to Anherenna[kht], the great one of the Medjay of the Tract of Pre, (and) Yey, troop commander of the Tract of Pre. In l.p.[h.].! [. . .] And further to the effect that: the troop commander Any (and) the troop commander Paherypedjet sent to me saying, “The great one said to us: ‘Give a [qu]ota of people.’ Then, when we said to him, ‘Read for us the names in the list of names so that one may bring them,’” (he said,) ‘I will not read them for [y]ou. Give [them].’ [It is] May, the deputy of Tjeku, who gave them to us in writing.’ So he (said) to us.” So they wrote to me. I gave it to you in writing in truth in accordance with the (letter) that you sent saying ‘Do it.’ Read to them the names, which are in your hand, and they will bring them to you. Did (I) not say to you, “Respond to the list immediately, and you will take them (lit. it)”? And you said, “I don’t know the inspectors of the Medjay and their many responsibilities to you.” But you know them, truly. It is you who are a child of the subjects. It is not you at all who are a nobleman, having been brought from another place in order that you be placed here. You know their duties. Read to them the names, which I gave to you, and they will bring them. Su[rely those w]ho are in the desert395 are yours; moreover those who are in Egypt are yours. It is you who are the administrator of the Medjay. Do not cause that another to say to us (even) a few words, but you listen to them. Act accordingly with what is in your hand, (otherwise) they surely won’t know its delivery. May your health be well.

This letter, found in a collection of late Egyptian miscellanies, constitutes a stern reproof from a deputy (idnw) of the htm-fortress of Tjeku to a great one of the Medjay (iwr n mḏyw).396 As discussed above, the term “Medjay” had shed its identity as a purely ethnic marker within a few generations of Egypt’s reunification in the New Kingdom. In the majority of contexts in which it is subsequently evidenced, the term refers to a police force or to a troop of desert scouts. Although the name “Medjay” probably indicates that decommissioned Nubian soldiers at first often filled these positions, by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty the Medjay are indistinguishable ethnically

395 This ideogram could also be read “ḥ3tu” or “foreign country.”
396 The letter is also addressed to a troop commander, but the import of the text is clearly directed at the great one of the Medjay.
from the general population. In this particular case, the great one of the Medjay, Anherennakht, bore an Egyptian name and is explicitly stated to have been a child of the “subjects” or “common people” (smdt).

The occasion for the deputy’s displeasure was as follows. According to the text of the letter, the deputy of Tjeku at some point previously had sent a list of names to the great one of the Medjay, who was stationed in the tract of Pre in the easternmost Delta. The list authorized the great one of the Medjay to requisition a number of designated individuals from two troop commanders (ḥry pdt) whose posts are not indicated. It is possible that the troop commanders were based at Tjeku, but if so the deputy of Tjeku must have been away at the time. Alternatively, it may have been that the troop commanders resided at an army base somewhere else in the eastern Delta.

The great one of the Medjay apparently went to the two troop commanders, wherever they were located, and demanded from them the men that the deputy of Tjeku had assigned to him. When the troop commanders asked for his authorization, however, he did not produce the list. Instead, the great one of the Medjay simply stated that the deputy himself had promised him the men, so the troop commanders should produce them on that authority alone. The troop commanders, on the other hand, obviously mistrusted the great one of the Medjay and refused to grant his request without viewing the list. They then wrote to the deputy of Tjeku on their own and requested information on the matter.

It was upon receipt of the letter from the two irate troop commanders that the deputy of Tjeku sent his own letter chastising the great one of the Medjay. In it, the deputy clearly expresses his displeasure that the great one of the Medjay had not simply produced for the troop commanders the document that the deputy had sent to him by order of the king. If the great one of the Medjay had simply done this, there would have been no problem. In demanding the men from the troop commanders without evidence of authorization, however, the great one of the Medjay had rightly been

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refused his request. Likewise, through this breach in the chain of command, the great one had caused the deputy of Tjeku unnecessary correspondence with the troop commanders. The deputy ended his letter by reminding the great one of the Medjay that as a man of the people, rather than a dilettante nobleman imported to the post from elsewhere, he should certainly have been familiar with the proper protocol.

The letter is of interest with respect to this study for three primary reasons. First, it shows that a deputy held a high position in the htm-fortress at Tjeku. This office is not well understood, but deputies are otherwise rarely associated with northern fortresses. Second, it demonstrates that the deputy of Tjeku possessed the authority to requisition men from troop commanders, although it is uncertain whether the troop commanders were stationed at Tjeku in his absence or whether they resided elsewhere. The former is certainly a viable possibility, as numerous sources attest to the fact that troop commanders generally held posts of high authority at Tjeku. Finally, the third major point of interest is that the deputy of Tjeku and the great one of the Medjay of the tract of Pre had a relationship close enough that the former had the ability to assign men to work for the latter. The intimate relationship between Medjay-scouts and the authorities at Tjeku is well illustrated by another model letter included in the same papyrus (see below).

3. ḫn ḫf(t) spr t3y.i ṣt r-r.tn iw.tn ḫr in n3 md3yw n t3 sfḥy ḫr smt nty ḫr ṭsy [r smt] m-_PUSH wnt (. . .) m,[t]w.tn tm in ḫh n n3 rmḥt i.d.i.i m ḫrt.tn m md3[t] ṭr tn m ir ṭfy n3 rmḥt ḫr p3y.sn ṣḥnt m.tw.tn [in].w n.i r ṭkw ink i.d.i.i ṣḥ.sn ḫr.n ḫbd ṣṁw sw 25 (P. Anastasi V, 18: 6–19: 2)

And say: when my letter gets to you, then you shall fetch the Medjay of the desert watch who are going up [to the desert] with (. . .) b[u]t don’t bring the group of people whose [names] I placed in your hand as a document[t]. Mind you, do not remove the people from their

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398 In P. Anastasi III, 1: 9–11 and P. Anastasi V 24: 6–25: 1 (see above) deputies of the army are indirectly associated with fortresses but are not the idnw of a particular fortress. Knowing that an idnw could be associated with a military base, however, makes it tempting to speculate that the idnw who sent a letter to court in P. Anastasi III, vs. 3: 7 (see above) may have been stationed at an Egyptian installation. For the title of idnw generally, see Schulman 1964a: 34–35.

duties. And [bring] them to me at Tjeku. It is I who will allow them to pass by us. Month 3 of Shomu, day 25.

Neither the sender nor the recipient of this businesslike missive is designated by name. From the context, however, it is clear that the sender held a post at Tjeku, perhaps that of deputy or troop commander. Less clear is the status of the recipient, however, who could have been a simple functionary or who may have exercised authority specifically over the Medjay. The resemblance between this letter and that discussed immediately above, then, is quite marked. Given this similarity, it is perhaps not surprising that both dispatches had been subsequently collated into the same compendium of teaching texts. Indeed, considering that three of the model letters in P. Anastasi V concerned matters pertinent to Tjeku, the compiler of the miscellany may well have utilized the archives of this fortress as a source for exemplary model letters.

Although this text and the letter of reprimand, discussed above, were both addressed to a man who was responsible for obtaining Medjay under the aegis of a high official at Tjeku, the two letters are superficially mirror opposites. In the first, the deputy of Tjeku sent the great one of the Medjay a list of individuals whom the latter was authorized to requisition. In the second, however, the list of names provided by the officer at Tjeku specified exactly those Medjay whom his colleague was expressly forbidden to commandeer. According to the letter, the responsibilities with which these particular men were charged were not to be interfered with.

As discussed above, Egyptian army personnel and fort officials were apparently notorious for co-opting the services of temple employees, slaves, or other vulnerable persons for their own ends. When such cases were pursued in an earthly or a celestial court of law, the consequences could be severe for the offender. Thus, it may have been primarily out of a desire to avoid sanction that the official at Tjeku took great care in specifying exactly which Medjay must remain at their duties.

Neither the origin nor the destination of the Medjay who were chosen to accompany the second officer is known. The fact that they had to pass through Tjeku in their transit from one place to the other, however, suggests that they may have been based in the eastern Delta. Indeed, given the text of the letter of reprimand, it is quite possible that the Medjay hailed from the tract of Pre. Likewise, the designation of the Medjay as desert scouts who were to “go up”
to the desert could indicate that the men were recruited to operate in the wasteland bordering the Wadi Tumilat. As demonstrated by the letter that detailed the pursuit of the two fugitives from Tjeku to the Ways of Horus (see above), a skilled desert patrol was absolutely essential to the strict enforcement of Egypt’s borders.

[4. sdm.i p3 h3b i.iri n.i p3[y.i nb] [. . . .] m ḫ3t š3’ m p3 ḫtm n [. . . .] ‘nḫ wḏ3 snb nty ḫr t3 smt gḥtyw r t3 wḥt p3 nbw m.tw.f ḫ3 š3[f] m t3 wḥt] p3 nbw r p3 ḫw n mntyw t3 šḥ [. . . .] [imn]-m-int iwr di.i w⁺ n ḫry md3yw i[ry m]-f.iw.f ḫr ḫ3[t] iry m⁺ n3 [. . . .] m nb3y.sn ḫmwt pr ṭw.tw in.w m sny n p3y.i nb (P. Anastasi VI, 67–74)

I have heard the communication, which m[ly lord] sent to me [. . . .] in measuring from the ḫtm-fortress of [. . . .] l.p.h., which is upon the desert of Coptos, to the Village of the Gold, and he measured fro[m the Village] of Gold to the Mountain of Montu. The letter [. . . .] [Amen]eminet, I placed one of the commanders of the Medjay [thereof together with] him, and he is measur[ing] thereof together with the [. . . .] in their wells. Look, one is bringing them as a document to my lord.

In the Nineteenth Dynasty, northern ḫtm-fortresses guarded the entrances to Egypt via the Nile, the Ways of Horus military highway, and the Wadi Tumilat. In the case of the latter two fortresses, known informally as Tjaru and Tjeku, textual sources also attest to the fact that each possessed a more formal moniker, which incorporated the throne name of the reigning king. In this excerpt from a letter purportedly sent from the scribe Inena to the scribe of the treasury Kageb, yet a fourth ḫtm-fortress is attested. This last installation, which also had a formal name, guarded the entrance to Egypt via the Wadi Hammamat. Throughout Egypt’s history, the Wadi Hammamat constituted by far the most convenient transit corridor between the shore of the Red Sea and Upper Egypt. By traversing its length, the determined traveler could reach the region of Coptos in roughly a week’s time.

This ḫtm-fortress, otherwise unattested in Egyptian sources, has yet to be discovered archaeologically. Given the reference to ḫmwt-wells

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401 These individuals are again recognizable in P. Anastasi IV, 7: 9–8: 7 and P. Anastasi VI, 5: 6–6: 16 (see above).
402 The “highland of Coptos” is known from P. Harris I, 77: 12 to have been a port on the Red Sea from which goods transported from Punt could be offloaded for overland transport to Coptos (Caminos 1954: 298).
in the text, however, it appears likely that the installation served, at least in part, to guard an important water source. Further, given the number of gold mines in the wadi and the importance of this industry to Egypt, it would not be surprising if the fortress had been erected in the vicinity of such a mine or at the entrance to a mining district. Indeed, if it had been located at the entrance to a mining zone, the *htm*-fortress could well have served to monitor the access in or out of a very sensitive region. Alternatively, it could have served an even broader purpose of restricting passage through the wadi to miners, traders, sailors, and other authorized inhabitants or personnel.

The reference in the letter to a Medjay scout who had assisted in the effort to measure the distance between the *htm*-fortress and the Village of Gold is also interesting. Although his connection to the fortress is not made explicit, it would appear likely that the *htm*-fortress of the Wadi Hammamat was associated with a group of desert scouts who scoured the region surrounding the fortress for illicit passersby or, perhaps, gold thieves. Medjay scouts were likewise associated with the *htm*-fortresses of Tjaru and Tjeku, and such individuals would have been of particular value in a desert environment like the Wadi Hammamat.

5. ḫn‘ dl r-nty sḏm.i p3 hšb i.i.rk n.i ḫr k3 is bw rḥ.k t3 st wḥ i.i.rt p3y.k šri p3 k3 šn b i.f sw d.i.f sw ṭy sryt wšḥ-nmḥtt ḫr iw ib.k r p3 k3 imi p3 ‘r‘r p3 ū n ḫy p3 sḏy p3 ḫšw p3 30 n ḫr bdḥ p3 10 n i-te m-it i.di.i n.k m-dḥ dl.k n.i ḫr smi ḫr p3y.i šri iwf.m n‘y r ḫšw iwf.i ḫr pn‘.f r p3 ḫtm i-ir nṣy.f iwr iy r kmt ḫr 6 rnpt (P. Anastas V, 13: 2–7)

And say as follows: I heard the communication, which you sent to me concerning the bull. Do you not know the place of storage, which your son made (for) the bull? Did he not take it in order that he might give it to the standard bearer Wesekhnemte? Now since you desire the bull, give (me) the *ḥt*-basket, the piece of hide, the *sd*-garment,

403 The area of Coptos was well known for its association with gold-mining activities in the Wadi Hammamat, a connection that gave rise to its ancient name—Nubet. The Village of Gold is not identified but may have been located in the general vicinity of Coptos. Alternatively, and perhaps more likely, the village could have been one of the centers of gold-mining activity in the Wadi Hammamat; some toponyms with like names are evidenced in the famous Ramesside Turin gold map (Goyon 1957: 289; Caminos 1954: 298). The fact that the distance needed to be measured between the *htm*-fortress and the village suggests, however, that the two were not in direct association.
the loincloth, the 30-khar of emmer, (and) the 10-khar of barley, which I gave to you since you told me about the report concerning my son, when he was traveling to Syria-Palestine, and I turned him over to the htm-fortress until his companions return to Egypt after six years.

The import of this letter, the original sender and recipient of which are unfortunately unknown, is not entirely clear. The writer had apparently received an inquiry from the recipient about a bull, which the recipient’s son had disposed of in some manner. Given the direction of the inquiry, the recipient must have had good reason to suspect that the writer would have knowledge of its whereabouts. And indeed, the writer replies to the recipient that he was under the impression that the recipient’s son had given the bull to a standard-bearer (tšy sryt) named Wesekhnemte.

Standard-bearers in ancient Egypt were directly involved in the conscription of civilians for duty in the army. So it is interesting to speculate as to whether the bull, which the recipient’s son supposedly brought to the standard bearer, was in effect a bribe, offered by the young man with the intent of either avoiding military service altogether or of being subsequently assigned to a particularly desirable post. Although the bull could have been given to the standard-bearer for a variety of other reasons as well, if it had in fact been a bribe, the writer’s reference to his own son’s military service and the writer’s seemingly edgy tone could, perhaps, be better understood.

Following his revelation concerning the bull’s whereabouts, the writer bluntly informs the recipient that the bull could possibly be returned if a long list of items and foodstuffs, which the writer had bestowed upon the recipient earlier, were likewise returned to him. These goods had apparently been given to the recipient after he or she had reported on the writer’s son’s progress toward Syria-Palestine. How the recipient would have come by news of the writer’s son, however, and the reasoning that lay behind such a lavish reimbursement for this information are unknown. Likewise, it is unclear how the writer planned to retrieve the bull from the standard-bearer, if the goods were in fact restored.

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404 Midway through the letter, a woman named Katuty is addressed concerning another matter (P. Anastasi V, 13: 7–14: 1). It is unclear, however, whether the entire letter was intended for her or whether the first section was written to a close associate or household member.

Finally, the writer ends discussion of the matter by reminding the recipient that he himself had turned over his own son to the $htm$-fortress until his son’s companions returned to Egypt after a six-year tour of duty.406 The contrast between the six-year service of his own son and the easier lot that the recipient’s son might have earned with his gift of the bull may well have accounted for the writer’s apparent lack of sympathy for his correspondent. This is pure speculation, however, and the relationship between writer and recipient is indeed difficult to comprehend.

As to the $htm$-fortress at which the writer’s son was stationed, the location of this installation is obscure. The writer’s son is said to have been on his way to Kharu, which might indicate that the fortress was located at Tjaru—the overland gateway to Syria-Palestine. As stated previously, the majority of identifiable $htm$-fortresses appear to have been located on the boundaries of Egypt proper.407 Likewise, a border locale makes sense given the statement that the writer’s son would serve in the fortress until the return of his companions to Egypt. Were the son in Syria-Palestine as well, one would expect that he and his companions would return together.

Reign of Siptah and Tawosret

406 In P. Bologna 1094, 9: 3–5, a shield bearer is reported to have served a five-year stint in Syria-Palestine (Kharu). There are otherwise, however, very few sources to indicate how long an individual normally served in the army. One would imagine that armies raised from civilians for the purpose of a specific campaign would return home once the campaign had been completed. For soldiers who elected to serve in the army as a career choice, however, the spans of time spent abroad would have been, naturally, quite a bit longer.

407 That life stationed at such a border-fortress may not have been easy or particularly pleasant is implied both by the exile of criminals whose noses had been amputated to Tjaru (see chapter four) as well as by the largely fanciful teaching text, “An official complains of the hardship of his post abroad” (P. Anastasi IV, 12: 5–13: 8).
[As for any overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea] who shall exist, and he is neglectful of this chapel [...] he is in the power of Amun of Usermaatre Setepenre; he is as a hated one of the gods of the sky (and) of the earth. [...] As for any overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea who shall exist, the temple of Amun of Usermaatre Setepenre being under his authority, an[d he] in fact gives attention to the chapel [...] he is in the favor of Amun of Usermaatre Setepenre, (and) he is in the favor of the gods of the sky (and) the gods of the earth, (and) he is in the favor of the king of his time, his (name) remains on the lip(s) of (his) brothers, enduringly; he cleaves to his office of overseer of the htm-fortress, his son ascending to his position; when he is sent upon a mission, (and) he relates its report, then his children will cleave to every creation which he made.

When Gardiner first viewed the Bilgai stele, it resided in the courtyard of a peasant’s house and had apparently been utilized for an appreciable period of time as a millstone. As no other Egyptian antiquities were found in the village, which was located some two hours’ donkey ride south of Mansoura, Gardiner speculated that the stele had originally been set up “at some seaport of the Tantic or Pelusiac mouth.”\(^{408}\) His rationale for this suggestion, of course, had to do with the text’s focus upon the role of the overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea.

The stele itself had originally been erected to commemorate the construction of a chapel of Amun of Usermaatre Setepenre. Although the chapel had been built in the name of Tawosret and an associated male monarch (either Seti II or, more likely, Siptah), practical responsibility for its construction seems to have fallen upon the unnamed dedicator of the stele. This individual, it is likely, occupied the office of overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea, as he fully expected that after his death jurisdiction for the chapel would be exercised by a holder of this same title.\(^{409}\)

Much of the text is concerned with a threat and reward formula designed to ensure that future overseers of the htm-fortress of the sea would safeguard the chapel. According to the text, an overseer of

\(^{408}\) Gardiner 1912: 52; see also p. 49 for details of the circumstances of its discovery. Six years after his publication of the stele, Gardiner suggested that it had in fact originally been set up in Pi-Ramesses or close thereto (Gardiner 1918: 256).

\(^{409}\) If the author of the stele was indeed an overseer of a htm-fortress, the end portion of the stele—in which the individual proudly reports the revenue of the taxes he had collected and delivered—would be yet another testament to the economic role of this office (KRI IV, 343: 7–16). See below.
the htm-fortress who acted in a responsible and righteous manner would turn his attention to the chapel, allow the statue of Amun of Usermaatre Setepenre to rest in it on every occasion that he appeared in public at a festival, and ensure that chapel personnel were not reassigned to other tasks. The overseer of the htm-fortress who fulfilled all these stipulations was then promised many things. The individual would find favor with the gods, his name would live on the lips of his descendants, and his son would ascend to his office. The errant overseer of the htm-fortress, on the other hand, would be effectively excommunicated. The gods would revile him, his name would cease to exist, and his son would not assume his office. The fact that the majority of these punishments were of a spiritual rather than a secular nature is true of threat formulae in general.

The Bilgai stele is interesting with regard to this study for two primary reasons. First, it demonstrates that overseers of htm-fortresses potentially could wield great authority over religious institutions in their jurisdiction. Not only were they to some extent responsible for the upkeep of the cults, but the proscription against reassigning temple personnel proves that it was within the power of these officials to do so, should they wish.

P. Bologna 1086, discussed above, may provide evidence for an actual case in which a slave destined for the temple of Thoth was reallocated to a military officer while he was under the authority of the overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea. An even closer parallel exists in the Nauri decree of Seti I in Nubia, discussed below, in which overseers of htm-fortresses are strictly forbidden to interfere with temple property. Evidence of state officials drawing upon temple resources, such as is envisioned in both the Nauri and Bilgai steles, is not difficult to discover in New Kingdom texts and must have presented a very real problem for religious officials.

The second item of interest in the Bilgai stele is the statement that the office of overseer of the htm-fortress would ideally pass from father to son. The desire for a son to ascend to his father’s profession is a stereotypical wish in Egyptian texts, expressed no matter what the specific job or the frequency with which this succession occurred in real life. There are, however, a number of examples of such filial promotions actually taking place with respect to the commanders of Egyptian military bases. In the Amarna letters, it appears that Pakhamnate, the overseer of Sumur, was succeeded in his post by his son Ha’ip (EA 131, 132). Seti, likewise, followed his father,
Paramesses’, footsteps by filling the dual positions of troop commander and overseer of the htm-fortress of Tjaru (see chapter four).410 In the Twentieth Dynasty, as well, there is a good possibility that Beth Shan’s troop commander-in-residence had inherited his position from his father (see chapter six).

It may have been the case then that men stationed in htm-fortresses not infrequently retained their positions for a number of years, residing in their posts along with wives and children, at least one of which it was hoped would succeed his father in his office. In the case of the overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea or the officials at Tjaru or Tjeku, such long-term residencies would not prove particularly problematic; these territories, although located in border zones, still belonged to Egypt proper. When officials began to raise families outside of Egypt, however, a whole new set of issues could potentially come into play.

Egyptian wives may well have accompanied the commanders of Egyptian bases who were stationed abroad. On the other hand, one could also imagine that these men may have been encouraged to form marriage ties with important local families in order to strengthen the bond between Egypt and indigenous elites. Certainly, the mixture of Egyptian and local material culture at military bases—when viewed in tandem with the evidence of Egyptians worshiping Canaanite gods—suggests a liberal intermixing of populations.

Such interaction with local peoples is often viewed as an important way for imperial powers to “settle in” and become accepted in a foreign territory. Intense social involvement in local communities, however, also carries with it the very real danger of officials “going native” and developing too close a bond with local groups. Such dual loyalties on the part of an official could potentially interfere with the goals of the imperial government. The Amarna archive is rife, for instance, with examples of Egyptian officials purportedly acting against Egypt’s interests. Due to the biases of individual authors, the veracity of these claims cannot be decided, but it is tempting to assign at least some of the apparently treasonous activities to the divided loyalties of expatriate Egyptian officials.411

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410 In P. Anastasi V, 12: 3–4, also, a troop commander and overseer of foreign countries writes a colleague who had just been appointed troop commander of the well (hry pdt n ts hnm) to congratulate him upon ascending to his father’s position.

411 See chapter four. The traitor Amenhotep of Tushultu (EA 185, 186) may also have been a renegade Egyptian.
This inscription, discovered in or near a foundation deposit dating to the time of Queen Tawosret, belongs to the familiar category of wine docket. From the late Eighteenth Dynasty onward, numerous doockets document shipments of wine from the border-fortress at Tjaru to contexts both cultic and royal. For this reason, when a docket states simply that the wine came from an overseer of a htm-fortress, the assumption is quite reasonably made that the htm-fortress in question is that at Tjaru. Given the evidence contained in the Bilgai stele, however, this assumption must be reevaluated, at least with regard to this particular docket.

As discussed above, the Bilgai stele provides the information that Tawosret sponsored the construction of a chapel to Amun of Usermaatre Setepenre somewhere near the mouth of the Tantic or, as is far more likely, the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. The stele makes it quite clear, as well, that this chapel would have fallen under the broad authority of an overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea. Of far more immediate interest in this context, however, is the fact that the dedicator of the stele, presumably himself an overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea, addresses the final portion of the stele specifically to two officials, both of whom held high positions within a Theban “temple (pr) of Seti Merneptah in the temple (pr) of Amun” (KRI IV, 343: 7)—i.e., the exact same institution witnessed on this very docket!

Of further interest is the content of the dedicator’s message to the two men, for it is solely concerned with a seemingly anomalous testimony to the prompt and even overzealous payment of his own harvest taxes (sma) and taxes (wy). The levies themselves were far and above what an individual could have been expected to produce, and the official reports explicitly that the goods came from the output (bk) of his people (mtt). As the author of the stele proudly boasts, in each case the quantities of foodstuffs that he paid were exponentially higher than those assessed to him. For instance, he delivered twice as much grain, ten times more honey, and almost six and a half more units of wine than was required of him (KRI IV, 343: 7–16).
The fact that his boast was specifically directed toward the officials of the temple of Seti Merneptah in the temple of Amun suggests very strongly that the taxes owed by the overseer of the $htm$-fortress of the sea were payable directly to the coffers of this Theban temple. Moreover, it might be possible to solidify the relationship even further. The wine docket found in the Theban context states specifically that the wine sent by an overseer of the $htm$-fortress came from the vineyards of the temple of Seti Merneptah in the temple of Amun. It is quite plausible, then, that the Theban temple actually owned the lands upon which the $htm$-fortress of the sea was situated. The far-flung nature of the property owned by Egyptian temples is notorious, and it is certainly of unexpected interest to gain insight into the relationship between the overseer of the $htm$-fortress of the sea and one specific Theban temple.

Archaeological evidence for Nineteenth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

Tell er-Retabah, Tjeku (see figure 33)
The toponym Tjeku first appears in Egyptian texts as a component in the title of a mid-Eighteenth Dynasty troop commander (see chapter three). Presumably, then, some of the architecture uncovered at Tell er-Retabah, the archaeological site now universally equated with the border-fortress of Tjeku, may date from this earlier time period. Large-scale excavations at the site, however, took place around the turn of the century, an era in which subtleties in the archaeological record were seldom noticed and even less frequently recorded. Therefore, given that the earliest securely dated in situ material at Tell er-Retabah is from the Nineteenth Dynasty, discussion of the archaeology has been saved for this chapter. It should be kept in mind, however, that all the architecture, with the exception, perhaps, of the temple, could certainly have been constructed in the Eighteenth Dynasty.

Tjeku and Tjaru, the two New Kingdom $htm$-fortresses that together effectively sealed Egypt’s eastern border, appear to have shared largely similar histories. Besides both having been lavished with attention as border-fortresses in the Nineteenth Dynasty, each of the sites enjoyed

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412 Naville 1887; Petrie and Duncan 1989 [1906].
Hyksos patronage in the Second Intermediate Period. Tell er-Retabah, in fact, was among the largest of 21 such sites discovered in a survey along the Wadi Tumilat.\footnote{Redmount 1989: 71–81.} This intensive Hyksos interest in Tjeku and the wadi in general is reminiscent of the Hyksos occupation in and around Tjaru, for both towns dominated the transit corridors that the Hyksos rulers in Egypt utilized as links or gateways to their eastern allies.

Whereas Tell er-Retabah was one of many Hyksos sites located along the Wadi Tumilat, it is the only site in the region that displayed any secure evidence of Egyptian presence in the New Kingdom.\footnote{Holladay 1999: 879.} The eradication of a troublesome population and its replacement by an Egyptian military base is a pattern that occurred at numerous other sites, such as Tjaru (Tell Heboua I), Tell el-Ajjul, Sai, and Beth Shan. Indeed, the scenario is so recognizable throughout the New Kingdom in both Syria-Palestine and Nubia that it must have been a tactic firmly ensconced in Egypt’s cross-frontier policy. Given the strong connection between Tell er-Retabah and Hyksos culture, then, it would be surprising if further excavations at the site fail to identify an early Eighteenth Dynasty occupation, such as has been identified at Tjaru.

Neither Naville nor Petrie, the only two archaeologists who have worked extensively at the site,\footnote{Johns Hopkins University and the Egyptian Antiquities Organization have conducted limited salvage work at Tell er-Retabah, but the archaeological picture has not been significantly altered (Holladay 1999: 880).} enjoyed the process of digging at Tell er-Retabah. Naville complained that he discovered nothing of interest, while Petrie stated that the local population had mined the site for building materials to the point that the tell was virtually honeycombed with pits.\footnote{Naville 1887: 24. Petrie and Duncan 1989: 28.} Partly as a result of the difficulties they encountered and partly due to the less-than-rigorous publishing standards at the turn of the century, very little of the Nineteenth Dynasty border-fortress is known in any detail.

Originally a little over 3 m thick and bastioned at irregular intervals, the town wall is preserved in piecemeal fashion only to the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[413] Redmount 1989: 71–81.
\item[414] Holladay 1999: 879. Such a profound dearth of New Kingdom remains in the Wadi Tumilat argues against Bleiberg’s (1983: 24) contention that the corridor consisted of a military zone in which were located four or possibly five distinct fortress installations.
\item[415] Johns Hopkins University and the Egyptian Antiquities Organization have conducted limited salvage work at Tell er-Retabah, but the archaeological picture has not been significantly altered (Holladay 1999: 880).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
south and the west, so it is impossible to assess accurately the total area of the site. Given its existing dimensions, however, it is likely that Tell er-Retabah could have enclosed a greater population within its walls than did Aniba, Soleb, Sesebi, or Sai, rendering it a fortress-town of significant magnitude. As is typical of New Kingdom enclosure walls in general, however, there seems to have been none but the most perfunctory efforts at real defensive fortification.

Although the wall was poorly preserved to the west, Petrie was fairly certain that the gateway of the enclosure wall and the town’s temple shared the same axis, so he reconstructed the gate in this manner in his plan. Such a placement for the gate would not be untoward, however, as east to west was not only the direction of the sun’s travel across the sky—and hence appropriate for a temple—but it was also the path a traveler took across the Wadi Tumilat. Such dual orientation of temple and town is also found at Sesebi (see chapter four).

Of the temple itself little remained except the foundations, scattered carved relief, and stele fragments. Like all state-sponsored temples in the New Kingdom, however, the decoration focused upon the relationship between the king and the gods. A depiction of a deity presumed to be Seth was found, but it was “Atum of Tjeku” who occupied the foremost position in the cult. This temple, then, is undoubtedly to be identified with the “House of Atum” (pr itm) to which the nearby pools belonged (P. Anastasi IV, 18: 6–7).

418 Petrie and Duncan 1989: 30.
419 Petrie and Duncan 1989: pls. 29–32; KRI II, 304: 10–15. Much of the material dating to Seti I and Ramesses II that was found at Maskhuta (Naville 1885; Porter and Moss IV 1934: 52–53; KRI II, 403: 10–411: 10) probably also had been robbed in antiquity from Tell er-Retabah’s temple.
420 Petrie and Duncan 1989: pl. 30. Holladay (1999: 879), having found Hellenistic sherds in the mound upon which the temple is situated, suggests that either these blocks were imported to the site later or that the temple must have been moved and reerected in the Ptolemaic period. Neither of these scenarios seems particularly likely, however, since Atum is said to be of tjkw and doorjambs at the site give the titles of someone also from tjkw. Archaeological evidence shows no other site that could have borne this designation in the New Kingdom. The idea that the temple would have been dismantled and moved in the Ptolemaic period is likewise unlikely, for these pharaohs were more interested in building their own temples than in preserving those already in an advanced state of disrepair.
421 Goedicke (1987b: 96) suggests that the pool should be identified with a depression located in close proximity to the fortress. Holladay (1999: 878) notes the presence of another large body of water near Tell er-Retabah in the central portion of the wadi.
for the rest of the town, very little is recorded. Interestingly, Naville refers to “numerous remains of brick houses,” while Petrie was impressed by the lack of architecture at the site, leading him to conclude that Tjeku served largely as “a fortified camping ground.”

Regardless of the nature of the htm-fortress as a whole, at least one other monumental building caught Petrie’s eye—his “Great House.” This structure, at nearly 370 m², possessed the dimensions characteristic of an elite center-hall house. Although it is not possible to compare the scale of this residence with other buildings at Tell er-Retabah, the fact that it was constructed out of large, state-sized bricks and that it was located on the highest point of the mound are two quite clear indications of its importance. Given that this building would have been of suitable dimensions to house the foremost official at Tjeku, it is tempting to propose that Usermaatre-nakht, the troop commander and overseer of foreign countries under Ramesses II, had once inhabited it. Doorjambs inscribed with this official’s name and titles were found in a secondary context at the site, and although Petrie ascribed the jambs to a tomb, there is no reason that they could not instead have fronted the entrance to an important building.

Finally, regarding Tell er-Retabah’s cemetery, which was situated some 400 m north of the settlement, very little can be said. The mud-brick, often multichambered graves were apparently plundered in antiquity, and thus associating the remaining material culture with any grave in particular proved a difficult task indeed. According to Petrie, he felt comfortable assigning only two graves, 8 and 19, to a Nineteenth or Twentieth Dynasty date based upon his analysis of the ceramic and jewelry found within.

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423 The actual plan of the building is difficult to discern, as only the foundations were preserved; however, its general outline—that of a large square building with a small antechamber at one corner—is certainly consistent with the plan of a typical center-hall house.
424 Petrie and Duncan 1989: 30.
425 For a discussion of this official, see the textual section above. The pottery and other items in the Great House indicate only that the house was occupied in the New Kingdom and the Third Intermediate Period (Petrie and Duncan 1989: 29. Loci 10 and 23 come from the Great House).
426 Petrie and Duncan 1989: 31, pl. 31. A similar doorjamb belonging to a Twentieth Dynasty troop commander was found at Beth Shan (James 1966: 162, 172, figs. 94: 3, 95: 3—see chapter six).
427 Petrie and Duncan 1989: 32.
Figure 33. Border-fortress at Tell er-Retabah
(after Petrie 1989: pl. 35)
Tell Heboua I, Tjaru (see figure 9)
As discussed in chapter two, following the dramatic expulsion of the Hyksos, early Eighteenth Dynasty pharaohs constructed a military base at the site of Tell Heboua I, a former Hyksos stronghold. The primary purpose of this newly built border-fortress must have been to block any such unwanted incursions of foreigners in the future. By the reign of Thutmose III, a massive mud-brick enclosure wall encompassed a granary complex, a center-hall house (BAT. I), an administrative building (BAT. IV), as well as numerous other state-sponsored installations, which remain as yet unexcavated. Likewise, within the town proper, numerous habitations were built and Hyksos dwellings reoccupied.428 Due to its strategic position guarding the narrow passage of dry land that separated the Delta from the Ways of Horus military highway, Tjaru continued to thrive in the mid- to late Eighteenth Dynasty. It was not until the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, that the Egyptian government again undertook major construction at the site.

As the Karnak relief makes clear, Seti I experienced significant difficulties due to hostile bedouin activity along the Ways of Horus, and this renewed threat may well have inspired him to pay extra attention to his premier border-fortress. Seti was, however, also obviously proud of the system of fortifications along the Ways of Horus, as his Karnak relief demonstrates. This combination of practical concerns and imperial pride may thus have inspired him to dedicate funds from the royal stores to renovate Tjaru in a number of significant ways.

First of all, it appears that around the time of Seti I, the town’s mud-brick enclosure wall was reconstructed and reinforced, doubling its width from 7 to 14 m thick.429 Although these improvements are only observable in the northwestern portion of the fortress, the vast majority of the enclosure wall has yet to be uncovered. It is likely that further work will demonstrate that the wall was broadened elsewhere as well—perhaps most pronouncedly in the vicinity of the town gates. There is no evidence, however, that the already impressive area enclosed by the fortress walls (upwards of 120,000 m²) was expanded at this time.

428 Abd el-Maksoud undertook excavations at the site in six seasons between 1986 and 1991. There is still a great deal of Tell Heboua I that remains to be exposed.
Three inscribed stone blocks, each bearing a cartouche of Seti I, were discovered in the ruins of Tell Heboua I, witness to this pharaoh’s interest in Tjaru. Maksoud believes that one of these blocks—a stone doorjamb—originally decorated the entrance to an impressive Nineteenth Dynasty administrative or residential structure (BAT. II).\footnote{Maksoud 1998: 36, 39, 120.}

This building, measuring 18.5 m to a side, was nearly the exact same size as the “Great House” at Tell er-Retabah, which Petrie speculated would have been the main administrative building at Tjeku (see above).\footnote{The building at Tell er-Retabah was 18.3 m to a side but included an extra porch or antechamber (Petrie and Duncan 1989: pl. 35).}

Although very little besides the foundations were preserved, it appears that BAT. II may have incorporated within its structure as many as 16 chambers. By far the most impressive of these was one extremely large room, which was distinguished by its brick flooring and by the single column in its center. Although this court was not central, as was the norm in center-hall houses, ten of the rooms bordered directly upon it from three sides. Maksoud speculates that the building was probably residential in nature, and it certainly falls well within the size category expected of an elite residence. It would be surprising, however, if such a massive, distinguished building did not also serve administrative functions.

Other Nineteenth Dynasty constructions at Tell Heboua I included a series of magazines (MA. I, II, and III) and a small storage complex.\footnote{Maksoud 1998: 35, 144.} These were built directly adjacent to the Eighteenth Dynasty granaries and the administrative buildings BAT. I and IV, which apparently continued to function at this time. Whether these magazines were likewise employed in the storage of grain or whether they were utilized for other supplies is unfortunately unknown.

Aside from the fortification work, BAT. II, and the new magazines, the only other specifically Nineteenth Dynasty constructions mentioned in the reports are residential in nature.\footnote{Maksoud 1998: 36, 116, 148.} The two houses specifically illustrated in Maksoud’s report were of relatively modest size (49 and 73.5 m² respectively) but incorporated large associated courtyard areas in which much household activity must have taken place. It is likely that as Tjaru’s importance and prestige continued
to escalate throughout the New Kingdom, the town’s population followed suit. The satellite communities located in the general vicinity of Tjaru (i.e., Heboua III, II, and V\textsuperscript{434}) may well have been inhabited primarily by individuals who derived part or all of their income from supplying Tjaru with goods or services.

\textit{Bir el-‘Abd (no plan available)}

This square fort, constructed in the Amarna Period and discussed in chapter four, continued to function in the Nineteenth Dynasty. A jar handle impressed with the cartouche of Seti I was discovered at Bir el-‘Abd\textsuperscript{435} and very likely indicates that the fort enjoyed state support at this period. Unfortunately, however, no discernable contemporary architectural modifications are visible.

With its thick walls, square structure \((40 \times 40 \text{ m}^2)\), and associated reservoir, the fort at Bir el-‘Abd is almost certainly depicted in Seti’s Karnak relief. While it cannot at present be equated with a carved counterpart, the fort is located roughly midway along the Ways of Horus, as are the \textit{bḥn} of Menmaatre and the \textit{nḥtw} of Seti Merneptah. According to the relief, Seti dealt a stinging defeat to a group of Shasu bedouin in this very area, but whether the battle actually took place adjacent to these forts or whether the draftsman utilized artistic license due to compositional concerns is not known. Certainly, no evidence for such a contest has been as yet uncovered at the site.

\textit{Haruba site A-289 (see figure 34)}

Just as the Egyptian government originally constructed Bir el-‘Abd in the Amarna Period, the fort at Haruba site A–289 was likewise preceded by an earlier, albeit unfortified, installation.\textsuperscript{436} Whether this “phase IV” building in fact dated to the reign of Thutmose III, as associated seal impressions might suggest, however, is unclear.\textsuperscript{437} It

\textsuperscript{434} Heboua III consisted of two rises, one a settlement site and the other a necropolis (Valbelle et al. 1992: 17). For Heboua II, see Valbelle et al. 1992: 17, 19; Maksoud 1998: 30. Further, Al-Ayedi believes that he has discovered an additional fortress at Tell Heboua II (see below). For Tell Heboua V, see Valbelle et al. 1992: 22. For additional sites in the general vicinity of Tell Heboua I, see Valbelle et al. 1992: 12–19.

\textsuperscript{435} Oren 1993a: 1389.


\textsuperscript{437} Oren 1993a: 1390.
would not be surprising, given the speed with which Thutmose and his army crossed the Ways of Horus, to find that state-sponsored way stations already lined the military highway in his reign.\textsuperscript{438} Seals bearing the cartouche of Thutmose III, on the other hand, are notoriously unreliable for dating purposes, and so a mid-Eighteenth Dynasty date is far from certain. Until more work is undertaken, then, both the nature and the timing of this earlier occupation must remain frustratingly vague.

Both the Eighteenth Dynasty compound and its Nineteenth Dynasty successor were located in a 4 to 5 km\textsuperscript{2} area, which was tightly packed with twenty New Kingdom encampments, settlements, food preparation areas, and other activity zones.\textsuperscript{439} In this dense cluster of sites, only two were excavated: Haruba site A–289 and a late Eighteenth Dynasty administrative installation at Haruba site A–345 (see chapter four). As opposed to Haruba site A–345, which was unfortified, Haruba site A–289 is a classic blocky fort of the type illustrated in Seti I’s Karnak relief.

Given its size and structure, it is almost certain that Haruba site A–289 would have qualified for inclusion in Seti’s relief. Attempting to discern just which of the named forts it should be identified with, however, is a difficult task. Its positioning only 12 km east of el-Arish would seem to indicate that the fort should be situated somewhere toward the eastern end of the relief. Certainly, the representations of two eastern forts—the \textit{nh}s of the ruler and the \textit{nhtw} of Menmaatre—would match up nicely with the square, bastioned, plan of Haruba site A–289. It is unfortunate, however, that none of the eastern forts is associated with a harbor in Seti’s relief. Such a marker would have been appropriate to Haruba site A–289, which was situated alongside a shallow anchorage on the coast.\textsuperscript{440}

At 2,500 m\textsuperscript{2} (50 \times 50 m), the fort at Haruba site A–289 is the largest fortified structure yet excavated in the northern Sinai.\textsuperscript{441} The mud-brick enclosure wall of the site measured 4 m thick and was bastioned on its northeastern corner and along the middle of its

\textsuperscript{438} Oren 1979: 186.

\textsuperscript{439} At one of these satellite sites, namely A–343, an Egyptian beer bottle with a cartouche of Seti I was discovered (Oren 1987: 84).

\textsuperscript{440} Oren 1987: 114, n. 8.

\textsuperscript{441} The fortress was excavated between 1979 and 1982 by Ben Gurion University as part of the North Sinai Survey Project under the direction of Eliezer Oren.
northern wall. The western and southern walls may have been bastioned as well, but extensive damage rendered the outline of these walls difficult to discern in many areas.442

A massive gateway allowed entrance to the east, and the foundations of this structure were completely intact. The entranceway itself was nearly 4 m wide—capacious enough for a chariot to pass through comfortably—and wooden doors sealed the gate at either end of its 16 m length. This impressive passage was flanked and defined by two equally imposing towers. Each of these measured 8 × 13 m and incorporated two hollow chambers in its interior, which Oren suggests were possibly utilized for storage.443 Everything about Haruba site A–289, from its plan to its masonry to the size of its bricks (45 × 22 × 12 cm), is typical of New Kingdom architecture.444

The plan of the structures erected inside the fort was unfortunately only partially recoverable, and what remains is difficult to interpret. The enclosure wall bounded numerous relatively small buildings, and these seem predominantly to have been dedicated to administrative and storage-related functions. Other complexes were likely residential in nature, and still others appear to have been devoted to the preparation of food.445 Fully a third of the interior space in the fort, however, was devoid of architecture, and this open space may have been designed to accommodate military requirements, such as temporary encampment or assembly.446

Within the fort proper, the material culture appears to have been predominantly Egyptian. In addition to the usual assortment of luxury goods and easily portable items, there were many objects at the site that appear to have been produced by Egyptians for Egyptians. Egyptian-style ceramic found at Haruba site A–289, for example, included utility wares such as saucer bowls, cup-and-saucers, flower

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442 Oren speculates that these buttresses served as the bases for watchtowers. These towers and the tops of the walls in general may have been accessed via a stairway in the northeastern corner (Oren 1987: 87, 92).


445 Oren suggests that smaller rooms (c. 12 m²) served as dwellings, while larger rooms (c. 25 m²) were administrative in nature. Likewise, long, thin rooms may have been storage related, and rooms with numerous clay ovens almost certainly were dedicated to food preparation and storage (Oren 1987: 92–93). Given that different sized rooms often occupied the same building unit, however, this model must be employed with caution.

pots, slender ovoid jars, funnel-necked jars, globular jars, handleless storage jars, and tall-necked cups. Further, at least two Egyptian storage jars at the site bore the cartouches of Seti II. Bronze spearheads and a stone chariot fitting likewise provide evidence that Egyptian-equipped troops were once resident.447

Perhaps the most interesting of the Egyptian-style items found at the site, however, were the hand-modeled clay cobra heads. Similar artifacts have been found in Egyptian bases at Haruba site A–345 and at Beth Shan.448 Although these cobra figurines are not well understood, they are presumed to have been votive in nature. Simpler to explain are the four clay duck heads also discovered at Haruba site A–289. These artifacts were likewise found in great numbers at Beth Shan, where it can be demonstrated that the heads of the ducks had broken off from the rims of votive bowls.449 The presence of these two types of typically Egyptian cultic artifacts at Haruba site A–289 may perhaps hint at the as yet undetected presence of a chapel that served the religious needs of resident personnel and travelers.450

Deir el-Balah (see figure 3.5)
At the site of Deir el-Balah in the late Eighteenth Dynasty, the Egyptians erected a large, unfortified administrative structure (see

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449 For the duck heads at Haruba site A–289, see Oren 1980: 30–31; Higginbotham 2000: 104. For the duck heads at Beth Shan, see James and McGovern 1993: v. I: 172–172; v. II: figs 86–89. The vast majority of the duck-bedecked bowls were found in or adjacent to the main temple at the site.

450 A cemetery, which would greatly help illuminate the ethnic and religious identity of the inhabitants of Haruba site A–289, has unfortunately never been discovered. Isolated graves dating to the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, however, were found scattered about the fort (Oren 1987: 89; 1993a: 1390).
Figure 34. Egyptian fort at Haruba Site A–289
(after Oren 1987: 88)
chapter four). This installation, located only 13 km southwest of Gaza, likely served as the last Egyptian outpost along the Ways of Horus before a traveler officially entered Canaan. At some point early in the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, this relatively unassuming structure was razed, and a radically different building was constructed over its southern half. Indeed, virtually the only consistency between the successive residencies was their proximity to a 400 m² man-made reservoir.

Perfectly square, bastioned at all four corners, and located directly adjacent to an important water source, Residency II superficially appears to be a flawless translation into an archaeological milieu of a fort from Seti’s Karnak relief. The trouble is, however, that the site of Deir el-Balah is located between Raphia and Gaza, and so is demonstrably listed neither in the Karnak relief nor in P. Anastasi I.451 As material remains from the site are unequivocal in pinpointing the florescence of Residency II in the reigns of Seti I and Ramesses II, the omission cannot be chronological in nature.

Perhaps the best explanation of the exclusion of Residency II, despite its seemingly picture-perfect blueprint, is that the Egyptians did not consider Deir el-Balah to be the same type of installation as the other bases they erected along the Ways of Horus. At only 20 m to a side, Residency II was substantially smaller than either Bir el-‘Abd or Haruba site A–289. In fact, although all three bases shared a square plan—and both Haruba site A–289 and Deir el-Balah were buttressed—Residency II was fundamentally a different type of structure. Clearly envisioned as one coherent building, Residency II resembled in size a high-end center-hall house or the residencies at contemporary Tell Heboua I and Tell er-Retabah. Haruba site A–289 and Bir el-‘Abd, on the other hand, incorporated within their much more massive enclosure walls not only a variety of different buildings but also a large plaza space.

It would seem likely, then, that the Nineteenth Dynasty residency at Deir el-Balah did not appear in contemporary lists of forts because it was, in fact, not a fort or a fortress-town (dmi) but was instead a fortified administrative headquarters. Indeed, in addition to its relatively modest size, Residency II shared many features in common

451 Contra T. Dothan (1982b: 782), who believes Deir el-Balah may have been one of the towns “which his majesty built newly.”
with Egyptian-style administrative headquarters built elsewhere in Canaan. It was square in plan, constructed on mud-brick foundations with a sand lining, and had walls thick enough—at 2.4 m—to support a second story.\textsuperscript{452}

It is unfortunate for the sake of comparison that Residency II at Deir el-Balah over time eroded to its foundations. Due to this denudation, the ground plan of the building is impossible to reconstruct with any certainty. Based on excavated parallels, however, it is likely that the downstairs of the residence served administrative and storage-related functions, while the upper story was residential in nature. Again, due to severe erosion, however, no \textit{in situ} objects could be recovered to help determine the activities undertaken within the building. The excavators did, however, find an extremely interesting foundation deposit. The builders of Residency II had placed a lamp-and-bowl offering under a wall, presumably to ritually initiate and sanctify the construction project.\textsuperscript{453} While there is very little manifestly “Egyptian” in this practice, such deposits have been found predominantly in association with Eighteenth (Bir el-‘Abd), Nineteenth (Tel Sera’, Aphek, possibly Tell el-Hesi, and Gezer), and Twentieth Dynasty (Haruba site A–289) Egyptian administrative headquarters in Sinai and Canaan.\textsuperscript{454}

Due to mountainous sand dunes and rapidly encroaching cultivation, Dothan and her team succeeded in exposing, over a period of ten years’ time, only half an acre of the ancient town.\textsuperscript{455} Given this tiny window, very little is known about Deir el-Balah’s environs or even about why the Egyptians chose to erect an administrative headquarters there in the first place. The only structure associated with the residency, a much smaller building just to its west, provides

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\textsuperscript{452} T. Dothan 1981: 127; 1982b: 760; 1985a: 61–62. The bricks employed in the construction at Deir el-Balah were quite large (c. 55 × 27 × 13 cm—T. Dothan 1993: 344) but within the realm of the Egyptian “state-sized” brick. For contemporary residencies in Canaan, see below and the concise summary in Oren 1984a.

\textsuperscript{453} T. Dothan 1981: 127; Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 108.

\textsuperscript{454} For these lamp-and-bowl foundation deposits, see Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 108, 110, who gained much of their information on the Sinai and Tel Sera’ deposits via a personal communication from Oren. See also Kochavi 1990: xx (Aphek); Petrie and Duncan 1989: pl. 7: 111–112 (Tell el-Hesi); Macalister 1912 v. I: 170 (Gezer); Bunimovitz 1988–1989: 73 (Gezer)

\textsuperscript{455} The site was excavated in fifteen seasons between 1972 and 1982 (T. Dothan 1985b: 32).
little information; neither its form nor its function is ascertainable.\textsuperscript{456} Bearing in mind the importance of water sources along the Ways of Horus, it is tempting to suggest that the residency served to safeguard and administer the reservoir. This theory, however, would certainly be stronger if at some point in the mid-Nineteenth Dynasty (strata 6–5) the cistern had not been filled in and surmounted by an industrial complex.

The transformed character of the defunct reservoir was not subtle. Due to the presence of four industrial kilns and ubiquitous spills of heavy ash, archaeologists had no difficulty discerning the telltale signs of craft specialists at work. In the smallest of the four kilns, excavators discovered a cache of Egyptian-style votive bowls, such as are often found in temple precincts.\textsuperscript{457} Whether these bowls were manufactured for use in a cultic context at Deir el-Balah or whether they were exported to nearby temples—like that dedicated to Anat at Gaza—is not certain. Judging from the number of interments in just the small, excavated portion of the cemetery, however, the community stationed at Deir el-Balah should have been capable of supporting a modest town chapel of its own.

Another of the four kilns also yielded a particularly interesting find, an assortment of smashed clay coffin lids. These lids were of the type employed on anthropoid clay coffins in the town’s cemetery, suggesting that the coffins themselves had been manufactured on site.\textsuperscript{458} Indeed, upon further excavation it quickly became apparent that nearly every type of artifact interred with the dead at Deir el-Balah had been manufactured in this small industrial precinct. Such items included—but were not limited to—pottery, bronze vessels, stone statuettes, faience objects, and linen.\textsuperscript{459} The exceptional number of stone implements scattered across the site may also attest indirectly to large-scale industrial activity and to a thriving farming economy.\textsuperscript{460}

\textsuperscript{456} T. Dothan 1985b: 40.
\textsuperscript{457} T. Dothan 1981: 129.
\textsuperscript{460} T. Dothan 1979: 4; 1982a: 255. The numerous sickle blades discovered at the site would have been employed in agricultural pursuits (T. Dothan 1988: 267).
In close proximity to the kilns, Dothan and her team discovered several fragmentary buildings. A number of these structures contained clay ovens, cooking ware, flint tools, grinders, mortars, and pestles. Based on their contents, the buildings were interpreted as domestic in nature—artisans’ dwellings perhaps. One particularly well-planned building, however, contained a water installation, which may have been utilized in the preparation of clay for coffins and for pottery production. A clay oven with numerous badly burnt household vessels in it and a dump containing an “enormous quantity” of broken storage jars, cooking pots, bowls and crudely made flower pots may well likewise have been associated with a ceramic workshop.

The most remarkable aspect of the industrial complex at Deir el-Balah is that it appears to have been largely focused upon the manufacture of funerary goods. It is perhaps not surprising, then, to discover that the cemetery lay only 150 m from the artisan’s quarter. Indeed, this proximity prompted Dothan to suggest that together the industrial complex and the cemetery formed “a self-contained mortuary unit.” While the late Eighteenth Dynasty burial ground at Deir el-Balah remains to be discovered, the necessarily limited investigation of the Nineteenth Dynasty cemetery has greatly enhanced our understanding of the site.

Of fundamental importance is the analysis of the skeletal remains, which has revealed that the individuals buried at Deir el-Balah bore affinities to Egyptian rather than to Canaanite populations. Further, the presence of both women and children in the cemetery indicates that at least some of the Egyptians stationed at this base settled there permanently, having chosen to raise their families abroad in service of the state. Even without the evidence from physical anthropology, however, the sheer predominance of Egyptian-style utilitarian and ritually specific artifacts would have betrayed an imperial presence at Deir el-Balah.

One of the most distinctive artifact classes in the mortuary assemblage at Deir el-Balah is the locally made anthropoid clay coffin.

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This type of sarcophagus, although not common, is known from a number of New Kingdom Egyptian cemeteries, often located in the Delta, Nubia, and sometimes associated with military outposts. In Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age I Canaan, as well, such coffins are evidenced almost solely at known or suspected Egyptian bases.

In Canaan as well as in Egypt, anthropoid clay coffin lids adopt two basic forms, “naturalistic” and “grotesque.” Naturalistic coffins mimic the basic appearance of an Egyptian wood or cartonage coffin, and the placid human countenance depicted on the lid often sports an Osiris beard. In general, the face and crossed arms do not appear too dissonant with actual human form. Grotesque coffin lids, on the other hand, resemble the gold burial masks found in elite Mycenaean graves, as they depict highly stylized human features that often stretch across the entire surface of the lid.

As a general rule, naturalistic coffins in Canaan are viewed as an Egyptian cultural import—i.e., as the Egyptian government’s attempt to provide Egyptians who died in Canaan with something resembling a traditional burial. Grotesque coffin lids, however, do not appear until the twelfth century B.C., when they are assumed by many scholars to be an Aegean adaptation of an Egyptian custom. Grotesque-style clay anthropoid coffins will be discussed in greater detail in chapter six.

At Deir el-Balah, the forty-some clay coffins hailing from the Nineteenth Dynasty cemetery are exclusively naturalistic in style. Moreover, this group, according to Dothan, represents the oldest

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465 Kuchman 1977–1978: 11–18; T. Dothan 1982a: 280. In Egypt, sites where clay coffins have been found include Tell el-Yahudiyyeh, Tell el-Borg, Kom Abu Billo, Saqqara, Meidum, Saït el-Henneh, Suwa, Rifeh, Riqqeh, Gurob, and Ahnas el-Medina. Nubian sites include Aniba, Tombos, Buhen, and Dabod.


467 The resemblance to Egyptian sarcophagi would have been heightened by the addition of paint. Although this decoration has seldom survived, remains of painted coffins have been found at Tell el-Yahudiyyeh and Lachish (Albright 1932: 302–304; T. Dothan 1982a: 279–280). White, yellow, red, and black paint were utilized on the coffins at Deir el-Balah, and in one case it was even possible to discern a floral funerary necklace, such as is traditionally depicted upon Egyptian sarcophagi (T. Dothan 1973: 130).

468 Petrie 1930: 8.

nineteenth dynasty

The discovery of these coffins at Deir el-Balah places them squarely in an Egyptian milieu, although it is by no means certain that the individuals buried within them would have been soldiers of a resident military garrison. Egyptian weapons have not been discovered in the cemetery at Deir el-Balah, nor do they appear to have been manufactured in the site’s industrial precinct.

The standard burial equipment of the dead at Deir el-Balah included a plethora of Egyptian-style items. Among these funerary offerings were the usual assortment of luxury goods and portables, but other more culturally indicative items were also present. Shabti figurines, for example, appear to have been manufactured on site and included with certain burials. These particular artifacts are especially interesting, as only a believer in an Egyptian afterlife would have found inherent value in this type of servant statuette.

Unequivocally indicative of the religious beliefs of at least some of Deir el-Balah’s inhabitants are four kurkar steles, which were unfortunately looted from the cemetery in modern times. Constructed out of local stone, these small funerary monuments appear to have been produced in the same workshop. While each stele is unique in certain telling details, they share similarities as a set. For example, all four steles stand well under a meter high, bear an inscription in hieroglyphic script, and present the god Osiris as the focus of worship. In three out of four steles an individual bearing an Egyptian name prays or libates before Osiris, and in the same ratio of steles a nmst-jar and a lotus flower are directly incorporated into the offering ritual.

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476 The names of the worshipers are given as Amenemuia, Hapy, and Aapehty.
Osiris steles are common in Egypt but are associated most readily with votive offerings left at Osiris’ cult center at Abydos or with the ritual trappings of ancestor cults. In the case of the Deir el-Balah examples, it would not be out of place to imagine the steles as centerpieces of individual funerary cults. Similar Egyptian steles have also been found at Beth Shan (see chapters four through six). In both towns, however, a funerary cult would technically be unable to function without the presence of either priests or relatives to maintain it. The fact, then, that an individual would have had access to either priests or relatives at an Egyptian base is highly significant, since it demonstrates the investment of both individuals and their government in maintaining a permanent presence in the community.

These four funerary steles were not the only items at Deir el-Balah that bore Egyptian writing. A student sorting pottery discovered a snippet of a hieratic inscription still visible on a rim sherd of a shallow bowl. Although too little of the sherd remains for it to be translated, comparable inscriptions have been found on the interior of bowls at Tell el-Far’ah South, Tel Sera’, and Lachish (see below and chapter six). On each of the comparable bowls, it appears that the inscriptions recorded the payment of taxes in grain to Egyptian authorities. Based on this and other evidence, scholars have suggested that when a bulk amount of grain was delivered as payment, scribes recorded the sum total on a bowl, which the taxpayer then symbolically dedicated to a deity. Although an Egyptian temple at Deir el-Balah has not yet been located, future work at the site may yet reveal such an installation. Certainly, this inscription, the discovery of votive bowls elsewhere at the site, evidence for funerary cults, and the large numbers of Egyptian dead in Deir el-Balah’s


477 Due to the fact that the bottom portions of three of the four steles were left blank, Ventura (1987: 113–115) speculates that they had been sunk into the ground and may have served as grave markers. He also suggests that the triangular stele tops alluded to the pyramidal structure that commonly surmounted private chapels in the New Kingdom (Ventura 1987: 113–115).

478 For an in-depth study of the Egyptian ancestor cult, see Demaree 1983.


480 See Goldwasser 1984: 84–85; Wimmer 1990: 1090. This scenario falls nicely in line with Bleiberg’s (1988) theory that both foreign and domestic bakhe were delivered to temples.
cemetery all strongly suggest that a local temple serviced the spiritual needs of the Egyptian personnel resident at the base.

While the bowl rim with the hieratic inscription is unequivocally the most exciting sherd yet discovered at the site, the more mundane pottery was extremely interesting as well. Mycenaean, Cypriote, and Canaanite forms were found throughout the site, as they are in most Late Bronze Age Syro-Palestinian contexts.481 Fully 80% of the ceramic repertoire, however, consisted of Egyptian-style pottery, which had been fashioned out of local clays.482 Forms found in the cemetery and elsewhere around the site included such Egyptian staples as saucer bowls, flanged-rim bowls, spinning bowls, tazzas, beer bottles, slender ovoid jars, funnel-necked jars, globular jars, necked jars, flat-based necked jars, handleless storage jars, tall necked cups, tall necked storage jars, and narrow-necked juglets.483 Other Egyptian items of a humble or utilitarian nature include a clay fertility figurine, razors, a hoof-handled knife, and a papyrus needle knife.484

All told, the cemetery at Deir el-Balah has so far yielded nearly fifty anthropoid clay coffins, a single anthropoid stone coffin, and an equal or greater number of simpler inhumations.485 Due to the limited amount of the site that has been excavated to date, it is not known whether or not such an impressive number of individuals could have all been based at Deir el-Balah during their lifetimes. Numbers of the dead might perhaps have been swelled, however, by a high number of combat deaths. Alternatively, if the bodies of Egyptians who died elsewhere in southern Canaan were specifically brought to Deir el-Balah for burial, this could account for the well-populated cemeteries at the site.486 With its resident boutique of

485 T. Dothan 1985b: 34; Beit-Arieh 1985: 52. Unfortunately, the majority of the clay coffins from Deir el-Balah come from illicit excavations at the site and so bear no specific provenience. For reports of the Hebrew University excavations, see T. Dothan 1972a; 1979; Beit-Arieh 1985. Significantly, the anthropoid stone sarcophagus is the only one of its kind ever discovered in Syria-Palestine (Beit-Arieh 1985: 48).
486 Oren 1987: 107–108. T. Dothan (1972a: 72; 1979: 101, 104; 1985a: 63; 1987: 130–131) notes that the burials were not only thoroughly Egyptian in character but were also, on the whole, relatively affluent.
Egyptian funerary items, Deir el-Balah may have offered the opportunity for Egyptians who died abroad to be buried in traditional Egyptian fashion, in the company of other Egyptians, and perhaps even to have had Egyptian priests officiate at their funerals. If such amenities were indeed offered, Deir el-Balah would presumably have been an attractive burial ground for Egyptians stationed in its general vicinity.

Due to the overwhelming predominance of Egyptian-style material culture at the site, as well as to recent examinations of skeletal remains, there is no doubt that a substantial Egyptian community had been established at Deir el-Balah. Even Higginbotham—a proponent of the idea that elite Canaanites, rather than Egyptians, resided at nearly all of the other Egyptian-style residencies in Canaan—admits, "the finds from the site are not inconsistent with the hypothesis of the excavator that it housed an Egyptian garrison-host during the Nineteenth Dynasty." Just what purpose Deir el-Balah did serve, however, is not entirely clear. While none of the artifacts recovered are particularly martial in nature, the site could well have served as the headquarters for garrison troops. On the other hand, however, Deir el-Balah may have functioned as a simple way station, which accrued extra income by administering a traditional Egyptian-style cemetery for the numerous garrison communities in the area. Finally, there is always the possibility that the imperial government actively encouraged Egyptian settlement at Deir el-Balah in its age-old effort to secure Egypt’s borders through the establishment of strong and loyal towns.

Miscellaneous installations along the Ways of Horus
Ongoing work in the northern Sinai and along the borders of the eastern Delta has ensured that New Kingdom fortresses will continue to be discovered for quite some time. Just recently, for example, Abdul Rahman Al-Ayedi identified a fortress installation at Tell Heboua II, which he believes to be a plausible candidate for the Dwelling of the Lion. While this may very well prove to be the

487 Higginbotham 2000: 131. T. Dothan (1985a: 55) has termed Deir el Balah “a type site for the Egyptian presence in Canaan during the Amarna Age and Ramesside period.”
488 Al-Ayedi, personal communication.
Figure 35. Administrative headquarters at Deir el-Balah
(after T. Dothan 1985: 56, fig. 1)
case, the kilometer or so separating Tell Heboua I (Tjaru) from Heboua II would seem an uncomfortably short interval for these installations to be situated from one another. Alternatively, however, Heboua II’s large rectangular form might indeed render it a fitting counterpart for the unnamed fortress depicted just across t3 dnut from Tjaru, and indeed it is notable that Tell Heboua I and Tell Heboua II seem originally to have been separated from each other by a waterway that Hoffmeier suggests may have been a narrow lagoon or a branch of the Nile. While the kilometer or so that stretched between them is a greater gap than the Karnak relief would lead one to expect, this distance might well be effortlessly telescoped by an Egyptian artist preoccupied by compositional concerns.

In 1999, another potentially very interesting discovery was made at Tell el-Borg (see figure 36). James Hoffmeier and his crew discovered the fragmentary remains of a series of three fortresses, the latest of which they tentatively dated to the reign of Ramesses II. This fortress is at present very poorly understood due to the disturbed nature of the site, but it is hoped that future seasons will clarify matters considerably. Certainly, the fact that the team discovered numerous temple decorations—including chariot scenes, stars, a representation of a deity, and cartouches of Ramesses II—strongly suggests that Tell el-Borg should not be viewed as a simple way station. Indeed, it may be that the fortress’ position guarding a narrow passageway between the lagoons and a Nile branch qualifies it for inclusion in the category of htm-fortress. Of further interest regarding the site was the cemetery, which yielded Ramesside pottery, fragments of anthropoid clay coffins, and a small limestone inscription. The last had been dedicated by the weapon-bearer Kha’ and bore a mention of “the great company (of) Amun, ‘Amun appears gloriously and victorious for Usermaatre Setepenre, given life like Re forever.’” As Hoffmeier suggests, this inscription might possibly be interpreted as evidence for the stationing of this particular military company at Tell el-Borg.

Other indications of possible forts along the Ways of Horus, unfortunately, are even less well known. Architectural fragments bearing

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<sup>489</sup> Hoffmeier 2003.

<sup>490</sup> For this assertion and for data relating to Tell el-Borg, see Hoffmeier 2003.
the names of Ramesses II have been discovered south of Gaza and may certainly have come from one of the eastern way stations. Otherwise, clusters of sites analogous to those that formed around the forts and administrative headquarters at Bir el-‘Abd, Haruba site A–289, and Deir el-Balah have been discovered in at least ten locations along the northern Sinai, including Rumani, Nagila, Madba’a, El-Mazar, El-‘Arish, Tell Abu Salima, and Tell Riddan. At none of these locales, however, was the Ben Gurion University expedition able to identify a fortress.

Of all the sites along the Ways of Horus, the crowning glory would be the identification of the ancient town of Gaza. Work was reinitiated in the area in 1999 by the Gaza Research Project, funded in part by the Council for British Research in the Levant. While the team’s surveyors have discovered primarily sites dating to the Middle Bronze Age, it is hoped that continued work will identify the town the Egyptians occupied in the New Kingdom.

Tell el-Ajjul (see figure 37)

Petrie’s excavations, undertaken in five seasons between 1930 and 1938, uncovered a series of three unfortified administrative headquarters at Tell el-Ajjul, two of which were associated with enough Egyptian-style material culture to convince the excavators and subsequent scholars that they had been inhabited by Egyptians. The first of these bases, Building III, was erected just following the expulsion of the Hyksos population from the tell in the early Eighteenth Dynasty (see chapter two). Not surprisingly, in the aftermath of the Egyptian conquest, the inhabited area of Tell el-Ajjul shrunk dramatically from what it had been at the end of the Middle Bronze Age. Indeed, this process continued until, by the late Eighteenth Dynasty, Building IV was practically the only occupied structure remaining on the tell’s summit (see chapter four).

The situation in the Nineteenth Dynasty was likely no better, but by Petrie’s day severe erosion had unfortunately swept away all but the barest vestiges of the contemporary Egyptian base. Indeed,
Figure 36. Border-fortress at Tell el-Borg
(preliminary plan courtesy of James Hoffmeier)
Building V had completely vanished, and only a couple courses of bricks survived to delineate the structure located just west of the residency. As far as can be ascertained, however, this western outbuilding generally followed the architecture of prior levels, suggesting that Building V may have closely resembled its predecessors as well.

In association with the admittedly scanty architectural remains, Petrie did not recover any contemporary material culture that he felt was worth remark. Intense erosion and Petrie’s early archaeological techniques are no doubt primarily to blame for this sorry state of affairs, but they may not be the sole culprits. Late Bronze Age IIIB Egyptian-style artifacts are in general very difficult to identify in the material record at Tell el-Ajjul, quite likely indicating that the Egyptian personnel stationed at the site had been scaled back significantly from previous levels.

The hypothesis that the Egyptian government shifted its forces elsewhere during the Nineteenth Dynasty, leaving only a token presence at Tell el-Ajjul, is strengthened further when mortuary evidence is taken into consideration. In her study of the cemetery at Tell el-Ajjul, Gonen assigns 164 graves to the late Eighteenth Dynasty but only 13 graves to the Nineteenth! Moreover, in the site’s Nineteenth Dynasty burials, Egyptian-style ceramic was apparently limited to a saucer bowl and a cup-and-saucer. Local Canaanite forms as well as Mycenaean and Cypriot imports overwhelmingly predominated in the ceramic assemblage. Significantly, Egyptian-style material culture was likewise limited to scarabs of Ramesses II, to other portables, and to luxury items.

(Petrie 1932: 1, 14; 1952: 5), whereas Albright (1938a: 355–359) assigned it to the tenth and ninth centuries. Recent reassessments have dated the building squarely in between, i.e., to the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties (Kempinski 1974: 148–149, n. 18; Weinstein 1992: 146; Mumford 1998: 28).

494 Petrie 1932: 5.

495 Gonen 1992b: 79–80. Of these graves, eight were pit burials found in the “Eighteenth Dynasty cemetery,” and five were pit burials in the “lower cemetery.” Petrie (1952: 5) describes a “large number of Ramesside burials in the side of the great fosse surrounding the site” but does not elaborate.

496 Petrie 1933: pls. 11, 59; Higginbotham 2000: 83. Cup-and-saucers are generally held to be an Egyptian-style form; however, see Higginbotham (2000: 152) for the possibility that they may have been a Canaanite innovation.

497 Imports accounted for 33% of the LB IIIB ceramic (Gonen 1992b: 20).

498 For the scarabs of Ramesses II, see Petrie 1932: 9, 15; 1933: 5; Giveon 1975: 248; Gonen 1992b: 130. Numerous other scarabs were found at Tell el-Ajjul as
Such a dramatic decrease in death rates and in Egyptian-style material culture likely indicates that the base at Tell el-Ajjul was in the process of being phased out in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Indeed, given that there is no evidence for activity following the reign of Ramesses II,\(^{499}\) it may even be that the base was closed down in his reign, perhaps in favor of Gaza, Deir el-Balah, or the newly erected residency at Tell el-Far’ah South. The Egyptian base at Tell el-Far’ah was situated an easy day’s walk to the southwest of Tell el-Ajjul and could, like Tell el-Ajjul, have served the dual purpose of protecting Egyptian forces in southern Canaan and monitoring passage along the Wadi Ghazzeh.\(^{500}\) Regardless, Tell el-Ajjul’s position inside a triangle of three other important Egyptian bases, each of which was situated roughly 20–30 km from one another, may well have rendered the headquarters functionally redundant.

**Tell el-Far’ah (see figure 38)**

In the second millennium, as today, the northern Negev received between about 200 and 300 mm of rainfall annually, placing it just at the border of where rain-fed agriculture was possible. This precarious positioning meant that in drought seasons much of the Negev could not be cultivated, and thus appealed solely to bedouin. Tell el-Far’ah, however, was situated alongside the Besor brook, which provided the town with a near permanent source of water and unusually fertile alluvial soil.\(^{501}\)

The numerous archaeological sites that stipple the length of Wadi Ghazzeh demonstrate that its virtues as a settlement zone and as a transit corridor were well known to seminomadic peoples throughout antiquity. Thus, it is likely that the wadi was routinely subject

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\(^{499}\) Tufnell 1993: 52. Sharuhen does appear on one of Ramesses II’s topographical lists at Amara West (KRI II, 16: no. 67). As Ramesses appears to have copied the majority of this list from one compiled by Amenhotep III at Soleb, however, it is generally deemed an unreliable historical source (Fairman 1940: 165; Astour 1979: 17; Rainey 1993: 181; Hasel 1998: 174–175).

\(^{500}\) Wadi Ghazzeh has been called a “second gateway into southern Canaan,” although it is difficult to determine who but bedouin would have utilized it in the Late Bronze Age (Dorsey 1991: 68).

\(^{501}\) Amiran 1953: 251; Thompson 1979: 7, 10.
Figure 37. Administrative headquarters at Tell el-Ajjul
(after Petrie 1932: pl. 49)
to relatively heavy traffic. Considering the problems that restless Shasu posed to Egyptian forces at the start of the Nineteenth Dynasty, it is perhaps not surprising that the imperial government would erect a military base in the center of this narrow thoroughfare. From its high perch along the wadi’s edge, troops stationed at Tell el-Far’ah could monitor the passage of bedouin groups into Egyptian-held territory and, at the same time, block the escape of fugitives out of it. Indeed, Tell el-Far’ah, it may be assumed, served much the same purpose in the Wadi Ghazzeh as did the fortress of Tell er-Retabah (Tjeku) in the Wadi Tumilat.

Significantly, Tell el-Far’ah was also connected, albeit by a road slightly less traveled, with another contemporary Egyptian base, Tel Sera’. This residency, also a Nineteenth Dynasty construct, was located 25 km to the northeast. By virtue of Tell el-Far’ah’s geographic position, then, a messenger sent out from this base could reach any of three nearby Egyptian headquarters—i.e., Deir el-Balah, Gaza, or Tel Sera’—within the span of a day. The proximity of the Egyptian bases to one another in the Nineteenth Dynasty suggests not only that the Egyptian government was extremely concerned with monitoring activity close to its borders but also that developing and maintaining a well-oiled communications infrastructure was a key part of its imperial strategy.

The two seasons that Petrie directed in 1928 and 1929 remain the only large-scale excavations at Tell el-Far’ah until the present day. On erroneous linguistic grounds, Petrie identified the site as Beth-Pelet, but its ancient name is still not definitively known. Tell el-Far’ah’s former status as an important Hyksos town led many scholars to propose that it be equated with Sharuhen, the southern Canaanite stronghold that Ahmose besieged for three years. Certainly,

503 See Singer (1988a: 6) and Redford (2000: 6–7), as both scholars place great emphasis on the formative role that hostile bedouin played in shaping Egyptian foreign policy.
504 Na’aman (1979: 85) maintains that this wadi route was very important in the trade of spices and other goods. How developed this trade would have been in the Late Bronze Age is unclear, but if it did flourish, it would certainly have been in Egypt’s interest to monitor this trade and to profit from it. Singer (1994: 285) also suggests that Tell el-Far’ah may have served as a way station along the route to the Arabah copper mines.
505 Dorsey 1991: 58, 68.
Tell el-Far’ah’s formidable Hyksos-built glacis still served centuries later to accentuate the slope of the mound in a manner ideal both for surveillance and defense. The fact that the site apparently lay abandoned between the Second Intermediate Period and the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, is troubling for such an identification. Thus, the general scholarly consensus has shifted to view Tell el-Ajjul, with its intensive early Eighteenth Dynasty Egyptian occupation, as the more convincing candidate for Sharuhen.

The Egyptian bases at Eighteenth Dynasty Tell el-Ajjul and Nineteenth Dynasty Tell el-Far’ah share a number of features in common in addition to their proximity to the Wadi Ghazzeh and to their former status as flourishing Hyksos centers. Each settlement, for example, occupied only a tiny fraction of the area utilized in the Middle Bronze Age. Likewise, both bases exhibited as their centerpiece a single large building—likely square in both cases—which was complemented by a rectangular suite of rooms a few meters to its west. While the function of this western outbuilding is clear in neither case, some sort of storage or administrative usage is probable. Given these striking similarities, it is particularly interesting to observe that the decline and abandonment of the base at Tell el-Ajjul coincided with the erection of that at Tell el-Far’ah. Indeed, it is even tempting to theorize that the Egyptian government constructed Tell el-Far’ah in the Nineteenth Dynasty specifically to replace the older Egyptian headquarters at Tell el-Ajjul.

Such a scenario, if valid, would be analogous to the move of Tjaru (i.e., Sile) from Tell Heboua I to Tell Abu Seifa in the Saite or Persian period or the move of Tjeku from Tell er-Retabah to Tell el-Maskhuta in Saite times. In both cases an Egyptian base, which

507 Petrie 1930: 1, 15–16; Yisraeli 1978: 1075.
509 The Hyksos settlement at Tell el-Far’ah was one of the largest in the northwestern Negev (Weinstein 1997b: 304), but Gonen (1984: 64) classifies the military base as “tiny” (i.e., under 2.5 acres).
510 The full extent of the main building at Tell el-Ajjul is not known. Judging from the surviving architecture and from similarly structured buildings, however, a square plan would be quite fitting.
had been inhabited for many centuries, was moved roughly 15 km to a strategically similar location. The new base retained its predecessor’s name but was now situated to take advantage of fresher agricultural land and more room for building. Following this logic, it would not be inappropriate to suggest that, while the town of Sharuhen was located at Tell el-Ajjul in the Hyksos period, it was Tell el-Far’ah that bore the name from the Nineteenth Dynasty onward. This explanation would neatly answer Ahituv’s query as to how Tell el-Ajjul could be identified as Sharuhen if the tell was abandoned in the Third Intermediate Period, when Egyptian and biblical texts imply that the town was still an important population center.

The administrative headquarters at Tell el-Far’ah is, thankfully, far better preserved than its equivalent at Tell el-Ajjul, although many of its features are not recoverable in detail until its Twentieth Dynasty incarnation. In terms of physical structure, however, there is virtually no doubt that the architect took for his model the Egyptian center-hall house. Square in form, with a corner entrance and a center-hall, the residency at Tell el-Far’ah could easily have been erected at Amarna. Indeed, included in its plan and execution are such telling features as a bed niche, a bathroom, and Egyptian-style all-brick foundations. At roughly 505 m² in area, too, the residency at Tell el-Far’ah fell securely in the size range expected of a very large center-hall house or a very modest palace. In fact, vir-

513 Scholars have uniformly rejected Petrie’s (1930: 18) suggestion that Tell el-Far’ah’s residence was founded in the reign of Thutmose III in favor of a Nineteenth Dynasty date (Starkey and Harding 1932: 31; Yisraeli 1978: 1077; Oren 1984a: 47; 1992: 120; Weinstein 1997b: 305).
514 Ahituv 1979: vi. Sharuhen appears in the topographic list of Sheshonq (no. 125) as well as the territory allotted to Simeon in the Bible (Joshua 19: 6); see Aharoni 1968: 265–266, 288.
515 For a detailed analysis of the residency at Tell el-Far’ah as a center-hall house, see Oren 1984a: 47. Even Higginbotham admits that the plan of the residency “parallels that of the houses at Amarna and would be at home in the Nile Valley” (Higginbotham 2000: 268).
516 The entrance, bedroom, and cistern are not visible in the first phase of the building’s history due to poor preservation, but given that the two phases share virtually the exact same floor plan, these features are likely to have been already present in the Nineteenth Dynasty. As Higginbotham (2000: 270) points out, the notation “sand” on Petrie’s plan in rooms ZG, ZP, ZR, and ZV (Petrie 1930: pl. 52) may indicate that the foundation trenches had been lined with sand—a quintessentially Egyptian masonry technique.
517 Cf. the Amarna center-hall house T 36.36 (Badawy 1968: 105) or the palaces at Medinet Habu (Badawy 1968: 36) and Megiddo (Oren 1992: 107).
tually the only discrepancy between the Egyptian base at Tell el-Far‘ah and the Amarna center-hall houses is the unusual thickness of Tell el-Far‘ah’s walls.

At roughly 2 m wide, the residency’s walls could easily have supported a second story, and, indeed, excavators discovered the remnants of a staircase in the building’s southwestern corner. Most contemporary Egyptian-style residencies in Canaan also possessed unusually thick walls and, thus, are reconstructed as two storied (see below). Such a building in Canaan would not only have visually asserted its importance in the landscape, but with greater height and thicker walls than was usual, a multistoried building could also have been useful for surveillance or defense. An additional advantage of a two-storied structure is that it allowed for the seamless combination in one building of both residential and administrative functions. It seems to have been a general pattern that the first floor of a residency was devoted to office space and storage, while a residential suite occupied the more private second story.

In Egyptian buildings, however, internal staircases often led straight to the rooftop. Further, while the businesslike first floors of other residencies might support the assumption that a second floor was present, the bedroom and bathroom at Tell el-Far‘ah were clearly located on the first floor! Likewise, excavations failed to reveal the column bases that one would expect to find in a 7 × 7 m central court. For this reason, it is quite probable that the central hall at Tell el-Far‘ah was in reality a courtyard, which provided light and air to the surrounding rooms. Alternatively, if the column bases had been removed in antiquity for reuse, as often happened with stone features, it may be that more weight should be given to Petrie’s Amarna-inspired reconstruction of the central hall, complete with its raised roof and clerestory lighting.518

As mentioned above, the intended function of the large (19 × 22 m) rectangular suite of rooms, lying just west of the residency and sharing its same masonry style and orientation, is not entirely clear. Considering the large area devoted to domestic space within the residency proper, it is possible that the suite of rooms originally contained administrative offices.519 Local and diplomatic activities at Tell

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518 See Oren 1992: 120. For the interpretation of the central room as an open-air court, see Oren 1984a: 47; Yisraeli 1978: 1076.
el-Far'ah would likely have occupied the attention of at least one or two bureaucrats in addition to the governor. Alternatively, or additionally, foodstuffs or other supplies might have been stored in the outbuilding. The lack of uniformity in the architecture and the corresponding lack of indicative archaeological finds, however, render this hypothesis tentative at best.

While most of the in situ artifacts discovered in the environs of the residency and its outbuilding at Tell el-Far'ah date to its destruction in the Twentieth Dynasty (see chapter six), one very important artifact can be associated unequivocally with the Nineteenth Dynasty building. In the courtyard, excavators discovered fragments of a large pottery storage jar inscribed with the cartouches of Seti II.520 Significantly, two virtually identical storage jars, also bearing the cartouches of Seti II, had been discovered in the courtyard of the fort at Haruba site A–289.521 Taken together, these marked jars may suggest that in Seti II's reign the state made a series of deliveries to bases located in the Sinai, in southern Canaan, and perhaps farther north as well. Such coordinated deliveries, if such they were, would in turn indicate that Egyptian bases—in the Sinai and southern Canaan at least—were centrally administered and subject to blanket policy decisions.

Other pottery discovered in the vicinity of the residence at Tell el-Far'ah was not nearly as remarkable as the Seti sherd. The repertoire consisted of local LB IIB ceramic, Egyptian-style forms,522 and imported Aegean pottery. The stylistic differences between Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty ceramic forms are rarely discernable in Egypt—much less abroad—and so are of little use for chronological analyses.523 The two phases of the residency, however, could be easily distinguished upon examination of the Aegean and Aegean-style pottery. The earlier level, conveniently sealed in one area by a cobbled courtyard, was found, for instance, to contain examples of imported Mycenaean IIIB ware.524 This pottery, characteristic of the

520 Starkey and Harding 1932: 28–29, pls. 61, 64; KRI IV, 242: no. 1.
522 For the Late Bronze Age, these consisted almost exclusively of bowls (see pl. 89 types 6F, H, K; 12 H, M, N2, 22N5). An Egyptian-style storage jar was also in evidence (43A2).
Late Bronze IIB period, disappears before the start of Iron Age IA,\textsuperscript{525} i.e., virtually at the beginning of the Twentieth Dynasty. Conversely, the earlier phase of the residency is defined by a distinct absence of Philistine ware, which came into use sometime in the Twentieth Dynasty and characterized the second occupation of the residency.\textsuperscript{526}

Ceramic comparable to the residency’s first level was also found in four cemeteries at Tell el-Far‘ah, namely burial grounds 100, 500, 600, and 900. While LB IIB Canaanite forms overwhelmingly predominated in the first three cemeteries, the situation in 900 was quite obviously different. Excavators encountered Egyptian-style ceramic only sporadically and almost exclusively in isolation in cemeteries 100, 500 and 600. In cemetery 900, however, Egyptian-style pottery was discovered in 53% of the 78 graves that yielded artifacts. Even more dramatically, it appeared in 9 out of the 10 most architecturally impressive Late Bronze Age tombs at Tell el-Far‘ah, all of which, as it happened, were located in cemetery 900.\textsuperscript{527}

The Egyptian-style ceramic forms, which included saucer bowls, bowls, jugs, jars, ovoid jars, long-necked storage jars, funnel-necked jars, and amphoriskoi,\textsuperscript{528} were predominantly utilitarian in nature. As such, they would not have been likely candidates for prestige goods on their own merit. Likewise, with the exception of a few storage jars, the Egyptian-style pottery could not have contained precious substances. The value of the ceramic to those who included it in their burial assemblages must have been primarily cultural in nature. On analogy with the situation at Bir el-‘Abd and Deir el-Balah, then, one can imagine that potters trained to manufacture Egyptian-style ceramic labored at Tell el-Far‘ah to provide Egyptian patrons with “Egyptian” pottery. While local Canaanite wares

\textsuperscript{525} A concise summary of the arguments for dating this style of ceramic can be found in Hasel 1998: 143–144, n. 23. Incidentally, the sherds inscribed with Seti II’s cartouche at Haruba site A–289 were likewise discovered in association with Mycenaean IIIB pottery (Stager 1995: 335).

\textsuperscript{526} Starkey and Harding 1932: 30; T. Dothan 1982a: 28.

\textsuperscript{527} Egyptian-style pottery was found in tombs 902, 905, 914, 921, 922, 934, 935, 936, and 960 but not in tomb 920. These statistics and those that follow come from my own examination of the tomb registers found in Petrie 1930: pls. 14–15, 68–71 and Starkey and Harding 1952: 90–93.

\textsuperscript{528} Cf. Duncan 1930: types 3A2, B, C; 4N2; 6F, H, J; 10P4; 12C, F, G1, H, J, K, L4, M4, N2, R, T, V3; 13H2; 20L1; 21L1; 22E1, N5, T2–3; V; 23K10, 13; 24B2; 26D1; 34E1, 38G3–4; 41F, Q; 44R1–2; 55A3, D3, E2T8, W; 75N, 0.
continued to be utilized, Egyptian forms must have held a particular sentimental value for the troops and administrators stationed abroad.

Pottery was not the only type of Egyptian-style artifact included in the burials, however. Scarabs and plaques that bore Egyptian motifs occurred in 54% of the graves in cemetery 900 and in 100% of the 10 largest tombs. Likewise, individuals interred in this upper echelon of sepulchers frequently included in their burial equipment anywhere from 20 to 142 scarabs! Amulets fashioned in the shape of Egyptian ideograms or deities were also popular, occurring in 32% of the burials in this cemetery. Other Egyptian style items included ornamental spoons (980, 982, 984), Egyptian-style jewelry (902, 922, 934, 936, 952, 960, 984), faux alabaster vases (905, 934, 936, 975, 978, 981, 982, and 984), as well as paraphernalia for serving wine (914, 960) or applying kohl (920, 935, 982).

Perhaps the most interesting of these Egyptian-style funerary trappings, however, was the anthropoid clay coffin discovered in tomb 935. Although the coffin’s lid had unfortunately long since disappeared, it was most probably, like its contemporaries at Deir el-Balah and Beth Shan, naturalistic in style. The grotesque-style clay coffins at Tell el-Far’ah—as elsewhere—uniformly hailed from Iron Age contexts (see chapter six). Given that Petrie recovered the coffin from the second largest Late Bronze Age tomb at Tell el-Far’ah, there can be no doubt that the clay coffins were markers of special status. Indeed, it is not unlikely that the coffin’s original owner had inhabited the site’s residency in his lifetime.

Cemetery 900 was undoubtedly a special cemetery. It contained all of the elite Late Bronze Age tombs at Tell el-Far’ah. Likewise, Egyptian-style objects permeated the cemetery, with 79% of the burials including at least one example. Although a good number of these items were prestige goods, far more of the Egyptian-style artifacts were inexpertly manufactured and composed of such common materials as clay, faience, or steatite. Of the 23% of the tombs that contained three or more categories of Egyptian goods (these categories being “religious amulets,” “scarabs and plaques,”529 “ceramic,” and “miscellaneous”), the plans of five are not provided in the excava-

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529 The scarabs, plaques, and amulets all bear recognizably Egyptian symbolism. Examples that looked to be Canaanite variations on the theme were not considered.
tion reports (980, 981, 982, 984, 985). Of the remaining twelve, however, nine tombs ranked in the top ten according to size (902, 905, 921, 922, 934, 935, 936, 960), and the remaining three, oddly enough, contained child burials (928, 952, 955).

Petrie’s methods of excavation and publication, although exemplary for his time, frustrate attempts at achieving an in-depth understanding of the residency, its outbuilding, or other traces of Late Bronze Age architecture at Tell el-Far’ah. In his treatment of the cemeteries, however, Petrie’s meticulous records have preserved information that is of great value for reconstructing the social history of the site. An examination of Petrie’s cemetery plans and his tomb registers demonstrates that elite burials and the intensive inclusion of Egyptian-style grave goods in burials were both limited to only one of the four cemeteries in use during the Late Bronze Age—cemetery 900.

In this cemetery, it would appear that the Egyptian rulers of the site buried themselves and their families in large chambered tombs. The humbler graves, which often clustered around the elite tombs, also included numerous Egyptian-style objects among their grave goods, and thus it is likely that these burials belonged to Egyptian soldiers and service personnel who had died while on duty. The interment of nineteen children in the cemetery along with Egyptian-style goods suggests that many of the Egyptian personnel had settled at the site, perhaps permanently, and begun families. Although it is impossible to tell whether the wives of these men were Egyptian or local women, the inclusion of Egyptian-style objects in the burials of the children suggests that the offspring were culturally identified as Egyptians.

The other three graveyards with LB IIIB burials at Tell el-Far’ah—cemeteries 100, 500, and 600—contain graves that are uniformly humble in size. Further, the grave goods interred within the burials

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530 Of the graves in cemetery 900, 24% possessed at least two categories of Egyptian-style artifacts.

531 Waldbaum’s idea that these chamber tombs, outfitted with a dromos and benches, derived from Mycenaean prototypes (Waldbaum 1966: 337–340; followed by G. E. Wright 1966: 74; and elaborated upon and adjusted to Cypriot influence by Gonen 1992a: 242) has largely been discarded, along with the notion that the inhabitants of the tombs were early Sea Peoples (Stiebing 1970: 140; T. Dothan 1982: 260; Bunimovitz 1990: 216–217; Weinstein 1997b: 305).
are overwhelmingly local in style, generally consisting of Canaanite ceramic, bronze anklets, and earrings. The inhabitants of these graveyards may well have been members of the Canaanite population at Tell el-Far‘ah, who earned their living farming or otherwise supporting or servicing the Egyptians stationed at the new base. The seemingly careful segregation of these locals from their occupiers in death, however, certainly prompts speculation as to whether such social segregation betrayed itself in life as well.

*Tel Sera*’ (see figure 39)
The ruins of Tel Sera’ are situated on the northern bank of the Nahal Gerar, a tributary of the seasonal waterway that spanned the distance between Tell el-Far‘ah and Tell el-Ajjul. As a Canaanite town, it had been founded in the Middle Bronze Age, presumably because of its proximity to a number of hearty springs. These perennial water sources would have been a particularly precious resource in an ecological niche in which the absence of millimeters of rain frequently transformed arable land into land suitable only for grazing. Similarly, in an area rife with potentially hostile nomads, it would have made sense for the founders of Tel Sera’ to perch their town atop a 14 m high bluff. From such a promontory, not only could the inhabitants spot the approach of would-be attackers in advance, but they could also effectively defend themselves if need arose against an armed assault. 532

Although the tell’s early levels remain largely unexplored, limited excavation has revealed that Tel Sera’ survived into LB I as a well-planned Canaanite town of some importance. Its fate in LB II A is less certain, but the town does seem to have possessed a substantial sanctuary. 533 Amidst the cultic debris generated by the temple, excavators discovered an Egyptian-style globular pot. Given that imported Cypriot ware was found in the same deposit, however, the pot does little to illuminate the nature of Egyptian involvement with Tel Sera’ in the fourteenth century. 534

534 Oren and Netzer 1073: 253.
Figure 38. Administrative headquarters at Tell el-Far‘ah
(after Petrie 1930: pl. 52 and Starkey and Harding 1932: pl. 69)
The nature of the relationship between Tel Sera’ and the imperial government becomes far clearer, however, with the advent of the thirteenth century. Over the course of five seasons, between 1972 and 1976, Oren and his team from Ben Gurion University excavated at the site and uncovered what they believe to have been an Egyptian governor’s residency.\textsuperscript{535} Established in the Nineteenth Dynasty, this building underwent at least four rebuilding episodes before its fiery destruction in the Twentieth Dynasty. With the exception of the first, however, the renovations were mostly minor, consisting generally of rises in the floor level and the erection of partition walls.\textsuperscript{536}

It would be interesting to have insight into the political process whereby an Egyptian administrative headquarters came to be erected at Tel Sera’. One possible route would have been for the town to invite occupation upon itself by acting against the interests of the imperial government. Alternatively, the Egyptians may well have assumed control of the town for purely pragmatic reasons. Located in the Wadi esh-Sharia, yet another major thoroughfare of the northern Negev, Tel Sera’ would have been an attractive point from which to monitor the activity of travelers, bedouin, or surrounding populations. Also, like Tell el-Far’ah, Tel Sera’ was located less than 30 km from numerous contemporary Egyptian bases, namely those at Tell el-Hesi, Tell el-Far’ah, Gaza, and Tell el-Ajjul, if indeed this latter base was still functional.\textsuperscript{537} Such a network would have ensured that Egyptian officials stationed at any one of these bases could have requested military assistance or reconnaissance information from officials stationed at any other with great speed. Moreover, with checkpoints located on every major highway in southern Canaan, it must have been relatively easy for the Egyptian government to maintain an iron grip on this sensitive border zone.

The first incarnation of the governor’s residency is not particularly well known, given that the stratum X building had been delib-

\textsuperscript{536} Oren 1993b: 1331.
\textsuperscript{537} The site of Haror was located barely 6 km away from Tel Sera’. Although no base has yet been excavated at the site, it did apparently yield an impressive quantity of Egyptian-style cups and bowls. Even more interesting was the find of a storage jar, which bore a hieratic inscription referring to an unknown regnal year of an unnamed king (Goldwasser 1991a; Higginbotham 2000: 62—this sherd is discussed further in chapter six). Thus, while there is no architectural evidence for an Egyptian headquarters at the site, the possibility that one yet existed should not be discarded.
erately razed and then rebuilt on identical foundations at the start of stratum IX. A more serious problem for understanding the structure of the building throughout its lifetime, however, is that later construction had completely obliterated its western end. Further, the building’s eastern wall had eroded away and could only be reconstructed by virtue of its deep kurkar-lined foundation trench.538

Several features originally led Oren to suspect that this monumental structure should be interpreted as an Egyptian governor’s residency. These include the building’s brick foundations, its 2 m thick walls, the presence of a second story, and the character of its artifact assemblage.539 The plan of the eastern half of the building, moreover, seemed consistent with what one might expect of half of a governor’s residency. In his reconstruction, then, on analogy with Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty residencies, Oren squared the 25 m length of the eastern wall to arrive at a building of some 625 m² in area. Further, he took a $4 \times 9$ m rectangular room—just visible at the western edge of the building—and transformed it into a three-columned center-hall.540 Despite the limited architectural remains with which he had to work, the essential validity of Oren’s reconstruction has not been challenged.541

In the LB IIB period, occupation at Tel Sera’ covered barely four acres, classifying it as a “small” settlement in terms of site size hierarchies.542 There was, however, at least one other important building that belonged to the same stratum (stratum X). Cultic building 1118 had succeeded the LB IIA period sanctuary and, like it, similarly adhered to a Canaanite rather than an Egyptian design. Incorporated into its layout, for instance, were plastered benches and a stone basin, also coated in thick plaster. The religious personnel

538 Oren and Netzer 1973: 253; Oren 1978: 1065; 1982: 166; 1984a: 39; 1993b: 1331. In the literature, the first stage of the residency is termed building 2502.
539 Artifacts discovered in association with the residency, most of which will be discussed in chapter six, include massive quantities of Egyptian-style pottery (some of which bore hieratic inscriptions) and miscellaneous items such as Egyptian blue pigment and the remains of a possible Egyptian scepter (see chapter six).
540 One column base remained, and based on its positioning in the room Oren (1984a: 39) restored two others.
541 Higginbotham (2000: 272–273) points out a few supposedly un-Egyptian features, such as the reconstructed placement of the door or the presence of three columns rather than two or four, but even she admits the residency’s “basic resemblance to houses at Amarna.”
officiating at the structure likewise followed the distinctively Near Eastern practice of disposing of the remains of cultic feasts and discarded equipment in favissae, i.e., ceremonial pits located on temple property. The favissae of stratum X contained such run-of-the-mill luxury objects as imported Mycenaean and Cypriot ceramic. In the pits as well, however, were numerous Egyptian-style objects.

Given the residency’s location just north of the town’s temple, the administrators of both buildings must have been well acquainted with one another. If the Egyptians stationed at Tel Sera believed that a local god could hearken to their prayers more effectively than could a deity that dwelt in the Nile Valley, the temple may well have been patronized by the occupiers as well as the occupied. Certainly, there is good evidence that Egyptians worshiped in local temples at Beth Shan and Gaza. Perhaps even more importantly, however, by situating the imperial headquarters in close proximity to the temple and by providing the temple with Egyptian-style offerings, the Egyptian authorities communicated to the Canaanite public both their control of the local spiritual leaders and their deft co-option of them. Such a demonstration would have been particularly effective if the temple priesthood had formerly wielded great social and economic power in the community.

At some point in the thirteenth century, the Egyptian administrative headquarters underwent a renovation, which coincided with a general expansion and rebuilding of the town as a whole. This shift from stratum X to stratum IX, curiously enough, is defined archaeologically in part by what it doesn’t contain. As opposed to stratum X for instance, no imported Aegean ceramic appears in stratum IX. Likewise, stratum IX lacks the locally produced Philistine ware that characterizes level VIII. It is thought that this intermediate level, then, would have straddled the end of the Nineteenth and the beginning of the Twentieth Dynasties. Because of this chronological scope, the latest phase of stratum IX will be discussed in chapter six.

543 The excavation summaries mention these Egyptian-style items but unfortunately do not specify what they were. For a description of the temple generally, see Oren 1978: 1067; 1982: 165–166; 1993b: 1330–1331.
Whereas only the foundations of the contemporary residency were visible in stratum X, archaeologists could flesh out significant details of its successor. At least one of the rooms of the stratum IX building, for instance, had been paved in brick.\textsuperscript{546} This was a luxury rare in Egypt and especially so in Canaan. Further, it was for the first time apparent in stratum IX that a staircase occupied the building’s northeastern corner. Although the destination of the staircase in the contemporary residency at Tell el-Far‘ah was ambiguous, destruction debris at Tel Sera‘ indicated clearly that the stairway had led to a second story.\textsuperscript{547} Perhaps the most important discovery associated with stratum IX, however, was a lamp-and-bowl offering found deposited near its foundations.\textsuperscript{548} This type of offering is attested elsewhere almost solely in association with Egyptian bases (i.e., at Bir el-‘Abd, Deir el-Balah, Aphek, Haruba site A–289, possibly Tell el-Hesi, and Gezer).

Given the preliminary nature of the published reports, very few of the artifacts discovered in the stratum IX residency can be dated to the Nineteenth as opposed to the Twentieth Dynasty. Because it is assumed that most of the artifacts would have been abandoned during the building’s destruction, the finds associated with the level IX residency will be discussed in chapter six. The appearance among them, however, of Nineteenth Dynasty scarabs and palm-tree and ibex decorated pottery suggests that at least some of the many Egyptian-style finds should in fact be dated to the Nineteenth Dynasty.\textsuperscript{549}

Circular refuse pits discovered outside the southern enclosure wall also yielded Nineteenth Dynasty scarabs, including one bearing the name of Ramesses II. This particular royal scarab was reportedly found in association with “beautifully decorated Egyptian faience

\textsuperscript{546} Oren 1982: 166; 1992: 118.
\textsuperscript{547} Oren 1984a: 39.
\textsuperscript{548} Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 110—via personal communication with Oren. In this case it would more accurately be termed a “bowl” deposit, for a number of Egyptian-type bowls were apparently found in a corner foundation stacked one atop the other. For lamp-and-bowl deposits generally, see Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 108–111.
\textsuperscript{549} For the Nineteenth Dynasty scarabs, see Oren 1978: 1065–1066. For the palm-tree and ibex pottery, see Oren 1972: 168–169. Amirán (1970: 161–162) refers to the palm-tree and ibex motif as “the most characteristic decoration of the Late Bronze Period,” although she notes that it does survive in a debased and abbreviated form into the Iron Age.
Similar deposits of Egyptian-style luxury goods in temple favissae presumably continued to be made during this time, but due to their ambiguous dating these caches will likewise be discussed in chapter six.

Tell el-Hesi (see figure 40)
Whereas the same extended wadi system linked the Egyptian bases of Tell el-Far‘ah, Tel Sera‘, and Tell el-Ajjul to one another, Tell el-Hesi was located roughly 30 km to the north in the Wadi Hesi. The town dominated an impressive 40 m high mound—a former Hyksos fortress, which was located midway along an important east-west transit zone. Although officially situated in the southern coastal plain of Canaan, rather than in the Negev, Tell el-Hesi nevertheless occupied an arid environment. It is likely no accident, then, that the town had been founded only a few hundred meters south of the confluence of two streams and in very close proximity to a perennial spring. As might be expected from such a marginal zone, Tell el-Hesi’s environs were heavily populated by nomads well into the modern era. In a similar fashion to its southern contemporaries, then, the Egyptian base served to monitor passage along a well-traveled thoroughfare in an area frequented by bedouin.

Interestingly, although evidence is slight, it appears that an Egyptian governor may well have resided in the town already in the mid- to late Eighteenth Dynasty. In a rubbish heap located outside a particularly impressive building, Bliss discovered an Amarna-style letter. Written in cuneiform, the missive had originally been sent by an Egyptian stationed at Lachish to his superior, who received it at Tell el-Hesi.

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552 In his preface to Tell el-Hesy (Lachish), Petrie complained bitterly about local bedouin who were “always in mischief; lounging about the excavations, carrying away things that were found, overthrowing any masonry, driving off the workmen’s donkeys . . .” (Petrie 1989: 10–11).
553 G. E. Wright (1966: 85) claims that Tell el-Hesi and Tel Sera‘ were two out of the three most strategically vital control points in southern Canaan. See also Tombs 1974: 19–20.
554 Albright 1942: 32–38. See chapter four. Whether the Egyptian official was stationed at Tell el-Hesi or just passing through is a difficult question. Since the two towns were located only a few kilometers apart, it would seem odd for Egyptian officials to be resident at both Tell el-Hesi and Lachish. The writer of the letter, however, appears to assume a familiarity on the part of his correspondent with
Figure 39. Administrative headquarters at Tel Sera’a
(after Hasel 1998: 95, fig. 10)
In light of the Amarna-style letter, it is tempting to assign extra significance to another of Bliss’s discoveries—a jar handle impressed with the name of Amenhotep II. While the sherd may simply reflect commercial activity, jars bearing cartouches have been found in the Sinai and in Canaan primarily at Egyptian bases such as Tell el-Ajjul (see chapter two), Haruba site A–289, and Tell el-Far’ah. Given the possibility that such pottery constitutes the detritus of an imperial provisioning system, it is certainly plausible that Egyptian interest in Tell el-Hesi began already in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. As is typical of Canaan as a whole, however, the first evidence for Egyptian-style architecture at the site does not occur until the advent of the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Archaeological surveys have revealed that in the LB IIB period, Tell el-Hesi was a “small” settlement. Our understanding of the nature of the town, however, is limited since the Egyptian-style residency occupied almost the entirety of the area that Bliss excavated. Further, the renewed excavations undertaken by the Joint Archaeological Expedition in the 1970s encountered Late Bronze Age remains only in highly disturbed contexts where very little could be concluded about the architecture. Bliss’s work, then, undertaken between 1891 and 1893, remains to this day the only significant exposure of LB IIB architecture at the site.

Although denuded to its foundations and characterized by certain ambiguities of plan, the building at Tell el-Hesi shared enough similarities with other Egyptian-style structures in Canaan for Oren to feel comfortable in classifying it as an Egyptian governor’s residency.

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local personalities and their activities, which implies that his superior may well have been stationed in the region for an appreciable time period.
555 Bliss 1889: 89.

556 According to Gonen (1984: 64), “small” sites range in size between 2.5 and 12.5 acres.

557 Bliss (1889). Petrie had excavated at Tell el-Hesi during the spring of 1890 but failed to find significant LB remains.

558 Fargo 1993: 632. The Joint Archaeological Expedition was affiliated with the American Schools of Oriental Research.

559 Bliss (1889: 71–74) named the stratum in which the residency was located “City Sub IV,” and he dated it to 1400–1300 B.C. While some still follow his dates (see Fargo 1993: 631), the majority of scholars have redated the level to the LB IIB period based on pottery, scarabs, cylinder seals, and the presence of the Amarna-type letter in the strata below (Amiran and Worrell 1976: 517; Oren 1984a: 46).

560 Oren 1984a: 46–47.
For example, the building was perfectly square in plan, at 18 m to a side. While this rendered it smaller than many residencies, it was almost perfectly on par with those at Tell Heboua I, Tell er-Retabah, and Aphek. Likewise, it was only slightly smaller than the residency at Deir el-Balah. Other similarities between the square structure at Tell el-Hesi and its administrative contemporaries in Canaan include thick walls (1.5 m) and the presence of a center-hall.

Perhaps most telling, however, were the residency’s foundations, which had been constructed out of mud-brick and erected in a trench lined with sand and kurkar. This unusual method for protecting the foundations from water damage is a carbon copy of that employed in the headquarters at Tel Sera.\textsuperscript{561} Evidence for such a patently practical—rather than strictly stylistic—similarity suggests that the two buildings had been designed and constructed under similar auspices. Petrie’s “Pilaster building” at Tell el-Hesi, which Bliss believed to belong to the same stratum, apparently also exhibited this distinctive kurkar and sand foundation lining.

While a number of scholars have redated the Pilaster building to the tenth century B.C.,\textsuperscript{562} Bunimovitz and Zimhoni believe it to have been a contemporary of the residency. Not only do the two buildings share the same highly recognizable method of trench construction, they argue, but the builders had also incorporated two lamp-and-bowl offerings into the foundations of the Pilaster building.\textsuperscript{563} At Tell el-Hesi, this type of foundation deposit is otherwise observed solely with regard to the LB IIB strata. Likewise, as discussed above, it is important to note that the lamp-and-bowl offering in Canaan is very frequently discovered in association with Egyptian bases.\textsuperscript{564}

With regard to the Egyptian-style artifacts discovered in association with the residency, it is unfortunate that the exact proveniences are for the most part unknown. The excavations at Tell el-Hesi were among the very first attempts at scientific archaeology, and thus

\textsuperscript{561} Oren 1984a: 46.
\textsuperscript{562} See Petrie 1989: 28.
\textsuperscript{563} Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 110, n. 19.
\textsuperscript{564} Oren 1984a: 47; Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 110–111; Petrie 1989: pl. 7: 111 and 112. As mentioned above, other Egyptian bases at which lamp-and-bowl deposits have been found include Bir el-‘Abd, Deir el-Balah, Tel Sera, Aphek, Haruba site A–289, and possibly Gezer.
recording techniques were understandably in their infancy. Among the published Egyptian-style objects from Late Bronze Age levels in general, however, were pottery (Egyptian-style bowls and cups-and-saucers), a figurine (possibly of Ptah), a kohl stick, pendants, and scarabs. While this does not appear to be a particularly impressive assortment numerically, the objects are various, and it is likely that a more modern investigation would have identified far more of their ilk.

Unlike its southern contemporaries, the Egyptian administrative headquarters at Tell el-Hesi was destroyed by fire at the end of the Late Bronze Age. Whereas it is certainly true that the fire could have been accidental, if this were the case, one would expect the base to have been subsequently rebuilt. Further, the transition between the Bronze and Iron Ages is notorious for widespread destruction all across Canaan, and so it would not be surprising to find Tell el-Hesi likewise embroiled in the fray.

While invading Sea People are credited with wreaking some of the havoc at the end of the thirteenth century, the lack of Aegean-style ceramic at Tell el-Hesi and the limited nature of the Iron Age IA occupation as a whole render this scenario perhaps doubtful. Aiding and abetting the regionwide chaos, however, must have been internal rebellions and nomadic raids. Indeed, whether for motives of revenge or profit, practically any enterprising faction of society could easily have taken advantage of Egypt’s grievously weakened state at the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty to rid itself of the imperial presence.

Ashdod (see figure 41)

Unlike Tell el-Far’ah, Tel Sera’, or Tell el-Hesi, all of which were located along inland wadi systems, the site of Ashdod lay directly astride the Via Maris, Canaan’s major north-south highway. This locale must have brought the town prosperity when it was first

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566 Oren 1992: 118.
567 Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993: 111, n. 21. Petrie and Bliss believed that following its destruction the site was abandoned until the ninth or tenth century. Modern excavations have hit upon Iron I material but only in a single probe (Fargo 1993: 631–632).
Figure 40. Administrative headquarters at Tell el-Hesi (after Hasel 1998: 95, fig. 10)
established in the MB IIC period, just as it was to attract it close Egyptians oversight in the Late Bronze Age. Ashdod boasted other charms as well. The water table in the surrounding area, for instance, was so high that even relatively shallow wells could provide a steady supply of freshwater. Additionally, the site was located on the banks of the Nahal Lachish, a perennial stream that provided Ashdod not only with an additional source of water but also with an outlet to the sea.568

Ashdod’s involvement in maritime trade is well attested in the archives at Ugarit. In the extensive corpus of thirteenth century Ugaritic texts, people from Ashdod are mentioned with greater frequency than are the citizens of all other southern Canaanite cities combined. Indeed, Ashdod’s investment in long-distance commerce appears to have been substantial enough that from its establishment the town utilized, and perhaps even founded, the settlement of Tel Mor as a harbor and a trade depot.569 This second town, located only 7 km downstream of Ashdod and barely 1 km from the coast, will be discussed in detail below.

Judging from the Ugaritic archive, Ashdodites seem to have specialized primarily in the manufacture of dyed purple wool, but other commodities were no doubt exchanged as well.570 Ashdod’s extensive commercial activity—at least some of which was undertaken in partnership with a Hittite vassal—would have been inconceivable in the New Kingdom without Egyptian consent. Indeed, given the assuredly lucrative nature of this trade, it is of little surprise that the imperial government eventually chose to erect an administrative headquarters in Ashdod.

Under the auspices of the Israel Department of Antiquities, M. Dothan excavated at Ashdod for nine seasons, from 1962 to 1972. He discovered that the fortified town, which had originally covered 50 acres or more in the MB IIC period, had shrunk to less than half this size under Egyptian domination.571 Such a drastic conden-

568 For a description of Ashdod’s setting, see M. Dothan and Freedman 1967: 5; M. Dothan 1973: 1–2.
571 See Gonen 1984: 64.
sation in size between the MB IIC and the Late Bronze Age, however, is typical of almost all Canaanite towns that survived this often-violent transition period.

Only ephemeral traces of the LB I period have been discovered at Ashdod, but considerably more is known of the LB IIA strata. Two monumental buildings are of particular interest. In the first—a spacious (12 × 17 m) LB IIA dwelling—excavators discovered an Egyptian-style ceramic bowl, an alabaster stand that probably had been imported from Egypt, and scarabs. The vast majority of the material culture associated with the building, however, was typically Canaanite, and nothing about its architecture betrays an Egyptian signature.

Another building that was founded in the LB IIA period (stratum 16) is of considerably more interest, not so much on its own merits but because of the nature of its contents in the LB IIB period. This rectangular structure occupied roughly 788 m², which made it significantly larger in size than Tell el-Hesi or the residencies located in the Negev. According to the excavator’s reconstruction, a pillared entranceway in the middle of the northern wall led into a foyer from which two suites of rectangular rooms could be accessed on either side. Progressing further, one would have encountered a tiny central room, which was, in fact, less a hall than an antechamber. Two large rooms occupied the rear of the building.

With its rectangular shape, centered entrance, minuscule center-hall and stone foundations, the building has little beside its large size and thick walls (1.2 m) to trigger suspicions that it might have been built under Egyptian patronage, as its excavators and others have suggested. Indeed, the only definitively dated LB IIA objects possibly fashioned in imitation of Egyptian prototypes were a cup-and-saucer and a sandstone cube that may have originally served as a bedpost. As discussed in chapter four, however, Amarna Period

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573 For details about the LB IIA version of this building, see M. Dothan and Porath 1993: 39–44.
575 M. Dothan and Porath 1993: 40, 44. The latter is said to resemble cubes discovered in contemporary levels at Deir el-Balah and Amarna.
Egyptian headquarters are notoriously difficult to identify in the archaeological record.

While very little of the building’s plan was altered in the LB IIB period, the discovery of an inscribed doorjamb—in a secondary context but in close proximity to the building—gives more credence to the excavator’s contention that the structure had at one time served as a governor’s residency.\(^{576}\) Although it is unfortunately fragmentary, the surviving segment of the doorpost can be reconstructed to read: “fanbearer (on) the king’s right” \(\text{tši ħw [hr] wnm n nsw}\).\(^{577}\) During the New Kingdom, this title was bestowed upon some of the highest officials in the land, including the viceroy of Kush and heirs apparent.\(^{578}\) The career of Yankhamu (EA 106: 38), however, demonstrates that the title might also be held by governors of foreign lands, just the category of official likely to have been stationed at Ashdod.

The title “fanbearer on the king’s right” is known from two doorjambs aside from that found at Ashdod. One, discovered in secondary usage in Bubastis and dated to the Nineteenth Dynasty, provided the titles of a man who held a number of important offices in the foreign service. In addition to being a fanbearer on the king’s right \(\text{tšy ħw hr wnm n nsw}\), he also served as a troop commander \(\text{ḥry pdt}\), an overseer of foreign countries \(\text{imy-r ḫ3wfd}\), and an overseer of garrison troops \(\text{imy-r ḫwʾyt—KRI III, 262: 6–8}\).

The other inscription, carved upon a doorjamb that likely belonged to the Twentieth Dynasty administrative headquarters at Beth Shan (House 1500), listed the titles of the resident official’s father. This man, who may well have held his post in the Nineteenth Dynasty, had also served as fanbearer on the king’s right, troop commander, and overseer of foreign countries.\(^{579}\) Given the concordance of these titles among imperially active fanbearers, it is tempting to suggest that a similar resume originally bedecked the jambs of the residence at Ashdod.


The inscribed doorjamb was by far the most impressive and important Egyptian-oriented artifact associated with the large LB IIB building at Ashdod. There were, however, other Egyptian-style items found in and around the building. Excavators discovered significant quantities of Egyptian ceramic, including saucer bowls, bowls, cup-and-saucers, beer bottles, and storage jars. The presence of this otherwise humble ceramic at Ashdod may indicate that this base, like others farther to the south, employed potters trained in manufacturing Egyptian tableware.580 Other Egyptian-style objects from LB IIB Ashdod included a chisel, an alabaster vessel, a glass vessel decorated with a cartouche of Ramesses II, a faience ring, and scarabs.581

One item of extraordinary importance for understanding Ashdod in the Nineteenth Dynasty was found not in the town itself but rather some 2.5 km away, along the banks of the Nahal Lachish. Ramesses II, it seems, had erected a life-size, or slightly larger than life-size, statue of a female in the vicinity of Ashdod. Due to the fact that the limestone statue had been destroyed in antiquity, only its left hand survived. It is thus unknown whether the subject was human or divine. Luckily for modern scholars, however, cartouches of Ramesses II ornamented the statue’s bracelet and handkerchief.582

In Egypt itself, monumental statues were almost always associated with a state building of some sort, usually cultic or administrative in nature. If the sculpture depicted a goddess, it would almost certainly have been erected within a temple precinct. But the same could be said with regard to a statue of one of Ramesses II’s wives or daughters. Statues of high-ranking individuals often served as the focus of a statue cult, and this cult would normally have been endowed with


581 M. Dothan and Freedman 1967: 80-81; M. Dothan and Porath 1993: 11, 49; figs. 12: 15, 20; Brandl 1993: 133–138; Higginbotham 2000: 87. It should be noted that some of these objects may have come from the LB IIA residency, as excavators often found it difficult to differentiate clearly between the two strata (M. Dothan and Porath 1993: 47).

lands and property to fund its own upkeep in perpetuity. Such statues, then, whether of gods or mortals, were often of significant importance, both spiritually and economically, to a community.  

If the statue portrayed one of Ramesses II’s many wives, it is tempting to speculate that she may have hailed from an elite lineage at Ashdod. As amply illustrated in the Amarna letters, the Egyptian king incorporated many second-tier princesses into his household for diplomatic, propagandistic, and economic purposes. Alternatively, based on the special relationship evidently forged between Meritaten and Tyre in the late Eighteenth Dynasty (see chapter four), one might suggest that for unknown reasons Ramesses II ceded special properties in Ashdod to the personal estate (or statue cult) of his daughter or wife. Like Meritaten, then, Ramesses’ favored female would have been especially honored in one particular Canaanite town and would, presumably, have enjoyed some manner of economic control over its resources.

The Egyptian base at Ashdod suffered violence at the close of the century, just as had its counterpart at Tell el-Hesi to the south.  

Whereas the perpetrators of Tell el-Hesi’s downfall remain mysterious, however, the situation is somewhat clearer with regard to Ashdod. The fierce and fiery destruction left ash deposits up to a meter thick in various areas of the site, and the settlement built atop the debris (stratum XIII) was completely transformed from its predecessor both in terms of architecture and material culture. Associated with this new settlement were numerous Mycenaean III C:1b sherds. M. Dothan attributes this type of ceramic—a locally made imitation of Mycenaean ware—to one of the first waves of the Sea People whose mass migrations and acts of piracy caused upset in coastal communities from Anatolia to Egypt. This initial onslaught, Dothan believes, paved the way for the intensive Philistine settlement at Ashdod in the twelfth century (stratum XIII A). 

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Figure 41. Administrative headquarters at Ashdod
(after M. Dothan and Porath 1993: 42, plan 7)
As noted above, the life history of Tel Mor was always closely linked with that of its patron town, Ashdod. The founders of Ashdod in the MB IIC period situated their settlement inland, presumably to take advantage of arable farmland and a location adjacent to the Via Maris highway. At the mouth of the Nahal Lachish, roughly 7 km to the northwest, however, the Ashdodites established Tel Mor as an associated port town. Canaan’s southern coastline possesses virtually no suitable natural harbors, and in ancient times sea-going ships were forced to moor in river inlets instead. By staking claim to the calm and spacious inlet at Tel Mor, the merchants of Ashdod astutely positioned themselves to take advantage of lucrative maritime trade in addition to that which passed regularly along the Via Maris.

Tel Mor’s dependence on Ashdod is partially indicated by Ugaritic texts, which demonstrate that the merchants of Ashdod possessed a formidable maritime trading network. It is also indirectly evidenced, however, by the extremely modest size of the settlement at Tel Mor. Perched upon a mound, which towered some 17 m above its surroundings, the inhabited area extended for barely an acre and a half. Indeed, in later times the Egyptian-style fortified installation must have completely dominated the site. It should be noted, however, that the excavation of Tel Mor was a short salvage operation that focused exclusively upon the tell itself. It is therefore quite probable that a small commercial and/or domestic zone associated with the harbor has so far escaped notice.

Tel Mor’s history from the MB IIC to the LB IIB period is not well known. The inhabitants of the site do, however, seem to have been actively involved in long-distance trade, as one might expect from their seaside locale. Indeed, in the LB IIA period a substantial storehouse or administrative building surmounted the tell. At the end of the fourteenth century, this settlement was abruptly

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587 For background on Tel Mor, see M. Dothan 1973: 1–3, 14; 1977a: 889; 1993b: 1073; M. Dothan and Freedman 1967: 5.
589 M. Dothan led the excavations in 1959 and 1960 on behalf of the Israel Department of Antiquities. Unfortunately, only preliminary reports and summary articles document their findings.
destroyed. Although the aggressors are not known, the erection of an Egyptian-style fortified storehouse or residency atop its ruins suggests that the Egyptians themselves may have been the culprits.\textsuperscript{591} Ashdod, one might speculate, perhaps had aggraved the Egyptian government, which had subsequently retaliated by placing observers in the town and its harbor. Alternatively, and more prosaically, it may have been that Egyptians had always been stationed at Ashdod and Tel Mor but that the construction of specialized buildings to house their officials only took place—as elsewhere in Canaan—in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

The LB IIB fortified Egyptian base at Tel Mor closely resembles its contemporary at Deir el-Balah. The architects of both buildings designed them to be square in plan and bastioned, although the structure at Tel Mor is slightly larger\textsuperscript{592} and bastioned on all four sides, as opposed to simply at its corners. Both buildings likewise had walls thick enough, at roughly 2.5 m each, to easily support a second story. Access to this upper level, and assuredly also to the roof beyond, would have been provided at Tel Mor by a staircase situated in the southwestern corner of the building, just to the right of the main entrance hall.

It is unfortunately impossible to do more than hazard an educated guess as to the function of the upper floor at Tel Mor. From the plan of the building’s first floor, however, it is quite clear that any domestic activities—if such indeed took place in the building—must have been restricted to the second story. Fully two-thirds of the ground level consisted of small chambers and long halls, all neatly compartmentalized and highly standardized in plan. A spacious entrance hall and the aforementioned staircase comprised the remaining third of the floor space.\textsuperscript{593}

This threefold architectural package of entrance hall, adjacent staircase, and standardized compartments is absolutely typical of Egyptian granaries.\textsuperscript{594} It would not be surprising, therefore, if Tel Mor had

\begin{footnotes}
\item[592] It measures 23 \times 23 m as opposed to 20 \times 20 m.
\item[593] For descriptions of this building, see M. Dothan 1977a: 889; 1993b: 1073.
\item[594] See Kemp’s (1986) study of Middle Kingdom granaries. Higginbotham (2000: 288) has remarked upon the similarity in plan between the storage chambers in Tel Mor and those discovered in the Middle Kingdom fortress at Uronarti. She notes that the only significant difference between the two storage systems lay in the orientation of the long chambers to the entrance hall.
\end{footnotes}
served to safeguard the foodstuffs and commodities that the Egyptian authorities or their deputies at Ashdod intended for redistribution or transshipment. Such Egyptian-controlled storehouses are frequently mentioned in the annals of Thutmose III and in the letters of the Amarna archive (see chapters three and four). Although no such buildings have been definitively identified on the ground, Tel Mor’s location and architecture are consistent with what one might predict for a harbor depot. The “considerable amount” of Egyptian pottery discovered in the interior of the building also helps to place it within a specifically Egyptian milieu.\footnote{M. Dothan 1977a: 889; 1981: 82; 1993b: 1073; Weinstein 1981: 22. Higginbotham (2000: 114, based on personal communications with M. Dothan) reports that Egyptian-style ceramic found at the site included beer bottles and saucer bowls, but the published reports are mute on the subject. The building’s resemblance to its contemporaries at Deir el-Balah and Beth Shan has led to its almost universal acceptance as an Egyptian-style building (M. Dothan 1977a: 889; 1993b: 1073; Weinstein 1981: 18; G. R. H. Wright 1985: 208; Higginbotham 2000: 288; Dever 1997c: 49).}

The devastation inflicted upon Tel Mor almost certainly coincided with that which ended the Egyptian occupation of Ashdod.\footnote{The destruction layers separated strata 7 and 6 at Tel Mor and strata 14 and 13 at Ashdod. Both destructions are dated to the late thirteenth century (M. Dothan 1981: 82; 1993a: 96—earlier reports date the destruction to the mid-thirteenth century, but a late thirteenth century date is more in line with what is understood about Mycenaean III C:1b ceramic). For the destruction level at Tel Mor specifically, see M. Dothan 1977a: 889; 1993b: 1073.}

\textit{The original dating of the destruction to the mid-thirteenth century led to suggestions that either Merneptah’s army or Israelite tribes may have been the perpetrators (M. Dothan 1977a: 889; 1993b: 1073). In light of evidence at Ashdod, the revised chronology, and Tel Mor’s seaside locale, however, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the town was decimated by raiders from the sea (see Stager 1995: 342).}
Figure 42. Administrative headquarters at Tel Mor
(after M. Dothan 1993: 1073)
Gezer (see figure 43)
The town of Gezer, like many of the locations chosen by the Egyptians to serve as administrative or military headquarters, was situated at the juncture of two very important ancient highways. The first, the Via Maris, ran north-south and formed the link between the southern bases of Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Ajjul, Gaza, and Ashdod. As mentioned above, it was perhaps the most important commercial and military trunk road in ancient Canaan. The second route, leading from Gezer, through the Shephelah, and up to the hill country, however, was also of vital importance as one of the main arteries connecting highland and lowland settlements.598

Gezer’s position at the nexus of two extremely well traveled and strategically vital roadways had brought it wealth in the MB II period and recrimination in the LB I. The town was destroyed, its excavators believe, at or prior to the reign of Thutmose III, during the time at which Egypt was first struggling to establish its northern empire.599 By the LB IIA period, however, the town appears to have recovered, and excavations have revealed an impressive fourteenth century palace on the site’s acropolis.600

Although the town played host to an Egyptian garrison during a particularly rough period in the wars with the hill country (EA 292: 29–38), Gezer’s rulers seem for the most part to have maintained their autonomy in the LB IIA period. Indeed, evidence from the Amarna letters shows them to have enjoyed remarkably high status in their dealings with the pharaoh and his ambassadors. The site’s monumental buildings and numerous Egyptian imports further attest to the town’s wealth at this period and to its close relations with Egypt.601

The excavations led by Dever and various co-directors on behalf of Hebrew Union College and other sponsoring institutions are largely responsible for the nuanced picture we enjoy of LB IIA Gezer. From 1964 to 1974, and then again in 1984 and 1990, these scholars care-
fully excavated and recorded the material culture from all time periods on the tell. Prior to their work, however, the only archaeologist to reach the Late Bronze Age levels was Macalister, who feverishly excavated nearly two-thirds of the tell from 1902 to 1909 for the Palestine Exploration Fund.

In his effort to record the entirety of Gezer’s archaeological history before his permit ran out and the site was left prey to looters, Macalister employed 200 locals and worked at breakneck speed. He endeavored, however, to undertake all of the record keeping and the architectural planning himself. Not surprisingly, given the colossal nature of the task and the infancy of scientific archaeology at the time, Macalister’s (1912) publication of Gezer is highly problematic, especially with regard to chronological issues.602 It is unfortunate, therefore, that it was Macalister who uncovered virtually all of the evidence pertinent to the question of whether Gezer played host to an Egyptian base in the LB IIB period.

Of this evidence, by far the most important is a sandstone architectural block, which Macalister discovered in a secondary context on the site’s acropolis. Upon its dressed surface, the stone bore the hieroglyphic sign for gold (nbw), a standard element in Egyptian royal titulary. The presence of this block, which Macalister described as “too bulky to have been imported to the city,” suggests that an Egyptian building may have been erected at Gezer.603 But when might this have been? The Amarna letters indicate that an Egyptian official and his troops were resident at Gezer for a short time in the late Eighteenth Dynasty. As the local ruler explained to pharaoh in no uncertain terms, however, the imperial representatives were at that time quartered in a building that the ruler considered his own (EA 292: 29–38).

Given that numerous Egyptian-style buildings were constructed in Syria-Palestine in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties—and that some even utilized inscribed stone jambs and lintels in their monumental doorways—a LB IIB or IA IA date for such a building at

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603 Macalister 1908: 200–202, fig. I; 1912 v. II: 307, fig. 446. The stone element could also have decorated a town gate, as did similar fragments in the contemporary town of Jaffa. The issue of whether or not Gezer possessed a functional wall at this period, however, is fraught (see Hasel 1998: 185–186, n. 41 for a concise review of the debate).
Gezer would seem quite probable. It is of considerable interest, therefore, that Macalister reports having found the block in association with artifacts that he believed to be of Nineteenth Dynasty date.\(^{604}\) Considering this archaeologist’s imperfect record on matters chronological, however, one can only wish that he had published descriptions and drawings of the supposedly diagnostic artifacts in his reports.

The renewed excavations at Gezer suggest that during the LB IIB period (stratum 15) the town suffered a slow downturn in fortunes, culminating in a highly localized destruction.\(^{605}\) Dever and his team believe that the burning episode, which occurred in Field II only, should be dated to Merneptah.\(^{606}\) This pharaoh is stated to have “plundered” ( partnering the town in the Amada stele (KRI IV, 1: 9) and to have “seized” (partnership) it in the Israel stele (KRI IV, 19: 5).

As stratum 15 is the last in which imported Mycenaean IIIB ware is found,\(^{607}\) however, one could easily place the stratum’s end later in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Ambiguously, the subsequent stratum (st. 14) contains artifacts dating securely to the Twentieth Dynasty but also some residual Late Bronze Age ceramic as well. Whether the residency was erected in stratum 15 or 14, however, it is clear that its administrators would have overseen a town well past its prime.

If one accepts that an Egyptian-sponsored building had indeed been erected at Gezer, the question remains as to whether it would have been established, like many of its counterparts, at or before the reign of Ramesses II, or whether it postdated Merneptah’s attack. As discussed above, the Egyptian government not infrequently assumed governance over Canaanite towns as punishment for rebellions or other offenses. Although the answer is at present unknowable, Singer’s firm belief that Merneptah could not possibly have abandoned Gezer without erecting an Egyptian base to prevent further insurrections prompted him to scour Macalister’s reports in hopes of discovering a likely candidate therein.\(^{608}\)

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\(^{604}\) Macalister 1912 v. II: 307, fig. 446.


In the end, the building Singer identified as a good candidate for an Egyptian-style “governor’s residency” was the same one that Macalister himself had originally pinpointed as “the residence of the governor.” Macalister was evidently extremely impressed by this structure. Not only did he dub it the “Canaanite Castle,” but he also, uncharacteristically, left it standing, believing it too valuable to destroy. Due to this prudent decision, Dever’s team was able to reexcavate the building in 1990.

The “Canaanite Castle” had been built directly against the ruins of the MB IIC city wall and, in fact, employed the remains of the wall as part of its northern foundations. According to Singer’s reconstruction, the building would have been “more or less squarish” in plan, although three spacious entrance alcoves enhanced its southeastern corner. If this reconstruction bears merit, the core of the building occupied an area comparable to that of Residency II at Deir el-Balah or the administrative buildings at Tell Heboua I and Tell er-Retabah.

Highlighting the building’s thick walls, its apparently squarish plan, and the presence of a corner staircase (room b), Singer favorably compared the layout of the “Canaanite Castle” to blueprints of the governor’s residencies found elsewhere in Canaan. Significantly, this comparison has survived closer archaeological scrutiny by Dever and Yonker. After their reexcavation of the site, these scholars concurred with Singer that the “Castle” may well have been an Egyptian governor’s residency or an administrative building of thirteenth century date.

Other scholars, however, have expressed considerably more skepticism concerning Singer’s arguments. Both Maeir and Bunimovitz, for example, argue that one would expect a governor’s residency to have been located on the tell’s acropolis. The Amarna Age palace and other important buildings, after all, had been situated upon this privileged higher ground. The “Canaanite Castle’s” position—in

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611 His comparisons centered upon those buildings identified by Oren (1984).


the low dip between Gezer’s two hills—is asserted to have better suited a building primarily concerned with military strategy than one that asserted governmental prestige.\textsuperscript{614} Bearing this argument in mind, it is interesting to note that two bronze axe heads and a bronze spearhead were listed among the very few items that Macalister found within the building.\textsuperscript{615}

Other aspects of the building’s attribution were also felt to be problematic. The layout of its internal rooms, for example, does not conform to that expected of either a center-hall house or a first-floor storage area—the two plans that frequently characterize governor’s residencies. Likewise, Singer’s critics faulted his easy acceptance of Macalister’s thirteenth century date.\textsuperscript{616} Without any identification of the artifacts that he had used to determine the date, they argued, Macalister’s assertion was worthless. All that could be stated was that the building postdated the MB IIC wall, which meant that a date in the Amarna Period or one much later would be equally plausible.\textsuperscript{617} Unfortunately, because the building had been constructed upon sterile fill and because Macalister’s excavations had removed any \textit{in situ} ceramic, Dever and Younker were unable to settle the debate through reexcavation.\textsuperscript{618}

If Singer’s candidate for an Egyptian governor’s residency is not entirely convincing, neither is the option put forth in its stead by Bunimovitz. Bunimovitz, although he rejected the status of the “Canaanite Castle” as a governor’s residency, nonetheless did agree with Singer that a governor’s residency probably had been erected within the city limits of Late Bronze Age Gezer. By specifically examining Macalister’s plans of the acropolis he was able to identify a different candidate—a thick-walled building of unusually fine brick masonry.

Although Macalister had not, in fact, excavated the northern or western walls of this structure, Bunimovitz reconstructed the build-

\textsuperscript{615} Macalister 1912, v. I: 208. These weapons—together with an alabaster vessel, some pottery, and a green stone ornament—were practically the only items discovered in the entire complex.
\textsuperscript{616} Macalister 1907: 192–193; 1912 v. I: 208.
\textsuperscript{617} Bunimovitz (1988–1989: 70, n. 1) and Dever (1997d: 398) have both suggested an Amarna Period date for the building. Maeir’s (1988–1989: 65) suggestion that it predated the MB IIC wall, however, is highly unlikely (see Dever and Younker 1991: 284).
\textsuperscript{618} Dever and Younker 1991: 284.
ing to measure 15 × 15 m in area, or perhaps 15 × 13 m. Bunimovitz believed that this building, like the “Canaanite Castle,” would have been thick-walled and roughly square. Its first-floor plan, however, bears a greater resemblance to the plans of other Egyptian buildings that were storage-related than it does to the layout of the “Canaanite Castle.” Roughly half of Bunimovitz’s building is devoted to six smallish chambers of the size and shape one might expect of storerooms. The remainder of the structure, as at Tel Mor, consisted of a stairway and entrance chambers. Similar double rows of storerooms, as noted by Bunimovitz, are also common to the plan of Residency II at Deir el-Balah.

According to Macalister’s view, the building reconstructed by Bunimovitz dated to roughly 1500 B.C. As usual, however, it is difficult to know exactly how Macalister had arrived at this date, for he made no mention of any artifacts associated with the structure. While the inside of the building may have been devoid of objects that Macalister found notable, however, the foundations held crucial information of relevance to the building’s date and possibly even to its function. Lamp-and-bowl deposits, with which builders had similarly dedicated numerous Egyptian installations in the Sinai and Canaan (Bir el-‘Abd, Deir el-Balah, Tel Sera’, Aphek, Tell el-Hesi, and Haruba site A–289), date predominantly to the LB IIB and IA IA period. While these deposits are rare at other sites except in association with Egyptian buildings, they are relatively common at Gezer. Numerous examples were discovered both by Macalister and by the Hebrew Union College expedition. In the renewed excavations, Dever’s team was able to date the lamp-and-bowl deposits at Gezer securely to the late thirteenth through the twelfth centuries.

Bunimovitz’s candidate for the Egyptian governor’s residency at Gezer exhibits several advantages over the “Canaanite Castle.” These

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619 Macalister 1912 v. I: 170, fig. 58; III: pl. 49.2; Bunimovitz 1988–1989: 72–74.
623 See Bunimovitz and Zimhoni 1993.
include its location on the acropolis, its regular plan, and its lamp-and-bowl foundation deposit. The building as Bunimovitz restores it, however, is noticeably smaller than any other suspected residency, and lamp-and-bowl deposits are frequent at Gezer. In the end, without the presence of artifacts that are indicative of an Egyptian occupation, neither of the suggested governor’s residencies can be accepted without some doubt. While Macalister’s inscribed architectural element indeed justifies the assertion that the Egyptians must have erected at least one building at Gezer, it remains as yet unknown whether that structure has been excavated or still awaits discovery.

Before leaving the subject of the Egyptian occupation of Gezer, it is useful to provide a brief overview of the Egyptian-style objects found at the site. This exercise is important even though the contexts of most artifacts were never recorded, due to Macalister’s belief that “the exact spot in the mound where any ordinary object chanced to lie is not generally of great importance.”

The more impressive objects that caught Macalister’s eye included alabaster bowls, faience vessels, a sundial, a duck spoon, and an ivory pendant. By their very nature, however, these artifacts could very well have found their way to Gezer as trade goods. The same can be stated of the easily portable items, such as scarabs, stamp seals, combs, faience rings, plaques, and pendants.

Subtler indicators of Egyptian presence, however, include ceramic plaques bearing images of Hathor-type naked females, a scarab seal impression, and utilitarian Egyptian-style pottery. Forms found at Gezer include: saucer bowls, cup-and-saucers, globular storage

\[\text{Quoted in Dever 1967: 51.}\]
\[\text{The alabaster vessels were particularly numerous. Fifteen vessels of eight different types have been recorded (Macalister 1912: v. I: 98, 305, 308, 324, 335, 339, 354; II: 340–341; III: pls. 26: 3; 64: 18, 19; 71: 18; 83: 27; 89: 13; 106: 4; 209: 98; 212: 3, 5, 9, 11, 20; Dever 1986: pl. 55: 1; Higginbotham 2000: 101–102). Items bearing Ramesses II’s name (an alabaster jar stopper and an alabaster vase—KRI II, 401: 8, 9) were less numerous than those bearing Merneptah’s (an ivory pendant—Macalister 1912 v. I: 15; II: 331, fig. 456; a portable sundial—Macalister 1912 v. II: 331; fig. 456; KRI IV, 24: 15). For the faience vessels, see Macalister 1912 v. II: 337; III: pl. 211: 26; Dever 1986: pl. 55: 14; 58: 7. For the duck spoon, see Macalister 1912 v. II: 118; fig. 293: 1.}\]
\[\text{Subtler indicators of Egyptian presence, however, include ceramic plaques bearing images of Hathor-type naked females, a scarab seal impression, and utilitarian Egyptian-style pottery. Forms found at Gezer include: saucer bowls, cup-and-saucers, globular storage.}\]
Figure 43. Suggested administrative headquarters at Gezer (after Singer 1986: 30, fig. 2 and Bunimovitz 1988–1989: 73, fig. 3)
jars, and long-necked “Canaanite” storage jars. It is likely, however, that far more Egyptian-style pottery would have been recognized had Macalister’s excavations been undertaken today.

**Jaffa (no plan available)**

The seaside town of Jaffa was situated a day’s walk to the northwest of Gezer, a short detour from the coastal road to the coast itself. As at Gezer, evidence for a Late Bronze Age Egyptian occupation at Jaffa comes not from actual excavated buildings but from stone fragments carved with hieroglyphic text. However, while Macalister discovered only one such stone in a secondary context at Gezer, the evidence from Jaffa is far more informative.

Kaplan and his team from the Museum of Antiquities of Tel Aviv-Jaffa discovered numerous inscribed stones, many of which still lined the town’s eastern gateway. Further, the inscriptions could be reconstructed to provide three of Ramesses II’s five regnal names. The left jamb read, “[Horus] ‘Strong-[Bull], beloved-of-Maat,’ [King of Upper and Lower Egypt, Lord of the Two Lands ‘Usermaatre Setepenre’]” (KRI II, 401: 7). Likewise, on the right jamb, stonemasons had engraved, “Horus ‘Strong-Bull, beloved-of-Maat,’ Son of Re, Lord of Crowns ‘Ramesses Meryamun’” (KRI II, 401: 6). Such a clear imperial signature upon Jaffa’s town gate confirms the impression, already gained from outside textual sources, that Jaffa served as an Egyptian-controlled imperial outpost in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Located on a high promontory jutting out into the Mediterranean Sea, Jaffa has always been southern Canaan’s most important harbor town. In the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, Jaffa debuted in Egyptian records as number 62 on Thutmose III’s list of conquered polities (Urk. IV, 783: no. 62). This imperial victory would later be memo-

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631 Kaplan’s excavations, undertaken in six seasons between 1955 and 1974, are unique in identifying Late Bronze material at the site. The gateway is tersely described in Kaplan 1964: 273; 1972: 79–81; Kaplan and Kaplan 1976: 535, 538; 1993: 656. Its plan, however, was never published.

rialized in more than one Ramesside folktale. Whether or not Egyptian soldiers had truly been smuggled into the town in baskets, however, one very real consequence of the battle was the loss of Jaffa’s autonomy. In the Amarna archive there is no hint that the town possessed an indigenous ruler. Instead, the letters provide information concerning an Egyptian official (EA 296), an Egyptian granary (EA 294), and a ruler of a nearby town who was broadly charged with protecting both Jaffa and Gaza from harm (EA 296).

As discussed previously, a letter found at Aphek demonstrates that Jaffa survived as an Egyptian granary into the Nineteenth Dynasty. At this time it fell under the jurisdiction of an Egyptian governor named Haya, who operated presumably out of the administrative headquarters at Aphek. Considering the many tons of grain with which this single missive was concerned, however, it is inconceivable that a colleague or a subordinate of Haya would not have been stationed at Jaffa itself.

Jaffa is likewise portrayed as an Egyptian base in P. Anastasi I, although no granaries are specifically mentioned therein. According to the author of this admittedly artificial composition, Egyptian-sponsored workshops and armories were located within Jaffa. Further, if an Egyptian messenger were so lucky as to be allowed access to the carpenters and leatherworkers who labored within, broken equipment could be fixed, lost items could be replaced, and the messenger could be sent on his way fully restored.

The site of Jaffa, despite its importance as a natural harbor, could not have incorporated much more than the Egyptian granary, armory, and workshops, which lay within its town walls. From its conquest by the Egyptians until the thirteenth century, it was apparently a “tiny” settlement. This substantive reduction in population from Middle Bronze Age levels suggests that many of the town’s inhabitants may have been exiled prior to the transformation of Jaffa into an Egyptian stronghold. Such an “eradication and replacement” strategy seems to have been widely favored on both frontiers by Egyptians in the New Kingdom.

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634 See the text in Kochavi 1990: xvii.
635 P. Anastasi I, 26: 3–9. Interestingly, Jaffa also seems to have served a similar restorative purpose in the late Eighteenth Dynasty (EA 138: 6).
636 A “tiny” settlement is classified as 2.5 acres or less (Gonen 1984: 64).
It is deeply unfortunate that the Egyptian base at Jaffa, like that at Gaza, is buried under many tons of modern development and habitation. Were Late Bronze levels able to be excavated beyond the town gate, archaeologists would likely find an enclave strongly marked by Egyptian-style material culture. Indeed, although Kaplan died before he could publish his excavations in more than summary form, Higginbotham was able to identify as having been uncovered in his work at Jaffa numerous Egyptian-style saucer bowls, twenty flower pots, a slender ovoid jar, and a handleless storage jar. 637

A fiery conflagration ended the Late Bronze occupation at Jaffa, just as such blazes had similarly destroyed the vast majority of Egypt’s contemporary northern bases. 638 While this incendiary destruction could have been the result of anti-Egyptian activity on the part of local Canaanites, Jaffa’s coastal location makes it tempting to assign blame to the Sea Peoples. Iron Age IA levels have yet to be excavated in any depth at Jaffa, but the presence of Philistine ceramic at the site suggests that Aegean refugee populations may have found the town attractive for settlement. 639 It would be intriguing to know, however, whether the new settlers at Jaffa, whoever they may have been, intentionally expressed an anti-Egyptian sentiment when they reinserted Ramesses’ doorjambs into the town gate both upside down and backwards. 640

Aphek (see figure 44)

Ancient Aphek was yet another town that an imperial power seeking to subdue Canaan would do well to control. The Ottoman Turks knew this and so erected a large fortress directly over the spot where, unbeknownst to them, an Egyptian governor’s residency had stood thousands of years before. Aphek attracted imperial attention for four

637 See Higginbotham 1994: 132, 143, 148, 159, 193. Higginbotham viewed this pottery at the Museum of Antiquities of Tel Aviv-Jaffa, Kaplan’s sponsoring institution. Seventeen of the flowerpots were discovered in a single locus, although the nature of the locus is not specified. Considering that Kaplan hit Late Bronze material in only an isolated portion of his dig, the quantity of ceramic that he discovered is extremely impressive.


640 Kaplan 1972: 82. It should be stated, however, that Egyptians themselves often reused their predecessors’ monuments in this style, so an anti-Egyptian sentiment is in no way inherent in this behavior.
primary reasons. First, it guarded a series of perennial springs, which served as headwaters for the Yarkon River. Second, the river debouched some 15 km to the west, conveniently close to the natural harbor at Jaffa. This riverine connection provided the town with an outlet to the sea. Third, Aphek was located directly on the Via Maris, which allowed it to profit from the intensive long-distance trade that frequented this corridor. And fourth, Aphek was not only located on the Via Maris, but it also dominated an especially narrow pass through which the route was forced to wend, i.e., the narrow spit of land between the Yarkon River on the west and the mountainous country to the east. Aphek’s position, then, enabled the occupants of the town to easily interfere with passage along this route or to meticulously monitor it.641

Although archaeological evidence demonstrates that Aphek had been occupied since Chalcolithic times, its first appearance in Egyptian sources is in the execration texts.642 Inclusion in this motley assortment of Egypt’s most hated and feared Canaanite contemporaries is a dubious honor and a testament to the political strength of Middle Bronze Age Aphek. The town’s heyday appears to have ended, however, with the onset of the Late Bronze Age. Aphek’s next appearance on an Egyptian list, after all, would be as number 66 in Thutmose III’s enumeration of conquered polities (Urk. IV, 794: n. 66)—a position that situated it virtually cheek-by-jowl with the town of Jaffa (no. 62).

One encounter with the Egyptian army must have been enough for the citizens of Aphek, for they evidently made no more trouble for Thutmose III. The townspeople likewise “emerged in peace” to greet Amenhotep II when this king campaigned in the Sharon many years later (Urk. IV, 1305: 15–16). Despite Aphek’s submissive postconquest behavior in the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, the town’s marked absence from the Amarna archive suggests that by the late Eighteenth Dynasty the Egyptians may have revoked its autonomous status. After all, any military leader could recognize that a potentially hostile town, which guarded a narrow pass along Canaan’s


642 Posener 1940: 65.
most important highway, introduced an unnecessary element of uncertainty into a campaign.

Although it is very much an argument from silence to suggest that Aphek was in Egyptian hands in the Amarna Period, there is perhaps another piece of supporting archaeological evidence. Since the Middle Bronze Age, a series of four palaces had been erected one after another on the acropolis at Aphek. In the Amarna Period, however, the architects broke with tradition and built Palace V in a completely different style and with a new orientation. While very little of this building is recoverable, it is notable that the demonstrably Egyptian administrative building constructed at Aphek in the Nineteenth Dynasty employed many of the older building’s foundations as its own.643

On the other hand, there is always the possibility that Aphek in fact maintained its independence during the late Eighteenth Dynasty and that Palace V belonged to a local ruler. According to this view, the Egyptians would not have interfered with the town until it provoked the wrath of Ramesses II (KRI II, 157: 16; 182: 12). This theory alleviates the need to explain why Ramesses would attack an Egyptian-held town. Likewise, it fits neatly into the tried and true Egyptian policy of transforming defeated enemy towns into military bases.

The Nineteenth Dynasty governor’s residency (i.e., “Palace VI” or “Building 1104”) was perched upon the acropolis, where the 15 m high tell was at its steepest. This locale had been chosen for nearly all important buildings throughout Aphek’s history. Indeed, Beck and Kochavi, the site’s excavators, actually discovered the residency only as a byproduct of a project to restore an Ottoman fortress. Prior to their work, which occurred from 1972 to 1985, no Late Bronze Age remains had ever been identified at Aphek, prompting some scholars to suggest other locales for the town.644

When the Late Bronze levels were finally identified, however, it became clear wherein the difficulty had lain. Like many of the settlements occupied by the Egyptians in the Late Bronze Age, Aphek was “small” in size. Indeed, virtually the entirety of the occupation at this time appears to have been in the vicinity of the residency

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and on the adjacent eastern hill. Whether or not this should imply that many of the town’s indigenous occupants were exiled following the Egyptian conquest, however, is not known.

Unusually for an Egyptian-style building in Canaan, Palace VI employed stone courses in its foundations and walls, the latter rising to a height of 2 m. In almost every other aspect, however, the building betrayed an Egyptian hand. Measuring 18 × 18 m in area, the base at Aphek was exactly the same size as that at Tell el-Hesi and only slightly smaller than the main administrative buildings at Tell Heboua I or Tell er-Retabah. Further, it shared the distinctive floor plan of Tel Mor, in which a central entrance hall provided access both to a corner stairway and to a series of regularized storage chambers. Likewise, although they broke with tradition to construct stone foundations, the builders of Palace VI at Aphek consecrated these same foundations with an extremely orthodox offering, a lamp-and-bowl foundation deposit. Lamp-and-bowl sets also graced the foundations of the Egyptian bases of Bir el-‘Abd, Deir el-Balah, Tel Sera’, Tell el-Hesi, Haruba site A-289, and Gezer.

Like many other Egyptian-style buildings, Palace VI at Aphek possessed a corner entrance. A substantial paved path led up to the doorway, and a massive stone trough stood immediately to one side, presumably to water the visitor’s horse or donkey. Such amenities would normally mark this door as the building’s major entrance. Just a few meters to the west, however, was a wider doorway, which led into the exact same stone-paved foyer as did the first entrance. This relatively small room featured a built-in stone bench but otherwise no marks of distinction that would seem to merit for the room two distinct entranceways.

The presence of these two doors, each entering into the same room from the same direction, makes little sense unless the doorways were designed to be utilized by different types of people or for different purposes. Along these lines, then, it may be significant that the larger and seemingly more prestigious entrance was situated directly adjacent to the stairwell leading to the second floor. The

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645 According to Gonen (1984: 64), a “small” settlement fits in the range of 2.5–12.5 acres. See also Kochavi 1990: xi.
narrower doorway, on the other hand, lay on the axis of the inner doorways leading into the storage wing.\textsuperscript{647}

Two small, interconnected rooms, one paved in stone and the other in plaster, occupied the southeastern third of the building. While the function of these chambers, and even their relation to one another, is unclear,\textsuperscript{648} they are likely to have served either as storerooms or possibly as a compact scribal suite. In any case, a modest corridor separated them from the two long halls that constituted the remainder of the ground floor. Constructed of equal width and with beaten earth floors, the halls closely resemble New Kingdom storage magazines. The large number of “Canaanite” storage jars found stashed within the halls only heightens this impression.

The 1.5 m thick walls of Palace VI and its “splendid” staircase would certainly have been enough to tip off its excavators to the possibility that the building was more than a simple storehouse. The magnificent preservation of the ruins, however, made any guessing as to the presence of a second story unnecessary. Charred timbers, crossbeams, and plaster provided a clear window into the construction of the roof. Moreover, a spill of painted plaster, household goods, and administrative documents demonstrated that the second floor of Palace VI had likely served as a residence and office. The various items stored on the second story will be discussed below.\textsuperscript{649}

While the building’s stone foundations and lower walls have prevented some scholars from feeling comfortable terming Palace VI a “governor’s residency,”\textsuperscript{650} its interior plan is similar to that discovered at Tel Mor. Likewise, the lamp-and-bowl foundation deposit, the square plan, the thick walls, the corner entrance, the corner staircase, and the building’s overall size are all typical of Egyptian-style buildings in Canaan. When the artifacts discovered within Palace VI are also taken into consideration, however, the structure’s strong ties

\textsuperscript{647} See also Kochavi 1978: 14.

\textsuperscript{648} In the plan provided here (see figure 44; after Kochavi 1990: xiii; Beck and Kochavi 1993: 68), the two rooms are connected to one another. In an alternate plan (Kochavi 1978; 1981: 78; Oren 1984: 40), however, the most southerly room adjoins the adjacent hall instead.

\textsuperscript{649} Kochavi 1990: xii; Beck and Kochavi 1993: 68.

\textsuperscript{650} Oren 1984: 49–50; Higginbotham 2000: 290. While both scholars reject the term “governor’s residency” with regard to the building at Aphek, Oren includes it in his study of “governor’s residencies,” and Higginbotham (2000: 290) suggests that, like Tel Mor, the building was modeled upon Middle Kingdom granaries.
to Egyptian culture are undeniable, and most scholars have therefore confidently identified it as an Egyptian headquarters.651

Of the numerous Egyptian-style artifacts that were discovered in association with the residency, perhaps the single most telling is the cuneiform letter sent from Takuhlina, one of the highest officials in Ugarit, to Haya.652 As previously discussed at length, Haya has been identified with relative certainty as Huy, a fanbearer on the king’s right (t̡r̡ m̡ h̡ t̡ ̱ n̡ n̡ w̡ n̡ s̡ w̡ n̡). Highlights of this man’s long and varied career include his service as troop commander (ḥr pd̡) of Tjaru and his accompaniment of Ramesses II’s Hittite bride to Egypt. Years later he would attain the position of viceroy of Kush. Haya’s extremely high status is demonstrated by the fact that Takuhlina, the second most important man in Ugarit, referred to him in the letter as “father” and professed to fall at his feet. Such protestations would seem unwarranted from a Hittite vassal, especially one from so powerful a city-state.

The letter concerned a shipment of 15 tons of wheat, which Takuhlina had sent to the Egyptian granary at Jaffa and subsequently wished to reclaim. Although it is hypothetically possible, as Higginbotham suggests,653 that the letter caught up with Haya while he was “passing through” Aphek on a circuit tour of duty, it is not very likely. The letter presumes a high degree of familiarity on the part of its addressee with the situation at hand and also with the people involved. Indeed, part of the reason the letter is so confusing to modern readers is precisely that so much seemingly vital background information was apparently deemed unnecessary. An official stationed at Aphek, it can be safely assumed, would have had far more likelihood of successfully interpreting the gist of the letter than would an official who visited Aphek infrequently.

The relations between Aphek and Jaffa, on the one hand, and between Ashdod and Tel Mor, on the other, appear parallel in nature. Both sets of towns, for instance, included one located along the Via Maris proper and another situated at a nearby harbor.654

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652 For the publication of this document, see Owen 1981. It is the subject also of an in-depth article by Singer (1983).
653 Higginbotham 2000: 37.
654 While Singer (1988: 2) suggests that Aphek fell under the jurisdiction of Jaffa
Such strategic pairing obviously facilitated the transfer of goods from land to sea or vice versa. Perhaps it is not surprising, then, that fan-bearers on the king’s right hand were stationed at both Ashdod and Aphek. From their respective bases on the Via Maris, these officials could keep close tabs on the highly profitable trade that occurred at this nexus of land and sea trade routes.

Likewise, it is probably no accident that the floor plans of Tel Mor and Aphek resemble each other so closely. The blueprints of both place a tremendous emphasis on storage space, indirectly indicating the importance of material goods to the ultimate purpose of these buildings. It would be interesting to know, however, whether the goods stored at these depots consisted primarily of Canaanite taxes or whether they represented the profits from a stranglehold on trade or industry. Further, the fate of the goods stored in these buildings is an interesting problem in and of itself. It is possible that the storehouses, like those originally set up by Thutmose III, were intended to be drawn upon by imperial servants and by armies on the march. Just as likely, however, the buildings temporarily served as depots for goods destined for shipment to Egypt.

The letter from Ugarit, which provoked these ruminations, was discovered in a cache of objects found in the southernmost hall of Palace VI, where they had landed after the second story collapsed. Items found in close association with it were of a sundry nature. They included a badly broken cuneiform tablet, Egyptian-style faience beads, and an ivory duck-headed pin. The last has a strong parallel in a duck-headed pin excavated at Kumidi, Egypt’s base in the Biqa Valley.655 Several other cuneiform documents were likewise found scattered about the premises, also victims of the second-story collapse. None, however, was nearly as informative as the letter from Ugarit. A missive written in Akkadian recorded the sale of real estate, although it is not clear whether houses or fields were at issue.656

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656 Kochavi 1990: xvi.
Another text enumerated large quantities (e.g. 1,000, 5,000, etc.) of some sort of commodity. Akkadian was the lingua franca of the Late Bronze Age, employed even by Egyptians stationed in Canaan to communicate with one another. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that the two remaining relatively intact cuneiform tablets found at Palace VI were lexical lists. Scribes often utilized this type of text for training purposes and in later life retained them for reference.

A Hittite seal impression, the only example of its kind ever found outside the boundaries of Hatti, provides evidence for further international communication. Significantly, an analysis of the seal indicates that its owner should have been of royal or at least extremely elevated social status. While it is surprising to find the Egyptians at Aphek in direct communication with a Hittite potentate, it should be remembered that Ugarit was a Hittite vassal and served as Hatti’s major seaport. Communication, therefore, may have centered on maritime matters. Indeed, if famine had already begun to plague Hittite lands, the grain stores at Jaffa would presumably have attracted great interest from northern quarters.

The Egyptian inscriptions found at Palace VI unfortunately did not consist of administrative records or letters. Such documents are relatively rare finds even in Egypt, due to the easy disintegration of papyrus. The first text simply consisted of a short votive prayer inscribed upon the bezel of a faience ring. It read “Amun-re, abundant in every favor, praise and joy.” Given that faience was not particularly valuable in the Late Bronze Age, one can safely assume that the ring would have held little importance to a native Canaanite, except perhaps as a curiosity.

The second inscription, written in ink upon a small faience plaque, is of far greater interest. Although archaeologists discovered the artifact discarded in a tenth century B.C. silo, it bore Ramesses II’s nomen and prenomen—and so likely hailed originally from a Nineteenth Dynasty context. Like the ring, however, this small faience

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658 See Amarna letter EA 333, a cuneiform document sent by one Egyptian to another.
plaque would have possessed "no intrinsic beauty or value" as anything but a curio to a non-Egyptian. On one side, the plaque bore the inscription "Good god, [User]maat[re], given life. Beloved of the Great-in-Magic, lady of the sky." Its verso continued in a like vein: "The son of Re, Ra[messes Mery]amun, like Re. Beloved of Isis the great, mother of the god . . . beloved of Dendera(?)."

Similar small votive plaques are frequently associated with temple foundation deposits. This fact has caused considerable confusion, as well as a few tentative suggestions that the Egyptians may have constructed a temple to Isis at Aphek in the reign of Ramesses II. On analogy to Beth Shan, it is not out of the realm of possibility that a cultic building did exist to serve the Egyptians at Aphek. There is no reason necessarily, however, to associate the faience plaque with such a structure. Temples to Isis are exceedingly rare in pharaonic Egypt, let alone in Canaan. Likewise, scholars have suggested that if the plaque was indeed a foundation deposit, it would most likely have derived from the toponym mentioned in the plaque. The Egyptian writing for Aphek definitively did not employ an iwn-pillar. Likewise, judging from its context, the plaque could have arrived at Aphek at virtually any time between the thirteenth and tenth centuries.

Other items discovered in Palace VI or in its immediate vicinity include a scarab of Ramesses II, which is of interest primarily as yet another circumstantial link between this pharaoh and the Egyptian headquarters at Aphek. Of more intrinsic cultural importance, however, are four mold-made clay figurines. All four represented nude females or goddesses. Two wore Hathor curls and grasped long-stemmed flowers in the Egyptian manner. A third bore no distinctive insignia, while the fourth suckled two children at her breast.

Nude female figurines served as votive gifts for Isis in Ptolemaic times and for Hathor and other Egyptian deities in the New

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662 Giveon 1978c: 189.
663 Giveon 1978c: 188. The toponym might variously read Hermouthis (iweni), Latopolis (iwnyt), or Heliopolis (iwnw). Given that Isis was supposed to have been born in Dendera (iwen) Giveon preferred this restoration. With only a single iwn-pillar preserved, however, any translation must be tentative.
666 Kochavi 1990: xxi, 38.
Kingdom, a fact that might seem to support the idea of a cult to Isis and her Canaanite equivalent at Aphek. Naked female figurines, however, are frequently found in household, funerary, and cultic contexts both in New Kingdom Egypt and in Late Bronze Age Canaan. It is therefore perhaps unwise to presume too much from their presence.

The function and cultural meaning of the Egyptian-style utilitarian vessels found in Palace VI is far easier to determine than that of the nude female figurines. The majority of this ceramic, tellingly, fell from the upper stories of the building, suggesting an at least partly residential function for the second floor. Most numerous among this pottery were Egyptian-style saucer bowls, the straw temper of which indicates that the bowls were fabricated by potters trained in Egyptian techniques. Other forms included a swollen-necked amphoriskos, a storage jar, a cup, a jar with a pointed base, and a duck bowl. This last is particularly interesting, given the numerous examples of bowls decorated with duck heads found in the vicinity of the Egyptian-sponsored temple at Beth Shan (see below). Within Palace VI there were, of course, numerous local and Aegean wares as well.

The last category of artifacts that merits special discussion is martial in nature. War-related weapons and equipment discovered on the premises of Palace VI include a bronze dagger, two bronze armor scales, and six bronze arrowheads, which were designed for use in a composite bow. Although these items were unfortunately rather international in type, a decorated bronze harness ring bears a finely crafted lotus motif, which is inarguably of Egyptian design. As Kochavi points out, in fact, this harness ring is very similar to one donned by Ramesses II’s own chariot team in the battle of Kadesh. Judging by the numbers in which these implements were found, it is likely that they belonged to a single individual rather than to the well-stocked armory of a garrison. That such items would number among the personal possessions of the building’s occupant at all, however, suggests that the duties of the official stationed at Aphek were unlikely to have been strictly bureaucratic.

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667 Pinch 1993: 221–222.
670 Kochavi 1990: xxii.
671 Kochavi 1990: xxiii.
Located several meters from Palace VI, and obviously in direct association with it, were two wine presses. Nearly identical in appearance, the two had clearly been constructed as a pair. The treading areas of each were parallel to one another, and both drained into stone-lined, plastered collection basins. Designed to hold a capacity of 3,500 liters of wine, each tank was equipped with a flight of seven steps that descended to its base. Significantly, the bottoms of these basins were littered with the remains of Canaanite storage jars, vessels in all respects identical to those discovered in the magazines of the residency. A heap of grape pits, found piled against one of the residency’s outer walls, likewise attests to the local wine-making industry.672

Significantly, ancient wine presses were generally situated on the outskirts of a village, i.e., in close proximity to the vineyard itself.673 The fact that these two presses were located directly adjacent to Palace VI and inconveniently far from the fields suggests that viticulture in Nineteenth Dynasty Aphek may have been an imperial monopoly. The Egyptian taste for Syro-Palestinian wine is well evidenced and has been discussed previously. It is likely, then, that the imperial government, in addition to taking advantage of Aphek’s strategic location, also usurped the rights to the profits of a lucrative local industry.

Whether the occupants of Palace VI directly owned the vineyards is unknown. They may simply, like medieval lords, have owned the wine presses and charged for their use. Undoubtedly, however, the Egyptians profited from the viticulture, and any wine not directly exported to Egypt likely found buyers along the Via Maris or in the coastal ports.

Aside from Palace VI and its wine presses, very little else is known about LB IIB Aphek. The only other major excavation was of a wealthy burial crypt, which contained eight skeletons and some 64 burial offerings.674 The ethnicity of those interred in this isolated grave, however, is not certain. Egyptian-style grave goods were indeed present, but consisted only of a bronze mirror, several scarabs, and

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673 Kochavi 1990: xxiii.
a saucer bowl. The mirror could easily have been obtained by trade. Likewise, the scarabs were the sort of easily portable item discovered in numerous contemporary graves.\textsuperscript{675} With regard to the saucer bowl, a single example of Egyptian-style pottery communicates very little. It is not, therefore, terribly likely that this grave served as the final resting place for the occupants of Palace VI.

Like many of its coastal Canaanite contemporaries, Aphek suffered a violent destruction in the mid- to late Nineteenth Dynasty. Palace VI was entirely consumed by flame, transforming the building into a pile of charred debris several meters high. In the rubble—tellingly—excavators discovered arrowheads lodged in the southern façade of the building and embedded in the ground adjacent to it. This vivid evidence sets to rest any suspicions that the fire might have been accidental.\textsuperscript{676} As is usual, however, the authors of Aphek’s destruction are unknown.

Beck and Kochavi have very tentatively put forth the Sea People as the usual suspects,\textsuperscript{677} a suggestion that would make sense if these same pirates had razed Jaffa and then found their way up the Yarkon to strike again. While the culture built atop the ruins of Late Bronze Age Aphek is not demonstrably Aegean-influenced, an undeciphered script found at the site bears similarities to the writing systems known from Cyprus and Crete.\textsuperscript{678} Likewise, the only parallel to this IA IA culture is that constructed over the ashes of Late Bronze Age Tell Abu Hawam, another coastal town. It is perhaps significant, then, that Aphek would later became an important Philistine settlement.\textsuperscript{679}

\textit{Beth Shan}

Although Egypt and Beth Shan appear to have been in close contact as early as the reign of Thutmose III (see chapter three), it is only with the advent of the Nineteenth Dynasty that a full-fledged Egyptian occupation may be recognized in the archaeological record. Beth Shan’s location, opposite three major fords of the Jordan River, was extremely advantageous from a military point of view. Both the

\textsuperscript{675} Interestingly, the scarabs mounted on rings were apparently Hyksos period heirlooms!
\textsuperscript{677} Beck and Kochavi 1993: 68.
\textsuperscript{678} Kochavi 1981: 80–81.
Figure 44. Administrative headquarters at Aphek
(after Kochavi 1990: xiii)
strategic and economic interests of an imperial power would have been likewise piqued by Beth Shan’s position at the nexus of two major trade highways. One of these thoroughfares ran north-south along the western side of the Jordan, while the other, significantly, served as the only lowland caravan route linking Egypt and Mesopotamia.\textsuperscript{680}

The site had other charms as well. By the Late Bronze Age the mound of Beth Shan towered nearly 80 m above the height of the Jordan Valley. The Jalud and Asi rivers, flowing to the north and south of the mound respectively, added to the town’s defenses at the same time as they provided Beth Shan with irrigation and drinking water. The fertile fields surrounding the site could easily support a garrison town, and Beth Shan, in the words of a fourteenth century rabbi, was “a blessed, beautiful land, bearing fruit like the garden of god, a very entrance to paradise.”\textsuperscript{681}

Two stratigraphic levels at Beth Shan date to the Nineteenth Dynasty (i.e., the LB IIB period). These strata, the University of Pennsylvania’s VIII and VII, had originally been thought by Rowe to date to the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty and to the late Eighteenth Dynasty respectively.\textsuperscript{682} Albright subsequently restudied these strata, and James and McGovern republished them in great detail.\textsuperscript{683} Through the work of these scholars, Rowe’s original dates have been amended. Level VIII is now thought to date to the reign of Seti I and level VII to the long remainder of the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Given that Seti I is generally believed to have reigned for only 10 to 15 years, it is hardly surprising that the material assemblages of phases VIII and VII are virtually indistinguishable.\textsuperscript{684} The two strata are likewise similar in that level VII appears to be largely a rebuilding of level VIII, the architecture of which it partially obscures.\textsuperscript{685} Despite the close ties between these two strata, however, the extensive

\textsuperscript{681} Esthori ben Moshe hap-Parchi, quoted in Rowe 1930: 3–4.  
\textsuperscript{682} Rowe 1930; 1940. Excavations at the site were conducted by University of Pennsylvania from 1921 to 1933. In 1983 Yadin and Geva conducted a short season for the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, and A. Mazar excavated from 1989 to 1996 for the same institution.  
\textsuperscript{683} Albright 1938b: 77; James and McGovern 1993.  
\textsuperscript{684} James and McGovern 1993: 4, 70.  
documentation that exists for each makes it worthwhile to discuss
the two separately.

**Beth Shan level VIII** (see figure 45)
Beth Shan appears no fewer than five times in the topographical
lists of Seti I: twice in the Karnak lists, on two sphinxes at the
Qurneh temple, and once at Abydos.\(^{686}\) The town is invariably asso-
ciated in the lists with the toponyms of Pella (\(p\beta\rho\)) and Yenoam (\(\gamma\nu\nu\mu\)).
The site of Hamath (\(\lambda\mu\eta\mu\)), likewise, joins this grouping two or possi-
ble three times.\(^{687}\) The appearance of all four sites in Seti’s lists is
almost certainly connected with the well-known rebellion in the
Transjordan, which took place in Seti’s first regnal year. The salient
events are narrated on a monumental stele found out of its original
context in level V at Beth Shan.\(^{688}\) As the content of the stele is dis-
cussed in the historical section above, it will suffice here to note that
the Egyptians evidently recaptured Beth Shan after it had suffered
an attack by the leader of Hamath and his allies.

Recent excavations by the Hebrew University project at Beth Shan
have uncovered evidence of a “fierce destruction” in a limited area.
Although Mazar attributes this layer to civil unrest at the close of
the Eighteenth Dynasty,\(^{689}\) there is no reason why the events nar-
rated on the First Beth Shan stele could not likewise have been to
blame. The destruction, such as it was, however, must have been
quite localized in scope. In all their years of excavation at Beth Shan,
the University of Pennsylvania team failed to recognize any equiva-
 lent stratum intervening between their levels IX and VIII. Leaving
aside, then, for the moment, the particular manner in which level IX
met its end, it is certainly significant that level VIII was designed
according to a radically different city plan than its predecessor. All
traces of the massive Canaanite temple complex that dominated most
of the tell in level IX were indeed completely eradicated in the sub-
sequent level.

As excavated, the rebuilt town of Beth Shan in level VIII con-
sisted of two major activity areas, cultic and domestic. The archi-

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\(^{686}\) Simons 1937: XVI: B1; KRI I, 32.
\(^{687}\) Hamath is present in the two Karnak lists, but its appearance in the Abydos
topographical list is questionable (see Kitchen 1993: 26).
\(^{689}\) A. Mazar 1997a: 69.
tecture of the religious zone to the west was unfortunately obscured to a great extent by the level VII temple. Based upon the scarcity of architectural traces in this area of level VIII, however, scholars have concluded that the two temples were almost certainly built along the same basic blueprint. Indeed, the only major difference in the layout of the two buildings appears to have been in the manner by which one accessed the altar room. In level VIII, a door situated between two columns provided entrance, whereas in level VII the altar could be reached by ascending a short staircase.

Detailed discussion of the temple’s architecture in levels VIII and VII will occur in the section pertaining to level VII, for the later version of the temple is much better known. The profundity of the change in sacred architecture at Beth Shan from level IX to level VIII, however, should be stressed from the start. In level IX, the temple area consisted of a 2,500 m², or larger, agglomeration of corridors, courtyards, and relatively small-scale shrines oriented in varying directions. By contrast, the temple of level VIII was a 14 × 14 m self-contained building, oriented basically north-south. In its entirety, it consisted of an entranceway, a columned hall, and an altar room. Three column bases and a miscellany of wall fragments bear witness to a slightly larger structure built to the north of the temple but along its same axis. On analogy with its equivalent in level VII, this northern building likely served as a temple storeroom or an annex of some sort.

Overall, in comparing the religious zones of level IX with those of level VIII, a dramatic reduction in scale is immediately apparent. Whereas the temple precinct of level IX dominated the excavated area almost entirely, level VIII’s temple precinct, including the mysterious building north of the temple proper, extended in all likelihood only 20 × 45 m—or roughly half of the excavated area. Hand in hand with the downsizing of the temple precinct came a

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692 Rowe 1930: 10–17.
693 James and McGovern 1993: 19, 237.
694 The excavated area is irregular but extends roughly 90 m at its widest (east-west) by 70 m at its longest (north-south).
695 The excavated area is again irregular and extends at its widest roughly 70 m east-west and 55 m north-south.
reduction in the number of sanctuaries. While the level VIII temple and possibly the northern building as well served as cultic centers, the previous temple contained at least six foci of worship.\(^{696}\)

Given this architectural shift, it is tempting to suggest that religion was significantly more homogenous and regulated in level VIII than it had been previously. Perhaps the most interesting indicator of political change between the two levels, however, is that a residential building, discussed below, equaled or exceeded the size of the level VIII temple! This suggests that the architects of the new Beth Shan designed their town with an eye toward accommodating the housing needs of earthly as well as heavenly powers.

In the area of the temple precinct, a large quantity of Egyptian-style votive offerings were in evidence including both prestige and nonprestige goods. The vast majority of these gifts were found under the altar in locus 1068, but numerous other loci also yielded Egyptian-style objects. Although both Egyptian-style and typically Canaanite votive goods were deposited in the temple, it was the former that predominated.

A clay duck head and seven ceramic cobra figurines, at least one of which possessed female breasts, are among the most intriguing of the nonprestige, Egyptian-style objects discovered in the level VIII temple precinct.\(^{697}\) Both of these artifact types are quite common at Beth Shan in level VII and appear in level VI as well. Although the cultic significance of the cobra figurines is not well understood, it is likely that they were intended to represent one of Egypt’s many cobra goddesses, such as Wadjet or Renenutet.\(^{698}\) The duck head, on the other hand, almost certainly had broken off of a temple offering bowl.\(^{699}\) Incidentally, both of these artifact types have also been found in contemporary levels at Haruba site A–289. Fragments of an entire duck bowl were likewise recovered at Aphek.\(^{700}\)

\(^{696}\) Rowe 1930: 10–14.

\(^{697}\) Both cobra figurines and clay duck heads are known from examples discovered at Deir el-Medina and el-Amarna. Clay duck heads have likewise been found at Gurab, Riqqeh, and Sedment. See James and McGovern 1993: 172–173 for discussions of these artifacts and a bibliography of their findspots.

\(^{698}\) See Broekhuis 1971 and Johnson 1990.


\(^{700}\) For the four duck heads found at Haruba site A–289, see Oren 1987: 96; Higginbotham 2000: 104. For the unspecified number of clay cobra figurines, see Oren 1980: 30–31; 1987: 96; 1993: 1390. The duck-shaped bowl found at Aphek is described in Beck and Kochavi 1985: 32.
Not surprisingly, the clay used to fashion the duck heads, the cobra figurines, and the Egyptian-style ceramic found in levels VIII–VI at Beth Shan was procured locally. Analysis of manufacturing techniques, however, demonstrated that the clay had been mixed with organics in a manner peculiar to Egyptian craftsmanship and alien to Canaanite tradition.701 Many other “special objects” such as certain female figurines, zoomorphic stands, model loaves (?), a clay cat haunch, and other sundry ceramic products are composed of the same highly organic temper and are thus presumed also to have been of Egyptian manufacture.703

Nude female figurines, whether Egyptian or Near Eastern in style, and snake motifs mingled in the votive repertoires of both the level IX and the level VIII temples,704 suggesting that some continuity in worship bridged the transition. This is important to note, considering the massive architectural restructuring of the temple precinct. The same proclivity toward snakes and naked ladies appears, indeed, to have continued long after the Egyptians abandoned Beth Shan in the twelfth century B.C.705

If the clay duck head had indeed broken off of an offering bowl, this bowl would then double the count of Egyptian-style pottery currently known from level VIII. A single beer bottle, found near the temple altar, is the only other contemporary Egyptian-style vessel.706 Due to the mass production of the beer bottle and its standardized size, it is tempting to view it—when found abroad—as part of the typical “mess kit” of an Egyptian soldier. The lone appearance of this particular vessel, however, taken together with its unabashedly

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702 In level VI at Beth Shan, Rowe (1940: 90) discovered two ceramic objects of similar size and of a roughly circular shape, which had been stamped with the word imnyt (“daily”). He determined these to be models of bread used as symbolic daily cultic offerings. Rowe also believed similar “cigar-shaped” clay objects found in the level IX temple to be model bread offerings. As these remain unpublished, however, his judgment cannot be evaluated. The “model loaves” of VIII may or may not be model loaves, but similar objects have been found at ‘Ain Dara in Syria and the New Kingdom fort of Semna (James and McGovern 1993: 188).
703 Glanzman and Fleming 1993: 95–98.
704 For the female figurines, see Rowe 1940: 68A, 1–7; James and McGovern 1993: fig. 77: 7. For the snake motif, see Rowe 1940: 70A, 5; James and McGovern 1993: 21, fig. 85: 5, 7.
705 James 1966: figs. 111–112, 115–116; Rowe 1940: pls. 57A–60A.
706 James and McGovern 1993: fig. 17, no. 20.
The cultic context, suggests that Holthoer’s explanation may in this case be preferable. According to Holthoer, Egyptian beer bottles were often employed in rituals proffering bread and beer to the souls of the departed. With the exception of 20 Mycenaean wares and 18 Cypriot imports, the remaining ceramic of level VIII was Canaanite in type.

Of all of the nonprestige, Egyptian-style goods found in level VIII, faience artifacts have by far the highest correlation to the temple precinct. Indeed faience objects were discovered over 21 times more frequently in the temple than elsewhere in the town. It should be noted, however, that these items were heavily weighted to one locus in particular—that of the temple altar. Faience artifacts found in this locus alone include: two jars, three goblets, hundreds of beads and pendants, two rings with wedjat-bezels, two without, a scarab, and a gaming piece. With the exception of the vessels, which were apparently imported from Egypt, the vast majority of the faience objects found at Beth Shan appear to have been produced locally, albeit according to traditionally Egyptian techniques. Although faience was assuredly as cheap a material to manufacture and to purchase in Canaan as it was in Egypt, this material’s purported resemblance to lapis lazuli and turquoise no doubt accounted for its popularity as a votive gift.

The distribution of Egyptian-style prestige goods in level VIII is just as dramatically weighted toward the cultic zone, and specifically again toward locus 1068. The domestic section of the town possessed only one such object—a serpentine vase of probable Egyptian manufacture. The Egyptian or Egyptian-style prestige items found in the vicinity of the altar meanwhile included pendants and scarabs of semiprecious stones, such as carnelian and amethyst. Curiously, the gold items were characteristically Canaanite in design. Of undis-
puted Egyptian origin, however, were an ivory gaming piece, an ostrich eggshell, and fragments of nine glass vessels. Considering the great care that must have been expended in transporting eggshell and glass to the Transjordan, these particular objects must have been precious indeed!

East of the temple precinct, in the domestic zone, archaeologists recovered the remains of four sizeable complexes. Of the partially excavated building to the northeast (loci 1318, 1320), very little can be stated. The plan is fragmentary, and no Egyptian-style artifacts were discovered in its vicinity. The large rectangular compound to the southeast (loci 1309, 1313–1314), however, was much better preserved. Judging from the span of its outer walls, the complex as a whole must have occupied an area of 12 by at least 20 m. Unfortunately, later construction activity had not been as kind to its interior walls, and all that remained visible for excavators was a hallway on its western side. Artifacts discovered within the compound included a serpentine vase (the domestic zone’s only Egyptian-style prestige item), a cobra figurine, part of a probable zoomorphic stand, Cypriot ceramic, an arrowhead, and a chariot terminal. This varied assemblage likely indicates that the units within the building were residential in nature and that they incorporated household shrines as well. Whether or not the arrowhead and chariot terminal betray military inhabitants, however, is unknowable.

The Egyptian-style center-hall house, located immediately across a well-defined street from the previous complex, is for our purposes the most intrinsically interesting of the domestic buildings in level VIII. While the western edge of the structure had been disturbed by level VII architecture, enough remained of the building’s overall plan for James and McGovern to reconstruct the house at 13 × 16 m in area. Given this plan, the central hall and its basalt pillar would have been located, appropriately, in almost the exact midpoint of the structure. Although much of the building was unfortunately

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715 On analogy with the corresponding wall in level VII, the VIII wall could have extended to 26 m long.
717 James and McGovern 1993: 46, 47. This is discounting rooms 1291 and 1306, which appear from the plan to have been slightly later additions.
destroyed, a basin and what appears to be a bath attest to its primarily domestic character.718

The relatively thin walls of this house distinguish it from contemporaneous residencies that also had been built on an Egyptian center-hall house model. Despite its thin walls, however, the Beth Shan house exceeded in size all other discrete buildings at the site, including the temple. Bearing this in mind, then, it seems highly probable that the highest political authority in the town would have resided within it. There is no guarantee, however, that this individual would have been Egyptian. Indeed, the dearth of patently Egyptian-style artifacts suggests that a Canaanite imperial functionary may have resided within.719 Egyptian officials of apparent Canaanite ethnicity are well known from the Amarna archive (see chapter four).

The only building still left to discuss in the domestic area of level VIII was almost certainly directly associated with the center-hall house. Located only a few meters to its northeast, the three-room structure (loci 1304–1305) looked as if it was meant to link up to the northern annex of the residence. Within the perimeter of this outbuilding, archaeologists discovered six basalt bowls and a lump of refuse glass, which might suggest that it functioned as a workshop. On the other hand, two of the rooms (1304 south and 1305) were lined with benches in the manner of local chapels, and the wall in 1304 north may have been porticoed.720 Its architecture and the finds of a cobra figurine and an anthropomorphic mask, therefore, could conceivably point to a more cultic usage for the structure.

Much of the material culture of the domestic zone has been touched upon above, so the discussion here will be brief. The primary salient feature of the assemblage is its notable lack of prestige

719 Fifteen “dumbbell shaped objects” found assembled together in an alcove (locus 1287) were presumed by Rowe (1940: 90) to be model bread loaves, and similar objects have been found in the New Kingdom fort at Semna (Dunham and Janssen 1960: 58). While this is not enough to declare the objects “Egyptian” in style, it is notable that the clay used to fashion the objects was unusually heavy in organic temper—as was typical of many of the Egyptian-style figurines and ceramic (James and McGovern 1993: 98, 188, fig. 118). Sharing the alcove with the mysterious dumbbell-shaped objects were a juglet, a faience mandrake pendant, three copper-base fragments, and five rings that may have been loom weights (James and McGovern 1993: 47).
720 James and McGovern 1993: 44.
goods and faience items in comparison with the material remains from the temple precinct. Egyptian-style ceramic items, such as a female figurine mold, a zoomorphic stand, numerous cobra figurines, and the “model loaves,” however, were as abundant as in the temple precinct or more so.721

To sum up briefly the evidence for Egyptian activity in level VIII, then, it appears that following his “liberation” of Beth Shan, Seti I redesigned the entire town. In place of the older temple precinct, he erected an Egyptian-style center-hall house and a similarly sized temple. This latter building, as will be discussed below, also possessed architectural correlates in Egypt. Although Egyptian pottery is very scarce in this level, numerous other nonprestige items—such as cobra figurines and faience amulets—attest to a small but substantial cadre of Egyptians who lived and worshiped alongside a larger Canaanite population at the very beginning of the Nineteenth Dynasty.

_Beth Shan level VII_ (see figure 46)

In the reign of Seti I, i.e., in level VIII, Egyptian authorities completely redesigned Beth Shan to suit their conception of an efficient garrison town. By contrast, the architectural work undertaken in level VII was significantly less intensive. City planners simply expanded and slightly modified the town’s overall design.

Based on ceramic and inscriptive evidence, level VII is now generally thought to span the nearly hundred-year period from the reign of Ramesses II to the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty.722 Rowe and Aharoni had each earlier argued that the beginning of level VII should be dated to the reign of Amenhotep III723 since the temple of this level is quite similar in style to some of the private chapels at Amarna. Additionally, items bearing the name of Amenhotep III had been discovered in deposits associated with the temple’s altar. It was Albright, however, who first pointed out the discrepancy between the assumed fourteenth century date and the ceramics associated with level VII. His chronological readjustments came to be accepted eventually even by Rowe himself.724

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721 James and McGovern 1993: 47.
723 Rowe 1930; 1940; Aharoni 1982: 121.
724 Albright 1938b: 76; Rowe 1955: 179.
Figure 45. Egyptian base at Beth Shan, Level VIII
(after James and McGovern 1993: 3, map 2)
Beth Shan appears in the Karnak list of Ramesses II (KRI II, 163: 14) in connection with the towns of Hamath and Yenoam. This list, however, appears to be largely a compilation of topographical lists composed by other pharaohs, including his father Seti I. Far more interesting is the appearance of Beth Shan in P. Anastasi I, 22: 7–23: 1, in which Beth Shan’s proximity to the town of Rehob, the pass to Megiddo, and the fords of the Jordan was highlighted. A stele dated to Ramesses II’s 18th year is also of interest, although it was unfortunately discovered reused in a secondary context (KRI II, 150: 10–151: 15). Almost entirely rhetorical in nature, this monument emphasizes Ramesses II’s dominion over foreign lands and peoples. Beth Shan is not mentioned, and no specific battle is referenced. It is notable, however, that Ramesses alludes to his intimate connection with the god Seth three times in the stele. Seth is the Egyptian god most closely tied to the Syro-Palestinian territories, and, as will be discussed below, the temple at Beth Shan may well have incorporated rituals associated with this god in its religious program.

In level VIII, the main temple at Beth Shan had been discernable only through the positioning of a very few architectural remnants and artifact clusters. The level VII building, however, was remarkably well preserved. Covering roughly 14 × 14 m in area, and oriented northeast-southwest, the temple consisted of an indirect entranceway, a two-columned hall with mud-brick benches lining the northern and western walls, and a slightly off-center naos. In addition to the mud-brick benches, remarkable features of the columned hall included a small altar located at the foot of the stairs to the naos, two binlike receptacles in the northwest and southwest corners of the room, and a similar fixture just to the west of the naos.

Like many of the buildings of presumed Egyptian manufacture in Canaan, the Beth Shan temple was built without stone foundations. This factor, however, has garnered far less scholarly attention than has its architectural style. The similarity in plan between this Beth Shan temple and several of the New Kingdom private chapels at Amarna and Deir el-Medina has been remarked upon by numerous scholars.

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scholars\(^{727}\) and thus will not be addressed in detail here. While a marked resemblance between the Beth Shan level VII temple and many New Kingdom private chapels is not in doubt, however, the direction of architectural influence yet remains a matter of contention.

Much current opinion argues that the Amarna private chapels were in fact based upon (so far undiscovered) Canaanite prototypes, as is evidenced by benches that “from the Early Bronze Age onwards . . . appeared sporadically in the domestic dwelling.”\(^ {728}\) There is, however, plenty of evidence to view the main features of this architectural type as indigenous to Egypt. Buildings exhibiting a combination of traits such as a tripartite structure, one or more rooms lined with mud-brick benches, pairs of columns, bin-like receptacles, an occasionally off-center axis, and/or a stairway leading to an altar in Egypt not only predate the Canaanite examples, but they are also far more numerous.\(^ {729}\) By contrast, virtually the only other Canaanite “Temple with Raised Holy-of-Holies”\(^ {730}\) is at Lachish, a site that by the LB II B period was already culturally and politically tied to Egypt.

In support of her contention that the temple at Beth Shan had been influenced solely by Canaanite prototypes, Bomann poses this question: “Why would the Egyptians, when building the level VII temple, have planned their building after some chapels from a remote workmen’s village such as Amarna, which incidentally by the reign of Seti I had become uninhabited?”\(^ {731}\) What Bomann fails to consider, however, is that the architecture of Beth Shan’s temple was still all the rage in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, as is evidenced by the Deir el-Medina chapels and by the Hathor temple at the Egyptian-run mining site of Timna. Thus, it is not unlikely that Egyptian architects working abroad would have been influenced both by the community ritual structures currently popular in Egypt.


\(^{728}\) See the plans of the chapels at Amarna and Deir el-Medina illustrated in Bomann 1991.

\(^{729}\) A. Mazar (1992b: 173–177) gives this title to the architecture under discussion.

Religious activity at Beth Shan seems to have occurred in the general environs of the temple as well as inside of it. Just to the north of the temple, although still within its broader precinct, animals seem to have been offered as burnt sacrifices at an outdoor altar. It is safe to assume, judging by the fact that the faunal remains from the earlier level were entirely unburnt, that this was a cultic innovation of level VII.732 Finally, toward the close of the level VII period—James and McGovern’s “late level VII”—storerooms were constructed to the north of the outdoor altar.

All three of the examples of nonroyal Egyptian inscriptions found at Beth Shan during level VII come from the temple proper or from its immediate surrounding area. The most intriguing is actually illegible, having been painted on a small limestone stele.733 This monument, discovered leaning up against the southwest receptacle in the columned hall, depicts a small woman lifting a lotus to the nose of a goddess. Dressed in a long gown, the goddess grasps in her hands an ankh sign and a lotus-topped scepter. Surmounting her head is a horned atef crown, from which a long streamer unfurled down her back. While the names of the goddess and her female devotee unfortunately did not survive, it is not unlikely that the goddess is to be equated with the Egyptian-style nude goddess who is depicted grasping a was-scepter on a gold pendant from level IX.734 Indeed, one might even suggest that the Egyptian-style and Near Eastern–style female figurines present in nearly all levels at Beth Shan were votives of her cult as well.

If some degree of continuity in worship through time may be assumed, a stele found out of context in level V likely sheds some light on the identity of the mysterious goddess.735 The stele depicts a man with the Egyptian name of Hesnakht raising his hands in worship to a goddess. This deity is in all respects identical to the goddess in the level VII stele except for the fact that she grasps a

733 Rowe 1940: pl. 49A, 1.
734 Rowe 1940: pl. 68A, 5.
735 Rowe 1930: pl. 50. The date of the stele is unknown, though it resembles others of Nineteenth or Twentieth Dynasty manufacture.
was-scepter instead of a lotus-topped scepter. A title written in hieroglyphs before the deity reads: “Anat, the queen of heaven, the mistress of all the gods.” At the bottom of the stele a typical offering formula appears: “An offering-which-the-king-gives to Anat, that she may give all l.p.h. to the ka of Hesinakht.”

Given the similarity in attributes between the female goddesses represented on the two steles, the pendant, and the figurines, it appears likely that they represent the same divinity. Whether the htp-di-nsw formula implies a royal sponsorship for the cult of Anat at Beth Shan is uncertain. As discussed above, Ostraca Michaelides 85 makes it quite clear that the cult of Anat at Gaza was officially sponsored in the Nineteenth Dynasty and that the goddess received both general “offerings” and private votive gifts from Egyptian officers stationed abroad. Indeed, it has been suggested above that the specific appeal of this cult for Egyptian authorities stemmed from the fact that Anat was one of the very few goddesses at home in both the Egyptian and the Canaanite pantheons. Thus, it may have been felt that if any cult could bind diverse worshipers together, it would be hers.

The second piece of inscriptional evidence from level VII at Beth Shan had been scratched into the slip of a storage jar. The jar itself, discovered in the entranceway to the temple proper, may have been Egyptian in style. There is no way to confirm this, however, as the excavators discarded the sherd in the field after it was drawn. As recorded, the inscription consisted of two hieroglyphic signs: a cobra and a pair of ka-arms. Generally, pot-marks are thought to designate the workshop of origin, the contents of the pot, the destination of the pot, or the name of someone associated with the pot. In this case, given the findspot and the presence of the ka-sign, which symbolized an aspect of the Egyptian personality or soul, it seems likely that the pot-mark specified information regarding the eventual cultic destination of the pot. As has been seen from the stelae erected by Pareemheb, [Amenem]opet, and Hesinakht, the private monuments dedicated at Beth Shan typically expressed funerary wishes for the safety and comfort of the deceased’s ka. It may be presumed, then, that among other gifts bestowed by the deities at Beth Shan was eternal care for the kas of their followers.

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736 Rowe 1930: 33.
737 James and McGovern 1993b: pl. 11.4.
Deities, like humans, were believed to have kas, and so the pot-mark may well have read “the ka of the cobra god(ess).” If so, this deity must also have inspired the numerous votive cobra figurines and pendants found at Beth Shan from level VIII on. Further, given that clearly recognizable breasts are found on a few of the local cobra figurines, it is tempting to assign the votives as a group to the cult of a goddess—perhaps to that of Wadjet or even more likely Renenutet, the agricultural goddess so beloved at Deir el-Medina. It is also possible, however, that at Beth Shan the female cobra was viewed as yet another manifestation of Anat. Whatever the name of the goddess, however, it is not unlikely that she received offerings for her ka within the temple at Beth Shan.

The final inscription was written upon a probable storage jar sherd, discovered just on the border between the northern adjunct temple area and the “commandant’s house.” The hieratic inscription is enigmatic, reading simply, “The fiend in the house of the ruddy beings.” It has been pointed out, however, that the god Seth is described as “red-haired and ruddy complexioned” and is called a “ruddy being” in the Theban Book of the Dead chapter 182. “Ruddy beings” or “red fiends” are likewise Sethian affiliates in chapters 42 and 96. In Chapter 141 a being called “him who dwells in the mansion of the red ones” is mentioned in an ominous context. Given the obviously dangerous nature and liminal context of ruddy beings, Rowe suggested that the Beth Shan inscription had been written on a jar that had been subsequently smashed as part of a magical execration rite against demons.

It is quite possible, however, that the “house of the ruddy beings” might have borne some relation to the level VII temple. As the god

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738 See James and McGovern 1993b: figs. 83.3–4; 85.2.
739 The ivory Hathor clapper used in temple ritual and found in the same columned hall as the Anat stele may possibly indicate that the Egyptians identified Anat with Hathor (James and McGovern 1993b: 105.1). The cobra could, however, also be utilized more generically as a determinative for any female goddess (see Gardiner’s signs I 12–13).
740 James and McGovern 1993b: fig. 15.6.
742 Pap. MMA 35.9.21, col. 29/9–10; Ritner 1993: 147.
744 Rowe 1929: 58; for related rites, see Ritner 1993: 144–153. The act of execration and the Sethian color red are closely associated.
of foreigners and chaotic beings everywhere, Seth often became identified with various foreign deities.\textsuperscript{745} It is quite possible, then, that the Egyptians amalgamated the worship of the paramount male god of Beth Shan—perhaps still Mekal of level IX—with aspects of the cult of the god Seth. Indeed, possible Sethian votives discovered in the temple at various points in its history include the physical remains of asses, a zoomorphic stand in the shape of a pig, and a red ceramic model of a hippopotamus.\textsuperscript{746} Further, one could speculate that it was precisely the intimate connection between Seth and Beth Shan’s city god that led Ramesses II to stress emphatically his close association with Seth in the stele that he erected at this town. In this context it is also perhaps of importance to note that the goddess Anat was one of Seth’s consorts in the Egyptian pantheon.

Egyptian-style ceramic at Beth Shan was far more plentiful in level VII than in any other level, and this is in a good part due to the 48 bowls recovered from the temple and its precinct.\textsuperscript{747} Indeed, only six Egyptian-style bowls were found outside the temple loci, five in the domestic zone and one in the newly built administrative section. Of the temple area bowls, 34 were saucer bowls, and the majority of these came from the later level VII storerooms.\textsuperscript{748} As in level VIII, some of the saucer bowls appear to have been decorated with ceramic duck heads. Sixteen such duck heads were found in the level VII temple zone, while only one each hailed from the domestic and administrative areas.\textsuperscript{749} The distribution across activity zones of the most popular form of Egyptian-style ceramic at Beth Shan, the bowl, implies that resident Egyptians were most insistent upon utilizing their own native types of ceramic in cult—rather than everyday—contexts. Imported pottery from Mycenae and Cyprus, on the other hand, was divided more evenly among the three areas of the town.

\textsuperscript{745} See most pointedly the witness clause in the treaty between Ramesses II and Hattusili III. In the Egyptian text, a great majority of the Syro-Palestinian gods are given the generic name Seth (Langdon and Gardiner 1920: 194).

\textsuperscript{746} Rowe 1940: pl. 21.13. The snout of a ceramic hippopotamus was found in level IX as well (Rowe 1928: 149). For the ass bones, see Rowe 1930: 18 as well as the numerous equid teeth listed in the registers of levels VIII and VII.

\textsuperscript{747} See loci 1068, 1072, 1089, 1105 south of 1213 and 1213, 1220, and 1374.

\textsuperscript{748} James and McGovern (1993: 98–99) refer to these saucer bowls by the term "splayed-rim bowls."

\textsuperscript{749} This statistic and others used in this summary to refer to the distribution of various artifacts was gathered from the registration of finds in James and McGovern (1993: 1–67).
Two examples of the New Kingdom “drop-pot” or “wine decanter,” an Egyptian ceramic type not represented elsewhere at Beth Shan, were found in the temple zone along with a beer bottle, a flowerpot, and a cup with a perforated bottom. Given that the beer bottle and flowerpot were discovered in the temple entrance hall and courtyard respectively, it is possible that they had been utilized together in an Egyptian funerary ritual. If so, the beer bottle and the flowerpot would have symbolized an offering of beer and bread respectively.

Aside from Egyptian-style female figurines, all three examples of which clustered in the temple area and may have been connected with the worship of Anat, the category of nonprestige items most typically found in the sacred zone consisted again of faience objects. These included vessels (mostly lotus-form goblets and simple bowls that were often decorated with water scenes), pendants, jewelry (generally bracelets, anklets, and nonroyal rings), and miscellaneous objects. As in level VIII, testing suggests that all were manufactured locally with the exception of the faience vessels, which may perhaps more accurately be viewed as prestige items.

When the faience objects are broken down into subcategories, it is found that the pendants or amulets are the most dramatically associated with the temple precinct. Of these, some 286 were found in the temple area, as opposed to 10 in the domestic zone and only 5 in the administrative area. Locus 1068, the holy-of-holes, accounted for 264 of the total number, and it is possible that some, if not all, were part of an elaborate necklace used to adorn a cult statue. McGovern, who in 1985 published an intensive study of Late Bronze Age pendants found in Canaan, asserts that the pendants recovered from levels VIII and VII at Beth Shan account for 45% of his total corpus. McGovern also found that of the Beth Shan pendants, 42 types were Egyptian in style, whereas only 6 were typically Canaanite. Significantly, the Canaanite examples were usually composed of materials other than faience.

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750 Near Eastern-style female figurines also clustered most heavily in the temple, where six examples were found (loci 1073, 1085, 1089, 1219, and 1374). Four Near Eastern-style female figurines were also excavated in the domestic zone (loci 1249, 1263, 1284, and south of 1244), however, and one appeared in the courtyard north of the “commandant’s house” (locus 1375).


One of the most surprising results of McGovern’s study is that the assemblages of Egyptian-style pendants in Canaan generally clustered into a northern and a southern grouping. At Beth Shan, the assemblage fit into the category typical of the northern Canaanite coast and the Jezreel Valley. McGovern concludes that the differences in the northern and southern assemblages could be due to the preferences of either the local Canaanites or, more likely, the resident Egyptians. A third possibility, however, is that the pendants were manufactured in two distinct areas—perhaps at Beth Shan and at Deir el-Balah, two sites at which we know local faience industries to have been in place. The differences would then reflect the repertoire of each workshop and its distributional sphere.

Following the trend already noted in level VIII, all of the prestige goods clustered in the temple precinct with the exception of calcite components of weapons and a copper Hathor-head that may perhaps originally have adorned a standard. The rings, plaques and scarabs bearing royal names were found exclusively in the immediate temple area, supporting the idea of pharaonic patronage for the institution. Non-royal scarabs, however, were no longer closely confined to the temple area. Only seven were found in the temple precinct as opposed to thirteen in the domestic zone and three in the administrative precincts. In addition, whereas scarabs were outnumbered by Near Eastern cylinder or stamp seals by a ratio of 3:1 in level VIII, in level VII scarabs exceeded their Near Eastern counterparts by three specimens. Just as telling, the cylinder and stamp seals still clustered almost exclusively in the temple area.

With regard to the domestic section of Beth Shan in level VII, very little is recorded. Architecturally, the zone seems to have adhered in the main to the model laid out in level VIII. Once again there are four major sections of the excavated area and two prominent streets: one running northeast-southwest and the other heading northwest-southeast. The center-hall house in the southwestern quadrant

753 These types of pendants include the baboon of Thoth, Bes, the uraeus, the Horus child or Ptah, the standing figure, the ram’s head, the owl [?], the cat [?], the date fruit, and the hieroglyphs ‘nh, dd, hh, wdt, itt, and hst (James and McGovern 1993a: 129).
754 James and McGovern 1993a: 129.
755 These included three Egyptian-style alabaster tazza cups and an Egyptianizing basalt model throne (loci 1087, 1089, 1068).
possesses the most coherent plan of all. Although it was built in the same general position as the level VIII center-hall house and along a similar plan (i.e., a small central hall surrounded by rooms on all sides), its dimensions had shrunk to roughly $12 \times 10$ m. It is highly probable that this marked reduction in size was due to the fact that the town’s most important official now presumably resided in the newly constructed “commandant’s house” located in the administrative section of the level VII town.

The center-hall house contained goods of a predominantly domestic nature. Egyptian-style pottery in and immediately adjacent to the residence included two spinning bowls and a lamp.\textsuperscript{756} Spinning bowls have been studied in detail by T. Dothan and are known to be diagnostically Egyptian in style.\textsuperscript{757} Their presence may, like the level VII stele of the female worshiper before Anat, give us our first indications of Egyptian women in residence at Beth Shan. This is important for it implies a more permanent presence for the administration and/or troops at Beth Shan than had been in evidence before. Other Egyptian-style artifacts from the house included a razor, three imported faience vessels, two faience pendants, a female figurine, a cobra figurine, and four scarabs. The house and its immediate environs also contained three arrowheads, one dagger, and a probable chariot yolk saddle boss. It is tempting to interpret these last items as implying that the inhabitant of the house was somehow involved in the military administration of the site.

To the east of the center-hall house lay an enclosed area (loci 1253–4, 1270–3), which had proven equally enigmatic in level VIII. Unfortunately, the compound went unexcavated with the exception of portions of the small westernmost rooms. Once again, however, it is tempting to view this enclosed area as a barracks for troops or as a housing complex. The latter hypothesis is made more appealing by the presence of three spinning bowls in this area, perhaps indicating three separate households, three separate Egyptian females, or—at the very least—perhaps only one Egyptian female with a taste for variety. Although the amount of spinning bowls could, perhaps, imply a workshop area, the architecture appears too confined for

\textsuperscript{756} While the lamp itself is not specifically Egyptian in style, it was found to contain a large amount of organic temper and to be most similar in fabric to the Egyptian-style bowls (James and McGovern 1993a: 101).

\textsuperscript{757} T. Dothan 1963.
this, and the presence of a pestle and grinder, a mortar, and a spindle-whorl corroborates the primarily domestic nature of the quarter.

The only other Egyptian-style ceramic excavated in the area was a globular jar. Otherwise the quarter contained three scarabs, one cylinder seal, an alabaster chariot boss, and the copper-based Hathor standard. The complete lack of the familiar assortment of nonprestige items (cobra or female figurines, faience items, etc.) is notable and unexpected if the area was indeed residential.

In the northeast quadrant of the domestic zone stood a building (loci 1275–9) with outer walls of almost 2 m in width, uncharacteristically thick for this quarter. Both the architecture and the material culture suggest that the area was perhaps nonresidential in nature. No Egyptian-style pottery was found here, and the only items of Egyptian type were a lunate blade and a faience plaque inscribed with the saying “Amun-re is [my] lord.” Local artifacts included storage jars, an axe, a flint blade, and two alabaster vessels—objects not inconsistent with what one might expect to find in a workshop.

The last component of the domestic quarter was a complex of rather amorphous courtyards and small rooms to the northwest (loci 1252, 1257, 1260–4, 1266, 1267–1268). Some of these chambers, especially the unit of 1260-2, lay within particularly easy access of the northern temple area and may in fact have been associated with it. It is perhaps significant, then, that the majority of the Egyptian-style pottery from this quadrant came from the three loci nearest the temple. From locus 1262—the passageway leading from the temple area into the courtyard space—came a Bes vase, a bowl similar to those known from cultic contexts, and a storage jar. A double pilgrim jar, decidedly undomestic in nature, was excavated in locus 1261, and in 1260 archaeologists discovered a duck head of the type that commonly decorated votive saucer bowls. The only other piece of Egyptian pottery from this quadrant is a flowerpot, a type otherwise only evidenced in the temple area.

Much of the rest of the northwestern building’s artifact assemblage also exhibited cultic affinities. Notable artifacts included nine cobra figurines, two zoomorphic stands, four faience vessels, and three faience pendants. A kohl stick and three scarabs rounded out the Egyptian-style remains except for a forked spear butt of a type otherwise unattested before the twelfth century B.C.\textsuperscript{758} Other weapons

\textsuperscript{758} T. Dothan 1976: 31.
also found in the northwestern complex, although not specifically Egyptian in type, include three arrowheads, an armor scale, and an axe.

Given the varied assemblage of this quadrant, it is likely that the compound can be divided into three major sections. As mentioned above, unit 1260-2 may have been associated with the temple precinct. Judging from their orientation, rooms 1257 and 1252 perhaps functioned as storerooms for the center-hall house. And, lastly, the unit consisting of chambers 1264 and 1266 could have served as additional storage units for pottery, some cultic-style remains, and a good deal of miscellaneous basalt, limestone, and copper-base material.

In level VII as well as level VIII, the town possessed observable “religious” and “domestic” areas. In level VII, however, an “administrative” zone was newly constructed. This area consisted of the “commandant’s house” and its associated courtyard, the so-called fort and its adjacent support rooms, and a “massive” building first excavated by Amhai Mazar’s Hebrew University team. With the exception of the last mentioned, these buildings were all located at the far west of the mound area.759

The “commandant’s house,” so christened by Rowe,760 was a 12 × 12 m building constructed of mud-brick and erected upon basalt foundations. With exterior walls of almost 2 m thick, the building probably originally had a second story, but nothing is known of the function of the upper rooms. The ground floor, however, consisted of three rooms and a corridor or stairway.761

The absence of any particularly large or otherwise impressive audience rooms, when taken in tandem with the presence of a toilet in room 1373 and a bed niche in room 1372,762 suggests a primarily residential function for the building. An associated outdoor cooking area, marked by a clay oven filled with ashes just to the north of the building, only furthers this impression.763 Egyptian-style artifacts discovered in the house include two bowls, two faience vessels, one calcite macehead, one “model loaf,” and two scarabs.

759 James and McGovern 1993: 54.
761 For the opinion that it was a corridor, see James and McGovern 1993: 54. For the opinion that it was a stairway, see Fitzgerald 1932: 142–145; Higginbotham 2000: 270.
762 James and McGovern 1993: 54.
Rowe, Weinstein, and James and McGovern all identify the “commandant’s house” as an Egyptian-style building. Weinstein, followed by James and McGovern, also compares the structure to Egyptian-style buildings found at Aphek, Tel Mor, Stratum IX at Tel Sera, and perhaps Palace IV at Tell el-Ajjul. Higginbotham, while acknowledging the resemblance of the “commandant’s house” to an Egyptian three-room house, denies that the building is Egyptian in character. She argues that a three-room house is not the type that an elite official would be expected to live in, that the toilet area takes up too large a space for a typical Egyptian house, and that the foundations of the building were stone and not brick.

While the first two of Higginbotham’s caveats are legitimate, it should be noted that the typical Canaanite residency or administrative building resembled the commandant’s house even less. Contemporary buildings of this nature in Canaan were almost uniformly constructed around a large outdoor courtyard. Further, indoor toilets, especially of the type represented in the commandant’s house, have parallels in Egypt, but not in Canaan. Finally, with regard to the “un-Egyptian” stone foundations, it should be remembered that the entirety of the contemporaneous workmen’s village at Deir el-Medina was built utilizing stone foundations! Likewise, the residence of Ramesses-user-khepesh in level VI at Beth Shan—while undeniably Egyptian in architectural and material character—was also constructed with basalt foundations.

Directly south of the “commandant’s house”, and apparently constructed as a unit with it, was a thick-walled bastioned building. Although the southwestern portion of the structure had been largely eroded due to the steep slope of the tell, the building would have possessed maximum dimensions of 17 × 15 m. Not only are the dimensions of this building the most impressive of any contemporaneous building at Beth Shan, but its walls were also among the thickest (some 2.5 m in width) and its bricks the largest (110 × 50 × 20 cm). Indeed, given the size of the walls, the building almost certainly had at least two stories.

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766 Peet and Woolley 1923: 18, 31.
767 James and McGovern 1993: 56.
Although this building has been designated as a fort or migdol,\textsuperscript{768} it may perhaps more accurately be described as a forti
died store-
house or residency, like those discovered at Deir el-Balah, Tel Mor, or Aphek. As with these buildings, the “fort” at Beth Shan was rel-
atively modest in size and arranged, at least on the bottom floor, into numerous discrete compartments. Given the town’s strategic positioning, it is not unlikely that the building originally stored trade goods or tax revenue. This is not to say, however, that the great height and thick walls of the building would not have come in handy were the garrison to have found itself under attack.

The largely domestic character of the artifacts found within the “fort” may suggest that, as at Aphek, the upper stories of the store-
house were residential. The Egyptian-style artifact assemblage of the building included a spinning bowl and two Egyptian saucer bowls amidst a good many native Canaanite jugs, bowls, and storage jars. Excavators likewise discovered three “model loaves,” which comple-
mented the loaf found in the commandant’s house and the three excavated in the rooms just east of the “fort.” Elsewhere in level VII at Beth Shan only one “model loaf” was found, this deposited in the inner sanctum of the temple. The distribution of these “loaves”—discovered 7:1 in the administrative zone—suggests that they may actually have served a primarily administrative purpose. One could imagine, for instance, that they symbolically represented goods paid in or dispersed out of the storehouse. If such were indeed the case, it might then follow that—as symbols of goods—the “loaves” may themselves have been deemed a fit votive offering in the temple proper.\textsuperscript{769} Such an explanation is, however, highly speculative.

The rooms that separated the “fort” from the temple precinct might have served as storerooms for either institution. Certain items found in the rooms, however, appear to correlate more strongly with the artifact assemblage typical of the administrative rather than the temple zone. Such Egyptian-style items include a calcite macehead (also found in the “commandant’s house”), model loaves (also found


\textsuperscript{769} Along these lines, it is interesting to note that in level VIII the “loaves” were discovered in the center-hall house and in the temple. Also, it is perhaps significant that in both levels the objects were fabricated in a typically Egyptian manner. For a Middle Kingdom parallel, see perhaps the soldiers’ bread-ration tokens discussed and pictured in Kemp 1991: 125, fig. 44.
in the “commandant’s house” and the “fort”), and a spinning bowl (also found in the “fort”). Although not demonstrably Egyptian, a bull figurine from locus 1365 is a type known otherwise only from the “fort” and the courtyard area just west of the “commandant’s house.” The exact function of these rooms, however, is uncertain.

The circular silo, which was located in the courtyard shared by the “commandant’s house” and the “fort,” is one of two granaries discovered in level VII at Beth Shan. At 4.6 m in diameter, it had an estimated carrying capacity of roughly 40 cubic meters of grain,770 which would equate to some 526 khar measures of emmer. Judging from Egyptian records, such a store of grain could have fed roughly 11 families or 44 unmarried men annually.771

Just what the exact population of Beth Shan amounted to during the late New Kingdom is far from certain. James and McGovern772 assumed a 5 hectare area of dwellings (including the “fort” and the “commandant’s house”). Then, employing Shiloh’s773 figure of 400 inhabitants per hectare, they arrived at an estimated population of roughly 2,000 individuals. Based on the percentage of Canaanite to Egyptian ceramic, they further assumed that roughly 500 of the inhabitants of Beth Shan were Egyptian nationals. James and McGovern admitted, however, that they may have underestimated the number of Egyptians, given that in their daily life many, if not most, of the Egyptians would presumably have utilized local wares. The heavy bias toward Egyptian ware in temple rather than strictly domestic contexts may lend credence to this supposition.

Mazar, in his survey and resumed excavations at Beth Shan, came up with a much more modest—and perhaps more realistic—figure for the town’s population. He concluded that during the period of Egyptian domination, the inhabited area of Beth Shan did not exceed 1.2 hectares. Bearing in mind that significant portions of the site were given over to religious, administrative, industrial, and storage purposes, he felt that the population dwelling on the tell likely comprised somewhere in the neighborhood of 350 individuals total. Mazar concludes, “there was no significant Canaanite settlement at the site during this period. Beth Shan served only as the headquarters of

770 James and McGovern 1993: 60.
773 Shiloh 1980.
the Egyptian officials and the soldiers serving in the Egyptian garrison.\(^{774}\) While it seems unlikely that Beth Shan’s population did not include at least a modest number of Canaanite service staff and soldiers, the picture that Mazar draws may be substantially correct. Certainly, it seems to have been a favorite pattern of the Egyptians to completely take over for themselves small, strategically important towns.

The other grain repository discovered in level VII at Beth Shan, significantly, was also associated with a state-controlled building. North of the temple precinct, in an area that would be wholly devoted to administrative buildings in the Twentieth Dynasty, Mazar discovered a “massive” building. Described as the sturdiest building yet found at Beth Shan, this structure possessed walls that in some cases exceeded 2.5 m in width.\(^{775}\)

Although only the basement of this building was preserved, it proved extremely interesting. Not only did Mazar discover a 2 m\(^2\) grain bin, but he also excavated a mud-brick bench with upper and lower grinding stones resting upon it. Nearby lay a substantial scatter of charred grain and Egyptian-style storage jars. While these finds attest to the structure’s function as a processing area and as a repository for cereal, the lack of ovens is puzzling. One must assume either that state-sponsored bakeries and breweries were located elsewhere or that the grain was distributed in khar form as payment to individuals, who transformed the rations into proper sustenance in their own households.\(^{776}\)

A final note of importance regarding this great grain-related building is that Mazar found evidence that it was destroyed in a fierce fire.\(^{777}\) The only other signs of level VII ending in a conflagration stemmed from a brief excavation in the 1980s in the southeastern quarter of the town.\(^{778}\) It is unclear, then, whether the failure of the University of Pennsylvania team to discover a comparable layer is a commentary on their methods of excavation or on the highly localized nature of the burning episodes.

\(^{774}\) A. Mazar 1997a: 67.
\(^{775}\) A. Mazar 1997a: 69.
\(^{776}\) This building is not yet published in any detail.
\(^{777}\) A. Mazar 1997a: 69.
\(^{778}\) Yadin and Geva 1986: 189.
The elaborate town planning of levels VIII and VII, the probable presence of Egyptian women at the site, and the great variety of Egyptian-style goods all suggest that the Egyptian government invested heavily in Beth Shan to make it a comfortable and familiar place for Egyptians to live. Their efforts may also have transformed the town into an acceptable place for Egyptians to be buried. Two tombs containing Egyptian artifacts in the Beth Shan cemetery (nos. 60 and 241) can be dated entirely to the Late Bronze II period, while several others (nos. 90, 107, 221, and 219) included multiple burials spanning the Late Bronze II period to the Early Iron Age. Due to the general state of confusion in identifying burials from different periods, however, these latter tombs will be discussed together with the early Iron Age material in chapter six. Oren, the scholar responsible for publishing Beth Shan’s cemetery assemblage, believes it likely that the main cemetery in use for the Late Bronze Age at Beth Shan has yet to be found.779

The Egyptian-style funerary goods interred with the five burials in tomb 241 included an Egyptian-style pyxis vase (the only example of its kind at Beth Shan), a carnelian pendant (otherwise found only in the religious zone), a scarab, and a shabti. The shabti had originally been placed inside one of the five anthropoid clay coffins also found in the tomb. Although the lids of only three of the coffins survived, all three exhibited the same naturalistic, Egyptian-style features displayed on the Deir el-Balah and Tell el-Far‘ah coffins. Tomb 60 also contained an anthropoid clay coffin with a naturalistic, Egyptian-style lid. Whether the individuals buried within these coffins were indeed ethnically Egyptian will never be known. Due to the disturbed nature of the evidence and the early date of excavation, the skeletal material was discarded without analysis. It is thus impossible to determine even such basic facts as what sex the individuals were and whether they died of natural causes.

The Egyptian tradition of burial in anthropomorphic clay coffins and the appearance of these coffins in Late Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Canaan has been extensively discussed in scholarly literature,780 and it has been addressed above with regard to the ceme-

779 Oren 1973: 68.
The presence of Egyptian funerary remains in the Late Bronze IIB period is to be expected, considering the strongly Egyptian flavor of Beth Shan as a whole. Egyptian architecture and artifact styles permeate the religious, administrative, and domestic areas of the site. Beth Shan, it seems, was intensively occupied by Egyptians who raised families, worshiped their own and local gods, made crafts utilizing Egyptian technology and aesthetics, and finally buried their dead according to the tenants of their religion. Moreover, such an investment in one site on the part of the Egyptian government and the Egyptian population itself marks a distinct break from the practices of earlier times in which the facilities of vassals would be co-opted and maintained on what appears to have been largely an ad hoc basis.

**Overview of Egyptian Interactions with Libya**

*Historical summary*

Prior to the Nineteenth Dynasty, Egypt’s interaction with the seminomadic populations west of the Nile Valley seems to have been limited to periodic scuffles and to trading ventures.\(^781\) In the early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, as before, the Egyptians referred to these people somewhat generically as natives of Tjemhu (\(\text{\textit{tmhw}}\)) or Tjehenu (\(\text{\textit{thmew}}\))\(^782\) and inserted them into the occasional presentation

\(^781\) See Spalinger 1979 and Osing 1980a for succinct overviews of Egypt’s relations with Libyans prior to the New Kingdom.

\(^782\) By the New Kingdom the original distinction between these two terms had been lost. Some Tjehenu territory still directly bordered the Egyptian Delta, but
Figure 46. Egyptian base at Beth Shan, Level VII
(after James and McGovern 1993: 2, map 1)
scene or rhetorical statement of sovereignty. Relations may have deteriorated, however, in the late Eighteenth Dynasty.

While no records of military confrontation survive from the late Eighteenth Dynasty, there are a few hints that all was not entirely peaceful. A painted papyrus found at el-Amarna, for example, depicts an Egyptian soldier in the act of slaying a Libyan. Tjehenu-Libyans, “seized” (ι) by Amenhotep III, labored on the construction of his mortuary temple at Thebes. Likewise, Libyans appear among other foreigners at state displays and in Akhenaten’s armed escort. As building projects and military units were frequent destinations for foreign prisoners of war, it is quite possible that the Libyans employed in such a fashion were serving under duress.

If Egyptians and Libyans came into closer and more regular contact at the close of the Eighteenth Dynasty, the process only intensified in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Judging from the Karnak reliefs of Seti I, this king fought a battle against Tjehenu-Libyans within his first decade of rule, i.e., at some point between his attack on Kadesh and his Hittite campaign. It is unfortunate, however, that neither the circumstances nor even the location of the battle is provided. All that can be gleaned from the bombastic and highly rhetorical text associated with the relief is that the enemy had been united under a number of different leaders (αντα—KRI I, 21: 7, 8, 12), that the Libyans decided ultimately to flee the battlefield, and that many of their number succeeded in hiding until the Egyptians abandoned

little else can be stated regarding either term (Gardiner 1947a: 116*; Hölsher 1 955: 49–50; Ossing 1980a: 1016; Kitchen 1990: 16, 18; O’Connor 1990: 30). The bastardization of the two toponyms as “Tjemhenu” in a rhetorical text of Ramesses II (KRI II, 344: 16–345: 1) aptly illustrates this casual conflation (Kitchen 1990: 18).

783 For presentation scenes, see Urk. IV, 373: 6–11; 809: 8–11. For an example of a rhetorical statement of sovereignty, see Urk. IV, 372: 9–10.
784 Leahy 2001: 292.
786 Spalinger 1979b: 34, 36–37; Murnane 1990: 99. See Gaballa (1976: 104), however, who believes that the Hittite campaign preceded both the Libyan campaign and that at Kadesh. The land of Tjehenu also appears on Seti’s topographic lists (KRI I, 31: no. 19; and probably KRI I, 33: no. 6). Although the Meshwesh are not specifically mentioned in Seti’s texts, the appearance of the Tjehenu-Libyans is quite similar to that of the Meshwesh in Ramesses III’s reliefs (O’Connor 1982: 919; Kitchen 1990: 17), suggesting that “Tjemhenu” here might have been employed in its broadest sense.
their search (KRI I, 22: 4–6). The battle’s outcome is hardly surprising. Without chariotry or any other observable military advantage, and unburdened with town or immovable property to protect, the transhumant Libyans would have had little incentive to stand their ground in a full-scale battle.

Seti’s son, the future Ramesses II, may well have participated in his father’s campaign against the Tjehenu-Libyans, for he had himself inserted into the Karnak battle scenes years later (KRI I, 21: 15). Likewise, at the Beit el-Wali temple—which Ramesses commissioned as crown prince—the reliefs depict the heir to the throne slitting a Libyan, and the text refers to his sword as having slain Tjehenu (KRI II, 196: 14). Even if Ramesses never did fight Libyans at the side of his father, however, as king he unfortunately emulated Seti’s bland indifference to detail when touching upon Libyan affairs. In Ramesses’ reign, Libyans are uniformly depicted in both art and text as passive objects of aggression.

Despite the rather rhetorical nature of the majority of Ramesses II’s references to Libyans, there are a number of reasons to suspect that conflicts did arise in his reign. The viceroy of Kush, Setau, for example, appears to have utilized some of the Tjemhu captives that he seized in the southern oases to help construct a temple at Wadi es-Sebua (KRI III, 95: 12–14). Libyan prisoners of war who were not put to work on building projects are stated to have been enrolled in the army (KRI II, 289: 16), resettled to the east of Egypt in nḫtew-strongholds (KRI II, 206: 15–16), or settled in towns (dmnwl) bearing Ramesses II’s name (KRI II, 406: 4). As discussed above, Syro-Palestinian dmnwl named in honor of Ramesses II were in reality directly administered Egyptian garrison towns.

While the texts provide clues to Egypto-Libyan relations, the archaeological remains demonstrate the severity of the Libyan threat most

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788 The spoils presented to Amun after the battle appear to have been Syro-Palestinian in origin, suggesting perhaps that the Tjehenu-Libyans—in their penis sheaths and plumes—possessed little that the Egyptians found worthy of plunder.

789 With respect to art, see Gaballa 1976: 113. The situation in text is no better. One finds the Tjehenu-Libyans fallen through dread of Ramesses (KRI II, 345: 1), conquered (KRI II, 404: 5–6), overthrown and slaughtered (KRI II, 289: 15–16), and reduced to nonexistence (KRI II, 465: 7). In one text, the leaders of the Tjehenu-Libyans come bearing gifts of timber, ivory, sheep, and goats (KRI II, 217: 4–6). While the sheep and goats were likely their own property, it is probable that the wood and ivory had been obtained through trade.
clearly. As will be discussed in-depth below, Ramesses II undertook building projects in a series of towns along the western border of the Delta, suggesting that he was adhering to the age-old adage that a secure border region is a well-populated one. In addition, however, he also constructed a chain of fortress-towns that punctuated the coastal road to Libya at semiregular intervals for some 325 km to the west. The erection of such a far-flung defense system—likely just as elaborate as that spanning the Ways of Horus—indicates that the Egyptian government felt genuinely threatened by the movements of its neighbors.

A stele erected at one of these border-fortresses, El-'Alamein, makes reference to Ramesses II’s capture or plunder (ḥ3k) of Libu-land (KRI II, 475: 7). Similarly, P. Anastasi II, 3: 4 alludes to Ramesses’ slaughter of Libu peoples. The sudden appearance of the Libu, the population that would eventually give Libya its name, coincides not only with the flurry of fortification just mentioned but also with the creation of hitherto unknown titles like “deputy of the chariotry of the Lord of the Two Lands [in] the western Delta region” (KRI III, 243: 6–7).

While the nature of the clashes between the Libu and Ramesses II’s forces is unknown, it is not unlikely that this group invaded Egypt in tandem with the Sherden, as they would in the reign of Ramesses’ son. The Sherden were a largely maritime people from somewhere in Asia Minor, while the Libu—like virtually all substantial Libyan populations—are thought to have hailed from the coastal region of Cyrenaica. Evidence for a coalition between the two groups in the reign of Ramesses II is admittedly slight, if still intriguing. Both groups, for instance, appear in Egyptian records for the first time in the reign of this king, and the narration of Ramesses’ victories over the Sherden in the Tanis stele directly follows a reference to the king’s slaughter of the Tjehenu-Libyans (KRI II, 289: 15–290: 4). Archaeology may offer further insights into just how such a relationship could have occurred. Excavations at an island off the coast of Marsa Matruh have turned up evidence of a seasonal occupation by

an Aegean group who presumably utilized the island as a refueling station. Certainly, this area represented the closest and best anchorage for mariners traveling from Crete to the Delta and onward to Syria-Palestine. In addition to Mycenaean and Cypriot ceramics, indigenous wares and ostrich shells were discovered on the island, suggesting that the mariners almost certainly traded with the local Libyans. According to the archaeological remains, it seems that this contact extended throughout the LB IIA period but was abruptly terminated at some point between the reigns of Horemheb and Ramesses II. It is significant to note, then, that not only were the first aggressions by Libu-Libyans and by Aegean mariners recorded in the reign of Ramesses II, but it was also in the reign of this king that the Egyptian fortress of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham was erected just a short distance to the west of Marsa Matruh.\footnote{The excavations at Bates Island are reported in White 1985.}

An alliance between the Libu and seafaring raiders, while purely hypothetical for the reign of Ramesses II, is well documented with regard to the fifth year of Merneptah. Memorialized on no fewer than four different monuments,\footnote{See the great Libyan war inscription at Karnak (KRI IV, 2: 12–12: 6), the triumph hymn (KRI IV, 12: 13–19: 11), the Libyan war stele from Kom el-Ahmar (KRI IV, 19: 15–22: 16), and the granite column fragment from Cairo (KRI IV, 23: 4–7).} the account of the battle fought by this pharaoh against the Libu and their allies is rich in detail. According to the Egyptian sources, the main aggressor was a leader (\textit{wr}) of the Libu named Meryey, who advanced upon Egypt by way of Tjahenu, the land just west of the Delta. In Meryey’s retinue were thousands of Libu warriors and an unspecified number of Meshwesh and Kehek—two Libyan groups also thought to have come from Cyrenaica.\footnote{The role of the Meshwesh in this battle is not entirely clear. More than 9,000 bronze swords “of the Meshwesh” (KRI IV, 9: 4) were taken by the Egyptians as booty, but this may simply imply that the Libu obtained the swords from the Meshwesh, who may themselves have obtained them through trade with their maritime contacts. Advanced metallurgy is generally believed to have been beyond the technology of the LB Libyan tribes (White 1985: 83). Although the Meshwesh are mentioned rhetorically in a number of different contexts (KRI IV, 5: 6–7; 14: 3–4; 21: 16), Meshwesh soldiers are not listed among the dead. Prior to this battle, the Meshwesh appear only in an unspecified association with cattle in the late Eighteenth Dynasty (see Hayes 1951: 50, fig. 10, nos. 130–132; 91, n. 119). The extent of participation by the Kehek is also not known; this group is mentioned just once but in conjunction with Libu prisoners of war (KRI IV, 9: 1).} Cyrenaica was not only large and fertile enough to
support numerous seminomadic populations, but its coastal locale meant that these groups would have had ample opportunity to meet and form alliances with the seafaring inhabitants of western Anatolia and the Aegean.795

The names of both the Sherden and the Lukka—two of Meryey’s overseas confederates—are familiar from the Amarna archive, where the Sherden are discovered at a seaside locale near Byblos (EA 122: 31–371; 123: 11–37) and the Lukka are accused of piracy and raiding (EA 38: 6–22). As discussed above, the Sherden fought against Ramesses II early in his reign (KRI II, 290: 1–4; 345: 3), and shortly thereafter Sherden regiments appear in the Egyptian army (KRI II, 11: no. 26). A papyrus dating to the time of Merneptah mentions “Sherden of the Great Green that are captives of his majesty, l.p.h. They are equipped with all their weapons in the court and bring a tribute of barley and provisions for their chariots, as well as chopped straw” (P. Anastasi II, verso 1–2).796 Judging from the papyrus, then, it appears that subsequent to the Libyan battle, Merneptah followed his father’s example and employed the formidable talents of the Sherden captives for Egypt’s ultimate benefit.

Soon after the decipherment of the Karnak text, scholars began to equate the names of the Aegean and Anatolian raiders who allied themselves with the Libu with the names of people known from Hittite and Greek sources. The Ekwesh were thus identified with the Achaeans or the Ahhiyawans, the Teresh with the Tyrsenoi (ancestors of the Etruscans), the Lukka with the Lycians, the Sherden with the population that gave its name to Sardinia, and the Shekelesh with mariners who settled in Sicily.797 Despite the considerable attention and excitement that the so-called people of the sea have

795 The causes of this upheaval in Asia Minor are too complex to be addressed here. See, however, Deger-Jalkotzy 1978; Sandars 1985; Ward and Joukowsky 1992; Drews 1993; Bryce 1999: 320–321, 336–337, 364–369 and the bibliographies contained therein. The subject is also addressed in chapter six.

796 See Caminos 1954: 64. See also P. Anastasi II, 5: 2, which alludes to the Sherden that Merneptah “carried off” with his strong arm.

797 De Rouge first suggested the identification of most of these groups in 1867, and his ideas have been accepted and elaborated upon by later scholars. See, for example, Helck 1977b; Barnett 1980; Sandars 1985: 105–115; T. Dothan and M. Dothan 1992: 24–28. The fact that many of these same groups appear in Homer’s epics has caught the imagination of many a historian. Zuhdi (1995–1996: 72–73), for example, has recently highlighted the many parallels between Merneptah’s accounts of his battles and Odysseus’ “false tale” in the Odyssey.
garnered in modern scholarship, however, in the Egyptian sources the raiders are clearly viewed as subordinate in both power and prestige to the ruler of the Libu. Indeed, Meryey is explicitly stated to have “brought” the northerners with him (KRI IV, 22: 8). Such a scenario makes it unlikely that the Libyan incursions in the Nineteenth Dynasty were primarily sparked by disturbances caused by the Sea People, as some scholars have posited. Instead, it seems more probable that powerful Libyan leaders were able to take advantage of the arrival of the raiders to achieve their own ends.

The fact that the Libu and their allies were able to invade the Delta, despite Ramesses II’s best efforts to prevent such an occurrence, may indicate that by the reign of his son the fortress system had been scaled back or largely abandoned. Certainly, excavations at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham have produced no evidence of Egyptian occupation beyond the reign of Ramesses II (see below). Quite probably, then, much of the original infrastructure was simply unequipped to cope with a force of thousands of warriors on the move.

For his own part, Merneptah attributed the ease of foreign penetration to the fact that the western Delta had in years past been largely abandoned except as pasturage for cattle (KRI IV, 3: 6–7). The Delta’s sparse population and its great expanse of verdant grazing land would have appealed to the Libu, who had purportedly traveled to Egypt with at least 1,308 cattle of their own as well as an unknown number of goats (KRI IV, 9: 7–8). Another probable motivation for migration—and one expressly addressed in the Karnak inscription—was famine. According to the Egyptians, the Libyans had entered the Delta in order to “seek the necessities of their mouths” (KRI IV, 4: 15) and once in the Delta had spent “their time roaming the land, fighting to fill their stomachs daily” (KRI IV, 4: 14–15).

The Egyptians were not necessarily averse to allowing bedouin periodic access to resources, as the sanctioned passage of the Shasu to the pools of Per-Atum demonstrates (P. Anastasi VI, 53–61).

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800 See Snape 1995: 171. As O’Connor (1990: 91–92) observes, however, nomadic groups in Cyrenaica generally weather ecological stresses without undue discomfort, so it is likely that other factors played a role in the migration as well.
Indeed, it is very likely that throughout Egyptian history agrarian Egyptians and nearby bedouin enjoyed a fruitful and symbiotic relationship. If the Libu and their allies entered Egypt without permission and attacked Egyptian settlements, however, the government must have found itself forced to respond.

According to Merneptah, not only had the Libyans already threatened the security of Memphis and Heliopolis, but they had also interfered with two oases populations (KRI V, 3: 4; 4: 11). On the other hand, it is surely significant that the Libyans had occupied the Delta for months before Merneptah addressed the problem and that it took nearly a full month from conception to execution for the pharaoh to muster an army against them. Clearly, the situation, although undoubtedly pressing, had not reached a crisis level.

One of the most intriguing aspects of the Libyan invasion is that only two days before Merneptah was set to wage war on the Libu, a messenger informed him that the Lower Nubians of Wawat had revolted (KRI IV, 1: 10–12). The timing of this insurgency among an otherwise typically docile population group has roused the suspicions of a number of scholars. They suggest that Meryey incited the Lower Nubians to revolt, just as Apophis had attempted to persuade his southern counterpart to wage war on the Thebans at the end of the Second Intermediate Period.\(^{801}\) By utilizing the oasis route, which the Libyans seem already to have wrested control of, such clandestine communication could have been easily effected. However, although the scenario of two powers conspiring to wage a double-headed war against Egypt may certainly be valid, it needn’t necessarily be so. The Nubians would doubtless have been aware of the national call to arms for the Delta conflict, and they may well have decided on their own volition to take advantage of the army’s preoccupation in the north. Indeed, as discussed above, the inhabitants of Ashkelon may similarly have seized upon Egypt’s distraction to raise their own rebellion in the east.

Although it had taken the Egyptians a month to react to the Libyan invasion and to assemble an army, the decisive battle did not last more than six hours. In the district of Pi-yer (\(pr-\text{inw}\)) at the break of dawn on the third day of the third month of the third

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season, the Egyptian and Libyan armies clashed briefly (KRI IV, 5: 13–6: 4).\(^{802}\) The outcome of the contest, however, appears startlingly similar to the battle against the Libyans that Seti had fought years before. Out-armed and very likely outnumbered, the Libyans eventually fled, dropping their bows and water-skins to lighten their load (KRI IV, 14: 6–8).

The Egyptian army pursued their enemies to a fortress located in a place called the Beginning-of-the-land (\(wp-t\)–KRI IV, 22: 3–4), a toponym employed in Nubia as well to signify the farthest reaches of Egyptian control.\(^{803}\) Taking care of the remainder of the Libyans, who were “scattered upon the dykes like mice” (KRI IV, 21: 3), must have been a relatively easy task, and Merneptah’s inscription at Amada tersely states that many of those who escaped death on the battlefield were later impaled at Memphis (KRI IV, 1: 13).

While the lists of the slain and captured assert that thousands of the enemy soldiers were unable to flee, the Libu leader managed to escape. In the process, however, Meryey shamefully abandoned his family, his army, and his possessions—avoiding Egyptian authorities by traveling to his homeland under the cover of night. Egyptian sources reported with great *schadenfreude* that if he survived his journey home, he would arrive to find himself divested of his plumes, his position, and his respect. A male relative, probably a brother, had already assumed leadership, and Meryey’s name was reviled by both his former subjects and the elite of his tribe (KRI IV, 6: 4–15; 7: 3–10).

The end of Merneptah’s battle against the Libu, like the end of most celebrated New Kingdom conflicts, was marked by the grisly process of counting the body parts of the dead (i.e., the assloads of uncircumcised phalli and the hands of circumcised soldiers, which purportedly flopped on the ground like fish—KRI IV, 7: 12–14). As distasteful as compiling the records must have been, the end product is extremely useful for reconstructing the components of the Libyan coalition. In addition to his twelve wives, six sons, and twelve pairs of horses, the disgraced Meryey had traveled with a massive

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\(^{802}\) As Redford (1970: 30, n. 2) suggests, the exact date—with its preponderance of threes—may have been chosen due its auspicious nature. Certainly, after having waited a month to confront his foes, the date of the attack would have been fairly flexible.

force. The slain Libyans amounted to well over 6,000 individuals, while their allies suffered more than 2,000 casualties.\textsuperscript{804} To this was added the not insubstantial numbers of men taken prisoner and their luckier colleagues who effected a successful get-away. All in all, O’Connor estimates that the total force may have numbered more than 30,500 strong.\textsuperscript{805}

Of all the individuals documented in the booty list, it is of paramount importance to note that the wives of Meryey were apparently the only women involved in the raid. As opposed to the situation in Ramesses III’s reign, then, it would appear unlikely that the Libyans and their allies had packed up all their belongings and their families with the intention of settling permanently in the Delta. Or, if a mass migration were in fact planned, the force encountered by Merneptah may have consisted of an army that had been sent out in advance to carve out a homeland for the rest of their countrymen.

In a seminomadic society, as in all societies, there are many motivations for war. The search for greener pastures is indeed one such proximate cause, especially with regard to seminomadic populations. Alternatively or additionally, however, elites in a given culture can employ war to enhance their own status as leaders, to help supply themselves and their followers with coveted goods, or simply to employ the energies of a surplus of potentially troublesome young men. Thus, while it is not unlikely that climactic change in Cyrenaica placed an unusual stress upon the Libyans and the raiders who landed on their shores, the decision to relieve that stress via an armed invasion of the Delta was likely made by elites with an eye to their own personal interests as well as those of their people.\textsuperscript{806}

\textit{Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for Nineteenth Dynasty western fortifications and administrative headquarters}

Both textual and archaeological sources support the idea that Ramesses II constructed a string of fortresses along the route to Libya. Further, archaeological evidence suggests that this king actively promoted settlement in towns along the western edge of the Delta. To date, Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham is the only one of Ramesses’ installations

\textsuperscript{804} Compare KRI IV, 8: 7 and 9: 1–2 with KRI IV, 8: 15–16.
\textsuperscript{805} O’Connor 1990: 44.
\textsuperscript{806} See O’Connor 1990.
along the coastal road to have been exposed to large-scale excavations (see figure 48). As this fortress-town is located farther to the west than any other known Egyptian compound, it is tempting to equate it with the same “mnnw-fortress of the west” that the fugitive leader of the Libu passed by under the cover of night. While the lack of any evidence for Egyptian settlement at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham after the reign of Ramesses II troubles this identification, an inscription found on the gateway of the compound leaves little doubt that it was indeed classified as a mnnw-fortress.

For the reigns of Ramesses II and his son Merneptah there are a number of references to the mnnw-fortresses that lined at least a portion of the highway from Egypt to Libya. Functionally, the texts imply that these installations shared a number of features in common with the fortified way stations constructed along the Ways of Horus. The mnnw-fortresses, for example, were closely associated with wells—termed either šdywt or hnmwet in the inscriptions. The Libyan fortresses also had formal names that combined an appellation of the reigning pharaoh with a laudatory or aggressive epithet. As was the case with the Sinai forts, however, the elaborately christened Libyan fortresses were often referred to simply by the name of the district in which they were situated (such as pr-irw or wp-t3). The Libyan fortresses, in addition to being bastioned like their counterparts to the east of Egypt, housed not only soldiers but also Medjay scouts. Particularly adept at scouring the desert for signs of fugitives, the latter were obviously of great use in the sandy environs of both highways. Further, like their counterparts to the east, the Libyan fortresses seem to have been overseen by a resident “troop commander” (ḥrjpdt), who could also hold the title “overseer of foreign countries” (imy-r ḫ3swt).

Given this slew of similarities, it is at first quite puzzling that the Libyan bases should have been termed “mnnw-fortresses,” while those that lay east of Egypt’s border and functioned in much the same way were known by a variety of other terms—but never “mnnw.” Upon investigating further, however, it is apparent that an issue of size and structure may have been at the root of the problem. If Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham is taken as relatively representative of the Libyan mnnw-fortresses, it is important to observe that this installation was roughly eight times larger than the largest of the excavated forts along the Ways of Horus (i.e., Haruba site A-289) and twelve times larger than the smallest (i.e., Bir el-ʿAbd). This great size
differential, it may be presumed, had primarily to do with the magnitude of the threat posed to Egypt just the other end of the highway. Whereas no enemy could be foreseen on the eastern horizon in the Nineteenth Dynasty, the scale of the Libyan invasions undertaken at that time obviously worried the Egyptian government.

If the Libyan fortresses and the way stations along the Ways of Horus did not resemble one another structurally, a far closer fit to Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham was found with regard to the Nubian fortress-towns erected by Seti I. Admittedly, Aksha and Amara West (see figures 51 and 52) were still only half the size of the Libyan mnnw, but they shared the distinction with Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham of being true fortress-towns rather than forts. Both the Nubian and the Libyan mnnw included within their 4–5 m thick enclosure walls one or more temples, storage areas, and habitation zones—i.e., the building blocks of any good Egyptian town. Given these structural similarities, it is highly probable that the term mnnw designated a type of substantial fortress-town that had been erected beyond the immediate borders of the Egyptian Nile Valley in order to stake a claim on potentially contestable territory.

Investigating the Libyan fortresses utilizing both archaeological and textual lines of evidence is a complementary exercise. By revealing the structural similarities of fortress-towns in both Libya and Nubia, archaeology illuminates the rationale behind the blanket use of the term mnnw to designate these compounds. Yet excavations at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham have also highlighted the ways in which this presumably typical Libyan mnnw differed from its southern counterparts. It is observed, for instance, that Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham played a substantial role in maritime trade, for its storerooms were packed with imports. Perhaps even more significantly, however, excavations of the mnnw’s glacis and extremely well-fortified gate demonstrate that the defenses at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham were designed to be highly practical. Clearly, the fortress’ architect anticipated hostility and took steps to safeguard against it. Such an impression could also be gained from the preponderance of troop commanders, standard bearers, army generals, Medjay-scouts, and armed guards that inscriptions inform us populated the fortress in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

While a substantial portion of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham awaits excavation, it has already supplied a wealth of information in comparison to the other purported fortresses commissioned by Ramesses II. Habachi and others have identified these settlements as belonging
to a chain of fortified towns partly on the basis of their positioning along the Libyan road (El-Alamein and El-Gharbaniyat) or along the very western edge of the Nile Delta (El-Barmugi, Tell Abqa‘in, Kom Firin, Kom el-Hisn, Kom Abu Billo, and possibly Karm Abu Gurg). While a number of the latter towns, such as Kom Abu Billo and Kom el-Hisn, had been important since the Old Kingdom, the same was not the case with Tell Abqa‘in (see figure 49) or the towns built along the Libyan road. These sites almost certainly represent newly fashioned fortress-towns built—like Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham—to safeguard important wells, to monitor traffic along the routes frequented by Libyans, and to thickly populate a crucial region with settlers who would, if need be, act in their own interests and those of the Egyptian government by protecting their territory from nomadic incursions.

*Textual References to Nineteenth Dynasty Western Fortress-Towns*

*Reign of Ramesses II*

1. ... mnw ḥr ḫst ṯnh šdywt m-ḥnw.sn r škḥḥ ... (Inscription on the corridor gateway in Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham; Snape 1995: 171 and personal communication)

... mnw=fortresses upon the foreign land of Tjemhu (and) the wells within them to refresh ...

The inscription quoted above comes from Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, the sole fortress in Ramesses II’s purported western line of defense to have been subjected to intensive excavation in modern times. More specifically, the text was found engraved upon the eastern jamb of the fortress’ monumental gateway. Short and sweet as the preserved portion of the text is, there are a variety of reasons why it is significant.

First and foremost, the inscription clearly states that this fortress and others like it were built around one or more wells. The presence of wells is in itself not surprising, for no town would be able

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808 The word šdyt can also refer to pools of water (Wb. IV, 567; Faulkner 1986: 274; Lesko 1987: 172), but given that Snape and his team have actually discovered a well within the precincts of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham (see below), the proper interpretation of the word seems relatively clear.
Figure 47. Western Delta and the coastal road to Libya
to flourish in the arid coastal environment of Marmarica, here broadly termed Tjemhu, were it not for fresh water. In lieu of any perennial waterways, wells and springs would have assumed a paramount importance in the region.

The presence of fortified structures enclosing or otherwise protecting wells or springs invites a comparison between Ramesses II’s western fortresses and the Nineteenth Dynasty fortified way stations that guarded water sources along the Ways of Horus.\(^{809}\) By securing each well or spring along a major thoroughfare, the Egyptians assured their own armies, messengers, functionaries, and traders of access to water and supplies on their journeys to foreign lands. Further, control of the water sources along these well-traveled routes allowed the Egyptian government to dictate just who could or could not pass through their territory. Although it would be theoretically possible to cross the hundreds of kilometers of desert from Cyrenaica to the Delta without making use of these wells, it would pose a substantial logistical challenge, and one that would be virtually impossible if the crossing were attempted with large populations and herds in tow.\(^{810}\)

Given that the Egyptians employed similar measures to protect the major roads to Libya and to Syria-Palestine, it is somewhat surprising that the vocabulary used to designate the fortified structures on both frontiers is mutually exclusive. It has been seen that the Egyptians referred to the large fortress-towns that guarded the entrances into the Delta as htm-fortresses, while they employed a variety of different terms, such as mktr (migdol), bhn, and nhtw, to identify the fortified way stations along the Ways of Horus. Of all the installations guarding the passage from Syria-Palestine to Egypt, however, none were termed mnnw-fortresses. While isolated references from the reign of Thutmose III mention mnnw-fortresses in Lebanon (Urk. IV, 739: 12–740: 1 and 1241: 13–1242: 4) and in the north (Urk. IV, 1105: 4), this class of fortification is otherwise witnessed exclusively in Nubian and Libyan contexts.

The distinction between mnnw-fortresses and other types of fortresses clearly cannot be ascribed to a north-south dichotomy or to a difference in basic functionality, and so it is likely that the term had

\(^{809}\) Cf. Oren 1987: 112.
\(^{810}\) Snape 1997: 23.
structural implications instead. Although Habachi guessed that the fortress at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham occupied some 8,000 m² of ground, the Liverpool team has revealed that the fortress instead enclosed 19,600 m². Such an area, impressive though it may be, is dwarfed by the vast extent of the excavated ḫtnm-fortresses, which ranged from 66,000 m² (Tell er-Retabah/Tjeku) to as much as 120,000 m² (Tell Heboua I/Tjaru). Conversely, however, Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham itself far outsized the forts erected along the Ways of Horus, as the smallest of these covered only 1,600 m² (Bir el-ʿAbd) and the largest barely 2,500 m² (Haruba site A-289).

It is surely significant, then, that by far the closest parallels to the scale of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham are the mnnw-fortresses, such as Amara West (11,664 m²) and Aksha (9,842 m²), erected by Nineteenth Dynasty rulers in Nubia. Given this broad similarity in size, it is not improbable that the word mnnw was employed to designate a moderately sized fortified population center. This definition also explains the not infrequent substitution of dmi for mnnw with regard to these installations.

2. s3 r’ r’-ms-sw mry-imm dd.f n wpwty-nsw [. . .] mnnw grg m ḫwt nbwt r . . . (Rhetorical stele, Tanis III; KRI II, 292: 8–9)

Son of Re, Ramesses Meryamun, he said to the royal messenger [. . .] mnnw-fortresses are provided with all things for . . .

Very little is preserved of the “Tanis III” stele aside from this snippet of text and a few standardized scenes of the king paying his respects to Ptah, Seth, Atum, and Re-Horakhty. Although the stele was later removed to Tanis, originally it had almost certainly been erected in one of the many temples at Pi-Ramesses, Egypt’s new capital city. In religious or rhetorical texts, such as this one, the word “mnnw” (fortress) can often be misleading. Frequently, rather than designating an actual fortress-town, the term is employed as an implicit metaphor for the temple’s spiritual function as the “fortress” of a god. Indeed, for this same reason the massive temenos walls of many state temples intentionally mimicked the appearance of fortress enclosure walls. In texts, the term mnnw could also be

812 Cf. Urk. IV, 1648: 6–9; 1656: 13–17; 1748: 9; KRI I, 67: 4, etc.
utilized in *explicit* metaphors in which the king was himself a fortress for his people or his army.\(^{814}\)

Even with such a scant bit of text preserved in the Tanis III stele, it is obvious that in this instance the use of the word “*mnw*” was neither symbolic nor metaphorical. The *mnw*-fortresses in the excerpt were provided\(^{815}\) with “things,” and they were associated in some fashion with a royal envoy (*wpwty-nsw*), as would be appropriate for Egyptian fortresses. Further, it is obvious that Ramesses regarded with pride the efficiency of this system of *mnw*-fortresses, which would facilitate the journey of his envoy by ensuring that he was provisioned with foodstuffs and supplies at regular intervals. Just where the messenger was traveling, however, is not specified.

*Mnw*-fortresses are attested in Libya and Nubia during the Nineteenth Dynasty, and, hypothetically, Ramesses II could have been referring to either frontier. Two factors, however, argue for the assignment of the *mnw* to a Libyan milieu. First, the statement that the fortresses were equipped with supplies may indicate that this in itself was something of a feat. In Nubia, as has been noted previously, *mnw* fortress-towns were generally located in or adjacent to fertile areas, and thus inhabitants of the *mnw*-fortresses would have been largely self-sufficient. Even if an envoy found himself detained between *mnw*, it is hard to imagine that in Nineteenth Dynasty Nubia food and lodging would not have been eagerly offered free of charge to a royal official. Along the road to Libya, however, even bare necessities such as food and fresh water would have been significantly harder to come by. The erection of an efficient system of royally supplied *mnw*-fortresses along this arid and barren route, then, would have been a far more impressive accomplishment of which to boast.

If the frontier in question were Libya, Ramesses II would have had yet another reason to brag about equipping a dangerous and desolate stretch of road with fortified enclaves. Archaeologically and

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\(^{814}\) Cf. Urk. IV, 1230: 12; 1233: 6; KRI II, 426: 15, etc. For an incidence of the word *mnw* that has led to great confusion as to whether the fortress was real or figurative, see Thutmose I’s Tombos stele (Urk. IV, 85: 2–4), discussed in chapter two.

\(^{815}\) The verb *grg* for “to provide” (or passively “are provided for”) is the same verb employed with regard to the villages, *nhtw*-strongholds, and towns of Ramesses II in his dedicatory text at Abydos (see above).
textually, all evidence indicates that these compounds were established for the first time in his reign (see below). While Ramesses built temples at Aksha and Amara West—the two Nubian mnnw-fortresses datable to the Nineteenth Dynasty—these mnnw had in fact been erected by his father. Ramesses was not above taking credit for his forbearers’ achievements, but accomplishing what no ruler had accomplished before was one of the aims of all Egyptian kings. In the case of Ramesses’ fortification of the Libyan road, he would truly have attained such a goal—a rare feat in a country that had been ruled by pharaohs already for nearly two millennia!

Reign of Merneptah

1. pḥwt 9 ḫr ḫwr ḫšw.s bštwt ḫr ḥt ḫw.s r’ nb [. . .] r ḫwr ḥn n mnw ḫk.n.w sḥt n kmt in itrw [9’ ḫ’n.sn skm.sn ḫrw 3bdw ḫmsw . . . (Karnak Libyan war inscription; KRI IV, 4: 8–10)

The Nine Bows plunder its borders (and) the rebels transgress it every day [. . .] in order to plunder these mn(n)w-fortresses, while they penetrated the marshland of Egypt by (means of) the [great] river. Then they spent days and months dwelling . . .

As Spalinger and others have noted, reports of wars were often molded to fit a literary genre, which Egyptologists refer to as the Königsnovelle or the iw.tw formulae. The sole purpose of these documents was to highlight the pharaoh as the central and dominant actor in a war, regardless of his real role. As is typical of this genre, Merneptah’s Karnak inscription prepares the reader for the narration of the battle and its aftermath by first describing the moment at which the king learned of the crisis (KRI IV, 3: 15–4: 4) and then reporting verbatim the speech by which the king announced his intention to remedy the situation (KRI IV, 4: 4–5: 7). In the oration that prefaced his call to arms for the Libyan war, Merneptah directly challenged the supposed complacency of his court—another common literary trope—by detailing the outrages committed against Egypt. One of these affronts, as it turns out, was the plundering of the mn(n)w-fortresses by his western enemies.

It has already been seen that mnnw-fortresses, such as Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham and El-‘Alamein, protected important water sources

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along the major highway to Libya. Further, it has been stated that such water sources would have been of crucial importance to a group of thousands of warriors and animals attempting to cross the barren track from Libya to Egypt. Such fortress-towns would also have held other attractions for an enemy army on the move. As major population centers in an uncertain environment, each would have possessed both substantial food stores and animals of their own. Also, if Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham is any indication, the _mnnw_-fortresses along the coast were important players in maritime trade and possessed stores of valuable trade goods (see below). Likewise, each fortress-town almost certainly housed at least one temple, the rich furnishings and architectural embellishments of which would have offered a tempting target for a plundering horde. Considering all this, Merneptah’s charge against the Libyans is likely to have been grounded in actual fact.

2a. . . ḫdbw ıry m mr r iwd p3 pr-m3ʿ(t) n (mr-n-pṯḥ ḫtp-ḥr-m3ʾt [. . .] ḫnw ntw m) [pr]-irw r p3 ḏw n wp-t3 (Kom el-Ahmar stele, verso; KRI IV, 22: 3–4)

. . . (List of) the slain ones who were made as heaps between the House-of-Tru(th) of (Merneptah Hotephirmaat, destroyer(?) of Tjehenu, which is in) [Per]-Irew to the mountain of the Beginning-of-the-land.

2b. . . [iw]d p3 pr-m3ʿ(t) n mr-n-pṯḥ ḫtp-ḥr-m3ʾt [. . . ḫ]nw ntw pr-ir(w) r n3 dmiw ḥryw n smt(alt. ḫst) ʾšʾ m mr-n-pṯḥ ḫtp-ḥr-m3ʾ . . . (Karnak Libyan war inscription; KRI IV, 8: 3–4)

. . . [between] the House-of-Tru(th) of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, [destroyer(?) of Tjehenu, which is in Per-Irew and the upper towns of the desert (alt. foreign country), beginning with Merneptah Hotephirmaat.

The two headings excerpted above immediately preceded lists of slain and captured foes from the year five Libyan war. In a sense, the texts provide the topographical parameters for the battle and the “mopping up” operations that must have followed. According to the Egyptians, then, the conflict spanned the distance between two specific towns (dmiw)—both named after Merneptah. The location of the House-of-Truth of Merneptah Hotephirmaat, destroyer(?) of Tjehenu,

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817 Brugsch translated the word as “destroyer,” although the text had been damaged by the time it was examined by Breasted (AR III, 248, n. d.).
in the district of Per-Irew is unfortunately unknown, but its bellicose
appellation makes it likely that this "dmi, like others named after the
reigning pharaoh in the Sinai and Syria-Palestine, was in reality an
Egyptian garrison town. Further, given Ramesses II’s extensive work
on western Delta border towns as well as on the chain of fortresses
along the route to Libya, it is not unlikely that the name appended
to the installation belonged originally to Mernephta’s father.

According to the Karnak account (KRI IV, 5: 14), the Libyan
and Egyptian armies met for battle in Per-Irew, so this toponym
almost certainly marks the easternmost extent of the fighting. Determining the identity of the westernmost point of conflict, however,
is more complicated. In the two texts, quite different toponyms are
employed. The Karnak inscription states that men were slain or
taken captive between Per-Irew and the upper towns (dmiw) of the
desert (or foreign country). These upper towns are stated to have
begun at a settlement bearing Mernephta’s name and to have ended
in an unknown locale, perhaps Wep-ta (wp-t3), the “Beginning (or opening)-of-the-land,” which is mentioned in the Kom el-Ahmar stele.

There are several clues that in the west the carnage occurred
along the line of fortresses erected on the road to Libya. The first
hint, of course, is the placement of the upper dmiw in the smt or
h3st, which—regardless of whether the translation “desert” or “for-

tign country” is preferred—would lie outside the Delta region. A
second indication of a locale west of the Delta is that the towns bore
names that were aggressive, formal, and royally inspired—as was
typical of Egyptian garrison towns and fortresses. Lastly, it is significant
that the term wp-t3 was also employed to designate the farthest south-
ern reach of the Egyptian empire. In Nubian contexts, the toponym
apparently signified the dividing point between true “foreign land”
and land that was under at least nominal Egyptian sovereignty.818

Presumably, on the Libyan frontier as well, then, wp-t3 would sig-

nify a division between the beginning of “Egyptian” land and the
foreign lands that lay beyond.

With respect to the toponym wp-t3, it is highly significant that
decades later Ramesses III would also end a Libyan battle in the
vicinity of “the town (dmi) of Usermaatre Meryamun, which is upon
the mount of wp-t3” (KRI V, 43: 10; 50: 4). Not only does the name

of this *dmī* suggest its status as a garrison town, but at Medinet Habu the base is unequivocally portrayed as a fortress located in a patently arid environment.\(^{819}\) It may be seen, then, that in the reigns of both Merneptah and Ramesses III, the fighting took place entirely within the Egyptian sphere of control. The Libyans were not pursued to their homeland, nor did the Egyptians attempt to annex Libyan land to their own.

\[\text{3. . . n mn nw imntt wst r stp-s3 'nḥ wḏ3 snb m dd r-nty ḫrw m'riwy iw ṭr ḫw.f n šw.f snt(nw) ḫr r.i m nfrw ḡrḥ . . . (Karnak Libyan war inscription; KRI IV, 7: 3–5)}\]

(The commandant[?] of the *mnw*-fortress of the west (sent) a letter to the palace, l.p.h., saying, as follows: The fallen one, Meryey, has come, his limbs having fled because of his worthlessness, (and) has passed by me in the dead of night . . .

Clearly, the Libyan plundering of the *mnw*-fortresses had been either spotty or superficial, for by the battle’s end the Western Fortress was fully operational. The disgraced leader of the Libu invasion fled past this installation in order to escape capture after the defeat of his army. Indeed, the fact that Meryey passed the fortress at all is a testament to the importance of the main Libyan highway, for this particular fugitive must have wished to avoid Egyptians at all costs. Though he fled by night, however, authorities at the fortress discovered evidence of his passage.

From the Middle Kingdom Semna dispatches to the late Egyptian miscellanies, discussed above, it is apparent that Medjay or other scouts were attached to most—if not all—desert fortresses. Because Egyptian installations, no matter how well manned, could be easily skirted in the darkness, it was of paramount importance that the desert be swept for tracks on a daily basis. If traces of fugitives were reported, not only could a posse pick up their tracks and hope to gain ground, but a messenger could also be sent ahead in all haste to alert the officials at the next fortress.

The Fortress of the West would seem to have been the informal designation for the westernmost Egyptian outpost—perhaps that at *wp-tl*. Whether this would also equate it with Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham,\(^{820}\) the westernmost fortress known to archaeologists, is per-

\(^{819}\) Medinet Habu I, pl. 70. O’Connor 1982: 921.

haps doubtful. Snape and his team have found no evidence post-dating the reign of Ramesses II at the fortress and believe that the installation was likely abandoned before the start of Merneptah’s Libyan war. Presuming, however, that the Western Fortress did mark the furthest contemporary penetration of the Egyptian frontier into Libyan territory, the fortress commander would have been faced with the decision of whether or not to pursue Meryey into Libyan territory. Such a venture undertaken in the aftermath of war would likely have been extremely risky.

If the commandant of the Western Fortress did attempt to trail and capture Meryey, his efforts came to naught. At the point at which the commandant wrote Merneptah, he was unable to provide information even as to whether the Libu leader was alive or dead. It is apparent, however, that the commandant did have access to an informant, who provided him with the valuable report that if Meryey did in fact live, he would never again command. Apparently in Meryey’s homeland the groundswell of public opinion had turned against him, and a male relative, sworn to kill him on sight, had assumed his position (KRI IV, 7: 7–10). Regardless of Meryey’s escape, it is surely a testament to the Egyptian intelligence network that a fortress commandant would have had access to this level of detailed information regarding the activities of an enemy located hundreds of kilometers away.

Merneptah’s Victory Stele provides yet another narration of his Libyan war. Unlike the other documents, however, the description of the Egyptian triumph is not followed by an accounting of enemy dead and booty seized. Instead, the stele ends with a long encomium to Merneptah. Written as if composed by the commoners of Egypt,
the text lists all the joys of normal life that Merneptah had restored to his people. Once again, his subjects could sit happily down to talk, they could take long walks, the herds could be left unsupervised, and the farmer could expect to consume what he had sown. This serene state is implicitly contrasted with the situation during the Libyan invasion, when people were afraid, cattle had to be closely watched, crops were stolen or burnt, and the air was filled with the lamentation of mourning people (KRI IV, 18: 1–19: 2).

Another contrast highlighted in the text is between the *mmnw*-fortresses as Merneptah had restored them, quoted above, and their state in wartime. Under Libyan attack it seems that the *mmnw*-fortresses were kept locked tight, their ramparts were often besieged, and their watchmen and Medjay-scouts existed in a constant state of wariness or activity. The text also mentions that during this time messengers were denied the use of *hunmt*-wells. While it is unlikely that the Egyptians barred their own messengers from access to water, the statement may imply that a significant number of the fortified wells and the wells protected only by soldiers had been captured by the Libyans. If so, the situation during the period of the invasion would have been dire indeed.

The snippet of text is also interesting in that it documents the presence in the western *mmnw*-fortresses of resident guards and desert scouts, the same mixture as is witnessed along the Ways of Horus and on the eastern border of the Delta. While the presence of associated scouts could be inferred from the letter sent by the commander of the Western Fortress to Merneptah, this passage dispels any doubts as to their importance. The text also reinforces the intimate connection between the fortresses and particularly important water sources, as is noted along the Ways of Horus as well. Finally, it makes reference to the bastioned ramparts of the *mmnw*-fortresses. While the 4–5 m thick walls at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham have only been partially exposed, bastions were indeed discovered near the gateway to the fortress and at its corners (see below).

822 Along the Ways of Horus, the wells that were not protected by a permanent Egyptian base were generally guarded by a troop commander (*hry pdt*—see chapter four) and his soldiers.
Archaeological Evidence for Nineteenth Dynasty Western Fortress-Towns

Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham (see figure 48)

Of the chain of fortresses or fortified settlements supposedly constructed by Ramesses II, only Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham has received significant archaeological attention. This site, located roughly 350 km west of the Nile Delta, was first surveyed by Rowe in 1946. Habachi conducted three short excavation seasons at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham from 1952 to 1955, and a team from Liverpool University under the direction of Snape reinitiated work in 1994. Although certain areas of the complex are thus reasonably well known, only approximately a third of the site has been explored, and a number of further seasons will pass before the Liverpool expedition publishes its final site report.

Snape and his team have already done much to clarify the structure of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham. For instance, Habachi had probed the enclosure wall in two places and estimated that it delineated an area of 100 × 80 m or 8,000 m². The Liverpool team, however, determined that the walls uniformly measured 140 m to a side and enclosed an area of 19,600 m². This finding more than doubles the size of the fortress from Habachi’s estimation and significantly alters its structure.

Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham’s mud-brick enclosure wall measured around 4 to 5 m in thickness and probably stood some 10 m high, which is comparable to the walls of Tell Abqa’in and also to those typically enclosing Nubian mnnw fortress-towns. There are a number of indications, however, that the designers of this Libyan fortress took defensive architecture rather more seriously than did their counterparts in Nubia. The gate of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, as it turns out, was heavily fortified with two imposing brick towers that flanked a narrow, limestone-lined entrance hall. The corners of the fortress had also been strengthened with bastions. Even more impressively, the architects had incorporated a thickly plastered glacis at the base of the wall for added protection. The glacis is typical of Middle

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823 Habachi 1980a: 16.
Kingdom Nubian fortresses and of Hyksos fortifications, but this feature remains otherwise unattested in New Kingdom architecture.

In the interior of the fortress, Habachi uncovered a 20 × 12 m temple composed of a pillared court, two transverse halls, and a tripartite sanctuary. This building had been constructed directly against the western wall of the fortress-town, providing it with a straight east-west axis in the traditional Egyptian manner. Habachi had excavated the building and discovered a pillar inscribed with the name of Ramesses II, a few laudatory texts, and a scene of Ramesses descending from his chariot.827 No other inscriptions or decorations survived, unless a doorjamb honoring Ptah, lord of Ankhtawy—found out of context some 50 m or so to the north—originally belonged to the temple.828 The Liverpool team reexamined this cultic building and recovered its pylons. To their surprise they further discovered not only a barque stand in the temple courtyard but also an elaborate drainage system that may have redirected rainwater to storage cisterns.829

Directly south of the temple and in communication with its courtyard was an adjunct temple—composed of another courtyard, a columned portico, and three interior shrines. The Liverpool team believes the chapel to have been dedicated to the deified Ramesses II, as it contained jambs referring to Ramesses’ destruction of Libya (Δ˙nw), texts extolling his prowess, and a stele that showed Ramesses dominating two prone Libyan chiefs.830 Steles depicting Ramesses slaughtering Libyans and interacting with the gods Amun-re and Sekhmet were also discovered in association with the complex.831 Finally, from the two most southerly chapels, the Liverpool team recovered a wide range of cultic detritus, including an incense burner still perched upon its stand, stirrup jars, base-ring juglets, Canaanite amphorae, as well as numerous other imported and local wares.832

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827 Habachi 1980a: 16.
831 Snape 1997: 24. The realization that Ptah and Sekhmet were worshiped at the site and the fact that a later settlement was called Apis prompted Rowe and Habachi to suggest that the northern temple may have been dedicated to the Memphite triad (Habachi 1980a: 18).
Temples devoted to the royal cult, especially that of Ramesses II, are most common in Nubian contexts, where they are found both inside *mnnw*-fortresses and on their own.

It is of particular interest that in their work at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, Snape and his team have identified two further cultic structures, both of which may have been oriented toward specific segments of the base’s population. To the east of the chapels just discussed, a 10 × 5 m limestone temple was identified. Fronted by a courtyard, three small chapels occupied the remainder of the temple, and texts indicated that these had been dedicated to the cults of Ptah and Sekhmet. Even without the inscriptions, however, the focus of the temple would have been clear. Finds within, for example, included a stone naos depicting Ptah and Sekhmet in raised relief and a 2/3 life-size statue of the troop commander Neb-Re, who grasped a standard topped with the head of Sekhmet.\(^3\) The profusion of evidence for these Memphite gods, here and elsewhere on the site, has led the Liverpool team to speculate that the resident garrison may have been recruited from the area of Memphis.\(^4\)

The second cultic structure, discovered in the south of the site and so referred to in reports as the “southern building,” is perhaps even more interesting. While this temple, like others at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, was composed of a broad courtyard that provided access to three long, transverse chambers, the building quite anomalously consisted of two stories. Discovered in the temple precinct were numerous out of *situ* elements inscribed with the names of Ramesses II and Neb-re, including a lintel that depicted Neb-Re seated beside his wife Mery-Ptah.\(^5\) The fact that this building possessed two stories and that one room included both a bath and a pedestal toilet has prompted Snape to suggest that it may have served, at least in part, as Neb-Re’s own residence.

What is most intriguing about the southern building, however, is that in each long chamber excavators discovered a tall (roughly 2 m high) freestanding pillar with a rounded top. The rounded tops of these monuments indicate that they should not be interpreted as

\(^5\) For a description of this southern building and the finds within, see Snape 2001: 19.
columns. Further, the apparently votive assemblage of ceramic arrayed around the base of each pillar provides a further attestation of their special status. As noted by the excavators, both Canaanites and Aegean peoples are known to have worshiped standing pillars in the Late Bronze Age.836 This odd southern building, then, may perhaps provide archaeological confirmation of Ramesses’ claim to have transplanted easterners to the west (KRI II, 206: 15), or alternatively, it might indicate that Sherden prisoners of war were employed in garrisons as well as in the regular Egyptian army (KRI II, 11: no. 26).

On a more secular note, the Liverpool excavations have also uncovered a substantial mud-brick storage complex located to the north of the main temple. According to preliminary reports, the magazine consisted of at least eight units measuring 16 × 3.5 m each. Inside these storerooms the excavators discovered color pigments and a considerable amount of pottery. While some of these wares were evidently Egyptian, trade wares from the Mediterranean made up the bulk of the assemblage. These exotic forms included base-ring juglets, stirrup jars, Canaanite amphorae, and “a repertoire of ceramic forms, which could almost be a type-collection of storage and transport jars of the Eastern Mediterranean in the Late Bronze Age.”837 From the ceramic evidence, which included a jar handle bearing an undeciphered Mediterranean script, it appears certain that the authorities at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham were active participants in the bustling maritime trade of the day—routinely exchanging the contents of their temple coffers for wine, olive oil, and numerous other commodities.838 If the Egyptians had indeed usurped this lucrative connection from the Libyans, as seems probable, it is little wonder that Egypto-Libyan relations deteriorated so precipitously in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Aside from their contents, the storage chambers were of interest for the inscriptions carved upon their limestone jambs and lintels. While the vast majority showcased the names and titles of Ramesses II, the lintel surmounting the entrance to the fifth storage chamber was different. This architectural feature bore the name and titles of

Neb-re and an image of this commander worshiping the cartouches of Ramesses II, a pose commonly adopted by high officials in Egypt, Nubia, and Canaan.\(^{839}\)

Neb-re’s titles are also known from a displaced fragment of a door-jamb, which bore a votive text to Ptah.\(^{840}\) This inscription read: “[True royal scribe], beloved of him, troop commander \(hry\, pdt\) and overseer of foreign lands \(imy-r\, h3swt\), Neb-re, true of voice” (KRI II, 475: 15). As has been noted many times previously, “troop commander” and “overseer of foreign lands” are the single most common titles held by fortress and garrison commanders stationed at Egypt’s borders, in the Sinai, and in Canaan. Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, however, is the first concrete example of a mmnw-fortress having been placed under the command of an official with these titles.

The numerous inscriptions bearing Neb-re’s name at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham are of particular interest, for they shed light on the official who not only commanded the fortress-town but who also likely played an instrumental role in its construction. Further, the fact that Neb-re’s name was carved on both religious and administrative buildings\(^{841}\) implies that this official exerted control over numerous aspects of life at the fort. Indeed, Snape has suggested, on the basis of later damage to some of Neb-re’s inscriptions, that this official may eventually have been forcibly deposed following a perception that he had overstepped his authority.\(^{842}\) The overseer of foreign lands, however, was not the only individual known from inscriptions at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham. A standard-bearer named Amenmessu and a royal scribe and great chief of the army named Panehesi, both good military men, erected votive steles at the fortress as well.\(^{843}\) All told, based on multiple lines of evidence, Snape suggests that a minimum of 500 men would have inhabited the site.

Other finds of interest at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham include a well that was located just opposite the storage magazines. Indeed, the

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\(^{841}\) It would be interesting to know whether the storeroom bearing Neb-re’s name contained his own private property, as opposed to temple property. If so, it would be of further interest whether Neb-Re housed his goods in the temple storeroom because it was the largest and most secure vault or whether a portion of temple profits was in fact steered into his own income.

\(^{842}\) Snape 2001: 19.

\(^{843}\) Habachi 1980a: 18, pl. vi.
cool water of this well and others like it had been memorialized in
the inscription from Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham’s gateway (discussed
in the textual section above). This well, which still bore water at the
time of its discovery by the Liverpool team, had been anciently
inscribed with the cartouches of Ramesses II and was complimented
by another well recently found elsewhere at the site. In this context,
it is significant that three similarly inscribed wells have been dis-
covered at Tell Abqa’in, the only other of Ramesses II’s western
Delta fortresses at which true fortifications have been identified (see
figure 49 and below).

To the south of the enclosure, the Liverpool team uncovered a
residential zone. In this area, modest three to four room houses were
found grouped around communal courtyards that often contained
ovens. The material assemblage of these houses, domestic courtyards,
and food production areas included numerous stone querns for grind-
ing grain (although no granaries have as yet been identified at the
site), mixing troughs, as well as beer bottles, water jars, drinking
cups, and numerous other assorted ceramic of both local and imported
varieties. Elsewhere at the site, Snape’s team encountered plentiful
evidence for the manufacture of linen cloth in the form of loom
weights, spindle whorls, and spinning bowls.844

Judging from the form of Ramesses II’s name as it is carved upon
the main storerooms at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, and given the
lack of attestations of earlier monarchs, it would appear that Ramesses
sponsored construction at the site in the opening years of his reign.845

The economy of the modern village of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham is
primarily agricultural, suggesting that the ancient site likewise may
have been capable of supporting a sizable population. Indeed, the
presence of the querns and even sickle blades in individual dwellings,
the courtyard configuration of the houses, and the size of the site
in general all combine to convey the impression that the men sta-
tioned at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham had settled at the base together
with their families and proceeded to support themselves, at least in
part, by farming the surrounding lands. If so, this permanent expa-
triate community would closely resemble those established since the
early Eighteenth Dynasty in Nubian mnnw to the south.

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While the establishment of a thriving fortress-town on the road from Libya to Egypt was undoubtedly undertaken with the object of thwarting eastward migrations, this endeavor appears not to have outlasted the reign of Ramesses II. No evidence of pharaonic occupation at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham postdates this period, and the lack of an observable destruction level at the site has led Snape to suggest that it had been abandoned prior to the Libyan invasion in Merneptah’s fifth year.846 A combination of the base’s great distance from Egypt’s borders and the relatively small size of its population in comparison to Libyan armies may have combined to make a continued occupation of the site impractical. Given the fortress-town’s original purpose, it is of course highly ironic that the final occupants of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham seem to have been Libyans.847

The purported chain of Libyan fortresses

Although Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham is the only western mmnw-fortress that has been intensively excavated in modern times, inscriptional evidence clearly indicates that it was not the only such installation to guard Egypt’s western frontier. Habachi also came to this conclusion based upon his experience as Inspector of the Western Delta. In the course of carrying out his duties, Habachi noticed that Ramesses II had undertaken major construction at a whole string of towns located on the western border of the Nile Delta and along the Mediterranean coastal road to Libya. Although the known inscriptional remains from these towns are solely cultic in nature, and even though superficial examinations have yet to reveal fortified walls at any of them, Habachi and other scholars believe that the temple ruins represent links in a chain of fortified towns, built or strengthened by Ramesses II in order to discourage Libyan encroachment into Egyptian territory.848

846 Snape, personal communication.
848 Habachi 1980a; Kitchen 1982: 71–72; 1990: 18–19; O’Connor 1982: 919; 1987a: 36–37; Oren 1987: 112; Leahy 2001: 292. Earlier scholars who anticipated Habachi’s conclusions include De Cosson (1935), Brinton (1942: 80) and Rowe (1953; 1954). By far the most useful overview of the information currently known regarding the Libyan fortresses along the western Delta and the coastal road to Libya is provided by Geoff Edwards in his web site devoted to the excavations at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham (www.geocities.com/zurdig/). I am indebted to this source for a number of the references cited in this summary. For a more skeptical view of the existence of a “chain” of Libyan fortresses, see Richardson 1999: 149.
Figure 48. Fortress-town at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham
(preliminary site plan courtesy of Geoff Edwards and Steven Snape)
The towns presumed to have been part of Ramesses II’s western line of defense fall into two categories, those located along the western edge of the Delta and others erected along the road to Libya. In the former category are Kom Abu Billo, Kom el-Hisn, Kom Firin, Tell Abqa’in, El-Barnugi, and perhaps Karm Abu Girg. Stone blocks bearing the name of Ramesses II or cultic inscriptions commissioned by this king were found at all these sites, although Habachi believed that Christian settlers had imported the inscribed stones to Karm Abu Girg for building material.

The presence of stone temples erected by Ramesses II at various towns would not be in the least remarkable, were it not for the fact that these sites are located in a neat line skirting the very edge of the Delta. Cultic buildings do not necessarily betray the presence of a fortress, for most state temples throughout Egypt were constructed of stone in the New Kingdom. Temples are important, however, in that they constituted the economic and social heart of an ancient Egyptian settlement. Royal patronage of a town’s temple, then, was in effect an investment in the town itself. Thus, even if none of these western Delta temples were constructed inside a major fortress, Ramesses II’s support for them was likely an attempt to create a defensible border by actively fostering the development of strong and populous towns.

Of the majority of these towns very little is known, due to a lack of archaeological work. The few scraps that are known, however, are extremely interesting. Kom Abu Billo, for example, was situated at the point at which the Wadi el-Natrun met the Rosetta branch of the Nile, and thus the town was of importance throughout much of pharaonic history. At this site excavators discovered anthropoid clay coffins, possibly indicating the presence of resident military

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849 Other sites suggested as probable Delta border-fortresses on the basis of strategic concerns include Kom el-Idris (Rowe 1953: 130-131; 1954: 487), Rhacotis (Rowe 1953: 137; 1954: 486), Ezbet Abu-Shawish (Rowe 1953: 140; 1954: 487), and El-Kurum el-Tuwal (Rowe 1954: 499).
850 KRI II, 471: 3 (Kom Abu Billo); KRI II, 471: 6–472: 10 (Kom el-Hisn); KRI II, 472: 13–16 (Kom Firin); KRI II, 473: 3–4 (Kom el-Abqa’in); KRI II, 473: 6 (El-Barnugi); and KRI II, 473: 9 (Karm Abu Girg).
personnel. Anthropoid clay coffins have also been discovered at a cemetery near Kom Firin. At Kom el-Hisn, another site of long-standing prominence, the mortuary evidence was also particularly intriguing. The discovery in the local cemetery of incomplete corpses, which had been anciently interred with weapons, suggested to the excavators that the occupants of the town might have been involved in an armed conflict with the Libyans.

Unlike Kom Abu Billo and Kom el-Hisn, Tell Abqa’in (see figure 49) seems to have been erected in the reign of Ramesses II and indeed to have been fortified by him with walls that—like those at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham—were roughly 4 to 5 m thick, bastioned, and would have stood some 10 m high. The presence of three deep wells inscribed with the cartouches of Ramesses II suggests that the settlement was located in a marginal area. Given that plenty of unoccupied arable land lay only a short distance to the east, this installation must have been founded for strategic reasons. Future excavations at the site should provide a wealth of information on the role this fortress played in Ramesses’ western defenses.

The second set of sites, those constructed along the coastal road, were not only far fewer, but they were also much more dispersed. Roughly 80 km separated El Barnugi, the last of the Delta towns, from El-Gharbaniyat, and nearly the same distance lay between El-Gharbaniyat and El-Alamein. Finally, a daunting 240 km separated El-Alamein and Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham. While it is conceivable that substantial distances separated these bases from one another, appearances might well be deceptive. Were it not for Seti’s Karnak relief and P. Anastasi I, after all, scholars would likely conclude that the Egyptians had fortified the northern Sinai road with only two or three bases, each located some 40–80 km apart.

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856 Habachi 1980a: 26; Thomas 2000. Excavations have been undertaken at this site by Susanna Thomas of Liverpool University since 1996. Although the dimensions of the outer walls are still somewhat tentative, it appears that they may have encompassed an area of roughly 39,000 m². This would place Tell Abqa’in in the same general league as the larger Nubian mmnw such as Sesebi and Sai. Many thanks are due to Dr. Thomas for allowing me to reproduce the map shown in figure 49.
857 Other locations suggested as possible sites for Ramesside fortresses in this coastal milieu—based upon their strategic value alone—include Khashm el-Eish (De Cosson 1935: 31, 120-121) and El-Bordan (De Cosson 1935: 26; Rowe 1953; 1954).
Regarding El-Gharbaniyat and El-Alamein, very little information is available. Only one inscription, discovered at El-Alamein, betrays aggressive intentions toward Libu-land (KRI II, 475: 7). Otherwise, the type of evidence recovered from the sites was, in fact, much the same as at the towns located along the western edge of the Delta. Stone temple debris from El-Gharbaniyat associates Ramesses II with the gods Re-Horakhty, Atum, Shu, Hauron, and perhaps Montu.\(^\text{858}\)

While it is an attractive suggestion that Hauron’s presence in the repertoire of deities is an artifact of Ramesses II’s policy of resettling easterners in the west, it is impossible to substantiate.\(^\text{859}\) The situation at El-Alamein is quite similar. In this coastal setting, blocks and steles highlight Ramesses II’s relationship with Shu, Re-Horakhty, Ptah-Tatenen, and Horus.\(^\text{860}\) Clearly, then, the scholarly assumption as to the military nature of El-Gharbaniyat and El-Alamein is due primarily to the geography of these settlements rather than to the nature of the material culture thus far found within.

**Overview of Egyptian Interactions with Nubia**

*Historical summary*

For the brief span of time that Ramesses I occupied Egypt’s throne, there is no direct evidence that he conducted or sanctioned a campaign against Nubia. His endeavors south of the border appear to have been of a more peaceful nature. The elderly pharaoh sponsored limited restoration work, for example, in the temple at the second cataract fortress of Mirgissa.\(^\text{861}\) Likewise, a stele discovered at Buhen records the king’s decision to commission a shrine (\(\text{s-h-ntr}\)) of Min-Amun at the fortress-town and to endow it with a gift of 12 loaves, 100 cakes, 4 jars of beer, and 10 bundles of vegetables.

In addition to the victuals, Ramesses donated an unspecified number of prisoners of war to serve as slaves in the temple workshop (KRI I, 2: 13–15; 3: 2). While the prisoners could have been

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\(^{858}\) Habachi 1980a: 24–25.

\(^{859}\) Habachi 1980a: 29. For Hauron’s affiliation with Canaanite and Egypto-Canaanite populations, see Albright 1936; 1941.

\(^{860}\) KRI II, 474: 2, 5, 9, 10.

\(^{861}\) Porter and Moss VII: 142; Reisner 1960: 22.
Figure 49. Fortress-town at Tell Abqa’în
(preliminary plan courtesy of Susanna Thomas)
captured in Nubia, evidence that Seti conducted at least one northern campaign as crown prince (KRI I, 111: 10–11, 13) has led some to conclude that the prisoners were most likely Syro-Palestinian.\textsuperscript{862} Resettling northerners in the south and southerners in the north—as had been pharaonic policy since the late Eighteenth Dynasty—undoubtedly dramatically lessened the likelihood of prisoners of war fleeing their assigned duties in order to return to their relatives and communities.

The first known Nineteenth Dynasty attack on Nubia came in the eighth\textsuperscript{863} regnal year of Seti I, and the campaign was carried out not against Nilotic Nubians but rather against the desert dwellers of Irem. According to the official account, which Seti published on steles at Amara West and Sai,\textsuperscript{864} the pharaoh had been informed by his agents of Iremite plotting well before any acts of insurrection had actually occurred. Faced with the prospect of mounting an expensive campaign to punish traitorous intentions, Seti apparently decided to draw up battle plans but to refrain from implementing them before more information was obtained (KRI I, 102: 14–103: 1).

It is not known whether the people of Irem eventually carried out their plans or whether further intelligence reports advocated the utility of a preemptive strike. Assured finally of the need for definitive action, however, Seti decreed slaughter for the rebellious people of Irem and their leaders. The infantry and chariotry that Seti sent in pursuit of the rebels departed from the Nile Valley upon reaching an otherwise unknown mmnw-fortress called “Pacifier of [. . . foreign land/people].” After seven days of searching the desert, battle was finally waged in the vicinity of six wells, all of which the Egyptians captured and presumably either defiled or secured with armed forces.

Considering the preoccupation with the land of Irem in New Kingdom inscriptions,\textsuperscript{865} however, it is remarkable just how few


\textsuperscript{863} Due to damage above the four strokes on the Amara West stele (KRI I, 102: 6), the date is not certain. A general consensus, however, favors year eight (Kitchen 1977: 215; Spalinger 1979d: 279; Murnane 1990: 102).


\textsuperscript{865} According to O’Connor (1987b: 125), the toponym appears in 52% of the topographical lists in the New Kingdom.
Iremites Seti’s army actually encountered. While the booty lists of the Amara and Sai steles are admittedly damaged, they imply that the Egyptians seized only 54 young men of military age, 49 children, and 66 beautiful maidservants (ṣdmw/t nfrwt; KRI I, 103: 5–104: 5). Further, it seems that all told the spoil of war amounted to just over 220 humans and some 420 head of cattle. Even factoring in the possibility that many of the Iremites were killed in battle, the campaign does not seem to have been mounted against a particularly daunting foe.

Now, just exactly where Irem should be located is the subject of much debate. Suggestions have included Upper Nubia in the environs of Kerma, the desert regions southwest of the third cataract, the area east of the Abu Hamed reach, and the northern Butana or the Berber-Shendi reach. Helck, for his part, has denied the toponym any specificity at all! Yet despite the reams of paper devoted to this topic, no proposal fits all of the evidence seamlessly. When, however, Seti’s inscription is focused upon in isolation, the high ratio of cattle to humans and the reference to wells indicate that, in this case at least, the rebellious Iremites were likely seminomadic pastoralists.

Although the heartland of the Egyptian empire in Nubia was the Nile Valley, there are a number of reasons why the imperial government conducted campaigns against desert dwellers. Aggression by nomads aimed at Egyptian mining projects, trade routes, and Nilotic settlements, for example, each occasioned imperial wrath. A rather inglorious added allure to these conflicts, however, must have been the prospect of a swift and easy seizure of animal and human booty from a relatively disorganized and poorly armed foe. Indeed, we

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868 Kitchen (1977: 217–218) locates the battle in the Wadi el-Qa’ab, while Vercoutter (1980: 165–177) locates the battle in the Wadi el-Qa’ab, while Vercoutter (1980: 165–177; followed by Topozada 1988: 160, n. 33; 162) believes it to have taken place south of Wadi Howar.
871 Helck 1975a: 98.
know that in his 44th year Ramesses II commanded his viceroy to capture Libyan tribesmen for the sole purpose of securing labor for a building project at Wadi es-Sebua (KRI III, 95: 12–14).

In searching for Irem, or at least the Iremites that Seti encountered, then, it is important to locate an identifiable area of Egyptian interest not much more than 150 km from a Nile Valley fortress. Likewise, although the environment was obviously one in which potable water was obtained primarily from wells, the area must also have been fertile enough in the second millennium to support a substantial transhumant population. Utilizing these criteria, the suggestions put forth by both Kitchen and O’Connor remain particularly attractive.

According to Kitchen, the six wells near where the Iremites were apprehended should be identified with the six permanent wells found roughly 65 km southwest of the third cataract area in the Wadi el-Qa’ab. Not only was this a region frequented by pastoralists, but the well-watered wadi would also have provided the Iremites with a convenient base from which to raid the nearby gold mines or to harass the new governmental center at Amara West. O’Connor’s thesis that the land of Irem was located in the Northern Butana or the Berber-Shendi reach, on the other hand, more easily explains the association between Punt and Irem in Hatshepsut’s Punt relief.

The Butana Desert is peppered with a series of important wells, and a nomadic group located in this area could have interfered with Egyptian access to trade routes on a regular basis. Ultimately, the question of the location of the conflict could be answered with relative ease if the identity of the fortress “Pacifier of [. . . foreign land/people]” could be divined. This problem, although ultimately irresolvable, will be discussed in more depth below.

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872 An army marching through rugged terrain can generally cover roughly 20 km a day (Astour 1981: 14).
873 It is possible that the Iremites had fled deeper into the desert than was their wont due to the Egyptian pursuit. The small number of warriors and the presence of women and children, however, suggest that the group may simply have been caught unawares.
877 Crawford 1953: 20–23; O’Connor 1982: 939; 1987b: 133, 135. Given the seven-day excursion from the nearest fortress, the conflict would almost certainly have occurred in the Butana rather than the Berber-Shendi reach.
As O’Connor points out, perceptions of the effectiveness and scope of New Kingdom foreign policy are significantly altered depending upon whether Irem is to be located west of the third cataract or east of the fourth.\(^{878}\) His point has merit, and it has been reiterated by a number of other scholars since.\(^{879}\) It is worth noting, however, that even undeniably strong and aggressive leaders had difficulty with nomadic activity in their own backyards. Seti I, for instance, fought Shasu along the Sinai road, while Ramesses II waged war on bedouin in Lower Nubia. If nomads in the third cataract region conducted occasional razzias against Egyptian enclaves or property, this shouldn’t necessarily be viewed as a sign of weakness on the part of Egypt. By the same token, if the Iremites hailed instead from the Butana, it is not surprising that they would have interacted with Egyptians on a regular basis. The imperial government had maintained a strong center at Napata since the early Eighteenth Dynasty and no doubt regularly vied with indigenous peoples over access to water and other resources associated with the trade routes.

While Seti’s campaign against the people of Irem could theoretically have been depicted in the damaged third register at Karnak, most scholars believe that the reliefs would have been completed by the time the battle took place.\(^{880}\) Indeed, Kitchen has even suggested that because there was no more room to depict his victory in a battle scene, Seti attempted to memorialize the campaign in a different fashion.\(^{881}\) At some point during his reign, scribes recarved a toponym list that related specifically to Seti’s Syro-Palestinian victories and replaced it with a standardized set of Nubian toponyms—the latter copied from a list of Thutmose III.\(^{882}\) Kitchen’s explanation, that this re-carving was Seti’s token effort to commemorate his Irem war, provides a plausible excuse for the otherwise puzzling problem of why this king would replace a toponym list memorializing his actual victories with a seemingly generic Nubian list.

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\(^{878}\) O’Connor 1987b: 129.


\(^{880}\) Kitchen 1977: 215; Spalinger 1979b: 42. Breasted (AR III: 77) suggests that an earlier Nubian war may have been depicted in the damaged register, but aside from the Egyptian predilection for balance (i.e., including Syro-Palestinian, Libyan, and Nubian battle scenes at Karnak), there is no reason to suspect this to have been the case.


\(^{882}\) Edel 1976: 88–89; Spalinger 1979b: 42; Murnane 1990: 44.
There is, however, one further relief that may showcase Seti’s year eight battle against the Iremites. Ramesses II, while still heir apparent, constructed a temple at Beit el-Wali upon which he depicted himself and two of his sons charging into a group of Nubians as they fled pell-mell to their village in panic. The associated text provides practically no historically pertinent information whatsoever. Oddly enough, however, the relief itself is almost anecdotal in its detail, even down to the identification of Seti’s viceroy, Amenemopet, as one of the participants. Given that this campaign must have occurred in Seti’s reign—a period for which no other Nubian wars are attested—it is quite possible that Ramesses had participated in the raid on Irem and chose to memorialize his own role in the conflict on the walls at Beit el-Wali.

Outside of the incident with the Iremites, Seti’s rule over Nubia appears to have been predominantly peaceful. Much of Egyptian imperial energy focused upon the matter-of-fact work of gold extraction. Indeed, there seems to have been a concerted effort at this time to open mines in formerly inaccessible areas. Seti claimed to have sunk at least one new well into a gold-rich area of the Wadi el-Miyah (KRI I, 66: 7–12), just east of Elkab, but his attempt to hit water in the Wadi Allaqi was apparently abandoned after a probe 120 cubits deep still came up dry (KRI II, 357: 1–4). This intensification of mining activity and exploration of new areas may be attributable, as Vercoutter suggests, to a decline in the profitability of the older mines.

Of Seti’s building projects, the founding of the fortress-towns of Aksha, just north of Buhen, and Amara West, just south of the third cataract, were undoubtedly his most ambitious. While these settlements will be discussed in-depth below, it is important in this context to

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883 See Säve-Söderbergh (1941: 172), however, who argues that a number of the colorful details—such as the crying woman, the wounded soldier, and the shepherd—are first observed in Horemheb’s reliefs and are discovered again at Derr. The latter observation is somewhat less troubling, however, if one believes that the reliefs at Beit el-Wali and Derr memorialize the same event (see O’Connor 1987b: 132).

884 Spalinger 1979d: 280, n. 53. See Kitchen (1977: 220; 1982: 40 followed by Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 5), however, who believes the Beit el-Wali scene to refer to a later conflict undertaken when Ramesses was officially co-regent.

885 The Turin gold map depicts another well and temple sponsored by Seti in the Wadi Hammamat (Kees 1977: 123).

point out that the two towns lay within a day’s journey from the earlier capitals of Upper and Lower Nubia, i.e., Soleb and Faras. The former lay in an important gold-bearing zone and the latter in an exceptionally fertile area, regions that made sense as administrative capitals. Given that both of these towns had flourished in the late Eighteenth Dynasty, and so would have remained in good physical shape in the Nineteenth Dynasty, it is likely that Seti’s decision to found new towns in their vicinity was primarily political. By establishing new residences for the deputies of Kush and Wawat—and perhaps also assigning a good portion of the wealth of the older towns to his new foundations—Seti could deliberately emphasize the distinction between his administration and the one that had come before.887

Other building projects were more modest in scale. In Lower Nubia blocks from the temples at Dakka and Amada suggest that building projects were undertaken there, while the fortress at Buhen continued to be utilized as a governmental base and population center.888 In Upper Nubia, aside from his work at Amara West, Seti also built in the temples at Sesebi and Gebel Barkal.889

Although Seti commissioned work on a not insubstantial number of temples, his activity pales in comparison to that undertaken by his son. Over the course of nearly seventy years as pharaoh, Ramesses II conducted an enormous amount of construction work in Nubia. It is remarkable, however, that for the duration of his long reign only one Nubian campaign is definitively attested.890 This venture, like the raid that Ramesses may have participated in as a youth, was waged against the Iremites.

887 See also Morkot 1987: 37.
888 For Dakka, see Bresciani 1975: 988. For Amada, see Porter and Moss VII: 73; Badawy 1968: 273. For Buhen, see H. S. Smith 1976: 99, 109; 212–213; Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 99. According to the texts, the cults of Horus of Buhen (KRI I, 100: 5; 304: 9) and Min-Amun (KRI I, 38: 2–12; 100: 9–10) continued to thrive at Buhen. Cults to the cataract deities and Horus also thrived at Elephantine, Bigeh, Aniba (mi’im), and Kubban (baky) (KRI I, 101: 4–5).
890 With the exception of the monuments relating to his campaign against Irem, discussed below, most of Ramesses II’s rhetorical statements or reliefs referencing Nubian victories have been deemed to hold little or no historical value (Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 171–172; Emery 1965: 193; Gaballa 1976: 107; Leclant 1978: 207).
At Amara West, Ramesses commissioned a scene of himself slaughtering Nubians who were identified in the text as men from Irem. While the inscription provides almost no specific information, it does include a partially preserved list of the captured and killed. Astoundingly, the numbers amount to more than 2,000 slain and well over 5,000 captured (KRI II, 222: 15–16). Obviously, this expedition must have been waged against a far more formidable force than the one encountered by Seti. Indeed, the numbers suggest either that these Iremites belonged to an agrarian population or, perhaps more likely, that the enemy comprised a coalition of normally autonomous, seminomadic entities that had banded together under strong leadership for the occasion.

If it indeed refers to the same conflict, a monument erected by the viceroy Setau may shed light upon the large numbers attested at Amara West. The stele, which refers to the capture or plunder (ḫ3k) of vile Irem, also details the seizure of the leader of Akuyuta together with his wife, his children, and an unspecified number of prisoners of war (KRI III, 93: 9–12). In Egyptian inscriptions, Akuyuta refers to the land and population located in the general vicinity of Wadi Allaqi, the mining district in Lower Nubia. That these people should have joined forces with the Iremites, who occupied the fringes of Upper Nubia, suggests a quite substantial rebellion of non-Nilotic Nubians.

68). In one extremely interesting example at Abydos (KRI II, 193: 4–5), a text makes reference to a victory over peoples in Khenthennefer, but the year of the victory and the numbers of the slain and captured were never filled in! While Kitchen (1977: 221) tentatively associates this scene with the campaign against Irem, it appears the essence of a generic “fill in the victory” royal monument.

891 It is tempting to date to the aftermath of this campaign a Ramesside letter containing a request that prisoners from Irem and a neighboring district be sent to Egypt (Trigger 1976: 113). Certainly, after such a victory there would have been no shortage of manpower to allocate.

892 Fairman’s (1948: 8) attribution of an “original” scene to Seti, and Gaballa’s (1976: 107) contention that this scene should be equated with the scenes carved at Beit el-Wali and Derr—and thus relate to Seti’s year eight campaign—are misguided for numerous reasons. Not only is there no evidence of recarving, as even Fairman admits, but the discrepancy in the scale of the two encounters is massive. Likewise, it is known that the viceroy Setau led a campaign against Irem at a point that cannot have predated the middle of Ramesses II’s fourth decade as pharaoh.

The phenomenon of “nomadization” has been discussed above and in chapter four with regard to many formerly sedentary people in Late Bronze Age Syria-Palestine who abandoned their settlements for reasons having to do with war, political oppression, or economic distress. Many of these individuals joined the ‘Apiru and either attached themselves to freebooting warlords or chose to inhabit the remote fringes of the empire, well beyond the effective control of the Egyptian government.\footnote{Liverani 1979a: 17–18; Bienkowski 1989: 61; Knapp 1992: 92, 94. Indeed, many biblical archaeologists favor this “peasant rebellion” theory as an explanation for the settlement of the Canaanite hill country and the emergence of Israel (see Gottwald 1985: 36, 37).} A similar scenario may well have occurred in New Kingdom Nubia. Certainly, the reference to an altercation with 7,000 semisedentary people coincides rather neatly with a period at which archaeologists have remarked upon a dramatic decline in the population of the Nile Valley proper.\footnote{Arkell 1966: 103–104; Trigger 1976: 131–137; Kemp 1978: 39–43; Morkot 1987: 38–39; Williams 1992: 141–142; S. T. Smith 1995: 154–156.}

It is interesting, in fact, to note that the settled agrarian communities in Canaan and Lower Nubia also shared much the same fate in the thirteenth century. On both frontiers towns that enjoyed Egyptian patronage flourished, or at least showed signs of relative health, while those ignored by the Egyptians except for the purposes of taxation existed in a state of economic and cultural depression or dwindled finally into nonexistence.\footnote{For the fullest discussion of this problem, see Adams 1964: 103–109; 1984a: 236; 1984b: 62. See the critiques of this argument by Kemp (1978: 39–43), Morkot (1987: 38–39), and S. T. Smith (1995: 154–156).} In Nubia, however, the decline of the local communities became so dire that one archaeologist rather dramatically concluded that Nubia had become “a sort of no man’s land ruled by the gods and peopled by the ghosts of the dead.”\footnote{Firth 1927: 28.}

It should be stated that numerous scholars have attempted to temper this bleak portrait of life in Ramesside Nubia.\footnote{For Syria-Palestine, see de Vaux 1978: 123; Liebowitz 1987: 5; Knapp 1992: 93–94; and for Nubia see Kemp 1978: 39–43; Adams 1984a: 241; Morkot 1987: 38–39; S. T. Smith 1993: 200-201; 212.} They suggest that a movement toward group interments, also occurring simultaneously in Egypt, made Ramesside burials difficult to discern. Another theory is that the indigenous population had become so economically depressed that relatives simply ceased interring objects with
their loved ones, thereby rendering the burials significantly more difficult to date.

While these explanations no doubt have merit, a depression—whether caused by repressive Egyptian policies, a falling Nile level, or some other reason—may also have led to the disaffection of the indigenous population and to a large-scale abandonment of the area. Indeed, it is tempting to interpret the boast of a Ramesside official that he brought children of Retenu to serve on the divine estates at Abu Simbel (KRI III, 204: 1–5) as an implication that the shortage of manpower had become so severe that it was necessary to import foreign labor. Although there is evidence that indigenous leaders still survived in Lower Nubia and Kush, the extent to which the Egyptians may have appealed to these individuals to restrain a widespread exodus, and indeed the extent of their power to do so, is unknown.

While the health of the countryside and its population may have failed in the reign of Ramesses II, imperial ventures thrived. Gold working, for example, was significantly aided by a new well that Ramesses sunk in the Wadi Allaqi. Unlike his father, Ramesses evidently succeeded in his effort to open up new mines in this extremely arid region (KRI II, 355: 1–359: 15). And, indeed, a surge in mining activity following the sinking of Ramesses’ well is attested epigraphically. The vast majority of the inscriptions left by individuals involved in gold mining are contemporary with or postdate the well’s excavation, and a good many of the inscriptions are discovered in its immediate vicinity.

In addition to jobs in the gold-working industry, Nubia in the reign of Ramesses II must have offered plentiful opportunities for experienced stonemasons. To a degree unprecedented in the reign

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899 See Adams 1984b: 63. In this context it is pertinent to note that Setau, a viceroy in the reign of Ramesses II, boasted that he had “doubled every tax (\(\Delta r\)) of this land of Kush and brought deliveries (\(\text{inw}\)) of this land of Kush (as numerous) as the sands of the sea” (Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 7).

900 Admittedly, however, according to Ramesses II, northern prisoners of war would ideally be settled in the south regardless of local conditions.

901 According to a stele, perhaps found at Serra, it appears that Ramesses II’s viceroy, Hekanakht, may have given the prince of Teh-Khet a field of 5 aroura (Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 204).

902 The “good ruler of Kush” is referred to on a wine docket discovered at Aniba (Steindorff 1937: 152; Säve-Söderbergh and Troy 1991: 207).

of any pharaoh before or since, Ramesses crammed Nubia with his own pious monuments. Like his forbearers, he undertook building or refurbishing projects at the temples in a number of the older fortress-towns, such as Elephantine, Kubban, and Faras, and he usurped temple inscriptions of Tutankhamun’s at Kawa. Ramesses also built grand temples at the fortified towns that Seti had founded at Aksha and Amara West; these will be discussed in-depth below. Other older towns, including Buhen, Askut, Semna, Sai, and Sesebi, continued to show signs of occupation, although they were not graced with new temples.

The works for which Ramesses II is most famous, however, are the temples that he constructed outside of any observable settlement. These included Beit el-Wali, Gerf Hussein, Derr, Wadi es-Sebua, and Abu Simbel in Lower Nubia, as well as the Amun temple at Napata in Upper Nubia. Further, at almost all of these sites at least one of the major gods worshiped was a divine form of Ramesses II himself. As these institutions were clearly not intended to serve as the social and economic center of a viable community, scholars

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904 For Elephantine, see Habachi 1975b: 1218, 1221. For Kubban, see Donadoni 1984: 52; KRI III, 124: 5. For Horus, lord of Baki, see KRI II, 354: 11; 721: 5; 770: 1; KRI III, 120: 6; 121: 9, etc. For Aniba, see Porter and Moss VII: 81. For Horus, lord of Miam, see KRI II, 354: 11–12; 722: 9; 728: 12; 770: 1; KRI III, 127: 5–6, etc. For a possible “Road of Horus, lord of Miam,” see Zaba 1974: 189. For Faras, see Arkell 1966: 102 and Karkowski 1981: 74. For Amun of shtp⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻⁻㈠

908 Cults of the deified Ramesses II are found at Gerf Hussein, Derr, Wadi es-Sebua, Abu Simbel, and Aksha (Trigger 1976: 118). In-depth studies of Ramesses self-deification have been undertaken by Habachi (1969b) and Wildung (1973a; 1973b).
have suggested that these grand and mostly rock-cut temples were intended to overawe the local population,\textsuperscript{909} to convert them to the cult of the divine pharaoh and to Egyptian ideology,\textsuperscript{910} or—more pragmatically—to provide both spiritual and physical protection for shipping in lonely and dangerous areas.\textsuperscript{911}

Whatever the rationale that prompted such a great explosion of “obsessive” or “megalomaniac” temple building and self-promotion, Ramesses’ example was not emulated in Nubia by any of his successors. Indeed, Ramesses was the last New Kingdom pharaoh to construct his own temple in Nubia! Nineteenth Dynasty construction activity after his reign was negligible. Artisans carved a few blocks at Dakka in Merneptah’s reign and reinscribed earlier works with this king’s name in the temple at Elephantine.\textsuperscript{912} The ephemeral rulers that finished out the dynasty, however, do not seem to have built in Nubia at all.

The last major military event of the Nineteenth Dynasty in Nubia has been alluded to above with regard to Merneptah’s great war against the Libu and their Sea People allies. Merneptah, just as he was amassing his troops to attack his Libyan enemy, received word that a “fallen one” of Lower Nubia had rebelled, apparently in league with Nubians from Kush (KRI IV, 1: 10–12). It is unfortunately unknowable whether the Nubians deliberately acted in consort with the Libyans and their allies or whether they opportunistically rose in rebellion once it became known that the Egyptian army was preoccupied in the north.\textsuperscript{913} Either scenario is plausible.

It is of special interest, however, that this battle of Merneptah’s is the only clear incidence in the Nineteenth Dynasty of Nilotic Nubians rebelling—and, even more dramatically, of Lower Nubians rebelling. This act of insurrection was as unbelievable, given the strength and extent of Egyptian power in the Nineteenth Dynasty, as the contemporaneous rebellions of Ashkelon and Gezer. It would

\textsuperscript{909} Wildung 1973b: 562; Kemp 1978: 25.
\textsuperscript{910} Adams 1984b: 60.
\textsuperscript{911} Trigger 1965: 11.
\textsuperscript{912} For Dakka, see Bresciani 1975: 988. For Elephantine, see Habachi 1975b: 1221. The cult of Horus of Buhen apparently still functioned in Merneptah’s reign (KRI IV, 97: 9).
\textsuperscript{913} Those who believe that the Libyans and Nubians acted in consort as part of a deliberate plot to distract the Egyptian army include Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 172–173; Kitchen 1977: 222–223; 1990: 19–20; O’Connor 1990: 86.
seem, then, that Egypt’s oppressed peripheries must have held high hopes for a Libyan success. Certainly, they would never have attempted such bold moves were the Egyptian military at ease.

All three of Egypt’s frontiers, however, woefully underestimated the strength of the imperial army. After the Libyans were defeated, the revolts to the north and south were quickly and cruelly quelled. Like his father, Merneptah chose mass deportation to Egypt as his method of staunching rebellion. Terror tactics worthy of Amenhotep II were also employed. While the text implies that only the Libyan offenders were impaled at Memphis, the leaders of the Nubian rebellion were apparently set on fire in the presence of their followers. Other Nubians were mutilated and sent earless or eyeless back to their homes in Kush, and the inhabitants of still other Kushite polities, if the inscriptions can be trusted, were made into heaps in their settlements. The purpose of such emphatically brutal treatment of the survivors, as stated in the texts, was to ensure that Kush would never again rebel (KRI IV, 1: 13–2: 1). Within Egypt itself, such treatments were generally reserved for crimes against the state and for those who violated the strictest of oaths—both charges for which the Nubians too were answerable.914

For the remainder of Merneptah’s reign and, in fact, for the remainder of the Nineteenth Dynasty, no military or civic ventures of any sort are noted. In Siptah’s third year, however, a graffito at Buhen records the passage of a treasurer who had journeyed south in order to receive the šk3ka-taxes of Kush (KRI IV, 368: 7). This official, one suspects, may have made the trip to Nubia in conjunction with a first charioteer and royal messenger to Nubia who also left a graffito in Siptah’s third year at Buhen.915 This official bore the epithet “one who establishes the leaders (wrw) in their offices” (KRI IV, 364: 14). It would certainly seem that the process of approv-

914 For comparisons, see the terror tactics employed by Amenhotep II abroad (chapter three) and the punishments threatened for offenders against state property in Horemheb’s Decree (chapter four) or Seti’s Nauri Decree (below).
915 The cult of Horus, lord of Buhen, still functioned in the reign of Seti II (KRI IV, 282: 5) and Siptah (KRI IV, 348: 7, 15; 349: 3; 374: 8, 15; 374: 8–11). In P. Anastasi VI, Elephantine is mentioned as a landmark in connection with the extraction of corvée labor from a wider area (P. Anastasi IV, 75–76). As the other toponym is unknown and the duties of the correspondents kept them otherwise in Egypt, it is likely that Elephantine simply marked the southernmost area from which individuals were to be requisitioned.
ing and formally swearing in new leaders could have been efficiently combined with the yearly event of tax collection.

The installations of new rulers undertaken in Siptah’s reign were likely of a routine nature, unlike the selection of new puppet leaders for the Nubian communities, which must have occurred after Merneptah had burned their predecessors alive. The Egyptian right to formally approve and swear in new rulers, to remove objectionable rulers from power, and to execute those viewed as rebels was exercised on all frontiers throughout the New Kingdom. Whether the new rulers in Siptah’s time had been raised and educated in Egypt, as was the custom in the Eighteenth Dynasty, is unclear. Following a rebellion of the scale of that which had recently occurred, however, such tried and true imperial practices may have been reinstated, if indeed they had ever been allowed to lapse.

Summary of the Textual and Archaeological Evidence for Nineteenth Dynasty Southern Fortress-towns

In the Nineteenth Dynasty, at long last, direct evidence clearly states that the first cataract installations at Bigeh and Elephantine were regarded as true border-fortresses, i.e., htmw. In the New Kingdom, htm-forteresses were constructed at the major entry points to Egypt, such as wadis, river mouths, and land passages. While these fortified centers would indeed help block an invasion if such were attempted, their more prosaic function was to monitor transborder traffic and to provide a record of the people and goods that entered or exited Egypt on a daily basis. As the country’s official southern border, the first cataract was the logical place for such htm-fortresses to have been located with respect to Nubia.

While the military compounds at Elephantine and Bigeh were likely referred to as htm-fortresses in the Eighteenth Dynasty as well, no definite evidence of this can be brought to bear. The two fortresses are classified semantically only in a single text—the Duties of the Vizier, found copied on the tomb walls of Thutmose III’s vizier. While both Elephantine and Bigeh are unambiguously termed mnnw fortress-towns in this source, the original text may have had Middle Kingdom roots and certainly was composed no later than the reign of Ahmose. It is thus not improbable that the use of the term mnnw to describe the fortresses at Elephantine and Bigeh in Rekhmire’s tomb was anachronistic, a hold over from a time when all Nubian military bases were uniformly known as mnnw-fortresses.
In the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, the situation becomes far less ambiguous. The compound at Bigeh is specifically referred to as a htm-fortress in three texts (the Nauri Decree, the Turin tax list, and O. Gardiner 362), and its formal name incorporated the nomen of the reigning monarch. The other htm-fortress, which is listed in conjunction with Bigeh in the Nauri Decree and the Turin tax list, should be placed at Elephantine on geographic grounds alone. Certainly no other major New Kingdom installation is known from the first cataract region. Further, the text of a model letter implies that both infantry and chariots were stationed at Elephantine in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

As at northern htm-fortresses, the military personnel stationed in the first cataract were placed under the command of an overseer of the htm-fortress (imy-r htm). Further, it would appear that this official, like his northern counterparts, was not infrequently drawn from the rank of troop commander (hry pdt). Other personnel associated with the southern htm-fortresses included scribes and administrators (rwΔw), all of whom had the potential to abuse their power by confiscating goods at the border—either as a semiofficial or as an unofficial duty-tax. For this reason, Seti I found it advisable to curb this practice, at least with regard to property belonging to his own temple, by issuing extremely harsh penalties to errant htm-fortress officials.

Although there is a good deal of textual information about htm-fortresses in Nineteenth Dynasty Nubia, the archaeological remains of these compounds at Elephantine and Bigeh have thus far eluded discovery and may indeed be irrecoverable due to later activity in the area. Nubia’s only contemporary and securely attested “mnnw” unfortunately also lacks an archaeological correlate. The failure to identify this mnnw-fortress, known as Pacifying-[the-foreign land/people],” is especially distressing given that knowledge of its identity could help settle the debate concerning the location of Irem. After all, Seti’s forces had departed the Nile Valley in the vicinity of this particular fortress in order to pursue desert-dwelling Iremite foe.

Pacifying-[the-foreign land/people] was undoubtedly not, however, the only mnnw-fortress that was actively occupied at this time. The newly constructed towns of Aksha and Amara West (see figures 51 and 52), for instance, were also almost certainly termed mnnw fortress-towns, and indeed both shared important features in common. The two towns were each founded in the reign of Seti I, and although the Nineteenth Dynasty settlements were significantly smaller than
earlier *mnw* fortress-towns, in general they conformed to the pattern of their predecessors. Each town, for example, was bounded by a thick enclosure wall that exhibited buttressed corners but few other nods to defensive concerns. Likewise, both Aksha and Amara West allotted a substantial portion of their total area to temple precincts, originally constructed in each case by Seti I. Early in his reign, however, Ramesses II replaced his father’s temples with new ones, dedicated to the deified image of himself and to the god Amun-re.

While the temple at Amara West possessed an extra forecourt and hypostyle hall, the structure of the two buildings was otherwise virtually identical. In light of this, it is important to note that the viceroy Hekanakht is attested at both sites, and so it is likely that the temple renovations occurred during his tenure. Hekanakht, who is always associated with the early spelling of Ramesses’ name (*r*-ms-s[ı̀]), held office within the first decade of this king’s reign.\(^\text{916}\)

Outside the temple precinct, both Aksha and Amara West incorporated workshops, storage magazines, and domestic areas into their town plans. In neither case, however, were the houses of the townspeople considered a focus of excavation strategy. This deemphasis on settlement archaeology is a pity, for an investigation of the habitations at either site might have shed light on their ethnic and socioeconomic composition, as well as on the stresses that contributed to Nubia’s significant population loss at this time.

One feature of Amara West that is notable and unique is the large residency that served as the seat of the *idnw* of Kush. Given that Aksha seems in many ways to have been the Lower Nubian complement to Amara West, it would not be surprising if Aksha had contained a similar residence for the *idnw* of Wawat. The Franco-Argentine expedition excavated roughly half of the town, leaving plenty of space in which such a residence could have been built.

Despite the garrison associated with Elephantine and the army’s departure from a *mnw*-fortress to pursue the Iremites, the military function of the fortress-towns in Nineteenth Dynasty Nubia seems to have been marginal at best. By the reign of Seti I, Nubia had been under Egyptian control for centuries, and the material culture of the inhabitants of Nubia was indistinguishable from that of the Egyptians. While this did not stop the Lower Nubians from seizing the opportunity

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\(^{916}\) Spalinger 1980: 97.
to rebel in Merneptah’s reign, for the most part the overseers of ḫtm-fortresses had little to fear from a southerly invasion. What they did have, however, was the prodigious task of monitoring the near constant movement of goods and people between Egypt and Nubia.

The inhabitants of the mnnw-fortresses south of the first cataract seem likewise unburdened by security concerns, if the houses and shrines constructed outside the town walls are any indication. The dearth of military titles and martial artifacts in contrast to the numerous religious and administrative titles is also remarkable. Finally, it is notable that the architects of the Nineteenth Dynasty Nubian mnnw-fortresses, like their Eighteenth Dynasty counterparts, placed barely a modicum of emphasis on defensive architecture.

Textual References to Nineteenth Dynasty Southern Fortress-Towns

Reign of Seti I

1. wn.in ḫm.f ḫr wd p3 mš² mtt ḫr ṣs spr [pw] ir.n mš² n ḫm.f r mnnw sgr[. . .] 3bd 3 prt sw 13 iw.w ḫr ṭs r.sn p3 ḫpš n pr-3 r-ḥ3t.sn mi hh n nsr ḫr ṭpt ṭw ḫpr ṭw3w n 7 ḥrw iw in sn p3 ḫpš n mnn-mš³-r² ḫty ḫ3 w² ṭw3w mi ḫmwt ḫ3k.f ḫmwt n mn-n.f ḫmwt 6 (Amara West and Sai Nubian war steles; KRI I, 103: 7–13)

Then his majesty dispatched the army (and) likewise numerous chariot. Then the army of his majesty arrived at the mn(n)w-fortress Pacif[ier of . . . foreign land/peoples] in the third month of Peret, day 13. They went up against them, the strong arm of pharaoh (going) before them like a burst of flame, trampling the mountains, and when the dawn came, seven days (later), the strong arm of Menmaatre delivered them, without missing (even) one of them, consisting of men (and) women alike. It (= the army) plundered six wells.

Despite the fact that Egyptians in New Kingdom Nubia frequently interacted with inhabitants of the land of Irem, Egyptologists have been unable to arrive at a consensus as to where the Iremite homeland should be located. For this reason, it is particularly frustrating that the mnnw-fortress of this inscription is of such little utility in settling the question. Later damage to both the Amara West and the Sai steles unfortunately badly obscured the fortress’ name. On the former stele only an initial s-sign and a terminal foreign throw-stick sign survive. The Sai stele, on the other hand, preserves an s-sign followed by a g-sign, and traces of what might be an r-sign below the g-sign. Judging from the limited space allotted to the toponym,
Figure 50. Nineteenth Dynasty Nubia
however, it could hardly have consisted of more than two hieroglyphic groups.

A number of scholars have attempted to restore the missing hieroglyphs. Based on the fact that the names of fortresses were often made up of known royal epithets, \textit{sgr[h] t\texttt{\textcircled{h}}} (“Pacifier of the two lands”) has been suggested. This is indeed a strong possibility, but it does not account for the throw-stick that seems to be evidenced in the Amara stele. Vercoutter’s suggestion of \textit{sgr nh\texttt{\textcircled{y}}} (“Pacifier of the Nubian lands”), while it would incorporate the foreign throw-stick, seems too long for the available space. O’Connor, on the other hand, notes the common substitution of the throw-stick for Gardiner’s sign Aa26 and thus suggests \textit{sgr sbi} (“Pacifier of the rebellious lands”)—a perfectly plausible candidate.\footnote{For \textit{sgr t\texttt{\textcircled{h}}} or \textit{sgr t\texttt{\textcircled{h}}}, see the expression in Wb. IV, 324: 7 and Kitchen 1977: 217; 1993: 86; Vercoutter 1980: 159, fig. 1; 162; Murnane 1990: 86, n. 53; 101, n. 15. For \textit{sgr nh\texttt{\textcircled{y}}}, see Vercoutter 1980: 162, n. 3. For \textit{sgr sbi}, see O’Connor 1987b: 111. Vercoutter’s (1980: 161–163) suggestion that the fortress should be located in the desert due to the presence of the throwstick determinative does not seem particularly convincing.} In point of fact, however, virtually any short toponym, such as \textit{k\texttt{\textcircled{s}}} (Kush) or even \textit{irm} (Irem), could have been inserted after \textit{sgr}.

Regardless of which—if any—of these suggestions is correct, however, the fact remains that this fortress is still otherwise unattested. Even more troublesome, it is difficult to equate it with a contemporary, archaeologically attested \textit{mnn\texttt{\textcircled{w}}} that could have served as a jumping off point for a campaign in the desert either west of the third cataract or east of the fourth. In the case of the former, one would expect that the fortress should have been located in the fertile Abri-Delgo reach. Of the \textit{mnn\texttt{\textcircled{w}}} fortress-towns in this area, however, only three exhibit evidence of significant activity during the reign of Seti I, namely, Amara West, Sai, and Sesebi. The ancient names of both Amara West and Sai are known. While it is possible that Sai possessed a more formal designation than “Shaat,” one would expect Amara West’s name, “House-of-Menmaatre” (see below) to have persisted unchanged throughout Seti’s reign.

Of the three fortress-towns in the Abri-Delgo reach, superficially Sesebi seems to be the least likely candidate. Not only was the town constructed primarily in the reign of Akhenaten, but also there is no sign that Seti commemorated his Irem campaign at Sesebi,
although he had done so at both Sai and Amara West. On a more encouraging note, however, the ancient name of Sesebi is unknown, and as a relic of the Amarna Period it may well have been changed at the advent of the Nineteenth Dynasty. Likewise, Sesebi’s location at the foot of the third cataract would have made it a convenient point of departure for the wells to the west.

If Irem were located in the Northern Butana rather than the third cataract region, however, Seti’s troops almost certainly would have departed the Nile Valley at Napata. The name of the resident fortress, sm3 h3stwyw (“Slaying-[or slayer-of]-the-foreigners”), is not encountered in Egyptian inscriptions after the reign of Thutmose III (Urk. IV, 1228: 12). While this name does have the virtue of beginning with an s-sign and ending in a throw-stick, none of the intervening signs bear correlates in the inscription. The difficulty in equating the two names, combined with the strong possibility that the fortress itself had fallen out of use since the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, makes it difficult to craft a strong case for situating Seti’s foes in the Northern Butana.

2. m-mitt iw w<l>n ħm.f rdi.tw ħn n3 h’w n inw n kš n t3 ħwt mn- m3t-r’ hr-ib m 3bdw r tm dit it imy-r ħtm nb ḥpr.ty.fy ḥr(y) p3 ħtm n sthy mr-n-pth nty m sn-mt ħwt nbw iṁ.sn m nbw m  śl’dw m iṁ[w nb] n ħtm m ħwt nbwt n w’w m šhr n wṣn r nḥḥ nนม’ dḥ [. . .] ir imy-r ħtm nb sš nb n p3 ḥ[t]m rwd nb p3 [ḥtm nty] r ḥṣy r  депут n t3 ħwt mn-m3’t-r’ hr-ib m 3bdw ḥnm’ nṭf it nbw [. . .] ḥmt ḥby ḥnt ḥwšt sd n nmy dḥr n nmm [. . .] ħwt nbwt n kš nty tw.tw ḥr int.f m inw r t3 ħwt mn-m3’t-r’ hr-ib m 3bdw [ir].tw [h]p [r.f] m [ḥw]i.tw.f m sḥ 100 m-s śdi.tw p3 (n)kt m-s.f m ḥy t3 ħwt mn-m3’t-r’ hr-ib m 3bdw iw 80 m-s3 w’ (The Nauri Decree; KRI I, 56: 6–9, 12–15; 57: 1–2)

Likewise, his majesty decreed that regulations be made (regarding) the boats of the imu-tribute of Kush of the temple “Menmaatre-is-content-in-Abydos” in order to prevent that any overseer of a ḥtm-fortress who will assume authority of the ḥtm-fortress of Seti Merneptah which is in Bigeh seize any things from them, (whether) consisting of gold, consisting of skins, consisting of [any] in[w]-tribute from a ḥtm-fortress (or) consisting of any things of a sailor in an arbitrary manner2¹⁸ eternally and enduringly [. . .]. As for any overseer of a ḥtm-fortress, any scribe of a ḥ[t]m-fortress, (or) any administrator of the [ḥtm-fortress who] will

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2¹⁸ One would expect the preposition “m” rather than “n” for this phrase (Faulkner 1986: 69).
descend onto a boat of the temple “Menmaatre-is-content-in Abydos” and it is he who seizes gold, [. . .], a leopard skin, a ḫwšt-skin, a giraffe tail, giraffe leather, [. . .] (or) any things of Kush, which one delivered as ina-tribute for the temple “Menmaatre-is-content-in-Abydos,” the [la]w will be [carried out against him] consisting of him being [beaten] with 100 blows together with the [pr]ofit being extracted from him as a seizure of the temple “Menmaatre-is-content-in-Abydos,” being (at a rate of) 80 to 1.

On a cliff face at Nauri, just downstream of the third cataract, Seti published a decree in which he issued a series of regulations designed to protect Nubian income that he had assigned to his new temple at Abydos. This document was addressed to, and presumably read aloud in the presence of, a number of officials who held positions of authority in Nubia. In addition to administrative officials, these included troop commanders (ḥryw pdt), charioteers, stablemasters, and standard bearers (KRI I, 50: 13–14). Two categories of official described in the text, but not explicitly named in the introduction, were overseers of ḫtn-fortresses (imy-w-r htm) and overseers of garrison troops (imy-r iwʿyt—KRI I, 57: 2). Given that holders of both titles were often drawn from the rank of troop commander (ḥry pdt), however, it is possible that the latter title in the introduction was meant to act inclusively.

Before delving into the subject matter of the text, it is important to note at the outset that this inscription marks the first instance in Egyptian history in which the term ḫtm was demonstrably employed with regard to a Nubian fortress. Up until the reign of Seti I, the word designated those northern fortresses that meticulously monitored the transit of people and goods to or from Egypt. These Eighteenth Dynasty ḫtn-fortresses, therefore, were located almost exclusively at major points of entry into northern Egypt, such as river mouths (i.e., the great fortress of the sea), the head of major transit corridors (i.e., Tjaru), or narrow wadis (i.e., the Wadi Tumilat and the Wadi Hammamat).919

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919 There are only two exceptions to this rule. The first is the ḫtn-fortress erected by Thutmose III at Megiddo (Urk. IV, 661: 1, 13), which monitored all passage in or out of the besieged city (see the discussion in chapter three). The second is the site of Husayin (P. Anastasi I, 27: 4), located along the Ways of Horus, which is almost certainly to be identified with the Migdol of Menmaatre in Seti’s relief (KRI I, 10: 1—see the discussion earlier in this chapter).
By virtue of their location at the head of the first cataract, Elephantine and Bigeh are the only Nubian installations that qualify as $\text{htm}$-fortresses. Whether the two were known as such prior to the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, is debatable. In the Middle Kingdom, for instance, both were designated as $\text{mmnw}$, but at that time the term $\text{htm}$ had yet to come into general use. Elephantine and Bigeh are likewise designated as $\text{mmnw}$ in the Eighteenth Dynasty, but the only source for this is a text called “the Duties of the Vizier,” which was reproduced in the tomb of Thutmose III’s vizier. Significantly, many scholars argue that the original document had been composed in the Middle Kingdom or—at the very latest—the reign of Ahmose.\(^{920}\) It is thus likely that the term $\text{mmnw}$ in this case was a linguistic holdover and that already in the Eighteenth Dynasty Bigeh and Elephantine would have been semantically recognized as true border-fortresses.

In the reign of Ramesses II, as will be discussed below, the situation is far less ambiguous. Bigeh is twice termed a $\text{htm}$-fortress, while an overseer of a $\text{htm}$-fortress left a graffito at Elephantine and elsewhere in the first cataract region. It is quite notable, however, that fortress-towns located to the south of the first cataract region are still uniformly known as $\text{mmnw}$, never as $\text{htm}$-fortresses. Clearly, in the Nineteenth Dynasty, then, the term $\text{htm}$ designated those structures in both the north and the south that monitored the official entranceways into Egypt.

The preceding discussion is of particular importance because the name of the $\text{htm}$-fortress in the Nauri Decree has uniformly been read $\text{s\text{htm}}$,\(^{921}\) even though a fortress with this name is otherwise unattested. Judging from the copy presented in its original publication, the name consists of a heavily damaged vertical sign, taken as the $\text{s}$-scepter, an $\text{m}$-sign (Gardiner Aa13), a bread-loaf “$t$,” and a hill-country sign. One could, however, interpret the vertical sign as a

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\(^{920}\) In the text, both Elephantine (Urk. IV, 1122: 13) and Bigeh (1120: 4, 13) are listed as fortresses overseen by $\text{tsn}$-commanders, a term not in general usage for fortress commanders in the New Kingdom. Gardiner (1947a: 47) and Hayes (1973: 355) believed the text to be a copy of a Middle Kingdom original, but see van den Boorn (1988: 19–20, n. 42, 255–257), who argues that the original was composed in the early years of Ahmose. See chapter three for a discussion of this text.

\(^{921}\) Griffith 1927: 203, n. 6; Edgerton 1947: 225; Arkell 1966: 102; Schulman 1964a: 112.
sn-sign (Gardiner T 22) rather than a sḫm-sign, given that these hiero-
glyphs could easily be mistaken for one another on a damaged stele.

Were such a reading followed, then the name of the htm-fortress in the Nauri Decree should be interpreted as “snmt”—the common name for the fortress at Bigeh. This interpretation is pleasing for three major reasons. First, it explains the designation of the Nubian structure as a htm rather than a mnnw-fortress. Second, it obviates the need to search for yet another previously unattested Nineteenth Dynasty fortress. And third, it enlightens our understanding of the regulations outlined for the overseers of the htm-fortress in the Nauri Decree.

Although technically two different regulations in the decree focused upon the behavior of overseers of htm-fortresses, in reality the stip-
ulations were nearly identical. The first stated that the overseer of the htm-fortress of Seti Merneptah in Bigeh was forbidden to seize property from the fleet that conducted inw from Nubia to the temple of “Menmaatre-is-content-in Abydos.” This property, according to the decree, might include gold, exotic hides, inw of a htm-fortress, or a sailor’s personal property. The second regulation covered the activities of three officials connected with a htm-fortress, i.e., the overseer, the scribe, and any general administrator (rw ← w). These people were likewise barred from boarding a temple boat and taking gold, animal products, or any property of Kush brought as inw. The penalty, in both cases it seems, was 100 blows and the payment of restitution to the temple of 80 times the worth of whatever was unlawfully taken.

Documents such as the Nauri Decree, which specifically prohibit certain practices, often inadvertently testify to the commonplace occurrence of these same practices, whether officially sanctioned or not.

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922 While the toponym is often written with a mut-vulture rather than an m-sign and a t-sign, this latter writing is evidenced in O. Gardiner 362 (KRI II, 822: 13); see below.

923 The inw of a fortress would presumably be the inw-tribute sent by the high-
est-ranking officials in a fortress to the king, by virtue of their position as im-
portant officers of the state. Although the inw was officially paid to the king (see Bleiberg 1996), it would have been Seti’s prerogative to donate it as revenue to his new temple. This explanation appears more likely than Edgerton’s (1947: 229) sugges-
tion that the inw was in fact paid to a fortress.

924 Inw from Kush likely designates the inw-tribute paid by both native rulers and high officials of the land of Kush to the king.
Taking this approach, it would appear that ḫtm-officers, and especially the overseer of the ḫtm-fortress at Bigeh, commonly enforced an import tax on ships passing from Nubia to Egypt. While it is hard to imagine that the taking of a sailor’s property would ever have been condoned, the extraction of a tax at border stations may have been the norm. In fact, it is of special interest in this context to note that the commander of the mmnw-fortress at Bigeh in the Duties of the Vizier is stated to have paid his dues to the state in gold and hides (as well as apes, bows, and staves of wood—Urk. IV, 1120: 3–1121: 4), precisely the type of valuable and exotic items that ships traveling from more southern regions would be expected to have carried as cargo.

Reign of Ramesses II


Overseer of the ḫtm-fortress of (ditto). . . . fishermen of the fish, which are in the water of [...]. Regular taxes (of) [... ] the overseer of the ḫtm-fortress of Bigeh [...] made in the place of [...] income tax of all, consisting of the [...] police, silver: 2 kite.

The Turin tax list, composed in the reign of Ramesses II, has been discussed already in this chapter with reference to the income taxes paid by the administrators of wells, a migdol-fort, and a nḥtw-stronghold along the Ways of Horus military highway. The breadth of this list, then, is especially impressive when one considers that it included within its scope officials stationed at both the northern and southernmost fringes of Egypt. Unfortunately, however, the damage suffered by the papyrus over the millennia has left it in an extremely fragmentary state.

The portion of the list excerpted above indicates that income taxes were assessed for two overseers of ḫtm-fortresses on Egypt’s southern border. The second of the two officers was situated at Bigeh (sn-mwt), and although the taxes that this man paid are not preserved, it is doubtful that he drew upon goods that properly belonged to Seti’s temple at Abydos! Indeed, it is notable that the police, who may have been affiliated with the fortress as well, paid their taxes in silver, a metal not native to Nubia. Although the name of the other ḫtm-fortress does not survive, there is little doubt that it would
have been 3bw (Elephantine Island). Not only was the installation at Elephantine only a stone’s throw from Bigeh, but Elephantine is the only other known first cataract border-fortress.

The letter from which this text is extracted had been written upon an ostraca, indicating that a scribal instructor may well have utilized it for pedagogical purposes. Like the majority of the letters in the Late Egyptian Miscellanies, however, the text shows no signs of having been explicitly composed as a teaching text, so there is a good possibility that it is, in fact, a copy of a real letter sent from the scribe Ramose to the royal scribe and overseer of cattle, Hatia (KRI III, 637: 9–10).

The letter concerns fifty barges, which Ramesses II had ordered delivered to Thebes. The ships were to contain, among other valuables, cattle that the pharaoh would offer as sacrifices at the Opet festival. Ramose, who was stationed at the htm-fortress of Bigeh, had managed to dispatch ten barges of his own accord at the time of writing, but the viceroy of Kush had just informed him that twenty more should be loaded and sent off as soon as possible. Although Ramose had written to the mayor of Elephantine requesting that any surplus the mayor could spare be sent to him, the situation was obviously urgent. Ramose’s letter to the overseer of cattle, then, urged him quickly to dispatch the remaining cattle on a fleet belonging to the temple of Amun, as the shipment was past due and impatiently awaited.

This short missive provides further evidence that the fortress at Bigeh was indeed regarded as a htm-fortress. It also confirms that
scribes were associated with the southern htm-fortresses, just as the Nauri Decree had indicated should be the case (KRI I, 56: 12–13). Considering the heavy administrative burden that keeping track of imports and exports would have necessarily entailed, however, this fact is of little surprise. Finally, the inscription reaffirms the close administrative connection between Bigeh and Elephantine that is evidenced in contemporary inscriptions and implied by the geographic proximity of the centers to one another. The overseer of the htm-fortress of Bigeh could obviously serve as an agent of the state, and in such capacity this individual evidently had the power to requisition goods and services from mayors, temple personnel, and other state officials.

3a. ỉw n ‘nkṭ nbjt stṭ sn-t3 n nb t3wy in imy-r k3ṭ imy-r htm ḫty pḥt nb-nḥtw m3’ ḫrw (Graffito at Sehel Island; KRI III, 260: 16–261: 1)

(depiotion of Nebinakht genuflcting before cartouches of Ramesses II) Adoration to Anuiks, lady of Seheil; kissing the ground of the lord of the two lands by the overseer of works, overseer of the htm-fortress, (and) troop commander, Nebinakht, true of voice.

3b. ḫtp ḫ nsw ḫmn stṭ ‘nkṭ dī.sn ‘nh ḫḥ ḫṭ mlwt n k3 n imy-r htm imy-r k3ṭ ḫty pḥt nb-nḥt snṭ.f nbṭ-pr ḡ3ḥ [. . .] s3.f ḫḥ [. . .] s3.f ḫw ḫ ḫḥt mr-imn snṭ.f [. . .] s3.f [. . .] (Graffito at Hassawanati; KRI III, 261: 8–10)

A boon that the king gives (to) Khnum, Satis, and Anuiks, that they might give l.p.h., alertness, praise, and love to the ka of the overseer of the htm-fortress, overseer of works, and troop commander, Nebinakht. His sister, mistress of the house, Wahi [. . .]; his son Heb [. . .]; his son, the soldier of a ship’s contingent, Meramen; his daughter [. . .]; his daughter [. . .]

3c. . . . n k3 n ḫty pḥt imy-r k3ṭ nb.i-nḥtw m3’ ḫrw (Graffito on the eastern face of Elephantine; KRI III, 261: 4)

. . . to the ka of the troop commander (and) overseer of works, Nebinakht, true of voice.

Nebinakht inscribed texts 3a and 3b on boulders in Elephantine’s immediate vicinity, while he carved graffito 3c on the island itself. Given that no other attestations of this official survive and that Nebinakht even went so far as to commemorate his wife and four children in text 3b, it is likely that he held office in the first cataract area. We know from three contemporary inscriptions (see above) that a htm-fortress was located on the island of Bigeh. The Nauri Decree and the Turin tax list both indicate, however, that yet another htm-
fortress lay in close proximity to Bigeh. Archaeologically, this could only have been situated on the island of Elephantine, for the nearest fortress south of Elephantine was Kubban, well over 100 km upriver. Thus, given the fact that Nebinakht carved his name at Elephantine itself, it is highly probable that the $htm$-fortress he oversaw was located on Elephantine rather than at Bigeh.925

Of the practical information contained in the inscriptions, however, there are only a few points to take into account, none of them particularly startling. First, Nebinakht is proof that south of the border as well as east of it, overseers of $htm$-fortresses were drawn from the rank of troop commander. This is in contrast to the officials bearing civilian titles stationed to the south in $mnw$-fortresses. Second, the inscription suggests that the families of overseers of first cataract $htm$-fortresses likely were resident at the fortresses as well. Considering that the border region hardly counted as an outpost, however, there is little unexpected in this. Finally, the inscriptions demonstrate that, like all high officials in the realm, Nebinakht was anxious to display publicly both his piety to local gods and his loyalty to the king.

4. $htp\ di\ nsw\ wsr-m\tt-r\ tstp-n\ r\ ntr\ \t\ \t n\ \ hr\ ib\ mnw\ pr-mn\ . . .\ (Doorjamb from Amara West; Spencer 1997: pl. 157)

A boon that the king gives that Usermaatre Setepenre, great god, lord of Nubia, residing in the $mn(n)w$-fortress, House of Men[maatre] . . .

ALTERNATIVELY:

A boon that the king gives that Usermaatre Setepenre, great god, lord of Nubia, residing in the $mn(n)w$-temple, Amun . . .

There are two ways to read this inscription. The first follows the interpretations of Fairman and Kitchen, who restore the $mn$-sign as an element in the name of Seti I.926 Two main of lines of reasoning are inherent in this decision. First, later in Ramesses II’s reign, the name of Amara West is given as “the House of Ramesses Meryamun” (KRI II, 322: 13), suggesting that it had earlier been dubbed “the House of Menmaatre.” Likewise, as will be discussed in-depth below, the town of Amara West fits perfectly into the archaeological expectations of the neatly planned and perfunctorily walled New Kingdom Nubian $mnw$ fortress-towns.

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925 See also Habachi 1979: 233.
To complicate matters, however, there are three persuasive reasons to distrust the restoration “Men[maatre].” First, no cartouche survives around the supposed name of Seti I. Second, the r'-sun would normally precede the mn-sign according to the rules of honorific transposition. Third and finally, Ramesses II appears to have exhibited little restraint in replacing his father’s name with his own in toponyms and building names throughout the empire from his earliest years onward, and so it seems unlikely that Amara West would still have borne Seti’s name well into Ramesses’ reign.

Fairman’s original reading, followed by Spencer, interpreted the mn-sign as an element in the name Amun. This reading satisfactorily accounts for the lack of a cartouche. It also makes logical sense given that the temple at Amara West was dedicated to Amun-re as well as to the deified Ramesses II. Finally, the reference to the mn(n)w is not at all inconsistent, given that temples were often symbolically termed mmea-fortresses. Although this second reading would appear to fit the evidence perhaps best, the situation is not entirely clear and both alternatives have merit.

Reign of Merneptah or Seti II

1. tw.i ḫr spr.kwi r 3bw iw.i ḫr mḥ t3y(i) wpt iw.i ḫr snhy m3 (t)-nt-ḥtr prw smdt n3 mnh n3 swt n3 srw n ḫm.f (P. Chester Beatty no. 5 = BM 10685, vs. 1: 1–2)

I arrived at Elephantine, and I completed my business, having made a registration of the army, chariotry, estates, subordinates, the tenant farmers, the officials, (and) the nobles of his majesty.

Elephantine is better known in the New Kingdom as a metropolis than as a military base, although this model letter clearly implies that infantry and chariotry were indeed resident on site. While one might expect a tally of the army and chariotry to have occurred as part of the preparations for a major campaign, the matter-of-fact tone and the variety of different personnel that were registered suggest that the writer of the letter had simply undertaken a routine census of state employees and estates at Elephantine. The

\[928\] Cf. Urk. IV, 1648: 6–8; 1748: 9; KRI I, 67: 4, etc.
\[929\] Gardiner (1935: 46) could not date the papyrus with precision.
infantry and chariots associated with the *htmn*-fortress, rather than having assembled there in anticipation of an imminent journey southward, would perhaps more likely have been members of the local garrison.

*Archaeological Evidence for Nineteenth Dynasty Southern Fortress-Towns*

*Aksha* (see figure 51)
The site of Aksha, or Serra West, was one of only two Nubian fortress-towns newly established in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Unfortunately, excavations at the site, which the Franco-Argentine Archaeological Expedition undertook in the early 1960s, were published in preliminary form only, and little outside of the cultic area is known in any detail. Seti I founded Aksha barely 20 km north of the Middle Kingdom fortress-town at Buhen. Although Buhen still functioned as an important political and cultic center, the ancient town had been continuously inhabited for well over 600 years by that point. Seti may have intended Aksha, then, to assume many of the functions of the older settlement. Whether Aksha was also intended to be the new seat of the deputy of Lower Nubia (*idnw n w3s3*) is not known. It is potentially important, however, that Seti’s other new town, Amara West, served as the residence of the deputy of Upper Nubia (*idnw n k5*). Likewise it is worthy of note that Faras, the residence of the late Eighteenth Dynasty deputy of Lower Nubia, lay only a few kilometers to the north and did not receive significant attention in Seti’s reign.

Imperial planners had designed the town of Aksha to fit within the parameters of a 6 m thick mud-brick enclosure wall, an imposing structure that had been strengthened by the use of corner buttresses. At $120 \times 82$ m to a side (or 9,842 $m^2$), the town was significantly smaller than earlier New Kingdom establishments such as Sesebi (54,000 $m^2$), Soleb (48,000 $m^2$), or Sai (33,320 $m^2$). It was, however, more nearly comparable in size to the contemporary fortress-towns constructed at Amara West (12,000 $m^2$) and Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham (19,600 $m^2$). Remarkably, virtually two-thirds of the town seems to have been devoted to administrative and cultic buildings. Indeed, even if the southernmost portion of Aksha had been entirely

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930 See below.
given over to dwelling space, the residential zone would still have encompassed barely 3,200 m². By way of comparison, the small workmen’s villages at Deir el-Medina (6,253 m²) and Amarna (4,900 m²) were substantially larger. It would be of interest to know, then, whether the anemic domestic quarter at Aksha was simply a reflection of the population loss evident elsewhere in Lower Nubia or whether it in fact presaged Ramesses II’s predilection for the construction of isolated temples.

Relatively early on in his reign, Ramesses II tore down the temple that his father had erected and replaced it with a massive stone edifice that dominated the northern third of the town. Oriented roughly east-west, the axis of the new cultic building lined up perfectly with the town’s quay, and undoubtedly this alignment added to the pomp and circumstance of river-borne ritual processions. The temple itself, not coincidentally, closely resembled the example built by Ramesses at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham in Libya. Both buildings consisted of a forecourt lined with square columns, a transverse hall, and three small chapels. Although the vast majority of the decoration succumbed to the ravages of time and to the indignity of reuse, the archaeologists did not find it difficult to establish that Amun-Re and the deified Ramesses II himself were two of the temple’s most important resident deities.

Of Seti’s temple almost nothing remained except reused stone blocks bearing scenes of Seti dominating Nubian captives. Just southwest of the Ramesses II temple, however, the Franco-Argentine Expedition discovered a standardized set of ten small chambers, which they referred to in their reports as the “section of Seti I.” Although these rooms were of the shape and size typical of temple magazines, the archaeologists believed them to be chapels, because lintels in the southern doorways evoked Seti’s name in conjunction with deities such as Horus of Buhen, Atum, Thoth and Ptah. At least two of the northern rooms, on the other hand, were redecorated with lintels depicting the viceroy Hekanakht genuflecting before the cartouches of Ramesses II.

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933 Vercoutter 1963: 134; Rosenvasser 1964: 96–97, 99. This pose, of course, is the same as that adopted by Neb-re on one of the temple magazines at Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham.
With the exception of the temple of Ramesses II and the “section of Seti I,” very little is known about Aksha. The large enclosed space southeast of the temple and east of the “section” almost certainly contained administrative buildings and a plaza. Due to its badly ruined state, however, this area was not intensively excavated. Of the three observable complexes, the function of only the most southeasterly was discernable. The doorjambs of this building indicated its affiliation with a temple administrator, although it is unfortunately impossible to determine whether the utilization of the building was official, domestic, or a combination of both.934

If little is known from the middle section of the site, the situation is far worse with respect to the southern third. This sector of the town, which the excavators believed to be the “commoner’s town,” was partitioned off from the administrative and cultic areas by a substantial wall, through which at least three small doorways communicated. Although almost no architecture was recovered, the bits and pieces that were excavated had the small, flimsy walls typical of domestic dwellings.935 Perhaps not surprisingly, this portion of the town possessed its own gate leading out to the river, and so it is unclear just how much intercourse necessarily took place between the southern third of the town and the cultic and administrative zones north of it. Indeed, it is even likely that the majority of the religious needs of the population were fulfilled in domestic shrines, for a doorjamb discovered in this area honored the goddess Renenutet, a domestic and agricultural snake deity revered and beloved by villagers in Egypt as well.936

Amara West (see figure 52)
The life histories of Aksha and Amara West are very similar, although the former was located in Lower Nubia near the second cataract and the latter lay between the Dal and the third cataracts in Upper Nubia. Seti I initiated construction on both towns, and each later received a brand new stone temple built by Ramesses II. In both cases the stone temples were decorated relatively early on in Ramesses’ reign, and each was dedicated to the cults of Amun-re and the deified Ramesses II.937

935 In some cases the walls were no thicker than 25 cm (Rosenvasser 1964: 98).
Figure 51. Fortress-town at Aksha
(after Rosenvasser 1964: fig. 1)
Whereas Aksha adhered to a rectangular form, Amara West was planned to be a perfect square, boasting 108 m long walls on each side (11,664 m²). The town’s enclosure wall, however, was of comparable thickness to Aksha’s (5 m as opposed to 6 m), and the wall was similarly buttressed at its corners and at least intermittently along its length. Bricks along the lower courses had been anciently impressed with the stamp of Seti I, leaving the sponsor of the work unambiguous. While it was Seti I, then, who likely erected the town gates of Amara West, Ramesses II embellished them. Indeed, this king chose the western gate upon which to publish his victory against the Iremites.

The fact that the two preserved town gates at Amara West opened in the opposite direction from the present-day Nile led Fairman to formulate the hypothesis that the town had originally been situated upon an island. This suggestion, after having been investigated more formally, has met with general support in the scholarly literature. The defensive benefits to founding an island-town are obvious, and in dangerous waters such a base could have been useful as an aid to shipping as well. The team from the Egypt Exploration Society realized yet another benefit to an island setting during the violent sandstorms that plagued their excavations in the 1930s and 1940s. As the archaeologists discovered from personal experience, by far the best place to weather such storms was upon an island, for in this setting the river acted as an effective buffer to the endless expanses of sand on either side.

The stone temple erected by Ramesses II was undoubtedly the largest, grandest, and most meticulously planned building at Amara West. Periodic finds of reused stone blocks from Seti’s reign, as well as evidence of a structure underlying the temple, indicate that Ramesses had previously dismantled his father’s monument—just as he had at Aksha. While Seti’s building is unfortunately irrecoverable, the newer structure adhered in the main to the typical blueprint of a New Kingdom state temple. The forecourt, although located outside the town’s enclosure wall, contained emplacements for trees and

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938 Fairman 1939: 140; 1975: 172.
939 Fairman 1948: 8.
941 Fairman 1948: 10.
942 Fairman 1948: 5; Spencer 1997: 19, 103.
steles. Processing south, one passed through the town wall to enter into a square court lined with pillars, rather like the forecourts at Aksha and Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham. This secondary court led in turn to a hypostyle hall, a transverse hall, and finally a tripartite shrine.

Although the remaining fragments of decoration were largely damaged, the archaeologists did discover a pedestal for a boat shrine in the central chamber. Inscriptions to Amun and the cataract gods were witnessed in the side chambers, and a doorjamb giving the name of the deified Ramesses II was also found in the temple precinct. Never one for modesty, Ramesses II had dubbed his temple—and possibly the town as well—“the House of Ramesses Meryamun” (KRI II, 322: 13).

Outside of the temple precinct, excavators noticed two distinct architectural levels coeval with the Nineteenth Dynasty. Level 4, which they dated to the reign of Seti I, had been leveled off almost uniformly throughout the site and surmounted by level 3. The team attributed level 3 to Ramesses II on a variety of grounds, and thus it is likely that the rebuilding of the town and the temple took place simultaneously.

Fairman blamed the razing of level 4 on structural instability, but the walls of the town were solidly constructed on the whole. For her part, Spencer suggested that level 4 may have been built specifically to facilitate the erection of Seti’s temple and that Ramesses intended level 3 to function as a permanent, working town. Spencer’s ideas may well be correct, but the similarity in the plan and the function of the complexes in both levels is remarkable. For instance, the two main areas of excavation outside of the temple proper, namely the storerooms and the governor’s residency, admirably retained their intrinsic character from one level to the next. Given this notable continuity, it is likely that level 4 represented an effort by Ramesses II to “spruce up” his temple town.

Of the magazines surrounding the temple proper, the majority contained a miscellaneous mix of wood ash, broken pottery, and bits

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943 Fairman 1939: 140-141; 1975: 172; Badawy 1968: 275–276; Spencer 1997: 46. Veneration of Horus, Min, and Ptah was also witnessed at the temple (Fairman 1938: 154).
944 Fairman 1939: 142.
of glass and faience.\textsuperscript{946} One vaulted chamber, bearing the cartouches of Ramesses II and situated directly east of the transverse hall, however, was of particular interest. In this room, termed E.14.7 in the reports, the archaeologists discovered hundreds of seal impressions. While seal impressions were excavated in lesser numbers in other magazines, the “perfect deluge” of hundreds of these artifacts in E.14.7 led Fairman to suspect that he had located the temple archive.\textsuperscript{947}

Curiously, the vast majority of the seals belonged not to Seti I or Ramesses II but rather to Thutmose III. While seals bearing the name of Thutmose III continued to be manufactured for centuries after his death, the discovery of other sealings bearing the name of the disgraced queen Hatshepsut led the team to suspect that these impressions actually did date from the early to mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. The presence of these sealings at first led to the supposition that an Eighteenth Dynasty temple lay undiscovered at Amara West. The lack of material evidence for an earlier habitation, however, renders it perhaps more plausible that the Nineteenth Dynasty temple had simply inherited an older archive.\textsuperscript{948}

Just south of the temple, a motley collection of workshops and buildings lay north of a well-planned street—opposite a large and obviously important complex to the south. The workshops to the northeast were found to contain numerous lumps of red and yellow okra as well as stone grinders and a large pot containing chunks of gold-bearing quartz. While no such indicative material culture was discovered in the larger southern building, the highly regularized nature of the building’s blueprint strongly suggests that it served as the temple granary or storehouse. Although these buildings were modified in the reign of Ramesses II, the older walls were typically reused for foundations, enabling the quarter to retain its general structure from level 4 to level 3.\textsuperscript{949}

The only other area of Amara West that was intensively excavated by the Egypt Exploration Fund lay in close proximity to the western gate into the town. The archaeologists were initially attracted to the location by the remains of what looked to be the largest com-

\textsuperscript{946} For a description of some of these Ramesside magazines, see Fairman 1939: 141; Spencer 1997: 53–74.
\textsuperscript{947} Quoted from Fairman’s diary in Spencer 1997: 57.
\textsuperscript{948} Fairman 1939: 142; Spencer 1997: 217.
\textsuperscript{949} Fairman 1948: 5.
plex outside of the temple precinct. Upon excavation, they discovered a building of roughly 700 m² that resembled a modified center-hall house and was roughly equivalent in size to the residency at Tel Sera' (625 m²). This structure, termed the “governor’s palace,” was separated by a narrow lane from a set of buildings that looked to be administrative and storage-related in function.

The residency itself consisted of large audience rooms, private apartments, kitchen facilities, and a washroom—the latter distinguished by a stone slab and a drainage pot. Far and away the most important finds, however, were a series of inscribed architectural fragments. Two doorjambs belonged to a deputy or idnw named Sebaukhau and three doorjambs and a lintel were inscribed for the “deputy of Kush, Paser.” Both of these idnw are thought to have held office in the reign of Seti I. Despite the rebuilding and architectural adjustments that took place in level 3, continuity in usage for the residency is suggested by the discovery of a lintel dedicated by a “deputy of the two lands” in honor of Ramesses II’s viceroy, Hekanakht. Not surprisingly, the many inscribed architectural fragments belonging to the deputy of Kush have led most scholars to conclude that Amara was likely the seat of this official and, thus, the capital of Kush in the Nineteenth Dynasty.

The decision to relocate the residence of the deputy of Kush from Soleb to Amara offered Seti I the chance to emphasize the distinction between his administration and the one that came before. Amara West was also a strategic area to control due to its proximity to gold mines and to desert trade routes. From Amara West, trails led northwest to Selima Oasis and southwest to the desert wells west of the third cataract.

As with all New Kingdom Nubian fortress-towns, however, the defensive features at Amara West appear to have been of a perfunctory

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951 For the jambs belonging to Sebaukhau, see Spencer 1997: 220, pl. 151. For the fragments belonging to Paser, see Fairman 1948: 9 and Spencer 1997: 168, pls. 152–155. For the lintel dedicated to Hekanakht, see Fairman 1948: 9 and Spencer 1997: 171, pl. 150. Trigger (1965: 108) suggests that the presence of this and other monuments referring to the viceroy indicates that this official also resided at Amara West. The viceroy could, however, simply have visited the town often to oversee construction at the temple and to consult with the deputy.
nature. Stairs leading to wall tops were soon blocked, and no glacis, parapets, or heavily fortified gates signaled a fear of attack. Remains of houses and even a python shrine outside the eastern town wall further indicate that the inhabitants led a generally peaceful existence, despite the possibility that the peoples of Irem lived close by.954

Of the inhabitants of Amara West, however, little is known. The Egypt Exploration Society did not consider excavating the town’s private dwellings a high priority. Further, the New Kingdom cemetery, which appeared to have been partially robbed, was not deemed worthy of significant excavation.955 Without data from the town’s domestic quarter, and without an understanding of the composition of the local cemetery, it is particularly difficult to obtain information on the more prosaic aspects of life in the capital of Kush during the Nineteenth Dynasty.

Northern, Western, and Southern Fortifications and Administrative Headquarters in the Nineteenth Dynasty: A Cross-frontier Perspective

In the Nineteenth Dynasty, the Egyptian government built and maintained a substantial number of ḥtm border-fortresses, mmnw fortress-towns, fortified way stations, and administrative headquarters in its subject territories. While the Egyptians restricted the latter two categories to the northern Sinai highway and to Syria-Palestine respectively, ḥtm and mmnw fortresses were erected on multiple frontiers. The distribution and emplacement of these compounds, however, follows a clear pattern.

The Egyptian authorities positioned their ḥtm or border-fortresses at major gateways into the Nile Valley, i.e., at relatively narrow passages through which the flow of people and property over the border could be monitored and recorded. Due to the eastern and western deserts, as well as to the natural boundaries of the Mediterranean and the first cataract, points of entry into the Nile Valley have always been tightly defined. Indeed, it is likely that the ancient Egyptians were able to do a more thorough job of policing their borders than

955 Fairman 1939: 139.
Figure 52. Fortress-town at Amara West
(after Spencer 1997: pl. 3)
the present-day governments of many large states can manage. In the Nineteenth Dynasty, htm-fortresses sealed off the entrance to at least one Nile mouth (the great htm-fortress of the sea),\footnote{It is not known whether there was only one htm-fortress of the sea or whether each Nile mouth was similarly treated. If there was only one, however, it would probably have been located on the Pelusiac Branch, as the political and economic heart of the Delta lay to the east during the Nineteenth Dynasty.} the isthmus leading from the Ways of Horus to the Delta (Tjaru), the Wadi Tumilat (Tjeku), the Wadi Hammamat (the htm that is upon the highland of Coptos), and the first cataract in Nubia (Elephantine and Bigeh). Whether a htm-fortress likewise demarcated the break between the Libyan road and the western edge of the Delta is unclear. A likely candidate for such a htm-fortress, however, would be El-Barnugi, which was located at the junction of the Libyan road and the western Delta.

The commanding officer of a htm bore the title “overseer of a htm-fortress” (imy-r htm), as had his counterparts in the Eighteenth Dynasty. As in the preceding dynasty as well, abundant evidence suggests that holders of this title were recruited from the rank of troop commander (hry pdt). It is remarkable, however, that southern htmw and their officers (imyw-r htm and hryw pdt) are not attested in surviving texts until the Nineteenth Dynasty. In addition to garrison troops, records show that a large and varied personnel served under the authority of the imy-r htm. Peoples attached to border-fortresses included a whole cadre of scribes, administrators, soldiers, charioters, and Medjay desert scouts. The skill of these scouts at discerning desert tracks was particularly useful, as fugitives tended to evade the fortresses and their officials under the cover of night.

Although there was undoubtedly a military component to the office of the overseer of the htm-fortress, the most important duties of this official appear to have been administrative. Documents such as the Nauri Decree and P. Anastasi VI, 53–61 imply that all individuals and goods crossing the border were duly registered at the htm-fortress. Likewise, it seems that htm-officials often coordinated quite complex transborder shipments. The overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea, for example, managed numerous affairs related to the proper disbursement of cargo ships full of slaves, fish, and wool, whereas the scribe stationed at the htm-fortress of Bigeh expended a great deal
of energy assembling many cargo loads of Nubian cattle for shipment to Thebes. Significantly, however, both the Nauri Decree and the Bilgai stele imply that the authority potentially wielded by the imy-r htm over property and personnel under his charge made this category of official perhaps unusually susceptible to corruption and graft.

While Nineteenth Dynasty htm border-fortresses constituted a functionally unified group, it is unknown whether they were also defined by distinguishing physical characteristics. Only two htm-fortresses have been examined archaeologically, Tell Heboua I (Tjaru) and Tell er-Retabah (Tjeku). Remarkably, both are extremely large sites, dwarfing the mnnw fortress-towns of Nubia and Libya as well as the majority of urban centers in the Nile Valley. Although only portions of the two htm-fortresses have been excavated, each included cultic, administrative, and domestic zones within its expansive and bastioned enclosure walls. The main administrative buildings or “residencies” of both towns, it is worth noting, resemble closely in size and structure the contemporary administrative headquarters erected by the Egyptians in Canaan.

Given that the htm-fortresses of Tjaru and Tjeku were both substantial cities, there is a distinct possibility that the town of Elephantine and the htm of Elephantine should be considered one and the same. Certainly, this town is similarly known to have possessed a robust population in the New Kingdom. Indeed, the bureaucratic scale of Elephantine necessitated that governance be shared between the resident overseer of the htm-fortress and a local mayor. Considering the remarkable scale of these three towns, it is highly likely that the pharaonic government actively encouraged the growth and health of Tjaru, Tjeku, and Elephantine—putting into practice the philosophy that strong towns make for strong borders. It is doubtful, however, that a large size and booming population was necessarily inherent in the definition of a htm-fortress. The perimeters of the htm of the sea and the htm at Bigeh are unfortunately unknown, but it is unlikely that the htm-fortress in the Wadi Hammamat would have been capable of supporting a major town.

Mnnw-fortresses, like htm-fortresses, have been discovered both in the north and in the south. This type of fortress-town, of course, is well known from the Nubian examples erected between the first and second cataracts in the Middle Kingdom. While these early mnnw were fortified to an almost hypertrophic degree, the architects of
their New Kingdom successors deemphasized defense, preferring to erect walled temple towns, which they later peopled with administrators, priests, and civilians. Evidence for the presence of military officials or even mildly sophisticated martial architecture at Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasty Nubian mnnw is difficult to discover.

In the Nineteenth Dynasty only two mnnw fortress-towns were erected south of the border, namely Aksha in Lower Nubia and Amara West in Upper Nubia. Although no text explains the reasons behind their foundation, it would appear that Seti I intended them to serve as the political headquarters for the idnw of w3west and k3, respectively. The chain of mnnw-fortresses that Ramesses II erected along the highway to Libya, however, had a far more pressing purpose. Since the reign of Seti I, Egypt had been experiencing large-scale armed incursions into the western Delta by Libyan tribes. Undoubtedly, then, the emplacement of these mnnw-fortresses represented a concerted effort on the part of the Egyptian government to staunch such aggressive migration into the Nile Valley.

Of these western mnnw-fortresses, it is unfortunate that only Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham has been archaeologically investigated. This large compound, however, shares many features in common with Aksha and Amara West. A thick enclosure wall possessing corner bastions, for example, defined the perimeter of all three fortress-towns. All were likewise of a comparable scale, ranging between nearly 10,000 and 20,000 m². (By comparison, the htm-fortresses of Tell er-Retabah and Tell Heboua I ranged from 67,000 to 120,000 m², respectively, while the fortified way stations along the Ways of Horus only enclosed from 1,600 to 2,500 m²). Finally, Ramesses II graced all three mnnw-fortresses with stone temples that—judging from their remarkable similarity—must have performed highly standardized religious and economic functions in their respective communities.

The definition of what constituted a mnnw, then, almost certainly had more to do with the size and structure of an installation than with its function. Inscriptions demonstrate that one of the main purposes of the Libyan mnnw fortress-towns was to guard water sources and to secure regular stocks of food at intervals along the highway from Egypt to Cyrenaica. This dual function was also inherent to the forts arrayed along the Ways of Horus. Other similarities between the fortified installations of the eastern and the western highways include the fact that both were administered by troop commanders (hry pdt) and that both employed the services of Medjay desert scouts.
in an effort to track fugitives. One would ordinarily have assumed, then, that fortresses that served to guard water and other resources along barren highways and that were administered in much the same manner should have been designated by the same term. It is undoubtedly significant in this regard that while the fortified entities along the Ways of Horus were identified by a variety of otherwise infrequently utilized words for “fort” (such as mktr, bhn, and nhtw), absolutely none of these installations was termed a mnnw.

The variety of terms used to designate the forts along the Ways of Horus is especially interesting considering the homogeneous nature of these compounds. Their overall similarity is indicated both by their representations on the walls of Karnak and by the similarities in their plans as excavated. Archaeological investigations at Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A-289 have largely confirmed, but have also refined, the general picture provided by Seti’s artists. The forts turn out to have been square settlements of modest size that were encompassed by a thick and largely featureless brick wall. While the reliefs did indicate the presence of associated reservoirs—an element actually found at Bir el-‘Abd—they were silent concerning extramural granaries. Excavations of the forts have likewise illuminated their internal structure, an arrangement in both cases in which administrative and storage-related complexes enclosed a central plaza.

It has been proposed above that the variety of terms used to designate the fortified way stations along the Ways of Horus had mostly to do with the desire to differentiate one from the other for administrative purposes. The forts, like many monumental Egyptian constructions, were designated by a simple formula. They were termed the “[architectural type X] of [reigning king’s name Y] at [geographic name Z].” This system of nomenclature likely worked relatively well in areas in which the complexes were spread apart, but the ten forts located between the htm-fortress of Tjaru and the town (dmi) of Gaza had the potential to be easily confused.

The Egyptian authorities, then, refrained from incorporating the same architectural type into each of the names, although technically this would have been correct. They also exploited a potential for

957 The true architectural name for these compounds is not known due to the variety of terms employed, but it is likely that they would have constituted either mktr or nhtw. This discussion does not include the dmiw. As discussed above, these dmiw-towns likely did represent a different type of emplacement, as Seti’s reliefs indicate.
variation by utilizing both the king’s nomen and his prenomen in various place names. It is important to note, however, that while the scribes drew upon a wide variety of architectural terms (e.g., mktr, bhp, nhtw, and ’t), they employed neither htm nor mnnw—the two most common words for “fortress.” This marked avoidance was assuredly due to the scalar and functional definitions of the two terms that barred the forts along the Ways of Horus from official inclusion in either category.

Northeast of the Ways of Horus forts, the most characteristic Egyptian emplacement of the Nineteenth Dynasty was the administrative headquarters or “governor’s residency”—as these bases are often designated. Such buildings have been identified at Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Ajjul, Tell el-Far’ah, Tel Sera’, Tell el-Hesi, Ashdod, Tel Mor, Gezer, Aphek, and Beth Shan. While there is variety among them, the residencies themselves tend to range from about 200 to 800 m² in size. Predominantly square, many had been constructed with abnormally thick outer walls that rested upon brick foundations. The first floor of these buildings often appears to have been devoted to administration or storage, while debris from upper stories not infrequently indicates the original presence of a domestic area above. Egyptian-style pottery and other Egyptian-style non-prestige goods typically are found in abundance in the vicinity of these residencies. Even more dramatic, however, are associated finds of inscribed stone lintels and doorjambs. The same types of architectural elements—frequently listing official titles or royal protocol—also fronted the entrances to important buildings in Egypt itself and in the Nubian fortress-towns.

Oddly enough, despite the fact that these buildings are evidenced at numerous sites within Canaan and the Transjordan, they are startlingly absent from the Egyptian architectural vocabulary. Egyptian bases in Syria-Palestine appear in textual sources, but it is the enclaves as a whole that are referred to—and then only blandly—as garrisons (iwywt) or towns (dmw). The latter term is unfortunately utilized with respect to purely Canaanite towns as well. The larger settlements, which were unequivocally placed under direct rule, the Egyptians unimaginatively, if expansively, dubbed “town of [royal name X], which is in [geographic name Y].” It is notable, however, that the administrative headquarters in Syria-Palestine do appear to have been overseen by troop commanders (hry pdt). This administrative decision places the Canaanite bases in the same general league as the htm-
forresstes, as well as the installations that guarded the roads leading west to Libya and east to Syria-Palestine.

Perhaps the most notable aspect of the Egyptian administrative headquarters in Nineteenth Dynasty Canaan is their apparent disregard for defensive architecture. While the residencies at Deir el-Balah, Tel Mor, and Beth Shan incorporated modest bastions into their structure, the small size of these buildings would have rendered them virtually useless in any serious armed conflict. What the architecture of the residencies does reflect, however, is a preoccupation with administrative and economic concerns. Not only is a large portion of the floor space of many residencies devoted to storage, but associated wine presses at Aphek may also indicate that many of the bases were actively involved in local industries. Further, the pairing of residencies on the Via Maris with those in nearby harbors indicates that the shipment of commodities was likely a primary concern.

Although administrative headquarters were only discovered in Canaan, the seeming disregard or deemphasis on defensive architecture is notable in both Canaanite and Nubian contexts. Unlike the Libyans, with whom the Egyptians had only recently come into hostile contact, the Nubians and the Canaanites had lived under Egyptian governance for centuries. Thus, despite occasional small flare-ups, mostly fomented by nomadic groups, the inhabitants of both regions had long ago resigned themselves to the reality of Egyptian rule.

Canaan and Nubia were socially and geographically very different entities. The effects of living under Egyptian rule on the inhabitants of both territories, however, appear rather similar on two counts: Egyptianization and demographic depression. In Nubia the adoption of Egyptian cultural ways began during the Second Intermediate Period and accelerated after conquest, until by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty native Nubians could be distinguished from Egyptians in only a few small pockets of the empire. Indeed, this rapid acculturation has hampered our understanding of cultural processes in Nubia, as it is not possible in most cases to determine the difference between Nubians and Egyptians.

While the Egyptianization of Nubia is a much-discussed problem, the adoption of Egyptian cultural customs by Canaanites is lesser known. In Late Bronze Age Canaan, however, there is a profound dichotomy in the burial practices of people living along the major transit zones frequented by Egyptian authorities and those who lived in the hills—
a resource-poor area largely ignored by the Egyptian government. In her study of Canaanite mortuary practices, Gonen argues that the lowland Canaanite adoption of the custom of interring the dead in pit burials in a supine position and with a western orientation was influenced by Egyptian norms. Meanwhile, the highland retention of family tombs, she argues, demonstrates a conservatism that could be interpreted as an active resistance to Egyptian culture ways.958

If the inhabitants of both lowland Canaan and Nubia adopted some Egyptian customs, archaeological investigation has demonstrated that the effect of Egyptian rule on both frontiers was one of economic depression and cultural stagnation in all but the centers occupied by the Egyptians themselves. Whether this was a product of heavy Egyptian taxation, or whether outright usurpation of native lands and industries transformed much of the indigenous population into veritable serfs, is unknown. What is evident, however, is that both areas suffered an observable population loss.

Whereas the situation in Nubia deteriorated to the point at which the local population virtually disappeared from the archaeological record, even in Canaan it is estimated that the settled population had decreased by half between the advent of the Late Bronze and Iron Ages.959 On both frontiers, a good portion of this loss was real and likely due to town dwellers fleeing to join seminomadic pastoralists, who lived largely beyond the reach of Egyptian control. Increasing impoverishment of indigenous burials in both Canaan and Nubia, however, probably also contributed to a seeming demographic loss, as a lack of indicative grave goods invariably complicates efforts to date specific interments.

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CHAPTER SIX
FRONTIER POLICY IN THE TWENTIETH DYNASTY

OVERVIEW OF EGYPTIAN INTERACTIONS WITH SYRIA-PALESTINE

Historical summary

By all appearances, the two decades that separated the death of Merneptah from the coronation of Ramesses III were turbulent ones both in Egypt and abroad. The text of P. Harris I, a posthumous celebration of the life of Ramesses III, describes Egypt’s devolution into chaos in the waning years of the Nineteenth Dynasty. During this time “the land of Egypt was abandoned; every man was a law to himself. They had no leader many years previously... Egypt had (only) officials and city rulers; one killed his fellow, (whether) great or small” (P. Harris I, 75: 3–4). This sort of dark depiction of times past is, of course, a standard topos in propagandistic literature, whereby a time of disorder and fear serves as a foil for the reintroduction of peace and prosperity under a new and improved leader. Bearing this disclaimer in mind, however, there is little in P. Harris I’s description that one would not expect of a period in which the central government had largely collapsed.

If things were bad in Egypt, they were far, far worse in Syria-Palestine. The transition between the Bronze and Iron Ages is believed to have taken place in the years immediately surrounding 1200 B.C.¹ The shift between these two time periods is recognized in the archaeological record primarily by two telltale signs. First, trade in imported Mycenaean and Cypriot fine wares abruptly ceased, although enterprising Canaanite potters soon strove to fill this vacuum by imitating the fine wares in local clays.² Second, the transition between the Bronze and Iron Ages is dramatically witnessed in the scorched earth

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¹ Although the bulk of the destructions seem to have taken place around 1200 B.C., the violence occurred over the span of a couple decades in various areas of the Near East (Fritz 1987: 90–91; Iakovidis 1990: 317–318; Dever 1992a: 108; T. Dothan and M. Dothan 1992: 169).
of the vast majority of contemporary Syro-Palestinian towns. Sites that obviously experienced some sort of catastrophic event include but are not limited to—Tell Abu Hawam, Akko, Aphek, Ashdod, Ashkelon, Tell Beit Mirsim, Beth Shan, Beth Shemesh, Beitin, Tel Dan, Deir ‘Alla, Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Far‘ah North, Tell el-Far‘ah South, Hazor, Tell el-Hesi, Gezer, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Lachish, Kadesh, Megiddo, Tel Mor, Pella, Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh, Tell Sera‘, Shechem, Ugarit, and Tell Yin’am.² Given this almost apocalyptic orgy of violence, and the great social and economic upheaval that inevitably ensued, it is of little surprise that these years saw the eclipse of nearly every significant power in the Near East.

Attempting to understand just who or what destroyed these cities and civilizations is no easy matter. The authors of the Bible, of course, credited the Israelites with conquering a wide variety of Canaanite towns.⁴ However, in their zeal to lionize the Hebrews, they described Israelite victories over towns like Ai (Joshua 7: 2–8: 24), Jericho (Joshua 5: 13–6: 25), and Arad (Numbers 21: 1–3), which were not even occupied in the Late Bronze Age! When it came to pointing fingers, the ancient Egyptians were equally unhesitant. They placed the blame for the sacking and pillaging of contemporary towns squarely at the feet of the so-called peoples of the sea, the displaced populations of the Aegean and Asia Minor, who were on the move—scattered in war. According to the Egyptians, “No country could stand before their arms, from Hatti, Kode, Carchemesh, Arzawa and Alashiya on, (but they were) cut off at [one time]” (KRI V, 39: 15–40: 1).

Numerous outside sources suggest that some level of violence was indeed perpetrated by both the proto-Israelites and the Sea People. Settlement in the hill country, for example, begins in earnest during the Twentieth Dynasty, and the older towns in and around this area may have suffered attacks as a byproduct of this process. Likewise, panicked letters from the king of Ugarit report the arrival of “enemy ships” whose inhabitants were setting fire to nearby towns and terrorizing the countryside. The king of Ugarit’s pleas for help fell on

deaf ears, but the immediacy and scope of the threat is vividly demonstrated by the fact that some of these missives were still hardening in Ugarit’s ovens at the time the city suffered its final destruction! Further, it is of interest that many of the sacked coastal towns were quickly reoccupied by settlers who utilized Mycenaean IIIc:1b or the slightly later Philistine ware—i.e., the ceramics associated by most archaeologists with the Sea People and their descendants. It is not unreasonable to suspect, then, that the raiders settled at least some of the towns they overthrew.  

For the authors of the Bible, the story of Israel’s conquest of Canaan reinforced the message that their own people were indeed divinely chosen. Likewise, in highlighting the fearsomeness of their sea-borne opponents, the Egyptians quite deliberately heightened the effect of their own bravery and martial prowess. While propagandistic motives encouraged the Israelites and the Egyptians to blame the destructions on a single source, however, most modern scholars who study this period of chaos and transition have favored a decidedly multicausal approach. The interplay of these causes and their respective primacy or importance, on the other hand, continues to be debated.

The amount of scholarship centering upon the collapse of Late Bronze Age society is formidable, so a very brief survey of probable causes will suffice here. The suggestion currently in vogue is that the Late Bronze Age political economy suffered a fatal systems collapse due to a breakdown in what had become an extremely fragile and intricate web of international and interregional relations. This breakdown could have been caused or at least exacerbated by ecological factors—such as an exhaustion of natural resources, drought, or earthquakes. Certainly Hatti, and likely other areas of the Near

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8 Ecological stresses are cited as a probable factor in the Late Bronze Age collapse by Carpenter 1968; Klengel 1974; Betancourt 1976; Weiss 1982; Stiebing 1980; 1994. The possibility of earthquake activity has been addressed by Schaeffer 1948; Kilian 1980; Klengel 1992: 183. See the discussion of these topics in Drews 1993: 33–47; 77–84. Yurko (1999) has recently suggested volcanic activity as another probable cause of the decline in Hatti’s fortunes at this period.
East as well, suffered at the time from the dual scourges of plague and famine.

A breakdown in political and economic intercourse could also have been caused or aggravated by war, as dangerous conditions inevitably interfere with commerce and communication. Competition for access to resources or the simple revivification of old feuds often spark internecine conflict, especially in times of stress. Warlike activity on the part of the Sea People, the proto-Israelites, or other displaced or seminomadic populations, on the other hand, was likely both a direct product of war and a contributing factor to its perpetuation. Armed refugees and unemployed mercenaries, after all, are notorious for spreading conflicts well beyond their original boundaries.9

The central point of the systems theorists is that ecological downturns and war, while certainly significant stressors in Late Bronze society, were not the ultimate causes of its demise. Strong and self-sufficient polities can weather both hard times and war. That these factors proved fatal in this instance should be attributed to an endemic problem of overspecialization and intermeshed economies in the Late Bronze Age. The fact that each major power relied upon the health of the others to maintain its own well-being is a foretaste of more modern “global” economies, in which the economic upheavals of one country have profound repercussions for a far-flung network of its trading partners.

Of the freebooting groups that terrorized sedentary Eastern Mediterranean societies in the early twelfth century, only the Libyans and the Sea People attempted to penetrate Egypt’s borders. Acting in consort, these two heterogeneous populations had earlier attempted an invasion in the fifth year of Merneptah, at which time, according to Egyptian sources, they were roundly defeated. In the reign of

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9 Scholars who focus upon destructions wrought by the Sea People include Malamat 1971; A. Mazar 1985b: 105; Wood 1991: 52; T. Dothan 1982a: 295–296; Stager 1995: 336–337. Those who highlight violence relating to the Israelite settlement or bedouin activity include Albright 1939; Yeivin 1971; B. Mazar 1981; Malamat 1982; Yadin 1982; Bietak 1990: 301. Indeed, Drews (1993: 98–225) argues that changes in the tactics of warfare conferred important new advantages upon the infantry favored by these “barbarian” raiders. The authors of the violence inflicted upon Late Bronze Age towns, however, likely varied quite substantially according to geographic region. Numerous towns may also have fallen victim to internal revolts or internecine warfare (Fritz 1987: 91).
Ramesses III, the second king of the Twentieth Dynasty, both groups attacked again.

The Libyans attempted major thrusts into the Delta in Ramesses' fifth and eleventh regnal years, and these incursions will be discussed in the portion of the chapter devoted to Libya. It is noteworthy, however, that the alliance forged between the Libyans and the Sea People in the reign of Merneptah seems not to have been renewed. The only two recorded encounters with the Sea People in the Twentieth Dynasty took place in Ramesses' eighth year, and neither enemy coalition incorporated a Libyan element. Nor did the Libyans number Sea People mercenaries among their allies.

According to the official record, published in its fullest form on the walls of Medinet Habu, the Sea People launched a double-pronged attack upon Egypt and its Syro-Palestinian territories in the eighth year of Ramesses III. These armed assaults, carried out simultaneously by land and by sea, were perpetrated by a confederation of six ethnic groups. Of these, only the Shekelesh and the Sherden, who are thought to have eventually settled in Sicily and Sardinia respectively, had invaded the Delta in Merneptah's reign. Population groups new to Egypt, on the other hand, included the Weshesh, Denyen, Tjekker, and Peleset. While the Weshesh cannot be equated securely with any known historical population, scholars have identified the remaining three groups with the Greek Danaoi, the Teucrians, and the Philistines, respectively.11

By the time the Sea People turned their eyes to Egypt, their might was already renowned. Not only was the memory of their clash with Merneptah's army still relatively fresh, but news of their triumphs over the civilizations of Hatti, Kode, Carchemesh, Arzawa, and Alashiya had recently reached Egyptian ears (KRI V, 39: 15–40: 1). As discussed above, modern scholars have blamed the Sea People

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10 Due to the brevity of his reign, very little is known of Ramesses III's predecessor, Sethnakht.
11 For discussions of the identification of the different populations that composed the motley Sea People assemblage, see chapter five; Breasted AR IV: 33–34; Gardiner 1947a: 194–205*; Helck 1962: 244–246; Sandars 1985: 111–113, 158, 164–166, 170; Grandet 1994b: 214, 241–243; Bryce 1999: 370–372. Although the Teresh (Greek Tyrsenoï) are not mentioned explicitly in the historical texts, a leader of this group is listed among the prisoners of war, suggesting that these people also took part in the battle (Sandars 1985: 111–112).
for the ravages suffered by nearly every harbor town in the Eastern Mediterranean, but even if the ancient scribes and their modern equivalents have somewhat glorified the destructive menace of the Sea People, it is clear that these roving warriors were justly feared. In preparation for their offensive, then, it is little surprise that Ramesses III assiduously readied his forces.

In anticipation of engaging the land-based Sea People in battle, Ramesses III states, “I reinforced my frontier at Djahy, it being prepared before them with local rulers, overseers of garrison troops (imy-r iw’yt), and maryannu-warriors” (KRI V, 40: 6–7). The toponym “Djahy” is unfortunately frustratingly vague, encompassing within its borders sites and regions as diverse as Ashkelon, Hazor, and Lebanon. Likewise, it is not entirely clear from this passage whether Ramesses III concentrated his available forces at a single point or whether he simply dispatched missives, such as those typical of the Amarna archive, that warned his vassals and governors to guard their bailiwicks. Certainly, it is an important point, however, that there is no evidence that Ramesses III bolstered his frontier with any extra Egyptian forces. The maryannu-warriors and the troops supplied by vassals would have been recruited locally, while imperial garrison troops already occupied key strategic centers in Syria-Palestine—as had been the custom since at least the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty.

If Ramesses’ words imply that his Syro-Palestinian vassals were left largely to manage the invasion on their own, the reliefs tell a different story. From the battle scene carved on the walls of Medinet Habu, it would appear that the Egyptians, with the aid of their Sherden mercenaries, definitively defeated the invaders in a single episode of carnage. As dubious as this scenario might be, the relief provides at least one detail that does much to illuminate the nature of the encounter.

In the background of the battle, Sea People women and children are depicted riding in heavy carts pulled by humped oxen. These oxen, however, are demonstrably Anatolian in stock and thus supply an inadvertent clue as to the origin of these particular invaders.

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12 See Klengel (1992: 182–184), however, who downplays Sea People involvement in these destructions.
15 Sandars 1985: 121, 169; Bryce 1999: 372–373. Here, of course, the term “Sea
It would thus appear that the enemy comprised a group of agriculturists that had traveled southward together with their draft animals in search of a new homeland, presumably one free from the problems that had recently wrought havoc in Anatolia. The battle depicted at Medinet Habu, then, may in effect constitute a glorified representation of an attack on a migratory population. Certainly, the lack of any associated city or definitive topographical marker bolsters this impression.\textsuperscript{16}

While the textual and the pictorial information relating to the purported land battle against the Sea People is vague and somewhat contradictory, the naval battle is presented in a much more straightforward manner. According to the official narrative of the event, the Egyptians had received advance warning of the enemy’s impending arrival and had time to prepare their defenses. Reliefs show Ramesses III issuing supplies to the infantry and the chariots, as well as to the auxiliary Sherden and Nubian troops.\textsuperscript{17} Meanwhile, according to the inscriptions, the harbors were outfitted with at least two different types of ships, all “manned completely from bow to stern with brave warriors carrying their weapons” (KRI V, 40: 9–10).\textsuperscript{18} Further, the Egyptians seem to have utilized both stockades and firewalls in their efforts to ensure that the Sea People would not be able to disembark from their fleet (KRI V, 40: 16–41: 1).

According to Ramesses III, the Sea People were only able to enter the Egyptian harbor because the pharaoh himself had laid a finely crafted snare for them (KRI V, 33: 5–6; 40: 5). While this may have been the case, it is tempting to speculate, somewhat cynically, that the Egyptians could in effect do nothing to prevent this entry and were instead forced to mount a last-ditch, no-holds-barred defensive effort to repel it. Whatever the circumstances, the reliefs make it clear that when the two fleets clashed in battle,\textsuperscript{19} victory fell to the Egyptians.

\textsuperscript{16} There is nothing in either the reliefs or the texts that supports the supposition of Stadelmann (1968), Sandars (1985: 121), and Bietak (1990: 293, 299) that the land battle had occurred near the mouth of the Pelusiac branch of the Nile. Indeed, Ramesses III’s referral of the matter to vassals, garrison troops, and maryannu-warriors would argue strongly against an Egyptian locale.

\textsuperscript{17} Edgerton and Wilson 1936: 36, pl. 29; KRI V, 28: 15–16.

\textsuperscript{18} Edgerton and Wilson 1936: 36, pl. 29.

\textsuperscript{19} A literal reading of the relief (Edgerton and Wilson 1936: 41–42, pls. 37–39)
The texts likewise provide the information that the enemy “were dragged, overturned, and laid low upon the beach—slain and made heaps from stern to bow of their galleys, while all their things were cast upon the water” (KRI V, 41: 1–3). Following Nineteenth Dynasty models, a series of scenes at Medinet Habu illustrated the grisly aftermath of the battle, namely the point at which the Egyptian scribes were faced with the unenviable task of meticulously counting and recording great heaps of disembodied hands and phalli. It is potentially important, however, that the totals of these counts were apparently not published at Medinet Habu or indeed elsewhere.

If one accepts the Egyptian records at face value, then, it would appear that an ethnically mixed group of Sea People had coordinated a simultaneous attack in Ramesses III’s eighth year, invading Egypt by sea and Egypt’s northern empire by land. Due to clever planning and the supremacy of Egypt’s armed forces, however, the Egyptians dealt the Sea People decisive and humiliating defeats in both venues. While the Egyptians slew the majority of the enemy warriors, they enrolled many of the remaining prisoners of war in service as garrison soldiers.

There are numerous scholars, however, who dismiss this official version of events as propaganda and believe, as Faulkner phrased it, that the Medinet Habu inscriptions “contain but a halfpenny-worth of historical fact to an intolerable deal of turgid adulation of the pharaoh.”20 Cifola, for example, in her structural study of Ramesses III’s Medinet Habu war narratives finds that the year eight account differs in important ways from the records relating to the Libyan conflicts in years five and eleven of the same pharaoh. She notes that the texts relating to the Sea People invasions are remarkable precisely for their lack of specificity regarding the battle itself, the booty taken, and the sociopolitical organization of the invaders. Further, the unusual stress on the coalition of the Sea People strikes Cifola as “nothing but the narrative condensation of a continuous

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long-lasting process consisting in small skirmishes and rebuffs of repeated attempts at assault and penetration, into a single great military event to serve a precise propagandistic purpose.”

Both the biblical and the archaeological record indicate that the main area of Philistine settlement in the early Iron Age was along Canaan’s southern coast. The Philistines derived their name from the Peleset, who were among the invaders in Ramesses III’s eighth year. It is highly likely, however, that the material culture that is defined as “Philistine” was produced not only by the Peleset, but also by at least a few of their confederates in arms as well. The presence of Philistine artifacts in southern Canaan, precisely in the heartland of Egypt’s empire, has led scholars to debate whether the Sea People were indeed there by invitation or whether the Egyptians had very little say in the matter.

Both textual and archaeological evidence has been employed to argue that Ramesses III quite deliberately settled the Sea People in southern Canaan. The textual evidence derives from an explicit statement by Ramesses III that he installed Sea People prisoners of war “in nhte-strongholds, bound in my name. Their military classes were plentiful, like hundred thousands. I apportioned them all with clothing (and) grain from the treasuries (and) granaries each year” (P. Harris I, 76: 8–9).

Sherden warriors had been employed as auxiliary troops by the Egyptian army since the reign of Ramesses II (KRI II, 11: 1–15) at least. Likewise, in the reign of Ramesses III, contingents of Sea People—perhaps originally captives of Merneptah—fought in the Egyptian army, even against their own countrymen! It would appear,
then, that Ramesses III would almost certainly have had every intention of employing the martial vigor of the newest wave of Sea People for his own benefit.

Just because the Egyptians recruited Sea People as mercenaries and housed them in nhtw-strongholds, however, does not necessarily imply that these strongholds were located abroad. Texts dealing with Libyan prisoners of war demonstrate that Ramesses III installed his western captives in nhtw-strongholds as well. Likewise, the texts provide the information that the Libyans were routinely branded and that their warriors were placed under the authority of troop commanders (P. Harris I, 77: 4–6; KRI V, 24: 1–3).

One stele, however, is unusually informative. It states that Ramesses III ordered that the Libyan captives “cross the river, (they) being brought to Egypt. They were placed in nhtw-strongholds of the victorious king that they might hear the speech of the (Egyptian) people (before following the king). He made a reversion of their speech, re[ver]sing their tongues that they might go upon the road, which (they) had not descended (before) . . . When they reached the district of the king, they were made into shield bearers, followers, and fan-bearers following the king” (KRI V, 91: 6–7, 9–10). From this inscription, it is quite clear that Ramesses III had placed this group of Libyans in nhtw-strongholds located well within Egypt for the express purpose of acclimatizing them to the culture and language of the Egyptian people and alienating them from their own. Whether nhtw always served as centers for acculturation, however, is not at all certain.27

The nhtw-strongholds in which the Libyans learned the Egyptian tongue were located in Egypt, as was the nhtw in which Thutmose III settled certain foreign prisoners (Urk. IV, 690: 2–5). On the other hand, Nineteenth Dynasty records demonstrate that at least two nhtw were built along the Ways of Horus (KRI I, 7: 5, 8: 16; P. Anastasi I, 27: 5; KRI II, 826: 2–5). Likewise, Ramesses II bragged of settling foreigners within nhtw-strongholds in the very same context in

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27 It should be noted that there is no evidence for such forcible methods of acculturation having been practiced in Nubia. There the process of Egyptianization seems to have been an indigenous movement, begun already in the Second Intermediate Period, when Nubia was free from Egypt’s political control (Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 187; Trigger 1965: 104–105; Bietak 1968: 105–117, 150–157; S. T. Smith 1993: 193, 197–198).
which he boasted of transplanting northerners to the south, southerners to the north, easterners to the west, and westerners to the east (KRI II, 206: 14–16). It is thus unclear whether the Sea People and the Libyans of Ramesses III’s reign always occupied nḫtw-strongholds within Egypt or whether occasionally these could have been located in foreign territories.

Scholars who argue that the nḫtw into which the Sea People were settled should be situated in Syria-Palestine bolster their argument by tracing the distribution of so-called Philistine material culture.28 As mentioned above, the Sea People—or Philistines, as they are referred to in archaeological contexts—are associated with two types of ceramic: an early Mycenaean IIIC:1b and the slightly later “Philistine ware.” Both pottery types are imitations of Mycenaean imports fashioned from local clays, and both tend to cluster primarily in Canaan’s southern plain, where biblical records place the Philistines in the Iron Age and where archaeology has demonstrated the existence of numerous contemporary Egyptian bases.

Sea People troops supposedly resident at Egyptian bases have also been associated by more than a few archaeologists with “grotesque” anthropoid clay coffins. This genre of artifact is first witnessed in IA IA contexts in association with “naturalistic” counterparts. As discussed in chapter five, naturalistic clay coffins dating to the Nineteenth Dynasty have been excavated in Egypt, Nubia, and Canaan. Naturalistic coffins represent a necessarily modified rendition of the mumiform coffins popular in contemporary Egypt, and indeed they seem originally to have been painted in order to resemble the latter even more closely. Not only do these Nineteenth Dynasty naturalistic clay coffins mimic Egyptian prototypes, however, but they are also discovered in the Levant exclusively at Egyptian bases, namely at Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Far’ah South, and Beth Shan. There is thus a general agreement among scholars that the original inhabitants of the naturalistic coffins were likely Egyptian military personnel who had died while stationed abroad.29

In the Twentieth Dynasty, naturalistic anthropoid clay coffins are evidenced at Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Far‘ah South, Beth Shan, and Lachish. Coexisting with the naturalistic types at all but the last of these sites, however, archaeologists discovered “grotesque” anthropoid coffins. While the general shape and structure of the two types was similar, the “grotesque” coffins are strikingly different entities.

Upon the lids of the naturalistic examples, a human face had been modeled in a manner that resembled the proportions of a real human face. The individual facial features on the “grotesque” coffins, however, were applied directly upon the lid, producing a highly stylized effect that has been likened to the gold burial masks discovered at Mycenae.\(^{30}\) Likewise, the brows of many of these grotesque effigies were crowned with headdresses that bear more than a passing resemblance to the headdresses of the Peleset, Tjekker, and Denyen as depicted on the Medinet Habu reliefs.\(^{31}\)

The placement of a piece of gold foil in the mouth of an individual interred in one of these “grotesque” coffins at Beth Shan may also be used to argue for an Aegean cultural influence.\(^{32}\) Indeed, were it not for the fact that almost all of the burials had been robbed in ancient or modern times, it is likely that evidence of this custom would have been more widespread. The co-existence of the Egyptian-style and Aegean-style anthropoid coffins at the Egyptian bases at Deir el-Balah, Tell el-Far‘ah, and Beth Shan has thus been employed to argue for the on-site burial of both Egyptian and Sea People garrison troops.\(^{33}\)

Other scholars, who oppose the idea that the Sea People were quartered in Egyptian barracks, do acknowledge that the IA grotesque coffins are limited to Egyptian bases, but they are quick to note that Aegean-style pottery is not.\(^{34}\) These ceramic types have

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\(^{30}\) Petrie 1930: 8. While traces of paint have not survived on any of the “grotesque” coffins, it would be very interesting to know in this context whether the lids had been originally painted yellow to imitate the gold of the Mycenaean facemasks.


been found at sites that were under Egyptian occupation and also in association with those that were not. Further, they point to certain Egyptian bases at which Aegean-style ceramic is largely absent, such as Tel Sera’, Lachish, and Beth Shan, to refute a one-to-one correlation between Egyptian garrison posts and Philistine mercenaries.

In this regard, it should be noted, however, that Ramesses III himself had boasted that the strongholds at which the Sea People were stationed would be supplied by Egyptian storehouses (P. Harris I, 76: 9). Likewise, as discussed in chapter five, archaeological evidence suggests that many Egyptian bases utilized potters who had been trained in Egyptian manufacturing techniques. For this reason, it should not be expected that Philistine pottery would necessarily be discovered at sites at which Sea People were garrisoned.

Scholars who are of the opinion that the Sea People settled in southern Canaan of their own volition also argue that Ramesses III would hardly have allowed his erstwhile enemies to settle in some of the region’s choicest real estate, especially land situated along the strategically vital Via Maris. Further, they argue that many of the sites that the Sea People occupied in the Twentieth Dynasty, such as Ashdod, Jaffa, and Aphek, were former Egyptian bases—bases that in all likelihood the Sea People themselves had destroyed! According to the view of these scholars, then, the Egyptian government had manifestly failed to prevent the settlement of the Sea People in the areas that these groups had conquered by force of arms. For the remainder of Ramesses III’s reign, according to this argument, the Egyptians and Sea Peoples coexisted uneasily in southern Canaan, with the Egyptians focusing their resources on inland bases such as Tel Sera’, Lachish, Megiddo, and Beth Shan and the Philistines dominating the coastal regions.35

It is certainly correct that there is no direct and exclusive correlation in the Twentieth Dynasty between Egyptian headquarters and Philistine material culture, and in the archaeological section of this chapter the issue of the presence or absence of Philistines at individual Egyptian bases will be explored in greater depth. The fact remains, however, that the Egyptians maintained a strong footing in southern Canaan during the first few reigns of the Twentieth Dynasty.

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Egyptian administrative headquarters have been discovered at Tell el-Far‘ah South and Tel Sera`. Further, it is likely that Deir el-Balah, Gaza, Lachish, and perhaps Tel Mor were garrison towns as well. Evidence may likewise be marshaled to argue that the Egyptians erected temples at Gaza, Beth Shan, and possibly Tel Sera`, Lachish, and Ashkelon as well. P. Harris I provides the further information that temple estates were established in nine Syro-Palestinian and Nubian settlements (dmiw), although the distribution of these between the two frontiers is unknown (P. Harris I, List A, 11: 11; 68a: 2). While temple estates are not necessarily synonymous with temples, Ramesses III’s boast that he “built” bḥm in Amun’s name in Egypt, Nubia, and Syria-Palestine (KRI V, 117: 13–14) indicates that rather than simply donating specific taxes to the cult of Amun, the imperial government actively invested its own resources in modeling the economy and sacred landscape of these towns according to an Egyptian prototype.

Archaeological and textual evidence demonstrates that the Egyptians maintained a strong presence in southern Canaan during the reign of Ramesses III, although they also occupied bases farther north at Beth Shan, Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh, and perhaps Megiddo as well. Interestingly, however, it is at the southern bases of Tell el-Far‘ah, Tel Sera`, and Lachish that archaeologists have discovered numerous votive bowls that bear hieratic inscriptions. These notations, dating minimally from the 7th through the 22nd regnal years of Ramesses III, record the receipt of large quantities of grain as payment of the Egyptian harvest tax (šniw).

According to P. Harris I, 9: 1–3, Syro-Palestinians regularly bore their harvests to a temple of Amun at Gaza, and it is thus quite possible that Egyptian-sponsored temples served as the collection points for taxes in Twentieth Dynasty Canaan. With this text in mind, it has been suggested that Egyptian scribes wrote tax receipts on bowls so that a token amount of grain could be placed in the bowls and returned to the individual who brought the grain. The taxpayer would then present the votive vessel and its contents to the

36 See the sections concerning the textual and archaeological evidence for Egyptian fortresses in Syria-Palestine, below.


temple deity as a symbol of his entire contribution. The quantity of grain recorded on the bowls, reaching in some cases into hundreds of thousands of liters, aptly demonstrates that Egyptian establishments in Syria-Palestine relied heavily on local taxes in order to support themselves and perhaps to transfer income back to Egypt as well.\textsuperscript{39}

If southern Canaan was indeed a “major granary”\textsuperscript{40} in the IA IA period, and if the Egyptians required a large quantity of produce to maintain their many bases, they would have been forced either to colonize the area in large numbers or to place the burden on the backs of local farmers. Since there is no evidence for Egyptian settlement outside of the bases themselves, it is likely that the second option was preferred. Archaeological evidence suggests, however, that by the close of the Late Bronze Age less than half of the country’s Middle Bronze Age population still farmed the countryside.\textsuperscript{41} Further, the depopulation of southern Canaan may have reached crisis proportions following the invasion(s) of the Sea People, which appears to have inflicted great violence and hardship on the local population.

It may have been, then, that by allowing the Sea People to settle an area they had already conquered, Ramesses III was not simply acquiescing to a situation he could do little to change. The Egyptians, in fact, may well have been facing a serious labor shortage, the magnitude of which posed a threat to their ability to maintain a strong presence in southern Canaan. In such a scenario, the infusion of a new population, especially a population that had brought their own draft animals and agricultural knowledge with them, could well have been a boon for the pharaonic government.

By encouraging Sea People settlement in a largely depopulated area, the Egyptians assured themselves of new taxes. Likewise, as the imperial government had relied upon Sea People as mercenary troops since the reign of Ramesses II, they may also have felt comfortable subcontracting some of the work of defending Egypt’s buffer zone to this group. Thus, while some Sea People warriors were likely

\textsuperscript{40} Goldwasser 1984: 87.
\textsuperscript{41} Broshi 1993: 14. For a discussion of the depressed and largely depopulated state of Canaan at the end of the Late Bronze Age, see chapter five; Ahituv 1978: 105; Dever 1992: 105.
installed as garrison troops in Egyptian bases, others were probably provided with abandoned land to settle in return for loyalty and the regular payment of taxes.

The imperial government may have been especially willing to unload some of the burden of manning bases in southern Canaan given that Egypt in the reign of Ramesses III was beset by internal problems. Prices experienced wild fluctuations, state-funded laborers struck for lack of payment, royal tombs were robbed, officials were fired on corruption charges, and a harem conspiracy almost led to the murder of Ramesses himself.\(^42\) Considering the trouble at home and the amount of government funds and resources that must have been expended in the construction of Ramesses III’s magnificent funerary temple at Medinet Habu, Egypt would likely have had a greatly diminished store of resources to invest in its northern territories. It is hardly surprising, then, that there is very little evidence that Ramesses III undertook the majority of the Syro-Palestinian wars that he “commemorated” on the walls of his temples.

Aside from the battles against the Sea People, scholars can agree on only one northern campaign that it seems probable Ramesses III actually sponsored.\(^43\) The author of P. Harris I credits Ramesses with the boast, “I destroyed the Seirites in the tribes of the Shasu. I looted their tents of people and property, their herds likewise without limit; (they being) pinioned and brought in captivity as tribute (to) Egypt, (where) I presented them to the Ennead as slaves (\(\dot{\text{hmw}}\)) for their estates” (P. Harris I, 76: 9–11). In his own day, Ramesses II had also campaigned against the Shasu of Edom as part and parcel of what must have been a concerted Nineteenth Dynasty effort to quell hostile bedouin activity.

An Egyptian assault on a bedouin camp hardly seems worth recording, yet it is the only Syro-Palestinian campaign memorialized in P. Harris I. On the walls of Medinet Habu and Karnak, however, Ramesses III commissioned numerous scenes of himself campaigning against towns in Syria and Amurru; these included Tunip and a polity in Arzawa. Further, the artists depicted the defenders of at least some of these settlements as ethnic Hittites.\(^44\) Given that the

\(^{42}\) For a thorough and comprehensive study of Ramesses III’s reign, see most recently Grandet 1993.

\(^{43}\) Faulkner 1980: 244; Bietak 1990: 302.

Hittite civilization and the majority of Ramesses III’s other supposed foes did not survive the transition to the Iron Age, most scholars view the reliefs as fabrications, included in the decorative program of the temple because a good Egyptian pharaoh, after all, was supposed to conduct grand campaigns in Syria and because such campaigns likewise served to symbolize the pharaoh’s triumph over the forces of chaos. Ramesses III’s toponym lists have similarly been regarded as largely plagiarized from the abundant lists of Thutmose III and Ramesses II.

A few scholars are willing to lend some of the reliefs a modicum of credibility due to Ramesses III’s boast in his description of the first Libyan war that “This one of Am[or] is as ashes, his seed is not. All his people are taken captive, scattered and laid low” (KRI V, 21: 13–14). These scholars argue that it is in fact feasible that campaigns to the north could have occurred as part of a “mopping up” operation after the land battle against the Sea People. Regardless of the historicity of the purported northern campaigns, however, a stele of Ramesses III discovered at Tyre and a fragment of a statue of the same king from Byblos demonstrate that relations between these important coastal areas and Egypt continued to be close, whether or not their rulers still officially counted themselves among the pharaoh’s vassals.

Ramesses III died after a reign extending over three decades in length, leaving his teenage son, Ramesses IV, to assume the mantle of leadership. This pharaoh ruled for only seven years, during which time Egypt’s internal problems only deepened. It is thus unlikely the government could have allotted significant resources to the maintenance of its empire. For the reign of Ramesses IV, no definite records of Syro-Palestinian campaigns have survived. Further, the two inscriptions that may possibly suggest northern activity undertaken at this time are both of very dubious merit.

First, Fairman discovered an extremely fragmentary hieratic stele at Amara West that appears to give details of a sea battle and a nocturnal conflict (KRI VI, 63: 15–64: 4). Dated to the third year

of an unnamed king, this stele has been tentatively assigned to Ramesses IV based on its inclusion of the quite rare word ‘grt, a term that is also employed on a Wadi Hammamat inscription from Ramesses IV’s third year (KRI VI, 14: 10).\(^{49}\) Even less encouraging is the second piece of evidence, namely that Ramesses IV employed 800 Apiru in quarrying stone from the Wadi Hammamat (KRI VI, 14: 7).\(^{50}\) Considering that Apiru had been put to use dragging stone as early as the reign of Ramesses II (P. Leiden 348, vs. 6: 1–7: 1), it is more than likely that the Apiru of Ramesses IV’s day were descendents of former prisoners of war.

Archaeological evidence also cannot confirm a strong Egyptian presence in the north. A stone fragment inscribed with Ramesses IV’s name, which was discovered on the surface at Tel Delhamiya, is the only evidence that this king commissioned work in Syria-Palestine. Whether this fragment indicates building activity at Tel Delhamiya or simply that stones were later robbed from nearby Beth Shan, it does suggest that Egypt’s military bases in the Transjordan continued to function at this time.\(^{51}\) Otherwise the sole objects bearing Ramesses IV’s name were scarabs discovered at a number of Canaanite sites including Tell el-Far’ah South, Gezer, and Tell es-Saft.\(^{52}\)

Regarding the four-year reign of Ramesses V, the next Ramesside king, there is little evidence pertaining to his activity in the north, as should be expected from a pharaoh with such a short tenure in office. The mines at Serabit el-Khadim and Timna continued to function, demonstrating that Egypt still reached beyond its boundaries, even if only slightly.\(^{53}\) Otherwise, P. Wilbour provides the information that military colonies of Shasu existed in Middle Egypt.\(^{54}\) The presence of these enclaves, however, was again more likely a remnant of Egypt’s martial past than a testament to its current state.

While the Egyptian presence in Canaan must have been significantly enfeebled under Ramesses IV and Ramesses V, it seems to have

\(^{50}\) Peden 1994b: 97.
\(^{51}\) Weinstein 1992: 146.
\(^{54}\) See the discussions in Giveon 1969–70: 51; Ward 1972: 41.
persisted in some state until the reign of Ramesses VI. A copper statue base of this king has been discovered at Megiddo, suggesting that this town was either under the control of the Egyptians or friendly toward them at the time of the statue’s erection. In the course of Ramesses VI’s reign, however, Egypt lost its grip not only on Canaan, but even on the Sinai Peninsula. Ramesses VI is the last king of the Twentieth Dynasty to have left an inscription at Serabit el-Khadim or indeed anywhere else in the Sinai. While troubles in the Nile Valley were undoubtedly the primary cause of Egypt’s withdrawal from the north, factors such as the government’s increasing use of mercenary soldiers, the influx of foreign and migratory populations into Syria-Palestine, and the effect of a second wave of destructions at this time have also been cited as contributing to the collapse of the empire.

Archaeological evidence suggests that the final end of Egyptian rule in the north was a short and bloody affair. Not only does evidence for Egyptian occupation cease abruptly in the reign of Ramesses VI, but nearly every Egyptian base in Canaan seems to have been torched, whether by enemy attackers, by garrison uprisings, or by the Egyptians themselves as they retreated homeward. The manner in which each Egyptian base met its end is to be analyzed in depth later in this chapter.

The common thread of destruction by fire is interesting, for it suggests that Egypt did not simply slink back into its borders as the revenue to support, and indeed to justify, the imperial infrastructure became increasingly difficult to attain. Instead, it seems that the local populations must have seized the opportunity of Egypt’s internal weakness to rid themselves of their overlords. Without Egyptian taxation, corvée labor demands, co-option of local industries and resources, and interference in local politics, the inhabitants of Canaan must surely have believed that their lots would improve significantly.

Following the reign of Ramesses VI, the record is quiet until the very last reign of the Twentieth Dynasty. At this time, according to the culturally indicative Tale of Wenamun, Egypt had lost any

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58 Although likely fictitious, this tale is generally held to reflect with some accuracy Egypt’s weakened international influence in the waning years of the Twentieth Dynasty.
power or influence over the Phoenician ports that it had once enjoyed. Neither the clout of the pharaohs of Egypt nor the once obscenely rich cult of Amun could secure an Egyptian envoy a loan once his cargo had been stolen. Likewise, upon being attacked in Cyprus, the hapless Egyptian protagonist was forced to deter his attackers with threats of reprisals from Byblos rather than from Egypt! Such was the sad state of affairs as the sun set on the Egyptian empire.

Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for Twentieth Dynasty northern fortifications and administrative headquarters

For the first time since the dawn of the New Kingdom, Twentieth Dynasty Egypt was directly faced with the threat of an invasion from the east. The central administration’s acknowledgment of this danger is reflected in the architecture of at least two of its htm border-fortresses. Both Tell er-Retabah (Tjeku—see figure 56) and Kom el-Qulzoum served to guard the Nile Valley at vulnerable points of entry, the former at the corridor of the Wadi Tumilat and the latter at a passage between the southern lakes. While Tell er-Retabah remained a population center of substantial size in the Twentieth Dynasty, the newly built fort at Kom el-Qulzoum better fit the scale of the forts along the Ways of Horus. The salient feature that unites both of these installations, however, is the exceptionally massive walls erected around them at this period.

The enclosure wall at Kom el-Qulzoum was reportedly 7 m thick, which given its relatively small size is quite remarkable. Meanwhile, Tell er-Retabah was refortified with a 9.5 m thick wall and then another wall 8.8 m in thickness. In addition, the only excavated gate at this border town had been so fortified in the Twentieth Dynasty that its passageway had become rather impractically narrow. Indeed, those wishing to enter or exit the fortress-town were now forced to do so single file!

Whether such efforts to enhance security were likewise enacted at the other two attested northern htm-fortresses is unknown. The great htm-fortress of the sea has never been located. Given the very real maritime menace posed by the Sea People, however, a substantial refurbishment of this installation is probable. The situation at Tell Dynasty (Lichtheim 1976: 224; Egberts 1998: 94–95). See Simpson (1973: 142), however, who believes the tale to be a polished version of an official report.
Heboua I (Tjaru) is likewise obscure. Although the Twentieth Dynasty levels at this site are not well understood, archaeologists would presumably have remarked upon any major architectural modifications that might date to this period. It may thus have been that Tell Heboua I’s status as a major population center posed enough of a deterrent to armed invaders that additional work on the town’s fortifications was deemed unnecessary. It should also be remembered that in the Nineteenth Dynasty Tjaru served as an arsenal. If it continued to do so in the Twentieth Dynasty, however, one might imagine that the weapons issued there would have been used for defensive, rather than offensive, purposes.

As discussed in the historical section above, the Twentieth Dynasty is notable for an almost complete dearth of texts reporting on or alluding to northern campaigns. A marked curtailment of martial activity abroad might also be surmised from archaeological evidence. The derelict state of Haruba site A-289 (see figure 39) and the abandonment of Bir el-'Abd demonstrate that forts along the Ways of Horus were largely neglected at this period. While one could argue that the forts may have been allowed to deteriorate because armies no longer passed them by, this suggestion is not entirely satisfying. Surely the upkeep of the way stations would have been but a minimal price to pay for the maintenance of a well-oiled infrastructure, still of service to numerous imperial messengers and functionaries. Instead, it seems a good possibility that the forts were *purposefully* abandoned, in order to make it significantly more difficult for land-based invaders to reach Egypt. A concerted army of any size, it may have been realized, would have had little problem defeating the small garrisons stationed at the forts. In the worst-case scenario, then, access to Egyptian stores of grain would only serve to fortify and hasten enemy soldiers on their journey toward the Delta.

This theory could, of course, be challenged if the fortified well that Ramesses III constructed at a place called Aiyn were situated along the Ways of Horus. Certainly the name is quite similar to Aiyanin, the locale of one of Seti I’s way stations. Given that the two toponyms translate respectively as “water source” and “two water

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59 Twentieth Dynasty pottery discovered at Tell el-Borg may indicate that this fortress, located in close proximity to that at Tjaru, had also been safeguarded with people or troops at this time (Hoffmeier 2003).
sources,” however, the similarity between them is hardly indicative of geographic proximity. The fortified well at Aiyn might have been situated along the coastal highway, but it could equally well have been erected elsewhere in the Sinai, in the Eastern Desert, or even perhaps near a mining settlement in the Negev. The only thing certain is that the well would have been sunk in an otherwise arid locale that was of some strategic interest to Egypt and that was, at least occasionally, frequented by Semites.

Despite Egypt’s own troubled state and the widespread upheaval that marked the end of the Late Bronze Age, the imperial government did in fact manage to maintain a presence at those few Egyptian headquarters that had escaped destruction at the end of the Late Bronze Age. These bases were limited to Tell el-Far‘ah (see figure 57), Tel Sera‘ (see figure 39), Deir el-Balah (probably), and Beth Shan (see figure 59). While the first three likely survived intact due to their location quite close to the Egyptian border, the garrison at the Nineteenth Dynasty base at Beth Shan may well have been strong enough to ward off attacks in its own right. New bases—or perhaps refurbished ones (the evidence is equivocal)—were also discovered at Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh (see figure 60) and possibly Lachish as well.

Although textual evidence cannot support the equation made by some scholars between Egyptian bases in Canaan and the ṣawtaw-strongholds at which Sea People prisoners of war were settled, this is not to deny that the Egyptians employed their former enemies as mercenaries. They most certainly did so. Archaeological evidence suggests that a good number of these individuals resided along with Egyptian soldiers at northern garrison posts. For example, Philistine pottery and grotesque anthropoid coffins were discovered at Beth Shan, Tell el-Far‘ah, and Deir el-Balah. The far greater quantities of Aegean-style ceramic evidenced at the two latter sites, however, is undoubtedly due to the fact that civilian Sea People, and thus Sea People craftsmen, resided in far greater numbers in the vicinity of southern Canaanite bases than they did in the Beth Shan area.

The doorjambs and lintels of the troop marshal (ḫs pḥ) Ramesses-user-khepesh at Beth Shan and the depiction of an Egyptian official on an ivory plaque from the residency at Tell el-Far‘ah (see figure 58) suggest that the Egyptians continued to fill leadership positions at their bases throughout the reign of Ramesses III. Indeed, it is quite probable that the Egyptians were still resident at these bases
as late as the widespread destructions that marked the mid-twelfth century. At Tell el-Far‘ah, the only administrative headquarters to survive this violent watershed, however, there seems to have been a seamless transition to sole Philistine occupation. The lack of any sign of a destruction level, together with long-standing evidence for cooperation between the two ethnic groups, indicates that the Egyptians at Tell el-Far‘ah may have bequeathed the base to their Philistine partners upon their own withdrawal from the region.

While none of Egypt’s administrative headquarters in Canaan is specifically referred to in contemporary inscriptions, both textual and archaeological evidence indicates that Egypt’s few remaining directly held bases were fundamentally re-organized in the Twentieth Dynasty. At Tell el-Far‘ah, Tel Sera, Deir el-Balah, and Lachish, bowls were discovered bearing hieratic inscriptions that recorded payment of a harvest tax (šmwt). As discussed above, these bowls may have constituted votive receipts in which taxpayers could offer to the deity of the Egyptian-sponsored temple token amounts of the grain that they had delivered as tax. Certainly, we know from P. Harris I that a certain segment of Canaanites paid their taxes at a temple (ḥwt) dedicated to Amun that was located at Gaza. The scattered findings of these votive bowls at sites all over southern Canaan, then, suggest that temples identified with the god Amun served as gathering points for taxes throughout the core of Egypt’s empire.

According to official texts, as many as nine towns (dmiw) or estates (bḥnw) belonging to Amun were situated in Canaan during the reign of Ramesses III. While no temples demonstrably dedicated to this god have yet been found, evidence for Egyptian cults may be noted at a variety of sites. The temple at Beth Shan, for instance, was not only strongly Egyptian in character, but it was also filled with Egyptian-style cultic goods and votive pottery. At Lachish a similar Egyptian-style temple and artifact assemblage is attested. Finally, the great quantity of Egyptian-style cultic detritus excavated in the local temple at Tel Sera suggests that the Egyptians had usurped this pre-existing holy place for their own purposes. Such a move would not only have saved the imperial government much-needed funds, but it would also undoubtedly have exerted a profound ideological impact on the temple’s community.

The question remains, however, as to how exactly this evidence should be interpreted. Three Syro-Palestinian towns had been donated to the cult of Amun in the time of Thutmose III, and at least two
temples to Egyptian deities had been erected on foreign soil in this same reign. In the late Eighteenth Dynasty, Egyptian gods were said to reside in Tunip (EA 59), and for the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties there is evidence that Egyptians stationed in Canaan worshipped both Egyptian and local deities. It may have been, then, that while the practice of recording taxes on votive bowls was new, the attention to Egyptian cults on the northern frontier was not.

Alternatively, the votive bowls and the unusually large number of references to the holdings of Amun in Canaan might well represent a fundamental shift in Egyptian policy, whereby the imperial government had decided to intensify control over its much-reduced northern empire. Such a goal may have been pursued through the transformation of the local economies into a system modeled on the Egyptian temple-town. Just as the Egyptians at this period were deeply concerned with acculturating foreign prisoners of war in order to render them docile, so too may the imperial government have decided that the best way to secure the whole-hearted loyalty of the subjects that it had ruled—at this point for many centuries—was to indoctrinate them with Egyptian culture, including Egyptian religion.

In Egypt, people who farmed land belonging to a temple paid a percentage of their yield to the temple as tax, and it is likely that the same sort of system had been instituted in the northern territories. It is, for instance, of interest to note that Ramesses III boasted of erecting bḥnw in both Egypt and Nubia as well as in Syria-Palestine. Likewise, in P. Harris I Amun received some 56 Egyptian towns as bequests from Ramesses III in addition to the 9 Syro-Palestinian and Nubian towns previously discussed.

It seems, then, that in the reign of Ramesses III, the imperial government made a policy decision to move toward integrating its remaining Syro-Palestinian territory, at least in the core of its empire, more closely into the economic and religious system practiced in Egypt itself. This incorporation, akin to an annexation, had been enacted in Nubia since the beginning of the New Kingdom. Whether this imperial adjustment in fact played a role in the final fiery Canaanite rejection of Egypt’s governance is intriguing to consider but unfortunately impossible to document.

With the exception of Tell el-Far‘ah, all of Egypt’s northern bases suffered destruction in the mid-twelfth century, likely within a few decades after the reign of Ramesses III. As in the case of the destructions at the end of the Late Bronze Age, it is impossible to assign
responsibility for the violence to one particular group. It is likely, however, that once Egypt was deemed to be weak enough, the local populations saw fit to rid themselves of Amun and his tax collectors.

At Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh, the Egyptians appear to have had time to organize a planned withdrawal. Telltale signs such as the discovery of corpses in the destruction debris at Lachish and the numerous precious objects found in the rubble at Tel Serat, however, indicate that the majority of the bases were taken by surprise. Regardless of the precise manner in which the Egyptians left Canaan, both archaeological and textual evidence demonstrates that Egypt’s northern empire did not far outlast the reign of Ramesses III.

**Textual References to Twentieth Dynasty Northern Fortifications and Administrative Headquarters**

**Reign of Ramesses III**

1. mgdr n r'-ms-sw ḫk₃ iwnw (Medinet Habu, year 8 relief; KRI V, 33: 16)

Migdol of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis

Following the naval battle against the Sea People, Ramesses III celebrated his victory at a building called “(the) Migdol of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis.” In the vicinity of this migdol Ramesses oversaw the bringing and branding of captives, the counting of hands and phalli, and the busy hubbub of postbattle activity in general.60 Clearly, then, the migdol must have been located in close proximity to the site of the battle itself.61

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60 See Nelson et al. 1930: pl. 42.

61 Given the migdol’s proximity to the naval battle, Edgerton and Wilson’s (1936: 43, n. 21) suggestion that it should be equated with the temple to Amun erected in Pa-Canaan (P. Harris I, 9: 1–3) would seem very unlikely. Grandet (1983: 113) follows Edgerton and Wilson, however, and further argues that the temple in Pa-Canaan, and thus the Migdol of Ramesses as well, should be situated at Beth Shan! Gardiner (1920: 110), Redford (2000: 13), and O’Connor (2000: 100) have placed the migdol among the fortifications situated along the land route to Canaan. Hoffmeier (pers. rom.) agrees, as he attributes a burnt gate at Tell el-Borg to Sea People activity. Recent archaeological work has demonstrated that Tell el-Herr, which Gardiner (1920: 110; followed by Alt 1959: 122, n. 1) believed to be the site of the migdol, was founded in the first millennium (Valbelle 1999: 783–784).
Figure 53. Twentieth Dynasty northern Sinai
Figure 54. Twentieth Dynasty Canaan
The hieroglyphic word “migdol” has as a determinative a \textit{niwt}-or city-sign, perhaps suggesting that the Migdol of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, should be equated with one of the numerous eastern Delta towns that incorporated the element “migdol” into its name.\footnote{See EA 234: 28–30 and the four Delta towns named Migdol in the demotic papyrus Cairo 31169. Another Migdol was located in the Faiyum (Gardiner 1920: 108).} While this remains a possibility, an actual migdol-fort is quite clearly depicted underneath the label (see figure 55). According to the relief, then, the Migdol of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, was in fact a square building that resembled in its shape and proportions the single-tiered buildings from Seti I’s battle scene at Karnak.

While the migdol of Ramesses III’s relief possessed crenellations atop its walls, however, it lacked observable bastions. The building also incorporated into its architecture two features that look suspiciously ceremonial in nature. First, the lintel of the doorway leading into the migdol is stylistically similar to the lintels of religious or administrative buildings, although it should be noted that similar doorways graced two forts depicted in the Second Libyan War battle scenes (see figure 62). Of a more manifest ceremonial character, however, is the window of appearance clearly depicted above the fort’s entrance. Windows of appearance were a traditional venue at which the king could appear before his army or his public on special occasions in a suitably lofty manner. This feature might seem out of place in a fort constructed specifically for defense.

It is appropriate to note at this juncture that Ramesses III was apparently enamored with the idea of the migdol as an architectural form. In an innovative variation on the typical temple precinct plan, Ramesses constructed a processional gateway before his temple at Medinet Habu that was specifically designed to resemble a migdol, crenellation and all. Further, just above the doorway of this mock-migdol his architects installed a window of appearance so that Ramesses could greet his subjects at festivals or other important events.\footnote{For a description of this structure, see Faulkner 1980: 244–245; Murnane 1980: 6–10.} It may have been, of course, that the window of appearance in the Medinet Habu “migdol” was modeled on a real architectural tradition. It is notable, however, that in Seti’s illustration of the Ways of Horus, only one structure is shown with a comparable
window, namely the two-tiered town (dmi) located in the vicinity of the trees and the unusually large water source (see figure 32). None of the other forts and fortified towns possessed this feature.

If the absence of bastions and the presence of a window of appearance lead one to suspect that the defensive features of Ramesses’ migdol may have been more decorative than functional, this impression is furthered by a consideration of the migdol’s purported location. The naval battle against the Sea People, if it did in fact take place as a single coherent event, would have been fought at the mouth of one of the Nile branches, probably the Pelusiac.  

Throughout the entirety of the New Kingdom, however, the htm-fortress of the sea is the only known structure to have safeguarded the entrance to Egypt via the Mediterranean. There are no known migdols of the sea, nor would it appear that any working forts were located upstream of the htm-fortress, as this would have situated them in thoroughly Egyptian territory. Given the architecture of the migdol, then, and its location somewhere in the vicinity of a Mediterranean harbor, this building likely functioned as a ceremonial state building of the sort that may have existed throughout Egypt in expectation of royal visits. Likewise, the superficial resemblance of this structure to a real migdol in all probability had more to do with Ramesses III’s personal predilections than with any practical concerns with defense.

2. 2. iry.i ˘hmnt ˘3t wrt m ˘h3st ˘yn iw.st in˘h.t(i) m sbty mi ˘gw n b˘3t m 20 n ˘3˘d˘wt m sn˘t˘3˘ hy˘ mh 30 ˘h˘ t˘smwt ˘n˘yw.˘f ˘htw sb˘w m˘dh m ˘s˘ n˘yw.˘w kr˘w m ˘hmnt ˘h˘ m˘3˘yw (P. Harris I, 77: 6–8)

I made a very great ˘hmnt-well in the foreign land of Aiyn, which was enclosed with a wall like a mountain of sandstone consisting of twenty layers (of bricks) as a foundation (and reaching) a height of thirty cubits with the battlements, its portal doorjambs being of cedar, their bolts being of copper with mountings.

Although P. Harris I was composed after Ramesses III’s death, the document is narrated in the king’s own voice. While the posthumous Ramesses devotes the vast majority of the text to emphasizing and enumerating the pious bequests that he made in life, his more secular accomplishments are highlighted in a retrospective of his reign at the end of the papyrus (P. Harris I, 76: 5–79: 4). In this venue,

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64 If the Sea People were attracted to Egypt in part for the sake of plunder, the towns located along the Pelusiac would have constituted by far the richest targets.
Figure 55. Migdol of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis
(after *Medinet Habu* I, pl. 42)
Figure 56. Border-fortress at Tell er-Retabah (Tjeku)
(after Petrie 1989: pl. 35)
Figure 57. Administrative Headquarters at Tell el-Far’ah
(after Starkey and Harding 1932: pl. 69)
Figure 58. Ivory from the Administrative Headquarters at Tell el-Far‘ah (after Petrie 1930: pl. 55)
Figure 59. The Egyptian Base at Beth Shan
(after James 1966: fig. 77)
Figure 60. “Western Palace” at Tell es-Sa’idiyeh
(after Tubb 1995: fig. 2)
Ramesses boasts of his military victories, his far-flung trading ventures, and his mining activities. Among his more notable achievements, he also includes the excavation of a *hnmt*-well in the country of Aiyn and his subsequent protection of this newly sunk well with massive fortifications.

The identity of the foreign or hill country of Aiyn is not known, but the word is Semitic in origin, signifying “water source.” Thus, it would appear likely that the district was located in an area of the Eastern Desert or the Sinai that in fact had access to some variety of freshwater prior to Ramesses III’s intervention. Significantly, the local name of the unusually wide body of water depicted in the midst of the Karnak Ways of Horus relief was Aiyanin, the dual of Aiyn. Although this *hnmt* already possessed a fortified emplacement, it is likely that Ramesses III’s newly protected well was similarly located in a relatively arid but nonetheless strategically vital area.

The description of the structure that Ramesses III erected at Aiyn introduces a written complement to the artistic depictions and the archaeological excavations of fortified way stations. Primarily, it provides the information that the walls of such structures could reach heights of almost 16 m, an extremely tall wall by ancient standards. Given that the building at Aiyn was newly constructed in the reign of Ramesses III, it is tempting to associate it with the Twentieth Dynasty fort at Kom el-Qulzoum, excavated although unfortunately unpublished by the Egyptian Antiquities Organization in the 1960s (see below). The enclosure wall of this fort was some 7 m in thickness, a breadth that could indeed structurally have supported a wall of such towering heights.

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65 Grandet 1994b: 254. It is, of course, possible that Ramesses III dug and fortified a Syro-Palestinian well, but unless this well was intended to enhance mining activity in the Negev, it is hard to imagine where it would have been located or what purpose it might have served.

66 As discussed in chapter five, this association is based upon the fact that the *hnmt*-of-Seti-Merneptah (KRI I, 7: 7) and the well of Aiyanin (P. Anastasi I, 27: 6) occupy the same relative position in the ordering of the wells and forts in the reliefs of Seti I and in P. Anastasi I, respectively.

67 Grandet (1994b: 254) suggests that Ramesses III’s fortified well might have been located at Aiyanin, but he also draws attention to Cledat’s (1923: 156) argument that Wadi el-Arish would have been an exceptionally strategic and well-watered locale in antiquity. It is perhaps unlikely, however, that Ramesses III would have had need to construct a well at this point or that any well already there would have been left unfortified.

68 An Egyptian cubit equals 0.523 m (Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 39).
The details that Ramesses includes in his description as to the cedar doors and the copper bolts of the complex at Aiyn are likewise interesting as these elements attest, respectively, to continuing long-distance trade and mining activity. While neither cedar nor copper architectural elements have been discovered in the excavations at the way stations of Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A-289, this could well be due to a later a reuse of materials and to decay over time. It is notable, however, that remnants of cedar beams have indeed been recovered from the charred rubble of the Twentieth Dynasty Egyptian administrative headquarters at both Tell el-Far‘ah and Tel Sera’ (see below).

In this passage of P. Harris I there is, of course, no mention of a fortress or an administrative headquarters. This inscription is important enough to devote individual attention to, however, as it provides unequivocal evidence that Ramesses III sponsored the erection of a temple to Amun on foreign soil. In the reign of Thutmose III, three Syro-Palestinian towns were dedicated to the god Amun (Urk. 664: 17–665: 3; 744: 3–8), but most scholars have concluded that this donation meant simply that the proceeds from the taxes of the towns were allotted to the god’s estate. According to this model, no temples to Amun would have been erected in the towns themselves. For the Nineteenth Dynasty, on the other hand, both textual and archaeological evidence for Egyptian-sponsored temples on Levantine soil is available, but in most cases it seems as if the state encouraged the worship of deities like Anat, who were at home in both Egyptian and Canaanite pantheons. Amun, especially “Amun of
Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis," however, was not only a quintessentially Egyptian deity, but even more importantly the god was also a divinized form of the pharaoh himself.69

Of further interest is the statement that the foreigners (ḥsplw) of Syria-Palestine (Retenu) delivered to the statue both their inw and their b3kw, i.e., their “diplomatic gifts” and their “taxes.”70 Syro-Palestinians had, of course, been delivering both inw and b3kw to Egyptian authorities since the time of Thutmose III at least. In earlier reigns, however, the deliveries seem to have been made to storerooms or to imperial functionaries. By decreeing that their Canaanite subjects should deliver their taxes to an Egyptian deity, moreover to a god explicitly associated with the cult of the divine ruler, the imperial power effectively forced the local population to participate in a state-centered Egyptian religious ritual. The potential for ideological indoctrination inherent in such a reform is certainly, far from subtle.

The reference to the temple of Amun in P. Harris I does not specify whether there existed only one such structure in Syria-Palestine or whether the temple in Pa-Canaan was simply the most recent and grandest of many. As will be discussed below, however, textual evidence suggests that a number of temple estates dedicated to Amun existed in the north during the reign of Ramesses III. Likewise, the numerous votive bowls inscribed with taxation records that have been discovered at Egyptian bases quite possibly constitute the archaeological remnants of this type of temple-based resource extraction.

Gaza is clearly referred to as Pa-Canaan in the battle reliefs of Seti I (KRI I, 8: 16). Given this equation and the fact that the Egyptians sponsored a temple of Anat at Gaza in the Nineteenth Dynasty, most scholars have concluded that the temple of Amun of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, was based in this town.71 Gaza also would seem to have been a logical place for Canaanites to deliver goods for transportation to Amun’s temple at Thebes. Finally,
interpreting Pa-Canaan as Gaza obviates the redundancy in toponyms that would otherwise ensue if Ramesses built his temple in the land of Djahy in (Pa-)Canaan.\(^\text{72}\)

\[4. \text{kt.i }\text{bhnw} \text{ hr } \text{rn.k m t₃–mri m t₃–[s]}\text{ty mitt t₃–ṣtt ḫtr.i st ḫr b₃kw.sn m grt mpt d₃m₄w nb(w) m rn.f twt ḫr imw.w r ms.w [n] k₃.k }\ldots \text{(Medinet Habu Festival Calendar; KRI V, 117: 13–14)}\]

I built \text{bhnw} in your (= Amun’s) name in Egypt, in [N]ubia, likewise (in) Syria-Palestine. I taxed them for their \text{b₃kw} for the year, every town \text{(d₃m₄w)} by its name, gathered together, bearing their \text{imw}-gifts in order to present them [to] your \text{ka} . . .

The \text{bhnw} that Ramesses III established in Amun’s name in Syria-Palestine, like the Amun temple that he built in Pa-Canaan, apparently served as centers for revenue collection as well as for religious devotion. It is unclear, however, whether the \text{bhnw} referred to in this inscription should be equated with actual temples of Amun, with \text{bhn}-forts,\(^\text{73}\) with farms,\(^\text{74}\) or with entire towns \text{(d₃m₄w)}, as the text might suggest. As discussed above, Thutmose III had dedicated three Syro-Palestinian towns \text{(d₃m₄w—Urk. IV, 744: 3)} to Amun, although the presence of an Egyptian temple at any of these is doubtful.

In the reign of Ramesses I, on the other hand, an overseer of a \text{ḥ₃m}-fortress donated a substantial tract of land to Amen-re of the \text{bhn} \text{(KRI I, 4: 2–3)}. It is again unclear, however, what exactly the term \text{bhn} signified in this case. The choice of the verb \text{kt} (“to build”) in Ramesses III’s inscription, then, is potently important, for it suggests that this pharaoh did indeed sponsor the construction of

\(^{72}\) Grandet’s argument that the temple was not a temple but a fortress that was difficult of access and that should be located at Beth Shan is far less convincing. Grandet (1983: 110–111, 113) suggests that the \text{ḥwt} could be interpreted as a fortress and that \text{ṣṣt} could mean “difficult of access.” Further, the references to the sky \text{(ḥsr)} and heaven \text{(ḥt)}, he argues, might indicate that the fortress, which was difficult of access, was located on a high promontory. As an Egyptian base on a hill, Beth Shan is Grandet’s pick for both the home of Amun of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, and for the Migdol of Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, at which Ramesses III celebrated his victory against the Sea People (see also Grandet 1994b: 50). Not only does Beth Shan still seem a rather arbitrary choice, and not only is there no evidence for the worship of Amun at the site, but Beth Shan would also seem an extremely inconvenient spot for goods to be assembled for transshipment back to Egypt.

\(^{73}\) The two attested \text{bhn}-forts are the \text{bhn} of Menmaatre along the Ways of Horus \text{(KRI I, 7: 5)} and the \text{bhn} of Mernephtah-Hotephirmaat in \text{d₃rₚ₃₃} (P. Anastasi III, vs. 5: 1–2). Neither seems to have had any particular religious affiliation.

\(^{74}\) After Haring 1997: 47, n. 2, 48–49, 189, n. 5, 201, 205, 313.
actual buildings in his northern territory that—like the bḥn in Ramesses I’s reign—belonged to the god Amun.

What is particularly interesting about the bḥnw of Amun that Ramesses III established, whatever in fact these may have been, is that they were erected not only in Syria-Palestine but also in Nubia and even in Egypt. Nubia had, of course, from the very beginning of the New Kingdom been integrated into the Egyptian administrative and economic system. It would seem then that the bḥnw established in Syria-Palestine represented an attempt to also mold the administration of Egypt’s northern frontier, now no longer a particularly foreign entity, into a closer fit with Egypt’s own.

5a. dmiw n ḫrwr kš 9 (P. Harris I, List A, 11: 11)
Towns of Kharu (and) Kush 9

5b. dmiw n ḫrwr 9 (P. Harris I, 68a: 2)
Towns of Kharu 9

The vast majority of P. Harris I is comprised of an intensive inventory of the people, produce, and property offered by Ramesses III to the cults of the various state gods of Egypt. Without a doubt the primary beneficiary of these donations was the god Amun, who received five times as many gifts as Re, the next richest recipient. Among the most substantial of the bequests to the god, however, were entire towns (dmiw)—56 in Egypt and 9 in Syria-Palestine and Nubia (P. Harris I, List A 11: 10–11). Although the distribution of the towns between the two frontiers is not known, it is of interest that in a later reprisal of the list, all nine were uniformly assigned to Syria-Palestine (P. Harris I, 68a: 2).

Were it not for the bḥnw of Amun built in the towns (dmiw) of Syria-Palestine (KRI V, 117: 13–14) and for the temple of Amun that Ramesses III constructed in Pa-Canaan (P. Harris I, 9: 1–3), it would be tempting to assign Amun the role of little more than absentee landlord in this case. However, taken together, however, these three

75 For the equation between the bḥnw dedicated to Amun and the dmi-towns dedicated to Amun, see also Grandet 1983: 112–113.
76 But see Helck (1962: 262; followed by Wimmer 1990: 1089), who argues that the towns donated to Amun in the reign of Thutmose III were among those given to the same god in the reign of Ramesses III. However, not only is it unlikely that Egypt still controlled areas as far north as Nukhasse, but it would also appear that Ramesses III’s bequests actually involved the installation of cults to Amun in foreign
inscriptions present a fairly good case that in the reign of Ramesses III the Egyptians were actively attempting to transform the administration of their northern territories into a similar type of temple-based economy as functioned in both Egypt and Nubia. It is unknown, however, whether resistance to the ideological and economic implications of this shift contributed to the eventual uprisings against Egyptian bases in Twentieth Dynasty Syria-Palestine.

Given that all evidence for cults of Amun in Egypt’s northern territory abruptly ceases with the withdrawal of the Egyptians themselves from this area, it is likely that worship of the god was never taken up by Canaanites of their own volition. This is in direct contrast to Nubia, where the cult of Amun had been institutionalized since the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. In Nubia, Amun’s legacy would thus prove both longer lasting and far more deeply rooted among the indigenous population.

*Ramesses III and his nḥtaw-strongholds*

1a. sn3.i n3 dnwn m n3y.sn iww n3 ṭkr prst irw m ssfy śrdn wss n ṭ3 ym st irw m tm wn ḥšk m sp w³ inw m ḥšk r kmt mi ś’y nw ṭdb sn3.i st m nḥtw w’f ḫr mn.i ’śšt n3y.sn ḏmḥw mn ḫmn ḫtr.i st r-ḥrw m ḫbs dw m r pr-ḥdw śnwτ r-tnw mnpt (P. Harris I, 76: 7–9)

I slew the Denyen from their isles; the Tjekker and the Peleset were made as ashes; the Sherden (and) the Weshesh of the sea, they were made as what had not been, captured at one time (and) brought as plunder to Egypt like the sand of the seashore. I settled them in nḥtaw-strongholds, subdued by my name, the multitudes of their conscripts being like 100,000s. I allotted them all with clothing (and) rations from the treasuries (and) the granaries annually.

1b. di.i ḫty.sn r ḫnd tḥš kmt ini.i spi.i dmi.i m ḥškw ’šw ḫnh mi ṭpdw r-ḥmt ssmt.in ḫmt.sn ṭrdw.sn m ṭ b’w n3y.sn ṭ3wt m ṭnw mn ḫmn grg.i n3y.w ḥš/w’tyw m nḥtw (w’f) ḫr mn.i di.i n.w ḥryw-pdt ’šw n mhwτ 3bw irw m ḫnw mnšw ḫr mn.i ḫmt.sn ṭrdw.sn irw m-mitt ms.i n3y.sn ṭ3wt r pr-imn irw n.f m mnmnt ḫnḥ (P. Harris I, 77: 3–6)

I caused that they (= the Libyans) desist from treading the border of Egypt. I brought back (those) whom I spared (and) I apportioned (them) territories, whereas those of Thutmose III almost assuredly did not (Alt 1944: 221; Mazar 1960: 205; Ahituv 1978: 95; Singer 1988a: 5).
as plentiful booty, (they being) pinioned like birds before my horses—
their wives (and) their children according to the 10,000s, their live-
stock in quantities according to the 100,000s. I settled their leaders in
*nhtw*-strongholds (subdued) by my name. I gave to them troop-com-
danders (and) great ones of the tribes, (the captives being) branded
(and) made as slaves, cartouched with my name, their wives (and) their
children being made likewise. I presented their livestock to the tem-
ple of Amun, (they) being made for him as herds until eternity.

1c. ḫkn.f ḫst [. . .] rbw mšw(š) di.f ḥw.ʾt w ṣmr in(w) r kmt st irw m
nḥtw n nṣw nḥt ʾḥm.w mdt rmts (r-ḥ)ḥ śms nṣw iri.f stḥ mdt.sn p[n]ʾ.f
nṣ.w śm.w ḫ r ʾḥ tḥ mt ḫty ḫʾi.(w) st (Stele from Chapel C at Deir el-
Medina; KRI V, 91: 5–7)

He plundered the foreign land [. . .] Libu (and) Mšwsh(g). He caused
that they cross the river, (they) being brought to Egypt. They were
placed in *nhtw*-strongholds of the victorious king that they might hear
the speech of the (Egyptian) people (be)fore following the king. He
made a reversion of their speech, re-ver(sing) their tongues that they
might go upon the road, which (they) had not descended (before).

1d. sḥw ṣt n ṣml ḫ ḫ km [dl] t [kn] rd.w ḫḥū tšs kmt snṯ nṣy.w ḫʾ(ʾ)htw
irw m nhw t nḥtw mnś ḫ ḫ r n ṣmr (n) ḫm.f (Medinet Habu, year 5
inscription; KRI V, 24: 1–3)

The backbone of the Tjemhu is broken until the completion of [eter-
ernity]. Their feet [have ceased] treading the border of Egypt. Their leaders
are settled, being put according to tribes in *nhtw*-strongholds (and) car-
touched with the great name (of) his majesty.

The settlement of foreign prisoners of war in *nhtw*-strongholds has
been discussed extensively in the historical introduction, so the sub-
ject will be only briefly reprised here. Basically, prior to the reign
of Ramesses III there are only two references to foreigners being
placed in *nhtw*-strongholds. Thutmose III established foreigners in
*nhtw* in Egypt (Urk. IV, 690: 2–5), and Ramesses II also bragged of
assigning his prisoners of war to *nhtw*-strongholds (KRI II, 206:
14–16). Although it is not clear where the *nhtw* of Ramesses II were
located, the context of this reference suggests perhaps that the cap-
tives would have been resettled on a frontier different from their
own place of origin.

The prior number of references to settling foreigners in *nhtw*-strong-
holds doubles in the reign of Ramesses III, which leads one to sus-
pect that this practice had been institutionalized or at least amplified
in his reign. From the inscriptions quoted above it appears that the
Egyptians separated the Libyan and Sea People captives of Ramesses
III into ethnic or tribal groups (mhwt), branded them, and assigned them to nhtw-strongholds. The men of military age (d3myw) were placed under the authority of troop commanders (hrw pdt) and tribal chiefs (swn mhwt), almost certainly in order to train them for enrollment in the Egyptian military. The pharaonic government also regularly provided the inhabitants of the nhtw with clothing and rations issued directly from its own treasuries and granaries. Given that the livestock and other valuables of these populations had previously been confiscated and donated to the temple of Amun, the prisoners upon their resettlement had become true dependents of the state.

As discussed above, evidence for Philistine material culture at certain Egyptian bases in Canaan has led many scholars to conclude that the Sea People had been settled in these nhtw as mercenaries. The problem is, however, that according to inscription 1a, the Sea People were first brought to Egypt and only then established in nhtw-strongholds. Indeed, inscription 1c is even more explicit, stating unequivocally that the Libyans were placed in nhtw located within Egypt itself. In fact, the inscription further elaborates this point, explaining that the prisoners were deliberately settled in Egypt for the express purpose of introducing them to Egyptian language and culture, so that they might, thenceforth, abandon their foreign customs and worldview. If Egypt’s former enemies were to be successfully transformed into soldiers of the state, it must have been felt that indoctrination and Egyptianization were necessary first steps in the process.

Designations of ethnic groups, such as “Shasu-people” (ššw), “Nubians” (nhṣwyw), and “Edomites” (šrw), are occasionally witnessed in the names of the towns listed in P. Wilbour and P. Amiens. The presence of such anomalies in an otherwise typically Egyptian repertoire of toponyms suggests that by the mid-Twentieth Dynasty numerous settlements of prisoners of war had been established in Middle Egypt. Such enclaves of foreigners, situated as they were in the

77 A scene of prisoners of war being branded is actually included in a Medinet Habu relief that chronicles the aftermath of a battle against the Sea People (Nelson et al. 1930: pl. 42).
78 See Wood (1991: 46–48), who also uses this text to further his argument that the nhtw of Ramesses III were established in Egypt rather than Syria-Palestine.
heart of Egypt, would appear to constitute excellent candidates for nhtw settlements. Of even more direct interest, however, is the presence at the mouth of the Faiyum of an actual nhtw called “Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, Beloved of His Army” in which Sherden-mercenaries were garrisoned (KRI V, 270: 11–12)! Inscriptions are likewise attested from the very end of the Twentieth Dynasty or the beginning of the Twenty-first Dynasty for a commander of the great nhtw-stronghold of the Sherden (h3t p3 nht ‘3 š3rnw3) and a commander of the five nhtw of the Sherden (h3t p3 nhtw 5 š3r[d]n3).80

While Grandet has suggested that the installation of these military colonies in Middle Egypt was motivated primarily by the fact that this area was liable to penetration by hostile Libyans,81 Middle Egypt may have been attractive for other reasons as well. First, it would have been comparatively difficult for a foreign fugitive to escape from Middle Egypt undetected. Second, located far from Egypt’s borders with other lands, this region was about as “Egyptian” as it got—a viable consideration if the assimilation of these foreigners was an ultimate goal. And lastly, Middle Egypt may have possessed underutilized farmland that could have been given over to foreign settlement without alienating the rights of Egyptian farmers.

An examination of the texts pertaining to nhtw-strongholds, thus, problematizes the theory that the Philistine material culture found at Egyptian bases should be directly related to this particular policy of Ramesses III’s. It has been seen that many if not all of the nhtw were in fact located within Egypt itself for the explicit purpose of Egyptianizing their inhabitants. Likewise, even if some of the nhtw were located in Syria-Palestine, the texts make reference to the fact that the property of the foreigners was confiscated at the time of their capture and that their material requirements were issued to them from Egyptian treasuries and granaries. For this reason, it should not be expected that mercenaries would have utilized objects indicative of their own cultural background. Indeed, it is quite likely that the ease of access that a Sea People mercenary enjoyed to Aegean-style artifacts may primarily have depended upon the numbers of other Sea People settled as civilians in the surrounding area. Thus, bases located on the plain of Philistia would not surprisingly

81 Grandet 1994b: 203–204.
exhibit more Aegean-style material culture than those situated along the Jordan River.

Terms in the Onomasticon of Amenemope

1. imy-r htm n p3 w3d-wr (The Onomasticon of Amenemope; Gardiner 1947a: 33, no. 105)

Overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea

The Onomasticon of Amenemope, which seems originally to have been composed in the late Twentieth Dynasty, is a collection of words, titles, and toponyms grouped together broadly by subject. Categories covered by the list include natural features, types of humans, titles and occupations, toponyms of Egypt and foreign lands, architecture, types of land and crops, as well as food and drink. Given that at least ten copies of the list have been discovered on media as diverse as papyri, ostraca, a writing board, and a strip of leather, there is little doubt that the Onomasticon of Amenemope was employed in scribal schools as a teaching tool. The two most important versions of the document are the Golénischeff Onomasticon and P. Hood (= BM 10202).82

The “overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea,” as might be expected, is found in the midst of a section enumerating the titles of military officers. In his redaction of the text, Gardiner interpreted the preceding title, “deputy” (idnw), as part of the former and read the whole as “deputy of the overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea.”83 As this longer title is unprecedented, however, Schulman’s suggestion that the two titles were in fact separate is likely correct.84

The title “overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea” is attested on the statue of Sat-Amun (Brussels E 4295)85 and the Bilgai stele (KRI IV, 342: 5–343: 15) of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties respectively. Overseers of a htm-fortress who likely served specifically in the htm-fortress of the sea are also noted in P. Anastasi VIII (KRI III, 499: 15–500: 10), P. Bologna 1086 (KRI IV, 79: 12–80: 6), and a wine docket (KRI IV, 354: 16), all of Nineteenth Dynasty date.

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82 For background information on the Onomasticon of Amenemope, see the introduction in Gardiner 1947a; Grumach-Shirun 1980: 971–974; Simpson 2001: 605.
83 Gardiner 1947a: 33, no. 105.
84 Schulman 1964a: 123, no. 237.
85 Capart 1900: 105–106; see the discussion of this text in chapter three.
Unfortunately, however, this Twentieth Dynasty example provides far less information than its earlier counterparts. Indeed, all that can be gleaned from the appearance of this title in the Onomasticon is that Egypt still manned its immediate borders in the late Twentieth Dynasty,86 an impression confirmed by the inclusion of the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru in the toponym list (see below). Given the anemic state of the nation in the waning years of the Twentieth Dynasty, however, it is likely that Egyptian control did not extend much beyond the borders of the Nile Valley itself.

2. ḏḥm n ḫrw (The Onomasticon of Amenemope; Gardiner 1947b: 202, no. 419)

The ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru appears in the Onomasticon of Amenemope at the end of a long list detailing Nile Delta toponyms. Its immediate predecessors were the recently established capital at Tanis and the papyrus marshes (ḏḥm ḫw).87 As the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru was located at the easternmost edge of the Nile Delta, the position of this fortress at the very end of the list is not at all inappropriate. For the Twentieth Dynasty, then, it is clear that Tjaru still constituted the quintessential Egyptian border town. This information, while not surprising, is useful in light of the fact that no specifically Twentieth Dynasty material has yet been published from Tell Heboua I.

3. ṯḏḥt (The Onomasticon of Amenemope; Gardiner 1947a: 191, no. 264)

Gaza

The town of Gaza appears in the Onomasticon of Amenemope as the third of three southern Canaanite polities. Preceding Gaza in

86 As there is no evidence that each Nile mouth possessed its own ḫtm-fortress, the Twentieth Dynasty ḫtm-fortress, like its predecessors, would probably have been located at the mouth of the Pelusiac. This seems especially probable given that the new capital at Tanis was located adjacent to this branch of the Nile, as were the majority of the older metropolitan centers. The other river mouths may have been manned by officials bearing the title “overseer of the river mouths of the hinterland” (ʾmḥ-ḏḥt Ḫmḥw), an occupation that was likewise included in the Onomasticon’s list of titles (Gardiner 1947a: 34, no. 109).

87 For a discussion of this toponym, see Gardiner 1947b: 201–202 and recently Groll 1999: 160.
the list are Ashkelon (no. 262) and Ashdod (no. 263). Since the beginning of the New Kingdom all three towns had been firmly in the control of Egypt, and there is evidence that the Egyptians possessed bases at Ashdod in the Nineteenth Dynasty and at Gaza until sometime in the Twentieth Dynasty. After the Egyptian empire collapsed, however, all three towns were primarily known as core members of the so-called Philistine Pentapolis, a confederation of major centers of Philistine power. The question with regard to the Onomasticon, then, is whether the author enumerated the towns because they were three of Egypt’s last footholds in Canaan or whether he grouped them together as Philistine towns.

In terms of Ashkelon’s status in the Twentieth Dynasty, archaeological excavations have been of little help, for the contemporary town has yet to be explored in great depth. There is, however, a good deal of controversy that has swirled around the discovery of three ivory plaques at Megiddo, each inscribed for an apparently female “singer of Ptah, he who is south of his wall, lord of the life of the two lands, great ruler of Ashkelon, Kerker” (KRI V, 256: 8, 10–11). Some scholars have interpreted these plaques to indicate that Ptah himself held the symbolic title “great ruler of Ashkelon” and thus likely possessed a temple at that town.

Others have argued, however, that Kerker may have started out her career singing for Ptah in Memphis and only later have been hired into the service of the great ruler of Ashkelon. Indeed, as Wimmer points out, the court of the ruler of Byblos included an Egyptian singer in the Tale of Wenamun. Thus it is perhaps probable that performers of exceptional talent were exchanged amongst international patrons in the same manner as were skilled healers and other specialists. Finally, it is also possible that despite the femi-

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88 The other two towns in this group were Gath and Ekron. For a brief overview of the biblical evidence relating to the Philistine Pentapolis, see T. Dothan 1982a: 17–21.
92 See the requests for an expert in augury (EA 35) and a physician (EA 49) in the Amarna letters, as well as the often repeated Hittite requests for an Egyptian physician in the correspondence between Ramesses III and Hattusili III (references and discussion in Bryce 1999: 313, 319, 336).
nine grammatical forms in the text, Kerker may have held the title “great ruler of Ashkelon” himself or, indeed, have been a female ruler.\footnote{See Higginbotham 2000: 69.}

Based on the existence of Syro-Palestinian towns dedicated to the cult of Amun in the reign of Ramesses III, it is not entirely implausible that Ashkelon possessed a temple to Ptah.\footnote{In this regard, it is interesting to note that three scarabs depicting the Egyptian pharaoh worshipping before Ptah have been discovered at Tell Jemmeh (Van Beek 1993: 669).} It is extremely doubtful, however, that such a structure, if it existed, would have continued to function following Egypt’s withdrawal from Canaan. According to Gardiner, the Onomasticon was likely composed at the very end of the Twentieth Dynasty. At this point, archaeological evidence suggests that the predominant cultural influence in Ashkelon was Philistine.\footnote{Stager 1991a; 1991b: 13; 1995: 342; T. Dothan and M. Dothan 1992: 42; Hasel 1998: 183–184. For evidence of a flourishing cult of Ptah at a Libyan military base, see the discussion of Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham in chapter five.}

While the nature of Egyptian activity at Ashkelon in the Late Bronze and Early Iron Age is not well known, Ashdod did in fact possess an Egyptian administrative headquarters in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Following its destruction at the end of the Late Bronze Age, however, the site was settled by a people who employed Mycenaean IIIIC:1b pottery. A short time later Philistine bichrome, “classic” Philistine pottery, is found at the site in large quantities. Levels equivalent to the Twentieth Dynasty show no signs of continuation of the former Egyptian base but contain plenty of evidence for Philistine settlement.\footnote{A. Mazar 1985: 100; Singer 1985: 110, 112, n. 4; Stager 1985: 62; T. Dothan 1989: 1–2; M. Dothan 1981b: 82; 1989: 65; 1990: 54; M. Dothan and Porath 1993: 12–13; Dever 1997b: 219.}

The ancient site of Gaza has yet to be excavated, but there is little reason to assume that its fate would have been different from the fate of its nearby contemporaries. Thus, while this town served as an Egyptian base in the reign of Ramesses III, it almost certainly was abandoned by the reign of Ramesses VII, after which time there is no evidence for an Egyptian presence in Canaan, or even in the Sinai for that matter. It is more than likely, then, that Gaza, Ashkelon, and Ashdod had been included in the Onomasticon as a list of
towns occupied by Philistines rather than as an enumeration of Egyptian holdings. In this context it is pertinent to note that while Gaza was number 264 in the Onomasticon, the Sherden, the Tjekker, and the Peleset constituted numbers 268, 269, and 270 respectively.

A late Twentieth Dynasty school text

1. sw thm r ḫrwr bw srf.t sw bn ḥbš [bn] ḫwt tw.tw ḫr snh n3 ḫ’w nw r-ḥt r p3 ḫtm n ḫrw (P. Lansing 9: 9–10)

He is called up for Syria-Palestine. He does not spare himself. There are no clothes. [There are no] sandals. The weapons of war are stored at the ḫtm-fortress of Tjaru.

This excerpt is embedded in a didactic text that Gardiner dubbed, “The scribe is free and rich, not miserable like the soldier.”

Although P. Lansing was penned in the late Twentieth Dynasty, texts lauding the life of the scribe to the detriment of all other professions had enjoyed great popularity in the scribal curriculum since the Middle Kingdom. This text begins by enumerating the myriad officers who held authority over a new recruit, including the troop commander (ḥry pdl) and the garrison captain (ḥry iw’yt).

The narrative then proceeds to recount with relish the hard labor that one quintessential soldier is forced to perform while stationed in Egypt and launches into the countless horrors that await him once he is called up for an expedition to Syria-Palestine. These include brackish water, dysentery, hard battles, theft, and the necessity of supporting weak prisoners of war on the long march home. By the end of the text, it was surely hoped that scribal students would be thoroughly dissuaded from abandoning their studies for a more “glamorous” profession.

Given that this genre of literature enjoyed a long history, there is no particular reason to assume that the original composition of this text, like the papyrus itself, should be dated to the late Twentieth Dynasty. Indeed, the description of victorious battles abroad would

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97 Gardiner 1937: 107; followed by Caminos 1954: 400.
98 For the date of P. Lansing, see Gardiner 1937: xviii. The Middle Kingdom “Satire of the Trades” is the most famous of its genre.
99 For Twentieth Dynasty titles relating to garrison troops, see Schulman 1964a: 138, no. 333a; 139, nos. 342a; 140, no. 345k; 156, no. 442; and 168, no. 506a.
suggest a Nineteenth Dynasty milieu. Regardless, the text provides the information that weapons issued to soldiers were cached in storehouses when not needed. Further evidence for this practice comes from P. Harris I, 78: 9–10, in which the Sherden and Kehek mercenaries are stated to have enjoyed a peaceful life at home, while their weapons lay untouched in storehouses (šn‘w). In preparation for expeditions to Syria-Palestine, the storage of weapons at Tjaru would make eminent sense. One can imagine in the late Twentieth Dynasty, however, that such armories were more frequently accessed for internal rather than external conflicts!

_Archaeological Evidence for Twentieth Dynasty Northern Fortifications and Administrative Headquarters_

_Tell er-Retabah, Tjeku_ (see figure 56)
As discussed in chapter five, the htm-fortress of Tjeku at Tell er-Retabah, which was excavated in 1905, is quite poorly understood. At the site, Petrie and Naville discovered a temple, a large administrative building, a bastioned wall, and fragments of other structures, all of which they dated to the Nineteenth Dynasty. The archaeologists, however, assigned very little in the way of architecture or artifacts to the Twentieth Dynasty. While a few fragments of monumental relief unquestionably come from renovations to the town’s temple undertaken by Ramesses III,\(^{100}\) other evidence for contemporary activity is limited to the construction of two impressive enclosure walls.

Nineteenth Dynasty rulers had erected a 3.15 m thick wall around the town. Although the wall was bastioned, however, it was not provided with any other features that demonstrated a serious concern with defensive issues.\(^{101}\) Given that the contemporary Egyptian frontier reached into southern Syria, the Nineteenth Dynasty pharaohs must quite rightly have felt that they had little reason to fear a direct assault on this border town.

The construction in the reign of Ramesses III of two walls and a thick, well-fortified gate at Tell er-Retabah, then, betrays a significant

\(^{100}\) Petrie and Duncan 1989: 31, pl. 31.
change of attitude on the part of the imperial government as to the permeability of its borders. After assaults on the Egyptian Delta by Libyans, Sea People, and then Libyans again, all in short succession, such fears were, indeed, well founded. The magnitude of this heightened insecurity on the part of the pharaonic government may be aptly assessed from the fact that the first wall constructed by Ramesses III (wall 2) was some 9.5 m wide—roughly three times as thick as its Nineteenth Dynasty predecessor (wall 1). A second wall (wall 3) was then built directly against the inner face of wall 2. At 8.8 m thick, this extra addition nearly doubled the width of the town’s already massive enclosure wall. Moreover, Petrie also assigned to this secondary building phase a newly constructed gate, which had been fortified to the degree that only one person was able to penetrate it at a given time.\(^{102}\)

Clearly, to construct such an impractical gate for a large town, the rulers of the Twentieth Dynasty must have anticipated trouble. Aside from implications regarding Egypt’s perception of its own vulnerability during the early Twentieth Dynasty, the fortifications at Tell er-Retabah are interesting in that wall 2, at least, can be securely dated to the reign of Ramesses III by virtue of a foundation deposit. This cache of votive items discovered beneath the southeastern corner of the wall included saucer bowls, miniature bowls, animal bones, models of cuts of meat, scarabs, beads, and small plaques bearing the cartouche of Ramesses III.\(^ {103}\)

Due to the badly plundered state of Tell er-Retabah’s cemetery, this area unfortunately provided virtually no evidence applicable to the Twentieth Dynasty settlement.\(^ {104}\) Early excavation strategies and complex stratigraphy have also obscured an understanding of the town’s interior during this period. The lack of a notable destruction layer at Tell er-Retabah and the discovery of objects within the town that date to the Twenty-second and Twenty-sixth Dynasties, however, suggest that despite the fears of Ramesses III, Tjeku continued to flourish throughout the Twentieth Dynasty and, indeed, for centuries to come.\(^ {105}\)

\(^{102}\) For discussions of the walls, see Petrie and Duncan 1989: 28, 30, pl. 35; Badawy 1968: 470; 1977: 201.

\(^{103}\) Petrie and Duncan 1989: 30; Holladay 1982: 4.

\(^{104}\) Petrie and Duncan 1989: 32.

\(^{105}\) Petrie and Duncan 1989: pl. 32, 34B, 34C.
Kom el-Qulzoum (no plan available)
From 1960 to 1962 the Egyptian Antiquities Organization excavated a Twentieth Dynasty fort located in the region of Lake Timsah and the Bitter Lakes. While the fort as a whole remains unpublished, some of the expedition’s discoveries have been noted in summary form.\textsuperscript{106} The fort, which had been founded upon a 3 m high mound of marl, was enclosed by a 7 m thick wall and possessed at least one fortified gateway to the west.

Working from photographs, Mumford has estimated that the wall circumscribed an area of between 1,260 and 1,680 m\textsuperscript{2}.\textsuperscript{107} The upper estimate of its extent would put Kom el-Qulzoum at a comparable scale to Bir el-\textsuperscript{2}Abd, which was 1,600 m\textsuperscript{2} in area. While the enclosure wall of the latter fort was only 3 m wide, however, its equivalent at Kom el-Qulzoum was more than twice that breadth. The extra precautions taken by architects at Kom el-Qulzoum, like those also taken at Tell er-Retabah, must have been deemed necessary due to the increased threats to Egypt’s border in the Twentieth Dynasty.

According to the summary reports, Kom el-Qulzoum’s impressive enclosure wall surrounded a “commandant’s quarters,”\textsuperscript{108} storerooms, and what may have been barracks. The excavator, Shafik Farid, found no material culture earlier than that of Ramesses III, so he dated the earliest level of the site’s occupation to this period. While the exact purpose of the fort is unknown, Mumford has suggested that Kom el-Qulzoum may have served simultaneously to protect against Shasu incursions and as a transfer point for copper and turquoise shipments from the South Sinai.

Haruba site A–289 (see figure 34)
Egyptians continued to man the fort at Haruba site A–289 for a short period in the Twentieth Dynasty. As in the previous dynasty, the inhabitants of this way station utilized predominantly Egyptian-style ceramic, and there is no significant break in the material

\textsuperscript{106} Leclant 1963: 85; 1964: 342. \textit{Egypt Travel Magazine} published an article on the site in 1962, and Mumford has written on Kom el-Qulzoum in his 1998 dissertation, chapter three, section 3.2.1.8, pp. 521–530.
\textsuperscript{107} Mumford 1998: plan 3:1, p. 530.
\textsuperscript{108} Leclant 1964: 342.
In addition to the usual reuse and repairs of older structures, the final florescence of the site also witnessed the construction of Building 500 in the fort’s western sector. With its meter-wide enclosure wall, large rooms, and “spacious” courtyard, the structure fits the architectural expectations of a public or administrative building.

Sometime around the early to mid-twelfth century B.C., however, Building 500 suffered a violent conflagration along with the rest of the fort. Although the authors of this destruction are not known, some scholars have assigned blame to the Sea People on the basis of the presence of a Mycenaean III C:1b bowl in the ruins of Building 500. The bowl could just as easily indicate, however, that Sea People had been garrisoned at the fort or that the inhabitants of the garrison traded with the Sea People settled in southwestern Canaan.

Significantly, following its destruction, the fort seems to have been reoccupied by a local—presumably bedouin—population. Examinations of the intramural burials that newly peppered the site have revealed that the adults exhibit skeletal characteristics typical of Canaanite or North Semitic stock. Further, the presence of numerous infant burials strongly suggests that this occupation of the fort was primarily domestic.

Another factor that contributes to the impression that Haruba site A–289 was no longer a strict military settlement in the second half of the Twentieth Dynasty is the “advanced state of disrepair” of the fortifications themselves. The fort’s enclosure wall seems to have collapsed in numerous places, and the formerly impressive gateway had been largely blocked off by the installation of cooking facilities. Indeed, given the large quantities of ash and accumulated trash in this area, the excavators suggest that the passageway would have been dirty and unpleasant for all who passed through it. The interior of the fort, likewise, was riddled with refuse pits and burials at this time.

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113 Oren 1987: 89, 94.
Bir el-ʿAbd, the other archaeologically attested Nineteenth Dynasty fort along the Ways of Horus, had ceased to function at the advent of the Twentieth Dynasty. One could perhaps view this abandonment of the northern Sinai way stations as symptomatic of Egypt’s seeming disinterest in campaigning abroad at this time. According to this view, the granaries and wells that lined the arid land route to Canaan would simply have been relegated to the back burner of imperial priorities once armies ceased to campaign abroad with any regularity. Concomitantly, of course, the decrepit state of these way stations would then make the prospect of conducting a Canaanite campaign markedly more expensive and logistically daunting for later Twentieth Dynasty rulers.

There is another more proactive possibility for why the Egyptians allowed their way stations to deteriorate, however. Given the relatively small size of these installations, it may have been recognized that an invading army would have had little difficulty penetrating the bases and gaining access to the wells and grain stores associated with them. Thus, since the Egyptians were unwilling to send armies abroad, the elaborate infrastructure for speeding travel across the northern Sinai was now in grave danger of being commandeered by enemy forces. By dismantling the way stations, the Egyptians may have hoped that any eastern armies that dared cross the Sinai would arrive at the elaborately fortified ḫtm-fortresses dangerously enervated by hunger and thirst.

Tell el-Farah South (see figure 57)

As discussed in chapter five, the Egyptians had erected an administrative headquarters at Tell el-Farah in the Nineteenth Dynasty, quite possibly to replace their older base at Tell el-Ajjul. Unlike the majority of Egyptian installations to the north, however, Tell el-Farah appears to have survived the transition to the Iron Age unscathed. The Twentieth Dynasty levels at the site in fact were distinguished primarily by the raising of floor levels and by the replacement of some of the older brickwork with walls fashioned out of rammed earth and scrap brick. This reconstruction is noticeable particularly on the eastern side of the building.116 In general, however,

116 Petrie 1930: 17–18; Starkey and Harding 1932: 32.
the residency maintained its structural integrity remarkably well from one dynasty to the next.

The Twentieth Dynasty headquarters, like its predecessor, was roughly square at 22 × 25 m and was bounded by 2 m thick outer walls. An extra wall had been added to the building’s eastern face and the architects had laid the foundations for a similar wall along the southern edge of the building. Because the pavement of the residency’s courtyard extended over the foundations of the southern outer wall, however, it is obvious that this feature had never risen above ground level.

The refurbishment of the building and its environs in the Twentieth Dynasty appears to have been directed primarily at emphasizing its importance. The crushed shell and lime cobbled courtyard in front of the headquarters, for example, was a Twentieth Dynasty addition, as was the courtyard’s enclosure wall and gate. To further mark the building with distinction, the entranceway to the residency itself was newly provided with a flight of steps.117

From its corner entrance to its central hall, the residency at Tell el-Far’ah is a near perfect translation of an Egyptian center-hall house onto foreign soil.118 At some 7 × 7 m in area, the center-hall itself served as the heart of the building, and rooms opened off of it to all sides. Of these, the rooms to the north were by far the most interesting. In Egyptian center-hall houses, the suite farthest from the entrance generally contained the master bedroom and bath,119 and the same was true at Tell el-Far’ah’s residency. While the building was entered at its southwestern corner, the bedroom and adjoining bath occupied its northeastern corner.

The bedroom, like its counterparts in Egypt, was recognizable due to the presence of a bed niche that was recessed into the northern wall. The bathroom was similarly easy to identify due to the plastered water tank, which was raised 1 m off of floor level and reached via a short flight of stairs.120 The same hallway that led off of the center-hall provided access to both of these rooms. If sealed off from the hall with a door, then, the bedroom and bathroom would have constituted a private suite.

119 See Badawy 1966: 26–27, 35.
Another northern room was also particularly interesting. In a small chamber, which was sandwiched between the bathroom to the north and the center-hall to the south, at least 45 amphorae of wine had been stored at the time of the residency’s destruction. The mud seals of some of the jars had survived intact, and a number bore the same notably unEgyptian seal impression, namely an image of a male deity standing astride a lion and grasping a scepter or spear in his right hand. Unfortunately, however, as this image is otherwise unparalleled, it is difficult to know from whence the wine came.

Other notable features of the house include a small hearth in the far northeastern corner of the center-hall and a plaster-lined gutter that channeled liquids from the roof and funneled them away from the foundations of the residency. Additionally, a flight of steps in the southwestern corner of the building led either to a second story or to a roof (the latter option is perhaps more likely given the location of the residential suite on the ground floor). Significantly, excavators noted that the roof itself had been constructed with the use of cedar of Lebanon, one of Syria-Palestine’s most prized and expensive woods.

Within the residency and in its general environs, Petrie and his team recovered an appreciable amount of Egyptian-style pottery. Although differentiating between Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty Egyptian-style ceramic is extremely difficult, it may be assumed that most of the pottery found within the residency itself would have been in use at the time of the site’s destruction. The pottery assemblage at Tell el-Far’ah, incidentally, is said to closely resemble that discovered at the contemporary Egyptian headquarters at Tel Sera.

Of all the items discovered in the headquarters at Tell el-Far’ah, an ivory inlay depicting an Egyptian official at his leisure (see figure 58) is of paramount interest. Four such inlays, which appear once to have been integrated into the design of a finely crafted box, were discovered in a narrow chamber just west of the center-hall. Three of the inlays bore images that were essentially a rendering in ivory

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121 Starkey and Harding 1932: 28–29.
122 Petrie 1930: 18; Starkey and Harding 1932: 28.
123 Yisraeli 1978: 1076; 1993: 442.
124 Petrie 1930: 18.
of the type of “bucolic” scenes typically discovered in tomb decorations from the late Old Kingdom through the Eighteenth Dynasty.\textsuperscript{127} In the ivories, nude men with tight curly hair trap birds in a papyrus marsh, while a bull looks on impassively. In an apparent sequel to this event, the same individuals, now wearing kilts, bring the dead birds out of the marsh, and one man carries a calf upon his shoulders.\textsuperscript{128}

While these quintessentially Egyptian pastoral scenes are of great interest, even more intriguing is the depiction on one of the ivories of an Egyptian official. This man is seated upon an Egyptian-style folding chair, holds a lotus, and wears an elaborately pleated gown and curled sandals.\textsuperscript{129} In his hands the official grasps a shallow bowl into which a woman has just poured liquid from a wine decanter. This female figure, presumably the wife of the official, also wears an elaborate linen garment, sports an Egyptian-style hairdo, and carries a lotus. Filling out the scene are a nude female dancer and a female flutist, the latter of whom also wears a long linen dress. Finally, behind the chair of the official, ready and willing to serve, is a bald man in a short kilt and a wide collar. Given that everything about this inlay is Egyptian in style, it is tempting to imagine that the governor stationed at Tell el-Far‘ah had commissioned the ivory as a keepsake. It should be borne in mind, however, that the box might also have been an import from Egypt.\textsuperscript{130}

If the architecture of the residency, the ceramic discovered within it, and the ivory inlays all suggest that the building served as the headquarters of an Egyptian administrator, hieratic ostraca recovered from a nearby grain pit only bolster this impression. While the sherds of reddish-brown ceramic were discovered in a secondary deposit, the paleography of the hieratic texts strongly suggests a

\textsuperscript{127} For example, see Steindorff 1913: pl. 134; Wilkinson and Hill 1983; 79, 116; Wilkinson 1988: 179–186.
\textsuperscript{128} Petrie 1930: 19, pl. 55.
\textsuperscript{129} Petrie 1930: 19, pl. 55.
\textsuperscript{130} These ivories have been discussed by Liebowitz (1980: 165–168), who comes to the conclusion that they were part of a set depicting a military victory, a return march, a gathering of food for a feast, and a feast, although the victory and the march had admittedly been lost. The scene of fowling, however, bears strong parallels with tomb scenes, and the scene of the governor receiving wine hardly constitutes a feast. Liebowitz dates the ivory to the late Eighteenth Dynasty, which predates the establishment of the headquarters at Tell el-Far‘ah and also seems too early from an art historical vantage point.
Twentieth Dynasty date. Reunited and translated, the fragments read, “... what was said is(?) what was brought ... which is the rest, as barley of/for the overseer of ... brought by the hand of the scribe Pa ...”\(^{131}\)

Similar hieratic receipts for tax deliveries, all written on votive bowls, have been discovered in association with the Egyptian bases at Deir el-Balah, Tel Sera’, and Lachish.\(^{132}\) This particular inscription is especially interesting, however, in that the grain was reportedly delivered by a scribe either to or on behalf of an overseer, perhaps even an overseer of northern foreign lands. Whether the scribe was acting as a middleman for an Egyptian or a Canaanite taxpayer or whether he was paying the tax himself, however, is unfortunately uncertain. As discussed above, Ramesses III’s boast that the Canaanites delivered their taxes to a temple of Amun at Gaza (P. Harris I, 9: 1–3) has prompted scholars to suggest that the votive bowls bearing tax receipts may in fact have originally been presented to a temple deity as a symbol of payment. Perhaps significantly, then, Uehlinger has recently published two scarabs from Tell el-Far‘ah, which he claims would have been utilized in the administration of the temple estates of Ramesses III.\(^{133}\)

Aside from the residency, the only other contemporary architecture explored by Petrie was the 19 × 22 m outbuilding located directly to its west. This structure, which may have combined administrative and storage-related functions,\(^{134}\) was consumed in the same violent conflagration as the residency itself. This destruction seems to have taken place shortly after the advent of the eleventh century, making Tell el-Far‘ah, then, the longest-lived of Egypt’s residencies.\(^{135}\) Evidence from the cemetery, however, strongly suggests that employees of the Egyptian government, or at least ethnic Egyptian employees, may

\(^{131}\) Goldwasser and Wimmer 1999: 40.

\(^{132}\) The text from Deir el-Balah remains to be published. The others, however, will be discussed below. For an overview of the bowls and an in-depth discussion, see Goldwasser and Wimmer 1999: 39–41. A hieratic ostracon was also discovered at Haror but in a stratum dating to the thirteenth century. Its preserved text includes a portion of a foreign toponym and a rnp-t-šp (regnal year) sign, but it is not demonstrably related to taxation (Goldwasser 1991a: 19; Higginbotham 2000: 62).

\(^{133}\) Uehlinger 1988: 9–15. He identifies a scarab from Beth Shemesh as another Twentieth Dynasty temple estate seal.

\(^{134}\) This building is discussed at greater length in chapter five.

have abandoned Tell el-Far‘ah a few decades prior to the destruction, and certainly by the end of the reign of Ramesses VIII.\textsuperscript{136}

One of the keys to dating Tell el-Far‘ah’s destruction is the Philistine ceramic, which was found both in the residency and in the cemeteries contemporary with it.\textsuperscript{137} Unlike the association with Mycenaean IIIC:1b ware and the destroyed Egyptian residencies at the end of the Late Bronze Age, however, there is no evidence that the Philistines were responsible for the sacking and burning of the Egyptian base. Rather, the distribution of the material culture suggests that at Tell el-Far‘ah the Egyptians and the Philistines largely cooperated.\textsuperscript{138} Just who was responsible for the attack on the residency is unknown, but a local revolt by disgruntled taxpayers or ambitious local leaders is not unlikely.\textsuperscript{139}

In the Late Bronze Age, four cemeteries (cemeteries 100, 500, 600, and 900) were occupied, although by far the highest density of Egyptian artifacts was discovered in cemetery 900. Judging from both tomb architecture and the nature of the finds, it is relatively certain that the highest status individuals had been buried in this cemetery.\textsuperscript{140} In the Twentieth Dynasty the same four cemeteries continued to be utilized, as well as cemetery 200, but the vast majority of Egyptian-style items were discovered in cemeteries 900 and 500. (Perhaps significantly, Philistine ceramic was evidenced in all of the other IA IA cemeteries except for cemetery 900. While this may have been due to the fact that the Philistines eschewed cemetery 900 for some cultural reason,\textsuperscript{141} an alternative hypothesis is that cemetery 900 may simply have fallen out of use by the time the main Philistine settlement at the site occurred.\textsuperscript{142} It is worth mentioning in this regard that cemetery 900 contained only bronze imple-

\textsuperscript{136} Starkey and Harding 1932: 31.
\textsuperscript{138} See Wood (1991: 51–52), however, for a dissenting opinion.
\textsuperscript{139} Petrie’s (1930: 18) suggestion that Amalekite slave raids were responsible is largely ignored today.
\textsuperscript{140} See chapter five.
\textsuperscript{141} T. Dothan 1982a: 29.
\textsuperscript{142} A. Mazar 1985: 98. Two scarabs of Ramesses IV have been discovered in cemetery 900 and may represent the final period of use for the cemetery. Two other scarabs were identified as those of Ramesses VIII, but this assignment has not been widely accepted (Starkey and Harding 1932: 31; T. Dothan 1982a: 29, n. 50).
ments, while iron jewelry and weapons were not infrequently discovered in cemetery 500.)

Discounting the graves from cemetery 900, then, which were difficult to date due to the similarity of their assemblages to those of the Late Bronze Age, only nine demonstrably IA IA burials included more than one category of Egyptian-style artifact among their grave goods. While there is, of course, no reason to assume that a grave containing a small smattering of Egyptian-style goods once belonged to an Egyptian, it is nonetheless notable that the sheer number of graves containing Egyptian-style goods had plummeted quite dramatically from Nineteenth Dynasty levels.

Despite the relative dearth of burials exhibiting significant Egyptian-style material culture, the four largest contemporary tombs at the site (532, 542, 552, and 562) all included more than one category of Egyptian-style grave good. It will be remembered that Egyptian-style artifacts and elite burials were also closely correlated in the Nineteenth Dynasty. Yet another of the burials with a high quantity of Egyptian-style items (540) was located in the direct vicinity of the four tombs just discussed, suggesting a close connection to the occupants of these larger funerary monuments.

When Petrie discovered the four largest tombs of the IA IA period, he christened them “the tombs of the Philistine Lords.” His assignment of the tombs to Philistines was based upon the Philistine ceramic found in tombs 542, 552, and 562. Further, the “grotesque” anthropoid clay coffins discovered in tombs 552 and 562 also suggested to him that their occupants were foreigners. These same factors have subsequently led other scholars to the same conclusion, although the idea that the tombs themselves were inspired by Aegean models has been convincingly refuted.

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143 T. Dothan 1982a: 32.
144 As in chapter five, my results come from a study of the grave registers in the publications of Beth Pelet I and II. The categories of Egyptian-style goods I employ are “religious amulets,” “scarabs and plaques,” “ceramic,” and “miscellaneous.” The tombs with two or more categories of Egyptian-style items consisted of numbers 104, 206, 233, 532, 540, 542, 552, 562, and 636.
TWENTIETH DYNASTY

While Petrie’s dates for these tombs are no longer accepted, the verity of his sequence for them has been borne out by the test of time. In chronological order from oldest to most recent, they run: 542, 552, 532, and 562. While the first two tombs contained scarabs similar to those used during the reign of Ramesses IV, the third held a scarab of Ramesses X, and the latest tomb, 562, had an assemblage typical of burials dating from the end of the twelfth to the beginning of the eleventh centuries B.C. The fact that most of the graves had multiple burials, however, undoubtedly complicates matters.

As noted above, Philistine ceramic was discovered in tombs 542, 552, and 564, while grotesque coffins were interred in 542 and 552. Large quantities of Egyptian-style ceramic were also present in all four tombs, however, and numerous scarabs were included in three of the tombs (542, 552, and 532). Perhaps the most satisfactory explanatory scenario for this cultural mixing is that the original inhabitants of all four tombs had been Egyptians and that the grotesque coffins, at least, belonged to later burials. Bearing this in mind, it is nonetheless notable that Philistine and Egyptian pottery were both discovered within the residency itself and in a variety of IA IA graves as well. This apparent contemporary usage of the two types of ceramic at Tell el-Far’ah suggests that for much of the base’s existence, both Egyptians and Sea People lived and worked together.

Given the notable reduction in Egyptian-style goods in all but the most elite of the tombs at Tell el-Far’ah, it might be suggested that the Egyptians continued to fulfill leadership positions until the mid-twelfth century. At that time, the majority of the contemporary garrison may have consisted of Sea People and native Canaanite levies.
Further, since Tell el-Far’ah lasted significantly longer than other Egyptian bases, and since the last burials in the elite tombs almost certainly belonged to Philistine leaders, it is perhaps likely that the Egyptians ceded the command of Tell el-Far’ah entirely to their Philistine vassals when they withdrew from Canaan around the reign of Ramesses VI or VII.

*Tel Sera*’ (see figure 39) It is of more than passing interest that the only two southern Canaanite bases definitely still occupied in the Twentieth Dynasty were Tell el-Far’ah and Tel Sera’, both sites that had escaped the nearly ubiquitous destructions that marked the end of the Late Bronze Age. As at Tell el-Far’ah, as well, the Twentieth Dynasty occupation at Tel Sera’ was marked primarily by relatively minor renovations. Although the western half of the building has since been obliterated by later construction, the residency seems to have maintained its basic plan, which Oren reconstructs as a square building at 25 m to a side. Like many of the Nineteenth Dynasty residencies, the building possessed 2 m thick walls, paved floors, and a second story. The Egyptian base at Tel Sera’, like that at Tell el-Far’ah, had also been roofed at some expense with cedar beams from Lebanon.

While the physical structure of this stratum IX residency has been addressed at some length in chapter five, the artifacts that were sealed within the building at the time of its destruction have not. While some of these undoubtedly were heirlooms from the Nineteenth Dynasty, the majority must have been in use in the Twentieth Dynasty. Nestled amidst the local ceramic, the charcoal, and the organic refuse that characterized the destruction layer throughout the site were a wide variety of Egyptian-style goods.

Egyptian-style ceramic included hundreds of plain bowls with string-cut bases. Likewise, ceramic forms included beer bottles, drop-shaped vases, high-necked cups, and cup-and-saucer bowls. Luxury goods

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152 These included the construction of some partition walls, renovations to the stairway, the paving of rooms with crushed chalk and brick, and the cobbling of the outer courtyard (Oren 1984a: 39; 1993b: 1331). As discussed above, the courtyard of Tell el-Far’ah South was also cobbled at this time.


154 Candidates for such items include scarabs typical of the Nineteenth Dynasty and palm and ibex style pottery (see chapter five).
consisted of faience and alabaster vessels, as well as a bronze fitting for a possible Egyptian-style scepter. Small portable goods included scarabs, amulets, and beads. Of particular interest, however, was a lump of Egyptian-blue pigment, as it may imply the presence of Egyptian craftsmen at the site.\(^{155}\)

Of all the evidence pertinent to Egyptian activity at Tel Sera’ in the Twentieth Dynasty, none is of more importance than the eleven Egyptian-style bowls and sherds that had been anciently inscribed with hieratic texts.\(^{156}\) These inscriptions, which were discovered in and around the residency, have been dated on paleographic and other grounds to the reign of Ramesses III. Remarkably, they are notations of harvest tax (\(\text{\textit{smw}}\)) payments, recording deliveries of grain in quantities as high as 460–2,000 hekat-measures, or some 33,500–145,652 liters.\(^{157}\) Unfortunately, only one of the bowls preserved information concerning its donor, in that case a \(pr\)-estate.\(^{158}\) Whether the term \(pr\) referred to a personal, religious, or institutional estate, however, is unclear. Intriguingly, sherd no. 6 preserved the phrase \(hrw\ nfr\), or “festivities,” suggesting that taxes may also have been levied for community-wide temple celebrations, as they were in Egypt.\(^{159}\)

As discussed previously, it is the opinion of the majority of the scholars who have addressed these bowls that they represent a combination tax receipt and votive offering. According to this reconstruction, an individual or representative of a corporate group who paid tax to a temple estate would receive a bowl, inscribed with the amount of their payment, in which they could then place a token amount of their delivery and symbolically offer it before the resident deity.\(^{160}\) Such a scenario would fit well with the inscriptional evidence from the Twentieth Dynasty, which demonstrates that tem-

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\(^{157}\) Bowls no. 1 and 3; Goldwasser 1984: 77, 80, 86. Bowl no. 4 recorded the delivery of only ten vessels (Goldwasser 1984: 81).

\(^{158}\) Bowl no. 2; Goldwasser 1984: 80.

\(^{159}\) Goldwasser 1984: 82.

\(^{160}\) Inscriptions on votive ceramic have been found in temple contexts in Egypt as well (Goldwasser 1984: 84–86).
ples or estates of Amun dotted the Canaanite landscape and that the inhabitants of the region paid their taxes at these cultic sites.\footnote{Contra Wimmer (1990: 1090), who suggests that Canaanites simply paid taxes to temple estates located within Egypt. P. Harris I, 9: 1–3, however, is quite clear about the physical presence of both a temple to Amun and an image of Amun at the site of Gaza, and others of the inscriptions discussed in this chapter (see KRI V, 117: 13–14; P. Harris I, 68a: 2 and List A, 11: 11) suggest that this may not have been a unique establishment.}

While an Egyptian-style temple has not been excavated at Tel Sera’, archaeologists discovered in the residency itself hundreds of Egyptian-style votive bowls, virtually identical to those upon which the inscriptions were written. Significantly, these bowls were the same type of vessels found in great quantities in the cultic buildings at contemporary Lachish and Beth Shan.\footnote{Oren 1972: 169; 1978: 1065; T. Dothan 1982a: 87; Goldwasser 1984: 85–86.} Indeed, Goldwasser has even suggested that the practice of presenting votive grain offerings before a temple deity might well account for the large concentration of wheat found covering the floor of the mound temple at Lachish.\footnote{Goldwasser 1984: 85.}

While it may be that the “residency” in fact included both administrative offices and a small sanctuary,\footnote{Oren and Netzer 1974: 265; Weinstein 1981: 19; T. Dothan 1982a: 87.} an alternate suggestion is that instead of or in addition to serving as the headquarters of an Egyptian official, the building functioned as an administrative unit associated with the local temple. In this context, it is noteworthy that a cultic building (Building 118) was indeed located in the vicinity of the residency and that the artifact assemblage of this structure closely resembled that found in the residency itself. Although Building 118 was typically Canaanite in physical type, it is quite possible that the Egyptians may have desired to appropriate this former indigenous holy site for their own purposes.\footnote{This building has been discussed in chapter five, and it does not seem to have undergone any significant change in the Twentieth Dynasty. It is published in Oren 1978: 1067; 1993b: 1330–1333.}

While the residency at Tel Sera’ escaped the pandemic destruction at the close of the Late Bronze Age, it met a violent end in the mid-twelfth century, as did nearby Lachish.\footnote{Oren 1978: 1066; 1982: 166; 1984a: 41; 1992: 118; Fritz 1987: 90.} The date for this destruction is arrived at through several lines of evidence, but one
of the most striking is the complete lack of any Philistine ware excavated at the site, although this type of ceramic is frequently encountered in the succeeding occupation.\footnote{Oren 1984a: 41.} That the Sea People settled the site after the reign of Ramesses III is beyond doubt, and it has even been suggested that the later name of Tel Sera’, Ziklag, was derived from the ethnic label “Tjekker.”\footnote{Oren 1982: 156; 1993b: 1329.} It is unclear, however, whether the Sea People conquered the Egyptian base or whether its destruction simply predated the appearance of Philistine ware.\footnote{Singer 1985: 113–114; T. Dothan 1989: 8; Oren 1993b: 1331.} Whoever attacked Tel Sera’, however, seems to have taken the Egyptians by storm, for the quantity of valuable goods buried underneath the burnt rubble suggests that the site’s inhabitants were not afforded the luxury of gathering their belongings and vacating the base peaceably.\footnote{Weinstein 1992: 148.}

Beth Shan (see figure 59)

As discussed in chapter five, the strategically located town of Beth Shan was one of the most intensively occupied Egyptian bases in the Nineteenth Dynasty. It is perhaps due to this strong imperial presence that the site escaped the nearly ubiquitous destructions at the end of the Late Bronze Age. While no destruction layers are observable at Beth Shan,\footnote{James and McGovern 1993: 4, 247.} the base was nonetheless subject to intensive renovation at the beginning of the Twentieth Dynasty. The IA IA town can be equated with the University of Pennsylvania’s lower level VI, Yadin’s strata 4, and A. Mazar’s level S3.\footnote{For discussions of the dating of this strata to the IA IA period, see Albright 1938: 77; Garfinkel 1987: 224; A. Mazar 1993a: 217; 1997: 70; Yannai 1996: 185; Finkelstein 1996a: 173–174, 176.} Archaeologists working at the site have thus far discovered administrative buildings (Building 1500 and Building 1700) as well as a temple, a residential zone, and a sizable cemetery.

Building 1500, located to the north of Beth Shan’s temple, has garnered a great deal of scholarly attention for two primary reasons. First, the residency itself bears marked similarities to center-hall houses discovered in Egypt proper, both in its structure and in its con-
struction method. Second, hieroglyphic inscriptions on the building’s doorframe conveniently provide the name and titles of the building’s Egyptian occupant.

Like center-hall houses in Egypt, Building 1500 was basically square in plan and, indeed, had the exact same dimensions (22 × 23 m) as the very similarly structured residency at Tell el-Far’ah.173 Both buildings also possessed 2 m thick walls. Notable differences between the two, however, include the selective use of basalt foundations at Beth Shan and the position of the headquarters at Beth Shan entrance in the center of the front wall, rather than at its corner.174

The heart of Building 1500 was its 8.8 × 8.2 m central hall. By analogy to Egyptian center-hall houses, the two column bases discovered in the middle of this room may well indicate that columns supported a raised roof with clerestory lighting.175 Around this central space, ten rooms were arrayed, and some of these appear to have been devoted to storage. Unfortunately, however, the quite limited record keeping of the original excavators has meant that the functions of most of the rooms can be deduced solely upon their structure.176 Amongst the finds that can be traced back to Building 1500 and its environs are spinning bowls, beer bottles, miscellaneous Egyptian-style ceramic, and one or two daggers.177

As is typical of high-status Egyptian architecture, the doorjambs, lintels, and T-shaped thresholds of Building 1500 had been constructed out of limestone. Even more quintessentially Egyptian, however, was the fact that a number of the jambs and lintels of Building

174 The general description of Building 1500 is taken from the discussions in Fitzgerald 1932: 142–145; James 1966: 10–12, 161; Oren 1984a: 49; Mazar 1993a: 218; 1997c: 159; Yannai 1996: 191; Higginbotham 2000: 270–272. Renewed excavations suggest that an earlier version of Building 1500, perhaps dating to the very early Twentieth Dynasty, possessed mud-brick foundations. This earlier structure was 20 × 20 m in area and was paved with mud-bricks (A. Mazar 1997a: 72; 1997c: 159–160).
175 Oren 1992: 118. No staircase was discovered, and—as at Tell el-Far’ah—there is no convincing evidence that the building had a second story (Fitzgerald 1932: 142–145).
176 Based on analogy with Egyptian houses and the residency at Tell el-Far’ah, it would appear likely that the suite of rooms farthest from the entrance was the private apartment of the building’s owner.
1500 had been inscribed with religious and dedicatory texts.\textsuperscript{178} On one lintel, a royal scribe (ṣš nsu) and great steward (imy-r pr wr) named Ramesses-user-khepesh knelt in adoration before the cartouches of Ramesses III and honored the king with a hymn.\textsuperscript{179} Likewise, a door-jamb discovered in the vicinity of Building 1500 referred to the provisioning of every granary (ṣdḥ3 śnwt nbt) and gave the titles of Ramesses-user-khepesh as “[oversee of] infantry troops, troop marshal of the lord of the two lands, royal scribe, and great steward” ([imy-r] mnfly tš pdtl n nb t3wy ṣš nsu imy-r pr wr). This monument also provided the name and titles of Ramesses-user-khepesh’s father, Djehutymes, who served as fanbearer on the king’s right and tr[oop] commander (t3y lw hr wnm n nsrw hry p[dt]).\textsuperscript{180} Finally, yet another lintel depicted a kneeling Ramesses-user-khepesh and gave the titles of his father as fanbearer on the king’s right and overseer of foreign countries (imy-r hšswt).\textsuperscript{181}

The jambs and lintels of Building 1500 provide evidence for the on-site residence of an Egyptian official who held both military and administrative posts. Indeed, the title great steward (imy-r pr wr) is particularly interesting, as it suggests that Ramesses-user-khepesh had authority over royal property, presumably located at or around Beth Shan. In this regard, it is perhaps pertinent to note that the Nineteenth Dynasty “border journal” indicates that in the reign of Merneptah an imy-r pr was stationed at the otherwise unknown but royally administered town of Ramesses-nakht (P. Anastasi III, vs. 5: 3). Considering that Egyptian stewards are otherwise rarely attested in Canaan, it is not impossible that Beth Shan and Ramesses-nakht should be equated.

Building 1500’s inscriptions also demonstrate that Ramesses-user-khepesh himself came from an illustrious military background. Although

\textsuperscript{178} These texts are published in James 1966: figs. 89: 1–4, 91: 1, 4. Of these, 89: 1 seems to be a hymn in honor of the king; 89: 2 mentions a šḥ-hall; and 89:4 mentions a “mighty city.”

\textsuperscript{179} James 1966: fig. 92:1. Viceroyos of Kush and other high officials are often depicted genuflecting before royal cartouches from the reign of Amenhotep III through the end of the New Kingdom (see Habachi 1957b: 14).

\textsuperscript{180} James 1966: fig. 96: 1, 3. There is a possibility that Djehutymes is the same individual evoked on an ivory pen case found at Megiddo. The text on the case read, “For the ka of the royal messenger to every foreign country, overseer of the stable (named) Mighty-is-Amun-of-the-residence; for the ka of the troop commander (?). . . Djehutymes(?).” Unfortunately, however, the readings of both the personal name and the title troop commander (hry pdl) are dubious (Ward in James 1966: 175).

\textsuperscript{181} James 1966: fig. 94: 3.
it is not specifically stated, it is perhaps likely that this official assumed his father’s position at Beth Shan following the latter’s promotion to a higher office.\textsuperscript{182} Indeed, such a situation might well explain the otherwise seemingly undue prominence of his father in Ramesses-user-khepesh’s own monuments.

Because it was only partially excavated, the plan of Building 1700 is far less clear than that of Building 1500 just to its west. Despite these ambiguities, however, Building 1700 appears to have been constructed according to a similar or perhaps even more imposing plan than its neighbor. It is thus also classified as an administrative building.\textsuperscript{183} Like Building 1500, Building 1700 was oriented toward the west and possessed T-shaped thresholds and limestone doorways inscribed with hieroglyphic signs and texts.\textsuperscript{184} Although the building apparently contained “many Egyptian finds,”\textsuperscript{185} these were not documented individually.

While Buildings 1500 and 1700 represented new Twentieth Dynasty constructions, the small temple that had graced the center of Beth Shan in the Nineteenth Dynasty was reconstructed along similar lines in the Twentieth Dynasty. The relatively minor changes incorporated into the structure of the temple included the addition of an entrance hall and an adjustment of the shrine itself to a more central axis.\textsuperscript{186} Like its predecessor, the Twentieth Dynasty temple at Beth Shan has been compared to chapels at both Amarna and Deir el-Medina.\textsuperscript{187} Perhaps not surprisingly, then, the architectural embellishments discovered in association with the temple were mainly

\textsuperscript{182} These inscriptions have been discussed by Ward in James 1966: 172–176; Kitchen 1993d: 109–110; Higginbotham 2000: 64–65. For the inheritance of command over Egyptian bases, see the discussions in chapters four and five.

\textsuperscript{183} James 1966: 11–12; Weinstein 1981: 18; Oren 1984a: 49; Higginbotham 2000: 271. A. Mazar (1997a: 72) believes that Building 1700 may have postdated Egyptian rule at the site. The Egyptian-style finds discovered within the building, the architecture, and the inscribed architectural elements, however, would appear consistent with a date more or less contemporary with Building 1500 (see also Yannai 1996: 192).

\textsuperscript{184} These include jambs 31–10–437 and 438, a lintel, and a jamb decorated with a uraeus and sun disc border (31–10–478, James 1966: fig. 91:2); a decorated cornice (31–10–477; James 1966: fig 91:3); and numerous miscellaneous fragments (see James 1966: 6, 12).

\textsuperscript{185} Yannai 1996: 192.


Egyptian in style. These elements included a courtyard niche for a stele, lotus-form capitals, stones with decorative friezes, and T-shaped thresholds.  

Indeed, one doorjamb discovered near the temple was inscribed with a religious hymn evoking the Nile-god Hapy, while miscellaneous finds included a stone sculpture of a hawk wearing the crown of Upper and Lower Egypt and a statuette of a red hippopotamus.

Further cultic material may have been deposited in an abandoned grain silo located near the temple. Perhaps of foremost importance among these artifacts were fourteen model bread offerings impressed with a stamp bearing the text “daily offering” (imnyt). These humble cultic remnants must certainly attest to the presence of an Egyptian-style religious ritual that took place within the temple. An even more monumental discovery was a life-size seated statue of Ramesses III. Although excavated from a disturbed context, the statue likely had originally been erected in this temple or its environs and had served as the focus of a statue cult.

While Buildings 1500, 1700, and the temple itself had been excavated by the University of Pennsylvania in the 1920s and 1930s, the renewed excavations by Hebrew University in the 1980s and 1990s uncovered a great deal of information about the contemporary residential neighborhoods. Mazar and his team uncovered numerous abodes, which they believed housed the members of the Egyptian garrison and their families in the Twentieth Dynasty. The excavators noted that some of the houses had been decorated with color-

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189 Rowe 1940: 19; Ward in James 1966: 171. For further fragments, see James 1966: 7.
190 Rowe 1940: 19; Ward in James 1966: 171. For further fragments, see James 1966: 7.
191 Thompson 1967: 129. The red hippopotamus, of course, is suggestive of worship of the god Seth, lord of foreigners and other potentially chaotic elements. For discussions of the Sethian associations of both hippopotami and the color red, see Säve-Söderbergh 1953; te Velde 1967; Behrmann 1989; Rüters 1993: 147–148.
192 The silo reportedly contained “cult objects,” faience items, and scarabs (James 1966: 17).
193 Rowe 1940: 19; James and McGovern 1993: 188. Similar objects are known from the Nineteenth Dynasty levels at Beth Shan (see chapter five and James and McGovern 1993: 188 and fig. 118.2) and the Egyptian fortress at Semna (Dunham and Janssen 1960: 58, fig. 5.28–1–422).
194 Rowe 1930: pl. 51; James 1966: 35.
ful wall paintings similar to those found in contemporary Egyptian homes, and at least one of the ovens excavated was built according to an Egyptian design.\footnote{196 A. Mazar 1997a: 71.}

Artifacts discovered in the residential zone also suggested a strong cultural affiliation with Egypt. In addition to numerous Egyptian-style utility wares,\footnote{197 While the majority of the Egyptian-style ceramic had been locally manufactured, a couple of the vessels had been imported. The shapes of the Egyptian-style vessels were identical to types current in contemporary Egypt. These included saucer bowls, storage jars, drop-shaped vessels, beer bottles, and mugs (A. Mazar 1997a: 71). Yadin also excavated in this area (Area S) and found much the same repertoire of Egyptian-style ceramic, as well as spinning bowls and a large bowl with rope marks (Yadin 1987: 53–55, 87–84). For discussions of the large quantity of Egyptian-style vessels found in Twentieth Dynasty levels as a whole, see James 1966: 27–28; Weinstein 1981: 22.} the team discovered fragments of an Egyptian-style lintel and a relief depicting an Egyptian official seated upon a folding chair.\footnote{198 In addition to the relief of the seated official, numerous examples of Egyptian steles have been discovered out of context at Beth Shan. As the dating of most of these items is problematic (James 1966: 133), they will not be discussed here. The reliefs are catalogued, however, in James 1966: 34–35, 168–171 and deserve further study. See also Rowe 1930: 32–33, 38; 1940: 33–34; pl. 28: 18; 65A: 1.} Among the small finds were jewelry wrapped in Egyptian linen, scarabs, amulets of Egyptian deities, clay bird figurines (presumably the duck heads that had been so popular in the Nineteenth Dynasty),\footnote{199 See James and McGovern 1993: 172–173, figs. 86–89.} an ostracon depicting a cobra and inscribed with the word “bow” or “archer” (\(\text{p}\text{d}\)), and clay bullas that bore seal impressions.\footnote{200 A. Mazar 1993c: 209–211; 1997c: 157; Wimmer 1994: 36–38; Sweeney 1998: 38, 52; Higginbotham 2000: 63. A seal impression similar to one found at Beth Shan was excavated in a contemporary level at Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh (Tubb 1990: 28, fig. 11).}

The houses of the dead at Beth Shan, like those of the living, were furnished with numerous Egyptian-style items. Small finds such as amulets and scarabs were widespread, as were luxury items like alabaster vessels, swimming-girl spoons, and bronze wine sets. Of a humbler and also ultimately more indicative nature, however, were numerous examples of Egyptian-style pottery, naturalistic anthropoid clay coffins, and eight clay shabtis.\footnote{201 Oren published the report of the cemetery and its many Egyptian-style objects in 1973. These tombs and their assemblages have also been discussed by Higginbotham 2000: 90–92.} Unfortunately, the ubiquitous communal tombs and the heavily plundered state of the cemetery
have largely prevented the positive assignment of burial goods to specific interments at Beth Shan.\textsuperscript{202}

If the majority of the cemetery’s occupants seem to have been strongly influenced by Egyptian culture, there is evidence of yet another non-Canaanite ethnic group at Beth Shan. Gold leaves placed in the mouths of some of the dead attest to Aegean traditions.\textsuperscript{203} Further, as at Tell el-Far’ah and Deir el-Balah, grotesque-style anthropoid coffins coexisted with naturalistic counterparts. Such “grotesque” coffins are commonly interpreted as the final resting place of elite Sea People mercenaries.\textsuperscript{204}

Sea People presence at the site may well, however, have been quite limited. Only five such “grotesque” coffin lids were discovered in the cemetery—and these clustered in two tombs (one in Tomb 66 and four in Tomb 90). The quantity of Mycenaean IIIC:1b and Philistine ware also is quite low at Beth Shan, in contrast to the situation at Tell el-Far’ah.\textsuperscript{205} While one would not necessarily expect to find Aegean-style ceramic at a garrison post in which Sea People mercenaries had been both housed and supplied by Egyptians, its marked absence may nonetheless indicate that Aegean troops did not make up a particularly high percentage of the base’s occupants.\textsuperscript{206}

While Beth Shan had survived the spate of destructions at the end of the Late Bronze Age, shortly following the reign of Ramesses III it fell victim to the violence that marked the end of Egyptian rule in Syria-Palestine.\textsuperscript{207} The meter-thick layer of debris that coated the mid-twelfth century levels at the site attests to a fierce con-

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Oren 1973: 3–4, 68; T. Dothan 1982a: 268.
\item The renewed excavations at Beth Shan uncovered “more than a dozen sherds of Mycenaean IIIC vessels” (A. Mazar 1997c: 158; see also A. Mazar 1985b: 99; 1993c: 216), but as of 1996 only a few Philistine bichrome sherds had been discovered at the site (Dothan 1982a: 81–83; Finkelstein 1996a: 177). Sea People mercenaries at Tell el-Far’ah, however, may have employed more Aegean-style material culture due to the fact the base was located in the same region in which the vast majority of nonmercenary Sea People had settled. Beth Shan was located north of the main Philistine settlement.
\item See also Tubb 1995: 137.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
flagration.\textsuperscript{208} Excavators have suggested, rather vaguely, that the destruction was due to “changes that took place in the geopolitical structure of the country with the penetration of the Sea Peoples and the emergence of Israel.”\textsuperscript{209} Such lack of specificity, however, is due to the dearth of any substantive clues as to the authors of Beth Shan’s destruction. The ceramic forms characterizing the subsequent stratum are typical of IA IA wares current elsewhere in Canaan,\textsuperscript{210} leading negative evidence to suggest, perhaps, that a local revolt had occurred.

\textit{Tell es-Sa'ādiyeh} (see figure 60)
The site of Tell es-Sa'ādiyeh is located on a double mound just 1.8 km east of the Jordan. Not only was this town, like Beth Shan, located in the vicinity of a shallow ford and in an agriculturally rich environment, but it was also situated at the crossroads of at least two major trade routes.\textsuperscript{211} De Contenson conducted soundings at the tell in 1953, and the University of Pennsylvania team excavated for four seasons in the 1960s. It was not until the British Museum excavations in the 1980s and 1990s, however, that evidence for an Egyptian occupation at the site came to light.

Although certain burials and the architecture of a building preceding the Twentieth Dynasty residency suggest that the Egyptians may have set up a base at Tell es-Sa’ādiyeh in the late thirteenth century, little is known about this period of time at the tell. Such an occupation, if it did occur, must have been brief, for the Egyptian evidence disappears rather quickly and is replaced by a typically Canaanite assemblage.\textsuperscript{212} While evidence for a late Nineteenth Dynasty Egyptian base is somewhat questionable, however, the situation is far more clear-cut with regard to the Twentieth Dynasty.

At the center of the tell itself, the British Museum team excavated a building that they identify as a governor’s residency on the basis

\textsuperscript{208} For descriptions of this destruction layer, see Yadin 1987: 89; A. Mazar 1997a: 70; 1997c: 158.
\textsuperscript{209} A. Mazar 1997a: 72. A. Mazar (1993c: 217; 1997c: 160) also suggests a Midianite invasion or a local Canaanite revolt as possible catalysts.
\textsuperscript{210} A. Mazar 1993c: 219; 1997a: 73.
\textsuperscript{211} For a detailed discussion of the strategic value of Tell es-Sa’ādiyeh, see Tubb 1995: 142.
\textsuperscript{212} Regarding the rather ambiguous evidence for an Egyptian occupation in the late Nineteenth Dynasty and for the reversion to Canaanite control that may have followed it, see Tubb 1995: 142; Tubb, Dorrell, and Cobbing 1997: 68.
of the dimensions of its mud-bricks, its deep mud-brick foundations, and the similarity of its plan to the residencies at Tell el-Far‘ah and Tel Sera’. Although the building’s plan has yet to be published, the residency is said to have incorporated into its structure storerooms, an internal courtyard, passageways, and a staircase. In the storerooms, the excavators discovered numerous Egyptian-style storage jars, but the remainder of the archaeological assemblage has not been discussed in depth.213

The residency was not the only building to have been constructed according to Egyptian masonry techniques. The so-called Western Palace also employed bricks of typical Egyptian dimensions as well as mud-brick foundations. This building, which was situated in the western portion of the tell behind a 6 m thick casemate wall, lacked a “central” space, but was otherwise made up of various rooms, courtyards, and chambers. By far the most interesting of these were two interconnected, vaulted cisterns, which seem to have been devoted to water retention, and one thickly plastered pool. This latter room had been provided with a system of inlet and outflow channels and was associated with an unusual aqueduct. Given the dense deposit of sherd from some fifty or sixty Egyptian-style storage jars, identical to those found in the residency, it would seem almost certain that the pool had been utilized to store wine at cool temperatures.214

In the 1960s, Pritchard had discovered the remains of an elaborate stone stairway that descended down the length of the tell until it reached an enclosed semi-circular pool located some 8 m below ground level. Pritchard surmised that this staircase, which had been divided into two halves by a mud-brick wall, served to provide the inhabitants of Tell es-Sa‘diyeh with access to a hidden water source that could have been utilized in case of a siege.215 Recently, the renewed British excavations have confirmed Pritchard’s suggestion that both the stairway and the pool were anciently enclosed and thus hidden from view. According to their findings, the staircase’s

The bricks of the Western Palace measured 44 × 23 × 11 cm, which is very nearly similar to those employed in the construction of Bir el-‘Abd (Oren 1987: 87). Additional finds in the Western Palace included a seal impression that bore an imprint of papyrus fibers on its reverse (Tubb 1990: 28; 1993: 1299).
dividing wall functioned, quite practically, to separate those descending the dark passageway from those ascending it.\textsuperscript{216}

The pool itself was fed by an underground spring, and conduits were discovered that prevented the stagnation of this water source by providing both inflow and outflow channels. Water supply, however, was not the only function of the pool, for numerous handleless Egyptian-style storage jars—identical to those found in the Western Palace and the residency—were discovered within it. It appears almost certain, then, that the inhabitants of the Western Palace employed the underground pool in their industrial pursuits.\textsuperscript{217}

The association of an Egyptian base with the detritus of a wine-making industry is, of course, familiar from the situation at Aphek. At this Nineteenth Dynasty base, the excavators discovered two winepresses and a large pile of grape pits. While no presses were discovered at Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh, the cooling facilities and the storage jars suggest that the Egyptians were very invested in the storage of this commodity. Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh itself was located in close proximity to the wine country of Gilead,\textsuperscript{218} and it is perhaps not unlikely that the grapes grown in this region were processed at the Western Palace, just as the Egyptians at Aphek pressed the grapes from the surrounding countryside at the residency itself.

It is perhaps significant, then, that both Aphek and Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh were located along major trade routes, one coastal and the other inland. Indeed, Tubb has suggested in his reports that the primary function of the base at Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh was as a trading entrepôt rather than as a military base per se.\textsuperscript{219} Sites that are strategic in terms of trade concerns, however, are often similarly strategic for military reasons. So it is not unlikely that Tell es-Sa‘idiyeh was thrice valuable as a manufacturing center, as a trading entrepôt, and as a military base.

According to the excavators, the architecture of the residency and the Western Palace is strongly Egyptian in character. Likewise, the storage jars and the papyrus sealing are artifacts typical of Egyptian assemblages. It is in the town’s cemetery, however, that the greatest preponderance of Egyptian-style goods has been discovered. Of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{216} Tubb 1988a: 46; 1997: 454.
\item \textsuperscript{218} Tubb 1995: 142.
\item \textsuperscript{219} Tubb 1995: 142; 1997: 454.
\end{itemize}
the 45 burials excavated by the University of Pennsylvania team and the 420 burials excavated by the British, the majority date to the first half of the twelfth century B.C. and are thus coeval with the Egyptian occupation. Of these burials, a great many Egyptian-style artifacts are numbered among the grave goods. These include luxury items such as alabaster vessels, bronze wine sets and other bronze vessels, faience vessels, ivory cosmetic spoons, bronze mirrors, jewelry, combs, scarabs, amulets, and pottery.220

It is of special interest regarding the Egyptian-style grave goods that the bronze objects appear by and large to have been wrapped in Egyptian linen. The bronzes were not the only things wrapped in linen, however. Judging from the posture of the corpses and the residue found on them, it would appear that a number had been tightly bound at death with linen wrappings. Even more peculiar, however, was the fact that “several” corpses had been wrapped in linen treated with bitumen, likely in a local attempt at mumification.221

The preponderance of Egyptian-style burial equipment and the practice of wrapping bronzes and even the dead themselves in linen are undoubtedly factors that betray the presence of a resident Egyptian (and perhaps also Egyptianized?) population at Tell es-Sa’idiyeh in the early to mid-Twentieth Dynasty.

While the burials at Tell es-Sa’idiyeh resembled those found at Beth Shan in terms of the high quantity of Egyptian-style grave goods, it is remarkable that no anthropoid clay coffins were discovered at the former site, and no evidence for mumification is present at the latter. Despite the lack of “grotesque”-style anthropoid coffins at Tell es-Sa’idiyeh, however, Pritchard and Tubb have argued for a probable Sea People presence at the site. Pritchard’s argument is based upon the Aegean influence obvious in some of the bronzes


and on the similarity of the assemblages at Tell es-Saʿidiyeh to the goods found in the tombs that contained “grotesque” coffins at Beth Shan.222

For his part, Tubb suggests that the 27 double pithos burials discovered at Tell es-Saʿidiyeh betray the Anatolian heritage of their occupants, as double pithos burials—while rare in Canaan—are relatively common in Anatolia.223 Alternatively, however, it is quite possible to interpret this style of burial as a low-cost alternative to interment in an anthropoid clay coffin.224 This latter hypothesis is rendered especially attractive given that the grave goods placed in and around the pithos burials were “strongly Egyptian in character.”225 Neither Mycenaean IIIIC:1b nor Philistine ceramic has yet been discovered at the tell or in the cemetery.

Tell es-Saʿidiyeh is perhaps unique among the Egyptian bases destroyed in the mid-twelfth century in that archaeological evidence suggests that the Egyptians may have torched their own base in an organized withdrawal. Three pieces of evidence point to this conclusion. First, there is little sign of conflict in the way of weapons or bodies, although it must be admitted that Aphek was the only base for which such evidence could indeed be definitively ascertained.226 Far more convincing, however, is that the excavators found very few objects at Tell es-Saʿidiyeh that were both precious and portable. Such a marked lack of valuable items is usually taken as characteristic of either a planned abandonment or an extremely thorough looting. Finally, the entrances to the residency and the Western Palace had been blocked with stone prior to the engulfment of these buildings in flame. Such purposeful sealing of access ways would

224 Given their form, anthropoid clay coffins were no doubt extremely difficult to transport. Thus, if no facilities existed for fashioning them locally, it is unlikely that the inhabitants of Tell es-Saʿidiyeh would import them.
225 Tubb 1993: 1299.
226 The arrowheads imbedded in the walls of the residency and discovered later in the destruction layer strongly suggest that the base at Aphek was taken by force of arms (Beck and Kochavi 1985: 31–32; 1993: 68; Kochavi 1978: 15; 1990: xii). A mid-twelfth century attack on Lachish killed a woman and her children. As will be discussed below, however, it is not absolutely certain that this site housed an Egyptian base.
have occurred neither while the base was still operational nor presumably in a postconquest situation.\footnote{The destruction level is dated to around 1150 B.C. (Tubb 1990: 28–29; Weinstein 1992: 145). It is described in Tubb 1995: 137, 140. The theory that the base was purposefully abandoned is put forth in Tubb 1988a: 40–41; 1995: 140. Conceivably, the barricading of the doors could also have represented a last ditch effort at fortification by a people under siege, yet if so, one would expect to recover evidence of a heated battle.}

Given the points listed above, it is extremely likely not only that the Egyptians left Tell es-Sa’idiyeh before they were forcibly driven out but also that they were reluctant to leave spoils for their enemies. Just whom they feared, however, is again uncertain. The succeeding level of occupation at Tell es-Sa’idiyeh is described as a squatter settlement or a campsite, as it is represented solely by hearths and grinding stones. Following this ephemeral habitation, the site remained abandoned for nearly a century.\footnote{Tubb 1988a: 40; 1993: 1298; 1997: 454.}

**Possible Twentieth Dynasty base: Deir el-Balah**

Deir el-Balah’s Nineteenth Dynasty residency was no longer occupied in the Twentieth Dynasty. Instead, the team from Hebrew University discovered numerous pits containing Philistine pottery. Scattered in and amongst the Philistine ceramic, however, were Egyptian-style beer bottles, bowls, flowerpots, and drop-shaped vessels.\footnote{T. Dothan 1982a: 255; 1985a: 66; 1985b: 42.} A hieratic tax bowl, unfortunately discovered in a secondary context at Deir el-Balah, provides an even more important indication that the Egyptian presence at the site may have continued into the Twentieth Dynasty. Although the inscription has yet to be published, the text and offering bowl apparently bear a marked similarity to those found at Tel Sera’, Tell el-Far‘ah, and Lachish.\footnote{T. Dothan 1982b: 745; Goldwasser and Wimmer 1999: 41, n. 3.} Further, at least one anthropoid clay coffin from the town’s cemetery displays features similar to those of the grotesque-style coffins discovered in Twentieth Dynasty assemblages at Beth Shan and Tell el-Far‘ah.\footnote{T. Dothan and M. Dothan 1992: pl. 17.} Given the Egyptian-style ceramic, the taxation bowl, the highly stylized coffin, and even a cartouche of Ramesses VI, then, it is not unlikely that a Twentieth Dynasty base remains as yet undiscovered at Deir el-Balah.\footnote{Due to the massive sand dunes covering the site, the Hebrew University team

Possible Twentieth Dynasty base: Lachish

At Late Bronze Age Lachish, a temple constructed in the fosse of the town’s Middle Bronze Age fortifications contained a great many Egyptian-style cultic artifacts, suggesting some degree of imperial patronage at the site. The remainder of the tell, however, exhibited a predominantly Canaanite material culture. At the end of the Late Bronze Age, both the town of Lachish and its fosse were completely destroyed. A new temple was constructed in the much-reduced IA IA town, that subsequently formed over the ashes of its predecessor. Since this temple had been constructed on the mound itself, Ussishkin and his team from Tel Aviv University and the Israel Exploration Society dubbed it the “mound temple.” This later temple closely resembles the temples of levels VII and VI at Beth Shan and also bears a strong similarity to chapels at Deir el-Medina and the worker’s village at Amarna.

Egyptian-style architectural elements evidenced in the mound temple included the form of the column bases and capitals, the addition of a stairway to the cultic niche, brick flooring, painted walls, and beams made from the cedar of Lebanon. Further, the assemblage of the cultic material included alabaster and faience vessels, ivory carvings, amulets, scarabs, painted ostrich eggs, gold foil, and a great number of votive bowls. Very little, however, is known concerning the deity or deities to whom the temple was dedicated. A graffito found within the temple depicted a god with a conical cap and an oversized spear. Likewise, a gold plaque highlighted a nude goddess with Hathor curls who held lotuses and stood on a horse. The iconography of the goddess suggests that she be identified with Qadesh—a Canaanite deity who had been to some degree adopted into the Egyptian pantheon. Considering her background, then, it is possible that Qadesh shared with Anat a broad and strategic crossover appeal for both Egyptians and Canaanites.

had funds to excavate only one half acre of the settlement area (T. Dothan 1987: 122). For the cartouche of Ramesses VI, see Weinstein 1981: 23.

233 Tufnell, Inge, Harding 1940: 78; Beit-Arieh 1985: 50; Wimmer 1990: 107; Higginbotham 2000: 110–111. For the likelihood that a garrison may have been stationed at the site for a brief period in the reign of Akhenaten, see chapter four.

234 For an overview of IA IA Lachish as a whole, see Ussishkin 1985: 217.

235 Ussishkin 1985: 220–221.


237 For the deities in the mound temple, see Ussishkin 1978: 22. For the god-
In addition to the architecture of the mound temple and the finds within, there were a number of other indications that Egyptians may have been resident at the site. Near the gate of the town, for example, archaeologists discovered a bronze element that bore the cartouche of Ramesses III and may once have decorated the town gate. Several lamp and bowl deposits were also excavated from IA IA contexts at Lachish. Moreover, archaeologists were particularly excited to discover two naturalistic anthropoid clay coffins at the site—especially as one of them still bore a few rather inept painted scenes and hieroglyphs. A depiction of Isis and Nephthys adorned this coffin as well as a badly bungled hieroglyphic inscription, which apparently represented an attempt to imitate Egyptian funerary prayers. Like anthropoid clay coffins elsewhere, those at Lachish appeared to be manufactured locally, but the design features were without a doubt Egyptian in style.

Of primary importance for establishing the on-site presence of Egyptians, however, were the four hieratic tax bowls recovered from Lachish, which were nearly identical in form to the votive bowls found on the floor of the mound temple. While three of these bowls had been recovered from a secondary fill, a fourth hailed from an area near the temple precinct. Of these bowls, one was inscribed with three separate hieratic texts dating to “regnal year 4.” All three of these inscriptions refer to quantities of wheat (swe), and in each
case, although the units are not specified, the quantities are above 1,000.

The first and best preserved of these three texts also mentions the harvest tax (šmēw), a tax exacted upon Egyptians in Egypt and apparently also upon Canaanites in Canaan. Reference in the same inscription to a “ruler of Latish” may indicate that the donor was in fact himself Lachish’s ruler. The other bowls are badly broken but bear fragments of text such as ḥrw pn (“this day”), šš (“scribe”), and mpt-sp 10 (+) (“regnal year 10 [+]).”\textsuperscript{241} As discussed above, it is thought that these bowls would have been filled with token amounts of the wheat brought in as taxes and then have been presented by the taxpayer as an offering in the temple itself. Indeed, Goldwasser has even suggested that such a practice may account for the high concentration of wheat discovered on the floor of the main hall of the mound temple.\textsuperscript{242}

Due to the combined evidence of the hieratic votive bowls, the Egyptian-style temple, the anthropoid coffins, the bronze element bearing Ramesses III’s cartouche, and the sundry other Egyptian-style artifacts discovered in Level VI at Lachish, many scholars have concluded that an Egyptian garrison occupied the site in the first half of the Twentieth Dynasty.\textsuperscript{243} Although no administrative headquarters has yet been discovered from this period, it is not improbable that one existed. The same cannot be said of Nineteenth Dynasty levels at Lachish, however, despite the numerous Egyptian-style objects discovered in the fosse temple.

Like many of the Egyptian bases in Syria-Palestine, Lachish suffered a fiery destruction in the mid-twelfth century. Although the mound temple may have been looted prior to the onset of this blaze, the charred remains of a woman and her three children—found pinned under the burnt rubble—suggests that the attack took at least some of the town’s residents by surprise. As is typical, however, it is not known whether the base was torched in a Canaanite uprising or in


\textsuperscript{242} Goldwasser 1984: 85, see also Ussishkin 1978: 21.

an outside attack. Following this all-consuming conflagration, however, Lachish lay barren until around the tenth century B.C.244

Possible Twentieth Dynasty base: Megiddo
The evidence for an Egyptian headquarters at Megiddo is admittedly far more tenuous than that assembled for either Deir el-Balah or Lachish, but it is nonetheless interesting. In Twentieth Dynasty levels at the site, archaeologists discovered two important Egyptian-style items: an ivory pen case and a bronze base for a statue of Ramesses VI.245 The former depicts a pharaoh kneeling in adoration before Amun and bears a dedication to a “royal messenger to every foreign land and stable-master” (wptyt nsw r h3st nb hry ith).246 Caution should be used in extrapolating too much from a personal item belonging to a royal messenger, however, as these officials often served as diplomatic envoys to local rulers, and in any case by definition their presence in a given area was frequently transitory. The base for the statue of Ramesses VI, however, is potentially a much more indicative object. At Beth Shan, for instance, a statue of Ramesses III had been erected and presumably served as the center of a statue cult. Yet, still, it is not entirely clear that the presence of the statue at Megiddo signified Egypt’s direct political control over the town rather than, for example, a simple self-aggrandizing gift imparted by the king to one of his vassals.

On the basis of these two artifacts, as equivocal as they are, Singer has argued for the presence of an Egyptian base at Megiddo in the Twentieth Dynasty.247 While the IA IA town did indeed produce some evidence for Egyptian-style ceramic,248 luxury goods,249 and a

246 The titles and even the name of this imperial functionary, however, have been debated. Wilson (in Loud 1939: 11–2, pl. 62) restored the additional titles hry pdt n nb tsy tmy-r h3swt, or “troop commander of the lord of the two lands and overseer of foreign countries.” As very few signs are preserved, however, the reconstruction is extremely tentative. The last and only preserved element of the official’s name, ms, has led Ward to suggest that he should be equated with Djehutymes, the father of the resident official at Beth Shan. This is, however, also highly tentative (Ward in James 1966: 175; see Higginbotham 2000: 67–68).
249 These consist largely of alabaster and faience vessels; see Higginbotham 2000: 112–113.
possible attempt at mummification,\(^{250}\) this material culture still cannot provide definitive proof for an Egyptian residence at the site.\(^{251}\) Whether occupied or not, however, Megiddo shared the same calamitous fate as the majority of Egyptian bases, suffering a fierce destruction in or around the reign of Ramesses VI.\(^{252}\)

**Dubiously assigned Egyptian bases: Tel Mor, Tell Jemmeh, and Tell Masos**

In the Nineteenth Dynasty, the Egyptians constructed a fortified storehouse or residency at Tel Mor, the site that served as the official harbor for their base at Ashdod. Following the destruction of both towns at the turn of the Late Bronze Age, however, the Egyptians abandoned Ashdod, and a smaller building was constructed at Tel Mor over the ruins of the old. As of yet, this structure has been published only in summary form, and no plan is available.

At only 11 m to a side, the second fort at Tel Mor was significantly smaller than its predecessor. Despite its diminutive size, however, the outer wall of the building measured some 4 m in thickness. Even considering that the fort appears to have been two stories in height, its walls were still far thicker than was structurally necessary. Internally the fort was also anomalous, given that its first story consisted solely of two small chambers and a ramp whereby the second story was accessed.\(^{253}\) Among the artifacts discovered in association with this odd building were scarabs, Egyptian vessels, and local pottery that imitated Egyptian styles.\(^{254}\)

Although numerous scholars have suggested that the Egyptians built and occupied this structure in the Twentieth Dynasty,\(^{255}\) this

\(^{250}\) Two skeletons discovered in Cave 911 had been coated in a “white lime-like substance.” Scholars have interpreted this treatment as another local attempt to simulate mummification, especially given that many of the objects included in this tomb were Egyptian in style (Guy 1938: 28–32; T. Dothan 1973: 140; Gonen 1992b: 45–46).


\(^{252}\) Scholars differ as to whether the statue base, discovered out of situ, would have pre- or postdated the destruction level; see Dothan 1982a: 295; Liebowitz 1987: 19, n. 3; Fritz 1987: 88; 1995: 31; Finkelstein 1996a: 171–172. One can hardly imagine, however, that a statue to Ramesses VI would or could have been erected following such a profound destruction.


\(^{255}\) M. Dothan 1977a: 890; 1981: 82; 1993b: 1074; T. Dothan 1982a: 43; 1985:
conclusion appears somewhat dubious. There is no evidence, for example, that the Egyptians occupied Ashdod in the Twentieth Dynasty, which one might expect given the intimate association of the two towns (see chapter five). Architecturally, the fort has no close Egyptian parallels. Further, it appears that the character of Tel Mor had changed dramatically in the Iron Age and that the top of the tell was now also occupied by houses and facilities for bronze-working. Finally, unlike the majority of the securely attested Egyptian bases in Canaan, Tel Mor appears to have passed peaceably into the hands of the Philistines in the mid-twelfth century.256 Given these concerns, the attribution of this base to the Egyptians would appear tentative at best.257

Tell Jemmeh and Tell Masos have also been occasionally designated as Egyptian-style headquarters,258 although there is in fact very little evidence to justify these conclusions. The preserved architecture of the “residency” at Tell Jemmeh does not particularly resemble other known Egyptian buildings, even as Oren has reconstructed it.259 Likewise, the Egyptian-style artifacts discovered at the site were limited to three saucer bowls, a razor, a knife, and scarabs.260 At Tell Masos the evidence for an Egyptian occupation consists solely of two flowerpots and a scarab.261 Likewise, while the “residency” does bear some affinities to Egyptian architecture, it also resembles the four-room houses that were extremely common at the site.262

257 Scholars who doubt that the Egyptians constructed this building include Weinstein 1992: 145 and Higginbotham 2000: 114.
259 See Petrie 1928: pl. VI; Oren 1984: fig. 2.
Overview of Egyptian interactions with Libya

Historical summary

In the fifth year of Merneptah, the Egyptians were faced with the necessity of combating an organized Libyan invasion undertaken in conjunction with a confederation of Sea People. While an Egyptian victory seems to have stemmed the Libyan tide for a few decades, trouble brewed again in the fifth year of Ramesses III. The record of this contest is inscribed upon the walls of Medinet Habu, and amidst the bombastic rhetoric it is possible to glean a few salient facts.

It seems that Ramesses III had imposed upon the Tjehenu-Libyans a ruler of his own choosing. He describes this individual as “a youngster of the land of the Tjehenu, a child aided by his strong arms” who was “appointed to be a leader for them, to supervise their land” (KRI V, 23: 2–3). Although the Libu, Seped, and Meshwesh all took part in the conflict that followed, it is unclear whether the young ruler had been appointed over all of them or solely over a single group that subsequently enlisted the others as allies.263

Whether or not the Libyans had in fact “begged a leader” (KRI V, 22: 15) from Ramesses III, the child he installed was evidently not to their liking. The rejection of this newly appointed puppet-leader, then, constituted an act of insurrection according to Egyptian policy. After consulting the oracle of Amun at Thebes, Ramesses III engaged the Libyan forces in a heated battle from which he states that he emerged victorious.

Following the conflict, in which enemy corpses were supposedly “made into pyramids” (KRI V, 23: 10),264 Libu and Meshwesh

263 O’Connor 1990: 76. At one point in the inscription, the Libyans are credited with remembering five of their own leaders who had fought against Egypt in the past and failed (KRI V, 24: 14–15). It is possible, then, that these distinct groups had a long tradition of uniting under a single leader, although such unions may also have been a wartime phenomenon (O’Connor 1990: 68). If the three groups indeed all came from the otherwise unknown “land of Burer” (KRI V, 22: 13), as the inscription implies, however, their unification under a single leader would not be hard to understand. Interestingly, no Sea People are among the Libyan allies in the wars of year 5 or year 11. Reliefs at Medinet Habu, however, depict Sea People mercenaries fighting on the side of the Egyptians (Medinet Habu 1930: pl. 62; Kadry 1982: 177; Sandars 1985: 119).

264 While the numbers of the dead amount to tens of thousands in the two sources that provide totals (KRI V, 15: 12–14; 18: 8–15), these lists unfortunately contain
prisoners were rounded up along with the hands and phalli of the dead at a fortress called “the town (dmi) of Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemeh” (KRI V, 14: 13—see figure 61). Although the location of the fortress is not stated, it was likely situated either along the western fringe of the Delta or on the coastal road to Libya. As discussed in chapter five, these are the two areas in which Ramesses II actively poured resources into preexisting towns and erected new mnnw-fortresses. After the surviving prisoners were registered, texts indicate that they were settled into Egyptian nḥtw-strongholds (KRI V, 24: 1–3; 91: 5–7; P. Harris I, 77: 3–6).

If the Libyans were dissatisfied with the ruler appointed over them at the time of the First Libyan War, they found a strong leader of their own some six years later. In Ramesses III’s eleventh year, a Meshwesh ruler named Meshesher launched an attack on Libyan territories located between his homeland and Egypt (KRI V, 60: 6–8). After conquering and inflicting great damage upon these more easterly Libyans, he may have incorporated them into his army. Certainly, when he set his sights on Egypt, he apparently commanded contingents from the Libu and five additional tribes (P. Harris I, 77: 3). The record of the battle implies that at least some of these allied peoples possessed leaders (wrw) of their own who served under the ultimate authority of Meshesher (KRI V, 45: 8).

P. Harris I (76: 11–77: 2) describes the large-scale infiltration of Libyans into the western Delta, a process that despite Egyptian efforts apparently had been continuing since the Nineteenth Dynasty, if not before. Meshesher’s invasion would simply have been the latest occurrence in an on-going process. The Egyptians, however, decided to take definitive action against this force and met them in battle in the vicinity of two of the fortresses-towns erected on the highway to Libya (KRI V, 43: 9–11; 50: 4—see figure 62). Incidentally, these fortress-towns were the very same bases to which Merneptah had earlier pursued his own Libyan foe (KRI IV, 8: 3–4; 22: 3–4).

According to Egyptian sources, this clash resulted in the deaths of more than 2,000 Libyans and in the netting of much booty in numerous and quite marked discrepancies (Faulkner 1980: 242; O’Connor 1990: 42–43).

265 Given the high numbers of women, children, and animals enumerated in the Egyptian booty lists, it would appear that Meshesher and his followers had intended to settle permanently in the Delta (O’Connor 1982: 923).
the way of cattle, horses, donkeys, goats, and sheep (KRI V, 54: 1–8). Of the 2,052 Libyans taken captive after the battle, however, the most prestigious by far was Meshesher himself, and the Egyptians also captured and killed Meshesher’s father together with his army when the older man came to plead for the life of his son (KRI V, 70: 4–12). Ramesses III commemorated this victory in the name of a herd of cattle that he donated to the cult of Amun (“Usermaatre-is-the-slayer-of-the-Meshwesh—P. Harris I, List B, 10: 8) and by means of the institution of a lavish new feast called “Slaying-of-the-Meshwesh” (KRI V, 173: 14).

For the remainder of the Twentieth Dynasty very little is known about Egypto-Libyan interactions. Libyans apparently threatened the Theban area in the 28th regnal year of Ramesses III and again under Ramesses VI, IX, and XI. Likewise, a punitive action against Libyans in the first regnal year of Ramesses VI may have been the occasion for a triumph scene and a special statue at Karnak. Finally, a document from Ramesses XI’s reign suggests that Meshwesh were at that time causing alarm in the Delta region.

By the late Twentieth Dynasty, however, many acculturated Libyans had ascended to respected positions in Egyptian society. Indeed, one of the most powerful officials of this time, Herihor, appears to have been of Libyan descent. During his tenure as high priest, this man obtained a level of power that rivaled or even exceeded that held by the king himself. Indeed, Herihor and his family no doubt helped pave the way for a pharaonic dynasty of Libyan origin that would come to command all of Egypt less than a century later.

Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for Twentieth Dynasty western fortress-towns

Textual evidence from the reign of Ramesses III demonstrates that at least three of the fortresses that had most likely been erected under

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266 It is the precise and even anecdotal character of the descriptions of the Libyan conflicts that has led Cifola (1991: 51) to argue that, whereas the narration of the Sea People battles may have been conflated from numerous smaller conflicts, the Libyan battles represented distinct historical events.
267 See P. Harris I, 57: 12–13; Kitchen 1990: 22; and the references cited in Richardson 1999: 150, n. 10.
Ramesses II still aided in the effort to protect Egypt from Libyan invaders. These fortresses, all termed dmi-towns, were designated as Usermaatre-Meryamon-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu; House-of-sand; and the town of Usermaatre-Meryamon (alternately, Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis), which is upon the mountain of the Beginning-of-the-land. It is not unlikely, however, that the latter two fortress-towns also possessed formal names akin to the first.

Unusually, artistic representations exist for all three fortresses, as these were carved on the walls of Medinet Habu to illustrate key events in the battles and their aftermath. Usermaatre-Meryamon-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu is depicted much like the dmi-towns that guarded the Ways of Horus in the reign of Seti I (compare figure 61 with figure 32). According to the representation, the settlement should literally have consisted of an inner citadel surrounded by an enclosure wall. In reality, however, the fort-within-a-fort motif is likely to have been intended by the artists as a generic signifier for Egyptian outposts of significant size.

The other two Libyan dmiw (see figure 62), on the other hand, resembled the single-tiered buildings designated as migdols, nhtw-strongholds, or bhn-buildings on the Ways of Horus relief. If the artists had utilized their tropes consistently, then, these two Libyan forts may have been square structures, with enclosure walls measuring some 40 to 50 m each, and with a central plaza but no inner citadels—akin to the excavated way stations at Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A–289. As discussed in chapter five, however, the words mnnw (“fortress-town”) and dmi (“town”) were occasionally employed as synonyms in the New Kingdom. Quite possibly, then, the artists—who almost assuredly had never seen the Libyan dmiw—in fact utilized an inappropriate icon to represent the two fortress-towns.

Unfortunately, it is also not possible to determine exactly where these fortified structures would have been located, as no excavated Libyan fortresses have yielded material evidence that can be specifically dated to Ramesses III. Given the desert setting of the reliefs and a few smatterings of textual hints, however, it would appear most likely that these battles had been fought on the coastal road to Libya rather than along the western edge of the Delta. Such a coastal milieu might also explain the 84 km that is said to have separated the House-of-sand from the Beginning-of-the-land. This is approximately the same distance that separates El-Barnugi from El-Gharbaniyat and El-Gharbaniyat from El-Alamein. Given its name, one would
expect the Beginning-of-the-land to have been situated near the westernmost extent of Egyptian-held territory.

Textual References to Twentieth Dynasty Western Fortress-Towns

Reign of Ramesses III

1. [. . .]n pr-‘3 ’nh w∆3 snb n šrw n rbw m-b3h dmi wsr-m3’t-r’ mry-

imn šsf ūmh (Caption on a scene at Medinet Habu; Medinet Habu
1, pl. 22—KRI V, 14: 13)

...of Pharaoh, l.p.h., the fallen ones of Libu in front of the town
Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu.

After the Egyptian victory over the coalition of the Libu, Meshwesh, and Seped in year five of Ramesses III’s reign, victory was celebrated in the vicinity of a dmi-town. Although towns designated as dmiw in Egypt and abroad were not necessarily, nor even frequently, military installations, two factors suggest that this dmi had been erected for strategic purposes. First, Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu is exactly the type of aggressive and functional name that the Egyptians frequently applied to fortresses. Second, this dmi-town is unambiguously depicted as a fortress—with crenellations and all—in the Medinet Habu reliefs (see figure 61).

For the purposes of this study, it is important that unlike the other fortified buildings depicted in Ramesses III’s reliefs, this dmi had two tiers. The Egyptians utilized this type of representation as artistic shorthand to designate the presence of both an outer enclosure wall and an inner citadel. It would appear likely, however, that such elaborate fortifications were rarely intended to be interpreted literally. Archaeological excavations have revealed that very few of the two-tiered Syro-Palestinian dmi portrayed in battle reliefs in fact possessed both inner and outer enclosures. While such towns were common in the Hyksos period, the New Kingdom Egyptians did not encourage—and perhaps even explicitly forbade—the construction of walls in the towns of their vassals.\(^\text{271}\) The image of the two-tiered fortress, then, must have been primarily utilized to signify a town of substantial size, regardless of whether its fortifications in actuality conformed to the type depicted.

As discussed in chapter five, it is remarkable that in Seti I’s Ways of Horus relief at Karnak the two-tiered way stations are uniformly designated as *dmỉ*-towns, while the single-tiered buildings are labeled with different architectural terms.\(^{272}\) Whether erected by Ramesses III or by Ramesses II in the latter’s concerted program of fortress construction, this Libyan *dmỉ*-town would very likely have been structurally similar to the *dmỉ*-towns erected along the Ways of Horus. Further, it would surely have served the same purpose of safeguarding food supplies and a water source, as well as protecting the route to the Delta from unauthorized intruders.

Unfortunately, however, the *dmỉ*-town of Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu cannot be located. While it was in all likelihood erected on the coastal road to Libya, as there are indications that the battle may have been fought west of the Delta,\(^ {273}\) the description of the battle itself is vague enough to prohibit localization. Moreover, excavation in the Libyan fortresses has been extremely limited to date, and while it is likely that at least a few of these installations remained manned in the reign of Ramesses III, specific evidence to this effect has not been forthcoming.

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2a. *p3 [smi r n ḫm.f m p3 ḫftyw n] p3 t3 [n mš]wš i.ii r kmt š3’ m r’s-ms-[s ḫk3 iwnw p3 dmi n ty ḫr p3 [dw] n wp-t3 [r] dmi ḫw[t-š]’ ir[w].n itrw 8 [n] w[t-w’] im.sn* (Caption of the battle reliefs at Medinet Habu; KRI V, 43: 9–10)

The slaughter that his majesty made among the enemy of the land of the Meshwesh, who came to Egypt, beginning from Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, the town which is upon the mountain of Beginning-of-the-land to the town House-of-sa, 8 iters of carnage having been made among them.

2b. *p3 s[m3 r n ḫm.f m n3 ḫrw n p3 t3 n mšwš i.]iw r kmt š3’ m dmi ḫw[t-s]’ r wsr-mš’t-r’ mry-imn p3 dmi nty ḫr p3 [dw n wp-t3 ir[w].n itrw 8 w[t-w’] im.sn* (Caption of the battle reliefs at Medinet Habu; KRI V, 50: 3–4)

The slaughter that his majesty made among the foes of the land of the Meshwesh who] came to Egypt, beginning from the town of House-

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\(^{272}\) While one double-tiered building is mislabeled as a *kḥmnt*-well, I have argued in chapter five that a simple adjustment to compensate for the mislabeling results in this building being designated as a *dmỉ* as well.

\(^{273}\) The text of the battle mentions the god Amun having opened the roads of the land of Tjemhu before the Egyptians (KRI V, 13: 3); see O’Connor 1990: 36.
Figure 61. Town of Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu
(after Medinet Habu I, pl. 22)
of-sand to Usermaatre Meryamun, the town which is upon the mountain of Beginning-of-the-land, 8 iters of carnage having been made among them.

2c. [r’s-ms-hḫȝ3 iwnw pȝ3 dmi nty] ḫȝ pȝ3 [dw n wp-tȝ3] (Caption over one fortress in Medinet Habu battle reliefs; KRI V, 43: 11)

[Ramesses, Ruler of Heliopolis, the town which] is upon the [mountain of Beginning-of-the-land]

2d. dmi ḫwt-š (Caption over one fortress in Medinet Habu battle reliefs; KRI V, 43: 11)

The town House-of-Sand

Both Merneptah in his fifth year and Ramesses III in his eleventh year pursued their Libyan foes to a place called the mountain of Wep-ta, or the “Beginning-of-the-land.” There are two indications that this town may have been situated at or near the westernmost outpost of Egyptian control along the coastal road to Libya. First, the farthest limit of Egyptian settlement would have constituted a fitting end-point for the pursuit of both pharaohs. Second, the toponym wp-tȝ3 was also employed in Nubia to signify its farthest-flung border, i.e., the beginning of [Egyptian] land. 274

If this Libyan town had indeed been situated in the vicinity of an especially high point (dw), as the inscriptions indicate, it is probable that archaeological survey in this border area may eventually pinpoint its location. 275 The proper placement of House-of-sand is likewise unknown. A much later text, however, suggests that the town was situated west of the Delta, 276 a locale that its name and context also imply.

As at the dmi-town of Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu, the battle reliefs with which Ramesses III decorated the walls of Medinet Habu make it quite clear that the dmiw of Beginning-of-the-land and House-of-sand were fortified installations (see figure 62). The relief of the conflict in year eleven illustrates two seemingly

275 Although surveys have thus far discovered no surface evidence of New Kingdom activity, the site of Khashm el-Eish (“Beginning of Plenty”), located 23 km to the southeast of El-Alamein, is described as having been sited on a topographical high point that boasted a good view of the desert to the west (De Cosson 1935: 120).
276 Gardiner 1918: 135; O’Connor 1982: 921.
identical fortresses, both of which appear to have been located in the thick of battle. Indeed Egyptian archers, situated upon the battlements of these structures, are depicted in the act of firing missiles directly into the ensuing melee below.

According to the reliefs, the fortresses themselves were single-tiered structures with corner battlements, not unlike the single-tiered way stations depicted along the Ways of Horus military highway. On analogy to Seti’s relief, however, one would have expected that Ramesses III’s forts should have been designated as migdols, nhtw-strongholds, or bhn-buildings. Instead, the labels inscribed upon the installations and the captions to the battle scene clearly identify them as dmiw.

It is likely that Ramesses III’s dmiw should be identified with the upper towns of the desert (n3 dmiw hryw n h3st—KRI IV, 8: 3–4) amongst which the Beginning-of-the-land was located in Merneptah’s Libyan battle. Although the Medinet Habu relief depicts the forts side by side, a distance of some 8 iters, or roughly 84 km,277 is said to have lain between the two. Perhaps significantly, roughly 80 km also separates El-Barnugi, the last of the Delta towns that Ramesses II is thought to have fortified against the Libyans, from his coastal fortress at El-Gharbaniyat. Likewise, nearly the same distance bridged the gap between El-Gharbaniyat and El-Alamein’s fortress.278 Although it is possible, or perhaps even probable, that other undiscovered forts or way stations were interspersed amidst these fortress-towns, it is nonetheless striking that the spacing of the archaeologically attested fortifications is nearly identical to that specified in Ramesses III’s text.

OVERVIEW OF EGYPTIAN INTERACTIONS WITH NUBIA

Historical summary

While a stele from the Upper Nubian site of Amara West has been dated to the brief reign of Sethnakht,279 the bulk of evidence for Twentieth Dynasty activity in Nubia dates to the reign of his son,

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277 An itr is roughly 10.5 km (Spalinger 1985a: 4; Gardiner 1988: 199, no. 266).
278 See chapter five.
279 Fairman 1939: 143.
Figure 62. Towns of House-of-Sand and Beginning-of-the-Land
(after Medinet Habu II, pl. 70)
Ramesses III. Ramesses’ involvement in Nubian affairs has often been belittled, due to the rather generalized nature of his Medinet Habu Nubian war scenes\(^{280}\) and the fact that his topographical lists appear to have been largely plagiarized from those of earlier rulers.\(^{281}\) As Kitchen has pointed out, however, a Deir el-Medina stele mentions a conflict with the Nubians of Tirawa and Irem that resulted in the capture of enemy soldiers (KRI V, 91: 8–10). Further, it is possible that at least some of these prisoners of war may subsequently have been donated to Theban and Memphite temples (P. Harris I, 10: 15; 51a: 9). Booty from the land of Nubia is also mentioned in Ramesses III’s Medinet Habu festival calendar.\(^{282}\)

Such a warlike encounter with the Nubians of Tirawa and Irem, if it did take place, may have been of relatively minor importance. Indeed, the battle is ignored altogether in P. Harris I’s summary of Ramesses III’s victories. This seeming slight, however, could also have been due to the fact that Ramesses, in all likelihood, did not personally take part in the battle.

If his martial activities in Nubia were minor, Ramesses III’s civil projects on his southern frontier were only a shade more impressive. Numerous blocks bearing his cartouche were discovered at Elephantine, suggesting that Ramesses had added to the temple there. Contemporary inscriptions and cartouches are likewise evidenced at Kubban, Buhen, Semna, and Soleb, although it does not appear that major work was undertaken at any of these sites.\(^{283}\) Inscribed columns and other architectural fragments suggest, however, that more substantial refurbishment occurred at the Nineteenth Dynasty capital of Amara West.\(^{284}\)

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280 Emery 1965: 204; Gaballa 1976: 120; Faulkner 1980: 244. The resemblance of these scenes to those depicted by Ramesses II on the walls of Beit el-Wali, Derr, and Abu Simbel has also been remarked upon (Edgerton and Wilson 1936: 2–3; Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 173–174). See O’Connor (1987b: 132), however, who notes that important discrepancies—such as the appearance of Sea People mercenaries—serve to set Ramesses III’s battle scenes apart from those of his namesake.


283 For Elephantine, see Habachi 1975b: 1221. For Kubban, see Porter and Moss VII: 83–84. For Buhen, see KRI V, 2: 14; MacIver and Woolley 1911a: 17; Habachi 1975a: 882. For Semna, see Porter and Moss VII: 145; Emery 1965: 204. For Soleb, see Porter and Moss VII: 171.

284 Porter and Moss VII: 161, 163; Fairman 1939: 141, 143; 1975: 172; Spencer
Indeed, Grandet has suggested that the name of this town may have changed to “House of Ramesses, Ruler of Thebes” under Ramesses III’s patronage. Further, he posits that Amara West was likely included among the nine Syro-Palestinian and Kushite towns dedicated to the god Amun in P. Harris I, List A, 11: 11.  

Despite the relatively short reigns of Ramesses IV and Ramesses V, contemporary evidence for occupation in Nubia is attested for both. The names and titles of Ramesses IV were carved at Aniba, Buhen, Gerf Husein, and Kawa. Inscriptions discovered at Dorginarti, on the other hand, were likely imported to the site at a later date. Understandably little is preserved for the five-year reign of Ramesses V. This king’s cartouche was discovered at Buhen, and P. Turin (1887, rt. 1: 1–3) records that in his reign a priest from Elephantine illegally sold an offspring of a Mnevis bull to Medjay stationed at Bigeh. Although a military colony of Nubians is attested in Middle Egypt (P. Wilbour A–45, 24) under Ramesses V, however, the existence of this colony was in all likelihood an artifact of Egypt’s more martial past.

Whether or not the seat of the deputy of Lower Nubia (idnw n w3m3št) had been located at Aksha in the Nineteenth Dynasty, it moved in the Twentieth Dynasty to the old fortress-town of Aniba, where an idnw named Pen-niwt chose to be buried. The texts in Pen-niwt’s tomb are particularly informative for they provide the information that the deputy had erected a statue of Ramesses VI in the temple at Derr. Moreover, the king had apparently rewarded Pen-niwt with two silver vessels—both for fashioning the statue and also for delivering to him Nubian and Akuyutian captives (KRI VI, 353: 4–7).
According to the texts, the statue of Ramesses VI was provided in perpetuity with the proceeds of five modest plots of Pen-niwt’s own land (KRI VI: 350: 13–351: 15). Interestingly, judging from references to neighboring fields that belonged to Nefertari and the king, Pen-niwt’s holdings appear to have been located in an area that was largely royally owned. Aside from his office as deputy, Pen-niwt also held positions of authority with regard to the local quarry and the temple of Horus of Miam. The relatives of the deputy likewise were important administrators, filling posts such as “mayor,” “treasurer,” and “scribe.”

Farther to the south, Ramesses VI’s viceroy of Kush, Ramesses-nakht, left inscriptions at Buhen, Semna, and the seat of the Upper Egyptian deputy at Amara West. It is tempting to read signs of impending trouble, however, in the inscriptions of a troop commander (ḥry pdl), overseer of foreign countries (imy-r ḫ3st), and overseer of garrison troops (imy-r iw3yt) discovered at the remote town of Kawa in Upper Egypt. Kawa’s main strategic value was its location opposite the overland route to Napata. The possible installation of a garrison in this area, then, causes speculation as to whether this route had recently become unsafe. Certainly, a cartouche of Ramesses VII on a shabti at Kawa constitutes not only the final bit of evidence for Egyptian presence at that site but also the sole attestation of Ramesses VII yet discovered in Nubia.

Although there is comparatively little evidence for Egyptian construction activity during the nearly twenty-year reign of Ramesses IX, a letter sent from the high priest of Amun-re to assorted Nubians of Akuyuta refers to gold-washing activities accomplished under their protection and to efforts on the part of the Egyptian government to protect the mining industry from aggressive Red Sea bedouin (KRI VI, 519: 12–522: 11). Other inscriptions from the reign of Ramesses

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290 For discussions of Pen-niwt, see Breasted AR IV: 231; Emery 1965: 205–206; Kemp 1978: 30. See also Porter and Moss VII: 76.
291 For Buhen, see Porter and Moss VII: 135. For Semna, see Porter and Moss VII: 151. For Amara, West, see Fairman 1938: 155; 1939: 140; 1975: 172; Porter and Moss VII: 159, 161.
IX attest to the fact that while the Egyptians had at this time completely withdrawn from their Syro-Palestinian territories, they were still active in Upper and Lower Nubia. Such evidence includes an inscription at Buhen invoking Ramesses IX as a god, a cartouche and a statuette at Napata, and numerous inscriptions at the temple of Amara West.\textsuperscript{295} It is remarkable, however, that following the reign of Ramesses IX evidence for Egyptian activity in Upper Nubia utterly ceases.

Ramesses X’s activities appear to have been restricted to Lower Nubia and to two sites in particular. At Kubban, which had always been important with respect to the gold-working industry, Ramesses X constructed a temple to Horus of Baki. His inscriptions have also been discovered at Aniba in the temple to Horus of Miam.\textsuperscript{296}

The final and inglorious end to Egypt’s Nubian empire came in the reign of Ramesses XI, the last pharaoh of the New Kingdom. Cartouches of Ramesses XI and inscriptions of his viceroy Panehesy (literally “the Nubian”) have been discovered at Buhen.\textsuperscript{297} Relatively early in his reign, however, Ramesses XI apparently summoned Panehesy to Thebes in order to help quell an insurrection fomented by a renegade high priest of Amun. Panehesy stayed in Thebes after the situation had been successfully resolved, but between years 17 and 19 he too found himself branded a criminal. It is not known whether this had anything directly to do with the accession of Herihor to the position of high priest shortly before year 19. Given the tremendous amounts of power held by both men and the fact that Herihor’s forces soon thereafter launched an attack on Panehesy, however, this option is certainly an attractive one.

Herihor’s son Piankh drove Panehesy and his forces back into Nubia, and the Thebans proceeded to spend nearly ten years striving to wrest control of Nubia back from the former viceroy. Such an undertaking must have been extremely costly at a time when Egypt itself was not only politically fragmented but also wracked with famine and corruption. Nonetheless, the lure of the Nubian gold

\textsuperscript{295} For Buhen, see H. S. Smith 1976: 97. For Napata, see Reisner 1931: 81. For Amara West, see Fairman 1938: 155; 1939: 141–142; Porter and Moss VII: 159, 161; Spencer 1997: 220.
\textsuperscript{296} For Kubban, see Porter and Moss VII: 82; Säve-Söderbergh 1941: 192; Arkell 1966: 101; Donadoni 1984: 52. For Aniba, see Säve-Söderbergh 1975: 274.
\textsuperscript{297} MacIver and Woolley 1911a: 86; Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 4.
mines must have been strong, for not only were some of the workers on the royal tombs at Thebes drafted to the army at this point, but those that remained behind were set to fashioning metal weapons instead of artisan’s tools.298 These efforts, however, were patently unsuccessful, for at the end of his life Panehesy was accorded an honorable burial at Aniba.299 Following this episode, Egypto-Nubian relations appear to have lapsed until the ascension to power of Kushite kings in the Twenty-fifth Dynasty.

The situation in Twentieth Dynasty Nubia is a slightly puzzling one. The impoverishment and seeming depopulation of the Lower Nubian countryside, already notable in the Nineteenth Dynasty, continued to the point where Adams has claimed that only one Twentieth Dynasty grave can be securely identified in all of Nubia.300 Despite this apparent depopulation, however, inscriptional evidence clearly illustrates that Twentieth Dynasty officials were active in the region and that both farming and mining activities continued to be undertaken.

It seems likely, then, that a somewhat diminished Egyptian and Nubian population continued to inhabit the Nile Valley until the reign of Ramesses XI, when ten years of war and perhaps also a worsening ecological situation301 caused the area to be largely abandoned. The archaeological invisibility of the inhabitants of Nubia prior to this time, however, must still be addressed. Proposed explanations include a demographic shift toward urban centers, a mortuary preference for mass burial, an increasing impoverishment of the population, and a difficulty in distinguishing specifically “Twentieth Dynasty” material culture.302

Summary of the textual and archaeological evidence for Twentieth Dynasty southern fortress-towns

Archaeological and textual data from the Twentieth Dynasty assume complementary functions in fleshing out our understanding of this

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298 For discussions of this period, see Bierbrier 1982: 661–662; Morkot 1987: 38–39; O’Connor 1989: 268; Hornung 1999: 123
301 Adams 1984b: 63.
period. For instance, archaeologists have yet to excavate the $htm$-fortresses of Bigeh or Elephantine, but inscriptional evidence leads us to believe that both continued to thrive. While the evidence regarding Elephantine is primarily concerned with the (often wayward) priests of the temple of Khnum, more secular personnel are attested at Bigeh. An overseer of a $htm$-fortress ($imy-r htm$) continued to command this border station, while Medjay-scouts served within it. A scribe of the $htm$-fortress, who had the power to requisition goods from Egypt proper, was also based at either Elephantine or Bigeh. Considering the amount of records such posts must have generated, however, it is likely that this official had numerous colleagues with whom he was very familiar at the first cataract. Certainly, the sale of the Mnevis bull’s calf and other documents indicate that the inhabitants of the two border fortresses interacted both socially and commercially with one another on a regular basis.

With regard to fortresses-towns farther south, P. Harris I provides the information that an unspecified number of towns in Nubia had been donated to the god Amun at Karnak. Temple-centered fortress-towns such as Amara West and Napata continued to flourish until well into the reign of Ramesses IX. It is not unlikely that these towns, at which cults to Amun were already established, formed the bulk of Amun’s property in Nubia, but this is, of course, not certain. Amun was the focus of numerous Nubian cults, and while temples to Amun were indeed often located within fortress-towns, they also not infrequently served as the core of relatively isolated settlements. Further, given that Egyptian temples commonly owned property in Nubia, there may not be any reason to suppose that the towns listed in P. Harris I necessarily possessed a temple to Amun at all.

Archaeological evidence indicates that the fortress-towns in Upper Nubia may have been quite deliberately abandoned sometime around the reign of Ramesses IX as part of an organized Egyptian withdrawal from its southernmost territories. Such a withdrawal may have been prompted by threats from growing indigenous powers. Of such entities, however, we have scant evidence. A more probable

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303 If, indeed, the entire island of Elephantine was regarded as the $htm$-fortress, this statement is not entirely correct. Purely administrative New Kingdom buildings, however, have yet to be discovered on the island.
scenario, then, might be that in its weakened state, Egypt simply
could no longer afford to invest personnel and resources in the con-
tinued well-being of its Upper Nubian towns. If a withdrawal of
Egyptian support caused the total abandonment of these settlements,
however, it might indicate that such installations were considerably
less self-sufficient than is generally supposed.

In Lower Nubia, many fortress-towns appear to have been occu-
pied until the reign of Ramesses XI. Indeed, the fact that a draftee
invoked the Horus-gods of Baki and Miam in letters he sent home
may imply that the fortresses of Kubban and Aniba played a part
in the late Twentieth Dynasty theater of war. Moreover, archaeo-
logical indications of a contemporaneous conflagration at Buhen
would seem to indicate that fighting was fierce and that at least some
Egyptian settlements suffered heavy damage. Whether as a result of
the wreckage and hardship inflicted by this long war or due to eco-
logical causes, Lower Nubia would languish for centuries after the
close of the New Kingdom before recovering its status as a vibrant
population center.

**Textual References to Twentieth Dynasty Southern Fortress-Towns**

*Reign of Ramesses III*

1. dmiw n ḫ3rw kš 9 (P. Harris I, List A, 11: 11)

   **Towns of Kharu (and) Kush 9**

Among the long list of people, animals, land, and property donated
by Ramesses III in his reign to the cult of Amun were nine towns
(dmiw) of Syria-Palestine and Nubia. Just how these towns were dis-
tributed on the two frontiers, however, is unknown. As discussed
above, it is notable that in the summary section of the list the same
donation is specified simply as “nine Syro-Palestinian towns” (DMIW
N Ḫ3RW 9–P. Harris I, 68a: 2).

The Nubian settlements donated to the cult of Amun have gar-
nered far less discussion than their Syro-Palestinian counterparts.
Nubia, after all, had seen a plethora of temples dedicated to Amun
since the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty. Moreover, documents such as the
Nauri Decree have provided the rather unsurprising information that
Egyptian temples frequently owned estates and other property in
Nubia.
Grandet, who is virtually the only scholar to discuss the Nubian towns specifically, has suggested that Amara West would have been among these polities. He bases his argument on the frequency with which Ramesses III is attested at the town and the obviously important temple to Amun that served as its centerpiece.\textsuperscript{304} He has also quite logically equated the Nubian, Egyptian, and Syro-Palestinian towns donated to Amun in P. Harris I with the $bh\textit{nw}$ that Ramesses III claims to have constructed for Amun in Nubia, Egypt, and Syria-Palestine (\textit{KRI} V, 117: 13–14).\textsuperscript{305} Both the $dm\textit{iw}$ and the $bh\textit{nw}$ provide ample evidence for the application of cross-frontier economic policy in the Twentieth Dynasty.

\textit{Reign of Ramesses V}

1. $n3 \text{sh}w nty r iwd $w'b \text{pn-}nkt \text{dd(}w).n.f s\text{d} n \text{pr-}\text{hm}n \text{s}d\text{d} r t3 iht \text{km(t)} nty m-\text{f} \text{iw.s msi} 5 \text{k}m3 n mr-\text{wr} \text{iw.f (hr) int.w} \text{iw.f ir h}w.w \text{m sht} \text{iw.f 3'\text{d} drt.f im.w} \text{iw.f (hr) int.w r rsy} \text{iw.f (hr) dit.w m shb n n3 w'b}w \text{s}d\text{d} r p3 km3 '3 n mr-\text{wr} nty m-\text{f} \text{iw.f 3'\text{d} drt.f im.f} \text{iw.f (hr) dit.f n n3 nhy n md3yw n p3 htm n sn-mwt} \text{iw.f 3'sp swnt.f m drt.w (P. Turin 1887, rt. 1: 1–3; Gardiner 1948b: 74)}

The documents, which are in the charge of the wab-priest Penanket, who is called Sed, of the temple of Khnum. Charges regarding the black cow, which is in his possession; it gave birth to five offspring of Mnevis, and he brought them (away), and he made their environment in the country, and he parted with them and brought them to the south, (where) he sold them to the wab-priests. Charges regarding the great offspring of Mnevis, which was in his possession; he parted with it, and he gave it to some of the Medjay of the $h\text{tm}$-fortress of Bigeh, (when) he received its price from their hand.

lb. $s\text{d}d\text{r p3 ii}t \text{i.iri.f r t3 ri(t)} \text{h}nw n p3 htm iw 7 hrw n swr $\text{hs}mn \text{i.iri.f iw ss pr-hd mn}t\text{w-hr-}h\text{p}x \text{di(}w) 'n}h n nbl 'n}h \text{wd}3 \text{sub n p3 hm-}\text{ntr n hm}n \text{r-dd bn di.i 'k.f hr p3 ntr i.ir(t) mh}(f) \text{n3y.f} \text{hrw n swr $\text{hs}mn} \text{iw.f tm sdm iw.f 'k hr p3 ntr iw wnn.f} 3 \text{hrw n swr $\text{hs}mn} \text{(P. Turin 1887, rt. 1: 9–11; Gardiner 1948b: 75)}

Charges regarding the arrival he made to the side of the interior of the $h\text{tm}$-fortress, while (only) seven days of drinking natron is what he did. The scribe of the treasury, Mentu-her-khepes, administered the oath of the lord, l.p.h., to the $h\text{tm}$-priest of Khnum, saying “I will not


\textsuperscript{305} Grandet 1983: 112–113.
allow that he enter before the god until (he) completes his days of
drinking natron,” (but) he did not listen, and he entered before the
god, (when) he had three days of drinking natron (left).

In this section of P. Turin 1887 a number of accusations are laid
out concerning the activities of a wab-priest of the temple of Khnum
at Elephantine. Some of these accusations detail his alleged affairs
with the wives of other men (P. Turin 1887, rt. 1: 5–6) and his theft
of temple property (P. Turin 1887, rt. 1: 7). Indeed, the number
and variety of the supposed crimes of this priest have prompted Peet
to label him “a surprising specimen of the ancient Egyptian crook.”
Two of the charges leveled against the priest are of specific interest
to this study.

First, the wab-priest apparently had been given responsibility for
one of the cows that mated with the great Mnevis bull. Over a
period of years, it seems, he had sold the cow’s offspring to priests
in the south and had in one case sold a calf to the Medjay stationed
at the htem-fortress of Bigeh. As Bigeh was located quite close to
Elephantine, this act would have been a brazen move indeed, and
especially so if the Medjay had subsequently consumed the calf! The
priest’s unauthorized and unreported sale of temple property con-
stituted a serious transgression in itself, but the crime would have
been of an even greater magnitude considering that it was from the
offspring of the Mnevis bull that this animal’s eventual successor
would be chosen.

The second accusation of interest in this context is that the wab-
priest apparently entered the htem-fortress of Elephantine, and more
specifically the temple to Khnum located within it, without purify-
ing himself for the required number of days. While this appears at
first to have been a less serious crime than the others, the Egyptians
believed that ignoring or abbreviating purification rites had the poten-
tial to introduce chaos into the undefiled and orderly world of the
temple and thereby to incur divine wrath. Viewed cosmologically,
then, this crime might incur ramifications for the entire community.

From the sections of P. Turin 1887 quoted above, it can be under-
stood that the htem-fortresses at Elephantine and Bigeh continued to

306 Peet 1924: 118.
307 Peet 1924: 124.
function well into the Twentieth Dynasty. The famous Khnum temple at Elephantine apparently was situated within the ḫtm-fortress, which may provide further evidence that the ḫtm-fortress and the town of Elephantine should be considered one and the same. With regard to Bigeh, on the other hand, it is of interest to note that Medjay-scouts resided at the ḫtm-fortress, just as they did at ḫtm-fortresses in the north. The Medjay employed at Bigeh, like their northern counterparts, no doubt patrolled the surrounding area for fugitives and aided in enforcing the regulations of the border-fortress.

2. imy-r ḫtm n p3 ḫtm n sn-mwt p3-ḥ3rw b3.k ‘nh m nft ḏb3ty m rw (Graffito at Seheil Island; Habachi 1965: 125)

The overseer of the ḫtm-fortress of Bigeh, Pa-kharu. May your soul live with breath, provided with joy.

On the first cataract island of Sehel, the overseer of the ḫtm-fortress of Bigeh is depicted standing opposite an individual named Pendjerti, the chief priest of Khnum, Satis, and Anukis. Both men hold up their hands in greeting and present each other with phrases of well-wishing. In his study of this inscription and others belonging to the family of Pendjerti, Habachi was able to ascertain that this particular priest was the father of a wab-priest named Nebwenef, a man who became embroiled in the scandals that plagued the Khnum temple at Elephantine in the reign of Ramesses V.³⁰⁸ Nebwenef is named in P. Turin 1887 as having heard another priest plotting ill deeds, although it appears that he had in fact reported the evil words to the proper authorities (P. Turin 1887, rt. 1: 12–13). This graffito, then, provides further evidence for the close relationship that existed between the inhabitants of the ḫtm-fortress of Elephantine and the authorities at the ḫtm-fortress of nearby Bigeh.

The second item of interest in the graffito is that the commander of the ḫtm-fortress of Bigeh was named Pa-kharu, literally, “the Syro-Palestinian.” While his name, of course, is not definitive proof of his ethnicity, it is not unlikely that the overseer’s family originally had hailed from Egypt’s northern empire. Given the Egyptian predilection for settling northerners in the south,³⁰⁹ it is possible that Pa-kharu’s forbearers had originally arrived on Egypt’s southern frontier.

as prisoners of war. As has been discussed above and elsewhere, foreign captives were not infrequently recruited into Egypt’s armed forces. Thus, it is quite possible that Pakharu’s family could have become well enough respected in military circles that Pakharu himself was able to ascend to a position of great importance in the reign of Ramesses V.

Reign of Ramesses IX

1. ṣḫty iw r ṟṣy ḫr ink ṗꜣy.[t]n sn [. . .] n nkt n smt r š3p m ḳi(tw) ḥry.i šs n ṗ3 ḥtm (P. Cairo A, lines 4–5; Helck 1967: 146)

The vizier has come to the south. Now I am [yo]ur brother, [and I have never been in need]310 of products of the desert ever since (one) caused that I be appointed scribe of the ḥtm-fortress.

Although the scribe who penned this letter to his brother had never previously asked his sibling to ship him goods of the desert, the vizier’s visit to the ḥtm-fortress apparently prompted this unprecedented request. The majority of the text that follows is devoted to a list of desired products, such as galena, cardamom, and acacia (P. Cairo A, lines 9–12). While the location of the scribe’s brother and the manner of his access to these products is not stated, an invocation to Min of Coptos at the very opening of the letter (P. Cairo A, line 3) might suggest that the scribe’s brother lived and worked in this town. The proximity of Coptos to the Wadi Hammamat and the many desert products located therein further renders this a particularly attractive suggestion.

As to the location of the writer, it is clear that he served in a ḥtm border-fortress. Moreover, given the information that the vizier had come south, it is obvious that the Nubian border was meant. Otherwise, the only information that can be obtained from the letter is that the scribe, by virtue of his post and his evident connection with the vizier, had the authority to requisition goods from areas located far to the north. Whether the scribe’s brother would be reimbursed for his shipments or whether they were viewed simply as a levy or perhaps even as a favor, however, is not stated.

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310 The restoration follows Wente 1990: 38.
The scribe Djehutymes (of the) necropolis to the scribe Butchamun and the chantress of Amun Shedemdua. . . I have come to my superior. . . and I met him at the town of Elephantine. . . Now we are moored at Elephantine, and he (Piankh) keeps saying, “I will go up (to Nubia) to meet (i.e., attack?) Panehsy at the (place) where he is.”

The scribe Djehutymes of the necropolis to the scribe Butchamun and the chantress of Amun Shedemdua. . . I say to Horus of Baki (Kubban) every single day to give you l.p.h. In l.p.h. (and in) the favor of Amun-Re, king of the gods, Mut, Khonsu, and all gods of Thebes. . . And further: I say to Horus of Baki (Kubban), Horus of Miam (Aniba), and Atum, the lord of the land, to give to you [l.p.h., a long lifetime] and a ripe, good old age.

In the 29th year of Ramesses XI and the 10th year of the so-called Renaissance, a venerable scribe of the royal necropolis was drafted.
into the service of the general and high priest Piankh. At this time, Piankh evidently called up many Thebans to help him in his campaign to wrest back Nubia from the forces of Panehesy, the newly repudiated viceroy of Kush. Most men were, of course, drafted as soldiers; however, the scribe Djehutymes was evidently too old and too sickly for military service. Although his credentials for the post are left unexplained, he seems to have been personally selected by Piankh to accompany the general as a noncombatant counselor. In their letters, Djehutymes’ family reminded the scribe of his purely advisory role in the Nubian war and warned him sternly to be sure to stay within his boat and avoid all arrows, spears, or stones (P. Phillipps, 10–13).

The correspondence between Djehutymes and his associates at Deir el-Medina is touching, for it is filled with personal detail. The old scribe worried continually about the people and business matters that he had left behind in Thebes, while his family fretted about his personal safety. Indeed, his son even went so far as to send notes to his father’s superiors urging them to be careful of this ailing old man who was not used to military ventures (P. Geneva D407, vs. 17–18; P. British Museum 10284, 7–11). To signal their mutual affection, both Djehutymes and his associates claimed that they were praying to the gods for the health and safety of their correspondent(s). While the gods that Djehutymes’ friends and family prayed to were Theban, however, the scribe was obliged to pray to the deities whose territory he passed through on his journey. Significantly, the mention of the specific gods that he solicited also provided his family with a convenient way to pinpoint his general locale. By virtue of Djehutymes’ piety, then, his family (and also later scholars) were able to trace his journey from the htm-fortress of Elephantine, where he met up with Piankh, to the older mnnw fortress-towns of Kubban and Aniba.

Because the Twentieth Dynasty strata of the fortress-towns at Elephantine, Kubban, and Aniba were all highly disturbed, the information that their temples were still serviceable in the waning days of the Twentieth Dynasty is particularly interesting. While the base at Elephantine would no doubt have been kept up due to its status as a border checkpoint, Kubban and Aniba were also strategically important centers. Kubban, of course, served as the launching point for numerous gold-mining ventures, while Aniba—as the seat of the deputy of Wawat—was effectively the capital of Egypt’s Nubian
empire.\textsuperscript{311} No doubt it was precisely due to these same factors that Ramesses X had recently undertaken work on the temples to the Horus-gods of Baki (Kubban) and Miam (Aniba) and, moreover, that Piankh and Panehesy now bestowed upon these crumbling fortress-towns a renewed military significance.

Judging from the preserved correspondence, Aniba may have been the southernmost fortress-town reached by Djehutymes on the expeditions he accompanied to Nubia. The temple to Horus of Buhen was relatively famous in the New Kingdom, and work on the fortress-town’s temple had been undertaken as late as the reign of Ramesses XI.\textsuperscript{312} Had Djehutymes reached this southern base, he almost assuredly would have put in a good word for his family with Horus of Buhen. As discussed in the historical introduction, a destruction level at the site suggests that the old fortress may indeed eventually have seen battle. By the time the dust settled, however, it would appear that Piankh’s forces no longer held territory even as far south as Aniba. After all, at the end of his life Panehesy was accorded an honorable burial at the site, and this surely would not have occurred had Aniba remained under Theban rule.\textsuperscript{313}

Archaeological Evidence for Twentieth Dynasty Southern Fortress-Towns

There is no evidence that the rulers of the Twentieth Dynasty constructed any new fortresses in Nubia, although the inscriptive evidence cited in the historical introduction suggests the presence of pharaonic officials at a number of sites. These include Elephantine and Kubban, where work on cultic structures was undertaken. Continued occupation is also noted for Aniba, Buhen, Semna, Soleb, Amara West, Kawa, and Napata. Of these sites, the Twentieth Dynasty levels have only been discussed in any depth for Buhen and Amara West.

At Buhen, the excavators noted that the Twentieth Dynasty levels were largely given over “to menial occupations,” even in such central areas as the commandant’s residence.\textsuperscript{314} H. S. Smith has further

\textsuperscript{311} Amara West, the Upper Nubian counterpart to Aniba, had been abandoned by the later years of the Twentieth Dynasty.

\textsuperscript{312} H. S. Smith 1976: 97; Emery, Smith and Millard 1979: 4.


\textsuperscript{314} Emery, Smith, and Millard 1979: 99. The nature of these menial occupations is unfortunately not specified.
observed that activity in the Twentieth Dynasty town centered largely upon its two temples. Moreover, judging from the fact that there was “virtually no evidence” of the Twentieth Dynasty inhabitants in Buhem’s cemeteries, Smith concluded that the occupants of the site might indeed have consisted almost solely of temple employees. 315

Although its excavators characterized Buhem as a dying town in the Twentieth Dynasty, 316 the mmrw-fortress remained occupied to some extent until the reign of Ramesses XI. At this time a significant portion of the fortress-town was consumed by fire. 317 It is tempting, then, to speculate that Buhem may have been destroyed and then abandoned during the course of the war between Panehesy and Piankh in the latter years of Ramesses XI’s reign.

Unlike Buhem, Amara West appears to have flourished throughout much of the Twentieth Dynasty as the seat of the deputy of Kush. Work continued on both the temple and the palace of the deputy, the latter of which received fine stone columned halls in its final incarnation. 318 Although the town apparently exhibited few signs of failing health, occupation appears to have ceased abruptly in the reign of Ramesses IX, perhaps as a direct result of an organized Egyptian withdrawal from Upper Egypt. 319 Certainly archaeologists noted that the deputy’s palace, the temple, and indeed the town as a whole was virtually devoid of valuable portable items. 320 In lieu of evidence for enemy conquest, then, the marked absence of such items suggests that the town’s inhabitants were afforded the luxury of gathering their valuables before they withdrew from the site.

The abandonment of the fortress-towns of Nubia was obviously not a homogenous affair, as can be seen from the examples of Buhem and Amara West. It is regrettable, however, that the largely disturbed state of most of these installations has precluded the attainment of a more representative sample. Some sites, undoubtedly, were abandoned naturally, when governmental support for local temples

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319 The silting up of a subsidiary Nile channel has also been suggested as a contributing factor to the abandonment of the site (Fairman 1939: 144; Shinnie 1951: 5, 11).
and other economic institutions was withdrawn. Other fortress-towns, in Upper Nubia especially, may have been abandoned in the course of an organized Egyptian withdrawal from the region. Finally, it would appear that, caught as they were in the crossfire of war, the destruction of many Lower Nubian towns could easily have occurred in the heat of battle.

**Northern, Western, and Southern Fortifications and Administrative Headquarters in the Twentieth Dynasty: A Cross-frontier Perspective**

Archaeological and textual evidence suggests that in the Twentieth Dynasty at least nine towns (and bhmu-estates) in Nubia and Syria-Palestine were dedicated to the god Amun at Karnak. Cults to Amun had been erected in Nubia since the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty, and Syro-Palestinian towns had been donated to the same god at this period as well. It is only in the Twentieth Dynasty, however, that textual evidence refers to a temple to Amun in Syria-Palestine and archaeological evidence suggests a system of temple-centered taxation in this same region. It is possible, then, that the imperial government in the Twentieth Dynasty had made a conscious decision to model its few remaining directly held northern properties on the temple-centered economy that had apparently been in place in Nubia since the advent of the New Kingdom.

It is unclear whether such a shift in policy would likewise have heralded a movement to “Egyptianize” the indigenous population of Egypt’s remaining southern Canaanite core. It may have been hoped that by encouraging assimilation, the Egyptians could render the Canaanites as cooperative and accepting of imperial rule as were the agriculturalists of Nubia. Moreover, such a project might have appeared more feasible than ever before given that by the Twentieth Dynasty the inhabitants of southern Canaan would have been as imbued with Egyptian culture as the Lower Nubians had been at the advent of the New Kingdom.

Whatever the Egyptian government hoped to achieve in streamlining the temple-centered economies of its two frontiers, its efforts were destined to failure on both fronts. Even in the reign of Ramesses III, who undoubtedly was the strongest pharaoh of the dynasty, invasions and internal corruption had weakened the government to the
point where it no longer invested in establishing new military bases, nor even in refurbishing damaged ones. In Syria-Palestine, Nubia, and likely the highway to Libya as well, preexisting and fully functioning bases were virtually the only installations to receive Egyptian patronage.

No evidence for the abandonment of the Libyan fortresses has yet been discovered, but archaeologists in Syria-Palestine and Nubia have demonstrated that the process was highly varied on the two frontiers. One item of interest, however, is that both Tell es-Sa’idiyeh and Amara West, two of the bases located farthest from the Egyptian core, appear to have been purposefully abandoned. Valuable portable objects were found at neither site, strongly suggesting that the towns’ inhabitants were not taken by surprise. Further, the blocking up of doorways into the main governmental buildings at Tell es-Sa’idiyeh before their destruction indicates that the Egyptians themselves likely set fire to their base as they pulled out. While the withdrawal from Tell es-Sa’idiyeh happened some two decades prior to the abandonment of Amara West, the similar patterns suggest that the government had anticipated in advance the impossibility of maintaining control over such far-flung territories.

For the Egyptian bases in Canaan that were located closer to home, for Buhen, and perhaps for other Lower Nubian fortress-towns as well, the end evidently was quite brutal. The destructions of the mid-twelfth century in Canaan were generally by conflagration, and the artifacts (and bodies) discovered in the charred rubble suggest that the inhabitants of the bases suffered enemy attack. The damage inflicted to Buhen, on the other hand, can perhaps best be ascribed to the civil war that raged in Lower Nubia during the reign of Ramesses XI.

As Egypt sank back into its traditional borders on both fronts, nearly half a millennia of Egyptian imperial investment crumbled. The Canaanite population was able to shake off this heritage with relative ease, likely due to the fact that the Egyptians had invested too little too late in techniques of indoctrination. The Nubian population and the Libyans resident in the Nile Delta, however, had so internalized Egyptian culture that ironically these two ethnic groups would later spawn the hyper-orthodox renaissance of Egyptian power in the Twenty-fifth and Twenty-sixth Dynasties respectively.
Figure 63: Twentieth Dynasty Nubia
CHAPTER SEVEN

A CONCLUSION

The broad aim of this study has been to reexplore the subject of New Kingdom foreign policy from a vantage point seldom utilized. Namely, it has been suggested that a comprehensive examination of the fortresses and administrative headquarters that the Egyptians erected on their borders and in foreign territory can shed valuable light on imperial priorities and tactics. This problem has been approached through a gathering and synthesis of both textual and archaeological data as it exists for the early, middle, and late Eighteenth Dynasty, as well as for the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. Such a chronological division has allowed a clear insight into the evolution of Egyptian foreign policy over time. Further, the frontiers of Syria-Palestine, Nubia, and Libya have all been considered in order not only to compose a more complete picture but also to allow for an examination of how imperial policies practiced on one frontier may have influenced policies subsequently enacted in another.

Within each chapter the sum total of information regarding the emplacement of these installations and their significance with respect to Egypt’s foreign policy has been subjected to analysis. Likewise, issues pertaining to cross-frontier policy are summarized at the conclusion of each chapter. In this final overview, then, it is fitting to focus upon the one aspect of this study that has not yet received a holistic treatment. In the introductory chapter it was stated that while numerous words have been translated as “fortress” or some variant of this term, the functional and/or structural differences that were important to the Egyptians in semantically distinguishing one type of military base from another have been poorly understood at best. While this study makes no claim to have deciphered the true meanings of these terms, it can elucidate some of them and identify patterning in others.

In the sections that follow, each term that designates either a type of fortress or administrative headquarters will be discussed in depth with regard to the distribution of these emplacements through time and across borders. Issues explored will include the varieties of
functions that these installations served, the titles of the officials that staffed them, and other pertinent information from the textual record. Archaeological data relevant to each type of military base will also be brought to bear. Finally, tentative definitions for each distinct term will be offered.

TM

The type of fortress most frequently referenced in Egyptian inscriptions throughout the New Kingdom is the $h$tm. In almost all attested cases, $h$tm-fortresses were installed at precisely those locations at which entrance to the Nile Valley could be effectively monitored and controlled.¹ $H$tm-fortresses are thus found guarding the juncture between the Ways of Horus and the Nile Delta (Tjaru), the Wadi Tumilat transit corridor (Tjeku), the mouth of the Pelusiac branch of the Nile (the $h$tm of the sea), the Wadi Hammamat (the $h$tm at the highland of Coptos), and the first cataract (Elephantine and Bigeh). While the point of departure for the coastal road to Libya is not known to have possessed a $h$tm-fortress, it is perhaps likely that one had been established at this nexus as well.

Officials who administered $h$tm-fortresses frequently bore the straightforward title “overseer of the $h$tm-fortress” ($i$m$y$-$r$ $h$tm).² Quite notably,

¹ There are only three exceptions to this rule. First is the $h$tm erected by Thutmose III outside of Megiddo (Urk. IV, 660: 14–661: 13), but it is notable that the purpose of this installation was to monitor movement in and out of the besieged city. Second are the series of $h$tmw that Thutmose III installed at the major ports of Canaan (Capart 1900: 105–106). Given that the traffic passing in or out of Levantine harbors would have been closely monitored by the Egyptians, however, the employment of the term in this case is consistent with its usage elsewhere. The third is the $h$tm of Husayin (P. Anastasi I, 27: 4), which is almost certainly to be equated with the Migdol of Menmaatre (KRI I, 10: 1) in Seti’s battle reliefs. While this fort was not directly situated at Egypt’s border, it was located in relatively close proximity to it and monitored traffic that passed along the Ways of Horus.

² For the overseer of the $h$tm-fortress of Tjaru, see Urk. IV, 1635: 11; 2175: 9; 2176: 14; Hayes 1951: fig. 7, no. 76; KRI II, 287: 11; 288: 7, 9; and probably Hayes 1951: fig. 7, no. 77; fig. 9, no. 118; Urk. IV, 2171: 16; 2173: 8; Wild 1957: 223. For the overseer of the $h$tm-fortress of the sea, see Capart 1900: 105–106; KRI IV, 342: 12; Gardiner 1947a: 33, no. 105; and probably KRI III, 499: 15–500: 10; KRI IV, 79: 15. For the overseer of the $h$tm-fortress of Bigeh, see KRI I, 56: 7–8; KRI II, 822: 13; Habachi 1965: 125. For the overseer of the $h$tm-fortress of Elephantine, see probably KRI II, 822: 9; KRI III, 261: 1, 8. For overseers of $h$tm-fortresses generally, see KRI II, 608: 10.
however, most of these individuals appear to have been recruited from the rank of troop commander (ḥyḥ pdh). This preference suggests that an army officer commanded each htm-fortress, and the troops under his authority protected it. Subsidiary military titles also frequently borne by the senior officers of htm-fortresses (whether designated as overseers or troop commanders) include overseer of horses (imy-r ssmt), royal messenger (wḥat n ss), and great one of the Medjay (wr n mdȝw).4

The last title, great one of the Medjay, is particularly interesting, for Medjay are independently attested at the htm-fortresses in the Wadi Hammamat, at Tjeku, and at Bigeh.5 As late as the Second Intermediate Period, the term Medjay referred to a specific Nubian population, but in the New Kingdom both police and desert scouts, regardless of their ethnic identity, could be designated as such.6 It is highly likely, given that a resident garrison might easily have

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3 For troop commanders of Tjaru, see Menna (Petrie 1935: U.C. 49 in pls. 8 and 27), Neby (Urk. IV, 1634: 14, 17; 1635: 10), Paramesses (Urk. IV, 2175: 8; 2176: 13; KRI II, 288: 9), Seti (KRI II, 288: 7), Huy (KRI III, 79: 16), and probably Kenamun (Wild 1957: 234, 236). For troop commanders of Tjeku, see Amenemhet (Giveon 1969a: 172), Kakemwere (P. Anastasi V, 19: 2–3), and Usermaatre-nakht (Petrie 1989: pl. 31). For a troop commander of a hbm-fortress in the first cataract, see Nebinakht (KRI III, 261: 4).

4 For the title “overseer of horses” with regard to Tjaru, see Menna (Petrie 1935: U.C. 49 in pls. 8 and 27), Paramesses (Urk. IV, 2175: 8; 2176: 13; KRI II, 288: 9), Seti (KRI II, 287: 10–11; 288: 8), and Huy (KRI III, 79: 16). For the title “royal messenger” with regard to Tjaru, see Neby (Urk. IV, 1634: 6), Paramesses (Urk. IV, 2175: 11; 2176: 13), and Huy (KRI III, 79: 16); with regard to Tjeku, see Amenemhet (Giveon 1969a: 172). For the title “great one of the Medjay” with regard to Tjaru, see Neby (Urk. IV, 1634: 14; 1635: 8) and Seti (KRI II, 288: 7–8); with regard to Tjeku, see Anhernakht (P. Anastasi V, 25: 2–3). Titles of a more civilian character include scribe (s—Capart 1900: 105–106; KRI I, 8: 16; P. Cairo A, lines 4–5) and royal scribe (šnsw—Pendlebury 1951: pl. 89: 123; Urk. IV, 2171: 16; 2175: 12; KRI II, 287: 10; 288: 8, 9; KRI III, 80: 1; de Garis Davies 1930: 13). There are also a number of instances in which the commander of a hbm-fortress was drawn from the children of the (royal) nursery (ḥrdw n kꜥḥ); see Menna (Petrie 1935: U.C. 49 in pls. 8 and 27) and Neby (Urk. IV, 1634: 7). The honorary title “overseer of foreign lands” (imy-r ḫṣwḥ) is also evidenced with regard to overseers of hbm-fortresses at Tjaru (see Paramesses [KRI II, 288: 9] and Seti [KRI II, 287: 11; 288: 7]) and Tjeku (see Usermaatre-nakht [Petrie 1989: pl. 31]).

5 For Medjay associated with the hbm in the Wadi Hammamat, see P. Anastasi VI, 5: 16; with regard to Tjeku, see P. Anastasi V, 25: 2–4; 25: 6–27: 3; P. Anastasi V, 18: 6–19: 2; with regard to Bigeh, see P. Turin 1887, rt. 1: 1–3.

doubled as a police force, that the Medjay stationed at Egyptian military bases functioned specifically as highly trained desert scouts.

Indeed, the retention of a cadre of skilled scouts would likely have been invaluable for the maintenance of proper security in a border zone. Under cover of night, as the story of Sinuhe demonstrates, even well-manned fortresses could be bypassed with relative ease. Thus, the primary manner by which illicit travelers were likely identified in the New Kingdom was through the intensive examination of surrounding areas for footprints, campsites, and other signs of unauthorized passage. P. Anastasi V, 19: 2–20: 3 provides a particularly vivid example of the immense efforts undertaken by the Egyptians to apprehend even small numbers of fugitives who had successfully evaded ḫtm-fortress officials.8

There is evidence from three of the sources examined in this work that officials stationed at such installations were particularly concerned with keeping detailed records of the people who passed through their gates, either en route to Egypt or abroad. According to P. Bologna 1086, the records composed and archived by a ḫtm-officer ultimately led to the recovery of a missing slave. Likewise, in P. Anastasi VI, 53–61 an official informed his colleague that a group of bedouin and their flock had been allowed west of the ḫtm-fortress of Tjeku on a specific day. The official further stated that similar passages, authorized in the past, had also been duly entered into the official reports. Finally, the scribe who composed the so-called border journal recorded assiduously the arrival to his fort of numerous letter bearers and other imperial functionaries over a ten-day period.9

While many of the ḫtm-fortresses, like Tjaru, may have been established for security reasons at the very beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty, it is likely that the dramatic expansion of the empire quickly transformed the priorities of these installations from the defense of a vulnerable border area to the administrative regulation of it. Indeed, many of the texts pertaining to ḫtm-fortresses are concerned primarily

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7 Sinuhe made his flight from Egypt in the dead of night “lest the watchmen upon the wall where their day’s (duty) was might see me” (Wilson 1969: 19).
8 See the discussion of this text in chapter five.
9 For P. Bologna 1086, see KRI IV, 79: 12–80: 6. For the “border journal,” see P. Anastasi III, vs. 6: 1–5: 9. Both texts are discussed in chapter five. While the latter document may have been composed by a scribe stationed at one of the forts along the Ways of Horus, it is certainly an example of the type of records that must have been kept at ḫtm-fortresses.
with the goods that passed through them\textsuperscript{10} or with the taxes paid by their officials.\textsuperscript{11} Interestingly, these taxes often included items characteristic of the hinterland that lay beyond the htm-fortress,\textsuperscript{12} suggesting perhaps that the officials stationed at these checkpoints profited from a minimal tariff.

Finally, inscriptions also imply that the officials stationed at htm-fortresses possessed an authority that extended beyond the htm-fortress itself. A number of texts indicate that officers of htm-fortresses had oversight over temples, or at least the potential to interfere with temple property.\textsuperscript{13} Others demonstrate that these individuals possessed the authority to requisition goods from officials employed elsewhere in Egypt.\textsuperscript{14} Significantly, as demonstrated in the case of Tjaru, the overseer of the htm-fortress could even serve as mayor.\textsuperscript{15} Indeed, the possession of a civil title of such importance must have provided the overseer of the htm-fortress at Tjaru with jurisdiction over almost all aspects of life in this vast settlement.

Archaeologically, only the htm-fortresses of Tjaru (Tell Heboua I) and Tjeku (Tell er-Retabah) are known. While both of these installations constituted extremely large walled settlements,\textsuperscript{16} well over 66,000 m\textsuperscript{2} in area, it would not appear that this was uniformly the case. The htm-fortress in the Wadi Hammamat, for example, could hardly have supported a particularly large population. Likewise, the Twentieth Dynasty fort at Kom el-Qulzoum, which was located in the type of border environment characteristic of htm-fortresses,

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\textsuperscript{10} The overseer of the htm-fortress of the sea, for example, received the inw of those of bad character (Capart 1900: 105–106), while a successor of his in P. Bologna 1086 (= KRI IV, 79: 12–80: 6) had authority to disburse slaves from a shipment that had arrived at his fortress.


\textsuperscript{12} Such foreign goods include wine of Syria-Palestine (Hayes 1951: fig. 7, no. 77), beer of Kedy (Hayes 1951: fig. 9, no. 118), and exotica from Nubia (Urk. IV, 1120: 13–1121: 4; 1122: 13–1123: 3. For a discussion of the debates surrounding the dating of Rekhmire’s tax list, see Gardiner 1947a: 47; van den Boorn 1988: 19–20 and chapter three).


\textsuperscript{14} KRI III, 499: 15–500: 10; 638: 8–639: 3; Helck 1967: 146.

\textsuperscript{15} In the reign of Thutmose IV, Neby served as overseer of the htm-fortress of Tjaru and mayor of Tjaru (Urk. IV, 1634: 7, 17; 1635: 11; Björkman 1974: 43).

\textsuperscript{16} It is uncertain whether the htm-fortress at Elephantine was a discrete emplacement or a designation of the island itself. If the latter, this htm also would have constituted a major settlement.
occupied only 1,600 m² in area, if that. Despite its comparatively small size, however, the installation at Kom el-Qulzoum was admirably suited to monitor the relatively limited traffic in its environs.\textsuperscript{17} It may be concluded, then, that the size of a $h\text{tm}$-fortress was probably determined both by the nature of its environment and by the magnitude of the threat posed to the border at the time of its foundation.

The etymology of the term $h\text{tm}$-fortress in the word “seal” or “lock” ($htm$)\textsuperscript{18} is key to understanding how the Egyptians themselves defined it. Just as $htm$-seals served as locks in ancient Egypt, the $h\text{tm}$-fortresses sealed or locked vulnerable points of entry into the Nile Valley or into restricted areas. While the vast majority of $h\text{tm}$-fortresses discussed in this work were indeed border-fortresses, two New Kingdom $h\text{tmw}$ are known to have monitored access to other entities. The $h\text{tm}$ built by Thutmose III at Megiddo closely regulated passage in or out of the besieged city, and recent work by Koh has likewise demonstrated that a $h\text{tm}$ erected outside Deir el-Medina functioned to monitor traffic entering or leaving this settlement.\textsuperscript{19}

It is precisely this preoccupation with “sealing” or “locking” the passage between two distinct areas that renders the etymology presented above preferable to that suggested by Valbelle. Valbelle has theorized that the administrative concerns of the $h\text{tm}$-fortresses caused them to be named after the $h\text{tm}$-seals employed by the numerous administrators located within.\textsuperscript{20} According to a different view, the architectural category of $h\text{tm}$ may simply have designated structures that could be locked.\textsuperscript{21} If the prevalence of administrators or the security of a building indeed constituted the main criteria for designation as a $h\text{tm}$, however, one would expect numerous $h\text{tmw}$ to have been erected throughout Egypt. Instead, the dramatic and consistent geographic patterning of the $h\text{tmw}$ at borders and at points that monitored and restricted passage from one area to another indicates

\textsuperscript{17} The successive Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasty fortresses at Tell el-Borg, which are still poorly understood, may also perhaps qualify as $h\text{tm}$-fortresses.

\textsuperscript{18} Wb. III, 352; Badawy 1968: 527; Lesko 1984b: 198.

\textsuperscript{19} For the $h\text{tm}$ at Megiddo, see Urk. IV, 660: 14–661: 13 and the discussion in chapter three. For the $h\text{tm}$-fort at Deir el-Medina, see Koh 2001; KRI III, 46: 5–7; KRI IV, 155: 8; 157: 3; 14: 211: 13.


\textsuperscript{21} Redford 1997: 64, n. 18. This does seem to be a proper interpretation of the word $h\text{tm}$ as it applies to storerooms; see, for example, Urk. IV 1105: 2; KRI III, 150: 15.
clearly the metaphoric function of these compounds as “seals” or “locks.”

As noted previously, the primary function of many of the htm-fortresses shifted early in the New Kingdom from sealing the border against enemy armies to sealing it against the unauthorized passage of people and goods. When Egypt’s borders were once again assailed from numerous directions in the Twentieth Dynasty, however, it is significant that the htm-fortresses seem to have reclaimed their status as vital defensive entities. In the reign of Ramesses III, disproportionately massive walls were erected around both Tell er-Retabah (Tjenu) and Kom el-Qulzoum.²² Although the exact nature of the expected enemy in these cases is not known, the newly built fortifications suggest that the Egyptian government feared its htm-fortresses would imminently encounter more formidable traffic than the usual traders and functionaries.

A htm-fortress should be regarded as a military base that functioned as a seal or a gateway, allowing access to a restricted area to be carefully monitored and, if need be, prevented. This term is most frequently utilized with respect to border-fortresses.

MNNW

In evidence since the Old Kingdom,²³ the term mnnw is applied to fortresses on all three frontiers in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties. It is notable, however, that there are only two textual references to mnnw in Syria-Palestine. Both attestations date to the reign of Thutmose III, and both likely designated a specific structure that this king erected in Lebanon and named “Menkheperre-is-the-one-who-subdues-the-wanderers.”²⁴ This mnnw has never been identified archaeologically, and so its physical structure is unknown. Moreover, very little can be gleaned from the texts aside from the fact that the fortress housed a garrison, which was at least occasionally employed in hewing the valuable cedar of Lebanon. References to mnnw established in Nubia, however, are far more common.

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²² See chapter six.
The numerous fortresses erected in Lower Nubia in the Middle Kingdom were uniformly termed mnnw,\(^{25}\) and the New Kingdom Egyptians continued this tradition with two exceptions. While the first cataract fortresses of Elephantine and Bigeh may have been known as mnnw in the reign of Ahmose—the latest date at which the “Duties of the Vizier” and the tax list copied in the tomb of Rekhmire could have been composed—in later texts they are consistently designated as ëtm-fortresses.\(^{26}\) The adoption of this new term served to highlight their status as border-fortresses and their predominantly administrative function as customs checkpoints.

Another Middle Kingdom legacy that disappeared around the reign of Ahmose was the custom of installing a ësw (i.e., commander) to the paramount position in a mnnw fortress. In the texts copied in the tomb of Rekhmire, ësw-commanders still served at Elephantine and Bigeh. Likewise, archaeologists exhumed monuments at Buhen that had been commissioned by a ësw who officiated there in the reign of Ahmose.\(^{27}\) Under subsequent rulers, however, it was either mayors (h3ty-s) or deputies (ïdnw) who filled the highest offices in Nubian mnnw.\(^{28}\) This administrative shift, combined with the large-scale disappearance of evidence for resident military personnel in mnnw-fortresses generally, then, strongly suggests that these entities functioned as primarily civil settlements in New Kingdom Nubia. Indeed, Amenhotep III’s Semna stele provides the important information that when troubles arose, troops were conscripted from local populations rather than from permanent garrison troops.\(^{29}\)

Archaeologically attested Nubian mnnw-fortresses include Sai, Faras, Kubban, and Amara West, although it would seem likely that this term applied to all fortified installations south of the first cataract.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{26}\) For Elephantine and Bigeh as mnnw-fortresses, see Urk. IV, 1120: 4, 13; 1122: 13; and probably Urk. IV, 1105: 4; 1113: 10 as well. For Elephantine and Bigeh as ëtm-fortresses, see KRI I, 56: 6–9; 12–15; 57: 1–2; KRI II, 822: 9–10, 13–16; KRI III, 260: 16–261: 10; 638: 8–639: 3; P. Turin 1887, rt. 1: 1–3, 9–11; Habachi 1965: 125. For the possibility that the “Duties of the Vizier” was composed in the reign of Ahmose, see van den Boorn 1988: 255–257 and the discussion in chapter three.
\(^{27}\) For the ësw at Bigeh and Elephantine in Rekhmire’s tax list, see Urk. IV, 1120: 13; 1122: 13. For Turi as the ësw of Buhen in the reign of Ahmose, see Randall-Macliver and Woolley 1911: 88, pl. 35.
\(^{28}\) For ësw at Turi, see KRI IV, 2068: 18; Posener 1958: 58; H. S. Smith 1976: 207.
\(^{29}\) For åty-s at Buhen, see Randall-Macliver and Woolley 1911: 88, pl. 35.
\(^{30}\) For Sai as a mnnw, see Vercoutter 1956: 74–75. For Kubban, see Urk. IV,
The determining factors behind the erection or reoccupation of some of these *mmnw* were almost certainly rooted in strategic concerns. Sai, for instance, was constructed on the site of a formerly powerful Kerman polity. Other *mmnw*, like Kubbann and Kawa, guarded important resources or trade routes. The unifying feature of almost all New Kingdom *mmnw*-fortresses, however, is that they served as population centers of some magnitude.\(^{31}\)

The fortifications of the New Kingdom *mmnw*, although substantial in their own right, appear purely perfunctory in contrast to their Middle Kingdom predecessors. Indeed, it is notable that of the reoccupied Middle Kingdom *mmnw*, only Buhen received a refurbishment of its fortifications, and this work was undertaken at the very dawn of the Eighteenth Dynasty in the reigns of Kamose and Ahmose.\(^{32}\) Although pharaohs did continue to sponsor construction in the older *mmnw*-fortresses throughout the New Kingdom, their attention was primarily limited to the erection or renovation of temples.\(^{33}\) Further, the single most characteristic feature of the *mmnw* established in the New Kingdom—with the exception of their enclosure walls—was the large temple precinct that formed the core of these settlements.

The active sponsorship of temples within the New Kingdom *mmnw* almost certainly represented a concerted effort on the part of the imperial government to create a strong spiritual and economic focus for these settlements.\(^{34}\) From the early Eighteenth Dynasty onward, the Egyptians modeled their Nubian empire both politically and economically on Egypt itself. Deputies were established in both Upper and Lower Nubia and fulfilled functions quite similar to those exercised by the viziers of Upper and Lower Egypt. Likewise, *mmnw*-towns possessed mayors, and a viceroy of Kush seems to have acted

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\(^{31}\) The exceptions to this statement are the second cataract fortresses, although these installations were largely abandoned in the New Kingdom.

\(^{32}\) H. S. Smith 1976: pl. 2, fig. 1; see chapter two.

\(^{33}\) For texts in which the primary focus upon the *mmnw* is religious, see Vercoutter 1956: 74–75; Urk. IV, 1228: 12–14; 2068: 19–20; Spencer 1997: pl. 157. Similar texts in which the term *mmnw* is not actually applied include Urk. IV, 194: 1–196: 8; 211: 16–212: 1.

as a delegate for pharaoh himself. While Nubian leaders continued to exist alongside this system, the tombs they erected and the names and titles they bore may indicate that they differed little in status and lifestyle from Egyptian nobles.\textsuperscript{35} As Morkot suggests, however, the marked absence between Kawa and Napata of mnnw fortress-towns and state temples may well indicate that local leaders in the Dongola Reach possessed significantly more power and cultural autonomy than did their counterparts to the north.\textsuperscript{36}

The nature and extent of interactions between Egyptians and Nubians in the New Kingdom is notoriously difficult to discern, given that by the mid-Eighteenth Dynasty the material culture of the two populations and the personal names borne by both were virtually identical. Inscriptions from the early and mid-Eighteenth Dynasties seem to contrast the Egyptian inhabitants of the mnnw-fortresses with the Nubians who were situated elsewhere,\textsuperscript{37} but it would appear doubtful that such a division of populations continued throughout the New Kingdom. In general the Nilotic Nubians within the sphere of Egypt’s empire appear to have caused very little problem for the Egyptian authorities, and a significant proportion of Nubians almost certainly participated in the life and economy of mnnw-towns.

If the New Kingdom mnnw of Nubia seem to have been primarily civil settlements, the mnnw erected in Libya in the Nineteenth Dynasty served a patently martial function. Like the forts erected along the Ways of Horus, the mnnw in Libya guarded a highway that separated Egypt from a potentially threatening population that the Egyptians were not eager to welcome into the Nile Delta. The Libyans west of Egypt appear to have become unusually aggressive in the Nineteenth Dynasty, and Seti I commemorated a battle against one of the first waves of these invaders on a wall at Karnak.\textsuperscript{38} Presumably in order to avert repeated incursions of this population into the Nile Valley, Ramesses II fortified or at least encouraged settlement in towns along the western edge of the Delta and erected


\textsuperscript{36} Morkot 1991: 295.

\textsuperscript{37} See Urk. IV, 138: 14–139: 1 and the discussion of Thutmose III’s Gebel Barkal stele in chapter three.

\textsuperscript{38} Epigraphic Survey 1986: pl. 27.
at least three fortresses along the coastal highway at El-Gharbaniyat, El-Alamein, and Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham. 39

Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, the only excavated Libyan *mmnw*, provides a strong contrast to its southern equivalents. In the Nubian fortress-towns, the lack of any pressing defensive concern is demonstrated by the wide gateways, the architecture erected outside the fortifications, and the blockage of stairways to the wall tops. The situation, however, was very different on the front lines that guarded against Libyan incursions. As discussed in chapter five, a massive towered gateway guarded the entrance to Zawiyet Umm el-Rakham, and the *mmnw* was further protected by the only known example of a glacis constructed in the New Kingdom. It is no doubt significant also that the local well and the storehouses were all situated safely inside the town walls.

Textual evidence suggests that in addition to protecting against Libyan advances, the western coastal *mmnw* had been constructed in order to safeguard important water sources and to maintain tight security—functions also fulfilled by the forts erected along the northern Sinai. Similarly to their eastern counterparts as well, the Libyan fortresses were overseen by troop commanders (*hry pdt*) and employed Medjay-scouts to patrol the surrounding area for signs of unauthorized passage. 41 Functionally, then, the installations along the two transit corridors would appear very nearly identical. However, while Seti’s Karnak relief and P. Anastasi I indicate that the forts along the northern Sinai were designated by a wide variety of architectural terms, 42 it is notable that “*mmnw*” was not one of them.

This situation would seem extremely puzzling if only texts were examined. Archaeological evidence, however, can perhaps supply an explanation for such an apparent terminological discrepancy. It seems that although the military installations along the two highways were functionally similar, structurally they were very different. As will be discussed below, the forts along the Ways of Horus were relatively small, compact structures, between 1,600 and 2,500 m² in area. The

39 See chapter five.
41 For troop commanders stationed in Libyan fortresses, see KRI II, 475: 15; for Medjay, see KRI IV, 18: 5–10. For a preoccupation with apprehending fugitives, see KRI IV, 7: 3–5.
42 See figures 31 and 32 and the discussion of these texts in chapter five.
Libyan *mmnw*-fortresses, on the other hand, were exponentially larger. Zawiya Umm el-Rakham, for example, occupied 19,600 m² in area, a scale that most closely approximates the two Nubian *mmnw*-fortresses also erected in the Nineteenth Dynasty: Aksha (at 9,842 m²) and Amara West (at 11,664 m²). Like these Nubian *mmnw* as well, Zawiya Umm el-Rakham encompassed within its walls a substantial temple and plenty of room for civilian habitation and administrative facilities.

Given the magnitude of the Libyan threat, it would undoubtedly have been in Egypt’s interest to erect fortress-towns in those areas of the coastal road that were capable of supporting a substantial population. Fortress-towns, after all, would have posed far more of a challenge to an invading force than a series of small forts might have done. Indeed, the status of the Libyan *mmnw* as population centers may have resulted in the rather confusing fact that they are sometimes termed towns (*dmiw*) in Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasty inscriptions.43

While the definition of a *htm* was tied primarily to its function as a border- or “sealing”-fortress, rather than to its physical structure, the definition of a *mmnw* seems to have been contingent upon its status as a fortress-town. Since the First Intermediate Period, at least, Egyptian rulers had recognized the utility of establishing towns in particularly vulnerable areas. They expressed this knowledge with aphorisms such as, “The Asiatic is a crocodile on its shore. It snatches from a lonely road; it cannot seize from a populous town.”44 Such statements indicate the very practical realization that, in defending their own homes and property from rebels or invaders, the inhabitants of settlements established in potentially hostile regions would also concomitantly defend Egyptian interests.

_A *mmnw*-fortress should be understood as a fortress-town. Such entities appear to have been erected according to the notion that settled areas were easier to defend and less vulnerable to outside penetration than were largely depopulated areas._

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43 KRI IV, 8: 3–4; KRI V, 14: 13; 43: 9–11; 50: 3–4. Nubian *dmiw* are also attested with relative frequency, and at least some of these installations may also have been known as *mmnw* fortress-towns; see, for example, KRI II, 322: 13; KRI V, 117: 13–14; P. Harris I, List A, 11: 11.

44 Lichtheim 1975: 104 from the Instruction addressed to the king Merikare. From the same text see also, “It (= Egypt’s eastern border) is settled with towns, filled with people, of the best in the whole land, to repel attacks against them” (Lichtheim 1975: 103). Similarly, “a settled town is not harmed” (Lichtheim 1975: 105).
DMI

Although the term *dmi* more often than not referred to a primarily civil settlement, it was also utilized on the three frontiers to refer to Egyptian bases. Libyan and Nubian *mnnw* could alternatively be termed *dmiw*. *Dmiw* were likewise erected along the Ways of Horus, and Egyptian bases such as Gaza, Sharuhen, Beth Shan, and Sumur were also known by this term. It has been argued in chapter five that a readjustment of the labels applied to the forts in Seti’s Ways of Horus Karnak relief—to compensate for scribal error—results in the three *dmiw* between Tjaru and Gaza being portrayed in a consistent manner (see figure 32). Namely, each representation of a *dmi* seems to illustrate a fort within a fort, or more likely a citadel surrounded by an enclosure wall. This is also the manner in which Ramesses III’s Libyan *dmi*-town “Usermaatre-Meryamun-is-the-repeller-of-the-Tjemhu” is depicted (see figure 61).

With regard to the three *dmiw* represented in Seti’s relief, it is of interest that two are portrayed on the very eastern fringe of the Ways of Horus, immediately preceding the *dmi* of Gaza. It may have been, then, that this last stretch of highway was capable of supporting a significantly larger population than could the barren regions to the west. Indeed, the only *dmi* located in the midst of the other forts perhaps constitutes the exception that proves the rule. This lone *dmi* was not only situated directly adjacent to an unusually large water source, but it was also depicted in close proximity to what look to have been palm trees. Quite possibly then, the Egyptians erected *dmiw*, i.e., relatively large military bases, in the very few regions of the northern Sinai that could support a comparatively robust residential population.

The structural reality, so far as it can be ascertained through archaeological investigations, supports the notion that the *dmi*-towns...

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46 For Gaza, see Urk. IV, 648: 10–11; KRI I, 8: 16. For Sharuhen (Tell el-Ajjul), see Urk. IV, 648: 5. For Beth Shan, see KRI I, 12: 9. See also *I-kr-ty* (Urk. IV, 1312: 7–16); Ramesses-Meryamun, which is in the Valley of Cedar (KRI II, 14: no. 35); Ramesses-nakht (P. Anastasi III, vs. 5: 3); Merneptah Hotephirmaat, which is in the district of Pa-Irem (P. Anastasi III, vs. 5: 3–4).
47 For the *dmi*-bases erected along the Ways of Horus, see KRI I, 7: 6; 8: 2, 5.
48 In another of Ramesses III’s reliefs, however, the two *dmiw* are portrayed as single-tiered structures (see figure 62), like the majority of the non-*dmi* erected along the Ways of Horus.
served as population centers, but it cannot provide any other commonality of structure. While the $\textit{mnww/dmiw}$ of Libya and Nubia were indeed walled towns, absolutely none of the Egyptian $\textit{dmiw}$ excavated in Canaan possessed fortifications. These northern bases have been referred to in this work as “administrative headquarters” or “residencies” because the settlements generally consisted of a single structure around which clustered outbuildings, granaries, dwellings, and occasionally a modest temple. Such unwalled enclaves are predominantly known from the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties, although it would appear that similar Egyptian garrison bases had been established in Canaanite buildings during the Eighteenth Dynasty.

The Canaanite $\textit{dmi}$-bases known from the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties would have been extremely easy to overpower, as the main buildings are comparatively small (ranging from only 150 to 800 m$^2$ in area) with outer walls that were generally around 2 m thick. It is thus notable that almost all these headquarters suffered destruction at the main crisis points in Egyptian power (i.e., at the end of the Nineteenth Dynasty and in the mid-Twentieth Dynasty). The fact that these bases lasted for so long without suffering destruction, however, must be attributed to the relatively pacified state of the core of Egypt’s northern empire.

Where it is possible to ascertain, $\textit{dmi}$-bases in Syria-Palestine were overseen by troop commanders ($\textit{hry pdt}$), who also served as overseers of garrison troops ($\textit{imy-r iw’yt}$). This is the same rank of military official as was stationed in the Libyan $\textit{mnww}$-fortresses, the bases along the Ways of Horus, and from which the overseers of $\textit{htm}$-fortresses were most frequently recruited. The Amarna letters too indicate that the Egyptian governors at that time were troop commanders (EA 107: 14–15; 171: 15–16) and fanbearers (EA 106: 38).

Interestingly, fanbearers on the king’s right ($\textit{t3y hw lr wmm n nsu}$) appear also to have occupied the headquarters at Ashdod and Aphek.

49 See chapter four for an in-depth discussion concerning the Egyptian government’s co-option of local buildings.

50 See P. Anastasi III, vs. 6: 2, 9; 5: 6; Schulman 1964a: 51; and the discussion in chapter five.

51 See chapter five. As discussed in chapter six, the commander of Beth Shan in the Twentieth Dynasty had a father who was also a fanbearer on the king’s right and who may have served as commandant at Beth Shan before him.
The inhabitants of dmi-bases in Syria-Palestine seem to have been of both Egyptian and Canaanite ethnicity, and numerous inscriptions suggest that Canaanites often served in Egyptian garrisons. While there is evidence that Egyptians worshipped Canaanite deities as well as their own while stationed abroad, it is notable that in the Twentieth Dynasty the Egyptians had established a temple to Amun in Gaza and possibly as many as eight others in Syria-Palestine. Further, as discussed in chapter six, archaeological evidence suggests that patterns of taxation may have been altered in the Twentieth Dynasty so that Canaanites specifically brought their taxes to Egyptian-backed temples and offered a token of their goods to the patron deity in the process. If this reconstruction bears merit, it is perhaps not coincidental that shortly following this administrative shift, Egyptian governance in Canaan was rejected for the last time.

*Egyptian dmiw erected outside of the Nile Valley served as population centers and administrative headquarters but are not otherwise unified in any precise structural or functional sense.*

**MKDR or MKTR**

The word *mkdr*, or migdol, is a Semitic term meaning “tower” or “fort” that the Egyptians adopted in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties to designate certain fortified structures. In the first millennium, it would also become incorporated into the name of some Delta towns, perhaps signifying that these had been founded in an effort to further populate Egypt’s border zones. As far as can be determined from an examination of the evidence, however, migdols had a very limited distribution in the New Kingdom. Outside of Egypt itself they are only found in the northern Sinai.

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52 See, for example, Taanach letters 5 and 6, discussed in chapter three; the many examples of Canaanite personnel resident at Egyptian bases in the Amarna letters, discussed in chapter four; P. Anastasi III, vs. 6: 1–5: 9.
53 Goedicke and Wente 1962: pl. 93; see also the steles dedicated to Mekal and Anat discovered at Beth Shan and discussed in chapters four and five.
56 See the P. Cairo 31169, recto, col. 3, nos. 20–23; Gardiner 1920: 108.
One or possibly two *mkdr*-forts were situated along the Ways of Horus. Textual evidence indicates that at least one of these was staffed by a troop commander (*ḥry pdt*). Further, Seti’s Karnak relief represents this migdol—like the other non-*dmỉ* forts—as a walled emplacement of relatively modest size and simple structure (see figure 31). Ramesses III portrayed a migdol in a similar fashion on a relief that detailed the aftermath of his naval victory against the Sea People (see figure 55). There is reason to believe, however, that this particular building, like the similarly structured high gate at Medinet Habu, was primarily ceremonial in nature.

As discussed in chapter five, it is notable that the single-tiered, non-*dmỉ* forts depicted along the Ways of Horus in Seti’s relief were designated by a variety of different terms, despite the fact that they all apparently served the same function and were structurally similar. It has been noted that the terms employed, namely *mktr*, *nḥtw*, and *ḥmn*, were all newly applied to forts outside of Egypt’s borders in the Nineteenth Dynasty and that they may therefore not have carried the same long-standing connotations of a functional or structural nature as did the terms utilized in the Eighteenth Dynasty (*ḥtm* and *mmnw*). It was further suggested that the scribes employed these terms, unburdened as they were by strict definitions, as an administrative tool to provide variation among the names of structures that were otherwise difficult to differentiate from one another.

It is unfortunately impossible to determine which if any of these words the Egyptians would have designated as the single unifying term that described all of the non-*dmỉ* forts erected along the Ways of Horus. Given the fact that functional migdols are only securely attested along the northern Sinai, however—whereas both *nḥtw* and *ḥmn* referred to types of structures found elsewhere as well—it is fitting to describe the two archaeologically attested forts along the Ways of Horus under the category of migdol. Whether or not this term was indeed a generic signifier that encompassed all the forts, however, is unknown.

57 KRI I, 8: 2; 10: 1; KRI II, 826: 2. The reference to the troop commander(s) stationed at the Migdol of Seti Merneptah is found in P. Anastasi V, 19: 2–3; 19: 6–20: 3.
58 KRI V, 33: 16; Medinet Habu I, pl. 42.
59 See the discussion in chapter six.
The survey of the north Sinai undertaken by Ben Gurion University in the 1970s and 1980s identified two compounds that appear to correspond to the type of structure depicted in Seti’s relief. Both Bir el-‘Abd and Haruba site A–289 were square forts of between 1,600 and 2,500 m² in size. Each possessed an enclosure wall of 3–4 m in width that defined an area in which a limited central space was surrounded by numerous small administrative, domestic, and industrial buildings.

Bir el-‘Abd is particularly remarkable for its possession of both an associated reservoir, like those depicted in Seti’s relief, and a series of silos capable of storing 40 tons of grain if all were filled to capacity. It is significant that, unlike the dmi-bases or administrative headquarters situated in Syria-Palestine, the ceramic assemblages of these forts were predominantly Egyptian in style. Canaanite forms were in fact mainly limited to cooking wares, perhaps indicating that the authorities commonly hired locals as domestic servants in these bases.

In terms of the historical trajectory of these compounds, it is certainly of interest that Bir el-‘Abd lay abandoned in the Twentieth Dynasty, while Haruba site A–289 was allowed to deteriorate significantly before its final destruction sometime around the mid-twelfth century. If the neglect of these forts in the Twentieth Dynasty indicates that the majority of the other installations erected along the Ways of Horus were treated in a similar fashion, this has important ramifications. Without protected wells and staggered food depots, it would have been substantially more difficult for the Egyptians to mount armed campaigns into Syria-Palestine. It is difficult to determine, however, whether the bases were abandoned because the Twentieth Dynasty pharaohs had largely ceased campaigning abroad or whether neglect and damage to these structures rendered subsequent campaigning dauntingly difficult.

In chapter six it was suggested that the bases might even have been abandoned in the Twentieth Dynasty, rather ironically, to help safeguard Egypt’s borders. While the garrisons stationed at the forts were apparently a match for small bands of bedouin or fleeing fugitives, they would have been unable to hold out for long against a

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60 Water sources along the Ways of Horus are also mentioned in a variety of other sources; see P. Anastasi I, 27: 2–4; KRI II, 826: 2–5; and perhaps P. Harris I, 77: 6–8.
61 These forts were actively involved in monitoring and intercepting the progress...
concerted enemy attack. The intensive fortification of the $htmw$ at Tell er-Retabah and Kom el-Quzoum in the Twentieth Dynasty suggests that the Egyptians were perhaps justifiably afraid that their borders could be penetrated by a formidable enemy. Just as the grain stored at these forts facilitated the progress of Egyptian armies eastward across the Sinai, so too, military tacticians must have feared, would such stores have greatly aided the speed and comfort of a westward-bound enemy that had been powerful enough to gain access to them.

The Egyptians appear to have utilized the word $mkdr$, or migdol, rather like their Canaanite counterparts, to indicate a fortified structure of relatively modest proportions. The limited use of this term, however, renders it unclear whether the Egyptians themselves adhered to a more precise definition.

$NTW$

The architectural term $nhtw$ almost certainly was derived from the Egyptian word for strength ($nhtw$), and thus it is generally—and probably correctly—translated as “stronghold.”62 Like the migdols, however, $nhtw$-strongholds are only securely attested outside of Egypt’s borders along the Ways of Horus. On this stretch of coastal highway it appears that at least three such installations were erected.63 As discussed above, however, the deliberate employment of numerous terms to designate structurally similar forts that served identical functions means that it is impossible to know whether the buildings themselves were truly $nhtw$-strongholds, or whether—as a term with connotations of strength and fortification—the $nhtw$-stronghold was a close enough synonym for a different architectural type (the $mkdr$ perhaps) to be employed for variation’s sake.

In the Eighteenth, Nineteenth, and Twentieth Dynasties, Egyptian rulers constructed $nhtw$-strongholds in order to house populations of foreigners.64 While it is not clear in all cases exactly where these

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63 KRI I, 7: 5; 8: 3; P. Anastasi I, 27: 5; KRI II, 826: 5.
nḥtw were located, in the instances where it is possible to tell definitively, they are found in Egypt itself. Thutmose III settled a population of foreigners in a nḥtw-stronghold in Egypt,65 and in the reign of Ramesses III prisoners were deliberately placed in Egyptian nḥtw so that they would “hear the speech of the (Egyptian) people (be)fore following the king. He made a reversion of their speech, re[ver]sing their tongues that they might go upon the road, which (they) had not descended (before).”66 Other sources imply that prisoners were installed in nḥtw only after they had been brought to Egypt.67

Twentieth Dynasty texts betray the presence of military colonies in Middle Egypt, and one particular nḥtw near the Faiyum is known to have housed Sherden warriors.68 Texts such as these further the likelihood that the nḥtw in which foreign prisoners of war were kept were usually situated in Egypt rather than in frontier zones abroad. It is quite unfortunate, then, that to date no such installation has been knowingly excavated in the Nile Valley.

The term nḥtw designates a relatively modest fortified stronghold. Outside of Egypt’s borders, nḥtw are only securely attested along the Ways of Horus. Within the country, however, these structures housed assemblages of foreigners who had been earmarked for service to the state.

B N

Of the vocabulary that the New Kingdom Egyptians employed with reference to military installations, bḥn is perhaps the least understood. Although the term seems to have a Hebrew cognate that indicates a fortified structure,69 in Egyptian texts the word bḥn most often refers to a villa or an estate that belonged to a noble or a king. It is possible, then, that its appearance in Seti’s Karnak relief should be interpreted as akin to the use of the term for dwelling (ʾt) in the

65 Urk. IV, 690: 2–5.
67 P. Harris I, 76: 7–9; 77: 3–6.
68 KRI V, 270: 11–12. For military colonies generally, see Sauneron and Yoyotte 1950: 67–70; Grandet 1994b: 203–204; and the discussion in chapter six.
formal name of another fort along the Ways of Horus.\textsuperscript{70} According to such a view, although incorporated into the name of a fort, the term \textit{bhn} would have borne no specific military connotation of its own. Indeed, this would be a particularly attractive option were it not for the fact that a \textit{bhn} of Merneptah Hotephirmaat had been erected in the otherwise unknown Syro-Palestinian locality of \textit{d-rrr-m}.\textsuperscript{71} As this structure has not been discovered on the ground, however, it offers little help in determining what exactly a \textit{bhn} erected outside of Egypt would have looked like.\textsuperscript{72}

There are two further instances of the word \textit{bhn} that are of interest in this context. The first is the inscription of an overseer of a \textit{htm}-fortress in the reign of Ramesses I who dedicated a large parcel of land to Amun of the \textit{bhn}.\textsuperscript{73} Further, in an inscription at Medinet Habu, Ramesses III records having established \textit{bhnw} in Amun’s name in Egypt, Syria-Palestine, and Nubia.\textsuperscript{74} Grandet has equated this inscription with the record in P. Harris I that notes the donation of towns (\textit{dmw}) in Egypt, Syria-Palestine, and Nubia to Amun.\textsuperscript{75} Haring, however, takes the view that the \textit{bhnw} should instead be interpreted as farms.\textsuperscript{76} This latter suggestion, while it would very aptly fit the fields dedicated to Amun of the \textit{bhn}, would not work well in the context of the \textit{bhn} established on the Ways of Horus.

A middle ground, perhaps, is to view the \textit{bhn} as an estate, as it is employed in Egyptian texts. Such an interpretation suggests the presence of a large and important building, associated structures, and a surrounding cultivated area. In the case of the \textit{bhn} on the Ways of Horus, the emphasis may have been upon the compound rather than the estate as a whole, while with regard to the donation of \textit{bhnw} to Amun, the emphasis may have been upon the land itself rather than the main building with which it was associated. Finally,

\textsuperscript{70} For the \textit{bhn} along the Ways of Horus, see KRI I, 7: 5. For the \textit{ht} along the Ways of Horus, see KRI I, 10: 1; P. Anastasi I, 27: 2–4; P. Anastasi V, 24: 6–25: 1.
\textsuperscript{71} P. Anastasi III, vs. 5: 1–2.
\textsuperscript{72} One unique example of a \textit{bhn} established in Egypt was located just north of the Ramesseum and termed “the \textit{bhn} of the Syro-Palestinians” (P3 \textit{bhn n n3 hzw}; Berlandini 1979: 265, n. 1). This enclave may have been similar to the settlement of prisoners from Gezer that Thutmose IV established in the vicinity of his mortuary temple (Urk. IV, 1556: 10–11).
\textsuperscript{73} KRI I, 4: 2–3.
\textsuperscript{74} KRI V, 117: 13–14.
\textsuperscript{76} Haring 1997: 47, n. 2, 48–49, 189, n. 5, 201, 205, 313.
the $bhn$ of Merneptah Hotephirmaat in $d$-$r$-$r$-$m$ might be envisioned as resembling the type of administrative headquarters erected in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. Namely, the $bhn$ may have consisted of a modified center-hall house or other such elite dwelling, associated outbuildings, workshops, and the surrounding fields from which the base was supported.

$bhnw$ located outside of Egypt’s borders may have constituted imperial estates.

**SGR**

The term $sgr$ is a borrowing from the Akkadian word $segôr$, which means “enclosure.” It is attested, however, in only one source that designates a structure outside of the Nile Valley. In this text, it is used with reference to Tjeku, a base otherwise known as a $htm$-fortress. Given the limited attestation of this word and its application to a $htm$-fortress, it may be that $sgr$ is another example of a foreign word that could be employed as a generic synonym for “fortified structure” but did not otherwise possess a specific definition of its own.

No definition more precise than the highly generic “fortress” is possible.

**Final thoughts**

From this work, it can be seen that the Egyptians employed four basic varieties of military base to help control and protect their borders and sovereign territories: border-fortresses, fortress-towns, forts, and administrative headquarters.

**The border-fortress**

At the most accessible points of entry into the Nile Valley, the Egyptians erected border-fortresses ($htmw$). These installations could

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77 Translations of $sgr$ include “secured building” and “fort.” For discussions of the word, see Wb. IV, 324, no. 6; Lesko 1987: 110–111; Hoch 1994: 270; Hoffmeier 1997: 179. For evidence of seven $sgr$-installations in Upper Egypt during the Twentieth Dynasty, see Gardiner 1948a: 35.

78 P. Anastasi V, 19: 7–8. For the designation of Tjeku as a $htm$, see P. Anastasi VI, 53–61.
consist of major fortified towns or relatively small forts, depending on the nature of the environment and the degree of danger posed from beyond the border. The purpose of many of these bases, especially at the very beginning and end of the New Kingdom, almost certainly was to help protect vulnerable areas from outside penetration.

For the majority of the New Kingdom, however, Egypt’s sphere of imperial control provided a buffer zone of many hundreds of kilometers between contested frontiers and the borders of the Nile Valley. A more regular and prosaic purpose of the border-fortresses, then, was to monitor the traffic that moved in or out of Egypt. Thus, the passage of messengers, functionaries, foreign tribesmen, and others was duly recorded in day-books. The surrounding areas were patrolled by desert scouts for signs of fugitives and would-be illegal aliens. Shipments of goods were likewise recorded, perhaps taxed, and sometimes disbursed by the overseers of the htim-fortresses themselves. While the duties of the overseers of the htim-fortresses were primarily administrative, it is still of interest that these men were generally recruited from the military rank of troop commander.

The fortress-town

South of their border, the Egyptians reoccupied and erected fortress-towns (mmnw). The fortress-towns constructed in the Middle Kingdom are notorious for their massive and extremely sophisticated defensive architecture. In the New Kingdom, however, these defenses were generally allowed to deteriorate, and the walls of the new fortress-towns, although undoubtedly sizeable, were relatively simple. Such towns were invariably supplied with a temple at their core, and the character of their settlements appears to have been predominantly civilian, with little or no evidence for a specifically military occupation. Further, where attested, it was mayors and not military officers who served as the highest officials. It would seem, then, that Nubian fortress-towns furthered the goals of the Egyptian government by providing a large settled population that held a strong allegiance both to the Egyptian government and to protecting their own settlement and property from hostile forces.

The Egyptians had long realized that a settled border was a strong border, and the mmnw fortress-towns erected along the coastal road to Libya, and perhaps the western edge of the Nile Delta as well, appear also to have been installed with this adage in mind. Throughout the Eighteenth Dynasty, interactions between the Egyptians and the
Libyans to their west seem to have been predominantly peaceful, or at least relatively limited in scope. The onset of formidable armed incursions at the beginning of the Nineteenth Dynasty, however, prompted Ramesses II to fortify his border. That he chose to employ fortress-towns rather than forts is perhaps a testament to the fertility of certain regions of the western highway as well as to the magnitude of the threat posed by the Libyans themselves. As thousands of westerners are recorded as participants in Nineteenth Dynasty battles, Ramesses must have realized the futility of protecting his coastal highway with anything less than extremely robust population centers.

Although the Libyan *mmnw* were stylistically similar to Nubian fortress-towns, the greater danger they faced is indicated both by their more intensive fortification and by the fact that military officials occupied positions of paramount authority. Further, these fortress-towns served to protect water sources and stockpiles of food from enemy armies. The monitoring of the surrounding desert for signs of trespassers was also evidently a pressing concern. In this manner, the Libyan installations functionally resembled the forts erected along the Ways of Horus, but it was their scalar and structural similarity to Nubian fortress-towns that resulted in their designation as *mmnw* (and occasionally as *dmnw*).

**The fort**

The third major type of Egyptian military installation is thus far geographically limited to the Ways of Horus highway across the northern Sinai. These forts (perhaps generally termed *mkdrw* or *nh*tw) are known from archaeological excavation and pictorial representation to have been squarish installations of some 1,600 to 2,500 m² in area. Their interiors included administrative and domestic structures, as well as a limited plaza area, but their small size necessarily limited the number and scale of the structures erected within their walls. In the vicinity of these forts were granaries and water sources, the latter of which are highlighted in Seti’s battle relief and also in the text of P. Anastasi I. Because of their barren environs, however, these forts would have required that many of their provisions be imported. Likewise, due to their small scale, a determined enemy could have breached their defenses with little difficulty.

Notably, although these forts were inhabited by a troop commander, his garrison, and desert scouts, their main purpose seems to have been to provision armies as they traveled across the Sinai...
at the start or finish of a military campaign. Likewise, they served
to monitor the passage along this highway for signs of illicit travel-
ers and to protect the wells and food stores from bedouin and oth-
ers who might desire access. At the time of their erection in the late
Eighteenth and Nineteenth Dynasties, however, Egypt had little or
nothing to fear from a large-scale invading force like those mounted
by the Libyans in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties. It is
significant, in fact, that by the Twentieth Dynasty, when these instal-
lations might have faced a comparable threat, their impracticality
for defense was realized and they were abandoned.

The administrative headquarters

The last major type of Egyptian base erected on foreign soil was
the administrative headquarters (dmiw and bhnw?), an architectural
category that was apparently limited to the eastern end of the Ways
of Horus and to Syria-Palestine. The Egyptians appear in the
Eighteenth Dynasty to have constructed these unfortified adminis-
trative clusters solely in areas that lacked a suitable preexisting infra-
structure to co-opt (such as Deir el-Balah, perhaps Gaza, and the
newly conquered Tell el-Ajjul). Elsewhere the imperial government
commandeered installations belonging to local officials or ordered
vassals to construct such buildings for them. Given that the bases
were located in Canaanite buildings, then, and were supplied by
taxes levied on the local population, such compounds have remained
for all intents and purposes archaeologically invisible.

In the reign of Horemheb, however, a governmental reform resulted
in the erection of administrative headquarters in Canaan, the core
of Egypt’s northern empire. These bases were built according to
Egyptian design and frequently employed potters and other crafts-
men trained in Egyptian methods of manufacture. The fact that these
administrative headquarters were uniformly unfortified is a testament
to the pacification of the region, resulting from 250 years of Egyptian
rule. Staffed by troop commanders and their garrisons, the new bases
served as centers of tax collection and local administration. Likewise,
as before, troops would almost certainly have been sent out to quell
local conflicts and to mediate internecine disputes. Judging from the
excavations of cemeteries associated with these headquarters—such
as those at Tell el-Far’ah South, Beth Shan, and Tell es-Sa’idiyeh—
there is also a possibility that a portion of the resident Egyptians
may have begun to settle permanently at these bases in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Dynasties.

The northern extremities of Egypt’s empire, namely Lebanon and southern Syria, have not been subjected to the same intensity of archaeological research as has been undertaken in the south. While it is possible that a high density of Egyptian-style administrative headquarters will also be discovered in these areas, then, this is perhaps doubtful. In these patently less secure frontier zones, the Egyptians may simply have continued their former policy of billeting military commanders and garrisons in local buildings, the potential destruction of which represented but a negligible loss to imperial coffers.

**Final thoughts revisited**

It is hoped that this investigation into the varieties of military bases erected at Egypt’s borders and in its foreign territories brings a new body of evidence to bear on discussions of New Kingdom foreign policy. These compounds, after all, represent concrete manifestations of the infrastructure employed by the Egyptians to control and administer their empire. The ever-changing character and distribution of these bases, as charted within the pages of this work, may thus provide a unique blueprint for appreciating the evolution and mechanics of Egypt’s imperial strategy.
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imy-r smt (overseer of horses)
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inw (royal gifts)
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idnw (deputy)
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cpwt nw (royal messenger)

wr n m tw (stronghold)

pdy (administrator)
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kwy (mayor)

hr dj (troop commander)

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